WASHINGTON CITY, _January 8, 1861_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:
At the opening of your present session I called your attention to the
dangers which threatened the existence of the Union. I expressed my
opinion freely concerning the original causes of those dangers, and
recommended such measures as I believed would have the effect of
tranquilizing the country and saving it from the peril in which it had
been needlessly and most unfortunately involved. Those opinions and
recommendations I do not propose now to repeat. My own convictions upon
the whole subject remain unchanged.
The fact that a great calamity was impending over the nation was even at
that time acknowledged by every intelligent citizen. It had already made
itself felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. The necessary
consequences of the alarm thus produced were most deplorable. The
imports fell off with a rapidity never known before, except in time
of war, in the history of our foreign commerce; the Treasury was
unexpectedly left without the means which it had reasonably counted upon
to meet the public engagements; trade was paralyzed; manufactures were
stopped; the best public securities suddenly sunk in the market; every
species of property depreciated more or less, and thousands of poor men
who depended upon their daily labor for their daily bread were turned
out of employment.
I deeply regret that I am not able to give you any information upon the
state of the Union which is more satisfactory than what I was then
obliged to communicate. On the contrary, matters are still worse at
present than they then were. When Congress met, a strong hope pervaded
the whole public mind that some amicable adjustment of the subject would
speedily be made by the representatives of the States and of the people
which might restore peace between the conflicting sections of the
country. That hope has been diminished by every hour of delay, and as
the prospect of a bloodless settlement fades away the public distress
becomes more and more aggravated. As evidence of this it is only
necessary to say that the Treasury notes authorized by the act of 17th
of December last were advertised according to the law and that no
responsible bidder offered to take any considerable sum at par at a
lower rate of interest than 12 per cent. From these facts it appears
that in a government organized like ours domestic strife, or even a
well-grounded fear of civil hostilities, is more destructive to our
public and private interests than the most formidable foreign war.
In my annual message I expressed the conviction, which I have long
deliberately held, and which recent reflection has only tended to deepen
and confirm, that no State has a right by its own act to secede from the
Union or throw off its federal obligations at pleasure. I also declared
my opinion to be that even if that right existed and should be exercised
by any State of the Confederacy the executive department of this
Government had no authority under the Constitution to recognize its
validity by acknowledging the independence of such State. This left me
no alternative, as the chief executive officer under the Constitution of
the United States, but to collect the public revenues and to protect the
public property so far as this might be practicable under existing laws.
This is still my purpose. My province is to execute and not to make the
laws. It belongs to Congress exclusively to repeal, to modify, or to
enlarge their provisions to meet exigencies as they may occur. I possess
no dispensing power.
I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State, and
I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld that
power even from Congress. But the right and the duty to use military
force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the
execution of their legal functions and against those who assail the
property of the Federal Government is clear and undeniable.
But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States toward each other
has already far transcended and cast in the shade the ordinary executive
duties already provided for by law, and has assumed such vast and
alarming proportions as to place the subject entirely above and beyond
Executive control. The fact can not be disguised that we are in the
midst of a great revolution. In all its various bearings, therefore,
I commend the question to Congress as the only human tribunal under
Providence possessing the power to meet the existing emergency. To
them exclusively belongs the power to declare war or to authorize
the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the
Constitution, and they alone possess the power to remove grievances
which might lead to war and to secure peace and union to this distracted
country. On them, and on them alone, rests the responsibility.
The Union is a sacred trust left by our Revolutionary fathers to their
descendants, and never did any other people inherit so rich a legacy.
It has rendered us prosperous in peace and triumphant in war. The
national flag has floated in glory over every sea. Under its shadow
American citizens have found protection and respect in all lands beneath
the sun. If we descend to considerations of purely material interest,
when in the history of all time has a confederacy been bound together
by such strong ties of mutual interest? Each portion of it is dependent
on all and all upon each portion for prosperity and domestic security.
Free trade throughout the whole supplies the wants of one portion from
the productions of another and scatters wealth everywhere. The great
planting and farming States require the aid of the commercial and
navigating States to send their productions to domestic and foreign
markets and to furnish the naval power to render their transportation
secure against all hostile attacks.
Should the Union perish in the midst of the present excitement, we have
already had a sad foretaste of the universal suffering which would
result from its destruction. The calamity would be severe in every
portion of the Union and would be quite as great, to say the least, in
the Southern as in the Northern States. The greatest aggravation of the
evil, and that which would place us in the most unfavorable light both
before the world and posterity, is, as I am firmly convinced, that the
secession movement has been chiefly based upon a misapprehension at the
South of the sentiments of the majority in several of the Northern
States. Let the question be transferred from political assemblies to
the ballot box, and the people themselves would speedily redress the
serious grievances which the South have suffered. But, in Heaven's name,
let the trial be made before we plunge into armed conflict upon the
mere assumption that there is no other alternative. Time is a great
conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point and afford the
people, both North and South, an opportunity for reflection. Would that
South Carolina had been convinced of this truth before her precipitate
action! I therefore appeal through you to the people of the country to
declare in their might that the Union must and shall be preserved by
all constitutional means. I most earnestly recommend that you devote
yourselves exclusively to the question how this can be accomplished
in peace. All other questions, when compared to this, sink into
insignificance. The present is no time for palliations. Action, prompt
action, is required. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend
a distinct and practical proposition for conciliation may drive us to
a point from which it will be almost impossible to recede.
A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can be produced is
surely not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by letting the
North have exclusive control of the territory above a certain line
and to give Southern institutions protection below that line ought to
receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed, it may not be entirely
satisfactory, but when the alternative is between a reasonable
concession on both sides and a destruction of the Union it is an
imputation upon the patriotism of Congress to assert that its members
will hesitate for a moment.
Even now the danger is upon us. In several of the States which have not
yet seceded the forts, arsenals, and magazines of the United States have
been seized. This is by far the most serious step which has been taken
since the commencement of the troubles. This public property has long
been left without garrisons and troops for its protection, because no
person doubted its security under the flag of the country in any State
of the Union. Besides, our small Army has scarcely been sufficient to
guard our remote frontiers against Indian incursions. The seizure of
this property, from all appearances, has been purely aggressive, and not
in resistance to any attempt to coerce a State or States to remain in
the Union.
At the beginning of these unhappy troubles I determined that no act of
mine should increase the excitement in either section of the country. If
the political conflict were to end in a civil war, it was my determined
purpose not to commence it nor even to furnish an excuse for it by any
act of this Government. My opinion remains unchanged that justice as
well as sound policy requires us still to seek a peaceful solution of
the questions at issue between the North and the South. Entertaining
this conviction, I refrained even from sending reenforcements to Major
Anderson, who commanded the forts in Charleston Harbor, until an
absolute necessity for doing so should make itself apparent, lest it
might unjustly be regarded as a menace of military coercion, and thus
furnish, if not a provocation, at least a pretext for an outbreak on the
part of South Carolina. No necessity for these reenforcements seemed to
exist. I was assured by distinguished and upright gentlemen of South
Carolina that no attack upon Major Anderson was intended, but that, on
the contrary, it was the desire of the State authorities as much as it
was my own to avoid the fatal consequences which must eventually follow
a military collision.
And here I deem it proper to submit for your information copies of
a communication, dated December 28, 1860, addressed to me by R.W.
Barnwell, J.H. Adams, and James L. Orr, "commissioners" from South
Carolina, with the accompanying documents, and copies of my answer
thereto, dated December 31.
In further explanation of Major Anderson's removal from Fort Moultrie
to Fort Sumter, it is proper to state that after my answer to the South
Carolina "commissioners" the War Department received a letter from that
gallant officer, dated on the 27th of December, 1860, the day after this
movement, from which the following is an extract:
I will add as my opinion that many things convinced me that the
authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act.
Evidently referring to the orders, dated December 11, of the late
Secretary of War.
Under this impression I could not hesitate that it was my solemn duty to
move my command from a fort which we could not probably have held longer
than forty-eight or sixty hours to this one, where my power of
resistance is increased to a very great degree.
It will be recollected that the concluding part of these orders was in
the following terms:
The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy
more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to
take possession of either one of them will be regarded as an act of
hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which
you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are
also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have
tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.
It is said that serious apprehensions are to some extent entertained (in
which I do not share) that the peace of this District may be disturbed
before the 4th of March next. In any event, it will be my duty to
preserve it, and this duty shall be performed.
In conclusion it may be permitted to me to remark that I have often
warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be
the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my
duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed, and,
whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the consciousness
that I at least meant well for my country.