group of ruined walls, above which rose a rough pile of broken masonry
that represented the village church. The Germans who occupied trench
lines on the southern side had shattered the British trenches opposite
Mametz so completely that the British infantry were forced to advance
over open ground.
CHAPTER L
THE FRENCH ATTACKS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE SOMME
From the hamlet of Vaux, ruined by German artillery, on the right bank
of the Somme, part of the battle field, with the configuration of a
long crest, looks like a foaming sea stretching away to the horizon.
Against the whitish yellow background the woods resolve into dark
patches and the quarries into vast geometric figures. In the valley
the Somme zigzags among the poplars; its marshy bed is covered with
rushes and aquatic plants; on the left stand crumbled walls
surrounding an orchard whose trees were shattered by German shells.
This is the mill of Fargny through which the French line passes. A
little beyond at a place called Chapeau-de-Gendarme was the first
German trench, and farther still in the valley stands the village of
Curlu, its surrounding gardens occupied by Bavarian troops. To the
eastward, half hidden by the trees, a glimpse could be had of the
walls of the village of Hem. In the distance a solitary church spire
marked the site of Peronne, a fortress surrounded by its moat of three
streams.
General Foch had planned his advance in the same methodical manner as
the British command. At half past 7 on the morning of July 1, 1916,
the French infantry dashed forward to assault the German trenches.
During a period of nearly two years the Germans had been allowed
leisure to strongly fortify their positions. At different points there
were two, three and four lines of trenches bounded by deep ditches,
with the woods and the village of Curlu organized for defense. But the
magnificent driving power of the French infantry carried all before
it, and by a single dash they overran and captured the foremost German
works. Mounting the steep ascent of the height that is called
Chapeau-de-Gendarme the young soldiers of the class of 1916, who then
and there received their baptism of fire, waved their hats and
handkerchiefs and shouted "Vive la France!"
The French troops had reached the first houses of the village of Curlu
occupied by Bavarian troops, who offered a most stubborn resistance.
Machine guns and mitrailleuses, which the French bombardment had not
destroyed, appeared suddenly on the roofs of houses, in the ventholes
of the cellars, and in every available opening.
The French infantry, obedient to the orders they had received, at once
stopped their advance and crouched on the ground while the French
artillery recommenced a terrible bombardment of the village. In about
half an hour most of the houses in the place had been razed to the
ground, and the enemy guns were silenced. This time without pause the
French infantry went forward and Curlu was captured without a single
casualty. The Germans later attempted a counterattack, but the village
remained in French hands.
There were found in the ruined houses a large number of packages which
had been put together by the Bavarians, consisting of articles of
dress, pieces of furniture, household ornaments, and a great variety
of objects stolen from the inhabitants of the village. The sudden
attack of the French troops did not allow the Bavarians time to
escape with their loot.
During the three days that followed the French were entirely occupied
with organizing and consolidating the positions they had conquered.
At 7 a. m. on July 5, 1916, they began a fresh offensive. In a few
hours' fighting the village of Hem and all the surrounding trenches
had been captured. About noon the few houses in the village to which
the Germans had clung tenaciously were evacuated.
Thanks to the prudence of the French command and the wisdom of their
plans and the rapidity with which the attack had been carried out, the
casualties were less than had been anticipated and out of all
proportion to the value of the conquered positions.
While the French were thus forcing the pace and winning successes
north of the Somme, their brothers in arms south of the river were
carrying out some important operations with neatness and dispatch.
In this area the French launched their attack on July 1, 1916, at 9.30
a. m., on a front of almost ten kilometers from the village of Frise
to a point opposite the village of Estrees.
Here it was that a Colonial corps that had especially distinguished
itself during the war delivered an assault that was entirely
successful. The Germans were taken by surprise. The French captured
German officers engaged in the act of shaving or making their toilet
in the dugouts; whole battalions were rounded up, and all this was
done with the minimum of loss. One French regiment had only two
casualties, and the total for one division was 800. The villages of
Dompierre, Becquincourt, and Bussu were in French hands before
nightfall, and about five miles had been gouged out of the German
front. Southward the Bretons of the Thirty-fifth Corps, splendid
fighters all, had captured Fay. Between them the Allies had captured
on this day the enemy's first position without a break, a front of
fourteen miles stretching from Mametz to Fay. They had taken about
6,000 prisoners and a vast quantity of guns and military stores.
On July 2, 1916, the French infantry attacked the village of Frise,
and by noon the Germans were forced to evacuate the place. Here the
French captured a battery of seventy-sevens which the enemy had not
had time to destroy. Pushing rapidly on, the French took the wood of
Mereaucourt. The village of Herbecourt, a little more to the south,
was captured by the French after an hour's fighting. By early dark the
entire group of German defenses was taken, thus linking Herbecourt to
the village of Assevillers.
Between this last place and the river they broke into the German
second position. Fayolle's left now commanded the light railway from
Combles to Peronne, his center held the great loop of the Somme at
Frise village, while his right was only four miles from Peronne
itself.
During the day of July 3, 1916, the French continued their victorious
advance, capturing Assevillers and Flaucourt. During the night their
cavalry advanced as far as the village of Barleux, which was strongly
held by the Germans. On the day following, July 4, 1916, the Foreign
Legion of the Colonial Corps had taken Belloy-en-Santerre, a point in
the third line. On July 5, 1916, the Thirty-fifth Corps occupied the
greater part of Estrees and were only three miles distant from
Peronne.
The Germans attempted several counterattacks, aided by their
Seventeenth Division, which had been hurried to support, but these
were futile, and finally the German railhead was moved from Peronne to
Chaulnes.
There followed a few days' pause, employed by the French in
consolidating their gains and in minor operations. On the night of
July 9, 1916, the French commander Fayolle took the village of
Biaches, only a mile from Peronne. The German losses had been very
great since the beginning of the French offensive, and at this place
an entire regiment was destroyed. On July 10, 1916, the French
succeeded in reaching La Maisonette, the highest point in that part of
the country, and held a front from there to Barleux--a position beyond
the third German line. In this sector nothing now confronted Fayolle
but the line of the upper Somme, south of the river. North of the
stream some points in the second line had been won, but it had been
only partly carried northward from Hem.
The French attacks north and south of the Somme had at all points won
their objectives and something more. In less than two weeks Fayolle
had, on a front ten miles long and having a maximum depth of six and a
half miles, carried fifty square miles of territory, containing
military works, trenches, and fortified villages. The French had also
captured a large amount of booty which included 85 cannon, some of the
largest size, 100 mitrailleuses, 26 "Minenwerfer," and stores of
ammunition and war material. They took prisoner 236 officers and
12,000 men.
It might well be said that this was a very splendid result. But it
only marked the first stage in the French assault.
The measured and sustained regularity of this advance, the precision
and order of the entire maneuver, are deserving of a more detailed
description. If we examine what might be called its strategic
mechanism, it will be noted that south of the Somme the French line
turned with its left on a pivot placed at its right in front of
Estrees.
The longer the battle continued the more this turning movement became
accentuated. On July 3, 1916, the extreme left advanced from Mericourt
to Buscourt, the left from Herbecourt to Flaucourt, which was taken,
while the center occupied Assevillers.
On the 4th the right, abandoning in its turn the role of fixed point,
moved forward and took the two villages of Estrees and Belloy. Thus in
the first four days of July, 1916, the French forces operating south
of the Somme constantly marched with the left in advance.
After a pause for rest and to consolidate positions won, the attack
was again resumed by the left wing on the 9th, and carried before
Peronne, Biaches, and La Maisonette.
It will be seen by this outline of operations that the maneuver, which
began early in an easterly direction, developed into a movement toward
the south. The object as stated in the official communique was to
clear the interior of the angle of the Somme and to cover the right of
the French troops operating north of the river. This delicate maneuver
involved great difficulty and risk, inasmuch as the French right
flank became the target for an enfilading fire from the south. By
consulting the map it will be seen that the artillery positions south
of Villers direct an enfilading fire on the plateau of Flaucourt and
points near by. The French General Staff showed keen foresight in
parrying this danger by advancing the right at the proper moment.
By these operations the French had reached the actual suburbs of the
old fortified city of Peronne, occupying a strong strategic position
above the angle made by the Somme between Bray and Ham.
It is a natural and necessary road of passage for all armies coming
from the north or south that want to cross the river. Bluecher in his
pursuit of the French armies after the Battle of Waterloo crossed the
Somme exactly at this point.
As a matter of fact at this time both adversaries were astride of the
river, the Allies facing the east and the Germans facing toward the
west. It is interesting to note that this is exactly the situation
that prevailed in the war of 1870, but with the roles reversed. At
that time the Germans were attacking Peronne as the French forces were
attacking it in July, 1916; they came, however, from the direction of
Amiens, precisely as the French came on this occasion.
The French, on the other hand, were in the positions of the
Germans--they came from the north. The army of Faidherbe had its bases
at Lille and Cambrai as the Crown Prince of Bavaria had his in the
present war.
CHAPTER LI
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED)
The British captured the fortified villages of Mametz and Montauban on
July 1, 1916. This success, as will have been noted, put the British
right wing well in advance of their center; and to make the gap in the
German position uniform over a broad enough front it was necessary to
move forward the left part of the British line from Thiepval to
Fricourt. At this time the extreme British left was inactive, in the
circumstances it seemed doubtful that a new attack would be
profitable, so what was left of the advanced guard of the Ulster
Division retired from the Schwaben Redoubt to its original line. The
front had now become too large for a single commander to manage
successfully, so to General Hubert Gough of the Reserve, or Fifth
Army, was given the ground north of the Albert-Bapaume road, including
the area of the Fourth and Eighth Corps.
Sunday, July 2, 1916, was a day of steady heat and blinding dust, and
the troops suffered severely. At Ovillers and La Boiselle the Third
Corps sustained all day long a desperate struggle. Two new divisions
which had been brought forward to support now joined the fighting. One
of these divisions successfully carried the trenches before Ovillers
and the other in the night penetrated the ruins of the village of La
Boiselle.
The Germans had evidently not recovered from their surprise in the
south, for no counterattacks were attempted, nor had any reserve
divisions been brought to their support. Throughout the long, stifling
July day squadrons of Allied aeroplanes were industriously bombing
depots and lines of communication back of the German front. The
much-lauded Fokkers were flitting here and there, doing little damage.
Two were sent to earth by Allied airmen before the day was over. The
Allies had a great number of kite balloons ("sausages") in the air,
but only one belonging to the Germans was in evidence.
With the capture of Mametz and positions in Fricourt Wood to the east,
Fricourt could not hold out, and about noon on July 2, 1916, the place
was in British hands. Evidently the Germans had anticipated the fall
of the village, for a majority of the garrison had escaped during the
night. But when the British entered the village, bombing their way
from building to building, they captured Germans in sufficiently large
numbers to make the victory profitable.
On Monday, July 3, 1916, General von Below issued an order to his
troops which showed that the German officers appreciated the
seriousness of the Allied offensive:
[Illustration: The English Gains.]
"The decisive issue of the war depends on the victory of the Second
Army on the Somme. We must win this battle in spite of the enemy's
temporary superiority in artillery and infantry. The important ground
lost in certain places will be recaptured by our attack after the
arrival of reenforcements. The vital thing is to hold on to our
present positions at all costs and to improve them. I forbid the
voluntary evacuation of trenches. The will to stand firm must be
impressed on every man in the army. The enemy should have to carve his
way over heaps of corpses...."
To understand the exact position of the British forces on July 3,
1916, the alignment of the new front must be described in detail.
The first section extended from Thiepval to Fricourt, between which
the Albert-Bapaume road ran in a straight line over the watershed.
Thiepval, Ovillers, and La Boiselle were positions in the German front
line. East of the last place the fortified village of Contalmaison
occupied high ground, forming as it were a pivot in the German
intermediate line covering their field guns.
The British second position ran through Pozieres to the two Bazentins
and as far as Guillemont. Thiepval and Ovillers had not yet been
taken, and only a portion of La Boiselle, but the British had broken
through the first position south of that place and had pushed well
along on the road to Contalmaison. This northern section had been
transformed by warfare into a scene of desolation, bare, and
forbidding, seamed with trenches and pitted with shell holes. The few
trees along the roads had been razed--the only vegetation to be seen
being coarse grass and weeds and thistles.
The southern section between Fricourt and Montauban presented a more
inviting prospect. A line of woods extended from the first village in
a northeasterly direction, a second line running from Montauban around
Longueval. In this sector all the German first positions had been
captured. The second position ran through a heavily wooded country and
the villages of the Bazentins, Longueval, and Guillemont.
During the night of July 2, 1916, the British had penetrated La
Boiselle, and throughout the following day the battle raged around
that place and Ovillers. The fighting was of the most desperate
character, every foot of ground being contested by the opposing
forces. The struggle seesawed back and forth, here and there the
Germans gaining a little ground, only to lose it a little later when a
vigorous British attack forced them to fall back, and so the tide of
battle ebbed and flowed.
On July 4, 1916, the heat wave was broken by violent thunderstorms and
a heavy rain that transformed the dusty terrain into quagmires,
through which Briton and German fought on with undiminished spirit and
equal valor. On the morning of July 5, 1916, the British, after one of
the bloodiest struggles in this sector, captured La Boiselle and
carried forward their attack toward Bailiff Wood and Contalmaison.
In the five days' fighting since they assumed the offensive the
British had been hard hit at some points, but at others had registered
substantial gains. They had captured a good part of the German first
line and carried by assault strongly fortified villages defended
stubbornly by valiant troops. The total number of prisoners taken by
the British was by this time more than 5,000. These first engagements
had for the British one exceedingly important result: it gave to the
troops an absolute confidence in their fighting powers. They had shown
successfully that they could measure themselves with the best soldiers
of the kaiser and beat them.
During the day of July 5, 1916, the British repulsed several
counterattacks and fortified the ground that they had already won. On
this date Horseshoe Trench, the main defense of Contalmaison from the
west, was attacked, and here a battalion of West Yorks fought with
distinction and succeeded in making a substantial advance.
There was a pause in the fighting during the day of July 6, 1916, as
welcome to the Germans as to the British, for some rest was
imperative.
On Friday, July 7, 1916, the British began an attack on Contalmaison
from Sausage Valley on the southwest, and from the labyrinth of copses
north of Fricourt through which ran the Contalmaison-Fricourt
highroad.
South of Thiepval there was a salient which the Germans had organized
and strongly fortified during twenty months' preparation. After a
violent bombardment the British attacked and captured this formidable
stronghold. More to the south they took German trenches on the
outskirts of Ovillers.
The attack ranged from the Leipzig Redoubt and the environs of
Ovillers to the skirts of Contalmaison. After an intense bombardment
the British infantry advanced on Contalmaison and on the right from
two points of the wood. Behind them the German barrage fire, beating
time methodically, entirely hid from view the attacking columns.
By noon the British infantry, having carried Bailiff Wood by storm,
captured the greater part of Contalmaison. There they found a small
body of British soldiers belonging to the Northumberland Fusiliers who
had been made prisoners by the Germans a few days before and were
penned up in a shelter in the village. The British were opposed by the
Third Prussian Guard Division--the famous "Cockchafers"--who lost 700
men as prisoners during the attack. In the afternoon of the same day,
July 7, 1916, the Germans delivered a strong counterattack, and the
British, unable to secure reenforcements, and not strong enough to
maintain the position, were forced out of the village, though able to
keep hold of the southern corner.
On the following day, July 8, 1916, the British struggled for the
possession of Ovillers, now a conglomeration of shattered trenches,
shell holes and ruined walls. Every yard of ground was fought over
with varying fortunes by the combatants. While this stubborn fight was
under way the British were driving out the Germans from their
fortified positions among the groves and copses around Contalmaison,
and consolidating their gains.
In the night of July 10, 1916, the British, advancing from Bailiff
Wood on the west side of Contalmaison, pressed forward in four
successive waves, their guns pouring a flood of shells before them,
and breaking into the northwest corner, and after a desperate
hand-to-hand conflict, during which prodigies of valor were performed
on both sides, drove out the Germans and occupied the entire village.
The victory had not been won without considerable cost in casualties.
The British captured 189 prisoners, including a commander of a
battalion.
Ovillers, where the most violent fighting had raged for some days,
continued to hold out, though surrounded and cut off from all relief
from the outside. Knowing this the German garrison still fought on,
and it was not until July 16, 1916, that the brave remnant consisting
of two officers and 124 guardsmen surrendered.
We now turn to the British operations in the southern sector where
they were trying to clear out the fortified woods that intervened
between them and the German second line.
On July 3, 1916, the ground east of Fricourt Wood was clear of Germans
and the way opened to Mametz Wood. During the day the Germans
attempted a counterattack, and incidentally the British enjoyed "a
good time." A fresh German division had just arrived at Montauban,
which received such a cruel welcome from the British guns that it must
have depressed their fighting spirit. East of Mametz a battalion from
the Champagne front appeared and was destroyed, or made prisoner, a
short time after detraining at the railhead. The British took a
thousand prisoners within a small area of this sector. An eyewitness
describes seeing 600 German prisoners being led to the rear by three
ragged soldiers of a Scotch regiment "like pipers at the head of a
battalion."
The British entered the wood of Mametz to the north of Mametz village
on July 4, 1916, and captured the wood of Barnafay. These positions
were not carried without stiff fighting, for the Germans had fortified
the woods in every conceivable manner. Machine-gun redoubts connected
by hidden trenches were everywhere, even in the trees there were
machine guns, while the thick bushes and dense undergrowth impeded
every movement. In such a jungle the fighting was largely a matter of
hand-to-hand conflicts. The German guns were well served, and every
position won by the British was at once subjected to a heavy
counterbombardment. Indeed from July 4, 1916, onward, there was
scarcely any cessation to the German fire on the entire British front,
and around Fricourt, Mametz, and Montauban in the background.
On July 7, 1916, the British General Staff informed the French high
command that they would make an attack on Trones Wood on the following
morning, asking for their cooperation. Assisted by the flanking fire
of the French guns, the British penetrated Trones Wood, and obtained a
foothold there, seizing a line of trenches and capturing 130 prisoners
and several mitrailleuses. On the same day the French on the British
right were pushing forward toward Maltzhorn Farm.
Trones Wood which for some days was to be the scene of the hottest
fighting in the southern British sector, is triangular in form and
about 1,400 meters in length, running north and south. Its southern
side is about forty meters. The Germans directed against it a violent
bombardment with shells of every caliber.
Owing to its peculiar position every advantage was in favor of the
defense. Maltzhorn Ridge commanded the southern part, and the German
position at Longueval commanded the northern portion. The German
second line in a semicircle extended around the wood north and east,
and as the covert was heavy, organized movement was impossible while
the German artillery had free play.
The British, however, continued to advance slowly and stubbornly from
the southern point where they had obtained a foothold, but it was not
until the fire of the German guns had been diverted by pressure
elsewhere that they were able to make any appreciable gains on their
way northward.
On July 9, 1916, at 8 o'clock the Germans launched desperate
counterattacks directed from the east to the southeast. The first
failed; the second succeeded in landing them in the southern part of
the wood, but they were ultimately repulsed with heavy losses. During
the night there was a fresh German attack strongly delivered that was
broken by British fire. Of the six counterattacks delivered by the
Germans between Sunday night and Monday afternoon, July 9-10, 1916,
the last enabled them to gain some ground in the wood, but it was at
a heavy cost. They did not long enjoy even this small success, for on
Tuesday, July 11, 1916, the British had recaptured the entire wood
excepting a small portion in the extreme northern corner.
On the same date the British advanced to the north end of Mametz Wood,
and by evening of July 12, 1916, had captured virtually the whole of
it, gathering in some hundreds of German prisoners in the operation.
The place had not been easily won, for while the whole wood did not
comprise more than two hundred acres or so, there was a perfect
network of trenches and apparently miles of barbed-wire entanglements,
while machine guns were everywhere. It was only after the British
succeeded in clearing out machine-gun positions on the north side, and
enfiladed every advance, that they were able to get through the wood
and to face at last the main German second position. This ran, as will
have been noted, from Pozieres through the Bazentins and Longueval to
Guillemont. The capture of Contalmaison was a necessary preliminary to
the next stage of the British advance. After the fall of this place
Sir Douglas Haig issued a summary of the first of the gains made by
the Allies since the beginning of the offensive:
"After ten days and nights of continuous fighting our troops have
completed the methodical capture of the whole of the enemy's first
system of defense on a front of 14,000 yards. This system of defense
consisted of numerous and continuous lines of fire trenches, extending
to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000 yards and included five
strongly fortified villages, numerous heavily wired and intrenched
woods, and a large number of immensely strong redoubts. The capture of
each of these trenches represented an operation of some importance,
and the whole of them are now in our hands."
General Haig's summary of what had been accomplished in the first
stage of the battle of the Somme was modest in its claims. The British
had failed in the north from Thiepval to Gommecourt, but in the south
they had cut their way through almost impregnable defenses and now
occupied a strong position that promised well for the next offensive.
At the close of the first phase of the battle the number of prisoners
in the hands of the British had risen to 7,500. The French had
captured 11,000. The vigor with which the offensive had been pushed by
the Allies caused the Germans to bring forward the bulk of their
reserves, but they were unable to check the advance and lost heavily.
CHAPTER LII
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
British commanders are methodical and believe in preparing thoroughly
before an attack, but they are ready at times to take a gambler's
chance if the moment seems opportune to win by striking the enemy a
sudden and unexpected blow.
At half past three in the morning of July 14, 1916, the British
started an attack with full knowledge of the risk involved, but hoping
to find the Germans poorly prepared. At Contalmaison Villa and Mametz
Wood they held positions within a few hundred yards of the German
line. It was the section from Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval where
the danger lay, for here there was a long advance to be made, as far
as a mile in some places, up the slopes north of Caterpillar Valley.
French officers are not inclined to err on the side of overcaution,
but on this occasion more than one of them expressed a doubt that the
projected British attack would succeed.
The 14th of July is a national holiday in France, the anniversary of
the fall of the Bastille. Paris was in gala attire, the scene of a
great parade, such as that city had not witnessed in its varied
history, when the Allied troops, Belgians, Russians, British, and the
blue-clad warriors of France, were reviewed by the President of the
Republic amid the frantic acclamations of delighted crowds. On this
day so dear to the heart of every French patriot the British troops in
Picardy were dealing hammer blows to the German line with the rallying
cry of "Vive la France" that made up in sincerity what it lacked in
Parisian accent.
The front selected for the British attack was a space of about four
miles from a point southeast of Longueval, Pozieres to Longueval, and
Delville Wood. The work cut out for the British right flank to perform
was the clearing out of Trones Wood still partly occupied by the
Germans. The two Bazentins, Longueval, and the wood of Delville were
either sheltered by a wood, or there was one close by that was always
a nest of cunningly hidden guns. More than a mile beyond the center of
the German position, High Wood, locally known as Fourneaux, formed a
dark wall in the background.
The British had only consolidated their new line on the day before the
attack of July 14, 1916, so every preparation was hurried at topmost
speed. In the first hours of the morning they began a furious
bombardment of the German positions. This was continued until 3.20 a. m.,
when the hurricane of fire abated. The Germans, as it developed
later, were not expecting an assault, such bombardments being of
frequent occurrence, a part of the day's program intended to impress
them, or to hide some stupid British strategy.
At 3.25 a. m., when the day was breaking and a faint light covered the
scene from a cloudy sky, the British infantry attacked. The Germans
were so completely surprised that the battalions which were assigned
to strike at the most distant points, hardly suffered a casualty
before they were within a few hundred yards of the enemy's defensive
wires. When the Germans did awake to their danger and loosed their
barrage fire, it fell to the rear of the attackers.
Success crowned the British efforts at every point on the line of
attack, though in such places where the German defenses had not been
destroyed the advance was necessarily slow. It may be of interest to
cite one instance to show how the British military machine worked on
this important day in the history of the battle of the Somme. In one
division there were two attacking brigades, each composed of two
battalions of the New Army, and two of the old regulars. It might
appear a hazardous experiment that the British command should have
placed the four battalions of the New Army in the first line, but the
inexperienced troops justified the confidence that had been placed in
them. They went forward with the dogged determination of old veterans,
and shortly after noon had triumphantly carried out the work assigned
to them. They had captured their part of the line and taken 662
unwounded men and 36 officers (among whom was a battalion commander),
while the booty included four howitzers, four field guns, and fourteen
machine guns and quantities of military stores.
By nightfall the British had captured the whole of the German second
line from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, a front of over three miles,
and had netted over 2,000 prisoners. Many of these belonged to the
Third Division of the German Guard, and included the commander of a
regiment. The commander of the Ninety-first Bavarian Regiment was
discovered by the British at the bottom of his dugout.
One of the most striking incidents of the day occurred on the British
right flank in Trones Wood. On the night of July 13, 1916, an attack
had been delivered there when 170 men belonging to the Royal West
Kents were separated from their battalion. Having a few machine guns,
and being well supplied with ammunition, they fortified one or more
positions, and in spite of vigorous German attacks, were able to
maintain their posts all night until the British advance in the
morning gathered them in.
It was a bit of good luck that these men had strayed away from their
regiment, for the positions they had fortified now proved of great
value in clearing the Germans out of the wood.
One of the most picturesque episodes of the day's fighting was a
brilliant cavalry charge. This was the first time since the battle of
the Marne that the British had any opportunity to engage the enemy on
horseback. The French, however, had employed two squadrons in their
offensive in Champagne in September, 1915.
A British division, pushing their way northward against the Tenth
Bavarian Division, had penetrated the third German position at High
Wood supported by cavalry--a troop of the Dragoon Guard and a troop
of Deccan Horse. The mounted men proceeded to show their mettle and to
share in the fighting honors of the day. Beyond Bazentin-le-Grand on
the valley slopes they found cover for a time in the growing corn.
About eight in the evening the cavalry set out on their last advance
on foot and on horseback through the corn, riding down the enemy, or
cutting him down with lance and saber, and capturing a number of
prisoners. Their rapid success had a heartening effect on the whole
British line. Having reached their objective, the cavalry proceeded to
intrench, in order to protect the British infantry that was advancing
from High Wood.
Throughout the day's fighting the British airmen had been constantly
active despite the haze which hampered observation. In twenty-four
hours they had destroyed four Fokkers, three biplanes, and a
double-engined plane without the loss of a single British machine.
On July 15, 1916, the British consolidated the new ground they had
won, while their left advancing to the outskirts of Pozieres attacked
the Leipzig Redoubt, and renewed the struggle for Ovillers which had
been fought over with scarcely any pause since July 7, 1916. Strong
counterattacks by the German Seventh Division forced the British out
of High Wood, or the greater portion of it, but the loss was not
serious, the place having served its purpose as a screen for the
British while consolidating their line.
Perhaps the fiercest struggle in this area was waged around Longueval
and Delville Wood, which became popularly known by the soldiers as
"Devil Wood." The struggle started there on the morning of July 14,
1916, and continued almost without pause for thirteen days. The losses
on both sides reached a formidable figure.
A better situation for defense could not have been selected. Delville
Wood presented a frightful jungle of shattered tree trunks and ragged
bushes interspersed with shell holes. There were cuttings through it
along which ranged the German trenches. Some seventy yards from the
trees on the north and east sides the Germans had a strong trench that
was crowded with machine guns, and the whole interior of the wood was
incessantly bombarded. Longueval, a straggling village to the
southwest of the wood, was a less troublesome problem.
Brigadier General Lukin's South African Brigade, which had been
ordered to clear the wood, succeeded in carrying it completely about
midday.
Those brigades which had been assigned the task of capturing Longueval
only gained a portion of it, and the Germans launching a counterattack
from the north end of the village, succeeded in forcing the British
back. Lukin's South Africans tried again on the 16th and 17th, but
failed with heavy losses, hanging on stubbornly to the southern
corner, where they were not relieved until the 20th.
It was during the four days' fighting in and around Delville Wood that
Lieutenant Colonel Thackera from the Transvaal, of the Third
Battalion, with Scots of other formations, made a desperate and heroic
defense. Without food or water the remnant clung to the position,
undismayed even when the withering fire of the enemy had thinned their
ranks and at last killed or wounded all the officers of one battalion.
But even under these depressing conditions the spirit of those who
remained had not weakened, and an attack subsequently made by
Brandenburgers of the Fifth Division was repulsed with considerable
losses.
[Illustration: The French Gains.]
The splendid courage displayed by the British New Army during these
days of intense fighting, and when all the odds were in favor of the
enemy, had done much to sustain the courage of the British command and
to offset the effect caused by heavy losses. The New Army for some
days had been trying conclusions with the German Third Guard Division
brought over from the Russian front in the spring, and considered by
the kaiser as the very flower of his forces. This division included
the Lehr Regiment, the Ninth Grenadiers, and the Guards Fusiliers.
Their reputation had preceded them, but the New Army were not disposed
to take them overseriously, and fought against them with as grim
determination as if they had been ordinary soldiers and not
distinguished soldiers of the War Lord. The crack regiments fought in
the main bravely, but the comparatively green troops of England made
up in initiative and audacity what they lacked in military experience,
and were more than a match for them. Each of these famous German
formations lost heavily.
Ovillers which had been bravely defended for some days was finally
captured by the British on July 16, 1916, thus clearing out the
principal obstacle in the way of a general assault on Pozieres. On
this day the British were also successful in taking Waterlot Farm,
about midway between Longueval and Guillemont, which cut another slice
out of the German front. For three days a heavy rain and low mists
hindered the observation of the British airmen, who were unable to
detect the positions of the new batteries they knew the enemy was
setting up. The Germans had all the advantage, as the British were now
occupying their old trench lines and they had the register.
On July 20, 1916, the British Seventh Division attacked again at High
Wood in the hopes of extending their situation at Longueval, which by
this time was exposed to the enemy's attacks. They carried the entire
wood, but a portion to the north, where the Eighth Division of the
Fourth Magdeburg Corps were intrenched, and where for many weeks they
defied every effort of the British to oust them.
At this stage in the battle of the Somme the total of unwounded
prisoners captured by the British numbered 189 officers and 10,779
men. The German losses in guns included five 8-inch and three 6-inch
howitzers, four 6-inch guns, five other heavies, thirty-seven field
guns, sixty-six machine guns, and thirty trench mortars.
No exact estimate of the German losses in dead and wounded could be
made, but captured letters spoke of desperate conditions and of
terrible slaughter. One German battalion was reduced to three officers
and twenty-one men, and there was mention in these letters of several
other formations which had broken down through exhaustion and retired
from action.
* * * * *
It was imperative now for the British to finish off their capture of
the German second position and to prepare for a German attack which
might develop at any moment. From east of Pozieres to Delville Wood
the enemy had lost their second line and were forced to construct a
switch line to establish a connection between the third position and
an uncaptured point, such as Pozieres, in his second position.
There was stubborn fighting among the orchards of Longueval and the
outskirts of Delville, where the British made little headway, but
registered some gains. All their hopes were centered at this time on
their chief objectives, Guillemont and Pozieres. The latter was
especially important, for it formed a part of the plateau of Thiepval.
If the British succeeded in gaining the crest of the ridge all the
country to the east would come under direct observation. The most
important points on the watershed were Mouquet Farm, between Thiepval
and Pozieres, the Windmill east of the last place, High Wood, and the
high ground that lay directly east of Longueval. It was important that
the British should capture Guillemont in order to align the next
advance with the French forces. This task presented many difficulties,
for the advance from Trones Wood must be made over a bare and
shelterless country that was under the Germans' direct observation
from Leuze Wood. There was also a strongly fortified quarry on its
western edge and a ravine to the south of it between Maltzhorn and
Falfemont Farms, while Angle Wood in the center was a German
stronghold.
The difficulties of the British position were summarized by Sir
Douglas Haig:
"The line of demarkation agreed upon by the French commander and
myself ran from Maltzhorn Farm due eastward to the Combles Valley, and
then northeastward up the valley to a point midway between
Sailly-Saillisel and Morval. These two villages had been fixed upon as
the objective respectively of the French left and my right. In order
to advance in cooperation with my right and eventually to reach
Sailly-Saillisel, our Allies had still to fight their way up that
portion of the main ridge which lies between Combles Valley on the
west and the river Tortille on the east. To do so they had in the
first place to capture the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le
Forest, Rancourt, and Fregicourt, besides many woods and strong
systems of trenches. As the high ground on each side of the Combles
Valley commands the slopes of the ridge on the opposite side, it was
essential that the advance of the two armies should be simultaneous
and made in the closest cooperation."
The British made an attack on Guillemont from Trones Wood on July 19,
1916. It was a rainy, foggy day, that hampered military operations,
and they failed to advance.
On the day following the French made a general attack that achieved
brilliant results. North of the Somme over a front of five kilometers
from Ridge 139 (800 meters north of Hardecourt) the French carried the
first German trenches. They reached as far as the slope east of the
height of Hardecourt. Their line passed the boundary of Maurepas, and
followed the highway from Maurepas to Feuillieres. South of the Somme
they carried the whole of the German defense system from Barleux to
Vermandovillers. During the two following days the British guns
incessantly bombarded the entire German front. Two new corps had been
joined with the Fifth Army, the Second and First Anzac, which occupied
ground between the Ancre and south of the Albert-Bapaume road.
On July 23, 1916, the British launched a strong attack over a wide
front. The heaviest blows were centered on Pozieres and the Windmill
on the left. The village was now a mass of rubble, but amid the ruins
the Germans had fortified almost every yard of ground, there were deep
and carefully prepared dugouts, cunningly concealed machine-gun
emplacements, and lines of covered trenches on every hand.
The British forces began the movement about midnight, delivering the
assault from two sides. A division of Midland Territorials advanced
from the southwest over the ground between Pozieres and Ovillers.
About the same time an Anzac division advanced from the southeast.
German defenses south of the village were rapidly cleared by the
Midland "Terriers," who then occupied a line in the outskirts of the
village extending toward Thiepval.
To the Australian troops which had displayed such valor at Gallipoli
was assigned the most difficult task in this assault, for there was
first a sunken road heavily organized to capture which ran parallel
with the highway, then a strong line of trenches, and finally the
highway itself which ran through the center of the village in a direct
line.
The Australians gave a good account of themselves, and added to the
reputation they had gained on many fields early in the war. They were
of one opinion that they had never tackled a more dangerous job or
come under a hotter fire than in this attack. It was only after
intense fighting that they won the highway and established a line so
near the enemy that only the width of the road separated them.
Instances of personal bravery were many and a number of Victoria
Crosses were awarded for especially heroic deeds, a few of which
deserve special mention. Private Thomas Cooke, a machine gunner,
continued to fire after all his companions had been killed and was
found dead beside his gun. Second Lieutenant Blackburn having led four
parties of bombers against a formidable enemy position, captured 250
yards of trench, then after crawling forward and reconnoitering
returned and led his men to the capture of another long trench. Of all
the Australians who won the V. C. on this day none was more deserving
of the honor than Private John Leak. He was one of a party that had
captured a strongly fortified place. Noticing that the German bombs
were outranging the British he sprang from the trench and dashing
forward under hot machine-gun fire at short range, after bombing the
enemy's post, leaped in and bayoneted three German bombers.
Private John Leak's bravery received special mention in the official
report. "His courage was amazing, and had such an effect on the enemy
that, on the arrival of reenforcements, the whole trench was
recaptured."
The battle continued almost without pause, and by evening of July 24,
1916, the British had captured the greater part of Pozieres. In the
morning of the following day the entire place was in their hands. The
Midland Territorials having taken two lines of trenches, linked up
with the Australians at the north corner of the village, where they
established themselves in a cemetery. As the Germans still held the
Windmill on much higher ground, they had good observation, and made
the most of it, bombarding the British position unceasingly until it
seemed smothered in smoke and fire. It seemed incredible that anything
could live in such a zone of death.
Captain C. W. Bean, who was with the Australians, has recorded his
impressions of the German bombardment in a few graphic lines.
"Hour after hour, day and night, with increasing intensity as the time
went on, the enemy rained heavy shell into the area. Now he would send
them crashing in on a line south of the road--eight heavy shells at a
time, minute after minute followed by a burst of shrapnel. Now he
would place a curtain straight across this valley or that till the sky
and landscape were blotted out.... Day and night the men worked
through it, fighting the horrid machinery far over the horizon as if
they were fighting Germans hand to hand, building up whatever it
battered down, burying some of them, not once, but again and again and
again. What is a barrage against such troops? They went through it as
you would go through a summer shower, too proud to bend their heads,
many of them, because their mates were looking. As one of the best of
their officers said to me: 'I have to walk about as if I liked it;
what else can you do when your own men teach you to?'"
PART IX--THE WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER LIII
THE VALUE OF ZEPPELINS IN LONG-DISTANCE RECONNOITERING--NAVAL
AUXILIARIES
The growing intensity and fierceness of the gigantic struggle between
the great nations of the world in the second half of the second year
naturally was reflected in the extraordinary activities of the aerial
fleets of the combatants. To give in detail the thousands of
individual and mass attacks is manifestly impossible in a restricted
work of this kind, and we shall have to be satisfied with a
description of the more important events in this latest of all
warfares.
Undoubtedly the most pronounced feature of aerial combat in 1916 was
the complete rehabilitation of the Zeppelin type of rigid airship
construction as an invaluable aid to the land and naval forces in the
difficult and dangerous task of reconnoitering the enemy forces. There
can be no doubt that the frequent raids of the eastern counties of
Great Britain were undertaken far more with the idea of gaining as
clear an idea as possible of the distribution of British naval units
in the North Sea than with the desire of hurling destruction from the
sky upon sleeping villages, towns, and, of course, harbors and
factories which might be of value to the British military forces. And
there also can be no doubt that for this purpose of reconnoitering
over immense areas the Zeppelin airship stands to-day unchallenged by
any other single means at the disposal of the army leaders.
The German Zeppelin airship carries at present a powerful
wireless-sending apparatus, the electric current for which is
furnished by one of the motors. These motors, five in number, are of
the six-cylinder Mercedes type, furnishing a total of 1,200
horsepower. Four of the motors are usually in service, the fifth being
held in reserve, and used in the meantime for furnishing the required
electric current. The wireless equipment is stated to have an
effective range of about 300 miles, due mainly to the great height of
the "sending station." It was this wireless equipment which is now
known to have precipitated the great naval battle off the Jutland
coast, and to have sent the German fleet to its home base before the
full force of the much superior British fleet had a chance to exercise
its crushing power.
According to the report of the captain of one of the German battle
cruisers, the Zeppelins, of which there were two in the early hours of
the battle, sighted a strong British naval force in the North Sea,
about two-thirds of the way from the British coast to Helgoland. The
information was flashed to Helgoland by the leading Zeppelin, which
was hovering more than two miles in the air, commanding an immense
area of the North Sea. The approach of the German fleet was unknown to
the British, although the Zeppelins could distinguish both fleets from
their great height.
As the battle developed and the British battle cruiser squadron became
sorely pressed by the superior forces opposed to them, calls for
assistance were flashed from them to the main fleet. The Zeppelins, of
course, caught the calls and set off at high speed northward with the
intention of giving timely warning to the German squadron battling
several thousand feet below them against the gradually increasing
British force.
The mist which hung over the North Sea made it difficult for the
Zeppelin commanders to distinguish objects clearly, but the same mist
prevented the British ship crews from sighting the airships in the
clouds. When the heavy black smoke from the battleships rushing south
at their highest speed was sighted by the northernmost Zeppelin, word
of the apparent strength of the reenforcements was flashed to the
German commander in chief and the order for retreat was given. While
the fleets executed their maneuvers, the British main forces arrived
and the greatest battle in naval history took place. Had it not been
for the timely warning from the Zeppelins hanging high in the air
above the sea, the German fleet might have been overwhelmed by the
huge forces rushing south to destroy it. Outnumbered by more than two
to one, its only safety lay in retreat--and so heavy had been the
fire, that the British commander did not press the pursuit too close.
For while the Germans knew to a ship the strength of their adversary,
the latter had to reckon with the unknown, hidden possibilities of
forces not yet seen. It cannot be denied that the Jutland naval battle
was a complete vindication of the use of Zeppelins as naval scouts, a
value now recognized by every naval officer in the world.
The second field of action in which the Zeppelin airship has shown a
certain measure of success is that of destroying small naval units of
the enemy. And not only the German airships have had occasion to show
their value, but the French have been especially successful in this
work. For several months previous to February, 1916, little had been
heard of the activities of the new French dirigibles, which were
reported to have been built, although a number of them were
continually cruising high in the air above Paris and in the district
north of the capital. Occasionally hints were dropped here and there
concerning their activity above the Channel and portions of the North
Sea, and in the early summer a fairly substantial report reached this
country to the effect that the new French lighter-than-air machines
were utilized chiefly in "submarine hunting."
In the early stages of the war, when military and naval aviation was
trying to adopt peace-time theories to war-time facts, Great Britain
attempted to hunt the German submarines with aeroplanes, or
hydroaeroplanes; but the method had its serious draw-backs. The
aeroplane is of necessity a fast traveling machine; it must make at
least forty miles an hour to be able to stay aloft. Whizzing through
the air at such speed is not conducive to a careful scrutiny of the
surface of the water below, necessary in order to detect the vague,
dim outlines of a submerged submarine. At first the pilots of naval
aeroplanes had considerable success in locating the submarines, and
Germany lost quite a few of them, before the reason was discovered.
Some one in Great Britain announced that it was easy to locate a
submarine from an aeroplane by the peculiar reflection in the sunlight
caused by the fine film of lubricating oil on the surface of the
water. As soon as this "tip" was communicated to Germany, submarines
discontinued the use of oil for lubrication, employing instead
deflocculated graphite. The fuel oil used in the Diesel engines for
propulsion on the surface is so thoroughly consumed and the exhaust
now is so free of oil that an oil film as an indication of submarine
proximity is no longer trustworthy. Besides, the submerged boat
_might_ be a friendly one, a fact which was borne upon the British
authorities on two separate occasions when scouting aeroplanes
reported submarines near, and speedy motor boats rushed to the attack.
In one case the British submarine is reported to have been rammed, and
in the other--so the story goes--the commander of the submarine
liberated a little buoy attached to the outside of the boat, which
rose to the surface and informed the watchers above that "a friend is
down below--not an enemy!"
The system followed now in the locating and possible destruction of
German submarines in the Channel and North Sea by French dirigibles is
as follows: The airships, chiefly of the _Astra_ type, travel at a
height of not more than 500 feet above the surface of the ocean, while
the observers constantly sweep the water within a radius of half a
mile with their glasses. Usually the airships are sent ahead at low
speed in spirals, or in a series of curves which enable them to cover
every square mile of watery area below. As soon as one of these
airships sights a submarine traveling submerged, it flashes the news
by wireless to destroyers which at the time may be fifty or more miles
away, and in the meantime endeavors to remain directly above the
submerged boat. Soon the destroyers arrive and, following the
direction of the airship, can ram or sink the submarine with almost
certain success. The French admiralty claims to have accounted for a
number of submarines by this method, but has found that the scheme no
longer will work. The German naval department, learning of the
airship patrol, has given its submarine commanders orders to travel at
great depth during daylight hours in the Channel and the southwestern
section of the North Sea, or to go to sleep on the bottom where the
sea is too shallow. In the evening the boat makes its escape from the
dangerous neighborhood.
The third field of action of airships--devastating hostile
countries--is the least valuable, although perhaps the most
spectacular of the activities of airships of the Zeppelin type. The
damage caused by the numerous Zeppelin raids over England, for
instance, is a subject of so much dispute that a true appreciation of
their value cannot be formed at present. While the German official
bulletins repeatedly declare that great material damage was done by
the bombs to military establishments, factories, harbor works, etc.,
the British statements dwell more upon the number of noncombatants who
were killed, and deny the infliction of any material damage.
Information of this kind is considered legitimate secrecy and it is
only when files of the British local and trade papers are examined
that an inkling of the real damage is obtained. Fires, boiler
explosions, railway traffic suspensions, and similar highly suggestive
items fill the columns of the papers, after every one of the Zeppelin
raids. On only one occasion, February 2, 1916, has the British War
Office admitted serious military damage in its official communication.
This communication was issued after exaggerated reports of the damage
caused had appeared in the German and neutral press, covering the
Zeppelin raids of January 30-31, 1916, and February 1, 1916, and
admitted officially the following: Bombs dropped totaled 393;
buildings destroyed: three railway sheds, three breweries, one tube
factory, one lamp factory, one blacksmith shop; damaged by explosions:
one munition factory, two iron works, a crane factory, a harness
factory, railway grain shed, colliery and a pumping station. "One of
the spectacular incidents of this raid was the chase of an express
train by the Zeppelin, the train rushing at its utmost speed of
seventy miles an hour into a tunnel, disappearing just as the first
bombs began to drop. The train remained in the tunnel for more than
an hour, waiting for the Zeppelin to fly away!" The official figures
of killed and wounded in this raid are given as sixty-seven killed,
and 117 injured.
During the month of July, reports of the new German super-Zeppelins
began to appear in British reports, and a number of neutral
correspondents endeavored to obtain authentic data concerning them.
Conflicting descriptions arrived from many sources, and it was not
until a Swiss reporter, equipped with extremely powerful glasses,
watched the trial flights of two of these super-Zeppelins above Lake
Constance, that fairly reliable information could be compiled.
One of these airships leaves Friedrichshafen every week for duty in
the North Sea, and the factory on the shore of Lake Constance expects
to be able to complete five machines every month after July, 1916. The
super-Zeppelin has two armored gondolas, without a visible connection,
although it is highly probable that such communication is provided for
within the outer envelope. Each gondola carries six machine guns and,
in addition, two quick-firing guns, as well as an aerial
torpedo-launching device, which was first used in the extensive air
raids on England in the last week of July.
The super-Zeppelin contains approximately 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas
and has a capacity of ten tons useful load. Of this load, about four
tons can be composed of bombs or other munitions, the remainder being
needed for fuel, machinery, and the crew, as well as ballast and
provisions. The gross weight of a fully equipped and loaded
super-Zeppelin is thirty tons, or roughly, 60,000 pounds. The
envelope, which heretofore has been painted gray with liquid aluminum
paint, now is impregnated thoroughly with finely divided metal, by
means of the Schoop metal-coating process, which is heralded as one of
the most far-reaching improvements in aerial navigation. By its means
the airship envelope is made absolutely impervious to atmospheric
influences.
For its protection against antiaircraft fire the new super-Zeppelins
carry apparatus in each gondola, producing artificial clouds of such
size and intensity as to envelop and shroud completely the entire
airship, rendering it absolutely invisible from below. While this
cloud expands and gradually grows thinner, the airship rises rapidly
in a vertical direction, speeding away while under protection of the
self-made clouds.
The motors of the latest Zeppelins weigh only 595 pounds each,
although developing 240 horsepower, which means that one horsepower is
developed for every three and three-quarter pounds of metal used. They
are fitted with twin pumps, double jet carburetors, and are usually
operated on mixtures consisting of one part benzol with one part
alcohol.
CHAPTER LIV
AEROPLANE IMPROVEMENTS--GIANT MACHINES--TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The experience gathered in the first eighteen months of the war by the
aviators of the hostile armies has done more for the development of
aeroplanes than many years of peaceful improvements could possibly
have accomplished. The ever increasing size, power and stability of
the heavier-than-air machine is plainly shown in the latest types of
battle planes, in which a spread of wings exceeding seventy-five feet
is no longer a novelty. True, the heralded approach of the gigantic
German battle triplanes did not take place in the second year of the
Great War, although it is an incontrovertible fact that such machines
have been built and are being used for some purpose. But none of them
took part in the fighting on the western front, nor has one of them
been seen on the Russian battle lines. There is reason to believe,
however, that these planes are used in naval reconnoitering, and their
great size permits of the carrying of large supplies of fuel, giving
them a great cruising radius. Reports from steamers plying the Baltic
state that gigantic aeroplanes have been sighted high up in the air by
captains and officers on Swedish and Danish ships, seemingly
maintaining a careful patrol of that sea against possible Russian and
British naval exploits.
There have been numerous unconfirmed reports concerning the use of
_cellon_, a tough and yet completely transparent material, in the
construction of aeroplanes on the German side, and occasional hints of
new "invisible" machines were dropped now and then. The reports
probably are based on some foundation of fact, but there is little to
show that _cellon_ is used to any large extent by the Teuton forces.
Samples of the material reached New York late in 1915, but the actual
uses to which it was put were not known at the time.
The tendency in recent months, especially on the western battle front,
has been the "attack in squadrons," instead of the individual combats
which made international heroes out of Boillot, Immelmann, Boelke,
Warneford and Navarre. The squadron attack was first employed by the
Germans in the Verdun operations. Previous to that time, only bombing
expeditions had been undertaken en masse, as many as sixty aeroplanes
taking part in a single attack. But actual aerial combat usually
engaged only two or four aviators.
Early in February of the second year of the war, several famous French
aviators fell victims to the new mode of warfare. It seems that as
soon as a machine would appear above the trenches in that section, six
or more German machines would rise quickly and surround the Frenchman.
Outnumbered and surrounded on all sides the French machines rarely got
back safely to their lines, among the first to be lost being George
Boillot, world-famous as an automobile racer.
The German tactics at once were imitated and improved on by the allied
forces, and by July, 1916, the French had perfected a system of
defense which, paradoxically speaking, may be termed "air-tight."
French aviation squadrons would be held in readiness at all times to
repel attacks, and twenty machines usually were considered a "unit."
At first sign of a hostile aeroplane approaching, ten French machines
would rise at top speed to a height of 10,000 feet, while five minutes
later the second ten would follow, rising to 5,000 feet. The
attacking machine usually would be found at a height intermediate
between the upper and lower French squadrons, both of which would
attack the invader vigorously, and with highly satisfactory results.
One of the lessons of these true aerial battles between opposing
squadrons has been the efficiency of the biplane, as compared with
that of the monoplane. When the war started the monoplane was
considered the machine par excellence for war use; its high speed and
quick maneuvering being cited as most important for fighting in the
air. Eighteen months of aerial battles have shown that for all-round
fighting, bombing and reconnoitering the biplane is far more
effective, and the construction of new monoplanes has been practically
abandoned by the allied governments. The Germans, it is true, have
found the Fokker type of monoplane a very efficient one, but the
number of Fokkers in use is comparatively small, when the great fleets
of Aviatiks and other well-known types of German biplanes are
remembered.
Exact statistics regarding the number of aeroplanes at present in use
along the various battle fronts are not available, but estimates made
by aviation officers, by correspondents and from notes in the
respective publications devoted to aviation abroad, fix it as in
excess of 12,000 machines. More than half of these are used by the
Allies on the western front; Germany is credited with 3,000
aeroplanes, Russia with about 1,000, Austria with 1,500, and Bulgaria
and Turkey with 500. In a statement made in the British House of
Commons, Mr. Tennant, speaking of the Royal British Flying Corps,
declared that 835 officers and 521 civilians were on the waiting list
of the Flying Corps in the last week of February, 1916.
France has definitely discontinued the use of monoplanes and is
manufacturing them solely for the British forces, as some of the
British aviators greatly prefer the monoplane. One of the reasons
given by the French for their action is the construction of Fokker
monoplanes by the Germans, which are so accurate a copy of the earlier
Morane monoplanes of the French that they could not be distinguished
from them in the air. Furthermore, the German copy of the Morane was
far speedier and could easily outdistance or overtake the French
machines of the same type. In place of the original Morane France now
has three types of speed planes, the Maurice Farman, a 110 mph.
biplane, the Morane-Saulnier, 111 mph., and Spad, 107 mph. The older
Nieuports, too, are fast machines, being capable of more than 100
miles per hour.
The new Maurice Farman speed plane is a biplane of small wing area,
the upper plane overhanging the lower. It is equipped with a new type
of Renault-Mercedes eight-cylinder motor, giving 240 horsepower at the
highest crank shaft speed. The Morane-Saulnier and the Spad are both
monoplanes, but of different shape and construction from the original
Morane; it is of the so-called monocoque type, made familiar to
Americans by the Duperdessin monocoques which took part in the Gordon
Bennett Cup race in Chicago in 1912. It is equipped with a device
which was first used in Germany and which permits the firing of the
gun through the propeller. It is an electric synchronizing device
which fires the gun at the exact moment when the bullet will pass
between the propeller blades.
Following the destructive raids of the German naval Zeppelins over the
eastern counties of England during the last days of January, 1916,
there came a period of retaliation flights by Allied aviators over
German cities, attacks on railway stations and munition depots,
culminating in the great attack of the coast of Schleswig-Holstein by
a fleet of British aeroplanes. On a certain section of this coast the
Germans have erected a series of Zeppelin hangars behind one of the
most elaborate systems of defenses known at present. According to
information which had reached the British admiralty, the German coast
north of the Kiel Canal is protected at intervals by the most powerful
antiaircraft artillery, including 4.1-inch guns, capable of firing
thirty-five pound shells to a height of 26,000 feet at the rate of ten
every minute. The risk which the British sea planes underwent was
great, but there seems to have been no hesitation on the part of the
aviators to fly to the attack.
Early in the morning of March 25, 1916, two sea-plane "mother ships,"
accompanied by a squadron of eight protected cruisers and fast
destroyers under the command of Commodore Tyrwhitt, started from the
east coast of England. When about fifty miles from Schleswig-Holstein
five sea planes and one "battle aeroplane" (according to the German
version of the attack) rose from the mother ships and flew toward
shore. What happened during the next two hours is still a matter of
doubt. Only two of the machines returned from the invasion, torn and
riddled with bullets and shrapnel, reporting the most terrific shell
fire from batteries of antiaircraft guns. The aviators declared,
however, that they "successfully bombarded the airship sheds." The
subsequent German report denied the claim, stating that none of the
machines succeeded in even reaching the Zeppelin stations, which were
several miles inland. Three of the sea planes were shot down by the
German guns, and the aviators were made prisoners. It was a gallant
attempt against heavy odds on the part of the British Flying Corps,
and its failure probably was due to the small number of machines
employed. If fifty or sixty machines had taken part in the attack, ten
or twelve might have been lost, but the others would probably have
been able to reach the sheds and do great damage to the Zeppelins
stationed there.
It was from the same sheds that three days later the Zeppelins arose
for their tremendous raids of England, during the week of March 30 to
April 4, 1916, as many as seven of the airships appearing over the
British Isles at the same time. During this series of raids London was
visited by one of the airship squadrons, the visit resulting in
twenty-eight deaths and forty-four injuries. Another squadron turned
northward and dropped bombs on Stowmarket, Lowestoft, and Cambridge,
while a third section of the air fleet attacked the northeast coast.
One of the attacking air cruisers was hit by gunfire, as well as by
bombs thrown from an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Brandon to a
height of several hundred feet above the Zeppelin. This ship, believed
to be the _L-15_, was so severely damaged that it was forced to
descend in the mouth of the Thames, after dropping overboard portions
of its machinery, gun, ammunition, and gasoline tank. The loss of the
airship was admitted by the German admiralty in a statement issued on
April 2, 1916, which said: "In spite of violent bombardment all the
airships returned, with the exception of _L-15_, which, according to
report, was compelled to descend in the waters of the Thames River.
Searches instituted by our naval forces have, up to the present, not
been productive of any result."
Zeppelin raids followed each other in quick succession, no less than
forty having been chronicled by July 31, 1916. They became so common,
in fact, that the people of England lost much of their first terror
and began to view the spectacle of a bombardment from the air as
something that was quite "interesting" to watch! How great the damage
caused to manufacturing and to railroads and shipping has been in the
course of these two-score air raids is something that the British
censor has jealously guarded. That such damage has been done is but
natural, for tons of explosives cannot be hurled from heights of two
miles upon a thickly populated district without doing considerable
harm. In one case, it is known, the first bomb dropped upon the power
house of the manufacturing town which was attacked, and put the entire
electric power and light supply out of business for a week.
Another Zeppelin raid, in which the attacking squadron suffered the
loss of an airship, took place on February 22, 1916, in the
neighborhood of Verdun. The Zeppelin _L-77_, one of the largest and
latest of the German air fleet, crossed the French battle lines at a
height of about 2,500 yards, when it was picked up by searchlights
stationed in the rear. A violent bombardment immediately began and one
of the exploding shells damaged the motor of the rear gondola. The
speed of the Zeppelin was reduced by the failure of the motor, and one
of the new French incendiary shells struck the gas bag near its
center, causing a violent explosion. The two ends of the big gas bag
dropped and as the gondolas hit the ground the entire load of bombs
exploded, tearing the ship and its crew to shreds. Two other
Zeppelins, flying at greater height, about ten miles to the north of
the scene of the accident, watched the destruction and then continued
inland over the French positions, dropping bombs for more than an
hour. They returned undamaged to the German lines.
Still another Zeppelin, _L-19_, was lost in the North Sea, on February
2, 1916, while returning from an "invasion" of England. Hit by gunfire
from the British antiaircraft batteries--or by the Dutch, as some
reports have it, for crossing over Dutch territory--the _L-19_
gradually dropped lower and lower until it floated on the surface of
the sea. The British trawler, _King Stephen_, appeared and the crew of
the Zeppelin asked to be taken off, and offered to surrender. The
captain of the trawler frankly declared that he would not take the
chance of rescuing twenty-eight well-armed German sailors, as his own
crew only amounted to nine men, unarmed. He steamed away, leaving the
Zeppelin crew to drown. When destroyers of the British fleet appeared
later on, guided to the spot by the trawler captain's report, the
Zeppelin and its crew had vanished.
CHAPTER LV
LOSSES AND CASUALTIES IN AERIAL WARFARE--DISCREPANCIES IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS--"DRIVEN DOWN" AND "DESTROYED"
To tabulate or chronicle accurately the losses and casualties suffered
by the various armies in their aerial warfare is absolutely
impossible. Not so much because of censorship or secrecy, but because
of the fact that when an aeroplane is "driven down" by the French
behind the German lines, it cannot be said that this aeroplane is
actually destroyed or even damaged, or that its pilot has received a
wound. Similarly when German machines attack and force a French or
British machine to descend swiftly behind its own lines. The reporting
of machines "driven down" among those "destroyed" is the cause of all
the discrepancies between the official reports of the contending
forces.
The following figures have been gathered with the greatest care from
the British "Roll of Honor," covering the killed, missing and wounded
members of the Royal British Flying Corps. They are for the month of
February, 1916, a month of comparative quiet, and there can be no
doubt that proportionately larger casualty lists could be compiled
from the more active months of the summer of 1916. The first week of
February resulted in nine officers killed, one wounded, and five
"missing"; two noncommissioned officers were also reported "missing."
The second week six officers were killed, two wounded, while one
noncommissioned officer was killed and another wounded. During the
third week three flight lieutenants were killed, five wounded, and two
captured by the enemy, while eight noncommissioned officers were
wounded. In the last week of the month there were three officers
killed, five wounded, and six "missing," while three noncommissioned
men were listed as killed. The total losses for the month on the short
battle line held by the British forces were therefore: twenty-one
officers killed, thirteen wounded, and thirteen missing; fifteen
noncommissioned officers killed or wounded. The losses among German
aviators, taken from the regularly published casualty lists issued by
the German Government, were twenty-four killed, and eleven wounded,
during the month of January.
The casualty lists become a deep mystery when compared with the losses
of machines admitted by the respective war departments. During the
month of February, for instance, the British announced the loss of
_six_ aeroplanes--yet the casualty lists showed a loss of sixty-two
officers and men! During the same month the French lost six machines,
the Germans eight, the Russians three, Austria one, and Italy one.
Statistics for the four months from April to July, 1916, gathered from
the periodical press of Great Britain and Germany, and probably far
more accurate than the occasional "estimates" made by the war
departments themselves, show the following losses in officers killed
in aerial combats:
_April_--British 18, French 15, Russian 7, Italian 3; German 16,
Austrian 3, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.
_May_--British 16, French 11, Russian 5, Italian 4; German 10,
Austrian 5, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 0.
_June_--British 19, French 10, Russian 11, Italian 3; German 8,
Austrian 6, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.
_July_--British 15, French 15, Russian 13, Italian 5; German 16,
Austrian 8, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 1.
Total losses in aviation officers: Allies, 170; Central Powers, 75.
A cursory examination of the records of aerial combats on the western
battle front shows an average of eighteen combats daily; on some days
there were as many as forty distinct aerial battles, while on others,
in blinding snow and rainstorms no machines were aloft. In the
3,000-odd duels in the air, the Franco-American Flying Corps began to
take a prominent part early in the spring of 1916, shortly after the
various American volunteer aviators had been gathered into a single
unit and been placed at the point of the greatest danger--the Verdun
sector of the front.
The formation of the Franco-American Flying Corps was formed by
Frazier Curtis and Norman Prince, after many unsuccessful attempts
since December, 1914. At the time of gathering the scattered Americans
into a single corps there were about thirty experienced aviators in
the group, but the number has been greatly augmented since then, and
in the latter part of July nearly a hundred are reported to have been
gathered in the aviation corps near Verdun.
The first American aviator to fly over the Verdun battle field since
the beginning of the great battle still raging in that sector, was
Carroll Winslow, of New York, who piloted one of the Maurice Farman
speed planes. Previous to the beginning of that battle, Lieutenant
William Thaw of Pittsburgh and Elliott Cowdin of New York had crossed
the battle field repeatedly.
CHAPTER LVI
AERIAL COMBATS AND RAIDS
February, 1916, because of foggy, stormy weather, did not furnish many
thrilling aerial combats. With the exception of a Zeppelin raid over
England and an attack on Kent by two German Fokker aeroplanes, in the
course of which bombs were dropped on Ramsgate and Broadstairs, few
events worthy of chronicling occurred on either of the big battle
fronts. In Egypt, early in that month, an officer of the R. F. C. flew
from Daba, railhead of the Mariut railway, to El Gara and return,
without a stop. The entire trip was made in eight hours, covering 400
miles. It was one of the most splendid pieces of reconnoitering work
accomplished by a British aviation officer.
On February 25, 1916, announcement was made in the British House of
Commons to the effect that the total loss of life in the twenty-nine
great and small Zeppelin raids up to that date had been 266.
On March 1, 1916, an Aviatik aeroplane, piloted by Lieutenant Faber,
and containing Lieutenant Kuehl as observer, succeeded in wrecking the
leading truck of a motor transport train on the Besancon-Jussey road.
The bomb struck squarely and blockaded the road for a considerable
time, causing confusion and delay in the transport. While the drivers
of the trucks endeavored to straighten out the tangle, the aviators
poured a withering fire from their machine gun into the crowd of men,
while circling over the truck at low altitude.
Four days later an extensive Zeppelin raid was directed at the east
coast of England, the result being twelve killed and thirty-three
injured, while considerable material damage was admitted by British
papers.
Aerial duels and combats over the battle lines began to increase in
number to such an extent as to cause their omission from the official
bulletins. Only the most spectacular feats thereafter were considered
worthy of record. Among these was an attack by four German sea planes,
which set out from some part of the Belgian coast and raided the
English coast from Dover to Margate, killing nine and injuring
thirty-one persons. One of the planes was damaged by the defending
guns.
A few days later the British returned the visit with five sea planes,
accompanied by a cruiser and destroyers, with disastrous results. As
related in a former chapter at some length, only two of the machines
succeeded in escaping from the withering fire of the strong
antiaircraft defense guns.
Then followed the series of Zeppelin raids between March 31 and April
5, 1916, when practically the entire eastern and northeastern coast of
England was bombarded by the German air fleet. Even Scotland was
visited by some of the Zeppelins, and there is every reason to believe
that the main object of the raid was to discover the whereabouts of
the main British battleship fleet. However, the airships seem to have
returned southward before locating the fleet. The German admiralty
never gave up hope of locating the main base with certainty, for many
Zeppelin and submarine raids were made with no other object in view.
Had the ships succeeded, there is no doubt that all available
submarines would have been dispatched to the spot, ordered to lie in
wait, and then entice the fleet out by offering a couple of older
ships as a sacrifice. The plan did not work out to the satisfaction of
the German navy heads, but it still remains one of their pet hopes.
On April 3, 1916, a French dirigible appeared above Audun-le-Roman,
bombarding the railway station, while on the same day a German Aviatik
was winged at Souchez, crashing to the earth and killing the
occupants.
On April 4, 1916, a sensational aerial battle took place between more
than a score of Austrian and Italian machines above Ancona. Three
Austrian planes were reported shot down, while two of the Italians
seemed severely damaged.
The next day a German official resume of the aerial battles was issued
by the Germans, in which it was claimed that fourteen German machines
and forty-four British and French were lost in March. In this
compilation the German statement differentiated between "destroyed"
and "brought down," claiming to have listed only those which were
actually shot down under conditions which precluded the safety of
pilot and observer, or which were captured in the German lines.
April 7, 1916, saw a heavy bombardment of Saloniki by Bulgarian and
Austrian aeroplanes; the camp of the Australian section and that of
the French contingent were severely damaged, and fire broke out in
them.
A week later, three naval British aeroplanes dropped bombs on
Constantinople and also farther north on Adrianople, in an attempt to
destroy the large powder factories and hangars there. The damage
reported was very slight, and of no military value. The machines made
a trip of 300 miles length, in order to carry out this attack, an
achievement worthy of special notice.
A strong French squadron shelled the stations at Nantillons and
Brieulles on April 10 and 11, 1916, doing considerable material damage
to buildings.
On April 12, 1916, the Czar of Russia had a narrow escape from death
when an Austrian aeroplane, of the Rumpler-Taube type, appeared over
the parade grounds at Czernowitz, throwing several bombs on the
officers present. The aviator did not know of the presence of the
czar, and the incident did not become public for several days after.
On April 15, 1916, a large French battle plane, fitted with a
37-millimeter gun, attacked a German steamer in the North Sea, but the
ship escaped without damage, as all the shells went wide of the mark.
The French resume of the operations on the west front during March
challenges the statement of the German authorities concerning the
number of machines lost. "During the month of March," says the
official communique, "our military aircraft displayed great activity
along the entire front, notably in the region of Verdun. In the course
of the many aerial engagements thirty-one German machines were
'brought down' by our pilots, nine of which descended or crashed to
the ground within our lines, while twenty-two were brought down in
the German lines. There is no doubt concerning the fate of those
twenty-two machines which our pilots attacked over the enemy's lines.
Twelve of these aeroplanes were seen coming down in flames, and ten
descended in headlong spirals under the fire of our airmen. Moreover,
four German machines were brought down by our special guns, one in our
lines in the environs of Avocourt and three in the enemy lines--one
near Suippes, one near Nouvion and one near Sainte-Marie-a-Py. This
total of thirty-five machines should be contrasted with the figures of
our own aerial losses, which amount to thirteen aeroplanes, as
follows: One French machine brought down in our lines and twelve
brought down in the German lines."
A pitched battle between Zeppelins, battle cruisers, and submarines on
the German side, and destroyers, land batteries, aeroplanes and sea
planes on the British side, took place in the morning of April 25,
1916, near Lowestoft. A number of aeroplanes and sea planes rose to
attack the Zeppelins which were flying high and bound westward. In the
course of the battle the airships turned toward the sea, bringing the
pursuing aeroplanes within range of the naval guns. Four submarines
also appeared on the surface and began firing their high-angle guns
against the British aeros. One of the latter was destroyed by fire
from a Zeppelin quick-firing gun, while two sea planes were severely
damaged by the fire from the battle cruisers and submarines.
May, 1916, began with three disasters for the German aerial forces. On
the 3d of the month, the naval airship _L-20_ (Schuette-Lanz type)
which had raided the coast of England and Scotland on the preceding
day, ran out of fuel on the return trip and was carried by a strong
wind eastward onto the Norwegian coast, where it stranded near
Stavanger. The Norwegian authorities interned the crew and blew up the
ship.
Two more Zeppelins were lost two days later; the _L-7_ (one of the
oldest airships in the service) was shot down by French warships off
Saloniki, while the other fell a victim to the guns of a British
squadron off the coast of Schleswig-Holstein.
An Italian airship, the _M-3_, attempted a reconnoitering trip over
the Austrian positions on the Gorizia front, but was heavily bombarded
with incendiary shells. Fire broke out on the airship and the
resulting explosion tore it apart, killing the crew of six men.
Sixteen Allies' aeroplanes undertook a bombing expedition upon the
German aerodromes at Mariakerke, dropping thirty-eight large and
seventeen small bombs. A sea plane dropped one 100-pound bomb and two
65-pound bombs on the Solvay Works at Zeebrugge. All the machines are
reported to have returned in safety, with one exception.
Aerial combats increased in number and violence during the summer
months, as many as thirty separate fights taking place in a single day
on a short stretch of the battle fronts. In one of the combats, early
in June, Lieutenant Immelmann, of the German forces, was shot down and
killed. At first the report included his famous comrade, Lieutenant
Boelke, among the killed, but news received later mentioned his name
among the fighting corps.
Dover and other ports on the English coast were raided by two German
sea planes on June 9 and 10, 1916, according to the German official
report. The British denied that any such raid took place. The next
day, two German sea planes attacked Calais, on the French side of the
Channel, dropping bombs on the port and the encampments. They returned
to their base undamaged.
German aeroplanes also raided Kantara, thirty miles south of Port
Said, and fired on Romani with machine guns. A number of casualties
occurred at Kantara.
A raid of considerable magnitude was carried out by the German forces
against the port of Reval, during which they bombarded cruisers,
destroyers, military buildings, and several submarines lying in the
harbor. One of the latter is reported to have been hit four times. The
sea planes had been convoyed to the port by a fleet of cruisers and
destroyers which waited in the open sea for the return of the
aeroplanes. The attacking party had no losses.
An aerial battle between more than forty machines took place on July
3, 1916, near Lille. A British squadron set out to bombard the city of
Lille, but was attacked during the bombardment by a fleet of twenty
German monoplanes and biplanes. The British claim to have brought down
two of the German machines, while all the British returned safely to
their lines.
Similar raids continue every day along the battle front in Flanders,
Belgium, and France, and even to enumerate them would be merely a
repetition entirely without value to the reader.
PART X--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER LVII
WAR CLOUD IN CONGRESS
A confused situation prevailed in Congress on March 1, 1916, the date
on which Germany decreed that her submarines would sink all armed
merchantmen of the Allied Powers without warning. The promulgation of
this decree had abruptly interrupted the imminent settlement of the
_Lusitania_ case, the Administration having taken a serious view of
Germany's latest step, which injected new elements into the whole
submarine dispute with that country. Once more the old question of the
danger to Americans traveling on belligerent vessels arose in an
aggravated form. The Administration was steadfast in upholding the
right of Americans to travel the seas when and whither they chose,
immune under international law from interference or menace on the part
of any belligerent power. Strong factions in Congress, in the face of
Germany's new decree, feared that the Administration's stand was
driving the country into certain war with Germany. Americans were
bound to be among the crews of passengers of the armed merchantmen
that Germany was determined to sink on sight, and this country had
already clearly indicated to Berlin what would happen if any fatality
befell them.
Hence, as mentioned in the previous volume of the history, a feverish
agitation developed in Congress for the passage of resolutions
forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent ships at all during the
war. German-American influences, especially congressional delegations
from districts, chiefly in the Middle West, where the German vote was
a decisive factor, assiduously fanned this movement, but there was a
scattered sentiment, wholly American at heart, and unallied with
pro-Germanism, which also held the view that Americans ought not to
jeopardize the peace of their country by traveling in belligerent
vessels. Resolutions pending in the House and Senate prohibiting them
from doing so had been pigeonholed in committee. President Wilson had
interposed, urging that no action be taken on them. He held that the
executive and legislature ought not to be at cross-purposes on a
question of foreign policy, and any antagonistic step by Congress
against the Administration would weaken the United States in the sight
of the world. The Congressional leaders, at heart opposed to the
President, reluctantly agreed that the two branches of the Government
should not be rent by divided counsels on such a dangerous issue as
the country's relations with Germany.
The President faced a critical and exasperating situation. He changed
his earlier view that Congress should not put itself in the position
of wrangling with the executive over the armed-merchantmen issue. If
divided counsels there were in Congress regarding his submarine
policy, let them now declare themselves, and let the stronger prevail!
Hence, instead of any longer desiring that the armed-merchantmen
resolutions should remain smothered in committee, he challenged the
leaders in Congress to bring them to a vote so that the world might
know whether Congress was with him or against him. The President would
not brook the continuation of an impasse which lent a spurious color
to the manufactured impression current abroad, that he was playing a
lone hand in his submarine policy, unsupported by Congress and the
country. He strove to emphasize that his insistence on the right of
Americans to travel on belligerent merchant ships, whether armed for
defense or otherwise, would not mean war with Germany, the latter
would rather surrender to the American demands to avoid war.
The immediate effect of the President's demand for a vote on the
armed-merchantmen resolutions was to clear the air regarding the
strength of their supporters in Congress. The overwhelming sentiment
in their favor rapidly diminished--if it ever really existed--under
the searchlight of careful canvassing by the Administration's
supporters, until it began to be manifest that, far from Congress
ranging itself against the President, the latter would carry the day.
Then came a reversal of tactics by the congressional factions opposed
to the President. When the belief or illusion prevailed that the
armed-merchantmen resolutions would pass the House by a big majority,
strident demands were heard for submitting them to a roll call and
unrestrained resentment against the President was expressed for
thwarting such action. But now, when national sentiment ranged itself
in support of the President, and many Congressmen had heard from their
constituents, there was a disposition in Congress to turn the tables
on the President by preventing the resolution being put to the vote
that is, by keeping them in the limbo where they had been consigned at
the President's original request, since, to be sure, the vote would
compel Congressmen to go on record as to their pro-German leanings,
and would, moreover, be defeated. This and other influences deferred
action by the House for a week.
Meantime national sentiment had rapidly crystallized to a simple
viewpoint, and Congressmen could not wisely ignore it. The general view
was that if Congress opposed the executive on the armed-merchantmen
issue, and proscribed the present rights of American citizens to travel
on the trading ships of belligerent nations, the whole diplomatic
negotiations with Germany on the submarine dispute would be reduced to
chaos. No president, oppressed by such a precedent, could enter with
confidence on any contention with a foreign power. His most earnest
representations and most solemn protestations might be rendered
meaningless by the intrusion of a Congress influenced by incorrect
reports or overcome by personal antagonism. Such a condition of
executive impotence was viewed as endangering rather than safeguarding
the country's tranquillity. The paramount need then was that Congress
should support the presidency, not the temporary occupant of the White
House. The country was in a controversy with a European power and the
American stand had been taken on definite and well-understood
principles.
In the midst of that dispute the demand had been voiced that the
American attitude be radically changed and the conditions seriously
altered. The inevitable effect of such a change in American policy, it
was felt, would be to hearten the power that was at issue with the
United States, to embarrass the President, and encourage the belief
that those to whom he must look for support would withhold it from
him. That injury could only be repaired by the repudiation by Congress
of the influences at work within it aiming at the overthrow of the
President's policy, and by a convincing exhibition of the unity of the
republic.
The Senate was the first to act. The armed-ship resolution, forbidding
Americans to travel on such craft, was introduced by Senator Gore, of
Oklahoma, who thus explained his purpose in doing so:
"I introduced this resolution because I was apprehensive that we were
speeding headlong upon war; perhaps, I ought to go further and say
what I have hitherto avoided saying, that my action was based on a
report which seemed to come from the highest and most responsible
authority, that certain Senators and certain members of the House, in
a conference with the President of the United States, received from
the President the information, if not the declaration, that if Germany
insisted upon her position the United States would insist upon her
position, and that it would result probably in a breach of diplomatic
relations, and that a breach of diplomatic relations would probably be
followed by a state of war, and that a state of war might not be of
itself and of necessity an evil to this republic, but that the United
States, by entering upon war now, might be able to bring it to a
conclusion by midsummer and thus render a great service to
civilization.
"Mr. President," added the Senator, "I cannot say what the truth may
be. I tell you the tale as it was told to me. This came to my ears in
such a way, with such a concurrence of testimony, with such internal
and external marks of truth, that I feared it might be the truth, and
if such a thing be conceivable I did not feel that, discharging my
duty as a Senator, I could withhold whatever feeble service I might
render to avert the catastrophe of war."
The President immediately authorized an unqualified denial to be made
that he had expressed any utterance to which such a meaning could be
attached. On the contrary, the President, in his talks with members of
Congress, had insisted that war was the last happening he wanted and
that his and not Congress' course would best insure peace. One version
of what transpired at the conference referred to by Senator Gore
credited the President with making these statements to the Senators
and Congressmen who consulted him: That the way to avoid war was to
convince the rest of the world that the people of the United States
were standing solidly behind the executive; that the course Congress
was seeking to pursue would lead toward war rather than away from it,
because yielding to Germany on the present issue would result in
further curtailments of American rights; that the only course the
United States could safely pursue now was to abide by international
law; that any other course would result in making circumstances
themselves the sole guide, and this policy would eventually cause the
fabric of international law itself to crumble and disappear; that any
concession to Germany, abridging the right of Americans to travel on
the seas, would necessitate a concession to Great Britain; and that
such a weakening of American policy would cause the country to drift
toward war. Asked what would happen if a German submarine sank an
armed merchantman with the loss of American life, the President was
quoted as intimating that in that event only a break in diplomatic
relations would follow; further asked as to the effect such a rupture
would probably have, he carefully replied that "it had been
represented that this would lead to war," and that the participation
of the United States in the European upheaval might result in ending
hostilities in six months.
The effect of the disputed disclosure of the President's views on the
issues with Germany, coupled with his disavowal of Senator Gore's
statements, was an accession of congressional support to the
Administration, and the dooming of the Gore resolution to certain
failure. After a couple of days' debate the resolution was put to the
vote and defeated March 3, 1916, by sixty-eight to fourteen. But this
only meant an overwhelming rejection of the intent of the Gore
resolution, for its proposer, foreseeing that it could not pass,
confused the President's supporters at the last minute by resorting to
a parliamentary maneuver changing its purport. The resolution, as put
before the Senate, had been reversed; instead of forbidding Americans
to travel on belligerent vessels, it had become a hypothetical
declaration of war against Germany--a bellicose affirmation in
irreconcilable contrast with the senator's well-known pacifism.
Originally the resolution read:
"Whereas a number of leading powers of the world are now engaged in a
war of unexampled proportions; and
"Whereas the United States is happily at peace with all of the
belligerent nations; and
"Whereas it is equally the desire and the interest of the American
people to remain at peace with all nations; and
"Whereas the President has recently offered fresh and signal proofs of
the superiority of diplomacy to butchery as a method of settling
international disputes; and
"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on unarmed
belligerent vessels has recently received renewed guarantees of
respect and inviolability; and
"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent
vessels rather than upon unarmed vessels is essential neither to their
life, liberty, or safety; nor to the independence, dignity, or
securing of the United States; and
"Whereas Congress alone has been vested with the power to declare war,
which involved the obligations to prevent war by all proper means
consistent with the honor and vital interest of the nation; therefore
be it
"Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives, concurring),
That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole
power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United
States should, in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of
the United States, forbear to exercise the right of travel as
passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether
such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is
the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or
renewed by the Secretary of State, or by anyone acting under him, to
be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for
purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power."
As voted upon by the Senate, this resolving clause had disappeared and
the following substitute with the preamble unaltered, had taken its
place:
"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the sinking by a submarine without notice or warning of an armed
merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a
citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient
cause of war between the United States and the German Empire."
CHAPTER LVIII
THE PRESIDENT UPHELD IN ARMED-MERCHANTMEN ISSUE--FINAL CRISIS WITH
GERMANY
The issue in the Senate, as far as the text of the resolution was
concerned, was beclouded. Senators on both sides vainly sought to
ascertain what the change meant. Senator Gore himself even voted
against his amended proposal. But out of the confusion the upshot was
plain. The debate before the Senate had been on the question whether
Americans should be allowed to travel on armed belligerent ships, and,
whatever the resolution finally expressed, that was the question on
which Senators really declared their aye or nay. Technically, the
Senate had failed, if it had not actually refused, to adopt a
resolution hostile to the Administration's foreign policy. Another
resolution similar to that originally proposed by Senator Gore,
sponsored by Senator Jones of Washington, was withdrawn by him, and a
bitter debate continued for hours without any measure pending. Hence
the Senate had technically gone on record against declaring war on
Germany if any of her submarines sank an armed merchantman without
warning, thereby causing the death of any American on board. Actually
it supported the Administration in its policy upholding the right of
Americans to travel on belligerent ships, and the handful of Senators
who voted for the amended resolution were hostile to the President's
stand.
Meantime parliamentary tactics by the President's opponents in the
House of Representatives successfully delayed the submission of the
McLemore resolution to a vote. The Foreign Relations Committee had
decided, by 17 to 2, to report it, with the recommendation that it be
"tabled." The resolution had even been abandoned by its author,
Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas, who was of opinion that it had
really served its purpose without being adopted. "The main object of
the resolution," he said, "was to prevent this country being plunged
into war with one or more of the belligerent nations, simply because
of the heedless act of some indiscreet American citizens, and I feel
sure that this object has now been attained."
But the object the President sought, which was a virtual vote of
confidence, by both Houses of Congress, on his submarine policy, had
not been attained, and would not until the resolution had been brought
into the open House and squarely voted upon. The issue between the
House and the President had gone too far for further cross-fires of
parliamentary moves to succeed in preventing the resolution from
coming to a vote, and, on March 7, 1916, it reached this crucial stage
and was defeated by 276 to 143, after six hours of turbulent debate.
The majority of 133 in favor of shelving the resolution, achieved by
the aid of many Republican votes, was interpreted as a decisive
compliance with the request of the President.
The voting in both the House and Senate on the armed-merchantmen issue
ranged more on geographical than on political divisions, and
indicated that on questions of foreign policy Congressional sentiment
was governed by sectional, not by party lines. Thus, of the fourteen
votes cast in the Senate against "tabling" the Gore resolution twelve
were recorded by Senators from States west of Indiana and Lake
Michigan, while a geographical analysis of the House vote revealed
that President Wilson met the strongest opposition from the Middle
West delegations, and derived his chief support from the Atlantic
Seaboard States.
Secretary Lansing later issued a ruling of the State Department
defining the status of armed merchant ships. Germany was thereby
notified that the United States recognized the equity of her
argument--that if a vessel was armed and used its armament to attack a
submarine the latter could not be called upon to give warning in
advance, for in so doing the safety of the submarine and its crew was
imperiled. But the United States reiterated what it had frequently
pointed out before as the only criterion governing such
occurrences--each case must be judged by itself. Only a belligerent
vessel which had been proved guilty of such an offensive use of
armament could be regarded as a warship. The presence of armament
could not of itself be construed as a presumption of hostility.
Summarized, the State Department's ruling laid down:
(1) That the status of an armed merchantman must in each case be
determined before it could be regarded as a warship--a neutral
government, on entry of the ship into port, presuming that the
armament was aggressive unless the belligerent proved otherwise.
(2) The belligerents on the high seas must assume that the armed ship
carried armament only for protection, and, unless resistance or an
attempt to escape was immediately made, the merchantman could not be
attacked without receiving due warning.
(3) That Americans and all others who took passage on armed ships
intermittently engaged in commerce raiding could not expect to be
immune, for such vessels acquired a "hostile taint." This was
Germany's contention; but the United States refused to agree to the
German idea that, because a few British vessels might be guilty of
wrongful use of armament, all British ships must consequently be
regarded as warships.
(4) The right of "self-protection" could be exercised by an armed
merchantman; and this was different from cruising the high seas for
the special purpose of attacking hostile ships.
(5) If belligerent vessels were under orders to attack submarines in
all circumstances they lost their status as "peaceful merchantmen."
Germany claimed England had so ordered. England denied the charge.
Evidence in each case must reconcile the difference of opinion.
The Administration's position in the submarine issue with Germany, now
that Congress had upheld the President, seemed to be that Germany's
decree condemning armed merchantmen curtailed the liberty of Americans
to travel on the high seas. The status quo had not been affected.
Germany, in the _Arabic_ case, had undertaken that merchant vessels
would not be torpedoed without first being warned, and that pledge the
United States looked to her to respect, whether the vessels were armed
for defense or not. What, then, would now happen, with Germany's
latest decree sent ringing round the world with resounding bombast, by
way of telling neutral noncombatants, including Americans, to stay at
home, as though cataclysmic destruction awaited all vessels which
dared to show a gun at the stern? The United States waited. Nothing,
so far as the German armed-merchantmen decree was concerned, did
happen. There was no appreciable increase in the number of vessels
sunk by Teutonic submarines, and armed merchantmen did not especially
figure among the victims.
In the face of this tame execution of the terrible decree, providing a
sorry anticlimax to its noisy proclamation, the German press called
for a policy of no compromise with the United States. The "Berliner
Tageblatt" announced that Germany intended to wage a ruthless U-boat
war against her enemies, whatever the American attitude might be.
Apparently the German people believed that a renewal of submarine
activity was vitally necessary, and were convinced of the propriety of
their stand, both from the point of view of ethics and international
law. Germany's armed-merchantmen decree, as indicated, was not
immediately followed by any submarine activity of a character in
keeping with the dire threat made; but toward the close of March,
1916, a sudden indiscriminate outbreak of destruction came against
merchantmen of every type. Many were sunk without warning, the
question of whether they were armed or not seemingly being disregarded
in the new crusade. The United States began to take stern cognizance
of these reckless operations when four ships having Americans on
board, either among the crews or passengers, became targets for the
kaiser's torpedoes, without warning. These were the _Eagle Point_, the
_Manchester Engineer_, the _Englishman_, and the _Sussex_. All were
sunk except the last-named vessel, and the Americans were saved except
one on the _Englishman_, though not, in several cases, without injury.
The circumstances of the torpedoing of the _Sussex_ provoked a final
clash between the United States and Germany. This vessel plied as a
Channel ferryboat between Folkestone and Dieppe. On March 24, 1916, at
4.30 p. m., while near the latter port, with 436 persons on board,
including seventy-five Americans, she was struck by a torpedo from a
submarine. The captain observed a torpedo about 100 meters from the
side and immediately maneuvered to avoid it; but the vessel was struck
in the forward part, which was destroyed. Rescuing craft towed the
disabled boat to Boulogne, where a majority of the passengers were
landed. About fifty persons lost their lives, and three Americans were
hurt.
The State Department at once instructed the American ambassador at
Berlin to inquire whether the torpedo which almost sunk the _Sussex_
came from a German submarine, though the Government entertained little
doubt that this was the case. The American suspicions were later
confirmed by incontestable evidence; but the Government first sought
to give Germany the opportunity of having her day in court before
acting.
Unofficially came reports from Berlin scouting as impossible the
assumption that a German submarine was the culprit, the assurance
being repeated that Germany in no circumstance would violate her
pledge to the United States not to destroy enemy vessels except after
full warning to enable crews and passengers to save their lives. No
official statement was forthcoming. The German admiralty declined to
"deny or explain" until all the submarines operating off the French
coast had returned and reported.
The American procedure in the _Sussex_ case differed from that
followed in previous issues with Germany arising from submarine
warfare. There were no official representations made to Berlin;
Ambassador Gerard was merely asked to ascertain informally and
transmit to Washington any pertinent facts he could gather bearing on
Germany's culpability. The submarine issue, in fact, had reached a
stage where explanations and excuses were of minor importance.
Evidence showing whether Germany had or had not broken her pledge not
to torpedo passenger vessels without warning was alone of interest to
the President. Proof of Germany's guilt foreshadowed an unqualified
threat by the United States to break off diplomatic relations. The
United States determined to be the judge with Germany in the dock as a
defendant, instead of arguing an issue with Berlin, as in the past.
This attitude placed Germany in the position of having to prove her
innocence in the face of damaging evidence of her guilt. No discussion
was even invited with the German ambassador over the case, and Count
von Bernstorff apparently did not want to make his usual extenuatory
or defensive pleas.
Germany assumed a mien of innocence. Her spokesmen by implication
declined to consider that she was in any way involved in the _Sussex_
case; hence there could be no need for Count von Bernstorff to make it
a subject of discussion with the American Government.
"I cannot help it," said the ambassador unofficially. "One cannot
blame Germany because the _Sussex_ struck a British mine. Why should
we discuss it? It does not concern us."
This was Germany's first informal explanation. The readiest means of
exculpating Germany from complicity in the _Sussex_ affair was
eagerly seized upon and clung to. What other cause except a British
mine would there be for the calamity the _Sussex_ had encountered when
Germany had pledged herself not to make such attacks?
Meantime information reached Washington that the German secret orders
to submarine commanders relating to the armed-merchantmen decree did
not conform to the pledges given to the United States, but urged the
importance of a policy of concealment in their operations, so that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay the proof at Germany's
door, if any vessel was sunk contrary to pledge. By this means the
German Government could decline to acknowledge responsibility for any
attack unless the United States could prove that the submarine was of
German nationality.