In July two American Y.M.C.A. secretaries were captured by the

Bolsheviki on the Onega front. Two others had been captured previously

to this and had been released by way of Stockholm, and had reported good

treatment. With these taken in July the Bolsheviki had taken also a

number of British soldiers, some army supplies, and some Y.M.C.A.

supplies. One of the secretaries had considerable money on his person

belonging to the Y.M.C.A. He was given permission to go to Archangel on

parole to take this money to "Y" headquarters, and he was given by the

Bolshevik command two messages. One was to negotiate the purchase of

the "Y" supplies captured, as the Bolsheviki did not consider these

things war booty and wished to pay for them. The other was a message to

the people of Archangel assuring them that when the Bolsheviki should

take their city there would be no reprisals but full political amnesty.

When this paroled American prisoner reached our lines he was taken to

British headquarters and there told that he could not go to Archangel on

any such mission. He appealed by telephone to the American Embassy and

arrangements were made for him to go to Archangel, virtually under

arrest. At British headquarters in Archangel he was ordered not to make

known any of the Bolshevist messages and an attempt was made to induce

him to break his parole. When he told of kindly treatment by the

Bolsheviki he was angrily denounced as a Bolshevik propagandist. He

returned to the front and re-crossed the line according to the terms of

his parole. These prisoners were sent to Moscow. They were not under

arrest nor restraint, nor were the British Tommies whom the Bolsheviki

held there as prisoners of war. These two men left Moscow September

fifth for home by way of Vologda and Archangel. They saw nothing of the

atrocities we read so much about, nor of the nationalization of women,

nor the separation of children from parents by state decree, nor the

other barbarities the British-American news factories give us so much to

read about.

*XIX*

*CONCERNING MILITARY INTERVENTION*

During the first half of 1918 there was considerable discussion in

America of the proposed military intervention in Russia. Mr. Roosevelt

favored it--insisted upon it. Mr. Wilson was understood to be opposed

to it, this understanding resting on the general interpretation of his

utterances. The debate, widespread, was before the fact. Now that the

fact is accomplished we may well look into the results.

The weak fashion in which we went into the enterprise has given rise to

the theory in some quarters that it will be claimed that we did not go

into it at all. If an armistice had been declared in Russia on November

11, or if America had then notified the Bolsheviki that we had no

military motives there, the affair could well have been charged up to

the war with Germany, and we might well claim that we had had no serious

intention of interfering in the affairs of Russia. But the armistice

did not even think of Russia. We were fighting a separate war there.

We in Russia were not even notified officially that there was an

armistice. We heard about it, and wondered where we came in. It was

after November 11 that most of our fighting took place and most of our

casualties were suffered. Not until March were we promised that we

should be taken home in the spring, and then no intimation was given us

that America was to withdraw. Rumors were industriously circulated

giving the impression that other Americans were on their way to take our

places, and not until our men were actually away did our "information"

permit us to realize that America had withdrawn from the expedition.

We intervened. We undertook to crush Bolshevism in Russia. We sent a

military and naval expedition there. We organized a civil war there.

It was unsuccessful. America lost a few men, England more, Russia many

more. How much more Russia suffered is not yet written. America

withdrew her troops. France, Serbia, Italy withdrew theirs. England

reluctantly withdraws hers.

Let us consider what this expedition meant to our own men. They were

only a few thousand men, to be sure, and their little event was so much

smaller than the big thing in France that it was naturally even

necessarily overlooked. Because I was with them, however, I know that

it was a big thing their government made them do. The men in France had

faith in their cause. The men in Russia had none. Over and over again

our men in Russia have argued with me that while we were fighting for

freedom in France we were fighting to kill it in Russia. Some said we

were fighting for the capitalists of England and France, others declared

that the Bolsheviki were more right than wrong, and everybody felt that

our government had made a great mistake and that a life lost there was a

life worse than thrown away. In this frame of mind American boys went

through all the dangers and privations and sufferings of a difficult

all-winter campaign and some of them went to their last battles.

Statistically it is a little thing, if you must measure everything by

statistics, but I have been made to feel how terribly great a thing was

the death of one man who as I held his hand cursed the fate that made

him die in a fight for which he had no heart.

It was a high degree of sportsmanship that enabled these men to see it

through. If Mr. Wilson told his colleagues at Paris that "if" American

troops were sent to Russia they would mutiny he might have based his

opinion on information as to what American troops in Russia had already

said on that particular subject.

It is difficult to imagine a more unmoral situation than that of an army

fighting without a sense of unction and against its sense of right, but

this is what military intervention in Russia imposed on a small army of

Americans.

I can testify of my personal knowledge that this was equally true of

Canadian and British soldiers. I have heard that it was true of the

French, the Italians, and the Serbians.

These men are all home now with their grievance. Few of them are proud

of the expedition, or glad they had a part in it, or grateful to their

country for its support, or willing to go again. Military intervention

has been a tragedy in their lives and was an injustice to them such as

no government may with impunity impose on its citizens.

We may not easily estimate the harm that military intervention has done

in the lowering of our standards of national rights and in devitalizing

our ideals of international relations. The precedent that has been

established, however, is most unfortunate and may in the future be used

to strengthen the hands of some one who may be trying to lead us into a

more serious error of the same sort. I must, moreover, say that this

enterprise has done considerable harm to the most important friendship

in the world--that of England and America--as far as so great a thing

could be affected by the few thousands of men who were directly engaged

in the expedition. Our governments do not know about this, of course,

but the men know. No thoughtful person could hear these men of either

nation talk about the other nation without seeing the awfulness of the

thing that has been done. It is not at all similar to the attitude of

the soldier who knew the British in France, nor to his disillusionment

about the French. It is very much worse. It is enmity. And it is clear

to me that it is directly due to the fact that our men had to fight in a

bad cause, with unwilling minds, beclouded consciences, and rebellious

hearts.

Again I do not know how much our participation in this affair has

vitiated the faith of small nations in our disinterested friendship for

the weak. We may hope that the nations of South America have not taken

the Russian campaign to heart as seriously as have the small nations of

Europe. Whatever result our military intervention in Russia has had

upon this faith, however, those of us who have been in Russia know that

it has had a profound effect upon the Russian people. We have not

destroyed their faith in us. One mistake could not do that. But we

have disillusioned many of them concerning the soundness of our judgment

if not the purity of our motives, and they will hereafter, I think, look

carefully into our alliances before trusting themselves utterly to our

guidance.

Having got into a bad job the governments found it expedient to suppress

news, to manipulate news, and even to manufacture a little.

Whether we have actually prolonged Lenin's tenure of office and

Trotsky's reign in power we cannot of course know. But this is quite

conceivable, and they are still in office and in power two years after

the November revolution. We know that the armed barrier that we have

built around them and forced them to build in front of us has prevented

us from reaching them with any of the more convincing proofs of our

"friendly purpose" than the shrapnel and h.e. we have managed to get

over into their lines. The business men and educators and engineers and

uplifters that we were going to send have had to wait while we undertook

to settle Russian turmoil by making more turmoil.

We organized civil war in Russia. The Russians were not fighting the

Bolsheviki--not our way. They did not want to fight them--in our way.

We made them. We conscripted them to fight for their own freedom. It

was difficult, but we had our army there and the army made the peasant

patriotic--our way.

The Russian hates conscription; but what were we to do? If he wouldn't

fight voluntarily he was a damned Bolshevik and must be made to. And

so, as ever, one thing leads to another--especially when we are not

quite clear that the one thing is a right thing. The conscripted

Russians who rebelled against us and went over to the Bolsheviki were of

course a small proportion of the whole. All sorts of mixed motives and

confused judgments and conflicting loyalties entered into the situation,

but one thing clearly emerged. This was civil war. Every man's hand is

set against his neighbor. And now as we confess the futility of our

intervention and evacuate, the evil harvest is to be reaped. No peasant

can escape it. No woman or child can escape it. Suspicion,

recrimination, tale-bearing, jealousy, hatred of Russian for Russian is

the harvest our intervention has left behind it.

*XX*

*CONCERNING RUSSIAN PEASANTS*

The peasants of North Russia are generally supposed to be the poorest

and least progressive class of Russians, living in the poorest and least

desirable part of the country. I think that if this is true the

interest which all Russia holds for Americans can hardly be exaggerated.

The people of North Russia are peasants. The professional and trading

classes are negligible--perhaps smaller than anywhere else in the white

world. The towns are small and few and even the towns are peopled

largely by peasants.

North Russia, humanly speaking, consists of long tortuous arteries of

life called rivers. The banks of these rivers are thickly, almost

densely, populated. Villages of from twenty to a hundred houses are

strung along so continuously and here and there clustered about a great

church so thickly that you wonder where there is land for all these

people to cultivate. Never, however, do you find an isolated settler. If

it is a forest nobody lives there. You find a village or nobody.

There can be no more hospitable people anywhere in the world than these

Russian people are. Their doors are never closed against strangers, and

with unfailing courtesy they offer the best they have. I have traveled

nearly a thousand versts by sled over this northern country and stopped

every six hours at a private house for a samovar and perhaps a bed. To

have the best the house afforded given me once or twice and pay refused

would not have impressed me so much, but to have uniform hospitality

extended me as though it were my right and to have this done without

consciousness of virtue made me feel that the world's championship in

hospitality abides with the people of this bleak and inhospitable

country.

[Illustration: The women work in the fields with the men.

Russians love their homes and their villages devotedly.]

They get their living from the soil in a very short season, and this is

possible only because the summer day is twenty-four hours long. This

means that in the short growing season the crops grow very rapidly, and

it also means that all the work has to be done in that limited time. If

the crops grow twenty-four or twenty-two or twenty hours, then the

peasant must work the harder. The wife and mother and children must

also work. Most of the farm work is done by each family for itself, but

some of it is done by the whole village co-operatively. I spent a

half-day working in a hayfield with peasants from Konetsgory who were

eight versts from home. There were seventy-five of them, men, women,

and children, and they stayed in that field five days and nights until

the great stacks were finished. The hay was community property to which

each family had a right in proportion to the number in the family. I

noticed that they ate by families while at this work, the food being

strictly private property. And I saw Mrs. "Smith" give Mrs. "Jones"

some of her fresh cake, and other little private property courtesies. I

asked if the families at Konetsgory not represented by workers in the

field would have a right to any of the hay. Of course they would,

because they were doing other work as directed by the staroster.

The staroster is a public official chosen by a meeting of the peasants

whose duty it is to assess labor for any public or co-operative purpose.

His assessments are compulsory upon men, women, children, and horses.

With most of the men in the army, as is now and has been the case for so

long, his chief labor resource of course is women. When there are

exceptions to his authority such as doctors and school teachers, these

persons do not count in the distributions of the co-operative products.

In all distributions of land and products now women are counted. This

is a result of the revolution and has been brought about not because it

was legislated but as a spontaneous product of the common sense of

right. When Russia does have an election, as we must hope some day she

will, these peasant people all assume as a matter of course that women

will vote.

Americans do not need to be told how backward Russia is in the matter of

machinery and especially agricultural machinery. But I gave myself a

surprise one day by going to every house in a small village and finding

in every house but one a one-horse cast-steel modern plow. I found also

some very good harrows and a few hand-wheel sewing machines, but

practically nothing else that could be called modern. I have since seen

two mowing machines and one hay-rake. The absence of machinery here is

practically as universal as it has been represented. There is no

prejudice against it and the people are not ignorant of it. They want

it, and they have plenty of money to buy it with, but it is not here to

buy, and the money has uncertain value.

There is so much printed matter in America proving eighty-five per cent

illiteracy among the Russian people that I approach this subject

timidly. I cannot find the eighty-five per cent. I have yet to find

one child ten years of age who cannot read and write, and the subject is

of such interest to me that I always inquired about it. I found some

old peasants who could not and some who could but sensitively would not

write their names for me. I had Russian soldiers line up by hundreds to

sign their names in a register and not a man would fail to write his

own. I had peasants tell me that they knew how to read and write when

they were children but had forgotten it since. I have no statistics on

the subject, but it would be interesting to have the statisticians go up

the Dvina River looking for the eighty-five per cent. In almost every

village the best house is the schoolhouse. When it is not the best it is

still a very good house. Among hundreds of villages there is not one of

twenty houses or more that does not maintain a school eight months of

the year.

Russia has but one church. I met a few dissentients--evangelicals and

atheists--but the dissent is not organized and there is very little

propaganda of reform. The Bolsheviki at first prohibited the church as

an evil thing. Many of the un-Bolshevik Russians have dropped the

church as a useless thing. But nobody seems to have undertaken to

reform the church. And yet one of the greatest reforms in

ecclesiastical history is taking place. In a moment and without warning

the physical and militant props dropped out from under this institution

and it had to stand alone or sink. Some of it did sink. Some of it was

scuttled by the Bolsheviki. Then came the aftermath--the afterthought of

the people. They missed something. They had not entirely outgrown the

church. They had hated its arrogance and exactions, but they still

believed what it had taught them and felt its spell. Now that they were

free from it they voluntarily returned to it. But it is with a new

attitude. These Russians go to church now looking for something that

they hardly find. And the priest's only resources now are

spiritual--superstition, art, inspiration, service, truth--perhaps he

will make use of all in the struggle for existence.

I was interested in the attitude of the peasants toward their priest in

a large village that we were about to evacuate. The Bolsheviki would be

there shortly after we should leave, and as they were reputed frequently

to shoot priests the military had arranged to take him with us. He had

received for his worldly needs a house to live in, the use of some land

which he and his wife had cultivated as peasants do, a certain amount of

money, and certain ecclesiastical emoluments. When the committee of

peasants came to settle with him they said: "You are favored above the

rest of us. You are taken to a place of safety while we are left to the

cruelty of the Bolsheviki. The first thing they will do will be to

demand much food from us. After that they may kill us. So you must

help with the food. You may take with you only eight bags of flour. You

may not sell your hay. You may sell your cow, but not the yearling."

There was no appeal, as this had all been decided upon by vote, in a

meeting. They took no money from him, nor gold, as they are told the

Bolsheviki do not consider gold has any particular value. They were

careful to see that he left everything pertaining to the church.

Talking with the priest afterward, having helped him build a fence

around "his" haystack, I asked him what he should do in the future. He

said he supposed he would be assigned to another church, but he wished

he could get a permanent job with the Y.M.C.A.

The sense of private property is very strong among these people. They

are jealous of what they own, and normally acquisitive. These easy

expropriations and confiscations arise not from an absence of interest

in private property but from the presence of a strong sense of common

right and communal responsibility. Private property is not so "sacred"

as with us but the acknowledgment of common responsibility is more

general.

I had occasion at one time to sell quickly about three hundred thousand

roubles' worth of supplies. I took a hurried trip through a string of

villages sending messengers to others, calling upon the president of the

co-operative society in each, and within a week I had sold out to the

co-operatives of twenty-two villages. My chief concern had been that

these goods should reach the peasants at cost, and they did. Each

co-operative gave me a statement showing the number of houses and of

people in the village, and showed me a statement giving the amount of

money that had been collected from each family as purchasing capital.

The staples, such as flour, sugar, and soap, were mostly distributed

among the houses within twenty-four hours. Every family was given the

privilege of buying its quota whether it had put up any purchasing

capital or not. These were their regular practices.

The meeting of all the peasants by vote determines many matters of minor

as well as major importance. The president of the co-operative at

Shamova told me that he had asked the meeting to permit him to buy

sardines, but they had voted against it. He wanted some sardines for

himself, but could not buy them in the name of the co-operative. Would

I sell them to him individually if he would sign a bond not to sell any

at a profit? One committee had come under instructions to buy only

flour and sugar, and as I had to ration these out with other goods in

order to dispose of my cargo quickly they had to row their great

carbosse back in the wind and rain twenty versts and call a meeting of

the peasants for revised instructions. Married women and widows vote in

these peasant meetings. One committee came with fifty thousand roubles

in its bundle, but with instructions not to spend more than half of it

unless they could buy cloth.

It seems to me almost unnecessary to say that I have found the Russian

people and the Russian soldiers scrupulously honest in all my dealings

with them.

The difference between their standards of morality and ours has been

often dwelt upon by our writers. This difference as I found it

consisted in the fact that they talk about sex more easily than we do

and think about it less vulgarly. I believe the peasant woman is as

virtuous as the average woman anywhere. And an intimate acquaintance

with thousands of soldiers throughout the winter has given me this

belief. Attractive women are not so rare as to fully explain the

unusually excellent medical reports of the N.R.E.F. And nowhere in the

West has the family tie been stronger nor the family organization so

rigidly maintained.

The war-weariness of these Russian people is beyond words to describe.

They are not in any sense militant in spirit. They do not believe in

war. Passive resistance they will resort to in a thousand ways and with

rare cunning and courageous persistence, but organized warfare is not to

their taste. Who rules Russia against her will or ideals from now on

will have a rocky road to travel, and who looks to her for militant

alliance is doomed to certain disappointment. I have had a Russian

officers' club in charge for two months and can say from personal

knowledge of these men that from colonels down they are utterly sick of

war and distrustful of its consequences. Before I went to Russia I felt

that Tolstoy had perhaps weakened the Russian spirit with his doctrine

of non-resistance. Now I think he only gave expression to what is most

common in the ideals of the Russian mind.

In politics the Russian people are amateurs. They do not know the game.

Not our game. They do not understand the compromises that are essential

to the democratic state. They cannot agree to disagree in amity. They

are inclined to be dogmatic. Like our own youth they are in search of

the absolute in truth and righteousness and frequently think they have

found it. But no higher ideals are to be found in any people than the

political ideals of these Russians, and their interest in politics is a

keen and vital one. I have attempted a number of speeches on political

subjects to Russian soldiers by the aid of an interpreter and have been

gratified both because I was understood and because I was asked

questions that indicated real intelligence in political matters.

I have witnessed a few peasants' meetings. At one the ownership of a

horse was hotly contested. A woman found the horse astray in the woods.

A boy claimed it, but it appeared that he had found it also only a few

days before. It probably had been owned in one of the villages that had

been burned in the fighting. The debate was loud and warm. The peasants

ranged themselves on the two sides and under the force of argument some

of them changed their opinion and so changed sides, arguing with each

other. Everybody argued. There was never an equal division. But the

Russian does not like majority votes. He insists on unanimity. There

came a calm, and an old peasant stood aside and said that neither

claimant had a good title to the horse, as its real owner might appear

and claim it, but suggested that if the boy would pay the woman ten

roubles for finding the horse he should hold it for six months and if by

that time no owner should appear the horse should be given to the

staroster as the property of the village. Everybody slowly went over to

the old peasant and the question was settled. The boy refused to pay

the ten roubles, so the woman paid ten roubles to him and took the

horse.

I do not know that they always do justice in the management of their

local affairs, but I am sure that if injustice is done everybody is

clearly responsible for it, for everybody seems to take a hand in

everything.

Fighting Without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia · 第 4 / 5 段