April 11, 1783.
Sir:
I have received your Excellency’s letters of the thirty-first of March,
and fourth of April; the last to-day. The one to Colonel Bland, as
member of the committee, has been read in committee confidentially,
and gave great satisfaction. The idea of not attempting to separate
the army before the settlement of accounts, corresponds with my
proposition. That of endeavoring to let them have some pay, had
also appeared to me indispensable. The expectations of the army, as
represented by your Excellency, are moderation itself. To-morrow we
confer with the Superintendent of Finance on the subject of money.
There will be difficulty, but not, we hope, insurmountable.
I thank your Excellency for the hints you are so obliging as to give
me in your private letter. I do not wonder at the suspicions that
have been infused; nor should I be surprised to hear, that I have
been pointed out as one of the persons concerned in playing the game
described. But facts must speak for themselves. The gentlemen who were
here from the army, General McDougal, who is still here, will be able
to give a true account of those who have supported the just claims of
the army, and of those who have endeavored to elude them.
There are two classes of men, sir, in Congress, of very different
views: one attached to State, the other to Continental politics. The
last have been strenuous advocates for funding the public debt upon
solid securities; the former have given every opposition in their
power; and have only been dragged into the measures which are now near
being adopted, by the clamors of the army and other public creditors.
The advocates for Continental funds, have blended the interests of
the army with other creditors, from a conviction, that no funds, for
partial purposes, will go through those States to whose citizens the
United States are largely indebted; or if they should be carried
through, from impressions of the moment, would have the necessary
stability: for the influence of those unprovided for, would always
militate against a provision for others, in exclusion of them. It is in
vain to tell men, who have parted with a large part of their property
on the public faith, that the services of the army are entitled to a
preference: they would reason from their interest and their feelings:
these would tell them, that they had as great a title as any other
class of the community to public justice; and that while this was
denied to them, it would be unreasonable to make them bear their part
of a burthen for the benefit of others. This is the way they would
reason; and as their influence in some of the States was considerable,
they would have been able to prevent any partial provision.
But the question was not merely how to do justice to the creditors, but
how to restore public credit. Taxation, in this country, it was found,
would not supply a sixth part of the public necessities. The loans
in Europe were far short of the balance, and the prospect every day
diminishing; the Court of France telling us, in plain terms, she could
not even do as much as she had done; individuals in Holland, and every
where else, refusing to part with their money, on the precarious tenure
of the mere faith of this country, without any pledge for the payment
either of principal or interest.
In this situation what was to be done? It was essential to our cause,
that vigorous efforts should be made to restore public credit; it was
necessary to combine all the motives to this end, that could operate
upon different descriptions of persons in the different States: the
necessities and discontents of the army presented themselves as a
powerful engine.
But, sir, these gentlemen would be puzzled to support their
insinuations by a single fact. It was, indeed, proposed to appropriate
the intended impost on trade to the army debt; and, what was
extraordinary, by gentlemen who had expressed their dislike to the
principle of the fund. I acknowledge I was one that opposed this, for
the reasons already assigned, and for these additional ones: _That_ was
the fund on which we most counted; to obtain further loans in Europe,
it was necessary we should have a fund sufficient to pay the interest
of what had been borrowed, and what was to be borrowed. The truth was,
these people, in this instance, wanted to play off the army against the
funding system.
As to Mr. Morris, I will give your Excellency a true explanation of
his conduct. He had been for some time pressing Congress to endeavor
to obtain funds, and had found a great backwardness in the business.
He found the taxes unproductive in the different States; he found the
loans, in Europe, making a very slow progress; he found himself pressed
on all hands for supplies; he found himself, in short, reduced to this
alternative, either of making engagements which he could not fulfil,
or declaring his resignation in case funds were not established by a
given time. Had he followed the first course, the bubble must soon
have burst; he must have sacrificed his credit and his character: and
public credit, already in a ruinous condition, would have lost its last
support.
He wisely judged it better to resign: this might increase the
embarrassments of the moment; but the necessity of the case, it was to
be hoped, would produce the proper measures; and he might then resume
the direction of the machine with advantage and success.
He also had some hope that his resignation would prove a stimulus to
Congress.
He was, however, ill advised in the publication of his letters of
resignation. This was an imprudent step, and has given a handle to his
personal enemies, who, by playing upon the passions of others, have
drawn some well-meaning men into the cry against him. But Mr. Morris
certainly deserves a great deal from his country. I believe no man in
this country, but himself, could have kept the money machine agoing
during the period he has been in office. From every thing that appears,
his administration has been upright as well as able.
The truth is, the old leaven of Deane and Lee, is, at this day, working
against Mr. Morris. He happened, in that dispute, to have been on the
side of Deane; and certain men can never forgive him. A man whom I once
esteemed, and whom I will rather suppose _duped_ than wicked, is the
second actor in this business.
The matter, with respect to the army, which has occasioned most
altercation in Congress, and most dissatisfaction in the army, has
been the half pay. The opinions on this head have been two: one party
was for referring the several lines to their States, to make such
commutation as they should think proper; the other, for making the
commutation by Congress, and funding it on Continental security. I was
of this last opinion; and so were all those who will be represented as
having made use of the army as puppets. Our principal reasons were,
_Firstly_: By referring the lines to their respective States, those
which were opposed to the half pay, would have taken advantage of
the officers’ necessities, to make the commutation far short of an
equivalent. _Secondly_: The inequality which would have arisen in the
different States when the officers came to compare (as has happened in
other cases), would have been a new source of discontent. _Thirdly_:
Such a reference was a continuance of the old wretched State system,
by which the ties between Congress and the army have been nearly
dissolved; by which the resources of the States have been diverted from
the common treasury, and wasted; a system which your Excellency has
often justly reprobated.
I have gone to these details, to give you a just idea of the parties
in Congress. I assure you, upon my honor, sir, I have given you a
candid state of facts, to the best of my judgment. The men against
whom the suspicions you mention must be directed, are, in general,
the most sensible, the most liberal, the most independent, and
the most respectable characters in our body, as well as the most
unequivocal friends to the army. In a word, they are the men who think
continentally.
I have the honor to be,
With sincere respect and esteem,
Your Excellency’s
Most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
P. S. I am chairman of a committee for peace arrangements. We shall
ask your Excellency’s opinion at large, on a proper military peace
establishment. I will just hint to your Excellency, that our prejudices
will make us wish to keep up as few troops as possible.
We this moment learn, an officer is arrived from Sir Guy Carleton with
dispatches; probably official accounts of peace.