Although machine-gun tactics are still somewhat indefinite, at least
there are well-marked tendencies which have a close relation to the
general tactical scheme or doctrine adopted by each of the various
armies as suited to its own purposes and conditions. For many years
before the South African and Manchurian wars, the machine-gun had been
freely spoken of as "a diabolical weapon before which nothing could
live," but this did not contribute much to the science of handling it.
Most military powers, indeed, distrusted it--actuated perhaps by the
remembrance of the vain hopes excited by the _canon à balles_. It was
not until the second half of the war of 1904-05 that the Japanese,
taught by the effective handling of the Russian machine-guns at
Liao-Yang, introduced it into their field armies, and although Great
Britain had provided every regular battalion with a Maxim-gun section
some years before the Boer War, and a Volunteer corps, the Central
London Rangers (now 12th bn. London Regiment) had maintained a
(Nordenfeldt) gun section since 1882, instruction in the tactics of the
weapon was confined practically to the simple phrase "the machine-gun is
a weapon of opportunity." More than this, at any rate, is attempted in
the drill-books of to-day.
One important point is that, whether the guns are used as an arm, in
numbers, or as auxiliaries, in sections, they should be free to move
without having to maintain their exact position relatively to some other
unit. It was in following the infantry firing lines of their own
battalion over the open that the British Maxims suffered most heavily in
South Africa. Another of equal importance is that the machine guns must
co-operate with other troops of their side in the closest possible way;
more, in this regard, is demanded of them than of artillery, owing to
their mobility and the relative ease of obtaining cover. A third factor,
which has been the subject of numerous experiments, is the precise value
of a machine-gun, stated in terms of infantry, i.e. how many rifles
would be required to produce the fire-effect of a machine-gun. A
fourth--and on this the teaching of military history is quite
definite--is the need of concealment and of evading the enemy's
shrapnel. These points, once the datum of efficiency of fire has been
settled, resolve themselves into two conclusions--the necessity for
combining independence and co-operation, and the desirability of
Mercury's winged feet and cap of darkness for the weapon itself. It is
on the former that opinions in Europe vary most. Some armies ensure
co-operation by making the machine-gun section an integral part of the
infantry regimental organization, but in this case the officer
commanding it must be taught and allowed to shake himself free from his
comrades and immediate superiors when necessary. Others ensure
co-operation of the machine-guns as an arm by using them, absolutely
free of infantry control, on batteries; but this brings them face to
face with the risks of showing, not one or two low-lying gun-barrels,
but a number of carriages, limbers and gun teams, within range of the
enemy's artillery.
Fire Effect.
Ranging.
French experiments are said to show that the fire-power of a machine-gun
is equal to that of 150-200 rifles at exactly known range, and to 60-80
rifles at ranges judged by the French "instantaneous range-finder." The
German drill-book gives it as equal approximately to that of 80 rifles
on an average. The distinction of known and unknown ranges is due to the
fact that the "cone of dispersion" of a large number of bullets in
collective infantry fire is deeper than that of machine-gun fire. The
latter therefore groups its bullets much more closely about the target
if the latter is in the centre of the cone--viz. at known ranges--but if
the distance be misjudged not only the close central group of 50% of the
shots, but even the outlying rounds may fall well away from the target.
At 1500 yards range the "50 per cent. zone" with the Maxim gun is only
34 yards deep as compared with the 60 yards of a half-company of
rifles.[9] The accuracy of the gun is more marked when the breadth of
the cone of dispersion is taken into account. The "75 per cent." zone is
in the case of the machine-gun about as broad at 2000 yards as that of
collective rifle fire at 500. At the School of Musketry, South Africa, a
trial between 42 picked marksmen and a Maxim at an unknown range at
service targets resulted in 408 rounds from the rifles inflicting a loss
of 54% on the enemy's firing line represented by the targets, and 228
rounds from the Maxim inflicting one of 64%. Another factor is rapidity
of fire. It is doubtful if infantry can keep up a rate of 12 rounds a
minute for more than two or three minutes at a time without exhaustion
and consequent wild shooting. The machine-gun, with all its limitations
in this respect, can probably, taking a period of twenty or thirty
minutes, deliver a greater volume of fire than fifty rifles, and
assuming that, by one device or another (ranging by observing the strike
of the bullets, the use of a telemeter, or the employment of "combined
sights") the 75% cone of bullets has been brought on to the target, that
fire will be more effective. The serious limiting condition is the need
of accurate ranging. If this is unsatisfactory the whole (and not, as
with infantry, a part) of the fire effect may be lost, and if the safe
expedient of "combined sights"[10] be too freely resorted to, the
consumption of ammunition may be out of all proportion.
Vulnerability.
The vulnerability of machine-guns is quite as important as is their
accuracy. At a minimum, that is when painted a "service" colour,
manoeuvred with skill, and mounted on a low tripod--in several armies
even the shield has been rejected as tending to make guns more
conspicuous--the vulnerability of one gun should be that of one
skirmisher lying down. At a maximum, vulnerability is that of a small
battery of guns and wagons limbered up.
Mobility.
Mobility comes next. The older patterns of hand-operated guns weighed
about 90 lb. at least, without carriage, the earlier patterns of Maxims
(such as that described in detail above) about 60 lb. But the most
modern Maxims weigh no more than 35 lb. Now, such weapons with tripods
can be easily carried to and fro by one or two men over ground that is
impracticable for wheeled carriages. Nevertheless, wheeled carriages are
often used for the ordinary transport of the gun and its equipment,
especially with the heavier models. The simplest machine-gun has a
number of accessories--tools, spare parts, &c.--that must be conveyed
with it, and at the least a pack-animal is indispensable.
Reducing these conditions to a phrase--the fire effect that can be
reasonably expected of machine-guns is that of fifty or sixty rifles,
the space it takes up in the line can be made to equal that occupied by
two men, and it possesses by turns the speed of a mounted man and the
freedom of movement of an infantryman.
Machine-Guns as a Reserve of Fire.
Machine-Guns with Cavalry.
The use of the machine-gun (apart from savage warfare) that first
commended itself in Europe was its use as a _mobile reserve of fire_.
Now, the greatest difficulty attending the employment of a reserve of
any sort is the selection of the right moment for its intervention in
the struggle, and experience of manoeuvres of all arms in Germany, where
"machine-gun detachments" began to be formed in 1902, appears to have
been that the machine-guns always came into action too late. On the
other hand, the conditions of the cavalry _versus_ cavalry combat were
more favourable. Here there was every inducement to augment fire-power
without dismounting whole regiments for the purpose. Moreover,
vulnerability was not a fatal defect as against a battery or two of the
enemy's horse artillery, whose main task is to fire with effect into the
closed squadrons of mounted men on the verge of their charge, and above
all to avoid a meaningless duel of projectiles. The use of wheeled
carriages was therefore quite admissible (although in fact the equipment
was detachable from the carriage) and, given the rapidity and sudden
changes of cavalry fighting, both desirable and necessary. Thus, thanks
to the machine-gun, the eternal problem of increasing the fire-power of
mounted troops is at last partially solved, and the solution has
appealed strongly both to armies exceptionally strong in cavalry, as for
example the German, and to those exceptionally weak in that
arm--Denmark, for instance, having two or three light machine-guns _per
squadron_. The object of the weaker cavalry may be to cause the onset of
the stronger to dwindle away into a dismounted skirmish, and this is
most effectually brought about by a fire concentrated enough and heavy
enough to discourage mounted manoeuvres; on the other hand, the stronger
party desires to avoid dismounting a single squadron that can be kept
mounted; and this too may be effected by the machine-guns. What the
result of such a policy on both sides may be, it would be hard to
prophesy, but it is clear at any rate that, whether on the offensive or
on the defensive, skilfully handled machine-guns may enable a cavalry
commander to achieve the difficult and longed-for result--to _give the
law_ to his opponent. The principal difference between the tactics of
the stronger and those of the weaker cavalry in this matter is, that it
is generally advantageous for the former to act by batteries and for the
latter to disperse his machine guns irregularly in pairs.
Machine-Guns in Combined Tactics.
It is not merely in cavalry tactics that the question of "section or
battery" arises. It deeply affects the machine-gun tactics in the battle
of all arms, and it is therefore decided in each service by the use to
which the guns are intended to be put. One powerful current of opinion
is in favour of employing them as a mobile reserve of fire. This opinion
was responsible for the creation of the German machine-gun batteries or
"detachments"; and in the drill regulations issued in 1902 for their
guidance it was stated that the proper use of machine-guns required a
comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the general situation, and that
therefore only the superior leaders could employ them to advantage.
Manoeuvre experience, as mentioned above, has caused considerable
modification in this matter, and while the large machine-gun
"detachments" are now definitely told off to the cavalry, new and
smaller units have been formed, with the title "companies" to indicate
their attachment to the infantry arm. A recent official pronouncement as
to the role of the "companies" (Amendments to _Exerzierreglement für die
Infanterie_, 1909) is to the effect that the companies are an integral
part of the infantry, that their mission is to augment directly the fire
of the infantry, and that their employment is in the hands of the
infantry regimental commander, who keeps the guns at his own disposition
or distributes them to the battalions as he sees fit. It must be
remembered that the regiment is a large unit, 3000 strong, and the idea
of a "mobile reserve of fire" is tacitly maintained, although it has
been found necessary to depart from the extreme measure of massing the
guns and holding them at the disposal of a general officer. The Japanese
regulations state that in principle the machine-gun battery fights as a
unit; that although it may be advantageously employed with the advanced
guard to assure the possession of supporting points, its true function
is to intervene with full effect in the decisive attack, its use in the
delaying action being "a serious error." In France, on the other hand,
the system of independent sections is most rigidly maintained; when in
barracks, the three sections belonging to an infantry regiment are
combined for drill, but in the field they seem to be used exclusively as
sections. They are not, however, restricted to the positions of their
own battalions; taught probably by the experiences of the British in
South Africa, they co-operate with instead of following the infantry. In
Great Britain, _Field Service Regulations_, part i., 1909, lay down that
"machine-guns are best used in pairs[11] in support of the particular
body of troops to which they belong" (i.e. battalions). "The guns of two
or more units may, if required,[12] be placed under a specially selected
officer and employed as a special reserve of fire in the hands of a
brigade commander" (corresponding to German regimental commander), but
"if an overwhelming fire on a particular point is required, it can be
obtained by concentrating the fire of dispersed pairs of guns." More
explicitly still, "the movements and fire action of these weapons should
be _regulated so as to enable them to open fire immediately a favourable
opportunity arises._"
Contrasting the German system with the French and English, we may
observe that it is German tactics _as a whole_ that impose a method of
using machine-guns which the Germans themselves recognize as being in
many respects disadvantageous. A German force in action possesses little
depth, i.e. reserves, except on the flanks where the enveloping attack
is intended to be made. Consequently, a German commander needs a reserve
of fire in a mechanical, concentrated form more than a British or a
French commander, and, further, as regards the decisive attack on the
flanks, it is intended not merely to be sudden but even more to be
powerful and overwhelming. These considerations tend to impose both the
massing and the holding in reserve of machine-guns. The French and
British doctrine (see TACTICS) is fundamentally different. Here, whether
the guns be massed or not, there is rarely any question of using the
machine-guns as a special reserve. In the decisive attack, and
especially at the culmination of the decisive attack, when concealment
has ceased and power is everything, the machine-guns can render the
greatest services when grouped and boldly handled. Above all, they must
reach the captured crest in a few minutes, so as to crush the inevitable
offensive return of the enemy's reserves. The decisive attack, moreover,
is not a prearranged affair, as in Germany, but the culmination, "at a
selected point, of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to
the enemy at all points" (_F. S. Regulations_). The holding attack, as
this "pressure" is called, is not a mere feint. It is launched and
developed as a decisive attack, though not completed as such, as it
lacks the necessary reserve strength. Here, then, the machine-gun is
best employed in enabling relatively small forces to advance--not to
assault--without undue loss, that is, in economizing rifles along the
non-decisive front.[13]
Withal, there are certain principles, or rather details of principle,
that find general acceptance. One of these is the employment of
machine-guns with the advanced guard. In this case the value of the
weapon lies in its enabling the advanced guard both to seize favourable
ground and points of support without undue effort and to hold the
positions gained against the enemy's counter-attack. This applies,
further, to the preliminary stages of an action.[14] Another point is
that as a rule the most favourable range for the machine-gun is
"effective infantry," i.e. 600-1400 yards (which is, _mutatis mutandis_,
the principle of Reffye's mitrailleuse). Its employment at close
infantry range depends entirely on conditions of ground and
circumstances--even supposing that the handiest and most inconspicuous
type of weapon is employed. Thirdly--and this has a considerable bearing
on the other points--the machine-gun both concentrates many rifles on a
narrow front, and concentrates the bullets of many rifles on a narrow
front. The first clause implies that it can be used where there is no
room (physically or tactically) for the fifty or eighty riflemen it
represents (as, for instance, in some slight patch of cover whence the
gun can give effective cross-fire in support of the infantry attack, or
in front of an advanced post, or can watch an exposed flank), and,
further, that it can be swung round laterally on to a fresh target far
more easily than a line of excited and extended infantry can be made to
change front. The second means that the exit of a defile, an exposed
turn in a lane or on a bridge, can be beaten by closely grouped fire at
greater distances and with greater accuracy than is attainable with
riflemen.
Further, the waste of ammunition and the strain on the weapon caused by
unnecessarily prolonged firing at the rate for which its mechanism is
set--varying between 350 and 700 rounds a minute--have caused it to be
laid down as an axiom in all armies that machine-guns shall deliver
their fire by "bursts" and only on favourable targets.
Lastly, the reports, both of observers and combatants, are unanimous as
to the immense moral effect produced on the combatants by the
unmistakable drumming sound of the machine-guns, an effect comparable
even at certain stages of the fight to the boom of the artillery itself.
_Equipments in Use._--Practically all nations have abandoned the
simple wheeled carriage for machine-guns, or rather have adopted the
tripod or table mounting, reserving the wheeled vehicle for the mere
transport of the equipment. Since the Russo-Japanese War the tendency
has been to sacrifice the slight protection afforded by the shield in
order to reduce visibility. The Japanese, who had unprotected field
guns and protected machine-guns in the war, found it advisable to
reverse this procedure, for reasons that can easily be guessed in the
cases of both weapons.
_Great Britain._--The service machine-gun is the Maxim .303 in.,
adjusted to a rate of 450 rounds per minute and sighted (except in a
few weapons) to 2900 yards. The original patterns weighed 60 lb., and
were mounted on wheeled carriages. In the latest pattern, however, the
weight of the gun has been reduced to 36 lb. The old Mark I. cavalry
Maxim carriage, complete with gun, ammunition, &c., weighed 13 cwt.
behind the traces, and the gun was 5 ft. above the ground. It had no
limber. The Mark III. cavalry carriage is much lower (3´ 6´´ from the
ground to the gun), and the gun carriage and limber together only
weigh 13 cwt. Of infantry carriages there were various marks, one of
which is shown in fig. 6. Now, however, all mountings for infantry are
of the tripod type, transported on wheels or on pack animals, but
entirely detachable from the travelling mounting, and in action
practically never used except on the tripod. The Mark IV. tripod
mounting, of which a sketch is given in fig. 21, weighs 48 lb. The
total weight of the fighting equipment is thus 84 lb. only--an
important consideration now that in action the gun is man-carried. The
gun can be adjusted to fire at heights varying from 2´ 6´´ to 1´ 2½´´
only from the ground; in its lowest position, then, it is a little
lower than the head of a man firing lying. All the later infantry
machine-gun equipments are for pack transport and have no shields.
The organization of the machine-gun arm is regimental. Each cavalry
regiment and each infantry battalion has a section of 2 guns under an
officer.
_France._--The guns in use are the Puteaux and the Hotchkiss. The unit
is the regimental 2-gun section. Four-horsed carriages with limbers
are used with cavalry, tripods with the infantry sections. No shields.
Weight of the Hotchkiss in use, 50 lb.; of the tripod, 70 lb. The
Puteaux was lightened and improved in 1909.
_Germany._--As already mentioned the German machine-gun units are
classed as cavalry "detachments" and infantry "companies." The
"detachment" or battery consists of 6 guns and 4 wagons, the vehicles
being of a light artillery pattern and drawn by four horses. The gun
(Maxim) weighs 61 lb., and its fighting carriage 110 lb. The
"companies" have also 6 guns and 4 wagons, but the equipment is
lighter (two-horse), and is not constructed on artillery principles,
nor are the guns fired from their carriages as are those of the
"detachments." The weight of the gun is 38 lb., and that of the
fighting carriage 75 (some accounts give 53 for the latter), the
difference between these weights and those of the mounted equipments,
affording a good illustration of the difference in the tactical
requirements of the cavalry and of the infantry types of gun. The
fighting carriage is a sort of sledge, which is provided with four
legs for fire in the highest position, but can of course be placed on
the ground; the height of the gun, therefore, can be varied from 3´
6´´ to 1´ 6´´. The sledges can be dragged across country or carried by
men stretcher fashion, and sometimes several sledges are coupled and
drawn by a horse.
_Japan._--The Japanese Hotchkiss, as modified since the war with
Russia, is said to weigh 70 lb., and its tripod mounting 40. Each
regiment of infantry has a six-gun battery and each cavalry brigade
one of eight guns. Pack transport is used.
_Russia._--Since the war eight-gun companies have been formed in the
infantry regiments, and each cavalry regiment has been provided with
two guns. The var organization is, however, unknown. Both wheel and
pack transport are employed for travelling, but the guns are fought
from tripods. Early and somewhat heavy patterns of Maxim (with shield)
are chiefly used, but a great number of very light guns of the Madsen
type have been issued.
The _Austrian_ gun is the Schwarzlose, of which some details are given
above. Pack transport is used, one mule taking the whole equipment
with 1000 rounds. Weight of the gun 37.9 lb., of the tripod 41 lb. The
height of the tripod can be varied from 9¾ in. to 2 ft. above the
ground. It is proposed that each cavalry regiment should have four
guns, and each infantry regiment two. Switzerland adopted the Maxim in
1902. It is used principally as a substitute for horse artillery.
_Denmark_ and other small states have adopted the Madsen or Rexer
light-type guns in relatively large numbers, especially for cavalry.
In the _United States_ the British organization was after many trials
adopted, and each infantry and cavalry regiment has a two-gun section
of Maxims, with tripod mounting and pack transport.
See P. Azan, _Les premières mitrailleuses_ ("Revue d'Histoire de
l'Armée," July 1907); _Le Canon à balles, 1870-1871_ ("Revue d'Hist.
de l'Armée", 1909); Lieut-Colonel E. Rogers in "Journal R. United
Service Institution" of 1905; Capt. R. V. K. Applin, _Machine-gun
Tactics_ (London, 1910) and paper in "J. R. United Service Inst."
(1910); War Office Handbook to the Maxim gun (1907); Capt. Cesbron
Lavau, _Mitrailleuses de cavalerie_; Lieut. Buttin, _L'emploi des
mitrailleuses d'infanterie_; Major J. Goots, _Les Mitrailleuses_
(Brussels, 1908); and Merkatz, _Unterrichtsbuch für die
Masch.-Gewehrabteilungen_ (Berlin, 1906); Korzen & Kühn,
_Waffenlehre_, &c. (C. F. A.)