II

Since the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens had been

meddling in the affairs of Sicily, under pretence of aiding the Ionian

cities, who dreaded the encroaching ambition of Syracuse. That these

fears were not unfounded was proved when, a few years afterwards, the

Syracusans expelled the commons of Leontini, and took possession of

their territory. The Leontine exiles sought refuge at Athens, but their

appeal for help remained for a time unanswered, as the Athenians were

then fully occupied in Greece. But six years after the conclusion of

the Peace of Nicias, an appeal came to Athens from a remote corner of

Sicily, which stimulated the Leontine exiles to fresh efforts, and led

to most important results.

Between the Greeks of Selinus and the Elymians of Egesta there was a

long-standing quarrel, and in a war which had recently broken out the

Egestaeans were reduced to severe straits by the combined forces of

Selinus and Syracuse. In their distress they turned to Athens for help,

and envoys were sent to plead their cause before the Athenian assembly.

In aiding Egesta, argued the envoys, Athens would be serving her own

interests; for if the Syracusans were not speedily checked in their

aggressions, they would soon make themselves masters of the whole of

Sicily, and in that case they could bring such an accession of strength

to the enemies of Athens in Greece as to make them irresistible. They

had good reason, therefore, to take sides against the enemies of

Egesta, and the more so as the Egestaeans promised to defray all the

expenses of the war.

The Athenians generally were inclined to take up the quarrel of Egesta,

but as a measure of precaution it was decided to send agents of their

own to make an inspection on the spot, and see whether the Egestaeans

were as wealthy as they pretended. On their return to Athens these men

reported that Egesta was possessed of fabulous riches. At every house

where they had been entertained, the tables and the sideboards had been

one blaze of gold and silver plate. The fact was that the Egestaeans

had collected all the gold and silver vessels in the town, and others

borrowed from the neighbouring cities, and by passing them on from

house to house, wherever these important guests were invited, had

contrived to make a great display. As an earnest of all this wealth,

the Athenian commissioners brought back with them sixty talents of

silver.

The smallness of this sum ought to have been sufficient to arouse the

suspicions of the Athenians; but they were willing to be deceived, and

they gave ready credence to reports of their commissioners. Voting in

full assembly, they passed a decree that sixty ships should be sent to

Sicily, under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. The

fleet was first to be employed in helping Egesta, and when that contest

had been brought to a successful issue the Leontines were to be

restored to their homes; finally, the generals were empowered to act as

might seem best in the interests of Athens. The real purpose of the

enterprise is indicated in the last clause. Vague plans of conquest

were floating before the minds of the Athenians, and at a time when

their whole energies should have been employed to repair the breaches

in their empire, they dreamed of founding a new dominion in the west.

Five days later the assembly met again to vote supplies and discuss any

further details which remained to be settled. But Nicias determined to

take the opportunity of reopening the whole question, wishing, if

possible, to divert his countrymen from their purpose, and put an end

to the expedition altogether. It was folly, he argued, to take up the

cause of needy foreigners, and drain the resources of Athens for a

distant and hazardous enterprise, when their subjects in Thrace were

still in open revolt, and their enemies in Greece were on the watch to

take them at a disadvantage. If they trusted in the treaty with Sparta,

they would soon find how infirm was the ground of their confidence.

That treaty had been forced upon the Spartans by their misfortunes, and

they would be only too glad to repudiate it, which they could easily

do, as many of the conditions were still under dispute. Moreover, the

most powerful cities of the Peloponnesian League had refused to sign

the treaty, and were ready, at the first hint from Sparta, to renew the

war. Athens was beset with perils, which were enough to tax her

strength to the utmost: and yet they talked of sailing to Sicily, and

raising up a new host of enemies against her! Even if the expedition

succeeded, they could never keep their hold on that vast and populous

island, while, if it failed, they would be utterly ruined. As to the

supposed danger from the ambition of Syracuse, that was mere idle talk.

The schemes of conquest, with which the Egestaeans had tried to alarm

the Athenians, would keep the Syracusans busy at home, and prevent them

from meddling in the affairs of Greece. "Leave the Greeks of Sicily

alone," said Nicias with true prophetic insight; "and they will not

trouble you. Do not disturb the prestige which belongs to a distant and

unfamiliar power. If they once learn to know you, they may learn to

despise you."

Then fixing his eyes on Alcibiades, who was sitting surrounded by his

own partisans, young profligates like himself, Nicias concluded thus:

"There is another danger against which I would warn you, men of

Athens--the danger of being led astray by the wild eloquence of

unscrupulous politicians, who seek to dazzle you with visions of new

empire, that they may rise to high command, and restore their own

shattered fortunes. Yes, Athens is to pour out her blood and treasure,

to provide young spendthrifts with the means of filling their

racing-stables! Against the mad counsels of these desperate men I

invoke the mature prudence of the elder members of this assembly, and

call upon them to show by a unanimous vote that neither flattery nor

taunts can induce them to sacrifice the true interests of Athens."

It must have been a severe ordeal for the young Alcibiades to sit and

listen to this keen and bitter invective, which set in a glaring light

the worst features in his character--his selfish ambition, his

shameless life, his total want of principle, his vulgar ostentation.

The last quality, so alien from the best traditions of Athenian

character, had been conspicuously displayed only a few weeks before at

the Olympic festival, where he had entered seven four-horsed cars for

the chariot-race, and won the first, second, and fourth prizes. Every

word of Nicias went home, galling him in his sorest point--his

outrageous vanity; and hardly had the elder statesman concluded his

speech, when he sprang to his feet, and burst without preface into a

wild harangue, which is a remarkable piece of self-revelation,

disclosing with perfect candour the inner motives of the man on whom,

more than on any other, the future of Athens depended. He began by

defending his barbaric extravagance, recently displayed at Olympia,

which, as he pretended to believe, had covered his native city with

glory, and spread the fame of Athenian wealth and power from one end of

Greece to another. The lavish outlay, and haughty demeanour, which

would be justly blamed in a common man, were right and proper in him,

one of the elect spirits of the time, inspired with great aims, and

treading the summits of public life. He had already shown what he could

do in the highest regions of diplomacy, by raising a great coalition in

Peloponnesus, which had faced the whole might of Sparta in the field,

and struck terror into the enemies of Athens.

After this impudent defence of his own pernicious policy, which had led

to the crushing defeat at Mantinea, and thus enabled the Spartans to

restore their damaged reputation, Alcibiades proceeded to deal with the

question of the day, and exerted all his sophistry to confirm the

Athenians in their design of invading Sicily. That island, he asserted,

was inhabited by a mixed population with no settled homes, and no

common patriotic sentiment; and among these motley elements they would

find plenty of adherents. The Siceliots [Footnote: Greeks of Sicily.]

were poorly armed, ill-furnished with heavy infantry, and in constant

danger from the hostile Sicels. The risk of attack from the

Peloponnesians would not be increased by sending part of the Athenian

fleet to Sicily: for Attica was in any case always exposed to invasion,

and a sufficient force of ships would be left at home to keep command

of the sea.

"We have no excuse, then," said Alcibiades in conclusion, "for breaking

our word to the Egestaeans, and drawing back from this enterprise. Both

honour and policy are pointing the way to Sicily. An empire like ours

is an ever-expanding circle, which lives by growing, and cannot stand

still. It is only by getting more, and always more, that we can keep

what we have. And let not Nicias succeed in his attempt to set the old

against the young, neither let us believe, like him, that the stability

of a state consists in stagnation. It is only by a hearty co-operation

of all ages and classes that any state can prosper, and a community

which finds no outlet for its energies abroad is soon worn out by

discord and faction at home. Above all is this true of us Athenians, to

whom ceaseless toil and endeavour is the very element in which we live."

The advice of Alcibiades, thus tendered in the garb of political

wisdom, was of fatal and ruinous tendency, and in direct opposition to

the oft-repeated warnings of Pericles. But his speech was exactly

suited to the temper of his audience, and most of those who followed

him spoke to the same effect, and when the Egestaeans and Leontines

renewed their entreaties it became evident that the original motion

would be confirmed by a large majority. Nicias, however, resolved to

make one more effort, and he came forward to speak again, hoping by a

new device to check the torrent of popular enthusiasm. Affecting to

regard the matter as settled, he entered into an estimate of the force

required for the proposed expedition, prefaced by an alarming picture

of the wealth and power of the Sicilian Greeks. To act with effect

against such an enemy, they must send, not only an overwhelming naval

force, but a numerous body of troops, both cavalry and infantry, and a

fleet laden with supplies for many months. They must proceed, in fact,

as if they were founding a great city on a hostile soil. On no other

condition, added Nicias, would he undertake the command. Nicias had

intended, by exaggerating the difficulties of the undertaking, to damp

the ardour of the Athenians; but to his utter dismay, these timid

counsels were greeted with a great shout of applause. It was supposed

that he had changed his opinion, and even the elder men began to think

that so prudent a leader, backed by such an armament, could not fail of

success. A great wave of excitement swept over the assembly, and the

few who still doubted were cowed into silence. When the tumult had

subsided, a certain Demostratus, [Footnote: The name is given by

Plutarch.] who had spoken strongly in favour of the expedition,

addressing Nicias in the name of the assembly, asked him to state

plainly what force he required. Thus driven into a corner, Nicias

answered, with great reluctance, that the number of triremes must be

not less than one hundred, with five thousand heavy-armed infantry, and

slingers and bow-men in proportion. This enormous estimate was carried

without demur, and by the same vote full powers were conferred on the

generals to fix the scale of the armament as they might think best for

the interests of Athens.

Thus, by a strange freak of fortune, the Athenians, at the most

momentous crisis of their history, were urged along the road to ruin by

the most opposite qualities in their leaders, the cold caution of

Nicias, and the wild energy of Alcibiades.