Head Quarters, Smith’s Clove, July 22, 1777.
Dear Sir:
Your favor of the eighteenth, from Saratoga, reached me yesterday. Your
pronouncing Fort Edward, among the other forts, indefensible, surprises
me a little, as it is entirely contrary to the representations of
several gentlemen of judgment, who have had an opportunity of seeing
and considering its situation; by whom we have been taught to believe
that it would be an excellent post, at least for checking and retarding
Burgoyne’s progress. I agree with you that our principal strength in
the quarter you are, will be in the forests and natural strength of
the country, and in the want of forage, provisions, carriages, &c., in
which the enemy may easily be thrown, by taking away what there are of
those articles, which, you observe, have never been in great abundance.
I am doubtful whether Burgoyne will attempt to penetrate far, and
whether he will not content himself with harassing our back settlements
by parties assisted by the savages, who, it is to be feared, will
pretty generally be tempted, by the enemy’s late successes, to
confederate in hostilities against us.
This doubt arises from some appearances that indicate a southern
movement of General Howe’s army, which, if it should really happen,
will certainly be a barrier against any further impressions of
Burgoyne; for it cannot be supposed he would be rash enough to plunge
into the bosom of the country without an expectation of being met by
General Howe. Things must prove very adverse to us indeed, should he
make such an attempt and _not be ruined by it._ I confess, however,
that the appearances I allude to do not carry a full evidence in my
mind; because they are opposed by others of a contradictory kind;
and because I cannot conceive upon what principle of common sense,
or military propriety, Howe can be running away from Burgoyne to the
southward.
It is much to be wished he may, even though it should give him the
possession of Philadelphia, which by our remoteness from it, may
very well happen. In this case, we may not only, if we think proper,
retaliate, by aiming a stroke at New-York; but we may come upon him
with the greatest part of our collective force, to act against that
part which is under him. We shall then be certain that Burgoyne
cannot proceed, and that a small force of continental troops will be
sufficient for that partisan war which he must carry on the rest of the
campaign.
A small force will also be sufficient to garrison the posts in the
Highlands, and prevent any danger there; so that we shall be able
to bring nearly the whole of the continental army against Mr. Howe.
The advantages of this are obvious. Should he be satisfied with the
splendor of his acquisition, and shut himself up in Philadelphia, we
can ruin him by confinement. Should he leave a garrison there, and go
forward, we can either fall upon that or his main body, diminished
as it will be by such a measure, with our whole force. There will,
however, be many disagreeable consequences attending such an event;
amongst which, the foremost is, the _depreciation of our currency_,
which, from the importance in which Philadelphia is held, cannot fail
to ensue.
I am, dear Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
Alex. Hamilton.