WE RETREAT WITH SIR JOHN MOORE.
We were now in active preparation for a march, but whether to be led
back to Portugal or forward to Valladolid not a soul in the army could
tell. All our movements depended on the information received from the
Spaniards, which to a tittle always proved to be false; and if we had
been guided by it, although it frequently passed through official
English authorities, the British forces in Spain must have been lost.
The army now underwent a partial remodelling. A corps of reserve were
formed, composed of select troops. They consisted of the 20th, 28th,
52nd, 91st, and 95th (Rifles) Regiments. The 20th and 52nd Regiments
formed the 1st Brigade, commanded by General Anstruther; the 2nd
Brigade consisted of the 28th, 91st, and 95th Regiments, commanded by
General Disney; the whole were under the orders of General Paget.
All being prepared for a move, the British army commenced their advance
from Salamanca on December 11th, with intention of marching direct to
Valladolid; but on the arrival at headquarters at Alaejos, on the 13th,
an intercepted despatch from the Prince of Neufchâtel to the Duke of
Dalmatia was brought to the general. These despatches were of such a
nature as to induce our general to deviate somewhat from the route
intended. Leaving Valladolid more to our right, our headquarters were
removed to Toro.
On the night of the 14th General Charles Stuart, with a detachment of
the 18th Dragoons, surprised a detachment of the enemy, consisting of
fifty infantry and thirty cavalry, cutting down or taking prisoners
almost all of them. One dragoon who escaped carried the report of the
destruction of the detachment, and was scarcely credited by General
Franceschi, who commanded about four hundred cavalry at Valladolid;
for previous to this surprise the French were fortunately in total
ignorance of our vicinity, reasonably concluding that by all the rules
of war we were in full retreat towards Portugal.
The reserve, in the meantime, arrived at Toro, where the advanced guard
of General Baird’s corps, consisting of the cavalry under the command
of Lord Paget, joined Sir John Moore’s army.
It now being evident that after the surprise of their outpost at Rueda
the enemy could no longer be ignorant of our advanced movements, Sir
John Moore pushed on his columns as fast as the severity of the weather
would permit. On the 16th the reserve were at Puebla, on the 17th at
Villapando. On the 18th headquarters were at Castro Nuevo. On the 19th
the reserve continued their march, and on the 20th reached Santarbas.
On this day the whole of the army were united, and so far concentrated
as shelter and deep snow would permit. The weather was excessively
severe, and the flat bleak country could furnish but little fuel.
[Sidenote: COMBAT OF CAVALRY.]
Lord Paget, being informed that General Debelle, with from six to seven
hundred dragoons, was in the town of Sahagun, marched on the night of
the 20th, with the 10th and 15th Hussars, from the different small
villages where they were posted in front of the army at Mayorga. The
10th marched directly for the town, and the 15th led by Lord Paget
endeavoured to turn it by the right and thus cut off the enemy’s
retreat; but his advance was unfortunately discovered by a patrol, and
the French had time to form on the outside of the town before the 15th
could get round. When therefore his lordship arrived at the rear of
the town about daybreak, with four hundred of the 15th (the 10th not
being as yet come up), he discovered a line of six hundred cavalry in
a field close to the town and prepared to oppose him. They were drawn
up in rear of a ravine which protected their front from being charged.
But in those days the superior numbers or strength of position of the
French cavalry had very little influence over our dragoons. After
manœuvring a very short time, each party endeavouring to gain the flank
of their opponent, Lord Paget charged with his wonted vigour, broke
the enemy’s line, and chased them off the field. The result of this
gallant affair was a loss on the enemy’s side of twenty men killed, two
lieutenant-colonels, eleven other officers, and one hundred and fifty
troopers prisoners; while the loss on our side amounted only to six men
killed and from fifteen to twenty wounded.
Continuing our advance, headquarters were established at Sahagun on
the 21st, and on the same day the reserve marched to Grajal del Campo.
In our present cantonments the British army were within a day’s march
of the enemy posted at Saldaña and along the Carrion. Such close
neighbourhood braced every nerve for deeds of arms. Our thoughts,
which heretofore dwelt upon the sparkling eyes, beautiful faces and
splendid figures of the Spanish fair were now totally engrossed by the
veteran soldiers of Napoleon. Love yielded to war; yet the flame which
animated our breasts remained, its ardour ever increasing as the object
in view became more glorious.
On the 22nd the whole army halted to refresh the troops, to put the
guns in proper order, and, what was of still greater consequence, to
repair the men’s shoes, which were seriously damaged during our eleven
days’ march over rugged roads covered with frost and snow. Our reserve
supplies had not yet come up. These preparations were diligently
carried on during the day and early part of the ensuing night, it being
intended that on the next day we should march against the enemy. The
Commander of the forces, however, calculated that by commencing his
march in the morning we should approach the enemy early enough to be
discovered, but too late to attack; and that consequently we should be
compelled to halt in the snow until daybreak enabled us to see what we
had to do. A night attack may perhaps succeed; but the exact position
of the party to be assaulted must be thoroughly ascertained previous
to making the attack. We possessed no such information; no two reports
ever agreed as to the enemy’s position or strength. For these reasons
the march of the troops was deferred until the evening. Marching during
the night, however severe the weather, was far preferable to a freezing
halt in the snow, and the men would be in much better plight to attack
the enemy at daybreak on the morning of the 24th; and, in fact, no time
would be lost, for had we marched on the morning of the 23rd instead
of the evening, still the attack could not have taken place before the
morning of the 24th.
In pursuance of this plan, orders were received at Grajal del Campo
early on the morning of the 23rd directing that the reserve should
march that evening on the road towards the Carrion, indicating the
point of junction with the rest of the army, and there halt until the
headquarters should arrive. On receipt of these instructions, General
Paget used every endeavour to induce the men to lie down and take
repose, exhorting the officers to keep the soldiers as much as possible
in their billets, but, without issuing any orders on the subject, to
tell them that the general’s anxiety arose in consequence of a long
march which was to take place that night. We (the reserve) therefore
moved forward that evening about four o’clock from Grajal del Campo in
light marching order, on our way towards the Carrion.
[Sidenote: A CHRISTMAS MARCH.]
After proceeding some hours, we halted not long after dark. The whole
country was deeply covered with snow, and the sprightly national carols
customary on the approach of Christmas were changed for a cold and
silent night march to meet our national foes; yet no hearts ever beat
lighter in the social enjoyment of the former than ours did at what we
confidently anticipated would be the result of the latter. But cruel
necessity required that we should be grievously disappointed. After our
halt, which took place at the point destined for our junction with the
other column, had continued for two hours, conjecture became various
as to the cause of their delay. We were first told that it was to
give the artillery, which rolled heavily over the snow, time to come
up; subsequently we were informed that the Marquis of Romana either
mistook or wilfully failed in his engagements to co-operate, and that
the attack must consequently be postponed. Thenceforward a hatred and
contempt of the Spaniards in arms filled the breast of every British
soldier. This feeling was renewed at Talavera and confirmed at Barossa,
and for similar causes was kept alive so long as a British soldier
remained in the Peninsula.
The report relative to Romana was not, however, in this instance
strictly a fact; for he actually did move forward from Leon to
Mancilla with six or seven thousand half-starved and half-naked,
wretched troops, having previously left his artillery in the rear.
The true cause of our halt and subsequent retreat was Sir John Moore
having received information from Romana, as well as from others in
whose accuracy he placed more reliance, that two hundred thousand
enemies were put in motion against him. The British general that night
commanded twenty-three thousand men; Soult, within a day’s march of his
front, commanded twenty thousand men; Napoleon, with fifty thousand
of the Imperial Guards marching or rather flying from Madrid, was
fast closing upon him and making rapid strides to cut off his only
line of retreat: thus he was placed in the immediate vicinity of
seventy thousand hardy veterans--more than triple his numbers. In this
statement Ney’s corps are not included, although within two marches of
Soult, with orders to press forward. Under such circumstances there
could be no hesitation how to act. A movement on Corunna was decided
upon.
The information just mentioned relative to the movements of the enemy
against the British army was received at headquarters (Sahagun)
about six o’clock in the evening of the 23rd, in time to enable the
Commander of the forces to countermand the forward march of the troops
stationed there; but as it was too late to prevent the forward march
of the reserve, orders were sent to the place intended as the point
of rendezvous directing their return to Grajal del Campo, where we
arrived on the morning of the 24th. There we halted the remainder of
that day to get ready our heavy baggage (for we had moved in light
marching order the previous night) and to give a day’s start to the
leading columns, Sir David Baird’s and General Hope’s divisions which
had marched that morning, the former for Valencia, the latter towards
Benevente.
[Sidenote: BRIDGE OF CASTRO GONZOLO.]
On the 25th the reserve, accompanied by the light brigade, and
covered by the cavalry, marched under the immediate orders of Sir
John Moore, and, following the track of Hope’s division, crossed the
Esla by the bridge of Castro Gonzolo on the 27th. Thence we moved on
to Benevente, distant about four miles. After passing Mayorga on the
26th, Lord Paget, with two squadrons of the 10th Hussars, charged a
large detachment of the enemy’s dragoons, strongly posted on a rising
ground, and, notwithstanding the strength of their position and great
superiority of numbers, he killed twenty and took a hundred prisoners.
The destruction of the bridge having commenced, and to favour this
arduous undertaking, as well as to cover the passage of the cavalry,
who had not as yet come up, General Robert Craufurd, with the 2nd
Light Brigade and two guns, took up a position on the left bank, which
from its boldness commanded the bridge and both banks, being thus from
necessity left on the enemy’s side of the stream, the right bank flat
and low offering no vantage ground. The cavalry having crossed on the
afternoon of the 27th, the destruction of the bridge commenced, which
occupied half the light brigade until late on the night of the 28th,
the other half being in constant skirmish with the advancing enemy. The
bridge being constructed of such solid material, the greatest exertions
were required to penetrate the masonry; and from the hurried manner
and sudden necessity of the march from Sahagun, there had been no time
to send an engineer forward to prepare for the undertaking. These
circumstances much retarded the work, and an incessant fall of heavy
rain and sleet rendered the whole operation excessively laborious
and fatiguing. To add to this, Napoleon, having been informed of our
movement towards Valladolid, was determined to crush us for daring
to advance; while Soult, now aware of our retiring, was resolved to
punish us, elate at our not having previously punished him, which we
most certainly should have done on Christmas eve had it not been for
the astounding information received by Sir John Moore late on the
evening of the 23rd, to the effect that his little army were then the
focus upon which two hundred thousand French troops were directing
their hasty strides. Those two consummate generals, Napoleon and Soult,
pushed on their advanced guards with such celerity that Soult’s light
troops and the chasseurs of the Imperial Guard came in sight whilst our
rearguard were crossing the Esla.
During the evening of the 27th and the whole of the 28th continued
skirmishes took place in the vicinity of the bridge, and the enemy kept
up a desultory fire along the banks. The Imperial chasseurs, flushed
with the capture of a few women and stragglers, whom they picked up
in the plain, had the hardihood more than once to gallop up close to
the bridge, with the intention no doubt of disturbing the men employed
there; but they always retired with increased celerity, leaving not a
few behind to serve as a warning-off to others.
[Sidenote: INTO BENEVENTE.]
On the night of the 28th, the preparations at the bridge being
completed, the troops retired. Fortunately it was dark rainy and
tempestuous; and so the light brigade passed unobserved over the bridge
to the friendly side in profound silence, except for the roaring of
the waters and the tempest, and without the slightest opposition.
Immediately on our gaining the right bank the mine was sprung with
fullest effect, blowing up two arches, together with the buttress by
which they had been supported, and awakening the French to a sense of
their shameful want of vigilance and enterprise. Had they kept a strict
watch, and risked an assault during the passage, which they would have
been fully borne out in doing from the number of their troops already
in the plain, and which were hourly increasing, the light division
would have been perilously situated; for Craufurd had passed over the
guns some time previously, and had immediately after cut one of the
arches completely through, so that the men were obliged to cross over a
narrow strip formed of planks not very firmly laid, while the impetuous
torrent, now swollen above its banks from the constant heavy rain and
snow, roaring rather through than beneath the bridge, threatened to
carry away both men and planks. All being thus happily terminated, the
troops moved into Benevente; but Craufurd’s brigade were so excessively
fatigued, having worked incessantly and laboured severely for nearly
two days and two nights, their clothes drenched through the whole time,
that they could scarcely keep their eyes open.