The events of the next few days more than justified Scott’s suspicions.
_McDowell Tests the Confederate Right_
On July 18, in a feeling movement on the Confederate right, Tyler made a
thrust against Beauregard’s troops stationed in the vicinity of
Blackburn’s Ford. The affair got somewhat out of hand with the result
that the Federal force was smartly repulsed. The action had a depressing
effect on Union morale but greatly boosted that of the Confederates.
There then followed 2 days of costly delay for McDowell during which
time he brought forward his supplies—a delay the Confederates were quick
to capitalize upon. To the sound of the axe and the crash of falling
trees, they built roadblocks along the Warrenton Pike in the vicinity of
the Stone Bridge and in general strengthened their defenses. More
important, the delay gave Johnston much needed time in which to reach
Manassas.
Confederate reinforcements were now steadily moving in. On the 19th,
Jackson arrived 2,500 strong, having covered approximately 55 miles in
25 hours. At sunrise of the 20th, more of Johnston’s reinforcements had
come in—the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments of Bartow’s brigade numbering
1,400 men. About noon, Johnston himself arrived accompanied by Bee, the
4th Alabama, the 2d Mississippi, and two companies of the 11th
Mississippi. The Confederate camp now became a scene of busy activity.
While the reinforcements moved up to position in the line, Beauregard
and Johnston conferred on plans for an offensive. Candles burned low in
headquarters that night as Beauregard and his staff put the finishing
touches to the Confederate plan of attack. At 4:30 a. m., he submitted
it to Johnston, his superior, for the approval that was quickly granted.
The plan involved the flanking of the Federal left, but the early
movement of McDowell, the delayed arrival of expected reinforcements,
and the miscarriage of orders combined to prevent its execution.
_First Battle of Manassas_ (SEE MAP ON PAGES 22-23.)
Sunday, July 21, dawned bright and clear. The listless stirring of the
trees gave early promise that the day would be hot. Dust lay thick upon
the grass, the brush, and the uniforms of the men. The Confederate camps
were just beginning to stir from a restless night when, suddenly about
5:15 a. m., there was heard the thunderous roar of a big gun in the
vicinity of the Stone Bridge. With this shot, fired from a 30-pounder
Parrott rifle of Tyler’s command, McDowell opened the first battle of
the war.
[Illustration: Young Confederates in Richmond who were soon to receive
their baptism of fire at the First Battle of Manassas. From
“Photographic History of the Civil War.”]
[Illustration: Federal Army near Fairfax Court House en route to the
First Battle of Manassas. A detachment of the 2d Ohio is shown in the
foreground. From original sketch by A. R. Waud. Courtesy Library of
Congress.]
Since 2:30 a. m. his troops had been in motion executing a
well-conceived plan of attack. In bright moonlight, across the valley
from Centreville “sparkling with the frost of steel,” the Federal army
had moved in a three-pronged attack. McDowell had originally planned to
turn the Confederate right, but the affair of the 18th at Blackburn’s
Ford had shown the Confederates in considerable strength in that sector.
Further informed that the Stone Bridge was mined and that the turnpike
west of the bridge was blocked by a heavy abatis, he determined to turn
the extreme Confederate left. By this flanking movement he hoped to
seize the Stone Bridge and destroy the Manassas Gap Railroad at or near
Gainesville, thus breaking the line of communication between Johnston,
supposedly at Winchester, and Beauregard at Manassas. To screen the main
attack, Tyler was to make a feinting thrust at the Confederate defenses
at the Stone Bridge, while Richardson was to make a diversion at
Blackburn’s Ford. Miles’ division was to cover Centreville, while
Runyon’s division covered the road to Washington. To a large extent the
success of the attack depended upon two factors—rapidity of movement and
the element of surprise.
Turning to the right at Cub Run Bridge, the main Federal column,
composed of Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, had followed a narrow
dirt road to Sudley Ford which they reached, after exasperating delays,
about 9:30 a. m. Here the men stopped to drink and fill their canteens.
Though this loss of time was costly, success might still have been
theirs if the movement had not been detected.
[Illustration: Sudley Springs Ford, Catharpin Run. Wartime photograph.
Courtesy Library of Congress.]
From Signal Hill, a high observation point within the Manassas defenses,
the Confederate signal officer, E. P. Alexander, had been scanning the
horizon for any evidence of a flanking movement. With glass in hand he
was examining the area in the vicinity of Sudley Ford when about 8:45 a.
m. his attention was arrested by the glint of the morning sun on a brass
field piece. Closer observation revealed the glitter of bayonets and
musket barrels. Quickly he signaled Evans at the Stone Bridge, “Look out
for your left; you are turned.” This message, which was to play an
important part in the tactical development of the battle, represents
probably the first use under combat conditions of the “wig-wag” system
of signaling.
[Illustration: The ruins of the Stone Bridge over Bull Run, from the
east. Here opened the First Battle of Manassas. Wartime photograph.
Courtesy National Archives.]