WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.

Newburgh, April 4, 1783.

Dear Sir:

The same post which gave me your two letters of the twenty-fifth of

March, handed me one from Colonel Bland on the same point.

Observing that both have been written at the desire of a committee

of which you are both members, I have made a very full reply to

their subject in my letter which is addressed to Colonel Bland; and,

supposing it unnecessary to enter into a complete detail to both, I

must beg leave to refer you to Colonel Bland’s (a sight of which I

have desired him to give you), for a full explanation of my ideas and

sentiments.

I read your private letter of the twenty-fifth with pain, and

contemplated the picture it had drawn with astonishment and horror:

but I will yet hope for the best. The idea of redress, by force, is

too chimerical to have had a place in the imagination of any serious

mind in this army; but there is no telling what unhappy disturbances

may result from distress, and distrust of justice: and as the fears

and jealousies of the army are alive, I hope no resolution will be

come to, for disbanding or separating the lines, till the accounts

are liquidated. You may rely upon it, sir, that unhappy consequences

would follow the attempt. The suspicions of the officers are afloat,

notwithstanding the resolutions which have passed on both sides. Any

act, therefore, which can be construed into an attempt to separate them

before the accounts are settled, will convey the most unfavorable ideas

of the rectitude of Congress: whether well or ill founded, matters not;

the consequences will be the same.

I will now, in strict confidence, mention a matter which may be

useful for you to be informed of. It is, that some men (and leading

ones, too) in this army, are beginning to entertain suspicions that

Congress, or some members of it, regardless of the past sufferings

and present distress, maugre the justice which is due to them, and

the returns which a grateful people should make to men who certainly

have contributed, more than any other class, to the establishment

of Independency, are to be made use of as mere puppets to establish

Continental funds; and that, rather than not succeed in this measure,

or weaken their ground, they would make a sacrifice of the army and all

its interests.

I have two reasons for mentioning this matter to you: the one is, that

the army (considering the irritable state it is in, its sufferings,

and composition) is a dangerous instrument to play with; the other,

that every possible means, consistent with their own views (which

certainly are moderate), should be essayed to get it disbanded without

delay. I might add a third: it is, that the Financier is suspected to

be at the bottom of this scheme. If sentiments of this sort should

become general, their operation will be opposed to this plan, at the

same time that it would increase the present discontents. Upon the

whole, disband the army as soon as possible, but consult the wishes of

it, which really are moderate in the mode, and perfectly compatible

with the honor, dignity, and justice, which is due from the country to

it.

I am, with great esteem and regard,

Dear Sir, your most obedient servant,

G. Washington.

To the Hon. Alexander Hamilton.

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