§ 1. General survey 417
Internal and external causes 417.—Principal internal cause
hindering the growth of slavery: the dependence of subsistence upon
closed resources 418.—Compulsory as opposed to voluntary labour
419.—Why in modern Europe labourers are not held as property
420.—Personal and impersonal compulsion 422.—The working classes of
modern Europe 422.—Slavery cannot exist, even where resources are
open, if subsistence is very difficult to acquire 422.—Secondary
internal causes. Condition of women 423.—Commerce 423.—Subjection
of tribes 424.—Preserving of food 424.—Militarism 424.—Luxury
425.—External causes. Fixed habitations 425.—Living in large groups
425.—Preserving of food 425.—The slave-trade 425.—The neighbourhood
of inferior races 425.—General recapitulation 426.
§ 2. Outlines of a further investigation of the early history of
slavery 427
I The different ways in which people become slaves 428.—II The
different ways in which people cease to be slaves 430.—III
Treatment of slaves by their masters 431.—IV Legal status of slaves
432.—V The attitude of public opinion towards slaves 433.—VI
Different kinds of slaves 433.—VII Slave labour 433.—VIII Serfdom
434.—IX Number of slaves 434.—X Happiness or unhappiness of slaves
434.—XI Consequences of slavery 435.—XII Development of slavery
437.
LIST OF AUTHORITIES 441
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
There exists an extensive literature on slavery. Many of these works
are intended for philanthropic purposes, viz. to further the
suppression of the African slave-trade, whereas many others contain
historical investigations of slavery among ancient or modern nations.
The present volume will not rank among either of these categories, but
deal with the general character of slavery as an industrial system.
Slavery has played a great part in the social history of mankind.
Social life among most of the ancient nations was based upon slavery,
and in many colonies it subsisted until far into the 19th century. On
the other hand, in the civilized countries of to-day all industrial
operations are carried on with free labour. Whence this difference? Why
have slavery and serfdom gradually declined in the course of European
history, so that at the close of the Middle Ages they had already in a
large degree lost their significance? These problems can only be solved
if we know the conditions necessary for the success of slavery as an
industrial system, and the inverse conditions under which slave labour
must give way to free labour. We shall try to find these conditions, or
at least some of them.
We shall use the comparative method, collecting facts and inquiring
what regularities can be found in these facts, under what general rules
they may be included. But before enlarging upon our method we must say
a few words concerning a limitation we have put upon our subject.
Our book, as the title shows, contains ethnological researches. We
confine ourselves to investigating the conditions which govern the
existence or non-existence of slavery among savage tribes, and the
materials we make use of are exclusively ethnographical materials, i.e.
descriptions of savage tribes.
Ethnology has already made considerable progress, and is taking a
conspicuous place among the Mental Sciences. Yet some ethnologists
still proceed in a somewhat narrow and one-sided manner. They generally
aim at reconstructing the early history of mankind with the help of
ethnographical data. The savages representing primitive man, or at
least man in a more primitive state than we can find by direct
historical research, they draw inferences from the actual state of
savage tribes as to the early state of mankind at large. This kind of
study has been very useful, especially in removing narrow views on
human development which existed at a time, when the traditions of a few
ancient nations were still considered to be the only evidence as to
early history. But this should not be the sole, nor even the main
object of ethnological investigation. It is sociological laws that we
want in the first place. It is certainly interesting to know what
changes have taken place in early history; but it is far more important
to know on what circumstances the existence of each social phenomenon
depends. And for this purpose ethnology can be of considerable use.
Among savages social life is much simpler than among civilized men; the
factors which govern it are comparatively few, and so the effect of
each of them can be traced without much difficulty. We can thus, by
comparing the institutions of many savage tribes, find sociological
laws, several of which will have a wider application and lead us to a
clearer understanding of the conditions which govern the social life of
civilized nations. For instance, the study of moral phenomena among
savages has already given us a deeper insight into morality at large.
The conclusions we arrive at in this book are of two kinds. Some of
them apply to savages only and cannot further our understanding of
civilized life. For instance, we shall see that settled tribes are more
likely to keep slaves than nomadic tribes; but civilized, and even
semi-civilized peoples are hardly ever nomadic. Other conclusions,
however, have a more general bearing. Thus we shall find that slavery
is not likely to exist in those countries, where all land is held as
property. And as this has been the case in Western Europe for some
centuries, we discover one of the principal causes, perhaps the main
cause, why slavery (and serfdom, which is a mitigated form of slavery),
have long since disappeared in these countries.
We do not, however, make any systematic inquiry into the bearing of the
laws found by investigating the phenomena of savage life on the study
of social life among civilized and semi-civilized nations. Where
phenomena of civilized life occur to us which bear a striking
resemblance to what we find among savages, we mention them briefly,
generally in a note. Only in one case we go farther. Where we find that
the relation between land and population is a factor of the utmost
importance in shaping the lot of the labouring classes, it is obvious
that this factor must have played a great part in the social history of
Europe, and therefore we adduce some statements of historians in
corroboration of our view. Yet, even here, it is our object to claim
attention for this factor that is commonly overlooked, and clear the
way for future research, rather than to give a ready explanation of the
decline of serfdom in Western Europe. We are thus justified in making
use of only a small part of the literature on this subject.
As we have already said, we proceed by an inductive, comparative
method. We first collect ethnographical materials. Then we critically
determine the meaning and reliability of the statements of our
informants. We thus see where slavery exists, and where it is absent.
And finally we inquire what are the causes of the observed phenomena.
Some remarks have still to be made on the details of our proceeding.
First as to the ethnographical literature.
We have collected our materials quite impartially, without any regard
to our ultimate conclusions, which, indeed, rest upon a study of the
facts, not upon any preconceived opinion. Though there is, of course,
much ethnographical literature we have not used, our collection is
rather extensive and contains most of the better works. All
geographical groups are properly represented, least of all perhaps
India, most of the literature on which country (so far as wild tribes
are concerned) seems to be wanting in the Dutch libraries. We have
greatly profited by being allowed to make use of Professor Steinmetz’s
schedules, being detailed extracts of hundreds of ethnographical books
and articles, somewhat resembling Spencer’s “Descriptive Sociology”,
but far more complete.
The ethnographical literature may not, however, be used without a
thorough criticism. We shall often meet with very loose and inaccurate
statements, and this book will afford many instances of the careless
use of the terms “slave” and “slavery” by ethnographers. The zoölogist
and the geologist have only to deal with accounts of their
fellow-scientists; but the ethnologist is obliged always to rely on
ethnographers, who often have no notion of ethnology, and sometimes no
notion of science at all. Hence the very bad terminology; hence also
the frequent omission of details which would have been very valuable.
Yet, regarding the very little that has as yet been achieved in
ethnology, we can hardly blame the ethnographers. It is true, if the
ethnographical literature were better, ethnology would greatly profit
by it; but, on the other hand, even with the help of the existing
literature, which, after all, is not so very bad, much more might be
attained than is actually done. And as long as ethnology is still in an
unsettled condition, it is perhaps better that an ethnographer should
have no ideas at all on ethnological subjects, than premature,
quasi-scientific, and probably erroneous ideas. Montaigne, one of the
most sensible men who have ever lived, speaking of his informant on the
cannibals of America, says: “This man whom I had was a simple and rude
man, which is a condition conducive to reliable testimony; for refined
people observe more curiously and observe more things; but then they
gloss them; and in order to force their interpretation on you, they
cannot but change the story a little; they never represent you the pure
facts; they warp and mask them according to the point of view from
which they regard them; and in order to give credit to their judgment
and make you accept their view, they readily add something to the
matter on that side and exaggerate it. A man must be either very
truthful, or so simple that he does not want to construct false
inventions and give them a semblance of truth, and is not riveted to a
theory.” What we want is, as the same writer has it, la matière de
l’histoire nue et informe [1]. An ethnographer should be taught what to
observe and how to observe, and how to record his observations. But
when this ideal cannot be attained, it is better to have an
ethnographer who only knows that every correct statement of his will
interest the men of science, than one whose perceptive faculties are
troubled by preconceived opinions.
We have subjected our materials to a thorough criticism, externally by
comparing in each case the descriptions of the same tribe by different
writers, and internally by inquiring what importance is to be attached
to the statements of each writer, considering the time in which he
wrote, his more or less intimate acquaintance with the people
described, the general character of his writings, etc.
We thus find where slavery exists or formerly existed, and where it
does or did not exist. We always mention the exact numbers of the
tribes with and without slaves in the several geographical groups, and
afterwards also in the several economic groups. We do not intend these
numbers as statistical materials, upon which to base mathematical
rules. We only mean to express the results of our investigations in the
exactest manner possible. Instead of stating: Slavery in such a group
exists in many cases, it is much more accurate to state: Slavery in
such a group exists, so far as our observations go, in, say, 80 cases.
We thus simply follow the method (sometimes miscalled statistical
method) first introduced by Professor Tylor in his article “On a method
of investigating the development of institutions”, and adopted by
Professor Steinmetz in his “Entwicklung der Strafe”.
We inquire next what conditions govern the occurrence of the observed
phenomena. This part of our work is certainly the most difficult, and
it is necessary here to proceed with the utmost caution. Many
ethnologists adopt a rather curious method. They have some theory,
found by deductive reasoning, and then adduce a few facts by way of
illustration. This, however, is quite insufficient. It does not appear
whether all existing facts agree with the theory; there may be many
instances, not mentioned by the theorist, in which his rule does not
hold. The only scientific method is impartially to collect facts and
inquire whether they can be brought under any general rule. If we find
a hypothesis that accounts for many, but not all, of the observed
phenomena, our task is not finished until we have explained the rest by
showing the influence of additional factors. Moreover, the negative
instances must be accounted for as well as the positive. If we account
for the existence of B by the coexistence of A, we must prove either
that in those cases where B does not exist A too is absent, or that in
such cases there are additional causes which neutralize the effect of
A. Ethnological works should not be causeries, as they often are, but
scientific researches.
But we must also be careful not to fall into the other extreme. We
shall never be able to arrive at a true understanding of the facts
without the help of leading ideas. The facts do not arrange themselves
spontaneously; we must try to account for them by hypotheses which seem
a priori plausible. When such a hypothesis occurs to us, we have to
inquire how far it can go to account for the facts, and, of course, to
abandon it if, however plausible it seemed, it proves to be erroneous.
By judiciously selecting our hypotheses we can save ourselves much
futile labour. For instance, when about to investigate the causes of
slavery, it occurs to us that its existence will probably largely
depend on the economic state of society, and we inquire whether this be
really so. If we began with investigating the effect of some factor
that a priori seems to have little connection with slavery, e.g. the
development of aesthetic sentiments, we should be almost certain to do
useless work.
The present volume endeavours to come up to the ideal we have set
ourselves and developed here. A book of the same size as this might
contain a survey of many more subjects connected with slavery. In the
last paragraph it will be shown how very much remains unsaid. We treat
only a small portion of the subject of slavery. But this portion is
treated carefully, and by doing so we think we have arrived at some
conclusions of scientific value, whereas, if we had superficially
treated a wider subject, our work, though perhaps more agreeable from a
literary point of view, would be nearly useless in a scientific sense.
Slavery among savages has never yet been made the subject of any
special investigation. Letourneau’s “Évolution de l’Esclavage” treats
of slavery among all races of mankind, savages included. But he deals
with his subject in quite an insufficient manner. His literature is
rather scanty, and there is no question of any critical inquiry into
the value of his materials. The theoretical part of his work consists
of some entirely unproved assertions; not a single systematic
investigation is to be found in it. Hence his general conclusion is
very meagre and contains only the hackneyed evolutionary series of
slavery,—serfdom,—wage-system,—socialist paradise, to which he adds
“slavery of women” as the very first stage. The scientific value of
this book is very little.
There is another book dealing with the general history of slavery,
Professor J. K. Ingram’s “History of slavery and serfdom”. This writer
confines himself to the historical nations of ancient and modern times;
the savages are excluded. Though he makes many valuable remarks, of
which, as the reader will see, we have availed ourselves, by far the
greater part of his work is purely descriptive. A great difference
between his book and ours is further that he writes “not for scholars,
but for the mass of thoughtful and cultivated men and women” [2],
whereas we appeal to the men of science, not to the public at large.
Yet it is an instructive little book. We only regret that the writer
appears to agree with Comte’s curious theory concerning the relation
between slavery and religion [3].
The general history of slavery is also the subject of a book of
Tourmagne’s. “There are two volumes by A. Tourmagne,” says Ingram,
“entitled respectively Histoire de l’Esclavage Ancien et Moderne, 1880,
and Histoire du Servage Ancien et Moderne, 1879, which bring together
many facts relating to slavery and serfdom; but they are somewhat loose
and uncritical; the author, too, repeats himself much, and dwells on
many topics scarcely, if at all, connected with his main themes” [4].
We are not acquainted with Tourmagne’s book on serfdom: but as to his
Histoire de l’Esclavage we fully agree with Ingram.
PART I.
DESCRIPTIVE.
CHAPTER I.
DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION FROM KINDRED PHENOMENA.
§ 1. Ordinary meaning of the term “slavery”.
In most branches of knowledge the phenomena the man of science has to
deal with have their technical names; and, when using a scientific
term, he need not have regard to the meaning this term conveys in
ordinary language; he knows he will not be misunderstood by his
fellow-scientists. For instance, the Germans call a whale Wallfisch,
and the English speak of shell-fish; but a zoölogist, using the word
fish, need not fear that any competent person will think he means
whales or shell-fish.
In ethnology the state of things is quite different. There are a few
scientific names bearing a definite meaning, such as the terms
“animism” and “survival”, happily introduced by Professor Tylor. But
most phenomena belonging to our science have not yet been accurately
investigated; so it is no wonder, that different writers (sometimes
even the same writer on different pages) give different names to the
same phenomenon, whereas on the other hand sometimes the same term
(e.g. “matriarchy”) is applied to widely different phenomena. As for
the subject we are about to treat of, we shall presently see that
several writers have given a definition of slavery; but no one has
taken the trouble to inquire whether his definition can be of any
practical use in social science. Therefore we shall try to give a good
definition and justify it.
But we may not content ourselves with this; we must also pay attention
to the meaning of the term “slavery” as commonly employed. There are
two reasons for this. First, we must always rely upon the statements of
ethnographers. If an ethnographer states that some savage tribe carries
on slavery, without defining in what this “slavery” consists, we have
to ask: What may our informant have meant? And as he is likely to have
used the word in the sense generally attached to it, we have to
inquire: What is the ordinary meaning of the term “slavery”?
The second reason is this. Several theoretical writers speak of
slavery, without defining what they mean by it; and we cannot avail
ourselves of their remarks without knowing what meaning they attach to
this term. And as they too may be supposed to have used it in the sense
in which it is generally used, we have again to inquire: What is the
meaning of the term “slavery” in ordinary language?
The general use of the word, as is so often the case, is rather
inaccurate. “Careless or rhetorical writers” says Ingram, “use the
words “slave” and “slavery” in a very lax way. Thus, when protesting
against the so-called “Subjection of Women”, they absurdly apply those
terms to the condition of the wife in the modern society of the
west—designations which are inappropriate even in the case of the
inmates of Indian zenanas; and they speak of the modern worker as a
“wage-slave”, even though he is backed by a powerful trade-union.
Passion has a language of its own, and poets and orators must doubtless
be permitted to denote by the word “slavery” the position of subjects
of a state who labour under civil disabilities, or are excluded from
the exercise of political power, but in sociological study things ought
to have their right names, and those names should, as far as possible,
be uniformly employed” [5].
But this use of the word we may safely regard as a metaphor [6]; nobody
will assert that these labourers and women are really slaves. Whoever
uses the term slavery in its ordinary sense attaches a fairly distinct
idea to it.
What is this idea?
We can express it most generally thus: a slave is one who is not free.
There are never slaves without there being freemen too; and nobody can
be at the same time a slave and a freeman. We must, however, be careful
to remember that, man being a “social animal”, no man is literally
free; all members of a community are restricted in their behaviour
towards each other by social rules and customs [7]. But freemen at any
rate are relatively free; so a slave must be one who does not share in
the common amount of liberty, compatible with the social connection.
The condition of the slave as opposed to that of the freeman presents
itself to us under the three following aspects.
First, every slave has his master to whom he is subjected. And this
subjection is of a peculiar kind. Unlike the authority one freeman
sometimes has over another, the master’s power over his slave is
unlimited, at least in principle; any restriction put upon the master’s
free exercise of his power is a mitigation of slavery, not belonging to
its nature, just as in Roman law the proprietor may do with his
property whatever he is not by special laws forbidden to do. The
relation between master and slave is therefore properly expressed by
the slave being called the master’s “possession” or “property”,
expressions we frequently meet with.
Secondly, slaves are in a lower condition as compared with freemen. The
slave has no political rights; he does not choose his government, he
does not attend the public councils. Socially he is despised.
In the third place, we always connect with slavery the idea of
compulsory labour. The slave is compelled to work; the free labourer
may leave off working if he likes, be it at the cost of starving. All
compulsory labour, however, is not slave labour; the latter requires
that peculiar kind of compulsion, that is expressed by the word
“possession” or “property”, as has been said before.
Recapitulating, we may define a slave in the ordinary sense of the word
as a man who is the property of another, politically and socially at a
lower level than the mass of the people, and performing compulsory
labour.
We shall inquire next, whether this notion is a practical one for the
purpose of our investigation, or whether it requires any improvement.
But it may be convenient first to examine, what our theoretical authors
have to say on the subject.
§ 2. Use of the term “slavery” in theoretical literature.
Spencer remarks: “[The captives] fall into unqualified servitude....
They belong absolutely to their captors.... They become property, of
which any use whatever may be made” [8]. Although this may not properly
be called a definition of slavery, it appears that he uses “becoming
property” and “falling into unqualified servitude” (or slavery) as
synonymous expressions.
According to Ingram “the essential character of slavery may be regarded
as lying in the fact that the master was owner of the person of the
slave” [9].
Lippert remarks: “The fact, that one man becomes an object of
possession by another, characterizes the nature of slavery” [10].
Sohm calls a slave “a man who is not regarded as a person, but as a
thing. The slave is left to the discretion of the master, who has over
him the right of property” [11].
Letourneau says: “The rights of the masters over their slaves were
always excessive; they were those of a proprietor over his possession”
[12].
According to Schmoller “the slave is the property of his master” [13].
In the same way, Meyer, speaking of slavery, says that ancient law
recognised an unlimited right of property over men [14].
Jhering also remarks that “the master’s potestas may be called
property” [15].
In the first paragraph three principal features of slavery have been
enumerated. We see that our theorists attach most importance to the
first feature: “property” or “possession” [16]. Whether we can agree
with them will be shown in the next paragraph.
§ 3. Definition for scientific use.
The present investigation is a sociological one; therefore our
definition of slavery has to be sociologically relevant. We have to
ask: What is the social value of slavery? Slavery is an organ in the
social body performing a certain function, and we have to inquire: How
is this organ developed, and how, in the various stages of its
development, does it perform its function? But then we must know first
what this organ and its function are. Thus only can we exclude from our
inquiry organs somewhat resembling slavery, but functionally quite
different from it, and organs wholly different from slavery, but
performing the same function or nearly the same. And this is necessary;
for the inclusion of such organs would create a confusion fatal to a
right understanding.
What then is slavery and what is its function?
The great function of slavery can be no other than a division of labour
[17]. Division of labour is taken here in the widest sense, as
including not only a qualitative division, by which one man does one
kind of work and another a different kind, but also a quantitative one,
by which one man’s wants are provided for not by his own work only, but
by another’s, A society without any division of labour would be one, in
which each man worked for his own wants, and nobody for another’s; in
any case but this there is a division of labour in this wider sense of
the word. Now this division can be brought about by two means. “There
are two ways” says Puchta, “in which we can avail ourselves of the
strength of other men which we are in need of. One is the way of free
commerce, that does not interfere with the liberty of the person who
serves us, the making of contracts by which we exchange the strength
and skill of another, or their products, for other performances on our
part: hire of services, purchase of manufactures, etc. The other way is
the subjection of such persons, which enables us to dispose of their
strength in our behalf, but at the same time injures the personality of
the subjected. This subjection can be imagined as being restricted to
certain purposes, for instance to the cultivation of the land, as with
soil-tilling serfs; the result of which is that this subjection, for
the very reason that is has a definite and limited aim, does not quite
annul the liberty of the subjected. But the subjection can also be an
unlimited one, as is the case when the subjected person, in the whole
of his outward life, is treated as but a means to the purposes of the
man of power, and so his personality is entirely absorbed. This is the
institution of slavery” [18]. We have not much to add to this lucid
description of slavery and its function. The function is a system of
compulsory labour, and slavery is the absorption of the whole
personality of the forced labourer to this end. As this absorption is
properly expressed by the word “property” or “possession”, we may
define the slave as a man who is the property or possession of another
man, and forced to work for him.
This definition, however, on further consideration will show itself
capable of some simplification. For when one man is the property of
another, this implies compulsory labour. The right of property in this
case, the object of it being a man, is a power over that man’s will
too. The Romans recognised this: “The master has not only a right of
property over the slave as over a lifeless thing, but also a power like
that over his son, the potestas dominica, that is a power over the
slave’s will” [19]. The right of property, that is a legally unlimited
power over a man, were useless, if the owner did not influence the
man’s will; and this influencing is equivalent to imposing labour upon
him, labour being taken in the widest sense. A mere physical
possession, such as the preserving of captives for cannibal purposes,
which Letourneau and Spencer make so much of [20], is socially of
little consequence. Possession of human beings, as a social
institution, is that which gets hold of the will of its object. Hence
it follows, that slavery is the fact that one man is the property or
possession of another.
This simplification of our formula has this advantage that, in
inquiring whether in any country there are slaves, we need not ask
whether there is labour imposed on subjected men. When this does not
sufficiently appear, we need not say: We do not know whether slavery
really exists here. When we are told that in such a country some men
are the property of others (except of course the cases of mere physical
possession we have hinted at, which are few and easy to recognise), we
may be sure that they perform some kind of compulsory labour, and are
justified in calling them slaves.
Further advantages of our definition are, that it is the definition
given by many theorists, and that it lies within the limits of current
speech.
In the following paragraphs we shall mark the distinction of slavery
from some phenomena which somewhat resemble it. Of phenomena of this
kind we shall consider only those that most frequently occur; other
questionable cases will be examined in surveying the occurrence of
slavery in the several parts of the globe.
§ 4. Distinction of slavery from kindred phenomena.
I. Wives in an abject condition.
In the first paragraph it has already been noticed, that the advocates
of women’s rights make very great use of the term “slavery”. We shall
see that this equally applies to some ethnographers and theorists
describing the state of women, especially as wives, in some primitive
societies. To give one instance of each of them: Bancroft says of the
Northern Californians: “Although I find no description of an actual
system of slavery existing among them, yet there is no doubt that they
have slaves. We shall see ... that women entitled by courtesy wives,
are bought and sold” [21]. The theorist we shall quote is Letourneau:
“In all very primitive societies woman represents the domestic animals,
the beasts of burden which the more advanced societies possess: she is
indeed treated as a slave, and this certainly is one of the reasons why
slavery has been instituted so late in the course of social evolution”
[22].
We may say that such authors use the word metaphorically (as Letourneau
certainly does); but this does not exempt us from examining, whether
the condition of wives in those cases, where according to them it so
much resembles slavery, is really slavery. We must not, of course,
inquire whether there are instances of female slaves being the wives of
their owners, but whether in any case the wives as such are slaves. In
doing this, we may confine ourselves to observing the condition of
wives among the natives of Australia, as this condition is commonly
described as a striking instance of an abject one. Letourneau remarks:
“In the Australian clans slavery, in the sense in which we use the
word, did not exist; but one half of the social group, the weaker half,
was reduced to servitude; the Australian woman, an indispensable and
despised helpmate, was during her whole life burdened with work,
ill-used, and in reward often eaten by those whom her unavailing labour
had fed” [23]. Schurtz states that the treatment of the Australian
wives is bad [24]. Ratzel expresses the same view: “The position of the
wife in such circumstances is always a low one. That she is positively
considered to be the property of her husband (hence in the Adelaide
district “owner of a wife” means husband) is not peculiar to Australia.
But to this a number of customs are added here, that, more than among
other peoples to which the notion of the wife as a commodity is equally
familiar, place her in the back-ground of public and even of family
life” [25].
Now let us cite some particulars about this abject state of the
Australian wives, as given by ethnographers. For the purpose of
enabling the reader to take a comprehensive view of the matter, we
shall arrange these particulars not according to the different tribes
each applies to, but according to the several phenomena bearing on the
object of our inquiry. This gives the following result:
A. The wife is acquired by the husband without her consent being asked.
So among the Dieri: “under no circumstances has a woman any say in the
choice of a partner”. Powell’s Creek natives: “After being purchased or
captured, the woman is generally taken away to a distance and kept more
or less isolated with her husband for some months, until she
contentedly settles down to the new order of things”. Queenslanders on
Herbert River: wives are acquired by bethrothal as children, by
exchange for a sister or daughter or by capture. N. W. Central
Queenslanders: the marriage can be proposed by the male relatives of
the woman, or a man can exchange his true blood-sister, i.e. by the
same mother, for another’s blood-sister; in both cases the consent of
the whole camp-council is required. Aborigines of N. S. Wales: girls
are often betrothed in infancy, or else given away by their father or
brother without their wishes being consulted; “the women are considered
an article of property, and are sold or given away by the parents or
relatives without the least regard to their own wishes”. Natives of the
Western District of Victoria: betrothal of children is very frequent. A
girl when adult can be asked of her father, without any attention being
paid to her wishes. When two young men have each a sister or cousin,
they may exchange the young women and marry them; the women are obliged
to obey. Southern Australians: the husband most often acquires his wife
by means of a contract with her father. Southern Australians of Port
Lincoln: girls are betrothed long before puberty; when adult they must
follow their intended husbands whether they wish it or not. Tribes of
Central Australia (described by Spencer and Gillen): the most usual
method of obtaining a wife is that which is connected with the custom
of Tualcha mura, i.e. an agreement between two men that the
relationship shall be established between their two children, one a boy
and the other a girl. S. W. Australians: “In no case is the girl asked
for her consent”. Natives of King George Sound (W. Australia): a girl
is often promised to a man years before her birth, but generally she is
acquired by capture. Northern Australians of Port Darwin and the W.
Coast of the Gulf of Carpentaria: “Wives are obtained by gifts of
parents; in the majority of cases female children when born are
promised to men of all ages.... Some men obtain women by stealing them,
generally from other tribes, or get them in exchange for a sister”.
Tasmanians: the girls are betrothed as children; before marriage they
are the property of their father or brother. When the match is broken
off, the girl is again betrothed, without her wishes being consulted.
Brough Smyth, speaking of the Australians in general, remarks: “Men
obtain wives by a convenient system of exchange, by conquest sometimes,
and sometimes a woman is stolen. By what mode soever a man procures a
bride, it is very seldom an occasion of rejoicing for the female”. And
Thomas says: “The process of acquiring a bride differs in different
tribes; she may be exchanged for a sister, the simplest and perhaps the
commonest form; she may be betrothed at, or even, provisionally,
before, birth, but this is usually part of a process of barter; she may
be abducted, either from an already existing, or a prospective husband,
or from her relatives; or she may be inherited from a brother or tribal
kinsman”.
B. The wife is entirely in the power of her husband, and treated
accordingly.
a. Sometimes such general expressions are found, as the wife being her
husband’s “property” or “slave”. So on Moreton Bay: wives are slaves.
On Herbert River: wives are slaves. In N. S. Wales: “the woman is the
absolute property of her husband”. In S. W. Australia: “the state of
slavery in which they [the women] are all held, is really deplorable.”
In Central Australia: the wife is desired by the husband only for a
slave. In Tasmania: the women are slaves and do all the menial work. We
may add Curr’s statement about the Australians in general: The wife “is
not the relative, but the property of her husband”. “The husband is the
absolute owner of his wife (or wives)”. Brough Smyth too remarks that
the husband is called the owner of the wife.
b. He treats her with contempt. In S. Australia women are despised. In
the Moore River District of W. Australia the husband gives his wife
only the offal of the chase. Central Australian men “eat alone, and
throw what they can’t eat to the women”. In N. S. Wales “as her husband
walks along, she follows him at a respectful distance.... If they sit
down to a meal, she still keeps behind and gets her share flung to her
without ceremony”.
c. He may sometimes ill-use and even kill her. On Moreton Bay the wife
is often beaten by her husband, especially when he is drunk with rum.
The Queenslander of Herbert River “treats his wife with but little
consideration, is often very cruel; he may take her life if he
desires”. In N. S. Wales the husband “may do with her whatever he
likes, even to the extent of putting her to death, without any
challenge from social or tribal law.” “The waddy(club) is applied to
their heads in a most unmerciful style, and few old women are to be
seen who do not bear unquestionable marks of the hard usage they have
received.” The Cammarray beats his wife violently for a trifling fault
even a few hours before her confinement. Dawson speaks of the “apparent
hard usage to which the women [of W. Victoria] are subjected”. In S. W.
Australia the method “he [the husband] adopts for correcting her is so
barbarous, that it often occurs that for a single look he pierces her
leg with the ghici, breaks her head with the dauac, and treats her to
other similar caresses”. The natives of King George Sound treat their
wives very badly. In the Moore River District most of the women die a
violent death before they have reached an advanced age. If, after an
unsuccessful chase, the husband finds that his wife has not enough
yams, she is glad to get off with only a flogging. In cases of famine
the women are eaten. In Central Australia women are very badly and
roughly treated. Nobody aids an ill-used woman. “If ... rightly or
wrongly, a man thinks his wife guilty of a breach of the laws which
govern marital relations, then undoubtedly the treatment of the woman
is marked by brutal and often revolting severity.” Tasmanian wives were
often cruelly beaten by their jealous husbands. According to Curr, the
Australian husband may “treat her well, or brutally ill-use her, at his
pleasure.” The wives “are, occasionally, cruelly beaten, or speared,
for even a trifling offence”. Brough Smyth states that “if she shows
favour towards another and be discovered, she may suffer heavy
punishment, be put to death even”. And, according to Thomas, “an erring
wife might be clubbed or speared through the leg on the spot by her
husband, and no one would take much notice of the incident. Indeed, the
injured husband might actually kill her.”
d. The husband exchanges and lends his wife. At Powell’s Creek wives
are sometimes exchanged. In Queensland and S. Australia “it frequently
occurs, that a woman is exchanged, and passes to a number of husbands
in a few years”. The Moreton Bay aborigines lend their wives to each
other and offer them to Europeans. In N. S. Wales “when visitors come
to the camp they are accommodated with wives while they remain; and a
brave chief, who has done much for their tribe by his prowess, gets the
wives of other men sent to him by them as a mark of respect and
friendship. Two men may even agree to exchange wives for a time”. “They
will frequently give one of their wives to a friend who may be in want
of one.” At Port Lincoln the men frequently exchange wives. The S.
Australian husband offers his wife to friends and strangers. Exchange
of wives also occurs in S. Australia. In Central Australia the husband
lends his wife to his friends. When he goes abroad a husband is given
her for the time. A guest is also provided with a wife. Men and parents
prostitute their wives and daughters. “At times a man will lend his
wife to a stranger as an act of courtesy”. Another writer informs us
that “they often bring them [their wives] up to white men and beg of
them to take them”. The natives of Port Darwin “exchange wives
occasionally”. Tasmanian women were offered to whites for payment. A
describer of the Australians in general states that the husband may
“keep her to himself, prostitute her, exchange her for another, or give
her away to any male of the same class as himself”. According to
another writer a young man who has no wife sometimes gets one from an
old man, who is tired of her. And Thomas states: “The Australians were
accustomed to lend their wives to strangers on festive occasions or
during ordinary visits. They might even agree to exchange wives for a
month”.
e. After his death she becomes the property of his brother. Among the
Dieri “the elder brother claims her as she is the wife of his brother”.
On Herbert River the widow belongs to the deceased man’s brother. In N.
S. Wales “when a man dies, his widow is the property of his next
brother”. Among the Kurnai the same custom prevails. In N. Australia “a
widow belongs to her late husband’s brother”. We may add Curr’s general
statement that “when a man dies, his widows devolve on his eldest
surviving brother”.
C. The husband makes his wife work for him. As regards the Dieri we are
told that “the more wives a man has, the more indolent he becomes; as
they do not till the soil, each wife has to go daily in search of food,
gather seeds, roots, and other vegetable products according to the
seasons; the men with a plurality of wives stay at home making weapons,
ornaments and fishing nets from rushes grown on the banks of the
lakes”. At Powell’s Creek “polygamy is common, more so amongst the old
men, who find a plurality of wives useful in hunting for them, and as
carriers when shifting camp, etc.”. On Herbert River the women procure
the food, and for this often make long journeys; they do all the hard
work. The husband makes the frame of the hut; she covers it. When
travelling she carries all that is to be carried. The husband often
keeps the animal food to himself; his hunting has rather the character
of a sport; the procuring of food is entirely incumbent on the wife.
According to Fraser the fate of the native wife in N. S. Wales is very
pitiable. “Married at an early age, she has not only to bear and rear
the children, but she does all the heavy work of the family; in camp,
it is her duty to put up the rude windshelter of sticks and foliage
which serves them as a home, to make a fire and keep it burning, and to
cook the food; on the march, she carries in a bag, resting on her back
and slung from her neck, all their portable property, and seated on
this bag is her youngest child, ... in this bag, in addition to the few
utensils she requires for domestic labours, she has a yam-stick with
which to dig up the numerous native roots which are used as food, a
supply of these and other articles of food required for a meal, a
quantity of native string and hooks for catching fish.... For the ready
kindling of a fire, whenever it is required, she has to carry with her
a smouldering piece of firewood; if she allows this to go out, and thus
puts her lord and master to the labour of getting fire by friction, or
if she in any other way gives him displeasure, he will beat her
severely, even till her body is covered with bruises and her hair is
matted with blood”. At Victoria River Downs Station an old man
generally has many wives, “probably to work and get food for him, for
in their wild state the man is too proud to do anything except carry a
woomera and spear.” In Western Victoria “after marriage the women are
compelled to do all the hard work of erecting habitations, collecting
fuel and water, carrying burdens, procuring roots and delicacies of
various kinds, making baskets for cooking roots and other purposes,
preparing food, and attending to the children. The only work the men
do, in time of peace, is to hunt for opossums and large animals of
various kinds, and to make rugs and weapons.” In S. W. Australia “when,
wandering through the woods, the savage observes that the sky threatens
rain, he enjoins his wife to erect a hut at the place which he thinks
most fit, and where he intends to pass the night”. At King George Sound
the women look very miserable; they do all the work. In the Moore River
District the wife who has not yams enough for her husband is severely
beaten (as quoted above). The Central Australian wife is the drudge of
her husband. About the natives of Port Darwin we get this information:
“The only reason I know of for the practice of polygamy is that, as the
wives have to provide food for their lords and carry all their family
possessions when travelling, the husband can lead a perfect life of
indolence”. Tasmanian women had to procure all sorts of food, except
the kangaroo. Ling Roth quotes a description of a Tasmanian repast:
“Hitherto we had had but a faint idea of the pains the women take to
prepare the food requisite for the subsistence of their families. They
quitted the water only to bring their husbands the fruits of their
labour, and frequently returned almost directly to their diving, till
they had procured a sufficient meal for their families”. Curr,
surveying the mode of life of the Australians in general, remarks:
“Wives have to undergo all the drudgery of the camp and the march, have
the poorest food and the hardest work”. Brough Smyth enumerates as
duties of the wife “building a new camp, getting firewood etc. and on
journeys acting as a carrier for all the worldly goods of her husband.
They are packed on her back, all excepting his war implements, which he
himself deigns to carry”.
This picture, surely, is very black. But, unlike Letourneau, we must
not view the dark side only. We may remark, first that, as it appears
from the foregoing survey, there are with regard to each of the
Australian tribes but a part of the enumerated phenomena on record; the
black picture is produced by blending the dark sides of each into a
whole. And, secondly, the same writers relate some particulars, which
prove that the life of the Australian wife is not all darkness. These
too we shall arrange in the order observed above.
A. In some cases we are told, that the girl’s wishes are to some extent
taken into consideration as to the choice of her husband. On Herbert
River the woman sometimes gets the man she loves; she is then very
happy; sometimes she runs away with the beloved man. In N. W.
Queensland, when a young man and a girl are in love with each other,
and the camp-council is not opposed to it, they elope, live as husband
and wife for some two months, and then return to the camp. In N. S.
Wales a girl, to escape from the betrothed man (oftentimes an old one),
may elope with her young lover; she is then brought back and beaten by
her family, “but it may be that she elopes again and again, and, if at
last they see that she is determined on it, they let her have her own
way”. In Tasmania the woman was stolen from her tribe, but not against
her will. Most often the girl succeeded in getting from her father the
man she wanted; otherwise she had to run away with him. Curr remarks:
“In no instance, unless Mr. Howitt’s account of the Kurnai be correct,
which I doubt, has the female any voice in the selection of her
husband.” This may be true, if we take “voice” in the sense of a
legally recognized right; virtually, however, she sometimes has a
“voice”, as appears from the instances given here. Howitt’s account
which Curr alludes to we have not been fortunate enough to meet with.
According to Brough Smyth “a young man who has engaged the affections
of a girl of a neighbouring tribe, agrees with her to run away at the
first opportunity that offers”. They are then persecuted by the members
of her tribe, as custom and law require, but not energetically. After a
few days the young man and his wife return to his tribe. Except at
first some scolding and muttering his new state provokes little
comment. “His young wife is treated well, and is soon familiar with all
the women of the tribe, to which she has become attached”.
B. a, b. Sometimes the ethnographers tell of much affection existing
between husband and wife. At Moreton Bay there is often a great
affection. On Herbert River “as a rule man and wife apparently get on
very well”. According to Eylmann, happy unions are not unknown among
the natives of South Australia. Fraser remarks about the aborigines of
N. S. Wales: “the kuri or black man is usually kind and affectionate to
his jiu, wife”; “in spite of the hardness of their mode of life,
married couples often live happily and affectionately together to a
considerable age”. On the river Darling, N. S. Wales, according to
Bonney, “although young women are often compelled to marry a man of
whom they know little and often nothing, they generally find happiness
and contentment in their married lives. Quarrels between husband and
wife are rare, and they show much affection for each other in their own
way”. In Central Australia “the women are not treated usually with
anything like excessive harshness”. “Taking everything into account ...
the life of one of these savage women, judged from the point of view of
her requirements, in order to make life more or less comfortable, is
far from being the miserable one that it is so often pictured”. Dawson,
after describing the work imposed on women in W. Victoria (as quoted
above), adds: “But notwithstanding this drudgery and the apparent hard
usage to which the women are subjected, there is no want of affection
amongst the members of a family”. Even Salvado, who so pities the S. W.
Australian wife, remarks: “Sometimes I heard a betrothed man say: I
love her and she loves me”. Of the Tasmanians we are told that they
“treat their women kindly”. Brough Smyth makes this general statement:
“It is hard to believe that even in a lower state the male would not
have had the same feeling of affection for his mate and an equal
jealousy of love as we see among the aborigines now”. In the same sense
Bonwick remarks on the Australian natives in general: “Home life there
was not quite the dark scene some pictured.... Affection is witnessed
between husband and wife, parent and child, tribesman and mate”.
We may add, that the Tasmanian women, though overburdened with work,
are described as a merry and laughter-loving kind of people. And Curr
remarks about Australian women in general: “In every way the female’s
looks to us a hard lot; and yet, notwithstanding, I do not hesitate to
say that they are, on the whole, fairly happy, merry and contented.”
c. The husband does not always enjoy such an entire freedom of action
towards his wife.
Sometimes, for punishing and divorcing her, he must have the consent of
the tribe. So in N. S. Wales, in case of adultery “he may complain to
the elders of the tribe, and they, on cause shown, decree a divorce;
but not if she has children.” According to another writer “the husband
who suspects another of seducing his wife, either kills one or both.
The affair is taken up by the tribe, if the party belongs to another,
who inflict punishment on him.” In W. Victoria “a man can divorce his
wife for serious misconduct, and can even put her to death; but in
every case the charge against her must be laid before the chiefs of his
own and his wife’s tribes, and their consent to her punishment
obtained. If the wife has children, however, she cannot be divorced”.
Here we find also some slight traces of protection of the wife by her
relatives: “A man is allowed to marry his brother’s widow, or his own
deceased wife’s sister, or a woman of her tribe; but he is not
permitted to do so, if he has divorced or killed his wife”. In N. W.
Central Queensland the wife is avenged by her relations. “In the case
of a man killing his own gin [wife], he has to deliver up one of his
own sisters for his late wife’s friends to put to death, he personally
escaping punishment.... A wife has always her “brothers” to look after
her interests”. At the initiation-feasts “each woman can exercise the
right of punishing any man who may have ill-treated, abused or
“hammered” her ... the delinquent not being allowed to retaliate in any
way whatsoever”. If these women are slaves, they at least have their
saturnalia [26].
We even find cases of the wife putting a check upon her husband,
especially in a sexual respect. On Herbert River the wife is furious if
her husband is unfaithful to her. In N. S. Wales “a wife may similarly
complain to them [the elders of the tribe] of the conduct of her
husband, and they may order both the man and his paramour to be
punished”. In W. Victoria “if a husband is unfaithful, his wife cannot
divorce him. She may make a complaint to the chief, who can punish the
man by sending him away from his tribe for two or three moons; and the
guilty woman is very severely punished by her relatives”. “A chief who
has been married under the law of betrothal, is not permitted to marry
another woman for a long time; and should he do so without obtaining
the consent of his wife, there would be constant quarreling”. At Port
Lincoln an old, former wife sometimes forces her husband to desist from
taking a young, new one.
Finally we meet with instances of the wife having a real ascendency
over her husband. On Herbert River the husband is sometimes led by his
wife, and even beaten by her. A curious piece of information we get
about W. Victoria. When a wife treats her husband with such persistent
disrespect or unkindness as to make him wish to get rid of her, he goes
away to some neighbouring tribe and tries to bring about her death by
means of sorcery. The wife, being informed of this, repairs thither and
entreats him to return, and so a reconciliation is effected.
In Tasmania the husband could divorce his wife; but she could also
force him to do so.
d. Exchange of wives does not seem always to take place against their
will. In W. Victoria wives may be exchanged only after the death of
their parents and with the consent of the chiefs, but not if one of
them has children. After the exchange both couples live peacefully
together in one hut, each in a separate compartment. If a man knows
that his wife is in love with another, and he is not opposed to it, she
can be amicably transferred to the other man with the consent of the
chief. At Port Lincoln the men frequently exchange wives; brothers and
near relatives have their wives nearly in common. The wife calls the
brothers of her husband by the name of husbands. This seems rather a
kind of group-marriage than a bartering of wives as of commodities.
These two instances point to the possibility that in other cases too
exchange of wives may be not so arbitrary an action as at first sight
it seems.
As to the lending of wives, in some cases it appears that these offer
themselves to strangers. In N. S. Wales the husband “is quite ready to
bargain with a white man, and with her consent too; for a black woman
considers it an honour to be thus courted by a man of a superior race”.
The Cammarray women prostitute themselves to Europeans for almost
nothing, and among themselves without any shame. In Central Australia
marriage does not impose any obligation of chastity; the wives always
prostitute themselves. In S. Australia women give themselves to
strangers with or without the consent of their husbands. On Moore River
the wives often have connections with young men; the husbands do not
seem to take much notice of it. Moreover, Spencer and Gillen warn us,
that “in many cases in which apparently women are lent (in the sense in
which we use the word, which is the sense in which it is generally used
in this connection) indiscriminately, a knowledge of details would show
that this was not so.... In the nine tribes examined by us we have
found that intercourse of this nature is strictly regulated by custom”.
e. The levirate law sometimes appears in the character of a duty rather
than a right of the deceased man’s brother. Fraser (describing N. S.
Wales) calls it a “refuge” for the widow. Dawson, speaking of the
aborigines of W. Victoria, states: “When a married man dies, his
brother is bound to marry the widow if she has a family, as it is his
duty to protect her and rear his brother’s children”. Salvado speaks of
the philanthropy of the S. W. Australian, who takes upon himself the
care of the wife of an absent friend or parent, or of a brother’s
widow.
C. Among the Kurnai the man must hunt for the sustenance of his wife
and children, and fight for their protection. In Central Australia the
women “have, as amongst other savage tribes, to do a considerable part,
but by no means all, of the work of the camp, but, after all, in a good
season this does not amount to very much, and in a bad season men and
women suffer alike, and of what food there is they get their share”.
The last-cited cases of levirate law, too, show that the subsistence of
the family does not depend on the wife only. Even the instances quoted
under C (p. 15) provide us with evidence that the men perform some kind
of work as hunting the larger animals, making weapons and fishing-nets,
getting fire by friction, etc. And what is said here about the Kurnai
certainly applies to all these tribes: the husband fights to protect
his wife. This being his great and indispensable function, we must not
wonder at his not liking to do other work that women can perform as
well [27].
The division of labour between the sexes is not always so unreasonable
as at first sight it seems. Hore, speaking of the African Wajiji, very
justly remarks: “Much has been said about the unfair division of labour
in such circumstances, but when it is considered that a wild man finds
scarcely anything to his hand, but must himself cut the wood and the
grass to build his house, manufacture his spear and cooking vessels,
take his part in tribal duties, and is frequently compelled to seek
food in long and laborious hunting expeditions, it will be seen that he
often gets his fair share of work” [28]. A similar division of labour
is admirably described by Pinart, as existing among the Indians of
Panama: “I may be allowed to make here a short digression on woman’s
place in the Indian household. It is commonly said by those who have
not lived intimately with the Indians, that they consider woman as a
beast of burden, that to her share falls a life full of troublesome and
fatiguing work, and to the man’s an easy and idle existence. It may,
indeed, seem strange to the superficial observer to see the woman
charged with heavy burdens and the man walking before her carrying
nothing but his weapons. But if the observer will only reflect a
little, he will understand that, whereas the man carries his weapons
only, the responsibility and the safety of his wife and children are
incumbent on him. The Indian’s life is indeed surrounded with dangers;
when traversing a savannah, or forest, a hostile Indian may appear at
any moment; a tiger, a snake etc. may throw himself upon the
travellers. Therefore it is the man’s task to be continually on the
alert, to have his hands and his movements free, in order to be able
immediately to take his arms and defend those who are dear to him. How
often have not I seen the Indian, when about to traverse a river,
making his family stand still, entering into the water and
reconnoitring whether it was not too deep or the stream too rapid; then
inspecting the opposite bank to see whether all was right there; then
crossing the river again, helping his wife and children to pass
through, often even carrying the burdens, and several times re-crossing
the river to transport on his back his wife and children. The river
being crossed, the man again takes the lead with his arms, the wife and
family resume their burdens, and the little caravan continues its way
in the same order” [29].
Another fact, proving that the Australian women are not in every
respect regarded as slaves, is the great influence they often have in
intertribal matters. “The peace-making influence of the women is very
great, and has often been observed among many tribes”. “The
peace-making function of the women is also very characteristically
shown by their being employed as international ambassadresses” [30].
Darwin justly remarks: “We thus see that with savages the women are not
in quite so abject a state in relation to marriage, as has often been
supposed” [31].
The question to be settled now is this: Are these Australian wives, and
accordingly all the wives that live in an abject state, to be called
slaves? Remembering the conclusion we arrived at in the third
paragraph, we may put the question thus: are they objects of
possession? Under B, a, we have quoted several statements of
ethnographers calling them the slaves, or the property, of their
husbands. We must not, however, forget Ingram’s warning against taking
a rhetorical use of the word “slave” too literally. The facts recorded
under B, c, B, d, and C are of more interest to us. The husband may do
with his wife as he likes: ill-use and kill her, overtax her with work,
exchange and lend her. It is but seldom that her relations protect her;
in but very few cases is the man’s power interfered with by the chief
or elders of the tribe. Therefore we cannot but admit that she is the
property of her husband.
Yet there is a reason, why we are not to bring these wives under the
denomination of slaves. We may refer here to the point of view we have
taken in determining the nature of slavery. Slavery is an organ in the
social body, that in a peculiar manner brings about a division of
labour. The Australian wives share the character of this organ as an
object of possession. Yet they are not the same organ; for besides
being forced labourers they are wives; hence it follows that their
relation towards their husbands is wholly bound up with the sexual and
family life: it is their character as women, not as labourers, that
prevails. We may remember here the mutual affection observed in so many
cases by the ethnographers. As the mother of his children, too, the
husband is likely to value his wife. We have seen (under B, c) that in
a few cases she cannot be divorced or exchanged if she has children.
Besides, it is frequently stated, that the Australian aborigines are
very fond of their children [32].
The Australian woman discharges the duties of a wife and a mother, and
besides, to some extent, the work that among other peoples falls to the
share of the slave; therefore she is not a slave. If she were, her
place, in a slave-keeping society, would be entirely occupied by the
slave; but no one will doubt whether in any such society there are
wives. In an evolutionary sense the slave and the Australian wife
differ in this: the Australian wife is a not-yet-differentiated organ,
performing two functions, which at a later stage of development will be
incumbent on two quite distinct organs: the peculiar function of a
wife, and the labour of a slave. This reasoning is not an assertion a
priori, by a biological parallelism, of a development that must
actually have taken place; it is only intended to show the fundamental
difference existing between wives, however abject their condition, and
slaves [33].
We may even go farther and say: Slavery proper does not exist, when
there are none but female slaves. For when females only are enslaved,
the reason probably is, that they are valued as women, not only as
labourers; otherwise males would be enslaved too. So, according to
Meyer [34], in the early stages of ancient history, most of the slaves
were women and their chief function was a sexual one. And even where
such women are not, all of them, actually treated as wives or
concubines, but only kept as labourers, there is no slavery in the true
sense of the word. In such cases, the husband keeps his wife or wives
subjected; this leads to the keeping of numerous subjected females, who
are scarcely to be called wives. But it is always women, as the weaker
sex, who are subjected to the men; subjection of labourers, only in
their quality of labourers, does not exist. The labourers have the
name, if not the state, of wives; this proves that the subjection of
labourers as such, i.e. slavery, is not yet developed.
We have dwelt at considerable length on this distinction between slaves
and subjected wives. There are some more distinctions to be made
between slavery and kindred phenomena; but these will not occupy so
much space and time.
§ 5. Distinction of slavery from kindred phenomena.
II. Children subjected to the head of the family.
There was a time, the time of the good old patriarchal theory, when the
condition of children in the early stages of social life was thought to
be one of complete subjection to the head of the family, the pater
familias, who had over them an unlimited power, extending to the power
of life and death. Carey, among others, holds this view, and very
plainly expresses it. “By nothing is the progress of mankind in
population and wealth made more manifest than by the change in the
relation of parent and child. In the infancy of cultivation the one is
a tyrant and the other a slave” [35].
The adherents of the matriarchal theory have assigned to the Roman-like
agnatic family its place as a later product of history; but to the
question as to how children were treated in an ante-patriarchal state
of culture they have not given much attention.
It is to Professor S. R. Steinmetz that we are indebted for the first
exact inquiry into the early history of the treatment of children. His
conclusions, based upon a large amount of ethnographical materials, are
these:
With most savages rational education is out of the question, the
children soon growing independent, and when young being either
neglected or much petted and spoiled [36]; a lesser number of savage
tribes show some slight beginnings of education without or nearly
without bodily castigation; in a few cases the children are under
strict discipline. In this last set of cases there is to some extent a
subjection of the children. “With the power over the mother the father
gradually acquired the power over the children.” “The patriarch became
master of his children and, whenever circumstances required and allowed
it, introduced a strict discipline over them” [37]. We may therefore
suppose, that there will be instances of children being treated in a
somewhat slave-like manner. We shall presently see that there are a few
such cases on record in Steinmetz’s book.
Among the Apaches the father holds unlimited sway over his children up
to the age of puberty [38].
Tlinkit boys must render unbounded obedience to their parents and
especially to their maternal uncle, to whom, according to the law of
inheritance, they are almost more nearly related than to their own
father. They have to perform the labour imposed upon them, without any
claim to compensation [39].
Of the Botocudos we are told, that the father, being stronger than his
children, compels them to work for him [40].
Among the Aeneze Bedouins the young girls work hard; they drive the
cattle to the pasture-ground; if one out of the herd is lost, they are
severely beaten by their father [41].
Among the Assja Samoyedes the father has a patriarchal power, and
punishes at his discretion and according to custom [42].
In these few cases only is it clearly stated that the head of the
family has an arbitrary power. The value of Zu Wied’s statement about
the Botocudos is much lessened by the same ethnographer telling us that
the children enjoy much freedom [43].
Considering now the state of the children in the cases referred to
here, are we justified in calling it slavery?
The head of the family has power over the children; and so far as it
appears from the particulars given by the ethnographers, this is a
legally unlimited power, that may be called right of property, and is
likely to lead to compulsory labour, as among the Tlinkits and Aeneze
Bedouins it certainly does. The condition of these children may
therefore be expressed by the word “possession”, our criterion of
slavery.
We may even go farther. The condition of slaves is not always very bad;
but however kindly treated, they are slaves, are the property of their
masters. So with children too. They may not be, as in the cases
mentioned above, under strict discipline; yet the father’s, or in a few
cases the maternal uncle’s, power, however moderate a use he makes of
it, may be legally unbounded, not restricted by social rules, not
interfered with by the community. In such a case the head of the family
may be called owner of the child, and is really called so in Roman law,
so clearly distinct from Roman practice. “The patria potestas of
ancient civil law means the full power of the father over the persons
subjected to him (the child, the grand-child by the son, the wife in
manu), the right of death and life (ius vitae ac necis) and the right
to sell into slavery” [44]. “This potestas originally was equal to that
over the slaves” [45].
We see that the term “possession” may well be used here. Yet there is a
reason that induces us not to call these children slaves, a reason
resembling that for which we have excluded the subjected wives. These
children may be called the property of their fathers; but this is not
the whole, nor even the main part of their condition. The relation
between father and child, if it includes subjection, includes much
more. There is mutual sympathy and in many respects a coincidence of
interests; there is respect on the side of the child; there is on the
side of the father a desire to promote the welfare of the child,
however much bound up with egotistical motives. There is also physical
and mental superiority on the side of the father and inferiority on the
side of the child [46]; and this in some cases may bring about a
somewhat slave-like condition of the latter; but this condition is not
an essential part of the relation between father and child; a fortiori
it is not coextensive with the relation, as in the case of the slave.
Biologically expressed: the child is quite another organ, with quite
another function, but in some cases performing in some degree the
function of a slave; therefore it is not a slave. We may add, that the
child is only temporarily subjected; one day he will be a master
himself [47]. This also bears upon the treatment of the child: the
slave is brought up to servility, the child to authority. Children can
never form a subjected class.
As for adopted children, it is not always easy to distinguish them from
slaves. Sometimes they are rather severely treated, especially those
captured in war or kidnapped. Tanner was thus adopted by an Indian of
the Shahnee tribe. The youngest son of this Indian had lately died, and
his wife had told her husband, she could not live if he did not restore
her the child. The husband accordingly went off, and came back with
Tanner whom he had kidnapped. Tanner was adopted on the grave of the
deceased boy, and given an Indian name. But the adoptive father treated
him not at all as a son. He had to do the hardest work, got but little
food, and was often severely beaten. If the mother tried to protect
him, she was beaten too. Finally the father, regardless of the mother’s
wishes sold him to an old Indian woman, who now became his adoptive
mother. She treated him kindly, yet made him cut wood, carry water and
meat, and perform other kinds of labour, which generally were not
imposed upon children of his age. However, he was not a slave. When
full-grown, he was considered by the Indians one of their tribe, and
married an Indian girl [48].
In the second Chapter we shall meet with more instances of captives
being adopted either into the tribe or into one of the families within
the tribe. As long as such persons are children, it is often not easy
to see whether they are slaves or adopted children, for it is not
always stated, as in Tanner’s case, that they are formally adopted. We
must ask then, what becomes of them when full-grown. If they have still
a master to serve, it is clear that they are slaves; for if they are
adopted members of the community, they will be free when adult,
excepting the (most often slight) moral obligations of full-grown
children towards their parents. Other facts proving that the captives
are slaves, are their not taking share in government affairs, when the
tribe is democratically organized, and their being excluded from
marriage with native-born women. With the aid of these criteria we
shall try, in every particular case, to decide whether the captives are
slaves or adopted members of the community. What has been said here of
captives, equally applies to purchased persons.
The last two paragraphs show that there is still something wanting in
our definition. Not every state of possession is slavery; those arising
from family relations are to be excluded. Thus only can we come to a
true understanding of the signification of slavery. For wives and
children may accidentally be forced labourers and the like; the slave
only is ex definitione a subjected person, a forced labourer, an object
of possession. Wives and children there would be, and there are in many
cases, without subjection; slaves there are not where there is not
subjection and compulsory labour. A society that begins to keeps
slaves, develops a new organ with a special, well marked function; and
it is the evolution of this organ we are to trace in the following
Chapters.
Our definition therefore wants an addition. We may now put it so:
Slavery is the fact, that one man is the property or possession of
another beyond the limits of the family proper.
§ 6. Distinction of slavery from kindred phenomena.
III. Members of a society in their relation to the head of the
community.
Bastian, after remarking that in a social community nobody is literally
free, gives a great number of quotations, describing widely different
kinds of subjection, and among these some few, where the subjects of a
despot are called his slaves or his property. “The Siamese are all
(even marked) slaves of their king.” “The subjects of the king of
Djagga are slaves, who may not marry without his consent.” “In Usumbara
all are slaves of the king.” “The absolute rulers dispose of all their
subjects as their property (even without having acquired a right by the
subjects having transgressed the law), and even mark with their badge
the different working-guilds, as is done by the king of Siam.” “The
princes and princesses on the Congo have the right to sell any one who
is not a prince like themselves” [49].
What Bastian means by heaping up these various quotations, without any
order or attempt at an explanation, is not clear. We, however, must not
follow his example, but inquire whether the word “slave” is rightly
used here, whether the subjects of a despot may be called slaves. A few
moments of consideration will show that they may not. For however great
the power of the chief, the king, the despot, in a word the head of the
community, over his subjects, they are not his property. “Property”
supposes a power of the master, pervading the whole life, personal,
domestic and social, of the slave; so great a power over his subjects a
chief never has. The following reasoning will make this clear. Slavery
would not be capable of much development, if it depended upon the
master’s personal superiority only; for slavery to become a social
system, the master’s power over the slave must be recognized by the
society. The slave lives in a society that regards him as a slave;
slavery cannot exist where there is not a society of freemen. Therefore
the despot, however great his power, is not as such a master of slaves.
The slave-owner has the community on his side; the chief has subjects
who themselves compose the community. Looked at from the practical
side, the chief’s power contains much more of voluntary submission than
the slave-owner’s. A chief never has the whole person of the citizens
subjected in his own behalf; he may exact some performances for his
personal benefit, but the restrictions put upon the subjects,
encroaching on their freedom in private life, will generally be
measures taken in the (real or supposed) interest of the community, and
approved of by the community. These restrictions are mutual, and arise
from the social connection itself; this is not, as in slavery, using
one person as a means to the purposes of another definite person. This
yet more distinctly appears, where not a single man imposes these
rules, but the council of citizens. In a communistic society there
would be an entire absence of personal freedom; yet there would be no
slaves, as there would be no freemen whom they could serve.
It need hardly be said, that a chief may keep slaves like any other
freeman. The public power as such, the state, also sometimes keeps
slaves (e.g. the servi publici in Rome). But these slaves are quite
distinct from the main body of citizens.
Sometimes it is stated, that the chief, or the public power, has
slaves, whereas no mention is made of any other slaves. In such cases
the slaves generally become such as a punishment for some offence.
Where such a state of things exists, we may not speak of a
slave-keeping people. For here the power of the government is so great,
that it can avail itself of the labour of the citizens; whether this is
done by imposing an equal amount of labour on all of them, or by
selecting a few persons for this purpose and keeping them in a
slave-like state, does not make much difference. Besides, slavery here
cannot have the same influence on social life it generally has; for
every freeman has to work for himself. This kind of slavery may be
compared with the tread-mill and other kinds of penal servitude
existing in more civilized societies. And we may not speak of a
slave-keeping people, where the only slaves are criminals, who become
the slaves of him who represents the public power, any more than we can
say that slavery exists in those civilized countries, where penal
servitude is still practised.
One more remark has to be added here. Hitherto we have used the terms
“possession” and “property” synonymously as indicating the nature of
slavery. In this paragraph it has been shown, that an essential feature
of slavery is its being recognized by the community. Therefore we
prefer the term “property”, that, better than the other term, conveys
the notion, not only of a virtual subjection, but of a subjection
considered legal in those communities where it exists.
§ 7. Distinction of slavery from kindred phenomena.
IV. Subjected tribes; tributary provinces; lower classes; free
labourers.
We shall meet with instances of tribes, the members of which are bound
to perform some kind of labour for other tribes or for the members of
the latter.
This is not slavery; for slavery is subjection of one individual to
another, and a subjection that absorbs the whole personality of the
subjected; and under such circumstances it is not possible that the
subjected lead a tribal life. Therefore, where the subjected are
described as forming a separate tribe, we may be sure that they are not
slaves. Ingram justly remarks that “the lowest caste may be a degraded
and despised one, but its members are not in a state of slavery; they
are in collective, not individual, subjection to the members of the
higher classes” [50]. What Ingram says here of the lowest caste, often
applies to subjected tribes.
That conquered districts, bound to pay a tribute in kind or money, do
not consist of slaves, is clear.
The foregoing remarks would be almost superfluous, were it not that
some ethnographers in such cases spoke of “slave tribes” and “slave
districts”. This may partly be caused by the natives themselves making
an incorrect use of the term “slavery”. In North Africa the coast
tribes call the inland tribes their slaves, because they keep them
bound by a trade monopoly. In the same regions a chief calls himself
the slave of another chief, to whom he has to pay a tribute [51]. As in
some cases the slaves live together in separate villages [52], it may
be difficult to decide whether we have to deal with slave villages or
with subjected groups. The criterion then is, whether the subjected
people have each an individual master. When we are informed that such
is the case, or that they are bought and sold, we may be certain that
they are slaves.
Lower classes can be of different kinds. Where they are only considered
inferior to the upper classes, or excluded from governmental functions,
it is easy to see that they are not slaves. Greater difficulties are
presented by some other cases. Sometimes a lower class consists of free
labourers. Now theoretically free labourers are easy to distinguish
from slaves: the slave is compelled to work, the free labourer
voluntarily submits to it. But the accounts of the ethnographers do not
always make it clear, which of these two kinds of labourers we have to
deal with in any particular case. When a labourer lives in the house of
his master and is wholly dependent on him, it may be rather difficult
at first sight to decide whether he is free or a slave. Sometimes the
details given are sufficient to settle the question; if not, we shall
have to leave it undecided.
A lower class can also consist of serfs. What they are, and what is the
difference between them and slaves, will be shown in the next
paragraph.
§ 8. Distinction of slavery from kindred phenomena.
V. Serfs.
What we have said of free labourers applies also to serfs: to draw the
theoretical line of demarcation between them and slaves is not so very
difficult; but practically it is not always easy to decide, whether a
subjected class we get some information about consists of slaves or of
serfs; sometimes even, because of the unstable terminology and the
scanty information, it is quite impossible. But there are several
unequivocal cases of serfdom, too, on record in history. Mentioning a
few of these will suffice to give the reader a clear idea of its nature
as distinct from slavery.
In Germany Leibeigene was, in the earliest times, synonymous with
slave. The law placed the Leibeigenen on a level with the domestic
animals. The master had the ius vitae ac necis, an unlimited right to
sell them, the right to exact from them all possible services, to marry
and divorce them. The owner of the Leibeigene was also owner of his
goods and chattels. The lord was responsible for any damages caused by
his servant, as for those caused by his horse, and might claim
indemnity if any one injured his man. But gradually this slavery was
mitigated into a state of subserviency. First the claim to unlimited
services was waived, and on the Leibeigene were imposed definite
Roboten (labour dues) and tributes. He had to work on fixed days, to
perform fixed services, to pay fixed sums. His earnings legally still
belonged to the lord, and the latter succeeded to his goods; but from
the 13th century the lord’s right of inheritance dwindled into a
present (mortuarium). From the 14th century the serfs acquired a
usufruct of the soil they tilled, and so their obligations assumed more
or less the character of a quit-rent. Sometimes they were even allowed
to choose another lord. In the Frankish empire the lords were already
forbidden to sell them abroad; from the 13th century they lost the
right to kill them, and afterwards also the right to whip them. The
church took away from the lord the right to divorce his serfs, if the
marriage had been contracted with his consent. The ius primae noctis
remained longer. Moreover, the relations of the serfs towards others
were gradually recognized by law, at first only as to unjust acts,
later on as to contracts. And so, when at last serfdom was abolished,
the only changes effected by this were: allowing of the right of
emigrating, abolition of the marriage-consent and of the court-services
and personal tributes.
Thus Siegel describes the development of serfdom in Germany [53]. Other
writers come to nearly the same conclusions. According to Brunner,
there was among the Western Germans a class between freemen and slaves,
called Liten or Aldien, a hereditary class, whose position was secured
by law. They had the right of acquiring property and making contracts;
they could by emancipation become fully free, or purchase their own
liberty. To marry they wanted the consent of their lord. They had the
right of feud (Fehderecht), and when they were killed a wergild was
paid, that fell partly to the lord. Their right of inheritance was
originally not recognized [54].
Schröder remarks, that the difference between freemen and subservients
(Hörigen) consisted in this, that the landed possessions of the latter
were smaller and liable to tribute. Moreover, they had no connubium
with freemen, nor any political rights; the wergild paid for them was
one half of that paid for a freeman [55].
In medieval France a similar state of things prevailed. There were no
longer slaves, but serfs. “Serfdom is a transitory stage between
slavery and entire liberty. The serf of the middle ages is not, like
the ancient slave, indissolubly riveted to his condition, deprived of
rights by his very birth, placed on a level with the beasts of burden
of his lord’s estate. Public opinion is favourable to him.” “The facts
agree with the doctrine. The serf has some means of acquiring property;
he may marry and have legitimate descendants, who will succeed to his
goods; he may give evidence in the courts; he may purchase his liberty
by means of his peculium. By getting some profits he is interested in
the cultivation of the soil. Giving his labour to the land, he may
expect to enjoy the fruits of it, by paying fixed tributes. By marrying
his children to free women he secures the liberty of his offspring. By
paying an indemnity he acquires the succession to his father’s
inheritance, and the right of property over his savings.... He may
dispute the tributes (tallies et cens) which the lord levies on the
tenement he cultivates, invoke an enquiry of experts who attest his
means, contract to pay a fixed annuity and so know beforehand what
profit he may depend upon” [56].
With these serfs may be compared the Roman coloni. “The colonatus
consists in this, that men are inseparably attached to a landed
property for the purpose of cultivating it.... This connection with a
determinate estate, from which the colonus might be severed only in
some cases fixed by law, brought about an approximation of the colonus
to the slave (as servus terrae), but also a difference between them, a
security for the colonus, which protects him from the lord’s arbitrary
power. Hence the colonus stands with regard to the lord on the free
footing of one bound only to comply with the yearly canon, annua
functio, a tribute fixed by contract or custom, which he has to pay to
the lord, generally in products of the land” [57].
The foregoing statements once more prove the sufficiency of our
definition of slavery. As soon as the forced labourer is no longer
entirely at the disposal of the lord, the latter being entitled to
fixed services and tributes only, such a state of things is called
serfdom, or colonatus, or subserviency, but not slavery. This agrees
with our definition of slavery. The slave, as we have remarked above,
is the property of his master, whose power is in principle unlimited,
not restricted to fixed performances. Therefore, even if the writers
referred to here called such institutions as serfdom and colonatus
slavery, we are not to do so; but we may regard it as a corroboration
of the conclusion we had arrived at before, that such writers, most of
whom have not made any special research into the nature of slavery,
when they meet with such an institution as serfdom, feel that they are
not to call it slavery.
Now let us look what the theorists have to say on the subject.
Ingram remarks: “The transition to serfdom took place in civic
communities, when the master parted with or was deprived of his
property in the person of the slave, and became entitled only to his
services, or a determinate portion of them. In rural life, where the
march of development was slower, the corresponding stage was reached
when, in accordance with the fundamental principles of feudalism, the
relation between the lord and serf, from being personal, became
territorial” [58].
The first words here perfectly express the truth: when the master loses
“his property in the person of the slave”, he is no longer a
slave-owner. What follows, that the master “became entitled only to his
services”, is less correct; for he who is entitled to all the services
of another is his owner; just the limiting of the master’s right to “a
determinate portion of them” is the change from slavery to something
else. If I may require all the services a man can perform, I am his
owner; if I am restricted to a determinate portion of them, I am not.
Spencer says: “As the distinctions between different forms of slavery
are indefinite, so must there be an indefinite distinction between
slavery and serfdom, and between the several forms of serfdom. Much
confusion has arisen in describing these respective institutions, and
for the sufficient reason that the institutions themselves are
confused” [59].
This consideration, however true, will not prevent us from drawing a
theoretical line of demarcation. Not a single social institution is
practically strictly separated from kindred institutions; yet we cannot
understand such institutions, unless we make a distinction, and not an
“indefinite” one.
Letourneau, after describing the state of the colonus, adds: “In a
word, he was not an object of possession, a slave, but only a
proletarian attached to the soil.” In another passage he remarks that
slavery always undergoes some mitigation in the course of civilization:
“Less and less is the person of the slave himself oppressed; one is
contented with exploiting him, depriving him in a larger or smaller
degree of the fruits of his labour, in a word the slave becomes a serf”
[60].
These quotations may suffice to show that our view of the matter is
held by theorists as well as historians.
The serf, therefore, is not a slave, because he is not the property of
his master, and the particulars of serfdom related by historians
provide us with means of more clearly understanding the practical
meaning of this notion “property”. It means a power that, however
leniently exercised in many cases, is in principle unlimited. Among
many peoples the master may ill-use and even kill his slave, without
the law taking any notice of it. And even where his power is restricted
by social regulations, he may have a right of property, viz. if his
authority be in principle unbounded, and any limitation put upon it
suppose a special legal provision. The slave-owner may do with his
slave whatever he is not by special laws forbidden to do; the master of
a serf may require from his man such services and tributes only, as the
law allows him to require. The slave-owner has a right of property; the
master of a serf has, so to speak, a ius in re aliena. [61]
§ 9. Pawns or debtor-slaves.
In the course of our investigation it will be shown, that among some
peoples a debtor, unable to pay a debt he has contracted, becomes the
slave of his creditor. Sometimes such persons are ordinary slaves; but
pawns or debtor-slaves in the restricted sense (who are of frequent
occurrence in the Malay Archipelago, Dutch pandelingen) are a class
whose slave-state is conditional; they become free as soon as the debt
is paid by or for them; the creditor cannot refuse to accept the money.
Because of this great difference between pawns and ordinary slaves (who
generally have not a right to be ransomed), most ethnographers do not
call the former slaves, but give separate descriptions of slavery and
pawning.
The question arises, and has to be settled here, whether we for our
purpose have to call these pawns slaves. We shall quote here one
description of pawning. Among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold
Coast of West Africa “a pawn is a person placed in temporary bondage to
another by the head of the family ... either to pay a debt, or to
obtain a loan.... When a person is pawned on account of a debt, the
services of the pawn, even should they extend over a considerable
number of years, count for nothing towards the liquidation of the debt;
and a pawn has to serve his master, until the amount of the original
debt with 50 per cent. interest, is paid by the person who pawned him”
[62].
Here the debtor pawns one of the members of his family; among some
other peoples (e.g. in the Malay Archipelago) he pawns himself; this is
not essential. The main fact is that the pawn is in “bondage”, however
temporarily, that he “has to serve his master.” Therefore, as long as
the debt remains unpaid, the pawn is in the same condition as a slave.
He has not to perform a fixed amount of labour, he must serve his
master without any limitation; the master has over him a power that is,
in principle, unlimited. Now we have to inquire: Is this pawn a slave,
i.e. is he the property of his master? In a legal sense the creditor
has not a right of property over his pawn; his right agrees with a kind
of pignus which the Romans called antichresis, i.e. something yielding
profit was handed over to the creditor, who utilized it instead of
receiving the usual interest [63]. Yet the right of the holder of the
pawn bore much resemblance to that of the owner: he had a utilis in rem
actio, a vindicatio pignoris [64]. We, for our purpose, may classify
the pawns among the slaves, if we can prove that sociologically a
system of pawning performs the same function as a slave-system. And
this certainly is the case. The same system of compulsory labour, the
same subjection of the entire person exists, whether the subjected are
perpetually slaves or temporarily pawns, viz. in those cases where, as
among the Tshi-speaking peoples, the master’s power is in principle
unlimited. Where pawns have a fixed amount of work to do, they are
temporary serfs; but where (as is most often the case) no limit is put
to the amount of work the master may exact from them, they are
temporary slaves, and as long as they are slaves, take the same place
as other slaves in the social system.
CHAPTER II.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVERY.
§ 1. Introduction.
Having now determined what is the meaning of the term “slavery”, we are
about to inquire, what is its social signification, what place does it
occupy in those societies where it formerly existed or still exists? As
this book confines itself to ethnological investigations, we shall try
to throw light on this problem with the help of the data supplied to us
by the study of savage races. But then we must first know, whether
slavery exists among all savage tribes, and, if not, whether it is
confined to certain races of men or to certain parts of the world; and
further, whether it is found on all levels of lower culture, or on some
only, and if the latter, on which. The solution of these problems
requires a survey of the occurrence of slavery among wild tribes in the
several parts of the globe. This survey will occupy the present
chapter.
A few words have still to be said about our method of ascertaining the
existence or non-existence of slavery in every particular case.
To one unacquainted with our science the task to be performed now may
seem very easy: we have only to consult the ethnographical literature
bearing on any tribe, and to look whether slavery is mentioned; if it
is mentioned in an affirmative sense, slavery exists; if in a negative
sense or not at all, slavery does not exist. But every one familiar
with ethnographical literature knows that it has not to be used in such
a rough-and-ready manner. The statements of ethnographers are not to be
accepted without much caution and a thorough criticism [65].
The observance of the following rules will, so far as we can judge,
give to our conclusions the highest possible degree of probability.
1º. If it is stated that slavery exists, is this sufficient evidence of
its existence? Our definition, arrived at in the first chapter, lies
within the limits of ordinary language; therefore it is probable that
our informants have used the term in the same sense we attach to it.
There are, however, many cases in which the words “slave” and “slavery”
are applied to something quite different from their true meaning, as
will be seen from our survey of the matter. Thus it is necessary to ask
for more evidence than is given by the mere term “slavery”.
a. If it sufficiently appears that in some tribe there are men
considered to be the property of others, we need not doubt whether
slavery exists.
b. If this is not clearly proved, there is still one particular, that
being mentioned makes the existence of slavery very probable, viz. the
fact that people are bought and sold within the tribe, except of course
women sold for wives. For other kinds of subjected persons, serfs,
lower classes, and subjects of a despot, are not bought or sold, at
least not within the tribe. Beyond the limits of the tribe a man may be
sold without previously having been a slave. Thus some African despots
sell their subjects to Arabian slave-traders; such a sale does not
prove that slavery exists within the tribe. But when a man is sold
within the tribe, either he was already a slave, or he becomes such,
e.g. as a punishment; in both cases slavery is practised by the tribe
[66].
c. If the particulars on record are quite insufficient to determine the
nature of the alleged slave-state, the possibility of a mistake is much
lessened by several writers, independently of each other, stating that
slavery exists.
d. Finally, the general trustworthiness of the writer or writers must
be taken into account.
2º. If we are told that there are no slaves, it is very probable that
slavery really does not exist, for slavery is a phenomenon rather easy
to observe, and the ethnographers are generally inclined to use the
word in a too wide rather than in a too restricted sense. There is no
need here for the extreme scepticism with which we have to receive an
assertion of any tribe having no religion [67]. This does not prevent,
of course, that if we find the existence of slavery denied by a writer
who is generally badly informed, we may reject such an assertion.
3º. The greatest difficulties are presented by those cases in which no
mention is made of slavery. Here the utmost caution has to be observed.
a. If it clearly appears from the description, that there are people
considered to be the property of others, without the word “slavery”
being used, the conclusion is evident.
b. Perhaps some facts are mentioned which make the existence of slavery
highly improbable. We shall see that the main source of slavery is
captivity in war; so, if it is stated that no captives are made, or
that the lot of the captives is something else than slavery, the
non-existence of slavery is probable. But even then it is not quite
certain: there may still be slaves, acquired by other means. Further:
if it is stated that there are no social classes, or if the classes are
enumerated and slaves are not among them, there is a strong presumption
that slavery does not exist. Yet here too there is no certainty; for
slaves, among savage tribes, have not always the aspect of a social
class. The description of the division of labour between the sexes may
also suggest to us the non-existence of slavery. When we are informed
that the men do some kinds of work and the women some other kinds, we
are inclined to think: if there were slaves, their special work would
be mentioned too. But this argument is most dangerous; for the slaves
very often have no special kind of work allotted to them.
We see that none of these criteria prove quite reliable. Yet, taken
together, they give a high degree of probability. And it is not even
necessary that all of them can be ascertained. If an ethnographer,
known to be trustworthy, gives us an elaborate description, pretending
to be a picture of the whole social life of the tribe he describes, it
were a wonder if he had entirely omitted slavery, while it existed; the
more so as this phenomenon is not so difficult to recognize. The same
argument obtains a fortiori, when several such descriptions of the same
tribe exist.
4º. In doubtful cases we may take into account the state of the group
to which a particular tribe belongs. It may be that in the general
descriptions of a group no mention is made of slavery; that, further,
all tribes belonging to this group of which we are well informed prove
to have no slaves. If, then, the information we get concerning a
particular tribe belonging to the same group, is not complete enough to
rely upon, there is a strong presumption that this tribe will be in the
same state as the rest of the group, i.e. that it does not keep slaves.
Under the same conditions we may suppose that a tribe belonging to a
slave-keeping group keeps slaves. The term “group” has to be taken here
in a sociological, not in an anthropological or linguistic sense, and
its application must be somewhat restricted. It must consist of tribes,
that live in somewhat similar conditions and the institutions of which
closely resemble each other; e.g. Australia (the continent) is a group
in this sense, North America is not. It is almost superfluous to add,
that this group-argument may be used only to strengthen existing, but
insufficient, evidence.
We confine ourselves here to the phenomena of savage life; therefore we
shall exclude the semi-civilized peoples. An exact distinction,
however, between these two classes of peoples has not yet been made
[68]; so we are fully aware of the possibility of mistakes, made here
in this respect. As we were not able to apply any exact criterion, we
have more or less followed our general impressions, paying most
attention to the development of political institutions. So for instance
we have excluded the Kabyls of Northern Africa, because their detailed
legal system, as described by Hanoteau and Letourneux [69], proves that
politically they have passed beyond the stage of savagery. And a
developed political organization cannot exist without profoundly
marking such an institution as slavery.
We shall find that several savage tribes have to a considerable extent
been influenced by civilized or semi-civilized nations. In such cases
the question arises: have we to deal here with phenomena of
unadulterated savage life? This question is important and deserves full
attention. We shall see that many savage tribes in their true
aboriginal state have been acquainted with slavery, whereas many others
when first discovered did not practise it; so neither the existence nor
the non-existence of slavery must necessarily be due to foreign
interference; either may be aboriginal, and must be supposed to be so
wherever there is not a strong presumption to the contrary [70]. But
there are also many cases in which foreign influence has undoubtedly
been at work. We must, then, make a distinction. If the influence of
the civilized or semi-civilized nation has led to a, so to speak,
normal development, i.e. a development, which lies within the limits of
primitive culture, we have to deal with a phenomenon of savage life.
For instance, commercial intercourse with a nation of higher
civilization has brought about an accumulation of wealth and a social
differentiation, which render the existence of slavery possible. In
such case we may safely speak of slavery as practised by savages, for
it is the effect of trade in general, not of intercourse with a
civilized nation as such, that we have to deal with here. If, on the
contrary, there has been an abnormal development, i.e. a development
which does not take place in countries inhabited by savages only, the
present condition of the savage tribe has no interest to us. For
instance, measures have been taken by a civilized nation on purpose to
abolish slavery. Then we, for our purpose, must consider the savage
tribe concerned as keeping slaves, and pay attention only to the
descriptions of its institutions as they were before the abolition.
The ensuing paragraphs will show which savage tribes keep slaves and
which do not keep any. The groups into which we have divided the
several tribes are mainly geographical, not intended to answer any
anthropological purpose. As long as the meaning of the term “race” is
so unstable as at present, we think it better not to operate with it.
Our groups are nearly the same as those given by Schurtz in his
Völkerkunde.
At the end of each paragraph its result will be mentioned. The
“positive cases” are the tribes which probably keep slaves, the
“negative cases” those which probably do not keep slaves. Under the
head of “no conclusion” we have given the cases in which the
probability that slavery exists is nearly as great, or as little, as
the inverse probability. The tribes, the names of which are printed in
italics, are those which afford “clear cases”, i.e. where the
probability nearly amounts to certainty.
At the end of the chapter a brief recapitulation will show the
occurrence of slavery among savages in the several parts of the globe.
When, in the following paragraphs, we say: “Such a tribe keeps slaves,”
or: “Such a tribe does not keep slaves,” this does not imply that the
same state of things still prevails. The tribe we speak of may have
died out; or, where slavery existed, it may have been abolished. When
we know that such a thing has taken place, we shall use the past tense.
But in many cases the only information we have got concerning some
tribe dates from many years back; and we do not know what has become of
this tribe in the meantime. Then, not to be obliged always to use such
tedious formulas as: “In Mr. X.’s time slavery existed among such a
tribe,” we shall simply say: “slavery exists.” Whether it still exists
is certainly of much interest to a philanthropist; but to us, for the
purposes we have set ourselves in the present volume, it is quite
immaterial.
§ 2. North America.
1. Eskimos.
Rink’s account applies especially to Western Greenland at the time of
the first European settlement, but may be taken as a general
description of the Eskimos [71]. According to him the family in the
restricted sense comprehended foster-children, widows, helpless persons
adopted as relatives and more or less treated as servants. They were
regarded as subordinate members of the family but never subjected to
any corporal punishment [72]. He then describes their social
organization, but makes no mention of slavery [73]. The question
remains whether these helpless persons are to be called slaves. This
does not very clearly appear; but, happily, we have more detailed
accounts of the several Eskimo tribes.
Crantz, in his description of the Greenlanders, gives many particulars
about their servants. Mothers of illegitimate children are despised;
sometimes a childless person buys her children. When a married couple
have no children or no full-grown children, the husband adopts one or
two orphan boys, who help him in his work and must provide the family
with the necessaries of life. The same is done by the wife with
daughters of others or with a widow. Although the adopted youths are
employed as servants, they are free from any compulsion, and are
regarded as the future lords of the house. The adopted maid-servant or
daughter can leave when she likes. A man will never beat his
man-servant, and were he to touch a maid-servant, he would incur great
disgrace [74]. We see that the condition of these servants is not
slavery. The boy is the future lord of the house, the girl may leave
when she pleases. Servants are only required to occupy the place that
in a normal household is taken up by the children. Labour is not asked
for. “If a man dies without leaving behind relatives, or full-grown
sons, nobody cares for the children, unless one wants a maid-servant.”
A widow must try to get a lodging, in which she does not always succeed
[75]. It is clear that to these Greenlanders slaves would not be of any
use. Nansen, too, makes no mention of slavery [76].
Boas, describing the Central Eskimos, states that among them too
children are adopted and regarded by the adoptive parents as their own
children; so “an elder adopted son has a preference over a younger son
born of the marriage,” viz. as to the right of inheritance. The
following statement still more directly bears on our subject:
“Sometimes men are adopted who may almost be considered servants.
Particularly bachelors without any relations, cripples who are not able
to provide for themselves, or men who have lost their sledges and dogs
are found in this position. They fulfil minor occupations, mend the
hunting-implements, fit out the sledges, feed the dogs, etc.; sometimes
however, they join the hunters. They follow the master of the house
when he removes from one place to another, make journeys in order to do
his commissions, and so on. The position, however, is a voluntary one,
and therefore these men are not less esteemed than the self-dependent
providers” [77]. The last sentence clearly shows that these servants
are not slaves. And as in no other place does Boas make any mention of
slaves, it is certain that slavery does not exist.
Ribbach gives some notes on the Eskimos of Labrador. There is nothing
on slavery in these notes. Describing their dwellings he says: “The
principal family has of course the best place; the servants, widows or
orphans, if there are such, have to content themselves with a place
near the door, where the cold is most severe” [78]. This agrees so much
with the foregoing descriptions, that we may suppose that the same
state of things prevails here.
As little mention is made of slavery in the descriptions of some other
Central Eskimo tribes, as the Frobisher Bay and Field Bay Eskimos [79],
the Kinipetu Eskimos [80], the Tchiglit Eskimos [81], the Eskimos of
the Ungava district [82].
Bancroft says of the Western Eskimos (or Eskimos of Alaska): “Slavery
in any form is unknown among them”. Elliott makes no mention of slavery
[83].
The describers of the Eskimos of Point Barrow, too, have not a word
about slavery. Adoption is practised to a great extent [84]. So the
same state of things probably prevails here as among the other Eskimos.
Some other tribes, belonging to the Eskimo group in the wider sense
[85], may also be treated here.
Amongst the Aleuts, according to Bancroft, the chief “is exempt from
work, is allowed a servant to row his boat, but in other respects
possesses no power” [86]. No more is added bearing on our subject.
Petroff, however, gives a detailed account of slavery among them. The
slaves were prisoners of war and their descendants. The master could
punish the slave with death, could sell and liberate him. Any attempt
to escape was severely punished. [87]. So the Aleuts had slaves.
The Athka Aleuts, according to Petroff, had also slaves [88].
Among the Koniagas or Southern Eskimos “slavery” says Bancroft “existed
to a limited extent.” This is affirmed by Holmberg [89].
2. Nootka group.
The Tlinkits formerly carried on slavery to a great extent. This is
proved by the detailed accounts of several writers [90].
The same applies to the Haidas [91].
Krause, in a short note, speaks of a female slave of a Tsimshian chief.
Niblack states that the Tsimshians acted as middlemen in the slave
trade. Boas describes the legends of the Tsimshians; in these legends
slaves and their occupations are frequently spoken of. Kane, in his
census of Indian tribes states that among the Tsimshians there were
slaves. [92]. Hence we may infer that slavery formerly existed among
them.
Boas, speaking of the Kwakiutl Indians, writes: “All the tribes of the
Pacific Coast are divided into a nobility, common people and slaves.
The last of these may be left out of consideration, as they do not form
part and parcel of the clan, but are captives made in war, or
purchases, and may change ownership as any other piece of property”
[93]. From this statement it appears that the Kwakiutl kept slaves.
Krause says of the Bilballas; “The chief possessed numerous wives and
many slaves; also were these Indians much given to slave-stealing and
the slave trade” [94]. As the Bilballas are reckoned by Bancroft among
the Haidas, amongst whom, according to him, “slavery is universal”, we
may suppose, that slaves were kept by them for their own use, not for
export only.
The many details, given in the works of Sproat and Brown, prove that
slavery existed among the Ahts of Vancouver Island [95].
The Nootkas, among whom, according to Bancroft, “slavery is practised
by all the tribes”, seem to be the same as the Ahts [96].
Bancroft informs us that “slaves are held by all the tribes” about
Puget Sound, and gives several details of their slave system [97].
Slavery also existed among the Fish Indians of British Columbia [98].
3. Tinneh group.
According to Kane, who was well acquainted with this group, “slavery in
its most cruel form exists among the Indians of the whole coast, from
California to Behring’s Straits, the stronger tribes making slaves of
all the others they can conquer. In the interior, where there is but
little warfare, slavery does not exist.” Niblack, however, states that
slavery existed among the interior Tinneh but they “had no hereditary
slaves, getting their supply from the coast” [99].
Of the Kutchins or Loucheux Jones says: “Slavery is practised among
them. Any poor creature who has no friends is made a slave” [100].
Hardisty gives more details; he tells us: “As a rule slavery does not
exist, but the orphan and the friendless are kept in servitude and
treated so harshly as to be really little better than slaves, until
such time as they get big enough and bold enough to assert their
independence, when they are allowed to shift for themselves” [101].
Such ill-treated children, who when full-grown are “allowed to shift
for themselves”, certainly are not slaves. Therefore we may safely
infer, that slavery did not exist here, the more so, as the other
authors [102] make no mention of slaves.
Mackenzie, describing the Chepewyans or Athabascas, states that “they
are constantly at war with the Eskimos, and kill as many of them as
they can, as it is a principle with them never to make prisoners”
[103]. Neither in his notes on the Chepewyans in general, nor in those
on some single tribes belonging to the Chepewyan family, as the Slave
and Dog-Rib Indians, Hare Indians, Beaver and Rocky-Mountain Indians,
does our informant make any mention of slavery. Nor is there a word to
be found about slaves in Russell’s and Bancroft’s accounts. Hearne
speaks of Northern and Southern Indians, divisions of the Chepewyans.
Among the Southern Indians a wife sometimes begs of her husband, who is
going to war, to bring a female slave with him for her to kill. The
chief Matonabbee was the son of a Northern Indian man and a Southern
Indian slave [104]. Hearne does not speak of male slaves. So we may
suppose that slavery proper does not exist.
On the Tacullies Bancroft remarks: “Slavery is common with them, all
who can afford it keeping slaves. They use them as beasts of burden,
and treat them most inhumanely” [105].
Of the Atnas on Copper River, a division of the Kenai, Bancroft says:
“Those who can afford it, keep slaves, buying them from the
Koltschanes” [106].
Mrs. Allison informs us that among the Similkameem Indians of British
Columbia “slaves taken in war were well treated, but always had one eye
blemished to mark them” [107].
4. Algonquin group.
The authors we have consulted on the Algonquins in general [108] make
no mention whatever of slaves.
Loskiel, describing the Lenape or Delawares, states that captured boys
and girls were received into their families, and employed as servants;
sometimes, however, they were sold to Europeans. If such prisoners
behaved well, they had nothing to complain of and were not overworked.
If they ran away and were recaptured, they were generally killed. But
the adult male prisoners, viz. those of them who were not killed, were
adopted by families, instead of those who had been killed in war or had
died in some other way, and from this moment were looked upon as
members of the tribe to which they now belonged [109]. As these men
became members of the tribe, it is not probable that the captive
children were made slaves; we may safely suppose that as long as they
were young they had to perform menial work, but when adult were on a
level with the members of the tribe. And as neither Loskiel, in any
other passage, nor Brinton refers to slavery, slaves were very probably
not to be found among the Delawares. [110].
In Le Jeune’s account of the Montagnais no mention is made of slaves.
Prisoners of war were cruelly put to death [111].
The Ojibways or Chippeways, according to Keating, killed the captive
warriors and old women; the marriageable women became slaves and were
very cruelly treated by the women of the victorious tribe; the children
were adopted and treated fairly well [112]. Jones’s account is somewhat
different. Most often all enemies were killed. Sometimes they made a
few prisoners, who were adopted by those who had lost a relative; then
the adopted prisoner became a relative or slave; if not adopted he was
burned alive. The relatives of a murderer sometimes paid large
indemnities to those of the victim; the murderer had then to work for
them in order to pay off the debt; he was reduced to a kind of
servitude [113]. In these accounts slaves and servitude are mentioned.
The servitude of the murderer very probably was not slavery. He had to
work: but it is not stated that he was made a slave, i.e. the property
of an individual person. The prisoners who became “relatives or slaves”
were adopted; therefore they were not slaves in the proper sense of the
word. And as for the female slaves Keating speaks of, we know that a
slave system without male slaves is not slavery proper. We may suppose,
that these female captives became an inferior kind of wives, to whom
the women of the tribe were unkind through a very natural jealousy.
Kohl, in his elaborate description of the Ojibways, makes no mention of
slavery. Their wars, he states, did not bring them any profit [114].
According to Carver, “all that are captivated by both parties, are
either put to death, adopted, or made slaves of.” “That part of the
prisoners, which are considered as slaves, are generally distributed
among the chiefs, who frequently make presents of some of them to the
European governors of the out-posts, or to the superintendents or
commissaries of Indian affairs. I have been informed that it was the
Jesuits and French missionaries that first occasioned the introduction
of these unhappy captives into the settlements and who by so doing
taught the Indians that they were valuable” [115]. From all the
foregoing we may infer that slavery was not an indigenous institution
among the Ojibways.
This inference is strengthened by what Tanner tells us of the Ottawas,
an Ojibway tribe. He was adopted by an Ottawa woman, but was not at
first on a level with the other children. The first few years she made
him do various kinds of manual labour: he had to cut wood, fetch water
and do other kinds of work, which were not generally required from
children of his age. Yet when grown-up he was on a level with the
Indians into whose tribe he was admitted, and married an Indian girl
[116].
Before passing to the Ottawas, Tanner had been a captive amongst the
Shahnees. He was very cruelly and ignominiously treated. Yet he was not
a slave, for he had been adopted by a married couple on the grave of
their youngest son, whose place he was to fill [117]. As this agrees
with the general customs of this group, in which there are no slaves,
we may suppose that here also slavery was unknown.
The Potawatomi also very probably had no slaves; for none of their
describers make any mention of slavery [118].
Amongst the Crees or Knisteneaux, according to McLean, adoption of
aliens was practised. A missionary, who had unintentionally killed a
Cree boy, offered himself in his stead, and was adopted. Kane speaks of
“the universal custom of Indian mothers eagerly seeking another child,
although it may be of an enemy, to replace one of her own, whom she may
have lost.... This child is always treated with as great, if not
greater, kindness than the rest.” The existence of this custom,
together with the fact that none of their describers makes mention of
slaves, renders it most probable that they did not keep slaves [119].
The Cheyennes very seldom captured adult males; when they did, they
generally put them to death. Children were adopted and treated like
their own children; women became the wives of their captors [120].
Slavery is not mentioned.
The Blackfeet nation consisted of four tribes: Piegans, Blackfeet,
Bloods, and Gros Ventres. We are told that once when at war against the
Crows, the Gros Ventres “rushed upon them and killed the whole number”
[121]. Grinnell, speaking of a Piegan chief, says: “He told his men not
to kill the captured women. They also captured ... many children. The
chief selected a wife for himself from among these women.” As a rule
they spare none of their enemies, killing alike men, women and
children. Sometimes they spare a captive for his bravery or from dread
of sorcery; he is then provided with food and dismissed to his home
[122]. These particulars being given, and no mention made of slavery by
any of our informants [123], we may safely infer that slavery did not
exist among these tribes.
Among the Abenakies, according to Maurault, prisoners of war were
either tortured to death or adopted into the tribe. Hence we may infer
that slavery, of which this writer makes no mention, was unknown among
them [124].
Hoffman, in his description of the Menomini Indians, referring to
Grignon, says that he does not know whether they had captive slaves;
but certainly they had purchased slaves. Our informant saw 6 male and 8
female slaves, most of whom had been enslaved when young. The female
slaves had been sold for 100 dollars each. The slaves were called
Pawnees, though some of them belonged to other tribes [125]. This
statement sufficiently proves, that in the time of this description the
Menomini had slaves. But in Hoffman’s time they were already very much
under the influence of European civilization. Whether at the more
remote period from which most of our information on the Algonquin
tribes dates slavery existed among them, we do not know.
5. Iroquois group.
The Iroquois had no slaves. This is stated by Morgan, who was
intimately acquainted with them. “Slavery”, says Morgan, “which in the
Upper Status of barbarism became the fate of the captive, was unknown
among tribes in the Lower Status in the aboriginal period.” And the
Iroquois are his typical instance of this “Lower Status”: “When
discovered the Iroquois were in the Lower Status of barbarism.”
Captives were either put to death or adopted [126]. Charlevoix states,
that “most of their captives are condemned to death, or to a state of
abject slavery in which they were never certain of their lives” [127].
But he gives no more particulars about this slave state, nor do our
other informants [128]. On the contrary, Lafitau informs us, that the
condition of prisoners, whose life is rather hard amongst the Algonquin
tribes, amongst the Iroquois and Hurons is very easy [129]. The
descriptions given by the authors of the fate of captives justify
Morgan’s statement: they were either killed or adopted [130]; and
though Lafitau calls the prisoners “esclaves”, their state, as he
describes it, is not at all like that of slaves. So we may safely
infer, that slavery did not exist among them, and that Charlevoix’s
above quoted statement is erroneous.
Among the Hurons or Wyandots, according to Powell, the captives were
either killed or adopted [131]. Lafitau’s and Charlevoix’s accounts of
the fate of captives among the Iroquois apply also to the Hurons. So it
is probable that they had no slaves.
6. Choctaw-Muskoghe group and neighbouring tribes.
Adair, speaking of the Katahba, Cherokee, Muskoghe, Choctaw and
Chickasaw Indians, states that they burned their prisoners. Only if a
prisoner succeeded in escaping to the house of the high-priest or some
other place of refuge, he was not burned; but what his fate was in such
a case we are not told. Young prisoners were not killed; but it is not
stated what became of them. If warriors had offended a neighbouring
tribe, and the chiefs wished to prevent war, they sacrificed either one
of the offenders belonging to a weak family or some unfortunate
prisoner, who had been incorporated into a declining tribe [132]. The
last sentence seems to show, that the custom of adopting prisoners
prevailed here too. At any rate, no mention is made of slaves.
Rochefort remarks that among the Apalaches (who, according to
Roosevelt, included the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks and
Seminoles [133]) an enemy who surrendered during the fight, was taken
to the conqueror’s home with his wife and children, held in an
honourable freedom and treated with as much leniency and care as their
own servants [134]. Whether such persons were slaves does not clearly
appear from this statement. But Adair’s record tends to prove that
slavery did not exist, at least as far as the three former divisions of
the Apalaches are concerned.
Loskiel relates that a prisoner was once condemned to death by the
Cherokees. He had already been tied to the stake, when a Cherokee woman
arrived. She brought a basketful of commodities, which she deposed at
the feet of the man to whom the prisoner belonged, and bade him leave
this prisoner to her, a childless widow, who wanted to adopt him as a
son. This was done [135].
Bartram tells us that the Creeks formerly tortured their captives to
death [136].
The Seminoles, too, according to Roosevelt, used to burn their
prisoners [137].
From all the foregoing we may safely infer that slavery did not exist
in the Apalache group.
Natchez warriors delivered their captives to the relations of those who
had fallen in battle. The captives were always burned [138].
Bossu speaks of slaves among the Attakapas; but it does not appear from
his notes whether they made slaves for their own use or for sale abroad
[139].
Strachey describes the inhabitants of Virginia (several tribes). He
makes no mention of slaves. It is stated in his account, that children
and foreigners were sacrificed [140]; if there had been slaves, these
probably would in the first place have been the victims. One of the
objects of their wars was to capture women and children. Before the
commencement of the battle it was announced that the conquered “upon
their submission or comyng in, though two daies after, should live, but
their wives and childrene should be prize for the conquerors” [141].
Another ancient writer gives a different description of the fate of
their conquered enemies: “when they gain a victory, they spare neither
men, nor women, nor children, in order to render revenge impossible”
[142]. We cannot arrive at a definite conclusion here.
7. Dacotah group.
Owen Dorsey, describing the Dacotahs or Sioux, says: “There are no
slaves among the Siouan tribes” [143]. This assertion is strengthened
by the other authors [144] making no mention of slaves. Mrs. E. G.
Eastman tells us, that captive women and children were well treated and
restored on the conclusion of peace; but often they preferred to remain
with their new husbands and adopted parents. Copway and Neill also
speak of captive children being adopted [145].
Mathews states, that the Hidatsas generally adopt the children captured
in war, and treat them like their own. When grown-up they sometimes
return to their own tribe, but most often remain where they are [146].
Owen Dorsey informs us that among the Omahas “Slavery was not known”.
“Captives were not slain by the Omahas and Ponkas. When peace was
declared, the captives were sent home, if they wished to go. If not
they could remain where they were, and were treated as if they were
members of the tribe; but they were not adopted by any one” [147]. This
positive statement is not weakened by James’s assertion about captive
women becoming slaves [148].
Hunter states that among the Osage and Kansas Indians prisoners were
adopted into the conquering tribe, as husbands, wives and children
[149].
Of the Assiniboins we are told: “Chiefs never receive a gift,
considering it a degradation to accept anything but what their own
prowess or superior qualities of manhood acquire for them. Their hearts
are so good and strong that they scorn to take anything, and
self-denial and the power to resist temptation to luxury or easily
acquired property is a boast with them” [150]. Where even the chiefs
rely only on their own prowess, the existence of slavery is improbable.
Lewis and Clark, describing the Mandans, speak of prisoners living
among them. One of their chiefs had been taken prisoner and adopted by
them, “and he now enjoys great consideration among the tribe.” In
another place they tell us of a woman, who was sold as a slave to a
Mandan chief, who brought her up and afterwards married her [151]. The
evidence is not sufficient to decide, whether their prisoners were held
as slaves or were adopted into the tribe.
8. Oregon group.
Gibbs describes the tribes of Western Washington and North-Western
Oregon in general. The principal of these tribes are the Chinooks and
the tribes about Puget Sound. “Slavery,” says Gibbs, “is thoroughly
interwoven with the social policy of the Indians of the coast section
of Oregon and Washington Territory. East of the Cascades, though it
exists, it is not so common.... Southward it ceases, so far as my
observation has gone, with the Siskiou Mountains, which divide Oregon
from California” [152].
“By the Flatheads,” says Bancroft, “captives are generally killed by
their sufferings.” McLean, speaking of their wars, remarks: “When one
party lost more than the other, compensation was made in slaves or some
other kind of property” [153]. This statement does not, however, prove
that slavery existed among them; these “slaves” might be members of the
tribe, delivered up either to be killed or adopted. So we are left in
doubt as to the existence of slavery [154].
The Chinooks had slaves. Bancroft says: “Slavery, common to all the
coast families, is also practised by the Chinooks; ... the slaves are
obliged to perform all the drudgery for their masters, and their
children must remain in their parents’ condition, their round heads
serving as a distinguishing mark from freemen”. Kane also gives many
particulars about their slave system [155]. Equally Swan, describing
the Chinooks and neighbouring tribes, makes mention of slavery as
practised by them [156]. Lewis and Clark speak of a war, in which the
Killamucks took several prisoners. “These, as far as we could perceive,
were treated very well, and though nominally slaves, yet were adopted
into the families of their masters, and the young ones placed on the
same footing with the children of the purchaser”. This short note is
not sufficient for us to arrive at any definite conclusion, the less
so, as these writers themselves declare that they had not the
opportunity of making a close study of the tribes of the Pacific Coast
[157].
“The Shushwaps,” Bancroft remarks, “are said to have no slaves” [158].
Among the Okanagans, a division of the Shushwaps, according to Ross,
“there are but few slaves ... and these few are adopted as children,
and treated in all respects as members of the family” [159]. From this
it would seem that slavery proper does not exist.
Another division of the Shushwaps are the Atnahs on Fraser River (not
to be confused with the Atnas on Copper River). Mackenzie describes a
division of Indians, whom he does not mention under a separate name;
but they seem to be akin to the Atnahs. “The Atnah and Chin tribe,”
says Mackenzie, “as far as I can judge from the very little I saw of
that people, bear the nearest resemblance to them.” On these Indians he
remarks: “The strangers who live among these people are kept by them in
a state of awe and subjection” [160]. These strangers perhaps are
slaves; but the lack of further details prevents our arriving at any
positive conclusion.
Bancroft, after describing the manner in which some tribes put their
prisoners to death, adds: “Among the Sahaptins some survive and are
made slaves.... The Nez Percé system is a little less cruel in order to
save the life for future slavery” [161]. So the Sahaptins or Nez Percés
seem to have kept slaves, though we should wish for some more
particulars that would exclude all doubt.
Powers states, that female slaves are more numerous among the Shastika
than among the Californians [162]. This short note is the only evidence
we have been able to collect on the subject.
Kane makes mention of slavery as practised by some other tribes, about
which we could not collect further information (perhaps they are
subdivisions of the tribes already enumerated) viz. the Macaws, Babines
or Big-lips, Nasquallies and Kye-uses [163].
9. Californians.
Of the Northern Californians Bancroft tells us: “Although I find no
description of an actual system of slavery existing among them, yet
there is no doubt that they have slaves. Illegitimate children are the
life-slaves of some male relative of the mother, and upon them the
drudgery falls; they are only allowed to marry one in their own
station, and their sole hope of emancipation lies in a slow
accumulation of allicochick (shell-money), with which they can buy
their freedom” [164].
Powers gives some more particulars about two North Californian tribes.
Among the Karoks it is thought ignominious for a man to have connection
with a female slave. When the purchase-money for the wife has not been
paid, the children are looked upon as bastards; they live as outcasts
and marry none but persons of their own condition. Among the Hupas a
similar system prevails. A bastard is much despised; when old enough he
is taken from his mother and becomes the property of one of her male
relatives; he is not a slave, and yet has no share in the privileges of
the family. The produce of his labour belongs to his master; he may
marry only a person of his own condition, and is treated with ignominy.
What he wins by gaming is his own; when this amounts to 15 or 20
dollars, he is free. His children are of the same rank [165].
Although these bastards present a close resemblance to slaves, Powers
explicitly says that they are not slaves. Probably they are only a
despised class; for social status, among these tribes, depends largely
upon wealth. The chief “obtains his position from his wealth, and
usually manages to transmit his effects, and with them his honours, to
his posterity” [166]. “The ruling passion of the savage seems to be
love of wealth; having it he is respected, without it he is despised”
[167]. We may therefore suppose, that these bastards are despised
because penniless, and as soon as they possess 15 or 20 dollars,
respected for their wealth. And as we “find no description of an actual
system of slavery existing among them,” slavery probably does not exist
[168].