II

It was not long before the effects of this impolitic breach with

Corinth were sensibly felt by Athens. In the course of the following

summer, Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, situated on the borders of

Macedon, and included in the Athenian alliance, openly raised the

standard of revolt, encouraged by promises from Sparta, and by the

presence of a strong body of hoplites, sent for its support from

Corinth. Potidaea was presently closely invested by an Athenian army

and fleet, and the Corinthians pretended to make this a fresh ground of

complaint, though they had themselves incited the city to throw off its

allegiance to Athens.

Feeling that matters were now approaching a crisis, the Spartans

summoned a congress of their allies, and invited all who had any

grievance against Athens to state their case. Then some spoke of the

wrongs of Aegina, formerly not the least among Greek cities, but now so

crushed under the yoke of Athens that she had not dared to raise her

voice openly against the tyrant-city. The Megarians complained of the

restrictions on their commerce, which threatened them with an empty

exchequer and a starving population; and others followed in the same

strain. When all the rest had spoken, the Corinthian orator, who had

reserved his eloquence till the end, came forward and delivered a

vehement harangue, containing hardly any specific charge against

Athens, but well calculated to inflame the passions and provoke the

pride of the Spartans. Though the acknowledged leader of Greece, and

champion of her liberties, Sparta, he said, had always been the last to

see the dangers which menaced the common country, and the last to take

measures for her defence. Spartan apathy and indolence had brought the

Greeks to the brink of ruin in the Persian War; and when that danger

was passed, the same fatal indifference had enabled Athens to advance

step by step on the path of aggrandisement; until now she had grown so

strong that the united force of the whole Peloponnesian league would be

required to put her down. Why had not the Spartans listened to the

warnings which they had heard, when the Athenians were rebuilding their

walls? Then they might have stopped the evil at its source, and saved a

multitude of cities from slavery and oppression. "Consider," cried the

orator, warming to his subject, "what manner of men these Athenians

are, and how vast is the difference between them and you. While you are

shut up in this inland valley, treading the dull round of mechanical

routine, they are continually pushing forward the boundaries of their

empire, toiling night and day to make their city great, never satisfied

with what they have, always thirsting for more. Cautious, timid, and

conservative as you are, hardly to be roused from your sloth by the

most imminent perils, how can you hope to curb the flight of Athenian

ambition, which knows no limit, and is checked by no reverse?

"Men of Sparta, I speak as a friend, and you will not take my candour

amiss. New times require new manners, and if you would maintain your

great position you must move with the march of events, and abandon your

old-fashioned ways. Do not mistake stagnation for stability, but learn

a lesson even from these hated Athenians, who have risen to their

present pitch of greatness by adapting themselves to every new need as

it arose.

"You know what you have to do, if you would wipe out the reproach which

rests upon you, and keep the respect of your faithful allies. Send an

army into Attica, and compel the Athenians to withdraw their forces

from Potidaea. And let it be done speedily, for while we are talking

our kinsmen are perishing."

It happened that an Athenian embassy was present in Sparta, having been

sent there on some other business, and not for the purpose of

representing Athens at the debate. But when they heard of the outcry

which had been raised against their city, the envoys asked permission

for one of their number to address the Spartan assembly, wishing to

explain the true character and origin of the Athenian Empire, and to

warn the Spartans against plunging the whole country into the horrors

of civil war. Leave being granted, the Athenian orator entered on his

subject by sketching the course of events for the last sixty years.

Athens, he said, had twice saved Greece, first at Marathon, and

afterwards at Salamis. On the first of these occasions she had stood

almost alone against an overwhelming force of Persians; and ten years

later, though betrayed by her allies, she had borne the brunt against

the navy of Xerxes. Who, then, was worthier than she to hold empire

over Greeks? That empire had been forced upon her by the inertness of

Sparta, and by the cowardice and sloth of her own allies in the Delian

league. The power thus gained had been used with moderation, in marked

contrast to the previous tyranny of Persia exercised over the same

cities, and the arrogance of Spartan officers when engaged on foreign

service. But a light yoke, it would seem, was harder to bear than a

heavy one; if Athens had openly oppressed her subjects, she would never

have heard a murmur.

Having thus tried to combat the prejudice against Athens, the orator

addressed himself directly to the Spartans, and said: "Consider the

awful responsibility which you will incur, if you suffer yourselves to

be carried away by the invectives of your allies, and drive us against

our will to tempt with you the dark uncertainties and perilous issues

of war. There is still time for an amicable settlement of our

differences: Athens is prepared to make all reasonable concessions, and

to submit to arbitration, as the terms of the treaty direct. And if you

decline to accept this offer, the guilt of the aggressor will lie with

you."

It is remarkable that the speaker, in tracing the later course of

Athenian policy, lays no claim to those high motives of patriotism

which had inspired his people with sublime self-devotion two

generations back. He boldly asserts the principle that it is lawful for

the stronger to rule the weaker, and claims merit for Athens in

abstaining from excessive abuse of her power. The Athenians, we may

believe, had been tainted by the baseness of their confederates. In the

early days of the Delian league they had not attempted to educate the

Greeks whom they led up to the standard of their own splendid

zeal,--or, if the attempt had been made, it was unsuccessful. They had

taken upon themselves the whole burden of a great public duty, and

standing alone, without moral support from their countrymen, they had

gradually fallen away from the pure and lofty virtues of their

ancestors. This decay of public morality proceeds with rapid strides in

the years which follow, and we shall presently hear the doctrine that

might is right proclaimed with cynical frankness by the lips of an

Athenian.

Having heard the complaints of their allies against Athens, and the

reply of the Athenian orator, the Spartans ordered all but those of

their own race to withdraw, and continued the debate with closed doors.

A great majority of the speakers were in favour of declaring immediate

war on Athens. But there was one important exception: the aged

Archidamus, who for the last fourteen years had been reigning as sole

king at Sparta, spoke strongly against the imprudence of assuming the

aggressive, before they had made adequate preparations to cope with the

offending city. It was an opinion generally held by the war-party that

the Athenians would be ready to make any concessions, in order to save

the land of Attica from ravage. This, said Archidamus, was a great

error; and the event proved that he was right. The Athenians, with

their great colonial empire, and complete command of the sea, were

quite independent of the products of their own estates in Attica. And

many years must elapse before the states of Peloponnesus could train a

fleet, and attack them on the sea, where alone they were assailable. It

was folly to suppose that such a contest could be decided by a single

summer campaign, as was commonly believed by the enemies of Athens. "I

fear rather," said the king, with prophetic foresight, "that we shall

leave this war as an inheritance to our children; such is the power,

and such the pride, of the state with which we have to contend." On the

other hand, the Spartans, as champions of the liberties of Greece, must

not allow the common oppressors of their countrymen to continue their

career of tyranny unchecked. Let them first, however, try what could be

effected by negotiation, and in the meantime prepare for war, by

building ships, and above all by collecting money, without which all

their valour would be useless. Then, if Athens still refused to listen

to reason, they might declare war with better hope of success.

The speech of Archidamus shows a true insight into the nature of the

crisis which the Spartans were called upon to face, and his views were

amply justified by subsequent events. His wise words were no doubt

applauded by the older and more sober-minded among his hearers. But

there was another and a much more numerous party at that time in

Sparta, filled with bitter envy and hatred against Athens. Their

passions had been inflamed by the invectives of the Corinthian orator,

and without counting the cost they were resolved to try the issues of

immediate battle. Their blind rancour found expression in the curt and

pithy harangue of Sthenelaidas, one of the five Ephors, a college of

magistrates which in recent years had greatly encroached on the

authority of the kings. Sthenelaidas spoke with true laconic brevity.

"I don't understand," he said, "all the fine talk of these Athenians.

They have told us a great deal about their own merits, but have not

said a word in answer to the charges brought against them. Even if we

accept their own account of themselves, their good conduct in the past

only lends a darker colour to their present crimes. We have one plain

duty to perform, and that is to save our faithful allies from

ill-treatment. The time for words is past--leave them to the

transgressor. Our part is to act, at once, and with all our might, and

put down the overwhelming insolence of Athens."

Then, in his capacity as Ephor, Sthenelaidas, without staying for

further argument, forthwith put the question to the Spartan assembly.

According to their ordinary procedure, the Spartans gave their votes by

cries of "Ay" and "No." But on this occasion Sthenelaidas pretended to

be unable to distinguish whether the "Ays" or "Nos" had it, and wishing

to encourage the war-party by showing how much they were in the

majority, he ordered the house to divide on the question whether the

treaty was broken, and whether the Athenians were in the wrong or not.

The division was made, and a great majority were in favour of the

motion, recording their votes against Athens. The allies were then

called in, and informed to the result of the private debate, and a day

was named for a general synod of the whole Peloponnesian league, to

reconsider the situation and decide whether war was to be declared.

In the interval, before the final assembly of the allies, the Spartans

sent to ask the oracle at Delphi whether it was expedient for them to

make war; and the answer, according to common report, was that if they

fought with all their might they would conquer, and that the god

[Footnote: Apollo.] would be on their side. The Corinthians were at the

same time carrying on an active canvass against Athens, sending their

agents from city to city to blow up the flames of war.

In the autumn of the same year the allies met in full synod at Sparta,

and once more the Corinthian speaker led the cry against Athens, and

called for a unanimous war-vote, flattering his hearers with hopes of a

speedy victory. The Spartans, he said, had at last set a good example

to their allies, and shown themselves convinced that imperial cities

had imperial obligations, by pronouncing in favour of war. Every member

of the league must join heartily in the struggle, whether he belonged

to an inland or to a maritime city; for if the seaports were closed by

the Athenian fleets, the inland towns would be prevented from exporting

their products, and importing what they wanted from abroad. War, then,

was in the interest of the whole body of allies. And on the moral side

their position was equally sound, for they were only acting on

desperate provocation, and the common god of Greece had promised

success to their arms. But to deserve that success, all must co-operate

heartily, contributing freely from their private purses to raise a

fleet which would make them a match for Athens on her own element. And

they must watch the course of events with a vigilant eye, and be ready

to seize any opportunity which might arise to aim a decisive blow at

their common enemy. Let them be warned by the experience of the

Ionians, and put out all their strength to save themselves from being

swallowed up by the devouring ambition of Athens. Justice, heaven's

favour, the good-will of all Greece, were on their side.

Others spoke to the same effect, and then the representatives of each

city were called up in turn to give their vote; and by far the greater

number voted for war. But many months elapsed before any overt act of

hostility occurred, and the time was occupied in preparations for an

invasion of Attica, and in a series of demands sent by Sparta to try

the temper of the Athenians, and put them in the wrong, if they refused

to comply. The first of these messages was conveyed in mysterious

terms, bidding the Athenians "to drive out the curse of the goddess."

The meaning of this was as follows: nearly two hundred years before a

certain Cylon tried to make himself tyrant of Athens: the attempt was

frustrated, and some of his adherents, who had taken refuge in the

sacred precinct of Athene, were put to death by the magistrates, after

they had surrendered under a solemn promise that their lives should be

spared. The illustrious family of the Alcmaeonidae was especially

concerned in this act of murder and sacrilege, and the Spartans, in

reviving the memory of an ancient crime, were aiming a blow at

Pericles, who was descended on his mother's side from the Alcmaeonidae.

For the Athenians were highly sensitive in all matters of religion, and

it was possible that they might even banish Pericles, if their

consciences were suddenly alarmed. And though this was not likely, the

Spartans hoped at any rate to lessen his influence, which was adverse

to themselves, and fasten on him the odium of being, in some sense, the

cause of the war. But their manoeuvre was unsuccessful, and the

Athenians retorted by bidding the Spartans drive out the curse of

Taenarus, in allusion to the murder of certain Helots who had taken

sanctuary in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus. And they further

charged the Spartans to rid themselves of the curse of Athene of the

Brazen House. This was a holy place in Sparta, where Pausanias, when

convicted of treasonable correspondence with Persia, had sought refuge

from the vengeance of the Spartans. He was kept a close prisoner in the

temple by the Ephors, who set a watch on him, to prevent him from being

supplied with food, and when he was reduced to the last extremity,

brought him out to die. But though his death occurred outside the

temple, this did not save them from the sin of sacrilege, and a public

reprimand by the Delphic God.

The game of diplomatic fencing went on for some time, and envoys were

continually passing to and fro between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians

were required to raise the siege of Potidaea--to allow the Aeginetans

to govern themselves--to rescind the decree against Megara; and when

all these demands were met by a firm refusal, the Spartans sent two

ambassadors, bearing their ultimatum, which was worded as follows: "The

Lacedaemonians wish that there should be peace, and war may be averted

if ye will let the Greeks go free." Knowing that the decisive moment

had now arrived, the Athenians met together in full assembly, to decide

on their final answer. There were many speakers on either side, some

arguing for peace, others for war: and then was heard that majestic

voice, which, for more than thirty years, had guided the counsels of

Athens--the voice of the Olympian Pericles. He had chosen his line of

policy a year before, in the fatal affair of Corcyra, and it was now

too late to draw back: peace with honour was no longer possible for

Athens. The furious zeal of Corinth had united her enemies against her,

and they were bent on her ruin. The demands put forward by Sparta were

a mere pretext, and if the Athenians had yielded the smallest point,

new concessions would have been required of them, until they were

stripped of all that had been won by the strenuous toil and devotion of

two generations. "We must listen," said Pericles, in the course of a

long speech, "to no proposal from Sparta which is not made as from an

equal to an equal. Dictation is not arbitration. If we are to fight at

all, the occasion matters little, be it small or great. What right has

Sparta to require of us that we should rescind the decree against

Megara, when her own laws jealously exclude all strangers from entering

her streets? Or why should we relax our hold upon our allies, or break

off the relations with them which were sanctioned by the Thirty Years'

Truce? No, all this is a mere pretence, and if we are deceived by it,

we shall be led on step by step to deeper and still deeper humiliation.

It may seem a hard thing to give up the fair land of Attica to pillage

and devastation. But think how far greater was the sacrifice made by

our grandsires, who refused the fairest offers from Persia, and gave up

all they had, rather than betray the common cause. Athens and Attica

were then all the country they had, and these lost they had nothing

left but their ships, their strong arms, and their stout hearts. In our

case, on the other hand, all the essential elements of our power--our

city, our fleet, our colonial empire--remain untouched. Shall we, then,

sell our honour to save a few vineyards and olive-grounds from

temporary damage? That would be a short-sighted policy indeed, and in

the end would involve not only dishonour, but the loss of our whole

empire. Let us act, then, in the spirit of our fathers, and send away

the Spartan ambassadors with the only answer which is consistent with

our dignity and our interest."

The reply to the Spartan ultimatum was framed as Pericles had directed,

and from this moment all negotiations ceased. And here we close our

account of the events which led to the Peloponnesian War.