Whether Washington was correctly informed or not, Germany's attitude

gave color to the theory that she had predetermined on repudiating

having any hand in submarine attacks if she could successfully cloak

the operations of her U-boat commanders. The situation embarrassed the

United States and influenced the procedure of the diplomatic

negotiations necessary to elucidate any given case. Germany's

attitude, in short, placed the United States in the position of either

assuming that the word of a friendly government could not be accepted

at its face value, or of abandoning further inquiry, as happened in

the case of the _Persia_, recorded in the previous volume. The

President boldly undertook to act on the first of these alternatives.

Before the crisis reached this stage, the German point of view

regarding submarine warfare was, despite pledges, more than ever

unalterably opposed to modifying that warfare to conform to the wishes

of any foreign power. For eleven days after the attack of the _Sussex_

the Berlin Foreign Office preserved an attitude of ignorance regarding

the torpedoing; but the seriousness with which the case was viewed in

the United States, coupled with the instructions from Washington to

Ambassador Gerard, at length caused the Foreign Office to call upon

the admiralty for a report on the destruction of the _Sussex_ if any

submarine commander could throw any light upon it. No hope, however,

was entertained that a satisfactory statement would be received from

Berlin. A resort to evasion, a professed lack of information, the

familiar assumption of an English or French mine being to blame, were

expected to be embodied in any defense Berlin made, and an explanation

of this tenor was rejected in advance.

Germany's answer was received on April 10, 1916, and fulfilled

expectations. The United States was informed that the admiralty had

subjected the affair to the fullest investigation, with this

results--that no German submarine attacked the _Sussex,_ but that one

torpedoed another vessel, about the same time in the same vicinity,

with the same result. A sketch the submarine commander made of the

vessel he struck was submitted to show that it was not the _Sussex_,

as the sketch differed from the published pictures of that ship. The

submarine commander, the German note said, had been led to attack the

"unknown" vessel in the belief that it was a warship, that is, "a mine

layer of the recently built _Arabic_ class." A violent explosion

occurred in the fore part of the ship after the torpedo had been

fired, which "warrants the certain conclusion that great amounts of

ammunitions were on board." The German note proceeded:

"No other attack whatever by German submarines at the time in question

for the _Sussex_ upon the route between Folkestone and Dieppe

occurred. The German Government must therefore assume that the injury

to the _Sussex_ is attributable to another cause than an attack by a

German submarine.

"For an explanation of the case the fact may perhaps be serviceable

that no less than twenty-six English mines were exploded by shots by

German naval forces in the channel on the 1st and 2nd of April alone.

The entire sea in that vicinity is, in fact, endangered by floating

mines and by torpedoes that have not sunk. Off the English coast it is

further endangered in an increasing degree through German mines which

have been laid against enemy naval forces.

"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material

for a conclusion upon the case of the _Sussex_ the German Government

would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material

also to an investigation.

[Illustration: British sailors and officers boarding the captured U-C-5

German mine-laying submarine. The open grating shows one of the

openings through which mines are laid.]

"In the event that differences of opinion should develop hereby

between the two Governments, the German Government now declares itself

ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed

commissions of investigation, in accordance with the third title of

'The Hague agreement for the peaceful settlement of international

conflicts, November 18, 1907.'"

In explanation of the sinking of the _Manchester Engineer_, the

_Englishman_, and the _Eagle Point_, which vessels had Americans on

board, the German note professed to be unable to say whether the

first-named ship was attacked by a German submarine, but in the case

of the two last-named they were attacked after attempting to escape

and disregarding signals to stop.

The communication made the worst of impressions on the Washington

Government. The clumsy prevarication of attempting to show that a

steamer other than the _Sussex_ had been torpedoed in the belief that

it was a war vessel merely sufficed to complete the accumulating

circumstantial evidence in the possession of the Government that the

_Sussex_ had been torpedoed by a German submarine without warning in

violation of an express pledge. The Administration had become weary of

Germany's protestations of innocence and good behavior, and of shallow

excuses for breaking her word, and had lost faith in any German

utterance. The cabinet view of the situation, as expressed at a

meeting called the day following the receipt of the German note, was

that a nation which would accept perjured affidavits as a basis for a

note charging that the _Lusitania_ was armed would not hesitate to

enter a blanket denial of any act if perpetrated.

The tension created by Germany's unconvincing alibi caused alarm in

Berlin, and government officials were reported as showing a nervous

anxiety to strain every nerve to avoid a rupture with the United

States. A loophole had been provided in the German note for a possible

withdrawal of her denial of responsibility for the destruction of the

_Sussex_ as will be seen from this passage:

"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material

for a conclusion upon the case of the _Sussex_ the German Government

would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material

also to an investigation."

This saving clause gave the German note the aspect of a preliminary to

the usual backdown and to an admission of liability, with the

palliating excuse of ignorance of the vessel's identity. At any rate

signs were not wanting that Germany recognized, had she had a choice

to make, with the American Government reenforced with clinching

testimony, to be duly presented, that a German submarine and none

other torpedoed the _Sussex_ and jeopardized the lives of twenty-five

Americans on board.

On April 19, 1916, President Wilson had the issue with Germany before

Congress and addressed that body in person, solemnly informing the

legislators that "a situation has arisen in the foreign relations of

the country of which it is my plain duty to inform you very frankly."

This he proceeded to do, speaking, he said, on behalf of the rights of

the United States and its citizens and the rights of humanity in

general. He announced that he had notified Germany that "unless the

Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an

abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against

passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United

States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the

German Empire altogether."

The President's address was more or less a paraphrase of the note he

had that day sent to Berlin, and was in fulfillment of a promise he

made to notify Congress of any action he took to bring Germany to

realize the serious condition of her relations with the United

States.

CHAPTER LIX

THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM--GERMANY YIELDS

The American note was an indictment of Germany's conscienceless

practices and broken faith. Secretary Lansing informed the kaiser's

advisers that their note denying any attack on the _Sussex_, but

acknowledging that another vessel had been torpedoed under identical

circumstances as to time, place, and result, confirmed the inferences

the American Government had drawn from information it possessed

establishing "the facts in the case of the _Sussex_."

A "statement of facts" relating to the _Sussex_ accompanied the

virtual American ultimatum. It set forth a chain of testimony, citing

the source thereof, showing that the passengers of the _Sussex_, which

included about twenty-four American citizens, were of several

nationalities, many of them women and children, and half of them

subjects of neutral states; that the _Sussex_ carried no armament;

that the vessel has never been employed as a troopship, but solely as

a Channel ferryboat, and was following a route not used for

transporting troops from Great Britain to France; that a torpedo was

seen driving toward the vessel and the captain was unable to swing the

vessel out of the torpedo's course; that on a subsequent inspection of

the broken hull a number of pieces of metal were found which American,

French, and British naval experts decided were not parts of a mine,

but of a torpedo, with German markings, and were otherwise different

from parts of torpedoes used by the French and British.

Regarding the sketch made by the German submarine commander of the

steamer which he said he torpedoed, showing that it did not agree with

a photograph of the _Sussex_ as published, the American statement made

this comment:

This sketch was apparently made from memory of an observation of the

vessel through a periscope. As the only differences noted by the

commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the

smokestack and the shape of the stern, it is to be presumed the

vessels were similar in other respects.

This conclusion was the more certain because no other German

submarines, on the day the _Sussex_ was wrecked, attacked steamers in

the same locality. Hence, in the American views, "as no vessel is

reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a submerged

submarine other than the _Sussex_, it is beyond question that that

vessel was torpedoed by the submarine whose commander's report is

relied upon in the note of April 10, 1916."

The United States had spoken its last word. No attempt was made to

disguise the gravity of the situation, and there was a quiet

recognition of the fact that the continuance of friendly relations

rested wholly on the action of the German Government. Just now,

however, political conditions in Germany were believed to be such that

the Government itself, even if it desired to give full satisfaction in

word and deed to the United States, would be facing a problem in

finding a way of doing so. The Imperial Chancellor, Dr.

Bethmann-Hollweg, representing the civilian part of the federated

government, had so far succeeded in holding the concessions to the

United States. But the military element, including the naval and

submarine advocates of a continued campaign of "frightfulness," headed

until recently by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, had nevertheless pursued

its course of ruthless destruction, either with the reluctant and

tacit consent of the chancellor or in spite of his opposition. There

thus existed a fundamental cleavage of policy between these two

factions of the German Government. The chancellor made pledges to the

United States and the naval authorities disregarded them, the kaiser

apparently being helpless or lukewarm in his support of the

chancellor's commitments. Presently, however, when Admiral von

Tirpitz's retirement was announced, the civilian element appeared in

the ascendant. His resignation smote the German people with the

startling effect of a coup d'etat, and was plainly the outcome of a

long and silent struggle in the inner councils of the Government. All

the political influence of the chancellor, supported by the romantic

weight of the kaiser's name, was exercised to stifle an outburst of

criticism in the Reichstag. Meantime, under the German system of

censorship, the submarine warfare was reported to the German people in

boastful terms, which made them almost a unit in demanding its

continuance without abatement. They heard little of the hundreds of

noncombatants killed by their submarines, or else these casualties

were explained as the result of the explosion of cargoes of munitions.

They had been told week by week of the steady reduction of British

tonnage, that the pinch of hunger which they had experienced was also

being felt in England, and that the German submarine was the only

shield between Germany and starvation. So the German people were

behind the military and naval element for an unrestricted U-boat

warfare. The situation was such that the gravest doubt was felt

whether the chancellor, even with the kaiser's support, could adjust

the submarine issue in a way satisfactory alike to the United States

and to the clamorous radical militarists upheld by a misled people.

The German Government brooded over the ultimatum of the United

States for fifteen days before it decided upon a declaration that

averted a rupture of diplomatic relations. The German note,

dispatched May 5, 1916, grudgingly admitted "the possibility that

the ship mentioned in the note of April 10, 1916, as having been

torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the

_Sussex_." It characteristically withheld an unreserved admission,

but "should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the

vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to

draw the consequences resulting therefrom." This hesitating and

qualified acknowledgment was accepted as about as near to a

confession of guilt as Germany was then capable of making.

On the vital question of the conduct of submarine warfare, a change in

which the United States was determined upon forcing Germany to make,

the note was more explicit and thus yielded to the American demand:

"The German Government will only state that it has imposed

far-reaching restraint upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in

consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these

restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No

such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and

her allies.

"The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the

submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit

and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by

international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare

against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the

war zone surrounding Great Britain.

"With regard to these no assurances have ever been given to the

Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in

the declaration of February 8, 1916.

"The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were

given or are executed in good faith."

Having said so much, the German note proceeded to cloud the issue by

virtually blaming the United States for the continued existence of

conditions calling for the sea warfare Germany practiced:

"The German Government has made several proposals to the Government of

the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American

travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare.

Unfortunately, the Government of the United States decided not to

accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the Government of the United

States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of

the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.

"The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an

agreement along these lines."

As though this reproach did not go far enough, the German note, while

affirming that the German Government attached no less importance to

the sacred principles of humanity than the American Government did,

accused the United States of showing favoritism in its humanitarian

sympathies:

"As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret

that the sentiments of humanity, which the Government of the United

States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine

warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many

millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention

of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings

shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into

ignominious capitulation.

"The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to

understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and

explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict

conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before

the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt

the conduct of warfare to these rules.

"The German people knows that the Government of the United States has

the power to confine the war to armed forces of the belligerent

countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of

international law. The Government of the United States would have been

certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist against

Great Britain on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas.

But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that

the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany,

struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective

weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for

maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protest

against illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the

German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are

supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.

"It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the

Government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and

principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet

the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal

otherwise always is certain to find here."

This complaint was an allusion to the refusal of the United States to

involve its issues with Great Britain with those it had with Germany

or to mediate the proposal that Great Britain raise her food blockade

against Germany, who would then discontinue her submarine war on

British merchantmen. The tone of an injured party Germany assumed in

taking this attitude, as though she had a just cause of complaint

against the United States, was accepted as a plaintive prelude to her

final surrender; but even this surrender she did not make without

again clogging her concessions with the same proposal which the United

States had already flatly rejected.

"The German Government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice within

the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make

peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus

indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld

from the nations of Europe. The German Government feels all the more

justified in declaring that responsibility could not be borne before

the forum of mankind and in history if after twenty-one months of the

war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the

German Government and the Government of the United States, were to

take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two

nations.

"As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent

things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is

prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the

rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,

thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which

the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement

with the Government of the United States.

"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government

of the United States that German naval forces have received the

following orders:

"'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and

the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law,

such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war

zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives

unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance.'

"But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for

existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use

of an effective weapon if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply

at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such

a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and

the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United

States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the

Government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is

determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from

whatever quarter it has been violated.

"Accordingly, the German Government is confident, that in consequence

of the new orders issued to the naval forces, the Government of the

United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may

have been in the way of a mutual cooperation toward restoration of the

freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July

23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United

States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall

forthwith observe the rules of international law universally

recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by

the Government of the United States to the British Government,

December 28, 1914, and Nov. 5, 1915.

"Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain

the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all

belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new

situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of

decision."

The first feeling aroused by the German note, with its wounded tone

and qualified compliance with the American demand, was one of

irritation. But after closer study the President was willing to accept

the German undertaking on probation, without taking a too liberal view

of the phraseology employed, and to regard the intrusive strictures

on the United States as intended for German, not for American reading.

The disposition was to be charitable and to take cognizance of the

matter rather than the manner of Germany's backdown, and to wait and

see if her government would live up in good faith to its new

instructions to submarine commanders, without recognizing the

impossible conditions imposed.

But in the country at large public opinion was less ready to interpret

the German note except as it read textually. It was denounced in

scathing language as shuffling, arrogant and offensive, or as

insulting and dishonest. One paper deemed its terms to be a series of

studied insults added to a long inventory of injuries. Said another,

Germany's mood is still that of a madman. A third comment on the note

described it as "a disingenuous effort to have international petty

larceny put on the same plane as international murder and visited with

the same punishment." A fourth paper remarked: "If an American can

read the note without his temples getting hot then his blood is poor

or his understanding dense." The weight of American press opinion was

against Germany, especially in the South, and either called for the

breaking of diplomatic relations or considered such a course

inevitable.

For the United States even to contemplate, as Germany proposed, "an

alliance between Germany and the United States to break a British

blockade that Germany cannot break" was viewed as unthinkable.

Intellectual dishonesty, characteristic of Germany in its attitude

toward the world since the war began, and especially shown in

negotiations with the United States, was seen in the effort to place

upon Great Britain the responsibility for wrongs committed by Germany

against the United States and in the renewed attempt to convict the

American Government of lapses because it has not controlled Great

Britain's sea policy. In fact, the attempt to dictate the American

attitude to Great Britain in return for a promise to restrict

submarine warfare was generally resented as an impertinence.

When all was said, however, the German reply, although having the

appearance of being as little conciliatory as words could make it,

did in fact yield to President Wilson on the main issue.

The President, in considering this view, was guided by Ambassador

Gerard's dispatches reporting his interview with the kaiser on the

submarine crisis. The kaiser, he said, was animated by a keen desire

that relations between the two Governments should continue amicable,

but he felt that German public opinion must be considered in making

concessions to the United States. From the kaiser's concern for

popular approval the ambassador gathered that the German Government

faced the necessity of so wording its answer to the United States that

the German people would not feel that the Government had been forced

to modify the rules under which submarines operated. The

Administration received the impression that Germany would go to great

length to avoid a rupture with the United States, and the German note

must therefore be construed in the light of this feeling. The kaiser's

views, as transmitted by the ambassador, tended to soften the

irritating tone and language of the German note, and was not without

effect on the President and cabinet when they determined to accept it

provisionally.

The President decided to ignore the pointed suggestion of Germany that

the United States should now seek to prevail on Great Britain to

abandon her blockade of Germany. One source of irritation caused by

the note was the statement that should the United States fail to raise

the British embargo "the German Government would then be facing a new

situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of

action." The Administration had no intention of accepting any

conditional compliance with its demand for the abandoning of illegal

submarine warfare; but the opinion officially prevailed that this

effort of Germany to lecture the United States as to its duty toward

another nation might be overlooked in view of the accomplishment of

the main object for which the Administration had been contending.

Nor would the Government heed Germany's proposal that it undertake the

role of peacemaker in the absence of any indication that the Allied

Powers were willing to respond to Germany's willingness to make

peace--presumably on Germany's own terms.

The promises in the German note were accepted per se, and the

qualifications and animadversions Germany attached to them ignored.

This determined upon, the intimation was made plain to Germany that

should another ship be sunk in contravention of her new pledge no

exchange of notes would ensue, but a severance of diplomatic relations

would automatically be effected by the forbidden act. German submarine

commanders held in their hands the key to the situation. Any

infraction of Germany's latest word would not call for a disavowal or

punishment of the commander; the United States would merely act on the

presumption that Germany could not or would not control her own naval

forces. Berlin would not be consulted again.

The American response to the German note was sent three days later. It

was brief, and swept aside the considerable debating ground Germany

had invitingly spread to inveigle the United States into discussing

mediation in the war. Its principal passage ran:

"Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of

the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between

the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon

a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the

Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an

interruption of the good relations existing between the United States

and Germany.

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that

it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not

intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is

in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic

negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other

belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages

in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to

be susceptible of that construction.

"In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the

Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that

it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion

that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of

the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the

slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other

government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants.

Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not

relative."

Secretary Lansing, in a comment on this reply, said the German note

was devoted to matters which the American Government could not discuss

with the German Government. He took the ground, as the American reply

indicated, that the only "questions of right" which could be discussed

with the German Government were those arising out of German or

American action exclusively, not out of those questions which were the

subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and any

other country.

"So long as she (Germany) lives up to this altered policy," he

explained, "we can have no reason to quarrel with her on that score,

though the losses resulting from the violation of American rights by

German submarine commanders operating under the former policy will

have to be settled.

"While our differences with Great Britain cannot form a subject of

discussion with Germany, it should be stated that in our dealings with

the British Government we are acting, as we are unquestionably bound

to act, in view of the explicit treaty engagements with that

Government. We have treaty obligations as to the manner in which

matters in dispute between the two Governments are to be handled. We

offered to assume mutually similar obligations with Germany, but the

offer was declined."

Mr. Lansing's comment appeared to be more enlightening to German

opinion than the official communication. But while the German was

frankly puzzled by the American contention--holding that there was an

intimate connection between England's "illegal blockade policy" and

the submarine war--and wondered naively whether or not he was the

simple victim of an American confidence game, or strongly suspected

that he had been hoodwinked by President Wilson into parting with the

effective submarine weapon, with no guarantee of getting any action

against England in return, hard German common sense discerned through

these doubts, and made the most of the one all-important fact it could

comprehend--that the dreaded break had been avoided.

With the air thus cleared, the usual anticlimax came to the

situation--the tumbling down of Germany's elaborate and grandiose

defense of her misdeeds--by a tardy confession of error, which swept

everything she had previously said into the discard. On May 8, 1916,

the same day on which the American note had been dispatched, Germany

sent a further communication acknowledging that, as result of further

investigation, her previous contention "that the damage of the

_Sussex_ was to be traced back to a cause other than the attack of a

German submarine cannot be maintained." It now seems that the _Sussex_

had been mistaken by the submarine commander for a British transport.

Nothing could be more complete than Germany's belated resort to an

amende honorable after the United States had proved her guilt:

"In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German

Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the

submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy

warship. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, misled by the

appearance of the vessel under the pressure of the circumstances, he

formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and

did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict

instructions which called upon him to exercise particular care.

"In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits

that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance

with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning,

has not been adhered to in the present case.... The German Government

does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It

therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret

regarding the deplorable incident, and declares its readiness to pay

an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also

disapproved of the conduct of the commander, who has been

appropriately punished."

TWO YEARS OF THE WAR

BY FRANK H. SIMONDS

The purpose of this article is to review rapidly and briefly the

history of the military operations in the European conflict during the

first two years, from the attack upon Liege to the opening of the

first general Allied offensive. Necessarily, in view of the space

limitations it will be confined to a summary of events in the three

more considerable campaigns, that of Germany against France in 1914,

that of Germany against Russia in 1915, and the second German attack

upon France at Verdun in 1916. All other land operations have been

subsidiary or minor and will claim only passing comment.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In the years that lay between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and

the outbreak of the present conflict the Great General Staff of the

German Army had carefully elaborated plans for that war on two fronts

which the Franco-Russian alliance forecast. In company with the staffs

of her two allies, Austria and Italy, Germany had formulated the

methods by which she purposed to repeat the great success of 1870.

With Italy in the war, with Great Britain out of it, it was plain that

with German efficiency and the numbers that she and her allies would

possess, Germany could count on a permanent advantage in numbers as

well as material. But the events of the early years of the century,

the incidents beginning at Tangier in 1905, and extending to the

Balkan Wars in 1913, clearly established the possibility that Italy

might enter the war as an enemy, and the probability that Britain

would decline to stay out while France was being destroyed.

If either of these things should happen, as both did, then German

soldiers recognized that Germany and her Austrian ally would

ultimately be outnumbered, although superior preparation would give

them the advantage in the first and perhaps in the second years of the

conflict. It was therefore the problem of German high command to

prepare its plans in such fashion as to win the war, while it still

possessed the advantage of numbers and before the enemy could equip

and train its own forces.

In fact the problem was this: Should the Germans hurl the mass of

their great army first at Russia or first at France, leaving only a

small containing force on the other front? The question was much

debated and remains a matter of dispute, now, when the attack

ultimately decided upon has failed. (Vol. I, 85.)

The decision to attack France, which seems to have been reached well

in advance of the actual coming of the war, involved new

considerations. Russia's mobilization was notoriously known to be a

slow thing, although it turned out far more rapid than Germany had

calculated. But at the least German high command figured upon two

months, during which it could safely turn all of its energies and

resources against France. (Vol. I, 85.)

Unhappily in the years since the Franco-Prussian War France had built

up a great barrier of fortresses from Luxembourg to Switzerland.

Granted the great superiority of German heavy artillery, it was clear

that this barrier could be forced, but defended by the mass of the

French army this forcing would consume more than two months.

If France were to be attacked first, then it must be attacked by some

other road than that leading from the valleys of the Rhine and the

Moselle, the route of the 1870 invasion. And the route manifestly lay

through Belgium. The fortresses of the Meuse were patently of little

modern value, the Belgian army was weak in numbers and only at the

beginning of a process of reorganization. By coming through Belgium

the Germans could hope, even if the Belgians resisted, to get to Paris

in six weeks, having delivered their decisive battle on the road.

(Vol. I, 85.)

The element of additional opposition supplied by the Belgian army and

the small British Expeditionary Army, if it came to the Continent, did

not offset in the German mind the strength of the French barrier

fortresses from Verdun to Belfort, and Belgium seemed the line of

least resistance even if that resistance were to be reckoned at the

maximum. If France were crushed within six weeks, it was safe to

reckon that there would be time to turn east and deal with Russia,

still unprepared and so far held up--if not defeated--by Austria. If

Italy merely remained neutral up to the moment of the decisive battle

in France, the outcome of this conflict would decide Italian policy.

Here, briefly, is the basis of German strategy and the reason for

German decision. (Vol. I, 86.)

THE BELGIAN PHASE

Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1, 1914. (Vol. I, 279.) She

was already mobilizing, and in a more or less complete form all Europe

had been mobilizing for at least a week. While there were delays in

the exchange of other declarations, this date may be accepted as the

real beginning of the world war. Moreover, when the declaration of war

was sent to Russia, Germany was already aware that France purposed to

stand by her ally. (Vol. I, 280.)

The first step in German action, then, was to seize the road through

Belgium. It might be had by diplomacy, but this hope was speedily

extinguished when King Albert revealed his determination to defend his

country. (Vol. I, 280.) Liege, the most important outer barrier, might

still be won by a quick blow, and thus the opening move of the

struggle was the dash of a few thousand German troops, not yet put on

a complete war basis, westward from Aix-la-Chapelle and along the main

Berlin-Cologne-Brussels railroad to the environs of Liege. (Vol. II,

9.)

As a _coup-de-main_ this attack upon Liege failed. The forts resisted.

For several days Belgian field forces held the open spaces between the

eastern forts, and the first German troops suffered bloody repulses

and were presently compelled to pause until heavy artillery could be

brought up. Meantime German troops moved north of the city and forced

the crossing of the Meuse at Vise. Thereupon the Belgian field forces,

which had been defending Liege, retired, to escape envelopment. The

German army penetrated in the wide unfortified gaps between the Liege

forts and occupied the city of Liege on August 7, 1914. The forts held

out for another week, one by one succumbing to the new heavy German

and Austrian howitzers, which were making their first noise in Europe.

(Vol. II, 12-23.)

Meantime, behind Liege the German concentration was going forward, the

main mass of the German army was getting ready for its great drive on

Paris, while west of Liege German cavalry was slowly but methodically

driving in the slender Belgian field forces, which took their stand

behind the north and south flowing rivulets of the central Belgian

plain. Here were fought some of the minor engagements which filled the

press of the world in the early days, but had no actual value. (Vol.

II, 9-11.)

Early in the third week of August, 1914, the German preparations were

complete and one great German army under Kluck, crossing the Meuse

about Liege moved directly west upon Brussels, while a second, under

Buelow, crossed the Meuse about Huy, between Liege and Namur, and

advanced upon the latter place. Still a third army, under Hausen,

moved across the Ardennes toward the Meuse crossings southeast of

Namur, while a fourth under the Crown Prince of Wuerttemberg aimed

farther south through the Ardennes at the Meuse crossings in France.

(Vol. II, 25, 26.)

Before this torrent the Belgian army was swept with little or no

delay. (Vol. II, 27.) By August 19, 1914, it was fleeing back to the

intrenched camp of Antwerp. (Vol. II, 27.) Brussels fell on August 20,

1914 (Vol. II, 30), and on August 22, 1914, the Belgian phase was over

and the German troops had come to grips with French and British troops

along the whole Belgian frontier from Luxemburg to Mons. (Vol. II,

37.) So far German plans had worked about as they had been expected to

work, and at the end of the third week Germany was on the eve of the

decisive battle, which she had planned.

[Illustration: On August 18, 1914, when the Belgian Retreat to Antwerp

began.

_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanrezac; D, Langle de Cary; E,

Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau.

_Germans._--I, Kluck; II Buelow; III Hausen; IV, Wuerttemberg; V, Crown

Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heoringen; VIII, Deimling.]

THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE

Meantime the French had mobilized with expected speed and before

mobilization was completed had pushed a raid into southern Alsace,

wholly comparable to the German raid on Liege. (Vol. II, 38.) This

advance had taken, lost and retaken Muelhausen by August 15, 1914.

(Vol. II, 41-45.) At this time the French were approaching the Rhine,

in this sector, and had crossed the Vosges and come down the Rhine

affluents for some distance.

But this was a minor operation. The main thrust of the French General

Staff, the answer to the German drive through Belgium, had long been

prepared. It was to be a swift and heavy advance through Lorraine,

between Metz and Strassburg, rolling up the German forces here,

cutting communications between these fortresses, and moving down the

Rhine Valley and menacing the rear of the German armies which had

invaded Belgium. (Vol. II, 43.)

While the German armies were beginning their main advance upon

Brussels and Namur, the French thrust was pushed out, was very

successful for several days until the French had reached the main

Metz-Strassburg railroad, and from Delme to Saarburg stood far within

the German boundary. But at this point came the first real disaster.

(Vol. II, 44.)

Resting on the hills of Delme and the marshes of the Seille, the

Germans had constructed strong fortified lines and furnished them with

heavy artillery. When the French reached these positions they were

assailed by artillery which was beyond the reach of their own guns,

they suffered heavy losses, were thrown into confusion, and presently

were flowing back upon Nancy and Luneville in something approximating

a rout, having lost flags, cannon, and many thousand prisoners. This

was the Battle of Morhange, or of Metz--as the Germans name it--and it

was over by August 22, 1914. (Vol. II, 44, 45.)

[Illustration: August 23, 1914, after the Allies had lost all the

First Battles.

_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanrezac; D, Langle de Cary; E,

Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau.

_Germans._--I, Kluck; II, Buelow; III, Hausen; IV, Wuerttemberg; V,

Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen; VIII, Deimling.]

At the same time another French army had pushed across the Meuse into

Belgium from the district between Sedan and Montmedy, it had won

minor initial successes, and about Neufchateau it had suffered exactly

the same sort of reverse that the French army to the south had met at

Morhange, German heavy artillery had procured another French defeat,

which again approximated a rout and this French army was also in rapid

retreat, having lost flags and guns as well as many thousand

prisoners.

Finally, still farther to the northeast, a French army had taken its

stand in the angle between the Meuse and the Sambre, from Dinant,

through Namur to Charleroi, and the British army prolonged the line to

the east of Mons. Against this dike there now burst the full fury of

the German advance made by the armies of Kluck and Buelow. (Vol. II,

46-49.) Again the French were defeated after a desperate battle about

Charleroi (Vol. II, 54), this time without any rout and after having

inflicted very heavy losses. But retreat was inevitable because the

Germans succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Meuse at

Dinant--that is, in the rear of the main army--while the fall of Namur

(Vol. II, 55-59), another triumph for German heavy artillery and a

complete surprise to the Allies, completed the ruin of their plans.

Meantime the British army about Mons, after a day of hard fighting

which had compelled them to contract their lines somewhat, but left

them unshaken, was thrown in the air by the French retreat from

Charleroi (Vol. II, 60), tardily announced to it, and was compelled to

begin its long and terrible retreat, which so nearly ended in

destruction. (Vol. II, 66.)

By the middle of the third week in August, 1914, the Germans had then

made good their way through Belgium, defeated the French counterthrust

in Lorraine, routed two French armies and heavily defeated a third,

together with its British supports. (Vol. II, 9-68.)

It was not yet clear whether the French armies could rally for another

general battle, but it was clear that if this should happen, the

Germans had still time, accepting their original time-table.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

In the fourth week of August, 1914, Joffre, the French commander in

chief, was compelled to make a momentous decision. All his first plans

had failed, all his armies had been defeated. It very promptly turned

out that none of the defeats had materially affected the fighting

value of his armies. Thus the army defeated at Morhange was promptly

reenforced by the troops drawn out of Muelhausen and in turn defeated

and repulsed its conquerors before Nancy, in one of the bloodiest

battles of the war. The army defeated at Neufchateau made good its

position behind the Meuse from Verdun to Charleville and inflicted

grave losses upon the Germans endeavoring to pass the river. Even the

army defeated at Charleroi was able, a few days later at Guise, to

pass to the offensive and throw back the Prussian Guard into the Oise.

(Vol. II, 90-92.)

Meantime two new armies, one under Foch, the other under Manoury, were

in the making and there was reason to believe that it would be

possible to renew the battle on the line of the Aisne, the Oise, and

the Somme. But there was one grave peril. German plans had not only

taken the French by surprise in making the main thrust through

Belgium, but had prepared to send this way a far greater number of men

than France had expected and had sent them much farther to the west.

The result was that the weight of the blow had fallen upon the

British. The British army had been compelled to make a night and day

retreat and had narrowly escaped destruction at Cambrai on August 26,

1914, "the most critical day." (Vol. II, 77.) The British army was too

heavily outnumbered to meet the German attack, its retreat had been so

rapid that the line of the Somme was about to be lost before the

British could be supported by Manoury's army, which came up on its

western flank too late. There was, therefore, the real danger that

Kluck might get between Paris and the main mass of the Allied armies,

enveloping them and producing a Sedan ten times greater than that

which had wrecked the Third Empire.

Joffre, accordingly, decided to continue the retreat and brought all

his forces that were west of the Meuse, in good order and no longer

heavily pressed back behind the Marne and on a line from Paris,

through Meaux, Sezanne, La Fere Champenoise, Vitry-le-Francois,

Bar-le-Duc, and thence north to Verdun. He thus stood with his forces

in a semicircle, the concave side toward the Germans and his flanks

resting upon Paris and Verdun, whose forts covered these flanks. (Vol.

II, 83.)

By September I, 1914, it was plain to the Germans that the French army

had escaped its embrace and that no envelopment was longer possible.

It remained possible to destroy them by main force, since German

numbers were still superior, German artillery unchallenged, and the

early successes productive of unbounded confidence. The German armies

thus leaped forward for the final decisive battle, which had been just

missed at the French frontier. (Vol. II, 84, 85.)

But the new situation imposed new strategy. It was no longer possible

to envelop the Allies, and accordingly, Kluck, on the western flank,

turned southeast and marched across the face of Paris, crossing the

Marne near Meaux and leaving only one corps to guard his flank toward

Paris. This was a sound maneuver, if the French troops in Paris were

too few or too broken to strike; it was perilous in the extreme, if

the opposite were the case. And it was the case, for Joffre had

concentrated behind Paris a new army, Manoury's, which was now to

attack.

On September 5, 1914, the Germans having now fallen into Joffre's

trap, the French commander in chief issued his famous order, and the

whole Anglo-French army suddenly passed from the defensive to the

offensive. (Vol. II, 102.) The first shots of the conflict, the great

Battle of the Marne, were fired by some German field pieces, at

Monthyon, just north of the Marne and less than twenty miles from

Paris. They greeted the advance of Manoury's army coming east out of

Paris and striking at Kluck's open flank. (Vol. II, 103.)

[Illustration: September 6, 1914, the Battle of the Marne.

_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, Manoury; C, British; D, Franchet d'Esperey

(Lanrezac); E, Foch; F, Langle de Cary; G, Sarrail (Ruffey); H,

Castelnau; I, Dubail.

_Germans._--I, Kluck; II, Buelow; III, Hausen; IV, Wuerttemberg; V,

Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen.]

The next day Manoury rolled up Kluck's flank, drove his troops in on

the Ourcq River, and threatened his army with destruction. Kluck saved

himself by extraordinary clever work, he drew his troops back from

the front of the British south of the Marne, put them in against

Manoury and by September 10, 1914, had driven Manoury back toward

Paris and was threatening him. The first blow had failed, but it had

brought a chain of consequences fatal to German plans. (Vol. II,

99-110.)

First of all the British, once Kluck had drawn his main masses from

their front, began somewhat tardily to advance, threatening Kluck's

other flank, and Franchet d'Esperey's army, to the east, about

Montmirail, in turn, attacked Buelow's, whose position had been made

dangerous by the retreat of Kluck. Buelow had to go back north of the

Marne, suffering severe losses and his retirement uncovered the flank

of Hausen's army fighting to the east from La Fere Champenoise to

Vitry. (Vol. II, 107.)

Meantime things had been going badly on this line for the French, and

their troops under Foch had been driven back many miles. The Germans,

feeling the danger from the west, were making one final effort to

break the French center and win the decisive contest. But Buelow's

retreat opened the way for a supreme piece of strategy on the part of

Foch, who descended from the heights, struck Hausen, almost routed him

and sent him in quick retreat beyond the Marne. (Vol. II, 120, 121.)

This settled the battle. Kluck, Buelow, and Hausen were now forced to

retreat, their retreat communicated itself all along the line and by

September 13, 1914, the Germans were all withdrawing, Kluck was over

seventy miles north of the Grand Morin, just taking root behind the

Aisne, the Battle of the Marne was over, and the great German plan to

deal with France in six weeks had been completely wrecked. Actually

the first phase of the war was over, unless the Germans could regain

the offensive and restore the conditions existing before the Marne.

(Vol. II, 120-123.)

THE END OF THE FIRST WESTERN CAMPAIGN

In this the Germans failed. They did succeed in rallying and beating

down the Anglo-French pursuit with great skill and promptitude. The

Battle of the Aisne (Vol. II, 130-146) marked the beginning of the

deadlock and the Germans took the positions they were to hold for the

next two years between the Oise and the Meuse.

[Illustration: September 20, 1914, the Deadlock. Solid lines show

trench fronts. Dotted lines show extension toward Belgium--"the race

to the sea" in September and October.]

But the effort to renew the attack failed. It began with an effort,

made by troops brought from before Nancy, where a new French defensive

success had saved the Lorraine capital, to come south to Paris along

the west bank of the Oise. It was continued in the so-called "race to

the sea," when French and German commanders tried to outflank their

opponents along the Oise, the Somme, and the Lys. But this resulted

only in extending the lines of parallel trenches which now stretched

to the Belgian frontier from Noyon.

Finally, having beaten down the Belgian resistance and taken Antwerp

in the second week of October (Vol. II, 168-172), the Germans made a

last attempt to interpose between the Allies and the sea, take Calais

and Boulogne and come south through Artois and Picardy.

They were halted in the desperate battles along the Yser and the Lys.

(Vol. II, 169-175.) The Belgian army, escaping from Antwerp, stood

solidly behind the Yser, the British just managed to cling to Ypres

(Vol. II, 171-172), and the French under Foch performed new miracles

on the defensive. Two months after the German defeat at the Marne, the

loss of the western campaign was made absolute by the unsuccessful

termination of the Battle of Flanders and a war of movement had fallen

to a war of trenches, a state of deadlock had succeeded to the

operations in the open field and the German tide had been permanently

checked. (Vol. II, 174-177.) But actually the check had been at the

Marne and in this battle the original German plan had been decisively

defeated. France had not been disposed of in two months, but had won

the decisive battle that German strategy had prepared. But she had

lacked the numbers and the artillery to turn the victory to best

account and had failed wholly in the attempt to free her own territory

as she was to continue to fail for two years.

[Illustration: November 15, 1914, the End of the Western Campaign.]

THE RUSSIAN PHASE

We have seen that it was the plan of the German General Staff to hold

the Russian armies while the great attack upon France was being made.

To do this the Germans had left a very small force in East Prussia,

but had practically assigned to Austria the task of holding up Russia.

(Vol. II, 371.)

German calculations as to Russian mobilization proved sadly

inaccurate. While the German troops were still in Belgium and the

Battle of Charleroi unfought, Russian troops crossed the East Prussian

boundary and began an invasion which produced something approximating

a panic. (Vol. II, 434.) One Russian army came due west from the

Niemen, another north from Warsaw, and all of Germany east of the

Vistula seemed in grave peril. (Vol. II, 437.)

TANNENBERG AND LEMBERG

It was then that the kaiser summoned Hindenburg, gave him the task of

defending East Prussia, and thus introduced one of the few famous and

successful soldiers of the war. (Vol. II, 438.) Hindenburg cleverly

concentrated his forces, leaving only a screen in front of the Russian

army coming from the Niemen toward Koenigsberg, practically surrounded

the other Russian army in the marshes about Tannenberg, brought into

action great parks of German heavy artillery, and routed and destroyed

the Russian army about September 1, 1914. (Vol. II, 438-441.)

On "Sedantag" Germany was able to celebrate one of the most decisive

of all her many victories, and the Russian peril in East Prussia had

been quickly abolished.

But the East Prussian incident was only a detail, due, it is still

insisted, to the prompt yielding of Russian strategy to Allied appeals

for some action in the east that might relieve the terrible pressure

now being exerted upon the Anglo-French forces in the west. And if the

East Prussian invasion did not, as was asserted at the time, compel

the Germans to send troops from Belgium to East Prussia, it did hold

up new formations and seriously complicate the German problem,

contributing materially to the French victory at the Marne thereby.

The real Russian blow was delivered against Austria. Faithful to her

agreement, Austria had promptly undertaken the invasion of southern

Poland and in the third week of August an Austrian army was

approaching Lublin, while another stood in a wide circle about the

Galician city of Lemberg. (Vol. II, 376-379.)

Ignoring the first army, the Russians sent their main masses westward

on a front extending from the Rumanian boundary to the Kiev-Lemberg

railroad. Before Lemberg the Austrian army was overwhelmed in a

terrible rout, which ended in a wild flight, costing some 300,000

prisoners and almost destroying the Austrian military establishment.

(Vol. II, 385, 386.)

The Austrian army, which had advanced into Poland was left in the air,

and its retreat was transformed into a new disaster. Lemberg fell

about September 1, 1914, and meantime a Serbian victory at the Jedar

had destroyed still another Austrian army and emphasized the weakness

of Hapsburg military power. (Vol. II, 329-335.)

At about the time the German blow at France was failing along the

Marne, the Russian victories were mounting, Russian armies were

sweeping through Galicia and approaching the San. (Vol. II, 398.)

Serbian armies were across the Bosnia frontier, (Vol. II, 323), and

the eastern situation was becoming perilous in the extreme for the

Central Powers, despite the great victory of Tannenberg, which had

cost the Russians an army of 100,000 men. (Vol. II, 438-450.) Thus in

the first six weeks of the war the whole German conception had been

defeated, France had not been destroyed by one great blow, and Russia

had not been held up by Austria, pending the delivery of this blow and

the return of the German troops who had delivered it.

[Illustration: October 24, 1914, The Battle Of The Vistula. Arrows

show Hindenburg's attack on Warsaw and Ivangorod.]

WARSAW AND LODZ

October brought the plain necessity to the Germans of coming to the

aid of their ally. While they were still endeavoring to reopen the

decision in the west it was necessary to send troops to Hindenburg and

to take pressure off Austria. The blow took the form of a rapid

advance upon Warsaw through Central Poland, which was destitute of

Russian troops. (Vol. II, 454-461.)

The thrust almost succeeded, German troops reached the suburbs of

Warsaw, German guns were heard by the citizens of the town and Warsaw

was in deadly peril, but Siberian troops arrived in the nick of time

and Hindenburg was obliged to retire. (Vol. II, 462-466.) Still his

main purpose was achieved. Russian armies in Galicia had been weakened

to save Warsaw and were compelled to retire behind the San and the

Vistula. (Vol. II, 420-427.)

Hindenburg's retreat was masterly, he flowed back upon Cracow and

Breslau, pursued by a great Russian army. (Vol. II, 458-462.) Meantime

the Russian armies in Galicia again took the offensive and November

saw Russian armies at the outskirts of Cracow and approaching the

boundary of Silesia. (Vol. II, 413-423.) Taken in connection with the

German repulses all along the western front and the defeat in

Flanders, which disclosed the final collapse of the original German

plan, this moment marked the high-water stage of allied fortunes for

many, many months.

Having led the Russian army after him to the German frontier,

Hindenburg quickly moved his troops on strategic railroads to the

north, invaded Poland again between the Vistula and the Warta (Vol.

II, 462-481), almost succeeded in interposing between the Russian army

and Warsaw, and won the great victory of Lodz. (Vol. II, 466, 467.)

But Russian numbers saved the day. After terrific fighting and

tremendous losses the Russians got back to the Bzura line, which they

were to hold for nearly a year and the German advance was beaten down

in fighting wholly similar to that in Flanders. (Vol. II, 471-478.)

THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN

Once more the Russian advance in Galicia was resumed. (Vol. III, 264.)

Russian armies never again approached Cracow, but they did come to the

Dunajec line, while to the south they began the slow ascent of the

Carpathians (Vol. III, 261-264), across which raiding forces of

Cossacks had several times passed. They also concentrated against the

fortress of Przemysl, the last Austrian stronghold along the San. This

campaign endured throughout the winter. Finally Przemysl, with a

garrison of 125,000 men, surrendered in early March (Vol. III,

249-257), and Russia was at last free to strike either at Cracow or

through the Carpathians for the Hungarian Plain.

Her decision to go south was probably influenced by the great victory

of the Serbs at Valievo. While German aid was taking pressure off the

Austrians a new Hapsburg thrust had been delivered at Serbia,

Austro-Hungarian troops had passed the Drina and penetrated deeply

into Serbia, Belgrade had fallen, and the end of Serbia seemed in

sight. But new Russian attacks having compelled Austria to recall many

of her troops, the remaining Hapsburg forces in Serbia were almost

destroyed in the bloody defeat of Valievo in December. (Vol. II,

325-357.)

To offset this the Germans soon won one more great victory in East

Prussia, at the Mazurian Lakes, where another Russian army was

well-nigh destroyed by the quick-marching, better-trained German

troops. And this victory beat down another Russian invasion of East

Prussia and, as it turned out, closed the period of immediate peril

for the German territories in the east.

In March and April the Galician campaign reached its climax in the

bloody battles of the Carpathians and Russian armies seemed slowly but

surely pushing their way over the mountains and descending into the

Hungarian Plain. (Vol. III, 235-276.) It was at this moment that Italy

had chosen to enter the war on the allied side, and there was every

reason to believe that Rumania would follow.

THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

Instead there came a sudden and tremendous German victory which was to

prove the prelude to more victories and to a summer of unparalleled

success for German arms. This victory was won at the Battle of the

Dunajec--named Gorlice by the Germans--which may well rank with the

Marne as the second great struggle of the war, since it saved Austria,

brought Russia to the edge of ruin and wholly transformed the horizons

of the conflict. (Vol. III, 264-276.)

It will be recalled that at the outset of the war the German General

Staff had to choose between two possible operations, an offensive

against France or an offensive against Russia. It had chosen to attack

France and had lost the campaign. It had in addition failed measurably

in its defensive against Russia and the result had been the loss of

most of Galicia with the incidental Austrian disasters.

But the campaign in the west had resulted in the occupation of

advantageous positions far within French territory and in the conquest

of most of Belgium.

Now the German General Staff was again able to decide whether it would

turn its entire energies for the summer of 1915 against France or

against Russia. If it chose to attack Russia there was solid reason

for believing that neither in munitions nor in numbers would the

Allies in the west reach a point where they would become dangerous

before autumn and between May and October Germany could hope to put

Russia out of the war, particularly as Germany knew what the rest of

the world did not, that Russia was at the end of her munitions, and

her long and terrible campaigns in Galicia, together with her defeats

in East Prussia, had temporarily much reduced the fighting value of

her armies.

Accordingly Germany decided to get east and put Russia out of the war

as she had undertaken nine months before to go west and had tried and

failed to put France out of the war. But she was again faced with the

fact that failure would expose her to new perils, this time on the

west.

For her first attack Germany selected the point in the Russian line

between the Vistula and the Carpathians, about Tarnow, where the

Russian line stood behind the Dunajec River. If the Russian line

should be suddenly broken here, the German General Staff might hope to

sweep up all the Russian armies which were facing south and

endeavoring to push through the Carpathians.

Just about May 1, 1915, the blow fell and Germany, massing hitherto

unheard-of numbers of heavy guns on a narrow front, and using untold

ammunition, not merely routed, but abolished Radko Dmitrieff's army

(Vol. III, 267-276), and moved rapidly in on the rear of the Russian

Carpathian armies. With difficulty these extricated themselves and

retired behind the San. (Vol. III, 276.) But they were unable here to

withstand Mackensen who had assumed command in all this field, and

fell back first upon Lemberg and then upon the Volhynian triangle of

fortresses within the Russian frontier. Przemysl fell, Lemberg was

lost and Dubno and Lutsk, two of the three Volhynian fortresses, fell.

(Vol. III, 276-312.)

Having thus disposed of the Galician armies, Mackensen turned

northeast from the San, struck at Lublin and Cholm (Vol. III,

357-365), and through them at Brest-Litovsk, far in the rear of the

Russian armies in Poland. At the same time Hindenburg in East Prussia

moved south, aiming at Grodno and Vilna, also behind the Warsaw front

(Vol. III, 256-361), while a third Germany army invaded the Courland

and aimed at Riga. (Vol. III, 337.)

The Russian armies in Poland were thus threatened with complete

envelopment; they were caught between the closing jaws of the pincers,

which were Mackensen and Hindenburg. For a certain time it was not

clear whether the gigantic double thrust might not result in the

capture of the whole Russian army in Poland. But this did not happen.

Warsaw was evacuated (Vol. III, 356), Ivangorod, Novo Georgievsk, the

fortresses along the Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier fell (Vol. IV,

176-181), but the Russian armies drew back upon Riga, Vilna, and

Brest-Litovsk. (Vol. IV, 186-188.)

[Illustration: October 1, 1915, at the End of the Russian Retreat.

Dotted line shows Russian front on April 1, 1915.]

RUSSIA SURVIVES

At Brest-Litovsk there was only a brief halt and then the Russians

resumed their retreat upon Pinsk and the Pripet Marshes. Behind the

Dvina from Riga to Dvinsk the northern army stood fast. But the

central armies, retiring upon Vilna, were nearly trapped and once were

actually cut off by German cavalry. (Vol. IV, 193-223.)

By September the great campaign approached its end. The Russians at

last took root on a line from Riga, through the Pripet Marshes to

Rovno and thence to the Rumanian boundary. (Vol. IV, 184-255.) The

czar sent the grand duke to the Caucasus and took command himself

(Vol. IV, 188), an allied offensive in the west in Champagne and

Artois (Vol. IV, 52-81) made sudden demands upon German man power, as

the Russian advance in East Prussia and Galicia had taxed German man

power in the days of the Marne, and so, by October, it was plain that

the second great German effort had also failed. Russia had not been

destroyed, she had not been put out of the war for any long period;

Russian armies were to resume the offensive the following June.

As in the west, Germany had conquered wide territories, she had taken

fortresses, provinces, vast numbers of prisoners and guns, but a

decision had escaped her. She was still confronted by the certainty

that at some future time all her foes, superior in numbers and

munitions, would beat upon all her fronts at once. But she was no

longer able to push eastward to follow the pathway of Napoleon and

meet a Russian winter on the road; moreover the situation in the

Balkans demanded attention and the Italian offensive along the Isonzo,

as well as Anglo-French pressure in the west, also claimed notice.

THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN

Early in the spring the Anglo-French fleets had made a desperate and

almost successful attempt to force the Dardanelles. (Vol. III,

423-437.) Their failure had been followed by a land expedition, which

took root at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, made slight

progress inward and was halted only a short distance south and west of

the commanding hills. (Vol. III, 429-437.)

[Illustration: The Conquest of Serbia, December, 1915.

Arrows show routes taken by Austrian, German, and Bulgar invaders.

_A_--Route of retreating Serbs

_B_--Route of Allies from Saloniki in their unsuccessful attempt to

rescue the Serbs.]

A new effort in August directed from the Gulf of Saros through Suvla

Bay had also just missed supreme success, through failures in

preparation and command which were beginning to show in all British

operations. (Vol. IV, 344.)

For the moment Turkey had saved Constantinople, but the Turks'

supplies of munitions were running short and there was reason to

believe that the Gallipoli thrust might presently end in victory and

open the straits to Russia, if Germany did not take a hand.

Thus spurred, Germany and Austria planned and executed the most

successful single campaign of the war. German diplomacy succeeded in

enlisting Bulgaria. (Vol. IV, 269-274.) Allied diplomacy chained

Serbian action while there was yet time for Serbia to save herself,

Greece deserted her old ally and in November a great Austro-German

army under Mackensen suddenly burst into Serbia from the north and

west (Vol. IV, 268-269), while a Bulgarian army entered from the east.

(Vol. IV, 269-273.) The result was inevitable. Serbia was crushed. Her

gallant army fled over the mountains after heroic resistance and

reached the Adriatic, but as a mob rather than as an army. (Vol. IV,

263-307.)

Tardy Allied efforts to come to the rescue through Saloniki were

blocked by the Bulgarians south of Uskub (Vol. IV, 308-316), all

Macedonia was taken (Vol. IV, 267-334), and the Anglo-French

expedition was driven south under the very shadow of the old walls of

Saloniki, and the roads to Constantinople and to Albania were opened

to Germany and Austria, the Balkans were conquered at a blow and

Berlin began to forecast a German-led drive upon Egypt by Suez and

even upon India by Bagdad.

As for the Gallipoli troops, December saw them hurriedly withdrawn

after great losses and terrible suffering. (Vol. IV, 369-380.)

Germany and Austria had now broken the iron circle about them; for the

moment Germany had realized the German dream of expansion to the Near

East, the conception of a Central Empire, a Mittel-Europa, fronting

the Baltic and the Adriatic, overflowing the Sea of Marmora into Asia

Minor and bound by the German-built railroad uniting Berlin, Vienna,

and Constantinople with Bagdad and Hamburg and Antwerp with Suez and

the Persian Gulf. Here at last was a solid gain, a real victory after

two great disappointments.

IN THE WEST

Meantime there had been a long trench struggle in the west. The German

attack at the outset of the war had terminated in Flanders. It was not

for several months that the Allies felt able to undertake any

offensive. Then in rapid succession came French attacks in Alsace, in

Champagne, and south of St. Mihiel (Vol. III, 151-169), while the

British made a desperate drive about Neuve Chapelle. (Vol. III,

83-98.) All these were checked by the Germans who passed to the

offensive themselves in April, and made a new attack about Ypres,

marked by the first use of poison gas. (Vol. III, 99-115.)

German success was inconsiderable, but it did reveal the fact that the

Allies were not yet dangerous and Germany turned her whole attention

toward the great Russian campaign just beginning. In May and June the

French made terrific attacks under Foch in Artois (Vol. III, 121-125),

and won some ground north of Arras. (Vol. III, 155.) But the attacks

had to be abandoned because they were too costly in men, while a

British attempt to support the French failed dismally.

Not until late September, when Russia was just at the lowest ebb in

her fortunes, did the western Allies try again. Then, starting on

September 25, 1915, they launched terrific drives in Champagne and

Artois, came within an ace of piercing the German lines, captured some

30,000 prisoners and many guns, but in the end failed to get through.

(Vol. IV, 61-131.) German troops were recalled from Russia and

Russia's escape was made certain, but this was the only considerable

consequence of the Allied attack, preparation for which had consumed

many months. Again it was demonstrated that England was not ready and

France, alone, could not free her own territory.

ITALY

Italy had entered the war just as Russia was suffering her first

terrible defeats in Galicia. (Vol. III, 382-392.) Had Italian decision

been reached a few months earlier the effect might have been decisive.

As it was, Italy came too late, her attack was halted south of Trent

and along the Isonzo, after inconsiderable progress. A certain number

of Austrian divisions, which conceivably might have been directed

against Russia and contributed to making the outcome of that campaign

decisive, were drawn off to the south. (Vol. III, 392-402.)

In September, and again when the Austro-German attack upon Serbia was

at its height, Italy attacked along the Isonzo. (Vol. IV, 415-417.)

Once more the result was limited to drawing off certain divisions, a

useful but not highly important service. In opening another front

Italy had contributed to the further consumption of the reserves of

the Central Powers, she had begun an operation to be compared with

that of Britain in Spain in the later days of the First Empire. She

was taking off a portion of the weight that France and Russia were

carrying, she was contributing to the exhaustion of Austria, but

neither in the first nor the second year of the war was the

contribution to be considerable and Italy was presently to require aid

from Russia, when at last Austria decided to pass to the offensive in

the Trentino.

VERDUN

With the coming of winter the German General Staff had to face a new

situation, full of menace. Their first great conception, the

destruction of the military power of France, had failed, although it

had won much territory and provided an admirable defensive position

far beyond their own frontiers. Their second major conception, the

elimination of Russia from the war, had failed, but it had also given

them much territory and they were not overoptimistic in assuming that

their victories would keep Russia on the defensive for many months;

their actual mistake, it turned out, was in overestimating the length

of time.

Again, then, there was offered the original choice: Should the next

blow be postponed until spring and directed at Petrograd or Moscow, or

should it be prepared and delivered before spring and in the west? The

decision for the west was made. Apparently the German reasoning was

this: Britain was not yet ready, winter and defeat had reduced the

value of Russia so low that it was safe to turn the best of their

troops from the east to the west. Actually the whole weight of the

military machine could be exerted against France.

From this second blow at France the Germans expected to derive the

benefits missed at the Marne. If the French lines were broken, as the

Russian had been at the Dunajec, then a wide swinging advance would

carry German troops deep into the French territory, end French hope

and compel French surrender. This was the maximum of possibility.

On the other hand, if there were no actual and deep piercing of the

French lines, the pressure upon the French would lead them to call

upon the British for help. British attack, while the British force was

still unready, would lead to great losses and would exhaust the

reserves in men and munitions of both France and Britain. At the worst

this would mean that neither France nor Britain would be ready to take

the field in their long-promised general offensive in 1916.

There was, of course, the possibility that the German attack would be

repulsed, that the French and British would not undertake a premature

offensive, and that Russia would rally and be able to storm the

eastern lines stripped of reserves to strengthen the western attack.

If all these things happened then Germany might herself lose the

offensive and conceivably the war. But no German soldier could believe

these things would happen and the remote possibility did not weigh

against the apparent opportunity to win a sweeping and decisive

victory, while the British and Russians were still unready and France

alone in the field.

THE FEBRUARY ATTACK

Accordingly Germany decided to attack in the west. She selected Verdun

as the objective for reasons not at first clear but now well known.

Verdun was in the public mind a great fortress, surrounded by

impregnable works, the strongest point on the French front. In fact it

was the weakest sector. The forts had been evacuated, the first line

defenses some miles north of the town were strong, but the second and

third had been neglected. The line was held by less than two army

corps of territorials; there were other faults in preparation

chargeable to the politicians. Worst of all of these was the lack of

rail communications due to failure to build new lines to replace those

cut by the Germans, who at St. Mihiel blocked the north and south line

from the Paris-Nancy trunk line and at Montfaucon and Varennes

interrupted the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire.

There was every reason why the Germans could expect that a sudden and

terrific blow would permit them to get to Verdun, take the forts on

the east bank, and possibly cut clear through the French lines and

break them into two parts. Not impossibly this would mean retirement

as far as the old Marne battle field: certainly it would mean the

extinction of French hope. So the Germans reasoned.

The first blow fell on February 21, 1916. The initial attack was made

east of the Meuse on a very narrow front; it resulted in an immediate

local success. The French trenches were abolished, the French line was

threatened, and the German army overflowed south in great force. The

possibility of a repetition of the Dunajec success was at this time

plain.

Worst of all, from the allied point of view, there now came a

difference in opinion between the French General Staff and the French

Civil Government. The former wished to retire behind the Meuse and

evacuate the eastern forts and trenches, thereby gaining a strong

defensive line, but surrendering Verdun. The Government felt that such

a retreat would be accepted as a grave disaster, would depress the

French people, and result in a political overturn.

At the outset the general staff seems to have adhered to its view, and

for some days the German advance was steady. Even Fort Douaumont, on

the outer rim of the old permanent fortifications, was lost, and the

German press announced the fall of the city itself. But in the end the

army listened to the Government, Castelnau and Petain went to the

front to organize the defense. By the middle of March the first crisis

was about over and the French had restored their line, the most

expensive detail in their defense. But they had not been able to

retake Douaumont, and German possession was to prove a thorn in their

side thenceforth.

With the great general attack of April 9, 1916, the first phase of the

battle for Verdun was over. This check abolished all chance of a

piercing of the French lines, of a second Dunajec. It assured to the

French time to complete their second- and third-line defenses, and it

gave ample evidence that the dangers of the first hours, due to

failures and errors which cost many generals their positions, were at

an end. Above all, it demonstrated that the wonderful motor-transport

system which had been improvised had proved adequate to save a city

deprived of all railroad communications.

LATER PHASES

Still the Germans kept on. Halted on the east bank, they transferred

their attack to the west, and Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme became famous

the world over. But their advances were slight and their losses were

tremendous. French tactics were now disclosed. It was the purpose of

the French to exact the very heaviest price for each piece of ground

that they defended, but they held their lines with very small

contingents, and, save in the case of a few vital points, surrendered

the positions whenever the cost of holding them was too great.

German high command had seen its larger aims fail. Why did it continue

to assail Verdun after the chance of piercing the French lines had

passed and when the cost was so terrific? The answer is not wholly

clear, but we do know that the concentration of artillery and men had

taken months; these could not quickly be moved elsewhere. Such a

change in plans would mean the loss of several months, which would be

improved by the British and the Russians; it would give France the

"lift" of a great victory.

Conversely it was clear that, while the French lines could not be

pierced, Verdun might be taken and the moral value of the capture

would be enormous in Germany, France, and the neutral world, although

the military value would be just nothing. Again, there remained the

fair chance that the continued pressure upon France would lead the

French to ask the British to attack, and the premature attack would

spoil the allied offensive, obviously preparing.

Against this chance the Germans had massed not less than 800,000

troops along the British front. Meantime they told the world that

Verdun was exhausting France, that it was making an allied offensive

impossible, and they used their slow but considerable advances, which

resulted from the French policy of "selling" their positions at the

maximum of cost to the Germans and minimum of loss to themselves, to

convince the world that they were systematically approaching Verdun

and would take it at the proper moment.

This phase lasted from April 9, 1916, down to the opening of July.

During that time the Germans pushed out from Douaumont and captured

Vaux; they crowded up and over Dead Man's Hill and up the slope of

Hill 304; by July 1, 1916, they had pushed the French right back to

the extreme edge of the hills, on the east bank of the Meuse, and the

French were just holding the inside line of forts--Belleville,

Souville, and Tavannes--with their backs to the river and with German

trenches coming right up to the ditches of these three forts.

By July 1, 1915, the French were in their last ditch before

Verdun--that is, on the east bank--but on July 1, 1916, there began

that allied offensive at the Somme which changed the whole face of the

western operations. Thus, by August 1, 1916, the Germans had been

compelled to remove many troops from Verdun and the French were able

to take the offensive here again, and by August 6, 1916, had made

material progress in retaking portions of the ground they had "sold"

the Germans for so great a price in previous weeks.

GETTYSBURG

After the German checks in April the French compared the Verdun fight

to Gettysburg. General Delacroix used that example to me in March, but

it was not until June that General Joffre was ready to adopt it. By

this time it was well established in all minds. Gettysburg had been

the final effort of the South to win a decision on the field while

superior organization gave her advantage over a foe that had

superiority in ultimate resources, both of money and men. The failure

at Gettysburg was promptly followed by the loss of the initiative, the

North passed to the attack, and the rest of the war consisted in the

steady wearing out of the Confederacy.

A victory at Gettysburg would probably have won the Civil War for the

South. A victory of the Dunajec style might have won the Great War for

the Germans. But the victory did not come, the struggle went on for

many months, and presently the consequence of stripping the eastern

lines was disclosed in new Russian victories, while the absolute

failure to provoke a premature offensive in the west, or prevent any

offensive, was disclosed in the Battle of the Somme.

Verdun, then, was the third failure of Germany to win the war by a

major thrust. It was a failure which was wholly similar to the

failures at the Marne and in Russia. Relatively speaking, it was a far

greater failure, because it brought no incidental profit as did the

other campaigns: it won only a few square miles of storm-swept hills,

it has cost not less than 250,000 casualties, and allied statements

placed the cost at half a million. From the military, the moral, the

political points of view, Verdun was a defeat for the Germans of the

first magnitude. Conversely, the French victory filled the world with

admiration. The French success at the Marne had been won in complete

darkness, and after two years the world still has only a vague notion

of the facts of this grandiose conflict. But there never was any

possibility of concealment about Verdun. The fight was in the open,

the issue was unmistakable, and French courage and skill, French

steadiness and endurance, surprised the world once more.

THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE

While the German attack upon Verdun was still in its more prosperous

phase the Austrians delivered a wholly similar attack upon Italy.

(Vol. V, 244-264.) Precisely as the Russian defeats had enabled

Germany to turn many troops west, they had provided Austria for the

first time with reserves that could be used against Italy.

Conceivably, success would put Italy out of the war, for it was plain

Italian sentiment was wearying of the long strain of sterile

sacrifice.

For the attack the Austrians selected the Trentino district. If they

could drive their masses through the Italian lines between the Adige

and the Brenta, and enter the Venetian Plain, taking Verona and

Vicenza, all the Italian forces to the eastward along the Isonzo would

have to retreat and might be captured. At the least, Austria might

hope to carry her front to the Po and the Adige, and thus stand on the

defensive far within Italian frontiers, as Germany stood within French

frontiers.

The same artillery preparation was made here as before Verdun, the

battle opened in the same way (Vol. V, 244), and for many weeks, until

June 1, 1916, the Austrian advance was steady, and finally passed the

old frontier and actually approached the Venetian Plain about Vicenza.

(Vol. V, 260.) For the first time Austria seemed within reach of a

great victory, and Italian apprehension was great. As for the moral

effect, an Italian ministry fell because of the reverses, and many

Italian generals were retired.

[Illustration: The mobility of the French motor-mounted batteries

makes them most effective, not only in bringing down aircraft but in

strengthening the line at any point. The gun is the famous 75. The

motor in the rear carries a supply of shells.]

By June 1, 1916, the Italian situation had become critical, (Vol. V,

258), just as the French situation about Verdun became critical on

July 1, 1916. But at this point the Russian attack upon the east front

changed the whole face of affairs, and Austria was forced shortly to

abandon her offensive in Venetia and hurry her reserves eastward.

(Vol. V, 265-291.) Accordingly, in a brief time Italian troops were

advancing again and regaining the lost ground. The Verdun attack

actually failed in all but local value, the Trentino thrust was still

succeeding when it had to be abandoned, but in abandoning it Austria

confessed her great preparations and considerable sacrifices had been

vain. Compared with Verdun, it was a minor defeat; but coming with

Verdun, it was a further blow to Austro-German prestige.

GERMANY LOSES THE OFFENSIVE

At the outset of the war Germany found herself with greater numbers,

superior artillery, and possessing a mechanical efficiency surpassing

anything that war had known. She was able to mobilize more men,

transport them more quickly, and employ them more effectively than her

opponents. Her heavy artillery gave her a decisive advantage both in

the matter of enemy fortresses and enemy armies. But they did not

quite avail to give her the decisive victory she had expected.

The second year of the war revealed the enormous resources of Germany

and the incredible fashion in which her people had been disciplined

and her preparations made. The collapse of Austria and the defeat of

the Marne did not deprive her of the offensive, and the weight of her

initial blow sufficed to hold her western foes incapable of effective

action, while she reorganized Austrian resources, put new armies in

the field, and won the great battles in the Russian field, which

carried her advance to the Beresina and the Dvina.

But the Russian operation in 1914 had been sufficient to deprive her

of the troops needed to deliver the final blow in the west, and the

French, Italian, and British attacks in September, 1915, had compelled

her to stay her hand against Russia at the critical hour. When she

chose to attack France at Verdun she had always to recognize that

sooner or later Russia would again take the field, and that unless her

second blow at France had already succeeded before this time came her

position would be difficult, while if her blow at France did not

suffice to prevent an allied offensive in the west, she might at last

have to fight a defensive war on both fronts.

Hitherto she had been able to fight offensively on one front while

holding on the other. Hitherto she had been able to move her reserves

from one front to the other whenever the need was urgent. She reckoned

that Russia would be incapable of a real offensive in 1916; she

reckoned that Britain would not be able to train her armies for

effective action in the same year, and she gambled on the probability

that her blows at Verdun would dispose of France. In addition, she

reckoned the Austrian attack upon Italy would dispose of Italian

threats for the summer.

But long before the war Bernhardi had foretold a German defeat in her

next conflict if all her foes were able to get their forces into the

field at one time, and Germany should fail to dispose of at least one

of her enemies before all were ready. It is not the time or the place

to assert that what Bernhardi forecast has now come true, but it is

clear that Germany, temporarily or permanently, as it may prove, lost

the initiative following her defeat at Verdun, that she was compelled

to accept the defensive on all fronts by July, and that up to the date

this article is written, August 8, 1916, she has been losing ground on

all fronts.

THE RUSSIAN ATTACK

Very briefly, now, in the remaining space allowed me, I purpose to

discuss the remarkable change in the whole face of the war that had

come by the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict. The

first authentic sign of this change was the great Russian success in

Volhynia and Galicia about June 1, 1916. (Vol. V, 154.) As far back as

February Russian successes in Asia Minor had suggested that the

Russian army was regaining power and receiving adequate munitions. The

captures of Erzerum and Trebizond were a warning that deserved, but

did not earn, attention in Berlin and the British failure and

surrender at Kut-el-Amara served to obscure the Eastern situation.

(Vol. V, 318-326.)

[Illustration: The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916. Shaded section

shows ground gained, June to September.]

But about June 1, 1916, Russia suddenly stepped out and assailed the

whole Austro-German line with fire and steel. The weight of the blow

fell between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian frontier. From this

front Germany had drawn many troops to aid in her Verdun operation,

Austria had made similar drafts to swell her forces attacking Italy.

Too late Berlin and Vienna realized that they had weakened their line

beyond the danger point and had hopelessly underestimated the

recuperative power of the Slav.

By July 1, 1916, the magnitude of the Russian success was no longer

hidden from German or Austrian. An advance of over forty miles in the

north threatened Kovel and Lemberg, twice as extensive an advance in

the south had reconquered Bukowina (Vol. V, 162-182), brought Cossacks

to the Carpathians, and threatened Lemberg from the south. (Vol. V,

192-198.) Lutsk (Vol. V, 159), Dubno (Vol. V, 163), and Czernowitz

(Vol. V, 162) had been taken, Kolomea and Stanislau were threatened

and were soon to fall. Upward of 400,000 prisoners were claimed by the

Russians, whose estimates of prisoners had hitherto proved reliable;

guns, supplies, munitions had been captured in incredible amounts, and

an Austrian collapse like to that of Lemberg seemed at hand.

In this situation Germany, seemingly on the point of taking Verdun,

had to turn her attention toward the east and direct new troops and

new reserves of munitions and guns to Volhynia and Galicia to save

Lemberg. (Vol. V, 198.) This effort was temporarily successful, and

July saw the Russian sweep slowing down, although by no means halted.

(Vol. V, 207-212.) Since the German victory at the Dunajec there had

been no such single success, and save for the Russian victory at

Lemberg, the Allies had won no such offensive victory.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

But on July 1, 1916, just as the Russian drive was slowing down and

while Germany was straining every nerve to meet the eastern crisis,

the French and British along the Somme suddenly broke out in a

terrific attack over twenty miles of front. The French rapidly

approached Peronne, the British more slowly by steadily moving toward

Bapaume. Here was the answer to the German assertion that Verdun had

exhausted France and made an allied offensive in the west impossible.

It was as complete a refutation of reckonings for the west as the

Russian victory had been of the German calculations for the east.

And after six weeks the Somme drive is continuing, slowly, but

steadily, actually recalling in every detail the slow but steady

advance of the Germans before Verdun. Meantime about Verdun itself a

new operation has begun, the Germans have been forced to recall troops

to use at the Somme and the French, passing to the offensive, have

temporarily, at least, retaken much ground and abolished the grave

danger that existed on July 1, 1915, when they stood in their last

ditch, with the river at their backs.

GORIZIA

The Russian blow had fallen in the first days of June, 1916; the

Anglo-French attack had opened in the early days of July, 1916; now,

in the first week of August, 1916, Italy suddenly launched against the

Gorizia bridgehead, the gateway into Austria between the sea and the

Julian Alps, which recalls in a grandiose fashion the Spartan position

at Thermopylae, the most considerable and the most successful military

effort in modern Italian history.

[Illustration: Austro-italian Campaigns, May to September, 1916. Lined

section shows ground gained by the Austrians in May and June, 1916.

Dotted section shows ground gained by Italians in August, 1916.]

On a front of thirty miles from the Alps to the Adriatic, their flanks

secured by the mountains and the sea, the Austrians had erected a

formidable system of trenches which closed the Italian road to Austria

and to Trieste, twenty miles to the south. (Vol. V, 288-290.) Monte

Sabotino on the north, Podgora Hill in the center, Monte San Michele

on the south at the edge of the Carso Plateau were the main features

of this position, and Gorizia lay in the cuplike valley of the Wippach

behind Podgora.

After some days of bombardment, first directed at the whole front and

then concentrated upon Sabotino and San Michele, the Italians swept

forward, took both hills, turned the Austrians out of Podgora and

Gorizia, took 15,000 prisoners and a vast booty of guns and munitions.

They had completed the first phase of their task by August 7, 1916. It

remained to be seen--and it remains to be seen now on August 15, 1916,

when these lines are written--whether they will get Trieste and force

the Austrians back from the whole position between the Adriatic and

the Alps. If they do, then an invasion of Austria on a wide front will

be inevitable; if they fail, they will have won a great local victory

and made a new draft upon Austrian man power.

Finally, in the Balkans a great Anglo-French-Serb army is standing

before Saloniki (Vol. V, 212-215), only waiting until Germany shall

have recalled her troops from the Peninsula and Austria summoned back

her contingents to strike the Bulgarians and strive to reopen the road

from the AEgean to Belgrade, thus cutting the railroad that binds

Berlin to Byzantium and the Osmanli to the Teuton. Similarly the

victorious Russians have passed Erzingan in Asia Minor (Vol. V, 337),

completed the conquest of Armenia, and are pushing on toward Sivas and

the Bagdad railroad. (Vol. V, 335-339.)

AS THE THIRD YEAR BEGINS

For the first time since the war broke out Germany and her allies are

everywhere on the defensive, and everywhere they have been and are

ceding ground. Their enemies, imperfectly prepared two years ago, are

now the rivals of Germany in preparation; England has millions of men

where she had hundreds of thousands in August, 1914; France and

Britain both have heavy artillery, and Russia is demonstrating her

wealth of munitions and her resources in men. Such is the great

transition that has come as the third year of the Great War begins.

Conceivably, Germany may still be able to forge a new thunderbolt, to

pass to the offensive again, and win the war; conceivably she can hold

her present lines until the fury of the Allies abates and losses and

economic strain impose a drawn battle and a peace without victory for

any contestant. But all these considerations are for the future. What

it is now important to recognize is that the three great efforts of

Germany to win the war in the Napoleonic fashion have failed. She has

had neither an Austerlitz, a Jena, nor a Friedland. She has instead

the Marne, Verdun, and the Russian failure. She has failed to

eliminate any one of her great foes as Napoleon eliminated, first

Austria, then Prussia, and then Russia. She has failed to win the war

while she had superior numbers, incomparably greater resources in

equipment, and unrivaled supremacy in artillery. She is outnumbered,

outgunned, and her foes control the sea and possess vastly greater

resources in money than she can boast.

The parallel of Napoleon before Leipzig, of the Confederacy after

Gettysburg, is in many men's minds to-day. But it is for the future to

disclose whether the parallel be true or false. What is clear as the

third year of the war opens is that all three of Germany's major

conceptions have gone wrong; all three of her great campaigns have

failed to accomplish their main purpose, and that, as a consequence,

Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts for the first time in

the war.

A moment ago I mentioned Bernhardi's words. Perhaps they will serve as

the best comment with which to close this review. The quotation is

from his book, "On War of To-day":

"If at some future time Germany is involved in the slowly threatening

war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her

enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely

on being successful if she is resolutely determined to break the

superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or the other of them

before their total strength can come into action, and if she prepares

for war to that effect, and acts at the decisive moment in _that_

spirit which made the great Prussian king once seize the sword against

a world in arms."

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR

Statements from the British, French, and German Ambassadors to the

United States

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1916.

DEAR SIR:

I beg to acknowledge with thanks your courteous invitation to my

government to make a statement concerning the war on the occasion of

the second anniversary of its outbreak.

My government fully appreciates your kindness and courtesy in placing

at its service the Review which has already contributed to such an

honourable extent to the world's knowledge of the great events which

are now passing before us. Had the policy of my government undergone

any change since the war's commencement I have no doubt that a

statement explaining such a change would have been issued. But the

policy of the British government is now what it was when the war first

began under circumstances with which your readers are entirely

familiar. To quote Sir Edward Grey's words: "Is there anyone who

thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on without

eternal disgrace?"

Yours faithfully,

CECIL SPRING RICE.

The Editor

_Collier's Weekly_,

NEW YORK.

AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE AUX ETATS-UNIS

WASHINGTON, le July 10, 1916.

DEAR SIR:

I had not failed to forward to my Government your request for a

statement concerning the war on the occasion of its impending second

anniversary.

I am instructed to convey to you, in answer, the expression of the

Prime Minister's regret at his inability to comply with the wish of a

review so honorably known as _Collier's Weekly_. The case of France is

so plain that it is not felt there can be need for explanations, much

less for pleadings; and it is enough to refer to public documents.

They show how that war, which France had done her utmost to prevent,

was declared on her by the Germans on the 3rd of August, 1914, for

such frivolous motives as a shelling by her aeros of places as distant

as Nurenberg: an imaginary deed of which she never dreamt, which she

has never been able to duplicate, and which an inspection of the local

newspapers has proved to have passed unmentioned by them and unnoticed

by the inhabitants. As she was considered a prey to be dealt with at

once and at all cost, the invasion of her territory was effected

through Belgium, and that invasion, entailing on the Belgian and

French populations untold misery, still continues.

It still continues; not for very long, a day will soon dawn which will

be the day of Justice.

I have the honor to be, dear Sir,

Sincerely yours,

JUSSERAND.

The Editor

_Collier's Weekly_,

NEW YORK.

KAISERLICH DEUTSCHE BOTSCHAFT

GERMAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

NEW YORK, August 28, 1916.

P. F. COLLIER & SON,

Publishers.

DEAR SIRS:

With reference to previous conversations I beg to send you the

enclosed statement for the "Story of the Great War". It has been

written by Baron Mumm von Schwarzenstein, former Ambassador to Japan,

now attached to the Foreign Office in Berlin.

Yours very sincerely,

F. BERNSTORFF.

WHAT HAS GERMANY ACHIEVED IN TWO YEARS OF WAR?

In order to appreciate what Germany has accomplished during two years

of war, one has to recall to mind the great expectations which her

enemies had attached to this war, into which their powerful coalition,

after years of political scheming and thorough military preparations,

had enmeshed the prosperous Empire.

At the outset, the avowed purpose of Germany's enemies was to

annihilate her,--her army, her fleet, her commerce and her industry.

France hoped to regain Alsace Lorraine and the western bank of the

Rhine. Russia expected to gratify her desire for territorial expansion

by conquering the provinces of East and West Prussia and Posen, which

probably were to receive the blessings of Russian culture.

Austria-Hungary was to be dismembered; the Balkan states were to be

rendered tributary to the Czar; Constantinople and the Dardanelles

were to be added to the Romanoff's dominions. As for England, she

deliberately entered this war because she thought that she would run

small risk in helping to bring the war to a speedy termination.

The world will remember the vainglorious way in which Germany's

enemies foretold that before long their armies would meet in the heart

of Germany, where Cossacks would parade the streets of Berlin and

Indian lancers and Gurkhas would stroll through the parks of Potsdam.

The German fleet, it was asserted, would be at the bottom of the sea

before it had time to think. When this fond hope was not realized, the

German fleet was to be dug out like a rat of a rat-hole. In their

expectations our enemies saw German industry ruined. Germany was soon

to be paralyzed, nay, would soon be passing away.

Such were the expectations of the enemies, attacking us from all

sides. Germany was drawn into a war of self-defense. Her fight is a

fight for national existence. And to-day how do matters stand?

Have the hopes and plots of our enemies been realized? Has Germany

successfully fought her war of self-defense or has she not?

Excepting one small corner of the Empire, the only enemy soldiers on

German soil are vast numbers of prisoners of war. The war is fought on

enemy soil. Germany and her allies occupy three independent kingdoms.

They hold vast areas of enemy territory in east and west. They hold

these territories firmly and without fear of losing them by force of

arms.

Consider the efforts that our enemies have made on the west front. In

their unsuccessful attempts at Loos and in Champagne last autumn they

suffered terrible losses and made no headway. In the spring Germany

took up the offensive against Verdun. Step by step, and with but small

losses, we are steadily gaining ground; the French positions, although

defended with desperate courage, are crumbling away one by one.

Thanks to the genius of Hindenburg, East Germany is no longer

threatened by Russia. Last year, in cooperation with our valiant

ally, Austria-Hungary, we drove back the Russians, overwhelming their

armies as well as their strongholds. We took possession of Courland,

Lithuania and Poland. For the last two months, it is true, the

Russians have resumed the offensive. But, although they have gained

considerable local advantages at terrible cost, they have not

succeeded in breaking through our lines.

Even at the very moment when our enemies, after months of careful

preparation, seek to bring to bear their greatest possible pressure on

both German fronts they attain nothing but terrible losses. They

achieve but little substantial gain. They have in no material way

deranged our general position on the western front. The tide has

turned again. Our enemies will probably realize in time that they are

biting on granite and that partial successes will sooner or later lead

to their exhaustion without materially changing the military

situation. To-day Germany awaits the outcome of the present combined

offensive of the Allies with calmness and confidence. Then her turn

may come once more. The Allies have been rejoicing over the collapse

of Germany. They have repeatedly and positively prophesied it.

Repeatedly it has been postponed. It seems now as if it would have to

be adjourned _ad Kalendas Graecas_.

Last autumn the world saw the rapid conquest of Serbia and Montenegro

by German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. The result was the

establishment of direct communication between Berlin and Bagdad. Who

can underestimate the political, military and economic importance of

this feat to Germany and to her allies?

Bulgaria joined the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey

because she realized that theirs was to be the ultimate victory. The

four Central Powers form a solid and powerful political combination;

they adjoin each other and are bound together by economic interests.

Let us now consider the naval situation. Instead of the German fleet

being at the bottom of the sea, considerably more British than German

men-of-war find themselves in that position. Since the great battle of

the Skagerrak, where the German High Sea Fleet successfully fought

against the entire British Grand Fleet, the British losses have

increased alarmingly. The German Navy is young, but it has proved its

merit; more than that, it has proved that the proud British fleet is

by no means invincible. Our submarines have shown to the world that

Germany possesses a powerful weapon against England, even though, out

of consideration for neutral interests, this arm of her navy has not

yet been fully tested against the illegal methods adopted by England

in her effort to starve Germany's entire civilian population. The

exploits of the _Emden_, the _Moewe_ and the _Appam_ are still fresh

in everybody's memory. To them can now be added the achievements of

the submersible _Deutschland_, by means of which we have begun to

resume our trade relations with the United States despite the

so-called British blockade.

For two years we have been fighting for the freedom of the seas.

Doubtless, Great Britain's sea power, which has caused us the loss of

our distant colonies and the suspension of most of our maritime trade,

is not yet broken. Nevertheless, to-day British prestige is not what

it used to be.

British sea power has caused Germany and the neutral nations of the

world many inconveniences, and it will no doubt continue to do so

until the end of the war. But we know that this will not advance our

enemies' cause. Victory does not lie this way. Germany has learned to

live on her resources during the war. All the raw materials necessary

for her economic life she produces herself. For such as are not

accessible at present, she has found substitutes. Our food supply is

ample for the maintenance of our military forces as well as for our

civilian population. The skillfully organized distribution of food,

recently introduced, will enable us to hold out in spite of the

British blockade, even if our harvest, which promises to be excellent,

should not come up to our expectations.

Looking back upon her achievements during the last two years, Germany

enters into the third year of the war with unaltered confidence in her

final triumph. Germany is willing to terminate this terrible

bloodshed, she is willing to make an honorable peace on condition that

her legitimate interests are safeguarded; but she is prepared to

continue the struggle with the same dogged determination that she has

manifested up to now, since her enemies are still virtually resolved

to annihilate her, even if, for appearance's sake, they have of late

somewhat modified their war aims by declaring that they merely intend

to wipe out what they call German "Militarism."

Germany is fighting against the greatest odds known in history. She is

not only fighting against the most powerful combination of enemies,

but at the same time has to contend with a world of prejudice,

skillfully created against her, as well as with lukewarmness toward

our enemies' tyranny on the part of the neutral nations. Sometimes we

wonder at this; but unerringly we go on fighting for our cause.