ON THE SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND THE FORM OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.
§ 26. _Explanation of this Class of Objects._
The only essential distinction between the human race and animals,
which from time immemorial has been attributed to a special cognitive
faculty peculiar to mankind, called _Reason_, is based upon the fact
that man owns a class of representations which is not shared by any
animal. These are _conceptions_, therefore _abstract_, as opposed to
_intuitive_, representations, from which they are nevertheless derived.
The immediate consequence of this is, that animals can neither speak
nor laugh; but indirectly all those various, important characteristics
which distinguish human from animal life are its consequence. For,
through the supervention of abstract representation, motivation has now
changed its character. Although human actions result with a necessity
no less rigorous than that which rules the actions of animals, yet
through this new kind of motivation--so far as here it consists in
_thoughts_ which render elective decision (_i.e._ a conscious conflict
of motives) possible--action with a purpose, with reflection, according
to plans and principles, in concert with others, &c. &c., now takes
the place of mere impulse given by present, perceptible objects; but
by this it gives rise to all that renders human life so rich, so
artificial, and so terrible, that man, in this Western Hemisphere,
where his skin has become bleached, and where the primitive, true,
profound religions of his first home could not follow him, now no
longer recognises animals as his brethren, and falsely believes them
to differ fundamentally from him, seeking to confirm this illusion by
calling them brutes, giving degrading names to the vital functions
which they have in common with him, and proclaiming them outlaws; and
thus he hardens his heart against that identity of being between them
and himself, which is nevertheless constantly obtruding itself upon him.
Still, as we have said, the whole difference lies in this--that,
besides the intuitive representations examined in the last chapter,
which are shared by animals, other, abstract representations derived
from these intuitive ones, are lodged in the human brain, which
is chiefly on this account so much larger than that of animals.
Representations of this sort have been called _conceptions_,[115]
because each comprehends innumerable individual things in, or rather
under, itself, and thus forms a complex.[116] We may also define them
as _representations drawn from representations_. For, in forming
them, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the complete, intuitive
representations described in our last chapter into their component
parts, in order to think each of these parts separately as the
different qualities of, or relations between, things. By this process,
however, the representations necessarily forfeit their perceptibility;
just as water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible. For
although each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can quite well
be _thought_ by itself, it does not at all follow that it can be
_perceived_ by itself. We form conceptions by dropping a good deal of
what is given us in perception, in order to be able to think the rest
by itself. To conceive therefore, is to think less than we perceive.
If, after considering divers objects of perception, we drop something
different belonging to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the
result will be the _genus_ of that species. The generic conception is
accordingly always the conception of every species comprised under it,
after deducting all that does not belong to _every_ species. Now, as
every possible conception may be thought as a _genus_, a conception
is always something general, and as such, not perceptible. Every
conception has on this account also its _sphere_, as the sum-total[117]
of what may be thought under it. The higher we ascend in abstract
thought, the more we deduct, the less therefore remains to be thought.
The highest, _i.e._ the most general conceptions, are the emptiest and
poorest, and at last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,
essence, thing, becoming, &c. &c.--Of what avail, by the way, can
philosophical systems be, which are only spun out of conceptions of
this sort and have for their substance mere flimsy husks of thoughts
like these? They must of necessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and
therefore also dreadfully tiresome.
[115] _Begriff_, _comprehensive_ thought, derived from _begreifen_,
to comprehend. [Tr.]
[116] _Inbegriff_, comprehensive totality. [Tr.]
[117] _Inbegriff._
Now as representations, thus sublimated and analysed to form abstract
conceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited all perceptibility, they
would entirely escape our consciousness, and be of no avail to it for
the thinking processes to which they are destined, were they not fixed
and retained in our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.
In as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries and therefore
of language, words always designate _general_ representations,
conceptions, never perceptible objects; whereas a lexicon which
enumerates individual things, only contains proper names, not words,
and is either a geographical or historical dictionary: that is to say,
it enumerates what is separated either by Time or by Space; for, as
_my_ readers know, Time and Space are the _principium individuationis_.
It is only because animals are limited to intuitive representations
and incapable of any abstraction--incapable therefore of forming
conceptions--that they are without language, even when they are able
to articulate words; whereas they understand proper names. That it is
this same defect which excludes them from laughter, I have shown in my
theory of the ridiculous.[118]
[118] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch.
8.
On analyzing a long, continuous speech made by a man of no education,
we find in it an abundance of logical forms, clauses, turns of phrase,
distinctions, and subtleties of all sorts, correctly expressed by
means of grammatical forms with their inflections and constructions,
and even with a frequent use of the _sermo obliquus_, of the different
moods, &c. &c., all in conformity with rule, which astonishes us,
and in which we are forced to recognise an extensive and perfectly
coherent knowledge. Still this knowledge has been acquired on the
basis of the perceptible world, the reduction of whose whole essence
to abstract conceptions is the fundamental business of the Reason,
and can only take place by means of language. In learning the use of
language therefore, the whole mechanism of Reason--that is, all that
is essential in Logic--is brought to our consciousness. Now this can
evidently not take place without considerable mental effort and fixed
attention, for which the desire to learn gives children the requisite
strength. So long as that desire has before it what is really available
and necessary, it is vigorous, and it only appears weak when we try to
force upon children that which is not suited to their comprehension.
Thus even a coarsely educated child, in learning all the turns and
subtleties of language, as well through its own conversation as that
of others, accomplishes the development of its Reason, and acquires
that really concrete Logic, which consists less in logical rules
than in the proper application of them; just as the rules of harmony
are learnt by persons of musical talent simply by playing the piano,
without reading music or studying thorough-bass.--The deaf and dumb
alone are excluded from the above-mentioned logical training through
the acquirement of speech; therefore they are almost as unreasonable as
animals, when they have not been taught to read by the very artificial
means specially adapted for their requirements, which takes the place
of the natural schooling of Reason.
§ 27. _The Utility of Conceptions._
The fundamental essence of our Reason or thinking faculty is, as
we have seen, the power of abstraction, or the faculty of forming
_conceptions_: it is therefore the presence of these in our
consciousness which produces such amazing results. That it should be
able to do this, rests mainly on the following grounds.
It is just because they contain less than the representations from
which they are drawn, that conceptions are easier to deal with than
representations; they are, in fact, to these almost as the formula
of higher arithmetic to the mental operations which give rise to
them and which they represent, or as a logarithm to its number. They
only contain just the part required of the many representations from
which they are drawn; if instead we were to try to recall those
representations themselves by means of the imagination, we should, as
it were, have to lug about a load of unessential lumber, which would
only embarrass us; whereas, by the help of conceptions, we are enabled
to think only those parts and relations of all these representations
which are wanted for each individual purpose: so that their employment
may be compared to doing away with superfluous luggage, or to working
with extracts instead of plants themselves--with quinine, instead of
bark. What is properly called _thinking_, in its narrowest sense, is
the occupation of the intellect with conceptions: that is, the presence
in our consciousness of the class of representations we now have before
us. This is also what we call _reflection_: a word which, by a figure
of speech borrowed from Optics, expresses at once the derivative and
the secondary character of this kind of knowledge. Now it is this
thinking, this reflection, which gives man that _deliberation_, which
is wanting in animals. For, by enabling him to think many things under
one conception, but always only the essential part in each of them,
it allows him to drop at his pleasure every kind of distinction,
consequently even those of Time and of Space, and thus he acquires
the power of embracing in thought, not only the past and the future,
but also what is absent; while animals are in every respect strictly
bound to the present. This deliberative faculty again is really the
root of all those theoretical and practical achievements which give man
so great a superiority over animals; first and foremost, of his care
for the future while taking the past into consideration; then of his
premeditated, systematic, methodical procedure in all undertakings, and
therefore of the co-operation of many persons towards a common end,
and, by this, of law, order, the State, &c. &c.--But it is especially
in Science that the use of conceptions is important; for they are,
properly speaking, its materials. The aims of all the sciences may,
indeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of the particular
through the general; now this is only possible by means of the _dictum
de omni et nullo_, and this, again, is only possible through the
existence of conceptions. Aristotle therefore says: ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῶν
καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν[119] (_absque universalibus enim non
datur scientia_). Conceptions are precisely those _universalia_, whose
mode of existence formed the argument of the long controversy between
the Realists and Nominalists in the Middle Ages.
[119] Aristot. "Metaph." xii. c. 9, "For without universals it is
impossible to have knowledge." (Tr.'s Add.)
§ 28. _Representatives of Conceptions. The Faculty of Judgment._
Conceptions must not be confounded with pictures of the imagination,
these being intuitive and complete, therefore individual
representations, although they are not called forth by sensuous
impressions and do not therefore belong to the complex of experience.
Even when used to _represent a conception_, a picture of the
imagination (phantasm) ought to be distinguished from a conception.
We use phantasms as _representatives of conceptions_ when we try to
grasp the intuitive representation itself that has given rise to the
conception and to make it tally with that conception, which is in
all cases impossible; for there is no representation, for instance,
of dog in general, colour in general, triangle in general, number in
general, nor is there any picture of the imagination which corresponds
to these conceptions. Then we evoke the phantasm of some dog or other,
which, as a representation, must in all cases be determined: that is,
it must have a certain size, shape, colour, &c. &c.; even though the
conception represented by it has no such determinations. When we use
such _representatives of conceptions_ however, we are always conscious
that they are not adequate to the conceptions they represent, and that
they are full of arbitrary determinations. Towards the end of the first
part of his Twelfth Essay on Human Understanding, Hume expresses
himself in agreement with this view, as also Rousseau in his "Discours
sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité."[120] Kant's doctrine, on the contrary,
is a totally different one. The matter is one which introspection and
clear reflection can alone decide. Each of us must therefore examine
himself as to whether he is conscious in his own conceptions of a
"Monogram of Pure Imagination _à priori_;" whether, for instance, when
he thinks dog, he is conscious of something _entre chien et loup_; or
whether, as I have here explained it, he is either thinking an abstract
conception through his Reason, or representing some representative of
that conception as a complete picture through his imagination.
[120] Part the First, in the middle.
All thinking, in a wider sense: that is, all inner activity of
the mind in general, necessitates either words or pictures of the
imagination: without one or other of these it has nothing to hold by.
They are not, however, both necessary at the same time, although they
may co-operate to their mutual support. Now, thinking in a narrower
sense--that is, abstract reflection by means of words--is either
purely logical reasoning, in which case it keeps strictly to its own
sphere; or it touches upon the limits of perceptible representations
in order to come to an understanding with them, so as to bring that
which is given by experience and grasped by perception into connection
with abstract conceptions resulting from clear reflection, and
thus to gain complete possession of it. In thinking therefore, we
seek either for the conception or rule to which a given perception
belongs, or for the particular case which proves a given conception
or rule. In this quality, thinking is an activity of the _faculty of
judgment_, and indeed in the first case a reflective, in the second,
a subsuming activity. The faculty of judgment is accordingly the
mediator between intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the
Understanding and the Reason. In most men it has merely rudimentary,
often even merely nominal existence;[121] they are destined to follow
the lead of others, and it is as well not to converse with them more
than is necessary.
[121] Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical,
consider the fate of Göthe's "Theory of Colours" (_Farbenlehre_),
and should he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that
fate, he will himself have corroborated it a second time.
The true kernel of all knowledge is that reflection which works
with the help of intuitive representations; for it goes back to the
fountain-head, to the basis of all conceptions. Therefore it generates
all really original thoughts, all primary and fundamental views and all
inventions, so far as chance had not the largest share in them. _The
Understanding_ prevails in this sort of thinking, whilst _the Reason_
is the chief factor in purely abstract reflection. Certain thoughts
which wander about for a long time in our heads, belong to this sort
of reflection: thoughts which come and go, now clothed in one kind
of intuition, now in another, until they at last become clear, fix
themselves in conceptions and find words to express them. Some, indeed,
never find words to express them, and these are, unfortunately, the
best of all: _quæ voce meliora sunt_, as Apuleius says.
Aristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no reflection is
possible without pictures of the imagination. Nevertheless, what
he says on this point,[122] οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή
(_anima sine phantasmate nunquam intelligit_),[123] and ὅταν θεωρῇ,
ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν (_qui contemplatur, necesse est,
una cum phantasmate contempletur_),[124] and again, νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστι
ἄνευ φαντάσματος (_fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam
intelligatur_),[125]--made a strong impression upon the thinkers
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently
and emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola,[126]
for instance, says: _Necesse est, eum, qui ratiocinatur et
intelligit, phantasmata speculari_;--Melanchthon[127] says: _Oportet
intelligentem phantasmata speculari_;--and Jord. Brunus[128] says,
_dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari_.
Pomponatius[129] expresses himself in the same sense.--On the whole,
all that can be affirmed is, that every true and primary notion, every
genuine philosophic theorem even, must have some sort of intuitive view
for its innermost kernel or root. This, though something momentary[130]
and single, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole analysis,
however exhaustive it may be,--just as one drop of the right reagent
suffices to tinge a whole solution with the colour of the precipitate
which it causes. When an analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like
a bank note issued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back
it; whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere combinations of
abstract conceptions, resembles a bank note which is issued by a firm
which has nothing but other paper obligations to back it with. All mere
rational talk thus renders the result of given conceptions clearer,
but does not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light. It might
therefore be left to each individual to do himself, instead of filling
whole volumes every day.
[122] Aristot. "De anima," iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.
[123] "The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image." [Tr.]
[124] "He who observes anything must observe some image along with
it." [Tr.]
[125] "De Memoria," c. 1: "It is impossible to think without (the
aid of) an image."
[126] "De imaginatione," c. 5.
[127] "De anima," p. 130.
[128] "De compositione imaginum," p. 10.
[129] "De immortalitate," pp. 54 et 70.
[130] "_Ein Momentanes end Einheitliches._"
§ 29. _Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing._
But, even in a narrower sense, thinking does not consist in the bare
presence of abstract conceptions in our consciousness, but rather
in connecting or separating two or more of these conceptions under
sundry restrictions and modifications which Logic indicates in the
Theory of Judgments. A relation of this sort between conceptions
distinctly thought and expressed we call a _judgment_. Now, with
reference to these judgments, the Principle of Sufficient Reason here
once more holds good, yet in a widely different form from that which
has been explained in the preceding chapter; for here it appears as
the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing, _principium rationis
sufficientis cognoscendi_. As such, it asserts that if a _judgment_ is
to express _knowledge_ of any kind, it must have a sufficient reason:
in virtue of which quality it then receives the predicate _true_.
Thus _truth_ is the reference of a judgment to something different
from itself, called its reason or ground, which reason, as we shall
presently see, itself admits of a considerable variety of kinds. As,
however, this reason is invariably a something upon which the judgment
rests, the German term for it, viz., _Grund_, is not ill chosen. In
Latin, and in all languages of Latin origin, the word by which a reason
of knowledge is designated, is the same as that used for the faculty
of Reason (_ratiocinatio_): both are called _ratio_, _la ragione_,
_la razon_, _la raison_, _the reason_. From this it is evident, that
attaining knowledge of the reasons of judgments had been recognised as
Reason's highest function, its business κατ' ἐξοχήν. Now, these grounds
upon which a judgment may rest, may be divided into _four_ different
kinds, and the truth obtained by that judgment will correspondingly
differ. They are stated in the following paragraph.
§ 30. _Logical Truth._
A judgment may have for its reason another judgment; in this case it
has _logical_ or _formal_ truth. Whether it has material truth also,
remains an open question and depends on whether the judgment on which
it rests has material truth, or whether the series of judgments on
which it is founded leads to a judgment which has material truth,
or not. This founding of a judgment upon another judgment always
originates in a comparison between them which takes place either
directly, by mere conversion or contraposition, or by adding a third
judgment, and then the truth of the judgment we are founding becomes
evident through their mutual relation. This operation is the complete
_syllogism_. It is brought about either by the opposition or by the
subsumption of conceptions. As the syllogism, which is the founding
of one judgment upon another by means of a third, never has to do
with anything but judgments; and as judgments are only combinations
of conceptions, and conceptions again are the exclusive object of our
Reason: syllogizing has been rightly called Reason's special function.
The whole syllogistic science, in fact, is nothing but the sum-total of
the rules for applying the principle of sufficient reason to the mutual
relations of judgments; consequently it is the canon of _logical truth_.
Judgments, whose truth becomes evident through the four well-known laws
of thinking, must likewise be regarded as based upon other judgments;
for these four laws are themselves precisely judgments, from which
follows the truth of those other judgments. For instance, the judgment:
"A triangle is a space enclosed within three lines," has for its last
reason the Principle of Identity, that is to say, the thought expressed
by that principle. The judgment, "No body is without extension,"
has for its last reason the Principle of Contradiction. This again,
"Every judgment is either true or untrue," has for its last reason
the Principle of the Excluded Middle; and finally, "No one can admit
anything to be true without knowing why," has for its last reason the
Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing. In the general employment
of our Reason, we do not, it is true, before admitting them to be true,
reduce judgments which follow from the four laws of thinking to their
last reasons, as premisses; for most men are even ignorant of the very
existence of these abstract laws. The dependence of such judgments upon
them, as their premisses, is however no more diminished by this, than
the dependence of the first judgment upon the second, as its premiss,
is diminished by the fact, that it is not at all necessary for the
principle, "all bodies incline towards the centre of the earth," to
be present in the consciousness of any one who says, "this body will
fall if its support is removed." That in Logic, therefore, _intrinsic
truth_ should hitherto have been attributed to all judgments founded
exclusively on the four laws of thinking: that is to say, that these
judgments should have been pronounced _directly true_, and that
this _intrinsic logical truth_ should have been distinguished from
_extrinsic logical truth_, as attributed to all judgments which have
another judgment for their reason, I cannot approve. Every truth is
the reference of a judgment to something _outside_ of it, and the term
_intrinsic truth_ is a contradiction.
§ 31. _Empirical Truth._
A judgment may be founded upon a representation of the first class,
_i.e._ a perception by means of the senses, consequently on experience.
In this case it has _material truth_, and moreover, if the judgment is
founded _immediately_ on experience, this truth is _empirical truth_.
When we say, "A judgment has _material truth_," we mean on the whole,
that its conceptions are connected, separated, limited, according to
the requirements of the intuitive representations through which it is
inferred. To attain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the
_faculty of judgment_, as the mediator between the intuitive and the
abstract or discursive faculty of knowing--in other words, between the
Understanding and the Reason.
§ 32. _Transcendental Truth._
The _forms_ of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie within the
Understanding and pure Sensibility may, as conditions of all possible
experience, be the grounds of a judgment, which is in that case
synthetical _à priori_. As nevertheless this kind of judgment has
material truth, its truth is _transcendental_; because the judgment is
based not only on experience, but on the conditions of all possible
experience lying within us. For it is determined precisely by that
which determines experience itself: namely, either by the forms of
Space and of Time perceived by us _à priori_, or by the causal law,
known to us _à priori_. Propositions such as: two straight lines do not
include a space; nothing happens without a cause; matter can neither
come into being nor perish; 3 × 7 = 21, are examples of this kind of
judgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no less my tables of the
_Prædicabilia à priori_,[131] as well as most of Kant's theorems in
his "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft," may, properly
speaking, be adduced in corroboration of this kind of truth.
[131] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p.
55.
§ 33. _Metalogical Truth._
Lastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal conditions of all
thinking, which are contained in the Reason; and in this case its truth
is of a kind which seems to me best defined as _metalogical truth_.
This expression has nothing at all to do with the "Metalogicus" written
by Johannes Sarisberriensis in the twelfth century, for he declares in
his prologue, "_quia Logicæ suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus inscriptus
est liber_," and never makes use of the word again. There are only four
metalogically true judgments of this sort, which were discovered long
ago by induction, and called the laws of all thinking; although entire
uniformity of opinion as to their expression and even as to their
number has not yet been arrived at, whereas all agree perfectly as to
what they are on the whole meant to indicate. They are the following:--
1. A subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates, or a = a.
2. No predicate can be attributed and denied to a subject at the same
time, or a =-a = o.
3. One of two opposite, contradictory predicates must belong to every
subject.
4. Truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of it, as
its sufficient reason.
It is by means of a kind of reflection which I am inclined to call
Reason's self-examination, that we know that these judgments express
the conditions of all thinking, and therefore have these conditions
for their reason. For, by the fruitlessness of its endeavours to think
in opposition to these laws, our Reason acknowledges them to be the
conditions of all possible thinking: we then find out, that it is just
as impossible to think in opposition to them, as it is to move the
members of our body in a contrary direction to their joints. If it were
possible for the subject to know itself, these laws would be known to
us _immediately_, and we should not need to try experiments with them
on objects, _i.e._ representations. In this respect it is just the
same with the reasons of judgments which have transcendental truth;
for they do not either come into our consciousness immediately, but
only in _concreto_, by means of objects, _i.e._ of representations. In
endeavouring, for instance, to conceive a change without a preceding
cause, or a passing into or out of being of Matter, we become aware
that it is impossible; moreover we recognise this impossibility to be
an objective one, although its root lies in our intellect: for we could
not otherwise bring it to consciousness in a subjective way. There is,
on the whole, a strong likeness and connection between transcendental
and metalogical truths, which shows that they spring from a common
root. In this chapter we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason chiefly
as metalogical truth, whereas in the last it appeared as transcendental
truth and in the next one it will again be seen as transcendental truth
under another form. In the present treatise I am taking special pains,
precisely on this account, to establish the Principle of Sufficient
Reason as a judgment having a fourfold reason; by which I do not mean
four different reasons leading contingently to the same judgment, but
one reason presenting itself under a fourfold aspect: and this is
what I call its Fourfold Root. The other three metalogical truths so
strongly resemble one another, that in considering them one is almost
necessarily induced to search for their common expression, as I have
done in the Ninth Chapter of the Second Volume of my chief work. On the
other hand, they differ considerably from the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. If we were to seek an analogue for the three other metalogical
truths among transcendental truths, the one I should choose would be
this: Substance, I mean Matter, is permanent.
§ 34. _Reason._
As the class of representations I have dealt with in this chapter
belongs exclusively to Man, and as all that distinguishes human life
so forcibly from that of animals and confers so great a superiority
on man, is, as we have shown, based upon his faculty for these
representations, this faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes
that Reason, which from time immemorial has been reputed the
prerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been considered by all
nations and in all times explicitly as the work or manifestation of the
Reason, of the λόγος, λόγιμον, λογιστικόν, _ratio_, _la ragione_, _la
razon_, _la raison_, _reason_, may evidently also be reduced to what is
only possible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate knowledge,
conditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive, immediate, sensuous
knowledge, which belongs to animals also. Cicero rightly places
_ratio et oratio_ together,[132] and describes them as _quæ docendo,
discendo, communicando, disceptando, judicando, conciliat inter se
homines_, &c. &c., and[133] _rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribus
verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam_. And[134] _ratio,
qua una præstamus beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur,
refellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus_. But, in all
ages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed themselves
in this sense with respect to the Reason, even to Kant himself, who
still defines it as the faculty for principles and for inference;
although it cannot be denied that he first gave rise to the distorted
views which followed. In my principal work,[135] and also in the
Fundamental Problems of Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the
agreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as about the true
nature of Reason, as opposed to the distorted conceptions for which we
have to thank the professors of philosophy of this century. I need
not therefore repeat what has already been said there, and shall limit
myself to the following considerations.
[132] Cicer. "De Offic." i. 16.
[133] _Idem_, "De nat. deor." ii. 7.
[134] _Idem_, "De Leg." i. 10.
[135] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. § 8, and also
in the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again
vol. ii. ch. vi.; finally "Die b. G-P. d. Ethik," pp. 148-154 (2nd
edition, pp. 146-151).
Our professors of philosophy have thought fit to do away with the name
which had hitherto been given to that faculty of thinking and pondering
by means of reflection and conceptions, which distinguishes man from
animals, which necessitates language while it qualifies us for its
use, with which all human deliberation and all human achievements hang
together, and which had therefore always been viewed in this light and
understood in this sense by all nations and even by all philosophers.
In defiance of all sound taste and custom, our professors decided
that this faculty should henceforth be called _Understanding_ instead
of _Reason_, and that all that is derived from it should be named
_intelligent_ instead of _rational_, which, of course, had a strange,
awkward ring about it, like a discordant tone in music. For in all
ages and countries the words _understanding_, _intellectus_, _acumen_,
_perspicacia_, _sagacitas_, &c. &c., had been used to denote the more
intuitive faculty described in our last chapter; and its results,
which differ specifically from those of Reason here in question, have
always been called _intelligent_, _sagacious_, _clever_, &c. &c.
_Intelligent_ and _rational_ were accordingly always distinguished
one from the other, as manifestations of two entirely and widely
different mental faculties. Our professional philosophers could not,
however, take this into account; their policy required the sacrifice,
and in such cases the cry is: "Move on, truth; for we have higher,
well-defined aims in view! Make way for us, truth, _in majorem Dei
gloriam_, as thou hast long ago learnt to do! Is it thou who givest
fees and pensions? Move on, truth, move on; betake thyself to merit and
crouch in the corner!" The fact was, they wanted Reason's place and
name for a faculty of their own creation and fabrication, or to speak
more correctly and honestly, for a completely fictitious faculty,
destined to help them out of the straits to which Kant had reduced
them; a faculty for direct, metaphysical knowledge: that is to say,
one which transcends all possible experience, is able to grasp the
world of things in themselves and their relations, and is therefore,
before all, consciousness of God (_Gottesbewusstsein_): that is, it
knows God the Lord immediately, construes _à priori_ the way in which
he has created the Universe, or, should this sound too trivial, the
way in which he has produced it out of himself, or to a certain degree
generated it by some more or less necessary vital process, or again--as
the most convenient proceeding, however comical it may appear--simply
"dismissed" it, according to the custom of sovereigns at the end of
an audience, and left it to get upon its legs by itself and walk away
wherever it liked. Nothing less than the impudence of a scribbler of
nonsense like Hegel, could, it is true, be found to venture upon this
last step. Yet it is tom-foolery like this which, largely amplified,
has filled hundreds of volumes for the last fifty years under the
name of cognitions of Reason (_Vernunfterkenntnisse_), and forms the
argument of so many works called philosophical by their authors, and
scientific by others--one would think ironically--this expression
being even repeated to satiety. _Reason_, to which all this wisdom is
falsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be a "supersensuous
faculty," or a faculty "for ideas;" in short, an oracular power
lying within us, designed directly for Metaphysics. During the last
half-century, however, there has been considerable discrepancy of
opinion among the adepts as to the way in which all these supersensuous
wonders are perceived. According to the most audacious, Reason has
a direct intuition of the Absolute, or even _ad libitum_ of the
Infinite and of its evolutions towards the Finite. Others, somewhat
less bold, opine that its mode of receiving this information partakes
rather of audition than of vision; since it does not exactly see, but
merely _hears_ (_vernimmt_), what is going on in "cloud-cuckoo-land"
(νεφελοκοκκυγία), and then honestly transmits what it has thus received
to the Understanding, to be worked up into text-books. According to
a pun of Jacobi's, even the German name for Reason, "_Vernunft_," is
derived from this pretended "_Vernehmen_;" whereas it evidently comes
from that "_Vernehmen_" which is conveyed by language and conditioned
by Reason, and by which the distinct perception of words and their
meaning is designated, as opposed to mere sensuous hearing which
animals have also. This miserable _jeu de mots_ nevertheless continues,
after half a century, to find favour; it passes for a serious thought,
nay even for a proof, and has been repeated over and over again. The
most modest among the adepts again assert, that Reason neither sees nor
hears, therefore it receives neither a vision nor a report of all these
wonders, and has a mere vague _Ahndung_, or misgiving of them; but then
they drop the _d_, by which the word (_Ahnung_) acquires a peculiar
touch of silliness, which, backed up as it is by the sheepish look of
the apostle for the time being of this wisdom, cannot fail to gain it
entrance.
My readers know that I only admit the word _idea_ in its primitive,
that is Platonic, sense, and that I have treated this point at length
and exhaustively in the Third Book of my chief work. The French and
English, on the other hand, certainly attach a very commonplace,
but quite clear and definite meaning to the word _idée_, or _idea_;
whereas the Germans lose their heads as soon as they hear the word
_Ideen_;[136] all presence of mind abandons them, and they feel as if
they were about to ascend in a balloon. Here therefore was a field of
action for our adepts in intellectual intuition; so the most impudent
of them, the notorious _charlatan_ Hegel, without more ado, called
his theory of the universe and of all things "_Die Idee_," and in this
of course all thought that they had something to lay hold of. Still,
if we inquire into the nature of these _ideas_ for which Reason is
pronounced to be the faculty, without letting ourselves be put out of
countenance, the explanation usually given is an empty, high-flown,
confused verbiage, in set periods of such length, that if the reader
does not fall asleep before he has half read it, he will find himself
bewildered rather than enlightened at the end; nay, he may even have
a suspicion that these ideas are very like chimæras. Meanwhile,
should anyone show a desire to know more about this sort of ideas, he
will have all kinds of things served up to him. Now it will be the
chief subjects of the theses of Scholasticism--I allude here to the
representations of God, of an immortal Soul, of a real, objectively
existent World and its laws--which Kant himself has unfortunately
called Ideas of Reason, erroneously and unjustifiably, as I have shown
in my Critique of his philosophy, yet merely with a view to proving
the utter impossibility of demonstrating them and their want of all
theoretical authority. Then again it will be, as a variation, only
God, Freedom, and Immortality; at other times it will be the Absolute,
whose acquaintance we have already made in § 20, as the Cosmological
Proof, forced to travel incognito; or the Infinite as opposed to the
Finite; for, on the whole, the German reader is disposed to content
himself with such empty talk as this, without perceiving that the
only clear thought he can get out of it is, 'that which has an end'
and 'that which has none.' 'The Good, the True, and the Beautiful,'
moreover, stand high in favour with the sentimental and tender-hearted
as pretended _ideas_, though they are really only three very wide and
abstract conceptions, because they are extracted from a multitude of
things and relations; wherefore, like many other such _abstracta_, they
are exceedingly empty. As regards their contents, I have shown above
(§ 29) that Truth is a quality belonging exclusively to judgments: that
is, a logical quality; and as to the other two _abstracta_, I refer my
readers partly to § 65 of the first volume, partly to the entire Third
Book of my chief work. If, nevertheless, a very solemn and mysterious
air is assumed and the eyebrows are raised up to the wig whenever
these three meagre _abstracta_ are mentioned, young people may easily
be induced to believe that something peculiar and inexpressible lies
behind them, which entitles them to be called _ideas_, and harnessed to
the triumphal car of this would-be metaphysical Reason.
[136] Here Schopenhauer adds, "especially when pronounced
_Uedähen_." [Tr.]
When therefore we are told, that we possess a faculty for direct,
material (_i.e._, not only formal, but substantial), supersensuous
knowledge, (that is, a knowledge which transcends all possible
experience), a faculty specially designed for metaphysical insight,
and inherent in us for this purpose--I must take the liberty to call
this a downright lie. For the slightest candid self-examination will
suffice to convince us that absolutely no such faculty resides within
us. The result at which all honest, competent, authoritative thinkers
have arrived in the course of ages, moreover, tallies exactly with my
assertion. It is as follows: All that is innate in the whole of our
cognitive faculty, all that is therefore _à priori_ and independent of
experience, is strictly limited to the _formal_ part of knowledge: that
is, to the consciousness of the peculiar functions of the intellect
and of the only way in which they can possibly act; but in order to
give material knowledge, these functions one and all require material
from outside. Within us therefore lie the forms of external, objective
perception: Time and Space, and then the law of Causality--as a mere
form of the Understanding which enables it to construct the objective,
corporeal world--finally, the formal part of abstract knowledge: this
last is deposited and treated of in _Logic_, which our forefathers
therefore rightly called the _Theory of Reason_. But this very Logic
teaches us also, that the _conceptions_ which constitute those
judgments and conclusions to which all logical laws refer, must look to
_intuitive_ knowledge for their _material_ and their _content_; just as
the Understanding, which creates _this intuitive knowledge_, looks to
sensation for the material which gives content to its _à priori_ forms.
Thus all that is _material_ in our knowledge: that is to say, all
that cannot be reduced to subjective _form_, to individual mode
of activity, to functions of our intellect,--its whole _material_
therefore,--comes from outside; that is, in the last resort, from the
objective perception of the corporeal world, which has its origin in
sensation. Now it is this intuitive and, so far as material content is
concerned, empirical knowledge, which _Reason_--_real_ Reason--works up
into conceptions, which it fixes sensuously by means of words; these
conceptions then supply the materials for its endless combinations
through judgments and conclusions, which constitute the weft of our
thought-world. _Reason_ therefore has absolutely no _material_,
but merely a _formal_, content, and this is the object-matter of
Logic, which consequently contains only forms and rules for thinking
operations. In reflecting, Reason is absolutely forced to take
its material contents from outside, _i.e._, from the intuitive
representations which the Understanding has created. Its functions are
exercised on them, first of all, in forming _conceptions_, by dropping
some of the various qualities of things while retaining others, which
are then connected together to a conception. Representations, however,
forfeit their capacity for being intuitively perceived by this process,
while they become easier to deal with, as has already been shown. It
is therefore in this, and in this alone, that the efficiency of Reason
consists; whereas it can never supply _material content from its own
resources_.--It has nothing but forms: its nature is feminine; it
only conceives, but does not generate. It is not by mere chance that
the Reason is feminine in all Latin, as well as Teutonic, languages;
whereas the Understanding is invariably masculine.
In using such expressions as 'sound Reason teaches this,' or 'Reason
should control passion,' we by no means imply that Reason furnishes
material knowledge out of its own resources; but rather do we point
to the results of rational reflection, that is, to logical inference
from principles which abstract knowledge has gradually gathered from
experience and by which we obtain a clear and comprehensive view, not
only of what is empirically necessary, and may therefore, the case
occurring, be foreseen, but even of the reasons and consequences of our
own deeds also. _Reasonable_ or _rational_ is everywhere synonymous
with _consistent_ or _logical_, and conversely; for Logic is only
Reason's natural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules;
therefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in the same
relation to one another as theory and practice. Exactly in this same
sense too, when we speak of a reasonable conduct, we mean by it one
which is quite consistent, one therefore which proceeds from general
conceptions, and is not determined by the transitory impression of
the moment. By this, however, the morality of such conduct is in
no wise determined: it may be good or bad indifferently. Detailed
explanations of all this are to be found in my "Critique of Kant's
Philosophy,"[137] and also in my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics."[138]
Notions derived from _pure Reason_ are, lastly, those which have their
source in the _formal_ part, whether intuitive or reflective, of our
cognitive faculty; those, consequently, which we are able to bring to
our consciousness _à priori_, that is, without the help of experience.
They are invariably based upon principles which have transcendental or
metalogical truth.
[137] "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 _et
seqq._; 3rd edition, p. 610 _et seq._
[138] Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 152;
2nd edition, p. 149 _et seq._
A Reason, on the other hand, which supplies material knowledge
primarily out of its own resources and conveys positive information
transcending the sphere of possible experience; a Reason which, in
order to do this, must necessarily contain _innate ideas_, is a pure
fiction, invented by our professional philosophers and a product of
the terror with which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has inspired
them. I wonder now, whether these gentlemen know a certain Locke
and whether they have ever read his works? Perhaps they may have
done so in times long gone by, cursorily and superficially, while
looking down complacently on this great thinker from the heights
of their own conscious superiority: may be, too, in some inferior
German translation; for I do not yet see that the knowledge of modern
languages has increased in proportion to the deplorable decrease in
that of ancient ones. How could time besides be found for such old
croakers as Locke, when even a real, thorough knowledge of Kant's
Philosophy at present hardly exists excepting in a very few, very
old heads? The youth of the generation now at its maturity had of
course to be spent in the study of "Hegel's gigantic mind," of the
"sublime Schleiermacher," and of the "acute Herbart." Alas! alas!
the great mischief in academical hero-worship of this sort, and in
the glorification of university celebrities by worthy colleagues
in office or hopeful aspirants to it, is precisely, that ordinary
intellects--Nature's mere manufactured ware--are presented to honest
credulous youths of immature judgment, as master minds, exceptions and
ornaments of mankind. The students forthwith throw all their energies
into the barren study of the endless, insipid scribblings of such
mediocrities, thus wasting the short, invaluable period allotted to
them for higher education, instead of using it to attain the sound
information they might have found in the works of those extremely rare,
genuine, truly exceptional thinkers, _nantes in gurgite vasto_, who
only rise to the surface every now and then in the course of ages,
because Nature produced but one of each kind, and then "destroyed the
mould." For this generation also those great minds might have had life,
had our youth not been cheated out of its share in their wisdom by
these exceedingly pernicious extollers of mediocrity, members of the
vast league and brotherhood of mediocrities, which is as flourishing
to-day as it ever was and still hoists its flag as high as it can in
persistent antagonism to all that is great and genuine, as humiliating
to its members. Thanks to them, our age has declined to so low an ebb,
that Kant's Philosophy, which it took our fathers years of study, of
serious application and of strenuous effort to understand, has again
become foreign to the present generation, which stands before it like
ὄνος πρὸς λύραν, at times attacking it coarsely and clumsily--as
barbarians throw stones at the statue of some Greek god which is
foreign to them. Now, as this is the case, I feel it incumbent upon me
to advise all champions of a Reason that perceives, comprehends, and
knows directly--in short, that supplies material knowledge out of its
own resources--to read, as something new to them, the _First Book_ of
Locke's work, which has been celebrated throughout the world for the
last hundred and fifty years, and in it especially to peruse §§ 21-26
of the Third Chapter, expressly directed against all innate notions.
For although Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths, inasmuch
as he extends his denial even to our _formal_ knowledge--a point in
which he has been brilliantly rectified by Kant--he is nevertheless
perfectly and undeniably right with reference to all _material_
knowledge: that is, all knowledge which gives substance.
I have already said in my Ethics what I must nevertheless repeat here,
because, as the Spanish proverb says, "_No hay peor sordo que quien no
quiere oir_" (None so deaf as those who will not hear): namely, that
if Reason were a faculty specially designed for Metaphysics, a faculty
which supplied the material of knowledge and could reveal that which
transcends all possible experience, the same harmony would necessarily
reign between men on metaphysical and religious subjects--for they are
identical--as on mathematical ones, and those who differed in opinion
from the rest would simply be looked upon as not quite right in their
mind. Now exactly the contrary takes place, for on no subject are men
so completely at variance with one another as upon these. Ever since
men first began to think, philosophical systems have opposed and
combated each other everywhere; they are, in fact, often diametrically
contrary to one another. Ever since men first began to believe (which
is still longer), religions have fought against one another with fire
and sword, with excommunication and cannons. But in times when faith
was most ardent, it was not the lunatic asylum, but the Inquisition,
with all its paraphernalia, which awaited individual heretics. Here
again, therefore, experience flatly and categorically contradicts the
false assertion, that Reason is a faculty for direct metaphysical
knowledge, or, to speak more clearly, of inspiration from above. Surely
it is high time that severe judgment should be passed upon this Reason,
since, _horribile dictu_, so lame, so palpable a falsehood continues
after half a century to be hawked about all over Germany, wandering
year by year from the professors' chair to the students' bench, and
from bench to chair, and has actually found a few simpletons, even in
France, willing to believe in it, and carry it about in that country
also. Here, however, French _bon-sens_ will very soon send _la raison
transcendentale_ about its business.
But where was this falsehood originally hatched? How did the fiction
first come into the world? I am bound to confess that it was first
originated by Kant's Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative.
For when this Practical Reason had once been admitted, nothing further
was needed than the addition of a second, no less sovereign Theoretical
Reason, as its counterpart, or twin-sister: a Reason which proclaims
metaphysical truths _ex tripode_. I have described the brilliant
success of this invention in my Fundamental Problems of Ethics[139] to
which work I refer my reader. Now, although I grant that Kant first
gave rise to this false assumption, I am, nevertheless, bound to add,
that those who want to dance are not long in finding a piper. For it
is surely as though a curse lay on mankind, causing them, in virtue
of a natural affinity for all that is corrupt and bad, to prefer and
hold up to admiration the inferior, not to say downright defective,
portions of the works of eminent minds, while the really admirable
parts are tolerated as merely accessory. Very few in our time know
wherein the peculiar depth and true grandeur of Kant's philosophy
lies; for his works have necessarily ceased to be comprehended since
they have ceased to be studied. In fact, they are now only cursorily
read, for historical purposes, by those who are under the delusion
that philosophy has advanced, not to say begun, since Kant. We soon
perceive therefore, that in spite of all their talk about Kantian
philosophy, these people really know nothing of it but the husk, the
mere outer envelope, and that if perchance they may here or there have
caught up a stray sentence or brought away a rough sketch of it, they
have never penetrated to the depths of its meaning and spirit. People
of this sort have always been chiefly attracted, in Kant's Philosophy,
first of all by the Antinomies, on account of their oddity, but still
more by his Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, nay
even by the Moral Theory he placed on the top of it, though with this
last he was never in earnest; for a theoretical dogma which has only
practical validity, is very like the wooden guns we allow our children
to handle without fear of danger: properly speaking, it belongs to
the same category as: "Wash my skin, but without wetting it." Now,
as regards the Categorical Imperative, Kant never asserted it as a
fact, but, on the contrary, protests repeatedly against this being
done; he merely served it up as the result of an exceedingly curious
combination of thoughts, because he stood in need of a sheet-anchor
for morality. Our professors of philosophy, however, never sifted the
matter to the bottom, so that it seems as if no one before me had ever
thoroughly investigated it. Instead of this, they made all haste to
bring the Categorical Imperative into credit as a firmly established
fact, calling it in their purism "the moral law"--which, by the way,
always reminds me of Bürger's "Mam'zelle Larègle;" indeed, they have
made out of it something as massive as the stone tables of Moses,
whose place it entirely takes, for them. Now in my Essay upon the
Fundament of Morality, I have brought this same Practical Reason with
its Categorical Imperative under the anatomical knife, and proved so
clearly and conclusively that they never had any life or truth, that
I should like to see the man who can refute me with reasons, and so
help the Categorical Imperative honestly on its legs again. Meanwhile,
our professors of philosophy do not allow themselves to be put out of
countenance by this. They can no more dispense with their "moral law
of practical Reason," as a convenient _deus ex machina_ on which to
found their morality, than with Free Will: both are essential points
in their old woman's philosophy. No matter if I have made an end of
both, since, for them, both continue to exist, like deceased sovereigns
who for political reasons are occasionally allowed to continue reigning
for a few days after their death. These worthies simply pursue their
tactics of old against my merciless demolition of those two antiquated
fictions: silence, silence; and so they glide past noiselessly,
feigning ignorance, to make the public believe that I and the like of
me are not worth listening to. Well, to be sure, their philosophical
calling comes to them from the ministry, while mine only comes from
Nature. True, we may at last perhaps discover that these heroes act
upon the same principle as that idealistic bird, the ostrich, which
imagines that by closing its eyes it does away with the huntsman. Ah
well! we must bide our time; if the public can only be brought to
take up meantime with the barren twaddle, the unbearably tiresome
repetitions, the arbitrary constructions of the Absolute, and the
infant-school morality of these gentlemen--say, till I am dead and they
can trim up my works as they like--we shall then see.
Morgen habe denn das Rechte
Seine Freunde wohlgesinnet,
Wenn nur heute noch das Schlechte
Vollen Platz und Gunst gewinnet.
GÖTHE, _West-Oestlicher Divan_.
[139] Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 148
and _sqq._ (p. 146 _et seq._ of 2nd edition.)
But do these gentlemen know what time of day it is? A long predicted
epoch has set in; the church is beginning to totter, nay it totters
already to such a degree, that it is doubtful whether it will ever
be able to recover its centre of gravity; for faith is lost. The
light of revelation, like other lights, requires a certain amount of
darkness as an indispensable condition. The number of those who have
been unfitted for belief by a certain degree and extent of knowledge,
is already very large. Of this we have evident signs in the general
diffusion of that shallow Rationalism which is showing its bulldog
face daily more and more overtly. It quietly sets to work to measure
those profound mysteries of Christianity over which centuries have
brooded and disputed with its draper's ell, and thinks itself wondrous
wise withal. It is, however, the very quintessence of Christianity, the
dogma of Original Sin, which these shallow-brained Rationalists have
especially singled out for a laughing-stock; precisely because nothing
seems clearer or more certain to them, than that existence should begin
for each of us with our birth: nothing therefore so impossible as
that we can have come into the world already burdened with guilt. How
acute! And just as in times of prevailing poverty and neglect, wolves
begin to make their appearance in villages; so does Materialism, ever
lying in wait, under these circumstances lift up its head and come to
the front hand in hand with Bestialism, its companion, which some call
Humanism. Our thirst after knowledge augments with our incapacity for
belief. There comes a boiling-point in the scale of all intellectual
development, at which all faith, all revelation, and all authority
evaporate, and Man claims the right to judge for himself; the right,
not only to be taught, but to be convinced. The leading-strings of
his infancy have fallen off, and henceforth he demands leave to walk
alone. Yet his craving for Metaphysics can no more be extinguished
than any physical want. Then it is, that the desire for philosophy
becomes serious and that mankind invokes the spirits of all the genuine
thinkers who have issued from its ranks. Then, too, empty verbiage and
the impotent endeavours of emasculated intellects no longer suffice;
the want of a serious philosophy is felt, having other aims in view
than fees and salaries, and caring little therefore whether it meets
the approbation of cabinet-ministers, or councillors, whether it serves
the purposes of this or that religious faction, or not; a philosophy
which, on the contrary, clearly shows that it has a very different
mission in view from that of procuring a livelihood for the poor in
spirit.
But I return to my argument. By means of an amplification which only
needed a little audacity, a _theoretical_ oracle had been added to the
_practical_ oracle with which Kant had wrongly endowed Reason. The
credit of this invention is no doubt due to F. H. Jacobi, from whom
the professional philosophers joyfully and thankfully received the
precious gift, as a means to help them out of the straits to which Kant
had reduced them. That cool, calm, deliberate Reason, which Kant had
criticized so mercilessly, was henceforth degraded to _Understanding_
and known by this name; while Reason was supposed to denote an entirely
imaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it were, to a little
window overlooking the superlunar, nay, the supernatural world,
through which all those truths are handed to us ready cut and dried,
concerning which old-fashioned, honest, reflective Reason had for ages
vainly argued and contended. And it is on such a mere product of the
imagination, such a completely fictitious Reason as this, that German
sham philosophy has been based for the last fifty years; first, as
the free construction and projection of the absolute _Ego_ and the
emanation from it of the _non-Ego_; then, as the intellectual intuition
of absolute identity or indifference, and its evolutions to Nature;
or again, as the arising of God out of his dark depths or bottomless
pit[140] _à la_ Jakob Böhme; lastly, as the pure, self-thinking,
absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-dance of the self-moving
conceptions--still, at the same time, always as immediate apprehension
(_Vernehmen_) of the Divine, the supersensuous, the Deity, verity,
beauty and as many other "-ties" as may be desired, or even as a mere
vague presentiment[141] of all these wonders.--So this is Reason, is
it? Oh no, it is simply a farce, of which our professors of philosophy,
who are sorely perplexed by Kant's serious critiques, avail themselves
in order to pass off the subjects of the established religion of their
country somehow or other, _per fas aut nefas_, for the results of
philosophy.
[140] "_Aus seinem Grund oder Ungrund._"
[141] "_Ahnung_ without the _d_." See above, p. 133. (Tr.'s note.)
For it behoves all professorial philosophy, before all things, to
establish beyond doubt, and to give a philosophical basis to, the
doctrine, that there is a God, Creator, and Ruler of the Universe, a
personal, consequently individual, Being, endowed with Understanding
and Will, who has created the world out of nothing, and who rules it
with sublime wisdom, power and goodness. This obligation, however,
places our professors of philosophy in an awkward position with respect
to serious philosophy. For Kant had appeared and the Critique of Pure
Reason, was written more than sixty years ago, the result being, that
of all the proofs of the existence of God which had been brought
forward during the Christian ages, and which may be reduced to three
which alone are possible, none are able to accomplish the desired end.
Nay, the impossibility of any such proof, and with it the impossibility
of all speculative theology, is shown at length _à priori_ and not in
the empty verbiage or Hegelian jargon now in fashion, which may be made
to mean anything one likes, but quite seriously and honestly, in the
good old-fashioned way; wherefore, however little it may have been to
the taste of many people, nothing cogent could be brought forward in
reply to it for the last sixty years, and the proofs of the existence
of God have in consequence lost all credit, and are no longer in use.
Our professors of philosophy have even begun to look down upon them
and treat them with decided contempt, as ridiculous and superfluous
attempts to demonstrate what was self-evident. Ho! ho! what a pity
this was not found out sooner! How much trouble might have been spared
in searching whole centuries for these proofs, and how needless it
would have been for Kant to bring the whole weight of his Critique
of Reason to bear upon and crush them! Some folks, will no doubt be
reminded by this contempt of the fox with the sour grapes. But those
who wish to see a slight specimen of it will find a particularly
characteristic one in Schelling's "Philosophische Schriften," vol. i.,
1809, p. 152. Now, whilst others were consoling themselves with Kant's
assertion, that it is just as impossible to prove the non-existence, as
the existence, of God--as if, forsooth, the old wag did not know that
_affirmanti incumbit probatio_--Jacobi's admirable invention came to
the rescue of our perplexed professors, and granted German _savants_
of this century a peculiar sort of Reason that had never been known or
heard of before.
Yet all these artifices were quite unnecessary. For the impossibility
of proving the existence of God by no means interferes with that
existence, since it rests in unshakeable security on a much firmer
basis. It is indeed a matter of revelation, and this is besides all the
more certain, because that revelation was exclusively vouchsafed to a
single people, called, on this account, the chosen people of God. This
is made evident by the fact, that the notion of God, as personal Ruler
and Creator of the world, ordaining everything for the best, is to be
found in no other religion but the Jewish, and the two faiths derived
from it, which might consequently in a wider sense be called Jewish
sects. We find no trace of such a notion in any other religion, ancient
or modern. For surely no one would dream of confounding this Creator
God Almighty with the Hindoo Brahm, which is living in me, in you, in
my horse, in your dog--or even with Brahma, who is born and dies to
make way for other Brahmas, and to whom moreover the production of
the world is imputed as sin and guilt[142]--least of all with beguiled
Saturn's voluptuous son, to whom Prometheus, defiant, prophesies his
downfall. But if we finally direct our attention towards the religion
which numbers most followers, and in this respect may therefore be said
to rank foremost: that is, Buddhism, we can no longer shut our eyes to
the fact that it is as decidedly and explicitly atheistic, as it is
idealistic and ascetic; and this moreover to such a degree, that its
priests express the greatest abhorrence of the doctrine of pure Theism
whenever it is brought to their notice. Therefore, in a treatise handed
to a Catholic bishop by the High Priest of the Buddhists at Ava,[143]
the doctrine "that there is a Being who has created the world and all
things, and who alone is worthy of worship," is counted among the six
damnable heresies.[144] This is entirely corroborated by I. J. Schmidt,
a most excellent and learned authority, whom I consider as having
undoubtedly the deepest knowledge of Buddhism of any European _savant_,
and who, in his work "Upon the connection between Gnostic doctrines and
Buddhism," p. 9, says:--
[142] "If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds
... how can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being?"
Prabodh Chandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23.--Brahma is
also part of the Trimurti, which is the personification of nature,
as procreation, preservation, and death: that is, he represents the
first of these.
[143] See "Asiatic Researches," vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangermano's
"Description of the Burmese Empire," p. 81.
[144] See I. J. Schmidt, "Forschungen im Gebiete der älteren
Bildungsgeschichte Mittelasiens." St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276,
and 180.
"In the writings of the Buddhists not a trace is to be found of any
positive indication of a Supreme Being as the principle of Creation.
Whenever this subject presents itself consistently in the course of
argument, it seems, indeed, to be intentionally evaded." And again:
"The system of Buddhism knows of no eternal, uncreated, one and only
Being, having existed before Time and created all that is visible and
invisible. This idea is quite foreign to Buddhism, and not a trace
of it is to be found in Buddhist works. And just as little mention
do we find of Creation. True, the visible Universe is not without a
beginning, but it _arose_ out of empty Space, according to consistent,
immutable, natural laws. We should however err, were we to assume
that anything--call it Fate or Nature--is regarded or revered by the
Buddhists as a divine principle; on the contrary, it is just this very
development of empty Space, this precipitate from it or this division
into countless parts, this Matter thus arising, which constitutes
the Evil of _Jirtintschi_, or of the Universe in its inner and outer
relations, out of which sprang _Ortschilang_, or continuous change
according to immutable laws, which the same Evil had established." Then
again:[145] "The expression _Creation_ is foreign to Buddhism, which
only knows _Cosmogony_;" and, "We must comprehend that no idea of a
creation of divine origin is compatible with their system." I could
bring forward a hundred corroborative passages like these; but will
limit myself to one more, which I quote on account of its popular and
official character. The third volume of a very instructive Buddhist
work, "Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali,"[146] contains a
translation of the interrogatories to which the High Priests of the
five chief Pagodas were separately and successively subjected by the
Dutch Governor of Ceylon about the year 1766. It is exceedingly amusing
to see the contrast between the interlocutors, who have the greatest
difficulty in understanding one another's meaning. In conformity
with the doctrines of their faith, these priests, who are penetrated
with love and compassion for all living beings, not excepting even
Dutch Governors, spare no pains to satisfy him by their answers. But
the artless, naïve Atheism of these priests, whose piety extends
even to practising continence, soon comes into conflict with the
deep convictions founded on Judaism, imbibed by the Governor in his
infancy. This faith has become a second nature for him; he cannot in
the least understand that these priests are not Theists, therefore
he constantly returns to his inquiries after a Supreme Being, asking
them who created the world, and so forth. Whereupon they answer that
there can be no higher being than Buddha Shakia-Muni, the Victorious
and the Perfect, who, though a king's son by birth, voluntarily lived
the life of a beggar, and preached to the end his sublime doctrine,
for the Redemption of mankind, and for our salvation from the misery
of constant renascence. They hold that the world has not been made
by anyone,[147] that it is self-created, that Nature spreads it out,
and draws it in again; but that it is that, which existing, does not
exist: that it is the necessary accompaniment of renascence, and that
renascence is the result of our sinful conduct, &c. &c. &c. I mention
such facts as these chiefly on account of the really scandalous way in
which German _savants_ still universally persist, even to the present
day, in looking upon Religion and Theism as identical and synonymous;
whereas Religion is, in fact, to Theism as the genus to the single
species, and Judaism and Theism are alone identical. For this reason
we stigmatize as heathen all nations who are neither Jews, Christians,
nor Mahometans. Christians are even taxed by Mahometans and Jews with
the impurity of their Theism, because of the dogma of the Trinity.
For, whatever may be said to the contrary, Christianity has Indian
blood in its veins, therefore it constantly tends to free itself from
Judaism. The Critique of Pure Reason is the most serious attack that
has ever been made upon Theism--and this is why our professors of
philosophy have been in such a hurry to set Kant aside; but had that
work appeared in any country where Buddhism prevailed, it would simply
have been regarded as an edifying treatise intended to refute heresy
more thoroughly by a salutary confirmation of the orthodox doctrine
of Idealism--that is, the doctrine of the merely apparent existence
of the world, as it presents itself to our senses. Even the two other
religions which coexist with Buddhism in China--those of Taotsee and
of Confucius--are just as Atheistic as Buddhism itself; wherefore the
missionaries have never been able to translate the first verse of the
Pentateuch into Chinese, because there is no word in the language for
God and Creation. Even the missionary Gützlaff, in his "History of the
Chinese Empire," p. 18, has the honesty to say: "It is extraordinary
that none of the (Chinese) philosophers ever soared high enough to
reach the knowledge of a Creator and Lord of the Universe, although
they possessed the Light of Nature in full measure." J. F. Davis
likewise quotes a passage, which is quite in accordance with this, from
Milne's Preface to his translation of the Shing-yu, where in speaking
of that work, he says that we may see from it "that the bare Light of
Nature, as it is called, even when aided by all the light of Pagan
philosophy, is totally incapable of leading men to the knowledge and
worship of the true God." All this confirms the fact that revelation
is the sole foundation on which Theism rests; indeed, it must be so,
unless revelation is to be superfluous. This is a good opportunity
for observing that the word Atheism itself implies a surreptitious
assumption, since it takes Theism for granted as a matter of course.
It would be more honest to say Non-Judaism instead of Atheism, and
Non-Jew instead of Atheist.
[145] I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St.
Petersburg on the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.
[146] Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali, from the
Singhalese, by E. Upham. London, 1833.
[147] Κόσμον τόνδε, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων
ἐποίησεν. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says
Heraclitus.) Plut. "De animæ procreatione," c. 5.
Now as, according to the above, the existence of God belongs to
revelation, by which it is firmly established, it has no need whatever
of human authentication. Philosophy, however, is properly speaking only
an idle, superfluous attempt to let Reason--that is, the human power of
thinking, reflecting, deliberating--once in a while, try its own powers
unassisted, as a child is now and then allowed to run alone on a lawn
and try its strength without leading-strings, just to see what will
come of it. Tests and experiments of this kind we call _speculation_;
and it lies in the nature of the matter that it should, for once, leave
all authority, human or divine, out of consideration, ignore it, and go
its own way in search of the most sublime, most important truths. Now,
if on this basis it should arrive at the very same results as those
mentioned above, to which Kant had come, speculation has no right on
that account to cast all honesty and conscience forthwith aside, and
take to by-ways, in order somehow or other to get back to the domain of
Judaism, as its _conditio sine qua non_; it ought rather henceforth to
seek truth quite honestly and simply by any road that may happen to lie
open before it, but never to allow any other light than that of Reason
to guide it: thus advancing calmly and confidently, like one at work in
his vocation, without concern as to where that road may lead.
If our professors of philosophy put a different construction on the
matter, and hold that they cannot eat their bread in honour, so long as
they have not reinstalled God Almighty on his throne--as if, forsooth,
he stood in need of _them_--this already accounts for their not
relishing my writings, and explains why I am not the man for them; for
I certainly do not deal in this sort of article, nor have I the newest
reports to communicate about the Almighty every Leipzig fair-time, as
they have.