5. Prevention of overcapitalization of all corporations, of overcharge

for services rendered the public by such corporations.

6. Abolition of industrial trusts, those that exist because of tariff

protection and those that exist because of freight discriminations

whether by rebates, special rates or otherwise.

7. Taxation that will tax every man according to his accumulated

wealth—tax property, not man; collect state and municipal taxes by direct

tax on the accumulated wealth of society assessed at actual cash value;

collect national taxes by a direct tax on the earnings of accumulated

wealth, whether large or small. Have only direct taxes, for indirect

taxes cover injustice and extravagance.

8. Foreign policy that will keep our country out of all entangling

alliances with European and Asiatic countries, and strengthen our

economic relations with all American countries that have different soil,

climate and products from those of the United States.

These are the demands of the People’s Party, the cardinal principles

for which that party contends. They are all simple, easily understood,

and must have approval of a great majority of the American people when

brought to them for consideration by a party of the rank and file,

controlled by the people themselves, not dictated to by the money

oligarchy; by a party that stands for the interests of the many, not

of the few. I close, as I began, by saying we need organization and

education.

_The Panic of 1893_

BY W. S. MORGAN

Hon. THOMAS E. WATSON,

_Thomson, Ga._

MY DEAR SIR—I have your letter containing communications from James R.

Branch, Secretary of the American Bankers’ Association, New York City,

and Jno. D. Reynolds, President of First National Bank, of Rome, Ga., in

which they deny the authenticity of the Panic Bulletin published in my

contribution to the March issue of your magazine.

I remember when the Bulletin was first made public I asked a friend, a

president of the Citizens’ National Bank, of Fort Scott, Kan., a man with

whom I was intimately connected in business for ten or twelve years, if

such a circular had been issued. He replied that he had received a number

of circulars covering the propositions therein contained, and that likely

he had received that one. This incident, and the fact that the Bulletin

had been published from time to time for years and I had not seen its

authenticity questioned, and furthermore that its suggestions were in

line with the events of that date, led me to believe that it was genuine.

However, the authenticity of the circular was not the subject matter of

the article which provoked these denials. My indictment of the National

Bankers was not merely for issuing the Bulletin, but for doing the things

it suggested. Messrs. Branch and Reynolds have ignored the indictment

and attacked the witness. But there are other witnesses that can’t be

demolished.

After Mr. Cleveland had sent Henry Villard and Don M. Dickinson to

Washington, in the winter of 1893, and failed to secure from the

Fifty-second Congress the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman

law, the National Bankers began to show their hand.

It was seen that no ordinary pressure on Congress would secure the

demonetization of silver. It was claimed that the Panic Bulletin was

issued March 8, just four days after Cleveland’s second inauguration.

What was the program laid down in the Panic Bulletin?

1. The interests of the National Banks require immediate

financial legislation.

2. Silver, silver certificates and Treasury notes must be

retired and National Bank-notes, upon a gold basis, be made

the only kind of paper money.

3. Bonds required to be issued as a basis for the bank-note

circulation.

4. Pressure must be brought upon the people, especially in

sections of the country where the free silver sentiment was

strong. Circulation to be reduced, loans called in, credit

refused and general distrust spread broadcast through the

land.

5. Demand for an extra session of Congress to repeal the

purchasing clause of the Sherman law.

This was the program laid down by the Bulletin. Did it agree with the

action of the National Bankers? We shall see.

On the 11th of April, 1893, Grover Cleveland appointed Conrad C. Jordan

to be Assistant Treasurer of the United States.

In this capacity Jordan had control of the Sub-Treasury at New York.

The Sub-Treasury is the great business establishment of the Federal

Government. It is one of the associated banks of New York City.

Jordan was a banker, the President of the Western National, of New York

City, and was recommended for the position by the New York National Bank

Presidents. He was the go-between—the link which connected the National

Bankers with Cleveland and the Federal Government.

His nomination was confirmed on the 15th day of April, and on the 20th he

was in Washington with his bond and conferring with Cleveland.

From that hour things moved with wonderful rapidity.

Jordan left Washington on the 21st, arrived in New York at 5.30 in the

afternoon, went directly to the Chase National Bank, No. 15 Nassau

Street, where he met Henry W. Cannon, President of the Chase National

Bank, and J. Edward Simmons, President of the Fourth National, two of the

most active and influential of those who controlled the associated banks

and who constitute the “New York National Bank Ring.”

It must have been an important meeting, for that night Cannon left New

York for Washington on a midnight train, arriving in Washington Saturday

morning, April 22, and while there had interviews with Grover Cleveland.

On the morning of April 22 Jordan was sworn into office, and his first

act, official or semi-official, was to arrange for a meeting with certain

National Bank Presidents in the afternoon.

I can give you the names of most of the National Bank Presidents who

met Jordan that afternoon. The meeting was said to be informal, and its

proceedings were carefully guarded. But it was of such importance that

Jordan went to Washington on a late evening train to make a report of its

proceedings.

It was generally believed at the time, and there is little doubt of its

truth, that Jordan was simply given the office to mask his character as

confidential agent between Grover Cleveland and the New York National

Bank Presidents.

After a conference with Cleveland on Sunday morning, April 23, Jordan and

Cannon returned to New York, arriving there late in the evening. Before

leaving Washington Jordan wired certain National Bank Presidents to meet

him at a private house uptown.

What happened at that meeting we can only surmise. I mention it to show

the connection between the National Bank Presidents and Grover Cleveland.

The next morning, April 24, Jordan was at his desk. One of the first

things he did was to notify the National Bank Presidents and officers

of trusts and other companies to meet him that day at the Sub-Treasury.

This also was a dark-lantern meeting, and no one would give out the

proceedings. But what followed shortly afterward, and the action taken

by those who attended that meeting, justifies the belief that that

convention was called for the purpose of arranging a concerted attack

upon the national industries, agriculture, commerce, property and social

order of the American people—the assault to be directed by the New York

National Bank Presidents—as the swiftest and surest means of forcing

Congress to repeal the silver law—to give the country Cleveland’s

“Object-Lesson.”

Nine National Bank Presidents met John G. Carlisle at the Williams House

on April 27, presumably to complete the arrangements for the attack. No

doubt Cleveland had approved the conclusions reached on the 24th, and

sent Carlisle to sanction them.

Carlisle’s meeting with the Bank Presidents that day was, as you know,

a subject of much newspaper comment. The meeting was said to have been

one of “effusive cordiality,” and, in view of the events which quickly

followed, there is little doubt but what it partook of the nature of “two

hearts that beat as one.”

It was there that the National Bankers proposed an issue of bonds. But

Carlisle, like a young girl, although keen to marry, intimated that it

was “too sudden.”

This was the last of the series of meetings between the Government

officials and the National Bank Presidents preceding the panic.

Everything was now ready to give the country the “Object-Lesson.”

Within the next forty-eight hours the worst financial calamity that ever

befell the people was to break upon them.

At this time there was nothing in the industrial situation to precipitate

a panic. Prices had been low for several years, and there was none of the

spirit of speculation which usually precedes a panic.

Cleveland himself volunteered to say: “Our unfortunate financial plight

is not the result of untoward events, nor of conditions relating to our

natural resources, nor is it traceable to any of the afflictions which

frequently check national growth and prosperity. With plenteous crops,

with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture, with

unusual invitation to safe investment and with satisfactory assurance to

business enterprise, suddenly financial distrust and fear have sprung up

on every side.”

Thus the people and all those engaged in industrial and productive

enterprises are exonerated.

Who are the guilty persons?

The men who did just what that Panic Bulletin describes.

The bankers who demanded the practical demonetization of silver; who

demanded a special session of Congress to secure it; who called in their

loans and reduced their circulation; who demanded and secured the issue

of bonds, and who now demand the retirement of the greenbacks.

Messrs. Branch and Reynolds and other National Bank advocates may be able

to repudiate the Panic Bulletin, but they cannot successfully deny that

every feature of the program it contained was carried out in detail by

the men who practically control the National Bank system.

Four days after the Williams House meeting at which Secretary Carlisle

was present, the New York banks began to call in their loans with brutal

vindictiveness.

We are not left to conjecture the effect of such a policy on the New York

Exchange. By the 5th of May the strain had become intense. The New York

_Tribune_ of May 6, referring to the condition of the market, said: “The

enormous losses of the last week, the utter demoralization of the buying

power in the market and the practical paralysis of credit, promised a

liquidation that, unless stayed, would have swept them all off their

feet.”

On May 7 the same paper said: “The effort of the Administration to bring

the South and West to a full realization of the inevitable consequences

of compulsory purchases of silver bullion has brought distress and

perhaps ruin to many innocent persons—but there is no reason to suppose

that it will be relaxed.”

Within ten days from the time of the Williams House meeting between

Cleveland’s Secretary of the Treasury and the National Bank Presidents

the panic had spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and for forty days

it continued with unabated fury. On the 9th of May several Western banks

were forced to close their doors.

“There is no lack of pressure,” said the New York _Tribune_ on the 22d of

May.

On the 6th of June—six weeks after the Williams House meeting—the New

York _Sun_, in its money article, said: “The Presidents of the New York

National Banks think that the so-called “Object-Lesson” has been carried

far enough. They see nothing to be gained by a further shrinkage of

values and unsettling of credits.”

It is useless for me to detail the results of the panic.

From May 9 to 30, inclusive, sixty banks were forced to suspend, and

fifty-eight of them were in the doomed section—the South, West and

Northwest.

From the time of the Williams House meeting, April 27, to December 30,

1893, a period of eight months, more than fifteen thousand bankruptcies

and suspensions had occurred. Over six hundred banks had been driven to

the wall, and the loss to the country in round numbers was SEVEN HUNDRED

AND FIFTY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS.

But the National Bank Presidents had won their fight. They had carried

out the program laid down in the Panic Bulletin, an extra session of

Congress had been called and the purchasing clause repealed.

That the “Object-Lesson” was intended for the West and South is evidenced

by the records. Out of 169 banks failing from March 5 to August 4, five

only were in Eastern States, forty-eight in Southern and 151 in Western

states—Dunn’s Report.

Dunn’s Report for July 21, 1893, says: “A large proportion of the

suspended Colorado banks and mercantile institutions will pay in full and

resume business, inability to borrow money on or sell ample collateral

alone being the cause of the Denver banks closing their doors.”

No doubt the panic reached proportions not at first intended by the

National Bank Presidents and threatened their own financial standing,

as Mr. Branch suggests is the case in time of panics. But they had a

remedy, no doubt decided upon beforehand. While they refused credit to

the Southern and Western banks, they issued Clearing House certificates

to the extent of $63,152,000 to themselves, an act which was in violation

of the law.

There is so much evidence obtainable to the effect that the National

Bankers are guilty of every count in the indictment contained in the

Panic Bulletin that a book could be filled with it.

In a speech in the United States Senate August 25, 1893, Senator David

B. Hill, referring to the bankers, said: “They inaugurated the policy of

refusing loans to the people even upon the best security, and attempted

in every way to spread disaster broadcast throughout the land. These

disturbers—the promoters of public peril—represented largely the creditor

class, the men who desire to appreciate the gold dollar in order to

subserve their own selfish interests, men who revel in hard times, men

who drive harsh bargains with their fellow-men regardless of financial

distress. It is not strange that the present panic has been induced,

intensified and protracted by reason of these malign influences. Having

contributed much to bring about the present exigency, these men are now

unable to control it. They have sown the wind, and we are now all reaping

the whirlwind together” (_Congressional Record_, Vol. XXV, Part I, p.

865).

August 8, 1893, Senator Teller said, in a speech in the United States

Senate:

“It is the height of folly that this is a panic caused by distrust of

the currency.” On the 29th of the same month the Senator from Colorado,

referring to the Williams House meeting of Secretary Carlisle with

the New York National Bank Presidents, said: “It is a most remarkable

interview; it will go far to support the charges which I am not going to

make on my own authority, but which I am going to make upon the authority

of others, that this panic is a bankers’ panic, brought by the action

of the New York banks, and brought about for distinct purposes, which

purposes were practically avowed on the 27th of April. The same things

have been reiterated by the financial papers, and the policy is still

continued up to the present hour. It had two objects in view. One was to

secure from the United States a large issue of bonds, and the other to

secure the repeal of the much-abused Sherman law.”

The records show that the bankers accomplished both of these objects.

They secured the repeal of the purchasing clause, and afterward the issue

of $262,000,000 in bonds.

In the same speech Senator Teller said: “There are many banks in the

West, and some that I know of, which shut their doors because they could

not draw the money that they had on deposit in New York” (_Congressional

Record_, Vol. XXV, Part I, p. 1022).

In its issue of August 20, 1893, the Chicago _Inter-Ocean_ said:

“When the future historian tells the world of the great financial panic

of 1893, he will say: ‘In the winter and spring months of that year the

New York bankers and financiers sowed the wind, and in the summer months

reaped the whirlwind.’

“We know of no arrangement of words that can more graphically describe

the action of the New York financiers and the results of that action.

Colonel Ingersoll, early in the season of disturbance, properly called

this a ‘bankers’ panic.’ Nor are the New York bankers alone to blame.

Those of Boston and Philadelphia come in for their share.”

But it is useless for me to continue to pile up testimony to further

sustain my contention. Whether the Panic Bulletin is a “canard” or not,

its suggestions were carried into effect. The bankers opposed silver,

and, for the purpose of having the law providing for its issue repealed,

they precipitated the panic and used the methods described in the

Bulletin to accomplish their ends. They are opposed to greenbacks, and

if necessary will, I have no doubt, precipitate another panic in order

to have them retired. And it all goes to show that the control of the

currency should be taken out of their hands.

W. S. MORGAN.

_Hardy, Ark._

_The Cradle of Tears_

BY THEODORE DREISER

_Author of “Sister Carrie”_

There is a cradle within the door of one of the great institutions of New

York before which a constantly recurring tragedy is being enacted. It is

a plain cradle, quite simply draped in white, but with such a look of

cozy comfort about it that one would scarcely suspect it to be a cradle

of sorrow.

A little white bed with a neatly turned-back coverlet is made up within

it. A long strip of white muslin, tied in a tasteful bow at the top,

drapes its rounded sides. About it, but within the precincts of warmth

and comfort, of which it is a fort, spreads a chamber of silence—a quiet,

solemn, plainly furnished room, the appearance of which emphasizes the

peculiarity of the cradle itself.

If the mind were not familiar with the details with which it is so

startlingly associated, the question would naturally arise as to what it

was doing there—why it should be standing there alone. No one seems to

be watching it. It has not the slightest appearance of usefulness, and

yet there it stands, day after day, and year after year—a ready prepared

cradle and no infant to live in it.

And yet this cradle is the most useful and, in a way, the most inhabited

cradle in the world. Day after day, and year after year, it is the

recipient of more small wayfaring souls than any other cradle in the

world. In it the real children of sorrow are placed, and over it more

tears are shed than if it were an open grave.

It is the place where annually 1,200 foundlings are placed, many of them

by mothers who are too helpless or too unfortunately environed to be

further able to care for their child, and the misery which compels it

makes of the little open crib a cradle of tears.

The interest of this particular cradle is, that it has been the silent

witness of more truly heartbreaking scenes than any other cradle since

the world began. For nearly thirty-five years it has stood where it does

today, ready-draped, open, while as many thousand mothers have stolen

shamefacedly in and, after looking hopelessly about, have laid their

helpless offspring within its depths.

For thirty-five years, winter and summer, in the bitterest cold and the

most stifling heat, it has seen them come—the poor, the rich; the humble,

the proud; the beautiful, the homely—and one by one they have laid their

children down and brooded over them, wondering whether it were possible

for human love to make so great a sacrifice and yet not die.

And then when the child has been actually sacrificed, when by the simple

act of releasing their hold upon it and turning away they have actually

allowed it to pass out from their love and tenderness into the world

unknown, this silent cradle has seen them smite their hands in anguish

and yield to such voiceless tempests of grief as only those know who have

loved much and lost all.

The circumstances under which this peculiar charity comes to be a part

of the life of the great metropolis need not be rehearsed here. The

heartlessness of men, the frailty of women, the brutality of all those

who sit in judgment in spite of the fact that they do not wish to be

judged themselves, is so old and so commonplace that its repetition is

almost a weariness.

Still the tragedy repeats itself, and year after year, and day after

day the unlocked door is opened and dethroned virtue enters—the victim

of ignorance and passion and affection, and a child is robbed of an

honorable home.

_The Racing Trust_

BY THOMAS B. FIELDERS

The only Trust that has the sincere and earnest and unfaltering support

of the daily press is the most audacious, the most grasping, the most

immoral of all trusts. This is the Racing Trust. There are hundreds of

trusts in this country. All corporations that have eliminated or lessened

competition to a marked degree are called trusts. It is asserted,

commonly, that such combinations are against the laws of the states that

form the Union and are in opposition to the Federal Constitution. If the

Beef Trust or the Sugar Trust or the Standard Oil Trust have advocates

among the daily newspapers of the country, these advocates are not

earning their salt, to say nothing of their salaries. The only support

they have the courage to give is silence. Yet it has to be proven that

these trusts have infringed the law.

In the case of the Racing Trust there is no doubt. There is none to deny

that it is an absolute monopoly. It conducts business in open defiance

of the law and the Constitution. It has the avarice of a miser, and the

impudent shamelessness of a courtezan. All who will help to fill its

maw are received with open arms. Lacking morals, it expects none of its

patrons. Within its portals the scum of humanity is made as welcome as

the cream. It has its rules, but these are without and beyond the law,

though, curiously, they are enforced by so-called guardians of the law.

The Beef Trust, by its rapacious methods, may make vegetarians; the

Racing Trust makes outcasts, who, sometimes, rise to the dignity of

convicts. The Beef Trust shuns advertisement; the Racing Trust welcomes

it. Any reputable undertaking must pay heavily for the support of the

press; the Racing Trust gets such support in columns per day for a

ridiculously small subvention. The press poses as a teacher of morality.

In the case of the Racing Trust it plays the part of a panderer without

getting the price insisted upon by that unutterable in any other walk of

life.

Americans believe that they possess a quality of humor that is far

superior to that which bears the hall-mark of any other nationality.

’Tis a comfortable belief, for it enables them to live cheerfully under

conditions which would not be tolerated elsewhere. There are several

kinds of humorists among us, and of these the men who make inadequate

laws, or laws which they know will be broken, and the men who break them

and go unpunished are worthy of more and of a different sort of attention

than they receive. People growl at the Beef Trust on account of the high

prices of beef, though Mr. Garfield, who was instructed by the President

to investigate that Trust, has said that its profits are only moderate.

What of the profits of the Racing Trust? Monte Carlo is described

invariably as the most delectable gold mine in the world. In ordinary

gold mines the vein may be “pinched out”; in Monte Carlo it runs on

forever. Games made by gamblers for gamblers are called games of chance.

There is little humor in your gambler, else he would recognize the

absence of chance. Many thousands have tried to “break the bank” at Monte

Carlo. Nobody has succeeded, for while play is conducted there honestly,

the games are of the “sure thing” variety, as the percentage is always

in favor of the bank. But the shareholders of the Casino at Monte Carlo

are satisfied with twenty per cent. per annum on their investment and,

sometimes, get less. And let it be remembered that in conducting their

business they do not break the law.

The Racing Trust would scorn to accept anything so paltry as twenty per

cent. on its investment, yet it is a law-breaker for seven months of the

year, on six days of the week, and in the course of time, doubtless, will

break it on the seventh day of the week also.

Laws against gambling have existed from time beyond count, just as they

have existed against murder and other crimes against public welfare. The

Constitution of the state of New York prohibited all kinds of gambling

until 1887. In that year the Legislature passed the “Ives Pool bill.”

Ives was a member of the Legislature from this city. Except that he

piloted this particular bill through a legislature which was paid to

adopt it, his name would have been forgotten. The bill called by his

name suspended the provisions of the Penal Code relating to gambling at

race-tracks. It limited racing between May 15 and October 15. It limited

racing upon any track to thirty days. It permitted bookmaking upon the

tracks. In return for enormous privileges the racing associations were

to pay to the state five per cent. of their gross receipts. The law

confined gambling to the tracks, and in order to take full advantage

of it, and also, of course, to improve the breed of racing stock,

philanthropists of the convict stripe opened tracks where racing was

conducted at night as well as by day, in winter as well as in summer. The

manner in which racing was conducted became a public scandal. The horse

was the principal factor, and, generally, was used as a means to an end.

There were, of course, owners and trainers and jockeys who were honest,

even under the Ives Pool law, but these were very much in a minority.

The “sport” reeked with dishonesty. Horses were “pulled,” trainers and

jockeys were “stiffened.” Some of the racing officials not only winked

at “crookedness,” but took part in it. Unless the starter of those days

had a piece of every “good thing,” it did not “come off” if he could

prevent it. None talked of the improvement “of the breed” except with

tongue in cheek. “Jobs” were discussed, after the event, as if they had

been meritorious performances. When these were the work of trainers and

jockeys the bookmakers were derided; when they were planned and realized

by bookmakers the latter were cursed. There was much cursing in those

days, as there was much reason for it, but the profanity was not due to

the failure of honest, but dishonest effort. Women as well as men were

allowed to bet, and the race-tracks were hotbeds of debauchery. The great

body of those who were interested in racing was beyond the pale. The

refuse of the country camped in New York while the orgy lasted, and so

obnoxious did these bandits make themselves that an organized effort was

made to induce the constitutional convention which met in 1895 to cleanse

the state of the filth which was bred by the Ives Pool law.

This convention appointed a committee, whose duty it was to prepare an

address to the people of the state. The address dealt with the work of

the convention. The committee called attention to the anti-gambling

amendment adopted by the convention in the following language: “The

passion for gambling to which the system of lotteries formerly ministered

has found fresh opportunity under the so-called Ives Pool bill, and,

under color and pretext of betting upon horse races, is working

widespread demoralization and ruin among the young and weak throughout

the community. We have extended the prohibition against lotteries so as

to include pool-selling, bookmaking and other forms of gambling. It is

claimed that this provision will array in opposition to the proposed

Constitution a great and unscrupulous money power; but we appeal to the

virtue and sound judgment of the people to sustain the position which we

have taken.”

This address was signed by Messrs. Joseph H. Choate (Ambassador to

England), Elihu Root, H. T. Cookinham, Elon R. Brown, Chester B.

McLaughlin, Milo M. Acker, Daniel H. McMillan and M. H. Hirschberg.

The anti-gambling amendment, which was adopted by the convention with

only four dissenting votes, was as follows:

“The delegates of the People of the state of New York, in convention

assembled, do propose as follows:

“Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution is hereby amended so as to

read: ‘No law shall be passed abridging the right of the people peaceably

to assemble and to petition the Government or any department thereof;

nor shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by judicial proceedings;

_nor shall any lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-selling,

bookmaking or any kind of gambling hereafter be authorized or allowed

within this state, and the Legislature shall pass appropriate laws to

prevent offenses against any of the provisions of this section_.’”

The “great and unscrupulous money power” to which Mr. Choate and his

associates alluded was that of the racing associations. Their power was

felt in the convention, and some of those who discussed the amendment

prior to its adoption claimed that it was offered at the suggestion of

one set of gamblers (poolroom keepers) against another set of gamblers

(the racing associations). This was true enough. The racing associations

were as grasping then as they are now. Their members claimed that the

poolroom was a nefarious and demoralizing influence. Why? Because it

prevented the racing associations from having a monopoly of the petty as

well as the big gamblers’ money—of the cash of those who had not time to

go to the races as well as of those who were unable to go. The engines

of the law were stoked up and run full tilt against the poolrooms at

the behest of the racing associations; therefore, in self-defense, the

poolroom keepers were anxious that all gamblers should be placed on the

same level; hence the anti-gambling amendment to the Constitution. Mr.

Telusky, who offered the amendment as a resolution, said that if any

member of the convention “can name one man in the state of New York

that is in the bookmaking business that is not a thief, a blackguard

or an ex-convict, I will withdraw my resolution. I say, Mr. President,

every bookmaker in the state of New York, no matter where he comes from,

is nothing but an ex-convict, a cracksman, a pickpocket, a thief of

the lowest character, and these men come here and desire to shut this

(amendment) out because the Legislature of a few years ago legalized a

certain kind of gambling, and they are trying to protect them.”

Mr. Edward Lauterbach paid his compliments to the racing associations in

plain language. “Their nefarious establishments,” he said, “have been

erected from Montauk Point to Niagara Falls, and the state treasury has

received and distributed to the county fairs a few miserable shekels,

which it has reserved as its share of the plunder. _Why, for every dollar

that the state has received, it has expended ten dollars to support those

who have become inmates of its prisons by reason of the weak policy so

pursued._ You are all familiar with the terrible temptation of this

alluring vice. The passion of gambling is pandered to in this fashion in

the most insidious manner. Exaggerated accounts of great winnings are

presented to the readers of every journal. Tens of thousands of young men

and women have been hurled to their ruin through the instrumentality of

the state that should have protected them. Gambling has already been made

unlawful. If anyone desires to legalize any one branch of gambling by the

suggestion of proposed amendment (to the anti-gambling amendment), let

us say to him, Never. Let us pass this amendment, so that, once enacted

into a law, it may carry out its beneficent purpose and not prove a sham

and a deceit. Just as it was as reported let us have this amendment—no

subterfuge, no change, no alterations; make no halfway work. Sweep the

whole brood together—gamblers, pool-sellers, bookmakers, all the racing

fraternity—into oblivion forever. Pass this amendment now, as it is,

unaltered and unchanged. True horse fanciers—the Bonners, the Lorillards,

the Belmonts, the Keenes and the rest—will thank you for the protection

you thus afford to their legitimate pursuit. Only the gambler, who should

be a pariah and an outcast, and not the state’s associate, will have

cause for regret.”

It was said at the time that the racing associations and the bookmakers

had collected a fund of $700,000, and intended to use it in buying enough

votes in the convention to defeat the anti-gambling amendment. Who said

it? The newspapers. True? Not at all likely. The racing associations

were able to raise such a fund, but would have got little assistance

from the bookmakers. The latter were an asset of the racing associations

and knew it; they must be taken care of. ’Twas said, when Mr. Jerome was

at Albany championing the Dowling bill, that the gamblers of New York

had contributed $100,000 for the purchase of the Black Horse Cavalry

in the Legislature. The press gave Troy as the headquarters of the

gamblers’ committee. There was no such committee. The gamblers of New

York, including Canfield, who had more at stake than any other gambler,

did not contribute a dollar for the purpose of killing the Dowling bill.

The latter was passed with surprising ease in Assembly and Senate, and

had become a law before the “clever division” had begun to think of the

possibility of such a result. This law, in the hands of Mr. Jerome, has

proved rather embarrassing to the gambling fraternity, and may give him

an opportunity of distinguishing himself in a manner after his own heart

before many weeks have passed.

The anti-gambling amendment to the Constitution was ratified by a popular

majority of nearly 90,000 votes. Some of the voters believed, doubtless,

that it would eliminate betting on race-tracks. These forgot that the

amendment was of little worth unless the Legislature made such gambling

an offense and also made a punishment to fit the offense. The Legislature

which followed the adoption of the Constitution was “open to reason.”

How much money was required to salve its conscience I do not know, but

the manner in which it replied to the demand of the popular vote shows

that it was dishonest. By the anti-gambling clause of the Constitution

it was ordered to “pass appropriate laws to prevent offenses against any

of the provisions of this section.” Instead of obeying such mandate it

adopted the Percy-Gray law, which makes gambling in poolrooms a felony

and gambling on race-tracks a misdemeanor. In other words, if the keeper

of a poolroom takes a bet on a horse race he commits a felony and can be

sent to jail, for according to the law he has committed a penal offense,

whereas if a bookmaker accepts your money on the same race he does not

commit a felony and you are at liberty to publish yourself as a poor sort

of creature by attempting to recover your money by civil action. Class

legislation? It looks like it. But class legislation is unconstitutional.

That is the general opinion, but in this particular case many thousands

of dollars have been spent in an effort to discover whether or not the

present racing law is unconstitutional, and the dollars have been thrown

away.

The situation would be amusing did it not demonstrate the power of money.

To the average mind it would seem as if the constitutional convention had

barred all kinds of gambling, particularly gambling on race-tracks. Yet,

under the fostering care of the Racing Trust, the volume of gambling at

race-tracks is at least thrice as great today as it was in 1895. Before

the convention met the Racing Trust was permitted to do business for five

months in the year; now it does business for seven months. Under the

Ives Pool law, which was wiped out as vicious, the tracks were limited

to thirty days of racing; now the Jockey Club does as it pleases in the

matter of dates. Under a law which is, upon its face, unconstitutional

because it discriminates, the Racing Commission, a state institution, has

the power to issue or refuse licenses. The Racing Commission is under the

control of the Jockey Club, and the latter is the ruler of the racing

associations. The Jockey Club, of which Mr. August Belmont is the head,

is lord of all it surveys in the metropolitan circuit, to say nothing of

the Bennings race-track, in which a majority of the stock is owned by

Mr. Belmont. Racing began at Bennings on March 23, and its dates are not

included in the seven months of racing in the metropolitan circuit.

In this circuit there are seven tracks, not counting the Buffalo track,

which is controlled by the Racing Trust. The track at Morris Park, the

most picturesque race-course in the United States, has been relegated

to obscurity, as it was not owned by the Racing Trust, but was leased

at an annual rental of $45,000. Belmont Park, which is owned by Mr.

August Belmont, the head of the Racing Trust, has taken its place. The

associations which are controlled by the Racing Trust are capitalized as

follows:

Westchester Racing Association (Belmont Park) $1,500,000

Queens County Jockey Club (Aqueduct) 700,000

Metropolitan jockey Club (Jamaica) 550,000

Coney Island Jockey Club (Sheepshead Bay) 525,000

Brooklyn Jockey Club (Gravesend) 500,000

Brighton Beach Racing Association 300,000

Buffalo Racing Association 200,000

Saratoga Association for the Improvement

of the Breed of Horses 50,000

----------

Total $4,325,000

These figures were obtained from the Secretary of State, the Hon. John

F. O’Brien. In any calculations that may be made the capitalization

of Belmont Park should be eliminated and the rental of Morris Park,

$45,000, substituted for $1,500,000, in order to show how thriving a

concern the Racing Trust is. It will be understood, of course, that the

capitalization of these concerns may be a trifle, just a trifle, higher

than the actual value of the said tracks and appurtenances, except in the

case of the Saratoga track, which was built solely “for the improvement

of the breed of horses.”

For the right to do business on these tracks the Racing Trust pays, or is

supposed to pay, to the state five per cent. upon the gross earnings of

said tracks. Among the duties of the Racing Commission is the supervision

of these receipts. The commission consists of Messrs. August Belmont,

John Sanford and E. D. Morgan. Mr. Belmont is the president of the

Westchester Racing Association (Belmont Park), and the largest owner of

stock in the Racing Trust. Mr. Sanford is the power at Saratoga, and

does not race until the season opens at the Spa. Attached to the Racing

Commission is a State Inspector of Races. Until he was appointed to a

position in the Internal Revenue Department the place was filled by

Charles W. Anderson, a colored man. Reports of gross receipts are made

to the State Comptroller by the racing associations and by the State

Inspector of Races. It is not impossible that the latter official takes

such figures as are offered to him, and it is difficult to imagine that

he ever objected to them on the score of inaccuracy or any other score.

The reports of gross receipts made by the members of the Racing Trust to

the State Comptroller for the years 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903 and 1904 are

as follows (the figures were obtained from the State Comptroller, the

Hon. Otto Kelsey):

1900. 1901. 1902.

Coney Island Jockey Club $494,895.06 $640,327.97 $820,184.18

Brooklyn Jockey Club 474,887.88 593,472.72 761,394.65

Brighton Beach 307,311.30 407,611.75 502,940.25

Westchester 323,041.23 432,187.86 571,178.79

Saratoga 137,248.21 272,612.24 359,342.40

Metropolitan

Queens 164,555.14 225,417.69 324,177.82

Buffalo 62,519.80

------------ ------------- -------------

Totals $1,901,938.82 $2,571,630.23 $3,401,737.89

1903. 1904.

Coney Island Jockey Club $903,128.84 $854,421.20

Brooklyn Jockey Club 790,054.07 731,559.26

Brighton Beach 559,348.00 626,837.10

Westchester 623,131.27 566,143.62

Saratoga 439,649.49 393,550.09

Metropolitan 355,270.70 307,396.03

Queens 282,900.88 218,729.16

Buffalo 60,857.63 106,489.05

------------- -------------

Totals $4,014,340.88 $3,805,125.51

The reader will notice the exactness with which the racing associations

make up their gross receipts—the “twenty cents” of the Coney Island

Jockey Club, the “nine cents” of the Saratoga “Association for the

Improvement of the Breed of Horses,” and so on. The reader will notice,

also, that the gross receipts for last year were $209,215.37 less than

those of 1903, though the press was unanimous in declaring that last

year’s racing was the greatest, which means the most profitable of all

years. The five per cent. paid to the state last year by the Racing Trust

amounted to $190,256.27. This five per cent. is “the penny in the dollar”

alluded to by Mr. Edward Lauterbach in his address to the constitutional

convention. But ridiculously small as it is, why does the Racing Trust

give it to the state? Simply as a sop to the rural legislator and his

constituents. The dweller in cities may lack some or many of the virtues,

but when it is necessary to find the highest plane of parsimonious

hypocrisy one must needs pay a visit to the rural districts. This five

per cent., which smacks so much of Iscariot’s thirty pieces of silver,

is divided among such agricultural societies as give annual fairs, and

to farmers’ institutes. Ostensibly it is intended for the improvement

of agriculture; in reality much of it is given as purses for trotting

races at the said county fairs. Without the support of the rural element

the Racing Trust would not have succeeded in getting the adoption of the

Percy-Gray racing law.

The profits of the Racing Trust are enormous. Take the Coney Island

Jockey Club, for instance. Mr. Leonard Jerome, who was a sportsman who

never made money out of sport, built the Sheepshead Bay track at a

cost of $125,000. The grounds of the Coney Island Jockey Club belong

to the people and were filched from them by an act of the Legislature.

Improvements were made since the track was built, but the actual legal

belongings of the Coney Island Jockey Club are worth far less than the

amount of the capital stock, which is $525,000. The gross receipts of

the club for last year, as reported to the State Comptroller, were

$854,421.20. Of what did these consist? It was said that the attendance

on “big days” last year numbered from 40,000 to 50,000. Put it at 35,000,

and the money taken in for admission, boxes and clubhouse seats and boxes

and for “field” admissions would amount to about $80,000. Then there are

the bookmakers. On more than one day last year there were 120 members of

the Metropolitan Turf Association in the ring. They paid $57 each for the

privilege of “laying the odds.” Back of them were a hundred layers who

paid $37 each. There were fifty others who paid $27, and as many more who

paid $17 each. Programs to the number of 40,000 at ten cents each make

$400. Then there are the bar and restaurant privileges, the commissioners

and many other means of income, so that the income of one such day could

not be less than $100,000.

There were thirty days of racing at Sheepshead Bay last year.

The attendance, according to the daily press, was “enormous,”

“record-breaking,” “large” or “highly satisfactory.” The “highly

satisfactory” days were the smallest of the season, which shows the

difference between English as it is understood by “sporting” writers in

the daily press and those who are able to distinguish the difference

between fact and fancy. If the average daily attendance were not more

than 12,500, it and the other sources of revenue would mean about $35,000

per day.

Thirty days’ racing at $35,000 per day $1,050,000

Expenses of all kinds at $10,000 per day 300,000

--------

Balance in favor of the club $750,000

The sum of $10,000 per day will cover all the expenses, including added

money, at Sheepshead Bay. According to such calculation and taking the

club’s figures of gross receipts as correct, the result would be like

this:

Receipts for thirty days’ racing $854,421.20

Expenses for thirty days’ racing at $10,000 per day 300,000.00

-----------

Balance in favor of the club $554,421.20

These figures show that the profits of the Coney Island Jockey Club for

_thirty days_ of racing are more than the full amount of its capital

stock. Some years ago, when racing was conducted on a smaller scale, this

stock paid 56 per cent. per annum. Unless a lot of money is packed away

in a reserve fund, the stock should pay dollar for dollar now, and the

state still gets the “penny in the dollar.”

Much of the income was contributed by the chief factors at a

race-course—the men who own and race horses; and one of the most

interesting features of a race meeting, to members of the Racing Trust,

is the fact that the men who own the horses are racing for money

contributed, in great part, by themselves. The money added by the racing

associations is often less than the amounts furnished by owners of

horses that have been entered for a race. Much stress is laid upon the

fact that $2,601,160 was won in purses last year on the tracks of the

metropolitan circuit and Bennings. This amount, large as it may seem, was

so distributed that very few owners paid much more than expenses, while a

far larger number lost much money. Four hundred and thirty-eight stables

or owners were among the winners, and a glance at the following table

will show that the losers were in a large majority.

OWNERS AND WINNINGS

Herman B. Duryea $200,043

James R. Keene 164,940

E. R. Thomas 151,210

Sydney Paget 133,441

Newton Bennington 104,210

John A. Drake 99,480

S. S. Brown 82,472

R. T. Wilson, Jr. 69,115

John E. Madden 55,830

Goughacres Stable 50,084

Thomas Hitchcock, Jr. 44,540

W. B. Jennings 34,605

M. L. Hayman 34,330

John Sanford 33,435

W. B. Leeds 32,320

L. V. Bell 31,520

J. W. Colt 23,130

Waldeck Stable 23,050

M. Corbett 22,445

J. L. McGinnis 21,400

Andrew Miller 20,155

Frank Farrell 19,980

W. C. Daly 18,495

“Mr. Cotton” 18,135

“Mr. Chamblet” 17,605

P. Lorillard 17,290

J. E. Widener 16,970

C. F. Fox 16,810

A. L. Aste 16,705

S. Deimel 16,605

J. McLaughlin 16,490

E. W. Jewett 16,165

August Belmont 15,745

Columbia Stable 15,317

W. Lakeland 15,220

Boston Stable 14,765

H. T. Griffin 14,555

F. R. Hitchcock 14,405

J. G. Greener 14,200

Albemarle Stable 12,895

T. L. Watt 12,755

E. E. Smathers 12,695

N. Dyment 11,900

U. Z. De Arman 11,080

Oneck Stable 10,600

John J. Ryan 10,515

W. M. Sheftel 10,515

W. L. Oliver 10,425

P. J. Dwyer 10,382

Joseph E. Seagram 9,305

Mrs. J. Blute 9,305

David Gideon (9 horses) 9,230

H. C. Schulz 8,910

W. F. Fanshawe 8,775

J. L. Holland 8,765

C. E. Rowe 8,475

F. R. Docter 8,440

J. W. Schorr 8,295

R. H. McCarter Potter 8,060

National Stable 7,805

J. C. Yeager 7,720

H. J. Morris 7,600

Fairview 7,405

T. D. Sullivan 7,335

Frederick Johnson 7,260

Chelsea Stable 7,090

In addition to the foregoing, 155 stables won between $1,000 and $7,000

each. Some of these stables had as many as a dozen starters who “figured

in the money.” Stables or owners to the number of 217 won between $100

and $1,000 each. Of this number fifty-four were in the $100 class. The

average winnings for the 438 stables were $5,938, which sum tells a

doleful tale for a majority of them, as the expenses of one thoroughbred

and its owner for a year cannot well be squeezed into $5,938, unless the

horse’s diet is restricted to hay and the owner lives at a Mills hotel.

Mr. Keene’s winnings were $164,940. That amount about paid his racing

expenses for the year.

All of which, I think, goes to prove that the Racing Trust is more

anxious to make and increase enormous profits than to improve the

breed of horses. And everybody is aware that such enormous profits are

made only by violation of the Constitution of the state, and that,

while gambling in poolrooms and elsewhere has been made difficult and

dangerous, no effort has been made by the authorities to interfere with

it on the tracks of the Racing Trust.

_Dependence_

Not that there are not “other eyes

In Spain” as bright as yours can be,

But that no eyes in all the world

Can ever seem as bright to me.

Not that there are not lips as sweet

Kissed daily by each separate wind,

But that no other lips to me

Can seem so sweet, can be so kind.

Sweetheart, I own myself your slave

Because you own yourself my thrall;

I—with so little, dear, to give;

You—who so gladly give me all.

REGINALD WRIGHT KAUFFMAN.

_What Buzz-Saw Morgan Thinks_

BY W. S. MORGAN

Paternalism is preferable to infernalism.

When the gentleman with the cloven hoof collects what is coming to him

there won’t be many bag barons left.

The Beef Trust does business on a sliding scale; the price they pay

slides down, and the price they sell at slides up.

A pauper lives off the public, and so do those who make their money

through special privileges granted them by law.

As Bryan is losing prestige with the people he is becoming more popular

with the plutocrats.

The United States Senate should be rechristened and called the

Corporations’ Cuckoo’s nest.

The way to make the cuss-toady-ans of public interests more amenable to

our will is to have ready an Imperative Mandate lariat.

Yes, the trusts are in the people’s pasture, and they got in over

Republican and Democratic fences.

It is better that a whole lot of business shall be “hurted” than that the

trusts should continue to rob the people and be a standing menace to free

government.

The Governor of Kansas is right; building a state refinery is not

Socialism; it is competition, just what the Populists stand for.

The trusts also have “big sticks.”

The Standard Oil Company has outlawed itself and ought to be “swatted”

off the face of the earth.

The bandit bag barons are going to have some hard sledding from now on.

If the concentration of wealth means the destruction of the republic,

then the people have a right to stop the concentration of wealth.

The fact that the trusts are now in control of the railroads is another

reason why the Government should own them.

An economic principle that does not rest upon a moral basis should

receive no support from honest men.

Every applicant for a special legalized privilege is an enemy to good

government.

It is the men who are always hammering at the doors of legislation for

special privileges that want “something for nothing.”

The greatest power in the world is that which controls the volume of

money, and the Republicans are talking about turning that power over to a

few private buccaneers.

When the very rich men are called by their right names there will not be

such a scramble to get rich.

It is to be hoped that in this fight with the trusts and railroad

corporations that “big stick” of Teddy’s will not prove to be a stuffed

club.

If Uncle Sam wants to mix his credit with anybody’s let him mix it with

that of the farmers. Their security is better than bonds.

More that half of the men in the United States Senate wear corporation

collars.

If all the big thieves were sentenced to jail we should have to turn the

little thieves out in order to make room for them.

I challenge anyone to point out a single instance in this country where

the national bankers have made a recommendation in the interests of the

people. It is always a jug-handled proposition in their favor.

One of the biggest pieces of foolishness in this old world of ours is for

Uncle Sam to make free money for the bankers to loan, and then borrow

that same money for his own use.

Unless there is some change made in the manner of selecting United States

senators, that body of corporation attorneys would better be abolished.

So insignificant was the last Presidential candidate of the Democratic

Party that a great many voters have already forgotten his name.

The country is now ready for the election of United States senators by

the people instead of the corporations, but that body of august lawmakers

will block every effort in that direction.

If there is no other way to prevent corporations from violating the law

they should be denied its protection, just like other outlaws. A dose of

that kind of medicine would soon bring them to their milk.

The decision of the North Sea Commission seems to be based upon the

principle (if it has a principle) that a naval commander has a right to

fire at anything that frightens him.

If the packers didn’t steal their immense fortunes from the people, whom

did they steal them from?

A “reasonable rate,” as interpreted by the railroad companies, is all the

honey except barely enough to keep the bees from starving to death.

There has already been a good deal of water squeezed out of Standard Oil

stock; now, if some process can be brought forward that will squeeze the

water out of the oil the company sells, it will be better yet.

The great trusts have shown that they have no regard for “vested

rights.” They have “frozen out” the smaller concerns without mercy. Why,

then, should they object to a little of the “freezing” process, if the

Government or states decide to go into the oil business on their own

account?

If the Socialists insist on turning the world over at one flip, like

turning a pancake, before they can start the show, they are following

a mighty cold trail. If they are willing to go by the usual road of

evolution there is no reason why they and the Populists should not work

together, for awhile at least.

The man who is wholly controlled by sentiment is not fit to vote. Voting

is a business proposition and demands both intelligence and good judgment.

It seems to be the policy of lawmakers in this country to grant special

privileges to the rich and powerful, and to permit them to impose upon

the weak, and this condition will remain just so long as men will submit

to being robbed.

The men who prate most about “vested rights” and “law and order” are the

ones who violate them most.

When the Government thought the express companies were charging

the people too much for the transmission of money it went into the

money-order business itself. What was the result? Why, the express

companies had to come to the rate established by the Government or get

none of the business. It was purely a matter of business, and that’s the

way to do it.

It was the “battle-scared” bag barons that discredited government paper

money during the Civil War between the states. Yet it is from these men

that we hear most about “national honor” and “public credit.” They are

the same class of men of whom honest old Abe Lincoln said: “They ought to

be hanged”; and the country would have fared better ever since if they

had been.

Nearly every civilized nation in the world owns all or a part of its

system of railroad and telegraph lines, and they have no disposition to

turn them over to private corporations. The United States alone permits

a few wealthy buccaneers to levy taxes on the people which no government

would dare do. An increase of three cents per bushel on corn alone means

a tax of fifty millions of dollars to the men who produce that cereal.

Until recently the national bankers paid the Government one per cent. on

the money the Government loaned them. Then they claimed that it was too

much to pay for the use of the money and the credit of the Government,

and Congress reduced the rate to one-half of one per cent. But the banker

has no conscientious scruples about loaning this money to the people at

eight and ten per cent.

The railroad companies admit that they violate the law by granting

rebates, but set up the claim that if they did not do it they would lose

their share of the traffic. It is a very singular plea. It is not half as

just as the one that a man steals because he is hungry, or because his

wife and children are suffering for the necessaries of life. “We violate

the law because somebody else does,” say the railroad companies. Suppose

that every criminal would set up the same excuse for the commission of

crime. And ordinary criminals have a better right to make that plea in

palliation for their crime than the trusts and corporations have. If, as

they admit, the railroad managers are so dishonest that one must violate

the law because another does, if there is no way to restrain them except

to turn the whole matter over to them, and permit them to pool their

earnings so that one thief can watch the other thieves, it is about time

to abolish the whole system of private ownership and for the Government

to take charge of the lines of transportation. The railroad companies

make out the worst kind of a case against themselves. They admit that

there are enough law-breakers among them to demoralize the whole system.

The public has heard a good deal about legislation that would discourage

capital from being invested in the state enacting the legislation. It has

been said that the passage of laws calculated to regulate the business

of large corporations would have the effect of driving them away. Kansas

just now is giving us an object-lesson along this line. The laws recently

passed by the Legislature in that state are perhaps the most drastic in

their nature ever passed by any state for the control and regulation

of corporations, yet the prospect is that more capital will go to that

state than ever before. Although the state is now engaged in building an

oil refinery, there are several other independent refineries projected,

with a good prospect for more to come. It is evident that capital has

not as much to fear from the people, when it is legitimately invested

and operated, as it has from the arrogant aggressions of such enormous

concerns as the Standard Oil Company that will brook no competition. If

capital will be satisfied with a fair profit it has nothing to fear from

the people, while, on the other hand, independent concerns that operate

legitimately in any line of business have much to fear from the great

trusts that have been built up through favors granted them by railroads

and municipalities.

_Flying the Kite_

HUDSON—Do you think they will be able to get along on $10,000 a year?

BUDSON—They ought to. With that much money they should manage to run in

debt for another ten thousand.

* * * * *

The rich man may defy the laws of the land and keep out of prison, but

when he gets dyspepsia from eating things out of season he realizes that

he can’t defy the laws of nature.

_The Heritage of Maxwell Fair_

BY VINCENT HARPER

_Author of “A Mortgage on the Brain”_

SYNOPSIS OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

Maxwell Fair, an Englishman who has amassed a colossal

fortune on ’Change, inherits from his ancestors a remarkable

tendency to devote his life to some object, generally a

worthy, if peculiar one, which is extravagantly chivalrous.

The story opens with Fair and Mrs. Fair standing over the

body of a man who has just been shot in their house—a

foreigner, who had claimed to be an old friend of Mrs. Fair.

Fair sends her to her room, saying: “Leave everything to me.”

He hides the body in a chest, and decides to close the house

“for a trip on the Continent.” Fair tells the governess, Kate

Mettleby, that he loves her; that there is no dishonor in

his love, in spite of Mrs. Fair’s existence, and that, until

an hour ago, he thought he could marry her—could “break the

self-imposed conditions of his weird life-purpose.” They

are interrupted before Kate, who really loves him, is made

to understand. While the Fairs are entertaining a few old

friends at dinner, Kate, not knowing that it contains Mrs.

Fair’s blood-stained dress, is about to hide a parcel in the

chest when she is startled by the entrance of Samuel Ferret,

a detective from Scotland Yard. He tells her that he, with

other detectives, is shadowing the foreign gentleman who

came to the Fair house that day and has not yet left it. He

persuades Kate to promise that she will follow the suspect

when he leaves the house and then report at Scotland Yard. As

soon as Ferret is gone she lifts the lid off the chest, drops

the package into it, and, with a shriek, falls fainting to

the floor. Mr. and Mrs. Fair run to her aid. On being revived

Kate goes to Scotland Yard, where, in her anxiety to shield

Maxwell Fair from suspicion, she inadvertently leads the

detectives to think that a crime has been committed at the

Fair house. The two detectives are piecing together the real

facts from the clues she has given, when Ferret is summoned

to the telephone by his associate Wilson, whom he had left on

guard in the home of the Fairs.

“Hello, Wilson!” He began speaking to his distant lieutenant. “Yes—yes.

No? By George! Yes, yes. Good, good! With you in ten minutes.”

He hung up the receiver and to Sharpe’s impatient gesture replied:

“Wilson says the quarry is up. Mendes the Cuban has just left the house,

with Thorpe following to see where he goes. And now there’s the very

devil to pay. Wilson is hot on the trail. So I’m off.”

“If anything goes wrong, call me up,” said Sharpe, keenly enjoying the

play of the big fish that he would have safely landed by a day or two.

“Right you are! Ta, ta!”

Ferret lost no time in reaching the Fair mansion. The guests were still

at dinner and he could see no trace of excitement from without. Wilson

reported in detail the sudden appearance of the Cuban, his hurried flight

up the street with Thorpe at his heels—and all quiet inside.

“Who the devil fired that shot, and at whom was it fired, and what did

pretty Kate mean by her stammering protests that no crime had been done?

Was the saucy little minx deeper after all than they thought?” asked

Ferret of himself. He must have a good look at that library—that was the

key to the thickening mystery. So he stole up the stairs, but before he

could investigate the fatal library he heard the family coming up from

dinner and fled to the attic, passing Kate’s door, which stood ajar, and

through which he saw her on her knees with her face buried on the bed.

Tom Watson's Magazine, Vol. I, No. 3, May 1905 · 第 4 / 7 章