* * * This event [the evacuation of Ticonderoga[1]], redounds very
little to our credit. For if the post was untenable, or required a
larger number of troops to defend it than could be spared for the
purpose, it ought long ago to have been foreseen and given up. Instead
of that, we have kept a large quantity of cannon in it, and have been
heaping up very valuable magazines of stores and provisions, that, in
the critical moment of defence, are abandoned and lost. This affair
will be attended with several evil consequences; for besides the
loss of our stores, which we cannot well afford, it opens a new and
easy door by which to penetrate the northern States. It will fix the
hitherto fluctuating disposition of the Indians in that quarter in
their favor, and expose the frontiers of the adjacent country to their
depredations. But though it is a misfortune we have reason to lament,
I dare say it will be regarded with you as much more important than
it really is, and as materially endangering the success of our cause,
which is by no means the case. Our opposition is at this time too well
matured, and has too great stability, to be shaken by an accident of
that kind. While we have a respectable army in the field, and resources
to feed, clothe, and arm them, we are safe. We have had a force
sufficient for the foregoing part of the campaign, to maintain such a
superiority over the main army of the enemy as effectually to hinder
them from attaining any of their purposes. And, to the northward,
with the reinforcements sent up to succor the retreating garrison of
Ticonderoga, and the militia flocking in from New England, I think
there is little doubt we have by this time a force adequate to give
Mr. Burgoyne a seasonable check. One good effect will result from the
misfortune, which is, that it will stimulate the eastern States to
greater exertions than they might otherwise make.
By our last advices, the enemy were in possession of all the country
between Ticonderoga and Fort George; and our army, nearly equal in
number to them, were about to take post somewhere between Fort Edward
and Saratoga.
The consequences of this northern affair will depend much upon the part
that Howe acts. If he were to co-operate with Burgoyne, it would demand
our utmost efforts to counteract them. But if he should go towards the
southward, all or most of the advantages of Burgoyne’s success will be
lost. He will either be obliged to content himself with the possession
of Ticonderoga, and the dependent fortresses, and with carrying on a
partisan war the rest of the campaign; or he must precipitate himself
into certain ruin, by attempting to advance into the country with a
very incompetent force. Appearances lead us to suppose that Howe is
fool enough to meditate a southern expedition; for he has now altered
his station at Staten Island, mentioned above, and has fallen down to
the Hook. Judging it morally certain that there would be a co-operation
of the two armies, we thought it expedient to march northerly; and had
accordingly reached within fourteen miles of New Windsor, the place
where we could cross the North River without danger or interruption.
But this new movement of the enemy’s fleet, has induced us to return
a few miles, and make a disposition for marching southerly. We shall,
however, be cautious how we proceed on that course, lest nothing more
than a feint is intended, to divert us from the real object.
If they go to the southward in earnest, they must have the capture
of Philadelphia in view; for there is no other inducement. We shall
endeavor to get there in time to oppose them; and shall have the
principal part of the continental force, and a large body of spirited
militia, many of them, from their services during the last campaign,
pretty well inured to arms, to make the opposition with. Yet I would
not have you to be much surprised if Philadelphia should fall; for the
enemy will doubtless go there with a determination to succeed at all
hazard; and we shall not be able to prevent them, without risking a
general action, the expediency of which will depend upon circumstances.
If the militia turn out with that zeal we have a right to expect, from
their conduct when the enemy made their last experiment in the Jersies,
and were supposed to be going to Philadelphia, we may do it without
much inconvenience. If they fall materially short of it, we shall
be obliged to confine ourselves to a skirmishing opposition, which
we cannot expect will be effectual. It may be asked, If, to avoid a
general engagement, we give up objects of the first importance, what is
to hinder the enemy from carrying every important point, and ruining
us? My answer is, that our hopes are not placed in any particular city
or spot of ground, but in the preserving a good army, furnished with
proper necessaries, to take advantage of favorable opportunities, and
waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal. Every new post they take,
requires a new division of their forces, and enables us to strike with
our united force against a part of theirs: and such is their present
situation, that another Trenton affair will amount to a complete
victory on our part; for they are at too low an ebb to bear another
stroke of the kind. Perhaps, before I may have an opportunity of
sending this, facts will unfold what I am now endeavoring to anticipate
by conjecture.
You will expect some animadversions on the temper and views of the
French nation. I presume you are nearly as well acquainted with the
assistance they are giving us as I am, both by their intrigues in
foreign courts, and by supplies of every kind of warlike stores and
apparatus.
It does not admit of a doubt that they are interested to wish us
success; and their conduct plainly shows, they are willing to give us
every aid essential to our preservation. But it is natural they should
desire to do it with as much convenience to themselves as they can.
I apprehend they are not over fond of plunging themselves into a war
with England if they can avoid it, and still answer the end they have
to pursue: and, indeed, from the evident reluctance shown on the part
of the latter, to do any thing that may bring about such an event, it
becomes extremely difficult to draw her into it. The conclusion we may
make, is, that France will not wish to force England into a war, unless
she finds our affairs require it absolutely; and England will not enter
into one, till she is compelled to do it.
My best respects to all friends; and I beg you will believe me to be,
with unabated regard,
Dear Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
[1] July 5, 1777.