[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Oscar L. Chapman, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER FIFTEEN_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C., price 20 cents
MANASSAS
(_Bull Run_)
NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK
Virginia
_by Francis F. Wilshin_
[Illustration: Bugler on horseback.]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 15
Washington, D. C., 1953
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
The National Park System, of which Manassas National Battlefield Park is
a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic
heritage of the United States for the benefit and enjoyment of its
people.
_Contents_
THE FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR 1
CONFEDERATES LOOK TO MANASSAS DEFENSES 3
THE FEDERAL ARMY MOVES TOWARD MANASSAS 5
MCDOWELL TESTS THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT 7
FIRST BATTLE OF MANASSAS 8
Morning Phase—The Fight at Matthews Hill 11
Afternoon Phase 13
Effects of First Manassas 17
WINTER’S LULL 18
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS TO SECOND MANASSAS 19
POPE CONCENTRATES BEHIND THE RAPIDAN 20
LEE’S OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAPIDAN AND RAPPAHANNOCK 21
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 26
First Phase—Bristoe and Manassas, August 27 26
Second Phase—Groveton, August 28 27
Third Phase—Main Battle, August 29-30 27
Fourth Phase—Chantilly, September 1 36
Results of Second Battle of Manassas 37
THE WAR AFTER SECOND MANASSAS 38
GUIDE TO THE AREA 39
THE PARK 46
HOW TO REACH THE PARK 47
ADMINISTRATION 47
RELATED AREAS 47
VISITOR FACILITIES 47
[Illustration: Wartime photograph of the Stone House, which still stands
as the most conspicuous landmark of both the First and Second Battles of
Manassas. Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: Manassas National Battlefield Park]
_Manassas National Battlefield Park preserves the scene of two of the
famous battles of the Civil War. The first shall be ever memorable as
the opening engagement of that great conflict, while the second, fought
approximately a year later, paved the way for Lee’s first invasion of
the North. In each instance Confederate arms won signal success and
dangerously threatened the National Capital._
The Civil War was perhaps the most dramatic and significant event in the
history of the United States as an independent nation. It was the climax
of a half century of social, political, and economic rivalries growing
out of an economy half slave, half free. In the race for territorial
expansion in the West, in the evolution of the theories of centralized
government, and in the conception of the rights of the individual, these
rivalries became so intense as to find a solution only in the grim
realities of civil strife.
It was on the great battlefields of this war, stretching from the
Mexican border to Pennsylvania, that these differences were resolved in
a new concept of national unity and an extension of freedom. In the
scope of its operations, in the magnitude of its cost in human life and
financial resources, the war had few, if any, parallels in the past. Its
imprint upon the future was deep and lasting, its heroic sacrifice an
inspiring tribute to the courage and valor of the American people.
_The First Days of the War_
The flash and the dull roar of a 10-inch mortar, April 12, 1861,
announced to a startled countryside the firing of the opening gun of the
Civil War. Two days later Fort Sumter surrendered. The reverberations of
this shot were to shake the very foundations of the Nation. Gone was the
period of apathy and indecision. Events now moved with lightning-like
rapidity.
On April 15, Lincoln issued his call for 75,000 volunteers, and soon
troops were pouring into Washington. On May 23, Virginia voted to ratify
the Ordinance of Secession, and the next day columns of Federal troops
crossed the Potomac and seized Alexandria and Arlington Heights. Eight
days later Richmond became the capital of the Confederacy and the chief
objective of the Federal armies in the East. Stretching from the Ohio to
Chesapeake Bay, Virginia constituted the wealthiest and most populous
state of the Confederacy. Here were to be found rich natural resources
and a heavy network of railroads and highways for military transport.
These military advantages, however, were somewhat offset by the deep
waters which flanked much of the state, increasing its vulnerability to
Federal attack.
Straight across the path of one of the main high roads to Richmond from
the north lay Manassas, a small railroad settlement, only a few miles
east of the Bull Run Mountains. Here the Orange and Alexandria Railroad
formed a junction with the Manassas Gap line which extended westward
through the Blue Ridge to Strasburg, near Winchester. By seizure of this
significant junction, located approximately 25 miles southwest of
Washington, the Federal army could follow the Orange and Alexandria
southwest to Gordonsville and thence proceed by the Virginia Central
eastward to Richmond. This, with good supporting highways, would assure
an overland approach that would avoid many of the natural barriers found
in the shortest route by Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg.
The significance of Manassas was likewise apparent to the Confederates.
As early as May 6, Col. St. George Cocke, commanding the Potomac
Department, had received a dispatch from Gen. Robert E. Lee: “You are
desired to post at Manassas Gap Junction a force sufficient to defend
that point against an attack likely to be made against it by troops from
Washington.”
The first troops to arrive were two raw, undrilled, and ununiformed
Irish regiments from Alexandria, armed with altered muskets. By May 14,
Cocke was able to write Lee that he had succeeded in assembling a force
of 918 men at Manassas. That he had a clear grasp of the military
significance of the area is seen in his dispatch to Lee the next day:
“It is obvious, sir, with a strong _corps d’armee_ at Manassas, and at
least a division at Winchester, these two bodies being connected by a
continuous railway through Manassas Gap, there should be kept at all
times upon that road ample means of transportation. These two
columns—one at Manassas and one at Winchester—could readily co-operate
and concentrate upon the one point or the other.” Here then was a
significant germ of Confederate strategy.
As a phase of this strategy, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had been sent
to take command of the Confederate force of about 12,000 men stationed
in the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley at Harper’s Ferry. Here was
the gateway to the North through the Cumberland Valley of Maryland and
here passed the great Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which connected
Washington with the West. But Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, then in command
of the Army of the United States, had dispatched Maj. Gen. Robert
Patterson with a force of about 18,000 men to seize this strategic
position and to prevent, at all odds, the junction of Johnston’s forces
with the Confederate army at Manassas.
_Confederates Look to Manassas Defenses_
On June 1, Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the Confederate hero of
Fort Sumter, arrived to take command at Manassas. Two days later he was
writing President Jefferson Davis requesting reinforcements. At this
early date the defenses of Manassas appeared anything but formidable to
the eyes of an English lieutenant of artillery who, arriving at night,
viewed them for the first time: “I could scarcely believe that this was
a great military depot, there being nothing within my range of vision to
indicate that such was the fact. The station itself was a low,
one-storied building, about seventy-five feet in length, with bales and
boxes scattered about; a house of refreshment close by was uninviting,
and except one or two small cottages scattered here and there, naught
was to be seen.”
[Illustration: Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard in command
of the Confederate Army of the Potomac. Courtesy National Archives.]
By the end of June this picture had materially changed. The roads, the
fields, and the town were filled with soldiers by the thousands. Around
the junction massive fortifications had been erected running out in
different directions from the station. Through the embrasures of these
earthworks the muzzles of heavy cannon pointed menacingly toward
Washington. Acres of trees had been felled to give free range to
artillery, and at key positions along the front men were constantly on
guard at their battle stations. Camps had sprung up like mushrooms in
the open countryside, and here troops in and out of uniform could be
seen almost incessantly engaged in drill.
By June 23, Beauregard was able to advise the Confederate Secretary of
War that, in consequence of large reinforcements lately received, he had
been able to divide his forces into six brigades commanded by Bonham,
Ewell, D. R. Jones, Terrett, Cocke, and Early. Advance detachments had
been stationed at key points including Centreville, Fairfax Court House,
Germantown, the junction of the Old Braddock Road with the Fairfax Court
House Road, and at Sangster’s Crossroads. With the main body of his
troops partially intrenched along Bull Run, from Union Mills to the
Stone Bridge, Beauregard watched closely the Federal preparations for an
advance.
As the tension mounted, alarms occurred with increasing frequency.
Bootless, hatless, and coatless men often dashed to assembly sounded by
the “thump, thump of the big drums.” Rumors of the Federal advance
“filled every breeze.” In a dispatch, dated July 9, Beauregard informed
President Davis: “Enemy’s force increasing, and advancing daily this
side of Potomac. He will soon attack with very superior numbers. No time
should be lost in re-enforcing me here with at least ten thousand
men—volunteers or militia.”
On the 17th Beauregard telegraphed President Davis informing him of an
attack on his outposts and requesting that he send reinforcements “at
the earliest possible moment.” Confronted with this crisis, Davis acted
quickly. Advising Beauregard of the dispatch of reinforcements of
Hampton’s Legion, McRae’s regiment, and two battalions of Mississippi
and Alabama troops, he ordered Holmes’ troops up from Fredericksburg.
The same day, through his adjutant, he sent the following dispatch to
Johnston in Winchester:
RICHMOND, _July_ 17, 1861.
General J. E. JOHNSTON, _WINCHESTER, Va._:
General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a
junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable,
make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper
Court-House either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the
arrangements exercise your discretion.
S. COOPER,
_Adjutant and Inspector General_.
Realizing that Harper’s Ferry was untenable, Johnston had previously
retired upon Winchester, with Patterson in cautious pursuit. Receiving
Davis’ dispatch at 1 a. m., July 18, Johnston determined to elude
Patterson and join Beauregard as quickly as possible. By a forced march
he reached Piedmont where his various brigades entrained for Manassas
Junction, 35 miles away. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade was in
advance, followed by those of Bee, Bartow, and Elzey.
Thus, after approximately 3 months of hurried preparation following
Sumter, the stage was finally set—the drama of the opening battle was
about to unfold.
_The Federal Army Moves Toward Manassas_
On July 16, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell had reluctantly put the Federal
army in motion. In vain he had attempted to delay the movement until
adequate training could provide him with an effective fighting force
composed of the 3-year volunteers, authorized by President Lincoln on
May 3, but popular clamor would not be denied. Pressure for a forward
movement was heightened by the realization that the term of enlistment
was rapidly expiring for a large body of the troops. Further delay would
mean the loss of their services.
[Illustration: Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, in command of the Federal Army
in the First Battle of Manassas. Courtesy National Archives.]
With excitement and high expectancy, the army, accompanied by many
notables in fine carriages, took the road 35,000 strong. Seldom had the
country seen such a splash of color as was presented by the brilliant
uniforms of the various regiments and the gaily fluttering national and
regimental flags. The first day’s advance covered only 6 miles.
Oppressive heat, dust, thirst, and the weight of heavy equipment slowed
the step and caused considerable straggling.
Lagging spirits, however, caught fire with the triumphant advance of
Hunter’s division into Fairfax Court House. As the head of the column
swung into town, Confederate units stationed there fled in such haste as
to leave large quantities of forage and camp equipage behind. In an
impressive show of martial splendor, the troops, four abreast with fixed
bayonets, paraded through the streets to the stirring strains of the
national anthem and other patriotic airs struck up by the regimental
bands.
From Fairfax Court House the advance moved cautiously toward
Centreville, with engineers and axmen flung forward to alert the army to
“masked batteries” and to clear roadblocks of fallen timber left by the
retiring Confederates. By noon of the 18th the main body of McDowell’s
army had assembled at Centreville and now stood poised to strike.
During the advance, little or no information had been received regarding
Patterson’s movements in the valley. Irked by this, Scott telegraphed
Patterson as follows:
Washington, _July_ 18, 1861.
Major-General Patterson,...
I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear
that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by
threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I
suppose, superior, in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent
reenforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win
victories....
WINFIELD SCOTT
[Illustration: Confederate fortifications at Manassas, Va. Wartime
photograph. Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF FIRST MANASSAS: SITUATION, Night of JULY 17,
1861]
To this, Patterson sent the following reply to Colonel Townsend in
Scott’s headquarters:
CHARLESTOWN, VA., _July_ 18th, 1861.
Col. E. D. Townsend:
Telegram of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I
have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in
force caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this
respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could well be
expected, in face of an enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of
communication to protect....