ARMY, FORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS
Prior to the reign of Dost Mahommed the defensive power of Afghanistan
was represented by an association of tribes whose chieftains offered to
the Amir of Kabul, as circumstances dictated, a more or less willing
service. Such a system, while making the promotion of any settled
organisation impossible, was satisfactory only so long as the Amir of
Kabul was able to rely upon the fidelity of the Khans. But in an order
of government, in which priority of place was secured by dint of might,
each chief, as opportunity offered, rose to proclaim his independence
of Kabul. By reason of these constant irruptions of disaffection among
the tribes composing the confederacy, few rulers were in a better
position than Dost Mahommed to realise the disabilities of such a
military system.
The forces over which he exerted complete control were confined to the
Kabul territory, although in addition he exercised nominal jurisdiction
over the tribal levies of the khanates of Kandahar and Herat. These
divisions of the available forces presented the following effective
establishment:
_Kabul Territory._ _Kandahar Territory._ _Herat Territory._
Mounted 21,000 12,000 12,000
Dismounted 10,000 6,000 10,000
------ ------ ------
Total 31,000 18,000 22,000
At the moment the fighting machine in Afghanistan was composed of
those tribal chiefs, district land-owners and priests whose influence
was sufficient to regulate the movement of any particular number of
followers. At the first news of war the leaders of these several
contingents hurried with their following to some central camp, the
united strength constituting the army of the district ruler, although
the component units of such a force owned allegiance to individual
district chiefs rather than to any supreme authority. In addition to
this combative force, there was usually another body which, although
not drawn from the best material and less numerous, was possessed of
greater experience than the main following. Composed of men who were
attached to no individual leader, or made up of the numbers of some
border ruffian, these auxiliaries participated in the operations for
the purposes of loot and from pure love of war and bloodshed. In each
case their weapons were of the crudest variety; very frequently the
dismounted forces were armed solely with swords, spears and shields,
the horsemen carrying matchlocks, flintlocks or ancient pistols. Every
one was compelled to furnish his own weapons, the mounted men being
responsible for their horses. The militia held the lands on condition
of service and were exempt from all taxes on land except the tithe. The
men were born fighters and each, so soon as he could wield a spear or
manage a fire-arm, attached himself to some district chief. No regular
rate of pay was made by the leader to his following who, if they failed
to live upon their plunder, were indemnified by small grants of land,
by the right of pasturage and by permission to adopt a trade. Upon
the part of the chief, too, as between himself and the Khan of the
territory, the scale of remuneration was never fixed, the sum varying
according to his local influence and the number of men he could bring
into the field. This condition of affairs, typical of most Asiatic
hordes at the time, had always prevailed in Afghanistan. The success
against other native armies of such a system, wherein no precautions
were observed and no knowledge of military operations was required,
was due to the great _élan_ in attack of the Afghans and to their
undoubted courage, more than to any preconceived notion of the art of
war.
[Illustration: TYPICAL AFGHAN FORTRESS]
In addition to the territories of Kandahar and Herat there was the
state of Balkh, allied with but independent of Kabul and invested
in Mahommed Afzul Khan. The army of Balkh was commanded by General
Shir Mahommed Khan, an officer of the Anglo-Indian army of the name
of Campbell, who had been captured by Dost Mahommed when he had
defeated Shah Shujah at the battle of Kandahar. The influence of this
man who, professing the Mahommedan faith, rose to the position of
Commander-in-Chief of the Balkh forces, was to become a determining
factor in the evolution of the army of Afghanistan from its tribal
state. Love of war was always more pronounced in the Afghan tribes than
among other Eastern races; and, as the profession of arms to them was
in the nature of a trade, expectations of a quick response of course
prompted the suggestions which Lieutenant Campbell made to the Amir of
Balkh. While every credit must be given to the wisdom and foresight
of Mahommed Afzul Khan, there is no doubt that the beginnings of the
present military system of Afghanistan were laid by this adventurous
Englishman. Moreover, it was due to the influence which Campbell
exercised over Abdur Rahman, the son of Mahommed Afzul Khan, which
caused the former to become an ardent apostle of reform in military
matters when he succeeded to the throne.
At the time of the elevation of Campbell to the supreme command of
the army of Balkh, the forces in the territory were divided between a
combined permanently enlisted body and a militia derived from Uzbeg,
Durani and Kabuli tribes. It numbered 29,500 men comprising:
_Mounted._ _Dismounted._ _Militia._
7,000 7,500 15,000
This force of fighting men, ill-organised and untutored, was
deficient in central control, its condition not unnaturally
reflecting the disorder actually inherent in the system. Under
Campbell’s administration, the masses of tribal levies were reduced
to an organised basis which contained the elements of the present
establishment. The mounted and dismounted sections were formed into
cavalry and infantry regiments; while the eighty guns, which were
included in the Balkh army, were established by batteries and an
elementary knowledge of the principles of drill and tactics imparted to
the troops.
In his task of reform Campbell received every encouragement. Although
Dost Mahommed himself made no alteration in the Kabul district, he
watched with interest the work of reorganisation. Unfortunately,
Campbell died before any great progress could be made, his demise
being followed within a short space by that of Dost Mahommed in 1863
and Mahommed Afzul Khan in 1867. Nevertheless his influence was
abiding, since the spectacle presented by the Balkh forces prompted
Shir Ali to adopt an Anglo-Indian model as the working basis for his
reorganisation of the Kabul army. In the sixteen years of his reign,
between 1863-1879, he continued to introduce improvements founded upon
Anglo-Indian drill-books, which he had had translated into Persian
and Pushtu. Batteries of field and mountain artillery, and regiments
of horse and foot were raised; territorial divisions were formed
upon paper and field columns, whose brigade and regimental units
corresponded with the Anglo-Indian system, were created. In actual
practice these troops were never brigaded together, and officers and
men alike were ignorant of parade and musketry exercises. Nevertheless,
if their notions of drill were vague, their spirits and their carriage
were not unmartial. In detail, and under a general distribution of the
regular forces, troops were located--
At Kabul, two regiments of infantry, eighteen field-pieces, two
heavy guns and one mortar.
At Balkh, three regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry
and sixteen field guns.
At Bamian, one regiment of infantry with two mountain guns.
In the Kohistan, one regiment of infantry, two field and two
mountain guns.
At Farah, one regiment of infantry and four field guns.
At Girishk, one regiment of infantry and four field guns.
At Ghazni, one regiment of infantry and four field guns.
At Akcha, one regiment of infantry and two field guns.
At Kelat-i-Ghilzai, one regiment of infantry, three mountain and
one field gun.
At Kandahar, three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, two
heavy guns, two mountain guns and twelve field guns.
In the Zamindawar, one regiment of infantry and four field guns.
The nominal strength of each infantry regiment was 800 men, although
daily parade seldom mustered more than 600 men. The state of the
cavalry regiments was 300 men, the complete return of the regular
forces of Afghanistan at this epoch being:
_Numbers._ _Average._ _Total._ _Artillery._
16 Regiments of Infantry 800 12,800
3 ” Cavalry 300 900
Field guns 67
Mountain guns 9
Heavy guns 4
Mortar 1
------ --
Total 13,700 81
[Illustration: PICKET OF THE HOUSEHOLD TROOPS]
The system of recruiting for these regiments was the worst conceivable.
Neither conscription nor free enlistment, it was little better than
the forcible seizure of the able-bodied in each district, the men
being compelled to serve on pain of the imprisonment and utter
ruin of their families. The pay of the infantry was nominally five
rupees a month, with ten rupees in each year deducted for clothing and
accoutrements. The distribution of the remainder was very irregular and
not unusually paid in grain, or credited to their families at home on
account of local taxes. Consequently the soldier, often finding himself
in his quarters without the means of purchasing the common necessaries
of life, was driven to recoup his finances by highway robbery, a
delinquency which the officers punished--by sharing in the spoil.
[Illustration: TROOP OF CAVALRY]
These troops were accoutred with the discarded flint muskets, swords,
belts and bayonets of the British forces in India, or a Kabul imitation
of these weapons. Certain companies were provided with two-grooved
rifles, constructed from models carried off by deserters from some
one or other of our frontier regiments. The uniforms were no less
abominable, not infrequently representing purchases of condemned stores
from our frontier stations which had been disposed of at an auction.
The clothing was invariably procured from these markets; and, as a
consequence, native officers of all grades, even in the same regiment,
might have been seen in every imaginable British habiliment, from a
naval jacket to a whipper’s-in hunting coat, including the full dress
of a general and the round beaver hat of a civilian. British kit was
very popular, and its possession conferred exceptional distinction upon
the lucky owner.
Of the horse it is only possible to say that in all respects they were
a bad imitation of the Indian light cavalry, reproducing even their
Hussar saddles and steel scabbards. Their appointments, equally with
the infantry, were almost hopeless and their drill quite unsuited to
their order. Foot drill was the conventional exercise; and, since
all horses were sent out to graze during the summer months, mounted
drill was practised only during the cold weather, when through lack of
food the animals were too poor in condition to be put through their
facings. The horses were undersized and generally procured from the
Turcoman steppes, but man and beast were equally valueless. No less
unsatisfactory were the Afghan artillery, although, from the numerical
strength of the Amir’s ordnance, a very false idea might be formed of
the actual value of his artillery. Many of the guns were useless; for
others there was no ammunition; while the equipment and carriages of
the field guns were of the most obsolete pattern.
Besides these so-called troops, the Amir had always available the
_jezailchis_, who were formerly the only infantry in the country. They
were light troops, armed with matchlock and jezail, accustomed to hill
warfare and perhaps as good skirmishers as were to be found at this
time in Asia. Experience had taught them to be judges of ground and
distance, while instinct made them chary of ambush. These were of two
classes. The one class was in the service of the Amir, on a nominal
salary of five rupees per mensem, which was paid in grain. These
men were armed by the State and mustered some 3500 men, employed in
holding forts and posts throughout the country. They were commanded by
Sadbashis and Dahbashis, captains of hundreds and heads over tens, who
received a proportionately higher rate of pay. The other class, the
immediate following of the different chiefs, may be considered as a
local militia. They were assigned rent-free a piece of land in lieu of
pay; and, as a rule, these several bodies of militia numbered in each
instance between 1000 and 1500 men.
The Irregular Afghan Horse, as they existed at this time, are even more
difficult than the _jezailchis_ to compute. They were not particularly
numerous, although Kandahar and its dependencies could furnish 8000;
Ghazni, 5000; Kabul, including Jelalabad, Logar and the Koh-i-Daman,
15,000; while Balkh, with its Uzbeg population, returned 10,000. These
men were the equal of any undisciplined horsemen in Asia; mounted upon
small but wiry horses, carrying a perfect arsenal of weapons, among
which shield, spear, matchlock, sword, pistol and knife were prominent,
they were always rough and invariably ready for the field. Capable of
undergoing great fatigue and exceedingly harassing to a flying foe,
they were, when led by a determined chief, anything but contemptible in
a _mêlée_.
[Illustration: MEN OF THE AMIR’S BODYGUARD]
The establishment of the regular and auxiliary forces, as they existed
at this date, boasted no commissariat department. In districts, where
the revenue was paid in grain, a certain proportion was allotted to
each fort; if the troops were on the march, orders upon the headmen of
the various villages were issued, the villages being credited with the
amount of grain, etc., supplied when the revenue came to be collected.
Upon any occasion where the whole available force was collected _en
masse_, each district had to furnish a certain amount of grain as
well as its fighting contingent, the daily ration of every man being
estimated at one seer of flour. So long as this supply lasted the men
considered themselves bound to remain with their chiefs; but the moment
that the issue ceased there was a general dissolution of the forces.
Similarly, there was no settled transport system nor ordnance supply,
arrangements, haphazard in the extreme, rising as occasion required. In
many respects, the changing conditions of military life, in the absence
of specific reforms, brought no remedy of abuses which, existing
under Dost Mahommed, found opportunity for increased activity in the
new order of affairs. The inevitable break-down occurred; and at the
first tests, imposed by the actions at Peiwar Kotal and Ali Masjid,
the entire machine went to pieces. Later, at Charasiab and Ahmad Khel,
the Afghan array had returned to its own style of fighting and, under
tribal leaders, ill-disciplined, yet courageous and determined, fought
valiantly and well.
In spite of the excellent beginnings which had been made by Shir
Ali, the condition of the army at the time of his accession placed a
very heavy burden upon the shoulders of Abdur Rahman. Handicapped by
internal dissensions, it was not until he had established as paramount
his authority over the tribes that he was able to turn attention to the
crude structure which had been built by his predecessor. Elaborating
the handiwork of Shir Ali by many personal touches, he gradually shaped
the whole system to his own mould. To every regiment of cavalry and
infantry he attached complementary engineer, medical and commissariat
details, so that each unit was complete in itself and independent
of its brigade. In a measure and as the outcome of this initiative
Abdur Rahman became the actual founder of the army of Afghanistan.
Recognising the many deficiencies in the military system, he increased
its potential significance by substituting for the old feudal levies
one central army, paid, created and controlled directly by himself.
With implacable severity he chastised his enemies, breaking up their
powers of resistance and developing his own position, until the
foundations of his earlier work became the permanent supports to a
military autocracy. Regiment after regiment was added to the permanent
strength of his military establishment as opportunity offered; while,
in addition, 50,000 pack-mules and pack-ponies were set aside as a park
of transport, and immense reserves of grain were stored in readiness
at Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. Monthly pay-sheets were drawn up, by
which generals of the first class received six hundred Kabuli rupees
monthly, a brigadier two hundred and fifty, a colonel of cavalry two
hundred, a major one hundred and twenty, captains of cavalry eighty, of
infantry and artillery thirty, down to corporals of foot, who received
ten rupees. The rank and file were paid partly in kind, a trooper
getting sixteen rupees in cash and four rupees’ worth of grain, a
private of foot five rupees in cash and three rupees’ worth of grain.
Every regiment was to have a chaplain (_mullah_), a physician (_hakim_)
and a surgeon (_yarrah_). To some extent bribery and corruption were
suppressed. A corps of signallers was formed and a body of sappers
and miners instructed in the art of entrenchment, bridge-building
and road-making. Further, the gunners were taught the technique of
their _matériel_, while the Kabul regiments were put through courses
of musketry and the elemental mysteries of tactics and strategy were
disclosed to their officers.
[Illustration: INFANTRY IN PARADE STATE]
So much was attempted by Abdur Rahman that he well may be forgiven for
leaving to his successor execution of detail. Within a few months of
his accession the strength of the army in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and
beyond the Hindu Kush consisted of 58,740 men with 182 guns.
REGULARS.
_Cavalry._ _Infantry._ _Artillery._ _Guns._
9750 30,890 1600 182
IRREGULARS.
_Tribal foot._ _Tribal horse._ _Total._
9000 7500 58,740
Weak in artillery--there being few trained gunners--the cannon,
partly of English, partly of native manufacture and of various ages
and patterns, were the time-honoured relics of Dost Mahommed and Shir
Ali. The infantry rifles of the regulars also were of different makes,
varying from the old two-grooved Brunswick to the Martini-Henry.
The tribal forces were largely armed with matchlocks. Assisted by
the subsidies which he received from the Government of India, Abdur
Rahman swept away the rubbish and collected an immense stock of
modern ordnance supplies. Over and above the quantity held against
the immediate mobilisation of the standing forces, by importation and
manufacture he piled up a vast reserve of rifles, field-pieces and
guns of large calibre with their requisite ammunition, doubtless very
varied in their character and including every sort of pattern from
Krupp field-pieces to Maxim, Nordenfeldt and Hotchkiss quick-firers.
For this purpose he erected in Kabul itself the necessary works,
imparting to the position of Afghanistan by these means and for the
first time in its history some element of security, and creating an
army which required only to be supervised with the same watchfulness
by his successor to attain ultimately as near to perfection as any
purely native organisation can arrive. Ordnance factories--with a
weekly output of two guns, one hundred and seventy-five rifles and a
varying quantity of small arms ammunition--workshops, and an arsenal
existing to-day in Kabul prove the inflexible determination of his
plans. In furtherance of them, it was his idea to fashion an army
which, apportioned between regulars and tribal levies, would number
1,000,000 men. There was to be a permanent regular force of 300,000
men, with an established ammunition reserve of 500 rounds to each
field-piece and 5000 rounds to every rifle. Moreover, many months
before his death the ordnance supplies, amassed in Kabul, sufficed for
a very large proportion of such a force, at the same time exceeding
the amount necessary for the requirements of the existing field and
garrison forces. Had Abdur Rahman only survived a few years longer,
it is indisputable that a force of a million fighting men, more or
less trained but at least efficiently armed, would have been secured,
although it may be doubted whether, save under the press of dire
necessity, he would have ventured to issue weapons to them or to place
more than a quarter of this number actually in the field.
At his demise the numbers of the forces available were considerably
below the million standard. At that time the peace strength of the
regular army was estimated at 150,000 men, distributed between the
military centres of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jelalabad,
Asmai, the region of the Upper Oxus, and in detachments on frontier
duty along the Russo-Afghan, Perso-Afghan and Indo-Afghan boundaries.
This force was composed as follows:
_Numbers._ _Average._ _Total._
80 Regiments of Infantry 700 56,000
40 Regiments of Cavalry 400 16,000
100 Batteries ⎨ 6 guns⎬ 10,000
⎩100 men⎭
Royal Bodyguard:
4 Regiments of Infantry 1,000 4,000
3 Regiments of Cavalry 800 2,400
Supplementary:
Police 30,000
Permanent Tribal Auxiliaries:
Unmounted 20,000⎬ 30,000
Mounted 10,000⎭
The many flaws in the system which Abdur Rahman had created were
emphasised at his death, in part by the indifference of Habib Ullah to
matters military, but in the main by organic difficulties emanating
from reactionary influences in the environment of the throne. Broadly
speaking, the army and administration of Afghanistan were too
centralised to be continuous unless the reins of government had passed
into the hands of a man as fearless and able as Abdur Rahman was. Habib
Ullah is a man of different mould; and as a consequence on the death of
Abdur Rahman the absolutism of his rule suffered material contraction.
It is to be regretted that the late Amir, while evolving out of a
heterogeneous collection of warring tribes a settled and independent
country, failed to bequeath to his son any portion of his own singular
abilities. As a consequence, the order of government in Kabul is
neither so unquestioned nor substantial as it was, for the men whose
services assisted Abdur Rahman to effect his life’s work have dropped
out--from death or through inability to serve Habib Ullah. Faults,
inherent in the character of the Afghans and particularly prominent
in the present Amir, have thus measured the success which befel Abdur
Rahman by the span of that ruler’s life, until it is really but little
more than the shell of the former edifice which now remains.
[Illustration: PATROL OF HOUSEHOLD TROOPS]
Deprived of the inspiring genius of Abdur Rahman, within the five
years which have elapsed since his death there is every ground to
believe that the army has fallen away in efficiency as well as in
numbers, and that the work of reorganisation largely requires to be
repeated. In a measure, the Afghans retain at the present time their
old characteristics--their love of their own country and their hatred
of alien races; but, through lapse of time and their intercourse on the
one hand with the Russians and in the other direction with India, they
are liable to flock to the standard of the Amir less than they were. It
must not be forgotten that to-day Afghanistan reproduces the condition
of a settled country, possessing a population much more peaceful than
were the inhabitants a generation ago. Moreover through the penetrating
associations of prosperity and through many years of peace the warlike
instincts of the tribes have become numbed, while their martial ardour
has evaporated, requiring constant amelioration of the conditions of
service by way of stimulating their military zeal. Increases of pay
and more generous rations have been conceded in the past and, lately,
attempts have been made to soothe the susceptibilities of the officers.
Habib Ullah has ordained that for the future promotions will go by
seniority, although the system of selection, where it is concerned with
posts which are hereditary in families connected with the Royal House,
will not be altered. As a sop to the feelings of the rank and file the
class-company system is to be enforced, the men of the different tribes
being incorporated regimentally under their own tribal leaders. In this
direction, too, it is of interest to note that every cantonment will
be provided with a garrison mullah who, on Fridays, will read prayers
before the assembled troops and address them on Saints’ Days, while
teachers in religious instruction are to be attached to each regimental
company.
Lately, Habib Ullah has shown signs of awakening to the responsibilities
of his position; and it is to be hoped that, under pressure from
recent political circumstances, he may abandon the foolish indulgence
to which hitherto he has been a slave. Indications of this spirit are
not very pronounced, but their manifestation does not come a moment
too soon. In the main they are associated with military matters,
although certain measures deal exclusively with the administration.
Among the former, orders have been given to the leather factories in
Kabul to manufacture 300,000 sets of infantry equipment and an agent
has been despatched to India to purchase gear for the mounted branches
of the service. At best these activities are no promise of an abiding
interest in his service and, indeed, they are discounted by his
refusal to hearken to advice. At the present time the army of
Afghanistan, in its existing condition, admittedly possesses in a high
degree the qualities of endurance, courage and mobility; but, in spite
of its modern guise, it lacks discipline and cohesion and, as a
fighting machine, is liable upon these grounds to be thrown quickly
out of gear. Under these circumstances the observation may perhaps be
hazarded that it would be as well before equipping it with first-class
material to make sure that the men were sufficiently organised to
understand its use. At present modern weapons are unknown to the great
bulk of the forces of Afghanistan; and it cannot be denied that the
absence of this quality makes it more of a menace to itself than to an
enemy. Hitherto, there has been greater variety than method in the
Afghan military equipment, irregularity of pattern distinguishing
alike rifle, field-piece and ammunition, while the education of the
officers and the training of the men has been neglected.
The continuation of these imperfections is due primarily to the
inability of the Amir of Afghanistan to rely upon the loyalty of his
troops. At the same time, their existence appertains to every Oriental
army which is placed solely in native custody. They have always been
a feature of the Afghan service. The condition of the garrison in the
capital perhaps reveals some little superiority over those which are
placed further afield, but it can be affirmed quite truly that the
military qualities of Afghanistan proceed entirely from the inborn
fanaticism of its people and not from the practical organisation
of its active state. Nevertheless under conditions applicable to
mountain warfare the Afghan army could become an invaluable auxiliary;
although its capacity, as well as its determination, to offer any
prolonged resistance are matters of doubt. Defects could be removed
by re-organisation; good qualities enhanced by careful training under
British officers or by the despatch of selected Afghan officers and men
for training with our own troops.
In spite of the obduracy of Habib Ullah over this point, he has made
known his intention of falling back upon the support of the Indian
Government when his own arms have been defeated. This contingency,
which is liable to arise at the outset of a war with any foreign power,
imposes upon the Government of India a thankless burden, in no way
lessened by the proposal of the Amir to create in Kabul an Afghan Staff
College, and the determination of the Imperial Government to avoid
insistence upon what is, by no means, an unreasonable precaution. As
matters rest at present unless change is introduced the preposterous
conceit, which distinguishes the Afghans, is destined to receive an
unwelcome shock. Nevertheless the Amir cannot be persuaded to place his
military affairs in the hands of the Indian Government; since, now that
the Japanese have beaten the Russians and, in the mind of the Amir,
the Imperial Government is frightened at the Russian Government, the
Afghans argue, having defeated British arms, that they are now superior
to the Japanese. Therefore, they deny us the possession of any point
of advantage in their country, a consummation which, while not quite
that towards which our diplomacy has been directed, may be ascribed
to the results, in combination, of a policy of friendly missions
and half measures. Now that we have given Habib Ullah permission to
import without check unlimited supplies of arms and ammunition the
disadvantages of such a situation increase rather than diminish; as
it exists so close to the Indian frontier and in a way in which it
cannot be controlled by the Indian Government, it behoves the Imperial
Government to come to a definite decision at once with regard to its
line of action in relation to Afghanistan.
[Illustration: INFANTRY ON THE MARCH]
Abdur Rahman did not confine his work of reorganisation solely to the
military system of Afghanistan. He devoted great attention to the
military roads of the state, realising that a system of communications
was as important as a well-equipped and efficiently-organised army.
Kabul, as the capital, was united with Badakshan on the east, with
Turkestan on the north and with Kandahar and Herat on the south and
west. Prior to these works certain native roads did exist between the
several centres; but it was due to the activity and initiative of the
late Amir that improvements were introduced, or altogether new lines
of communication opened. Undeterred by the difficulties which beset
his engineers and as an index to the consistent vigour with which he
assisted the development and execution of his policy, he threw roads
across the Hindu Kush, facilitating by these means not only the trend
of inter-provincial trade, but the pacification and administration of
his provinces. In addition to these strategic roads, he improved the
trade routes which led into the country from the Trans-Oxus, India
and Persia. In the south the Khyber, Kurram and the Gomul routes
received notice; in the north there were the routes from Russian
Turkestan leading through well-known centres to points of admission
upon the Afghan border. After the subjugation of Kafiristan he took the
precaution of making a military road through that country from north
to south, thus opening up communication with the Kunar Valley, and
Jelalabad, where considerable numbers of troops are always stationed.
Further, he directed that it should eventually be carried over the
western Hindu Kush so as to give a better route to Kataghan, Badakshan,
and the upper Oxus Valley. This portion of the work was finished in
March 1904. The northern terminus of the road is at Faizabad, the
principal town of Badakshan, where caravan routes meet from Bokhara on
the north-west, the Pamirs and Kashgar on the north-east. The Afghan
Government have constructed _serais_ at all the halting-places, and
caravans are encouraged to use the road in preference to that through
Chitral.
Curiously enough in another direction, the construction of fortresses,
Abdur Rahman was more neglectful. If he improved the lines of
communication and re-organised the state of the army he built but
few forts, relying almost entirely upon those which already had been
constructed. Nowadays with the exception of the Kabul positions,
Dehdadi, Mazar-i-Sharif and Baldak Spin, the two latter of which he
built to command the approaches to Balkh and Kandahar, there are no
modern forts in the kingdom. Those that do exist are made of mud and
are of insufficient strength to withstand bombardment. The great
majority serve merely as garrison depôts and are without interest save
as interesting ruins.
The list is as follows:
_Kala Afghan._--A fort in the Kunduz district, on the east side
of the Lataband Pass, and on the road to Badakshan. It is famous
for its springs, of which there are 450 in the neighbourhood.
_Kala Asin._--A fort 33 miles south-east of Kabul on the route
from Kabul to Jelalabad by the Karkacha Pass.
_Kala Azim Khan._--A square mud fort, 73 miles from
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 16 miles from Kandahar. Provisions and fuel
very scarce. Good water.
_Kala-i-Babakar._--A fort in good repair, inhabited by Karotis,
6 miles east of the Kotal-i-Sarwandi Pass, over the Suliman
range, and at the source of the Gomul river.
_Kala Badal._--A fort in the Murghab river basin.
_Kala-i-Bhak._--A fort in the Ghilzai country, south-east of
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, situated upon the plain. It contains 400 to 500
houses, and belongs to the Ohtak Ghilzais.
_Kala-i-Bist._--A fort 30 miles south of Girishk, situated upon
an island of the Helmund river, just above its confluence with
the Tarnak.
_Kala-i-Dukhtar._--A small fort 3 miles south of Sabzawar, upon
the left bank of the Adraskand.
_Kala Fatula._--A small square mud fort with bastions upon each
corner about 90 miles from Quetta and 57 miles from Kandahar.
Forage and grass are procurable but the water is brackish. The
place contains some 40 houses and shops.
_Kala Haji._--A fort 10 miles north of Kabul, upon a small
stream which drains to the Panjsher river.
_Kala Ibrahimi._--The centre group in a number of small forts
situated in the eastern extremity of the Bakwa plain, about 95
miles from Girishk and 66 miles from Farah.
_Kala Kaisar._--A fort in the Taimani country, north-east of
Teivereh.
_Kala-i-Karoti._--A fort 102 miles south-east of Ghazni and at
the west end of the Ghwalari Pass. It contains 30 houses of
Karoti Afghans and its water is procured from the Gomul river.
_Kala Kasim._--A deserted fort 13 miles from Kabul upon the
Ghazni road. It is situated in a beautiful and highly cultivated
valley in the basin of the Kabul river.
_Kala Kazi._--A fort 20 miles north of Kabul, south-east of
Istalif.
_Kala Kazi._--A fort 3 miles south-west of Kabul. It is enclosed
by walls and lies upon an eminence. The inhabitants are Tajik.
Water and supplies procurable.
_Kala Khanum._--A fort in the Ghilzai district, situated
in the hills, 12 miles from Kala-i-Bhao and south-east of
Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The garrison is usually 50 men; and 2000 tribal
levies can be mustered in the vicinity.
_Kala Khan Taraki._--A fort in the Ghilzai country, about 20
miles from Mukur, and upon the direct road to Shalkot. It is
situated in the centre of a populous region. The garrison,
composed of levies from the Taraki Ghilzais, numbers 200
horse and 100 foot. Four thousand men can be called up in the
neighbourhood.
_Kala Khoja._--A fort in Afghan-Turkestan, north of Bamian, upon
the road to Kamard and between Saighan and Dasht-i-Sufed. Kala
Khoja is the largest of several forts, all situated in this
district.
_Kala Khoja._--A village and fort in Wakhan, on the bank of the
Panja.
_Kala Khushk-i-Jamburan._--A small fort 16 miles north-east by
east of Sabzawar. It is situated in a fertile plain, 20 miles in
breadth, enclosed by hills upon three sides.
_Kala Khan._--A fort 30 miles south of Lake Abistada.
_Kala-i-Langar._--At this point, which is 222 miles from Dera
Ismail Khan and 68 miles from Ghazni on the Ghwalari road, there
are two forts, each containing about 80 houses. The larger fort
is a square, 100 yards in length with mud walls 20 feet high
and 6 feet thick, flanked by towers. It is one of the strongest
forts in Katawaz. The inhabitants belong to the Suliman Khel
Ghilzais.
_Kala Mahomed Husen._--A fort in the Jelalabad district and
situated 15 miles from Jelalabad.
_Kala Mama._--A fort in Wazikhwah district of the Ghilzai
country. It lies on the road from the Kundar to Kandahar, 12
miles from Khan Taraki, and some 32 miles from Mukur. The
fort contains mounted lines besides quarters for infantry. It
contains two wells and a few shops. The walls are pierced by
three gateways.
_Kala Mir Alam._--A fort in Shorawak, on the road from Kandahar
to Kalat. It is capacious and neatly constructed of mud, with
eight towers on each face besides the corner bastions. Close by
there is a canal from the Lora river.
_Kala-i-Nadar._--An abandoned fort 52 miles from Kandahar upon
the road to Herat. It is of large dimensions, with a good supply
of water; the adjacent country is well cultivated.
_Kala Najil._--A fort 88 miles from Jelalabad and 41 miles from
Farakhan, containing 300 houses.
_Kala Nao._--A fort 20 miles north-east of Herat, and north
of the Serabund mountains. Once a place of some importance
and a depôt for caravans going from Persia to Bokhara; it is
surrounded now only by the encampments of nomadic Hazaras.
_Kala Panj._--A fort in Wakhan, upon the left bank of the Panja
just below the junction of the Sar-i-Kol and Langar Kisht
branches.
_Kala Rahim Khan._--A fort 60 miles south of Ghazni, and west of
Lake Abistada.
_Kala Ramzan Khan._--A fort 3 miles south of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, on
the road from Ghazni to Kandahar.
_Kala Sangi._--An uninhabited fort a few miles north-east
of Teivereh, in the Taimani country. It is built of large
roughly-cut stones piled together without cement.
_Kala Bar Sang._--A fort in Afghan-Turkestan, commanding
a defile south of the Saighan valley. The fort is a rude,
shapeless building, with no pretensions to strength save what it
derives from its site.
_Kala Takah._--A fort in Afghan-Turkestan, 42 miles south of
Sar-i-Pul.
_Kala Wasil._--A fort in the Kah Dara division, north-west of
Kabul.
_Kala Kamard._--A fort of Afghan-Turkestan upon the road from
Balkh to Kabul, and about 110 miles south of Khulm. It is
inhabited by Hazaras and Tajiks, and draws its water from the
Surkhab, a tributary of the Kunduz river. At this point the
Surkhab possesses a width of 24 feet, a mean depth of 2 feet,
and an average current of 4½ miles an hour. Its source is at the
head of the valley, where it issues from a cleft in the rock.
Kamard fort stands 5600 feet above the sea in a gloomy narrow
valley, containing orchards of apricots which extend for many
miles. The rocks rise upon either side of the valley to a height
of 3000 feet; the valley itself is not more than 300 yards in
width.
The following routes indicate briefly the principal lines of
communication in Afghanistan.
I.
BALKH TO HERAT.
1. _Aktapa_ (10 miles).--A fort in ruins, 150 houses; forage
plenty; road level; intersected by canals and watercourses; four
canals bridged.
2. _Meilik_ (10 miles--20 miles).--A town of 2500 souls,
surrounded by a mud wall; water and forage plentiful;
cultivation scarce; road level, with no impediments.
3. _Shekhabad_ (10 miles--30 miles).--A village of 50 houses;
water and forage plentiful; cultivation very partial; road over
a level plain; no impediments from canals.
4. _Akcheh_ (10 miles--40 miles).--A town containing 4000 or
5000 souls; supplies, forage and water abundant; road over a
level plain, crossing 10 or 11 canals, all having wooden bridges
about 12 feet broad. Any amount of supplies procurable.
5. _Airagli_ (10 miles--50 miles).--A small mud fort, 80 to
100 houses; supplies, forage and water abundant; road level,
crossing two bridged canals.
6. _Shibirghan_ (10 miles--60 miles).--A town and fort containing
1500 to 2000 houses; supplies, water and forage abundant; road
excellent, crossing one bridged canal.
7. _Khorasanguzar_ (10 miles--70 miles).--A halting place;
forage and water alone procurable; road level, but slightly
sandy.
8. _Takht-i-Rustam Khan_ (20 miles--90 miles).--A halting place;
forage and water alone procurable; road sandy; for want of water
this stage cannot be shortened.
9. _Tekeh Marakht_ (10 miles--100 miles).--A halting place by a
river; forage procurable; road good, over a desert; one bridged
canal and three small watercourses.
10. _Khairabad_ (10 miles--110 miles).--A village of 150 houses;
road level and good.
11. _Islim_ (10 miles--120 miles).--An encampment of shepherds,
with a small mud fort; a river, fordable, knee-deep; partial
cultivation.
12. _Maimana_ (10 miles--130 miles).--A city and fort cross the
Sangalak river; fordable, ankle-deep.
13. _Almal_ (20 miles--150 miles).--Five small forts, containing
500 houses; a weekly fair here; a road, 4 miles longer than the
direct road which crosses nine different hills, turns off to
lead over three hills, easy of ascent and descent. This stage
can be divided by halting at Iskat Baru, where there is plenty
of water.
14. _Kisir_ (10 miles--160 miles).--A village of 200 houses and
tents and a small fort; river bridged; road good over one hill,
easy of passage.
15. _Mahri_ (10 miles--170 miles).--A camp of 20 tents; no
cultivation; water and forage abundant; the Kabr-i-Shutr hill at
starting.
16. _Char Shanbi_ (10 miles--180 miles).--A camp of 50 or 60
tents; partial cultivation; water and forage abundant; level
good road.
17. _Panj Guzar_ (10 miles--190 miles).--A camp of 60 tents;
cultivation extensive; water and forage abundant; road good.
18. _Kaor Mach_ (10 miles--200 miles).--A camp of 10 tents; no
cultivation; water and forage abundant; level good road.
19. _Gali Chasm_ (10 miles--210 miles).--Two old deserted forts;
no cultivation; camel forage and water abundant; road runs
between hills.
20. _Bala Murghab_ (20 miles--230 miles).--A village of 200
houses and tents and a fort; cultivation abundant; 8 miles from
Gali Chasm is a steep hill, practicable for guns with some
labour. There is not sufficient water at any intermediate place
for more than 200 persons with cattle.
21. _Karnachi_ (10 miles--240 miles).--No habitations; camel
forage plentiful; the only water is from a small cut 2 feet
wide from the Murghab river; road along the water-course; no
impediments.
22. _Chasm-i-Mangur_ (10 miles--250 miles).--A camp of 15 or 20
tents; forage and water abundant; level good road.
23. _Koh-i-Duzd_ (20 miles--270 miles).--No habitations here;
the river water brackish, but there are 30 or 40 springs near at
hand; at 3 miles there is an ascent for half a mile, and then a
long descent for 4 miles, after which the road is good and level.
24. _Kala-i-Nao_ (20 miles--290 miles).--A town of 1500 houses
with a mud fort; cultivation abundant; road level and good. This
stage can be divided by halting half-way at Postalak, where
there are springs of fresh water.
25. _Aushara_ (10 miles--300 miles).--A camp of 30 or 40 tents;
and good water and encamping ground; forage abundant.
26. _Khushk-i-Zard_ (10 miles--310 miles).--A camp of 40 tents;
no cultivation; forage and water abundant; one hill difficult of
descent.
27. _Band-i-zer-Mast_ (20 miles--330 miles).--No dwellings;
forage and water abundant; an ascent of 6 miles, very stony and
difficult.
28. _Kharoke_ (20 miles--350 miles).--A military post;
cultivation, forage, and water abundant; road level and good.
There is water in the middle of this stage, but no forage.
29. _Herat_ (20 miles--370 miles).--Good level road, through a
well populated country, the whole way.
_N.B._--The first numbers in this and following routes give the
length of the stage, the second the total distance from the
commencement of the route.
II.
KANDAHAR TO HERAT (BY THE NORTHERN ROUTE)
1. _Kokaran_ (7 miles).--The river Argandab runs within 500
yards of the high road; an irrigation channel also furnishing an
abundant supply of water. Small quantities of forage procurable.
For the first 3 miles the road passes through the enclosed
gardens surrounding the city and crosses the several canals
drawn from the Argandab for irrigating the valley of Kandahar.
2. _Jangeri_ (5 miles--12 miles).--Water procured from an
irrigation canal drawn from the Argandab, the river one mile
distant south-east; forage for camels and horses procurable. The
road stony in some places but generally good; there is an abrupt
descent into the bed of the Argandab river, which is easily
fordable.
3. _Haoz-i-Madat Khan_ (14 miles--26 miles).--Watered by the
same canal which supplies Jangeri; grass plentiful about 5 miles
to the southward; several villages and much cultivation in the
vicinity; large flocks of sheep and goats. The march lies across
a hard and level plain. Water is found close to the road, a
short distance from the village of Badwan, 2½ miles from Jangeri.
4. _Khushk-i-Nakhud_ (15 miles 6 furlongs--41 miles 6
furlongs).--Abundant supply of good water from two artificial
watercourses. Grass scarce, and little cultivation. A hard level
road.
5. _Khak-i-Chopan_ (9 miles 5 furlongs--51 miles 3
furlongs).--Water procurable in sufficient quantity. Road
generally good and level; sand lies rather deeply on it for a
short distance, and some slight undulations in the ground are
met with towards the end of the march. Cultivation and villages
lie 2 or 3 miles to the south.
6. _Left Bank of Helmund River_ (22 miles 5 furlongs--74
miles).--Water abundant, from irrigation channels and from the
river. Very little cultivation on this side of the river and but
few dwellings. Road generally good and hard.
7. _Girishk_ (1 mile 4 furlongs--75 miles 4 furlongs).--Water
from irrigation channels abundant. The river a mile distant to
the south-east; ground somewhat broken by water-courses and
damp spots. Forage both for camels and horses excellent and
most abundant. Many small villages and much arable land, but
comparatively little cultivated ground.
8. _Zerak_ (20 miles 7 furlongs--96 miles 3 furlongs).--Water
good and abundant; forage for both camels and horses plentiful;
some cultivation in the vicinity. The dried bushes found on
the plains form almost the sole fuel procurable at most of the
stages. The first 6 miles of the road on this stage stony and
undulating, the beds of several torrents which drain the desert
plain crossing the line; after this it becomes level and easy
till the fort of Sadat, 18 miles from Girishk, is reached.
Beyond Sadat the road again passes over undulating ground with
one or two steep slopes till Zerak is close at hand. There is an
abundant supply of water at Sadat.
9. _Doshakh_ (12 miles 7 furlongs--109 miles 2 furlongs).--Water
abundant; one or two villages and some cultivation in the
vicinity; the road hard and level the whole way. At the village
of Sur, 6 miles from Zerak, forage is procurable, and if Sadat
were made a halting-place Sur would form another at a distance
of 8½ miles from it.
10. _Khushk-i-Sufed_ (21 miles 7 furlongs--131 miles 2
furlongs).--The first part of the road good and level;
excellent water from a reservoir at a distance of 3 miles from
encamping-ground. At 10½ miles from Doshakh the march is through
a range of hills, the path leading over which shortly afterwards
contracts in several places, so that a laden camel can barely
pass. The ascent gradual, no steep slopes; the road broken and
stony.
11. _Washir_ (9 miles 5 furlongs--141 miles).--Abundance of
water. The road is hard and good with a gentle descent the whole
way till within a mile or two of Washir, when it is undulating
and stony in some places.
12. _Left Bank of Khash Rud_ (12 miles 2 furlongs--153 miles 2
furlongs).--Excellent water from the river; forage for camels
not abundant on the banks of the river; the grass not plentiful
nor of good quality; no village in sight and the country on
either side dry, stony and almost a desert. The road stony and
uneven.
13. _Ibrahim Jui_ (16 miles 7 furlongs--170 miles 1
furlong).--Water abundant. The road leads across a hard level
plain for about 9 miles without any obstacle. At the termination
of the plain it enters a range of hills of moderate elevation,
the path being in some places narrow, difficult, and crossed in
many places by the dry beds of mountain torrents.
14. _Nalak_ (13 miles 4 furlongs--183 miles 5 furlongs).--Water
from a running stream good and abundant; forage for camels and
horses plentiful; very little cultivation. The road lies among
hills for a mile, then debouches on a plain. Skirting a range of
precipitous and lofty hills on the right for 3½ miles road good
again, twining into another mountain gorge and ascending the
valley for 5 miles to a spot called Ganimargh, where villages
are seen. The road continues to thread a succession of mountain
valleys.
15. _Tut-i-Kasarman_ (6 miles 5 furlongs--190 miles 2
furlongs).--Good water from a “karez”; forage for both camels
and horses abundant; fuel procurable but no supplies. Road among
hills all the way, gradually ascending but not difficult.
16. _Lajward Karez_ (15 miles--205 miles 2 furlongs).--Water
from the ‘karez’ good and abundant. The road pursues a northerly
direction for about 2 miles, and then turns to the westward
and follows a mountain valley from three-quarters of a mile
to 2 miles wide, bounded by lofty and rugged peaks on either
side. At 5½ miles from Tut-i-Kasarman, the summit of the pass,
a height of 1200 feet is gained. The path then descends to the
foot of the slope, where water is found in the bed of a stream
completely overgrown by long grass, bushes and reeds; here the
valley widens out from 3 to 4 miles, and the road continues
tolerably level till a “karez” is reached. The road over the
pass is much broken.
17. _Shaharak_ (15 miles--220 miles 2 furlongs).--Abundance of
good water; grass plentiful; villages and cultivation near.
18. _Shahiwan_ (15 miles--235 miles 2 furlongs).--Numerous
canals for irrigation.
19. _Right Bank of Farah Rud_ (1 mile 3 furlongs--236 miles 5
furlongs).--Water of great purity from the river; forage not
plentiful.
20. _Ab-i-Khurmah_ (21 miles 3 furlongs--258 miles).--Water from
a spring not very wholesome; ground very irregular; fuel scarce;
forage for camels sufficient. For 14 miles the road traverses
a hard stony level plain; it then enters among low hills, and
follows for some time the bed of a mountain stream.
21. _Chah-i-Jahan_ (17 miles 2 furlongs--275 miles 2
furlongs).--Water tolerably good from spring; forage for both
camels and horses abundant; vegetation in the bed of the
watercourse very luxuriant; no villages or cultivation near; the
road rough and stony.
22. _Aisabad_ (20 miles 1 furlong--295 miles 3
furlongs).--Abundance of water. The plain is rather marshy;
forage for both horses and camels abundant; fuel scarce.
23. _Left Bank of the Adraskand_ (21 miles 2 furlongs--316 miles
5 furlongs).--Water from the river; forage and fuel abundant;
no signs of cultivation or inhabitants near the river, nor are
any villages seen between the valley of Sabzawar and that of
Herat, a fatiguing and difficult march. High peaks rise to the
eastward, the summits of which are judged to exceed 10,000 feet
in height above the level of the sea. The table-land is 2½ miles
across, where there is a further slight ascent, the elevation
reached being considered 1500 feet above the level of Sabzawar.
The descent into the valley of the Adraskand is steep, rocky,
and tortuous.
24. _Robat-i-Shah Bed_ (22 miles 2 furlongs--338 miles 7
furlongs).--Forage for camels and horses abundant; no supplies
of any description procurable. For 19 miles from the Adraskand
the road ascends among hills, the elevation being 6500 feet
above sea-level. Forage and water procurable the whole way. The
road stony.
25. _Rosabagh_ (21 miles--359 miles 7 furlongs).--Good water
from numerous artificial channels. Road attains elevation 7200
feet above sea-level falling further 2000 feet, and is good the
whole way from the foot of the hills. The Rosabagh is a Royal
garden planted with Scotch firs, now of great size and beauty.
26. _Right Bank Hari Rud_ (4 miles 4 furlongs--364 miles 3
furlongs).--Water good. This spot is but 3 miles from Herat and
within reach of the bazaars of the city. The road fords the Hari
Rud river running in several channels over a wide shingly bed.
27. _Herat_ (3 miles 180 yards--367 miles 3 furlongs).
III
KANDAHAR TO HERAT BY GIRISHK, FARAH AND SABZAWAR (THE SOUTHERN ROUTE).
As far as Girishk (7 marches, 75 miles 4 furlongs), see route
II. page 331.
8. _Haoz_ (a reservoir) (17 miles--92 miles 4 furlongs).--The
reservoir, which is 20 feet square, is built in a broad ravine,
through which there is a considerable stream after the snow
begins to melt; forage and grass scarce; a few ravines crossed;
the road, generally good, is over a hard, level, and arid plain.
9. _Shorab_ (23 miles--115 miles 4 furlongs).--Water plentiful
in the winter and spring; later in the year it is brackish, but
the supply is susceptible of great improvement; forage and grass
generally plentiful; road over a desert plain, somewhat uneven,
and in places stony.
10. _Dalhak_ (8 miles--13 miles 4 furlongs).--A ruined fort;
water rather scarce, but might be increased with care from a
spring; forage and grass scarce.
11. _Hasn Gilan_ (15 miles--138 miles 4 furlongs).--A ruined
fort; water, forage, and grass scarce. The Darwaza pass is
crossed about the third mile.
12. _Dilaram_ (13 miles--151 miles 4 furlongs).--Water, forage,
and grass abundant; the road fords the Khash Rud at the end of
the march; the bed of the river is 300 yards broad, with a small
clear stream in the dry season about 2½ feet deep. There are
villages all the way; the left bank is high and steep.
13. _Ibrahim Jui_ (14 miles--165 miles 4 furlongs).--Forage,
water, and grass scarce.
14. _Kala Ibrahimi_ (5 miles--170 miles 4 furlongs).
15. _Chiagaz_ (14 miles--184 miles 4 furlongs).--A small fort
near Siahab; water, forage, and grass abundant. Road crosses the
Bukwa plain.
16. _Karez_ (15 miles--199 miles 4 furlongs).--Water bad; road
good, over a level plain.
17. _Khormalik_ (16 miles--215 miles 4 furlongs).--Water good
and plentiful; cultivation in the neighbourhood; the road
crosses two ranges of hills, one pass being stony and difficult
for camels.
18. _Haoz-i-Kalsa_ (10 miles 4 furlongs--226 miles).--Water,
forage and grass good and plentiful.
19. _Farah_ (10 miles 4 furlongs--236 miles 4 furlongs).--All
supplies procurable.
20. _Karez_ (9 miles--245 miles 4 furlongs).--Road over a fine
plain, crossing the Farah Rud soon after leaving Farah. The
river is about 400 yards broad, with a stream in the dry season
of 150 yards, and 2 feet deep. Water clean and rapid.
21. _A Well_ (8 miles--253 miles 4 furlongs).
22. _Mula Mustafa’s Well_ (7 miles--260 miles 4 furlongs).
23. _Jeja_ (13 miles--273 miles 4 furlongs).--A village on the
left bank of the Adraskand. Road for the most part tortuous,
rocky, and bad.
24. _Water among Hills_ (9 miles--282 miles 4 furlongs).--Road
crosses the Adraskand on leaving Jeja, and soon afterwards
ascends a short pass.
25. _Adraskand River_ (9 miles--291 miles 4 furlongs).--Water.
26. _Adraskand River_ (8 miles--299 miles 4 furlongs).--Water.
27. _Sabzawar_ (8 miles--307 miles 4 furlongs).--The road
follows the right bank of the Adraskand until Sabzawar is
reached, and crosses the Gudar Khana pass.
28. _Ziarat_ (12 miles--319 miles 4 furlongs).--Few supplies
procurable. Water sufficient; forage and grass abundant; the
road lies over a plain.
29. _Sherbakhsh_ (17 miles 4 furlongs--337 miles).--Water
plentiful but brackish; forage and grass abundant.
30. _Gandatsu_ (9 miles 4 furlongs--346 miles 4
furlongs).--Water scarce; forage and grass abundant.
31. _Shorak_ (10 miles 4 furlongs--357 miles).--Water scarce
except in the spring, when it is abundant; forage and grass
plentiful; the road skirts the Shah Bed range.
32. _Water in a Ravine_ (7 miles--364 miles).--Water scarce;
forage and grass plentiful; the road winds round the
north-western extremity of the Shah Bed range.
33. _Ghor-i-Sufed_ (8 miles--372 miles).--Water, forage and
grass sufficient: succession of rolling undulations, which the
road crosses at right angles; soil hard and gravelly.
34. _Kala-i-Mula Yasin_ (9 miles 4 furlongs--381 miles 4
furlongs).--Water plentiful; forage and grass abundant; a few
small villages in the vicinity; road over undulating ground.
35. _Rozeh Bagh_ (11 miles 4 furlongs--393 miles).--Water
plentiful from canals; grass very scarce.
36. _Hari Rud_ (4 miles 4 furlongs--397 miles 4 furlongs).
37. _Herat_ (3 miles--400 miles 4 furlongs).
IV
KANDAHAR TO DERA ISMAIL KHAN.
1. _Kala Mohmand_ (6 kos).--Over the Kandahar plain. The water
here is from springs, but brackish. A little cultivation in the
neighbourhood.
2. _Taruk_ (6 kos--12 kos).--Over a sandy plain;
encamping-ground on the bank of the Tarnak river, from which
water is procurable.
3. _Wilgai_ (5 kos--17 kos).--In this day’s march a small “pass”
has to be crossed. No provisions procurable here, and water only
from springs.
4. _Jandar Madat Khan_ (5 kos--22 kos).--A village in the midst
of a well cultivated tract on the banks of the Arghesan; road
good.
5. _Lora_ (6 kos--28 kos).--Road along the bed of the Arghesan;
here also are villages and cultivation, and Lora itself is
situated at the junction of a stream coming down from above the
Mukur with the Arghesan.
6. _Sarghaz Kotal_ (6 kos--34 kos).--Still up the bed of the
stream, the road is broken and rugged; there are a few small
villages in the neighbourhood surrounded by small patches of
cultivation. The country generally is mountainous and barren;
camping-ground at the foot of the Kotal.
7. _Camp_ (6 kos).--Long tedious march. The ascent and descent
of the Sarghaz mountain takes the greater part of a day. The
encamping-ground is at a spring on the remote side of the range;
no village, but trees.
8. _Camp_ (6 kos).--Over an undulating broken country, gradually
descending again to the bed of the Arghesan, on the bank of
which is the spot for encamping.
9. _Shirkzai_ (6 kos).--Over a country undulating and hilly; the
banks of the Arghesan are here and there cultivated, and have a
good sprinkling of villages.
10. _Katt_ (6 kos).--Road resembles previous march. A Ghilzai
encampment near some springs; the road leaves the bed of the
Arghesan and crosses the Ghwauza Kotal, which is neither high
nor difficult; this is the last halting-place in the Kandahar
district.
11. _Surkhel_ (7 kos).--A village belonging to the Tokhi
Ghilzais; country tolerably well cultivated; water brackish from
springs.
12. _Sturanisa_ (7 kos).--Over an undulating plain; no
cultivation; villages deserted; water procurable from wells;
this spot belongs to the Tokhi Ghilzais.
13. _Kirshutu ke Kala_ (6 kos).--Road good, country level, but
only inhabited by wandering Babars; water from “karez.”
14. _Topan_ (6 kos).--Over a plain; here is one well but no
cultivation. The country belongs to Babars.
15. _Lowana Karez_ (7 kos).--Over a plain; Lowana is a small
village surrounded by cultivation.
16. _Gharabi Dara_ (6 kos).--Halting-ground at the entrance to
the pass; water procured by digging in the bed of a ravine where
it is always to be found close to the surface.
17. _Lari_ (6 kos).--The name of a plain occupied by a tribe of
Kakars. Road through a long darah flanked by low hills; water
from springs.
18. _Trikhghaz_ (7 kos).--This place consists of 30 or 40 houses
of the Jhunirian tribe. Country hilly and barren.
19. _Mukhal_ (6 kos).--An encamping ground; road passes through
a long defile; water procured from a small stream, a tributary
of the Gomul.
20. _Mamukhani_ (8 kos).--A long and tiresome march, for five
kos through a narrow defile, commanded by lofty heights;
the path then debouches on the Mamukhani plain, occupied by
Mandukhels and Nasrs.
21. _Kharkhandi_ (6 kos).--Here are a few villages in the midst
of cultivation belonging to Mandukhels and Nasrs. Road generally
through a hilly country along the bed of the Kundar stream.
22. _Gasta_ (6 kos).--Still along the bed of the stream; this
spot which is only an encamping-ground without houses belongs to
the Mandukhels.
23. _Husen Nika_ (7 kos).--A halting-place at the Ziarat of
Husen, where the Kholdad Khel and Suliman Khel Ghilzais come
down to trade and barter with the Lohanis. From here two roads
strike off, one to Ghwalari and the other to Zhob.
24. _Damandar_ (7 kos).--A halting-place watered from a spring
on the water-shed line between the Kundar and Gomul streams;
this day’s march is a difficult one, through a rugged dara, at
the end of which a high kotal has to be ascended.
25. _Kanzur._--The first halting-place in the Waziri country on
the banks of the Gomul. Caravans are frequently attacked by the
Waziris in all the routes through their portion of the country,
where there are no villages, but only well-known halting-places,
named as here shown. The road in this march is down a steep
descent, and then along the bed of the Gomul river.
26. _Ramtaj_ (7 kos).--Along the bed of the Gomul.
27. _Kotghai_ (7 kos).--Along the bed of the Gomul.
28. _Kirkani_ (9 kos).--Along the bed of the Gomul; 2 kos from
Kotghai is the Tol dara, a narrow but well cultivated glen,
inhabited by Taftani Povindahs, who are on friendly terms with
the Waziris.
29. _Ghwalari_ (14 kos).--The road leaves the bed of the Gomul
and crosses a very difficult kotal. Water is scarce at this
stage.
30. _Mashkanai_ (10 kos).--Through low barren hills; water from
a brackish spring.
31. _Zernarikah_ (8 kos).--Through low barren hills; water from
a brackish spring.
32 _Manjigarh_ (9 kos).--At the fourth kos the road passes out
of the hills and crosses to Manjigarh. From there the road lies
through the Derajat to Dera Ismail Khan, 49 miles.
V
KANDAHAR TO KABUL.
1. _Abdul Aziz_ (5 miles 7 furlongs).--Grass for horses and
forage for camels very scarce.
2. _Kala Azim_ (9 miles 7 furlongs--15 miles 6 furlongs).--Over
a hard stony road, considerably undulating and intersected by
beds of nullahs; plenty of excellent camel forage but little
grass; fuel scarce; a few wells of sweet water; ruined village
near the fort.
3. _Khel-i-Akhun_ (16½ miles--32¼ miles).
4. _Shahr-i-Safa_ (11 miles--43¼ miles).
5. _Tir-andaz Minar_ (10¼ miles--53½ miles).
6. _Tut_ (11½ miles--65 miles).
7. _Asia Hazara_ (10 miles--75 miles).
8. _Kelat-i-Ghilzai_ (12¾ miles--87¾ miles).
9. _Sar-i-Asp_ (10¼ miles--98 miles).
10. _Nurka_ (9½ miles--107½ miles).
11. _Tazi_ (8¾ miles--116¼ miles).
12. _Shaftal_ (6½ miles--122¾ miles).
13. _Chasma-i-Shadi_ (10½ miles--133¼ miles).
14. _Pangak_ (6½ miles--139¾ miles).
15. _Ghojan_ (12 miles--151¾ miles).
16. _Mukur_ (12¼ miles--164 miles).
17. _Oba Karez_ (14 miles--178 miles).
18. _Jamrud_ (12 miles--190 miles).
19. _Mashaki_ (9 miles--199 miles).
20. _Ahmad Khel_ (9½ miles--208½ miles).
21. _Nani_ (7½ miles--216 miles).
22. _Ghazni_ (15¾ miles--231¾ miles).
23. _Shashgao_ (13 miles--244¾ miles).
24. _Haft Asia_ (8½ miles--253¼ miles).
25. _Haidar Khel_ (10¾ miles--264 miles).
26. _Shekhabad_ (9½ miles--273½ miles).
27. _Maidan_ (18½ miles--292 miles).
28. _Kabul_ (26 miles--318 miles).
VI
KABUL TO THE OXUS BY BAMIAN, TAHKT-I-PUL AND BALKH.
1. _Argandab_ (14 miles).--Supplies procurable in small
quantities; water plentiful; grass scarce. Road tolerably good.
2. _Rustam Khel_ (8 miles--22 miles).--Supplies and water
procurable; grass plentiful but coarse.
3. _Jalrez_ (10 miles--32 miles).--A village; supplies and water
procurable, grass rather scarce. Road generally rough and stony,
passing through a well cultivated valley.
4. _Sar-i-Chasma_ (10 miles--42 miles).--A spring of water, one
of the sources of the Kabul river. Road very rough, stony, and
narrow.
5. _Unai Pass_ (Foot of--9 miles--51 miles).--Water procurable,
grass scarce. Road fair, occasionally running along the slopes
of hills; very stony.
6. _Urt_ (5 miles--56 miles).--Water procurable, grass scarce.
The road consists of a succession of very steep ascents and
descents.
7. _Gardan-i-Diwar_ (6 miles 4 furlongs--62 miles 4
furlongs).--Water and grass plentiful; road tolerably good,
passes over four rather high spurs, and crosses the Helmund.
8. _Siah Kala_ (7 miles--69 miles 4 furlongs).--Grass and water
plentiful.
9. _Kahzar_ (6 miles--75 miles 4 furlongs).--A few supplies,
water and grass plentiful; road indifferent.
10. _Irak Pass_ (5 miles 4 furlongs--81 miles).--Water
procurable. Road passes over rocky and boggy stretches.
11. _Ab-i-Irak_ (6 miles 4 furlongs--87 miles 4
furlongs).--Water procurable; the ascent over the kotal is not
steep. The road is straight and tolerably free from rock, the
descent is steeper. For camels the road is not good.
12. _Irak_ (4 miles--91 miles 4 furlongs).--Water and grass
procurable. Road very bad, leading through a rugged stony
valley, and descending rapidly the whole way.
13. _Zohak_ (6 miles--97 miles 4 furlongs).--Water and grass
procurable; road difficult.
14. _Bamian_ (9 miles 4 furlongs--107 miles; Elev. about 8000
feet).--All supplies abundant.
15. _Akrabat_ (15 miles--122 miles).
16. _Saighan_ (20 miles--142 miles)--Well cultivated valley;
water and grass plentiful.
17. _Kamard_ (18 miles--160 miles)--Water, supplies and forage
procurable. The road is difficult.
18. _Mother_ (18 miles--178 miles)--Road tolerable.
19. _Doah_ (18 miles 4 furlongs--196 miles 4 furlongs).
20. _Roi_ (20 miles--216 miles 4 furlongs).
21. _Kuram_ (20 miles--236 miles 4 furlongs).
22. _Sar-i-Bagh_ (13 miles 4 furlongs--250 miles).
23. _Aibak_ (20 miles--270 miles).
24. _Hazrat Sultan_ (17 miles--287 miles).
(19 to 24 are well-watered populous districts. They contain
villages and are under cultivation.)
25. _Khulm or Tashkurghan_ (20 miles--307 miles).--Supplies and
water plentiful; a road to Kunduz, 70 miles.
26. _Mazar-i-Sharif_ (34 miles--341 miles).--Supplies and water
abundant. Route traverses a plain and crosses the Abdul Kotal; a
road runs from there to Bamian.
27. _Takht-i-Pul_ (8 miles 4 furlongs--349 miles 4 furlongs)--.A
town; supplies and water abundant; plain, open country.
28. _Balkh_ (8 miles--357 miles 4 furlongs).--Supplies and water
procurable.
29. _Manlik_ (20 miles--377 miles 4 furlongs).--Supplies scarce.
30. _Turcoman Kala_ (20 miles--397 miles 4 furlongs).--Supplies
scarce.
31. _Oxus River_--_Bank of_ (27 miles--424 miles 4
furlongs).--The banks of the Oxus; water and forage abundant;
supplies procurable.
VII
KABUL TO PESHAWAR.
1. _Bhut Khak_ (8½ miles).
2. _Khurd Kabul_ (9 miles 1 furlong--17 miles 5 furlongs).
3. _Tezin_ (12⅞ miles--30 miles 4 furlongs).
4. _The Giant’s Tomb on the Tezin_ (8½ miles--39 miles).
5. _Rud-i-Kata Sang_ (4¾ miles--43 miles 6 furlongs).
6. _Jagdalik_ (7½ miles--51 miles 2 furlongs).
7. _Surkhab_ (13 miles--64 miles 2 furlongs).
8. _Sufed Sang_ (9¾ miles--74 miles).
9. _Fatehabad_ (12 miles--86 miles).
10. _Sultanpur_ (7½ miles--93 miles 4 furlongs).
11. _Jelalabad_ (9 miles--102 miles 4 furlongs).
12. _Ali Baghan_ (6¾ miles--109 miles 2 furlongs).
13. _To Char-deh_ (14 miles--123 miles 2 furlongs).
14. _Hazarnao_ (11¾ miles--135 miles).
15. _Dakka_ (9 miles--144 miles).
16. _Lundi Khana_ (9 miles--153 miles).
17. _Ali Masjid_ (13¾ miles--166 miles 6 furlongs).
18. _Kadam_ (10 miles--176 miles 6 furlongs).
19. _Koulsir_ (7 miles--183 miles 1 furlong).
20. _Peshawar_ (8¾ miles--191 miles 7 furlongs).
VIII
GIRISHK TO SEISTAN.
1. _Chah-i-Dewala_ (20 miles).--One well on the road.
2. _Chah-i-Karki_ (20 miles--40 miles).--One well on the road.
3. _Chah-i-Kasadi_ (20 miles--60 miles).--One well on the road.
4. _Khash_ (16 miles--76 miles).--400 houses of Arbabzais on the
Khash river.
5. _Kadeh_ (46 miles--122 miles).--300 houses of Arbabzais on
the Khash river.
6. _Chakhnasur_ (16 miles--138 miles).--500 houses of Mir Tajiks
on the Khash river.
7. _Janabad_ (16 miles--154 miles).--400 houses.
8. _Jelalabad_ (10 miles--164 miles).--400 houses of Seistani
Kayanes on the Helmund.
9. _Afzalabad Ford_ (16 miles--180 miles).--200 houses of
Arbabzais on the Helmund.
10. _Koh-i-Khoja_ (10 miles--190 miles).
IX
HERAT TO MAIMANA.
1. _Parwana_ (11 miles).--The road crosses mountains; village of
40 houses.
2. _Khushk-i-Rabat_ (11 miles--22 miles).--The road crosses a
plain of clayey soil; no provisions or houses.
3. _Kushk-i-Assaib_ (24 miles--46 miles).--The road is stony,
and lies across mountains and valleys, and is frequently cut
up by torrents very dangerous to pass after heavy rains. Good
water; no houses or provisions.
4. _Changurek_ (24 miles--70 miles).--No houses; good water.
5. _Turchik_ (24 miles--94 miles)--Cultivated district.
6. _Mingal_ (14 miles--108 miles).--Crosses plain; water
supplies.
7. _Murgab_ (14 miles--122 miles).--The road leads along a
fertile valley, through a well-cultivated populous country.
8. _Kala-i-Vali_ (24 miles--146 miles).--Villages and supplies.
9. _Char Shamba_ (11 miles--157 miles).--Meadows; villages of
380 houses, and supplies.
10. _Kaisar_ (11 miles--168 miles).--The road goes through a
well-cultivated plain; fine villages; Kapchaks.
11. _Maimana_ (28 miles--196 miles).