BAUMAN TO HAMILTON.

West Point, August 13, 1780.

Dear Sir:

I cannot help laying before you a few of my thoughts, which lately

have engrossed my whole attention, on the review of our changeable

government at West Point. However, I hope you will make no other use

of them but such as may be of advantage; and whatever may be improper,

or improperly stated, impute to my inability only: and there you

will please to let it rest, and take in good part what I shall say,

as it proceeds from a zeal of affection to you, and from a regard to

the cause I am engaged in. On this consideration you will excuse me,

if any where I should seem to exceed those bounds which custom has

prescribed to subalterns, when they treat of any thing, or adopt modes,

to their superiors.

A continual change of commanding officers, or commandants, is, in my

humble opinion, injurious to this post, and hurtful to the military

duty, so absolutely requisite to be performed, and preserved in a

garrison. As there is no nation at war which pursues the like mode

excepting us; I am therefore induced, not only from this consideration,

but from weighty experience during my station at this post, to offer

an opinion of its impropriety, and bad consequences. The visible ill

it creates; the damage to innumerable things; the irregularity it

continually causes; and lastly, the total loss of the many thousands

which have been, and daily are, expended on this national fabric, which

inevitably must fall to pieces, unless an officer is fixed to this

post (and who ought to be a competent judge of fortifications, and a

military man), are matters which, I think, demand consideration.

A Town-Major, and a good Barrack-Master, are as necessary here, as

the necessaries of life are. The former to regulate the duty and to

keep up discipline in this jurisdiction: the latter to take care of

the buildings, which must otherwise be destroyed. The next thing which

falls to our attention, is the public provision, which has been, and

daily is, exposed here to be lost, to be stolen, and to be damaged, for

want of sufficient shelter and proper repositories. The troops have

suffered, and still suffer, from these and other causes. They have

been cheated in weights, in measure, and in their scanty allowance of

fatigue rum; which I can attest, by being appointed, after my having

represented the matter to General M’Dougall, to inspect into some of

those abuses. Notwithstanding the many thousands of boards which came

here, there are not sufficient for barracks, bunks, etc. For as fast

as one thing is built up, another is torn down again. There is not,

in all this garrison, a proper guard-house for the conveniency of

soldiers, nor for the security of the criminals. No powder magazine,

nor a store for the reception and reserve of the implements of war. In

short, the whole appears, at present, under the care of ungovernable

and undisciplined militia, like a wild Tartar’s camp, instead of that

shining fortification all America thinks not only an insurmountable

barrier against the incursion of its enemy, but likewise an easy

defence in case of an unforeseen disaster of its army.

However, to return to my subject. The importance of those heads already

mentioned, and their connection with those preceding, will, I hope,

obtain your pardon for the digression into which they have led me; and

to your discretion I shall leave what I state.

In a letter I wrote to General Knox some time last winter, among many

things I had to say concerning the ordnance and myself, I made this

remark, to wit: “That relieving of an officer from a garrison, is not

like a relief in the field: for an officer who knows himself to be

relieved, will leave many things undone for the next to do; which I

have seen, heard, and experienced. Beside, after once every thing is to

rights, the men then ought to desist from labor, and exercise the guns.

But new commanding officers have chiefly new systems of defence, which

add labor to labor, and nothing will be formed systematically.”

I have already stated these and more things minutely to the general

officers here, who all agreed in their validity and propriety. But

they, being all liable to immediate removal, there cannot be any thing

formed into a permanent and regular system. Moreover, I have been

informed, that owing to the mismanagement of their predecessors, they

were obliged, after they had taken the command, to hunt for materials

in order to build their own systems; and to issue orders upon orders,

to acquaint themselves with those persons who have, as it were, in

keeping, the several branches which flow into this department.

And let me once more, in confidence, assure you, that I suffer

incessant pain from the sad state this garrison is in. To rectify

defects, my dear sir, when roused to arms, can never be attainable.

Therefore let me beg you to assist in adopting some plan which may be

soldierly, for the good of the service: which, however, can be done

in no other manner, but such as I have hinted to you. For let General

Arnold have all the sagacity imaginable, it will take him some time

to get himself well acquainted with the position and defence of this

post; especially as there is not one single Continental officer left

here who can in any way assist him. Every thing seems new here; and the

very engineer is transferred from hence, on whom he, in some measure,

could have depended for information, with regard to the weakest and

strongest parts of this fortress. And I have not yet told you the one

hundredth part of what I have to say upon some of these subjects; but I

shall finish with prognosticating, that should ever capriciousness hold

sway here, it may prove fatal to this post.

I am, with due respect, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

S. Bauman,

Major of Artillery.

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