THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF THE BUKOWINA
Simultaneously with the drive in Volhynia, the extreme left wing of
the Russian southern army under General Lechitsky forced the
Austro-Hungarians to withdraw their whole line in the northeastern
Bukowina, invaded the crownland with strong forces and advanced to
within fourteen miles of the capital, Czernowitz. On the Strypa the
Austrians had to fall back from their principal position north of
Buczacz. In spite of the most desperate resistance and in the face of
a violent flanking fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of
whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's troops captured the Austrian
positions south of Dobronowce, fourteen miles northeast of Czernowitz.
In that region alone the Russians claimed to have captured 18,000
soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and ten guns. Southeast of
Zaleszcyki on the Dniester the Russians again were victorious and
forced the withdrawal of the Austrian lines. Fourteen miles north of
Czernowitz the Austrian troops tried to stem the tide by blowing up
the railroad station of Jurkoutz. At the same time they made their
first important counterattack in the Lutsk region. Making a sudden
stand, after being driven over the river Styr, north of Lutsk, they
turned on the Russians with the aid of German detachments rushed to
them by General von Hindenburg, drove the Muscovite troops back over
the Styr and took 1,508 prisoners, including eight officers. At other
points, too, the Austrian resistance stiffened perceptibly, especially
in the region of Torgovitsa, and on the Styr below Lutsk.
Dubno, a modern fortress, built, like Lutsk, mainly in support of
Rovno, to ward off possible aggression, now supplied an excellent
starting point for a Russian drive into the heart of Galicia.
Proceeding on both sides of the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railway the
Russians should be able to cover the eighty-two miles which still
separates them from the Galician capital within a comparatively short
time, provided that Austrian resistance in this region continues as
weak as it has been up to date.
A greater danger than the capture of Lemberg was, however, presented
by the Russian advance into the Bukowina. If these two Russian
drives--to Lemberg and to Czernowitz--would prove successful the whole
southeastern Austro-Hungarian army would find itself squeezed between
two Russian armies, and its only escape would be into the difficult
Carpathian Mountain passes, where the Russians, this time well
equipped and greatly superior in numbers, could be expected to be more
successful than in their first Carpathian campaign.
Still the Russian advance continued, although on June 11, 1916, there
was a slight slowing down on account of extensive storms that
prevailed along the southern part of the front.
In Galicia, in the region of the villages of Gliadki and Verobieyka,
north of Tarnopol, the Austrians attacked repeatedly and furiously,
but were repulsed on the morning of the 11th. Farther south, however,
near the town of Bobulintze, on the Strypa, fifteen miles north of
Buczacz, the Austro-Hungarians, strongly reenforced by Germans, scored
a substantial success. They launched a furious counterattack, bringing
the Russian assaults to a standstill and even forcing the Muscovite
troops to retreat a short distance. According to the German War Office
more than 1,300 Russian prisoners were taken.
Simultaneously with this partial relief in the south Field Marshal von
Hindenburg began an attack at several points against the Russian right
wing and part of the center. He penetrated the czar's lines at two
points near Jacobstadt, halfway between Riga and Dvinsk, and at
Kochany between Lake Narotch and Dvinsk. At the three other points, in
the Riga zone, south of Lake Drisviaty and on the Lassjolda, his
attacks broke down under the Russian fire.
Lemberg, Galicia's capital, was now threatened from three sides.
Czernowitz, the capital of the Bukowina, was even in a more precarious
position. It had been masked by the extreme left wing of the Russian
armies and, unless some unexpected turn came to the assistance of the
Austrians, its fall was sure to be only a matter of days, or possibly
even of hours. All of southern Volhynia had been overrun by the
Russians who were then, on the ninth day of their offensive, forty-two
miles west of the point from where it had begun in that province.
Northwest of Rojitche, in northwestern Volhynia, after dislodging the
Germans, General Brussilov on June 12, 1916, approached the river
Stokhod. West of Lutsk he occupied Torchin and continued to press the
enemy back.
On the Dniester sector and farther General Lechitsky's troops, having
crossed the river after fighting, captured many fortified points and
also the town of Zaleszcyky, twenty-five miles northwest of
Czernowitz. The village of Jorodenka, ten miles farther, northwest of
Zaleszcyky, also was captured.
On the Pruth sector, between Doyan and Niepokoloutz, the Russian
troops approached the left bank of the river, near the bridgehead of
Czernowitz.
The only point at which the Austrian line held was near Kolki in
northern Volhynia, south of the Styr. There attempts by the Russians
to cross that river failed and some 2,000 men were captured by the
Austro-Hungarians. In the north Field Marshal von Hindenburg's efforts
to divert the Russian activities in the south by a general offensive
along the Dvina line had not developed beyond increased artillery
bombardments which apparently exerted no influence on the movements of
the Russian armies in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukowina.
The only hopeful sign for the fate of the threatened Austro-Hungarian
armies was the fact that the daily number of prisoners taken by the
Russians gradually seemed to decrease, indicating that the Austrians
found it possible by now, if not to withstand the Russian onslaught,
at least to save the largest part of their armies. Even at that the
Russian General Staff claimed to have captured by June 12, 1916, a
total of 1,700 officers and 114,000 men. Inasmuch as it was estimated
that the total Austrian forces on the southwestern front at the
beginning of the operations were 670,000, of which, according to
Russian claims, the losses cannot be less than 200,000, including an
estimated 80,000 killed and wounded, the total losses now constituted
30 per cent of the enemy's effectives.
How the news of the continued Russian successes was received in the
empire's capital and what, at that time, was expected as the immediate
results of this remarkable drive, secondary only to the Austro-German
drive of the summer and fall of 1915, are vividly described in the
following letter, written from Petrograd on June 13, 1916, by a
special correspondent of the London "Times":
"As the successive bulletins recording our unprecedented victories on
the southwestern fronts come to hand, the pride and joy of the Russian
people are becoming too great for adequate expression. There is an
utter absence of noisy demonstrations. The whole nation realizes that
the victory is the result of the combined efforts of all classes,
which have given the soldiers abundant munitions, and of an admirable
organization.
"The remarkable progress in training the reserves since the beginning
of this year was primarily responsible for the enormous increase in
the efficiency of our armies and the heightening of their morale. The
strategy of our southwestern offensive has been seconded by a
remarkable improvement in the railways and communications. Last, but
not least, it must be noted that the Russian high command long ago
recognized that the essential condition of the overthrow of the
Austro-German league, so far as this front is concerned, was the
completion of the work of disintegration in the Austrian armies, in
which Russia has already achieved such wonderful results. At the rate
at which they are at present being exterminated it would require many
weeks completely to exhaust the military resources of the Dual Empire
and to turn the flank of the German position in Poland.
"The consensus of military opinion is inclined to the belief that the
Germans will not venture to transfer large reenforcements to the
Galician front, as it would require too much time and give the Allies
a distinct advantage in other theaters. But as the Germans were
obviously bound to do something to save the Austrian army, they are
endeavoring to create a diversion north of the Pripet in various
directions. The points selected for these efforts are almost
equidistant on the right flank of the Riga front, near Jacobstadt, and
south of Lake Drisviaty, where the enemy's maximum activity
synchronized with General Lechitsky's greatest successes on the
southern front....
"On the southwestern front all eyes are now focused on General
Lechitsky's rapid advance on Zaleszcyky and Czernowitz. As the
official reports show, the Austrians have already blown up a bridge
across the Pruth at Mahala, thus indicating that they entertain scant
hope of being able to hold Czernowitz, and they may even now be
evacuating the city. General Lechitsky's gallant army, which some
months ago stormed the important stronghold of Uscieszko on the
Dniester, has performed prodigies of valor in its advance during the
last few days. The precipitous banks of the Dniester had been
converted into one continuous stronghold which appeared impregnable
and last December defied all our efforts to overcome the enemy's
resistance. In the first few days of the offensive we took one of the
principal positions between Okna and Dobronowce, southeast of
Zaleszcyky. Dobronowce and the surrounding mountains, which are
thickly covered with forests, were regarded by the enemy as a
reliable protection against any advance on Czernowitz. The country
beyond offers no such opportunities for defense.
"General Brussilov's operations on the flanks of the Austro-German
army under Von Linsingen are proceeding with wonderful rapidity. All
the efforts of German reenforcements to drive in a counterwedge at
Kolki, Rozhishshe and Targowica, at the wings and apex of our Rovno
salient, proved ineffectual. On the other hand, we have scored most
important successes west of Dubno, capturing the highly important
point of Demidovka, marking an advance of twenty miles to the west.
Demidovka places us in command of the important forest region of
Dubno, which, as its name indicates, is famous for its oak trees.
These forests form a natural stronghold, of which the Ikva and the
Styr may be compared to immense moats protecting it on two sides. The
possession of this valuable base will enable General Brussilov to
checkmate any further effort on the part of the enemy to counter our
offensive at Targowica, which is situated fifteen miles to the north.
"The valiant troops of our Eighth Army, who have altogether advanced
nearly thirty miles into the enemy's position in the direction of
Kovel, will doubtless be in a position powerfully to assist the thrust
of the troops beyond Tarnopol and join hands with them in the possible
event of an advance on Lemberg."
On June 13, 1914, the progress of the Russian armies continued along
the entire 250-mile front from the Pripet River to the Rumanian
border. The capture of twenty officers, 6,000 men, six cannon, and ten
machine guns brought the total, captured by the Russian troops, up to
about 120,000 men, 1,720 officers, 130 cannon and 260 machine guns,
besides immense quantities of material and munitions.
South of Kovel the Austrians, reenforced by German troops, offered the
most determined resistance near the village of Zaturzi halfway between
Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynski. Southwest of Dubno, in the direction of
Brody and Lemberg, Kozin was stormed by the Russians, who were now
only ten miles from the Galician border. To the north of Buczacz, on
the right bank of the Strypa, a strong counterattack launched by the
Austrians could not prevent the Russians from occupying the western
heights in the region of Gaivivonka and Bobulintze, where only two
days before the Austrians had been able to drive back their opponents.
But the most furious battle of all raged for the possession of
Czernowitz. A serious blow was struck to the Austro-Hungarian
defenders when the Russians captured the town of Sniatyn, on the
Pruth, about twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, on the
Czernowitz-Kolomea-Lemberg railway. This seriously threatened the
brave garrison which held the capital of the Bukowina, as it put the
Russians in a position where they could sweep southward and cut off
the defenders of Czernowitz, if they should hold out to the last. In
fact the entire Austro-Hungarian army in the Bukowina was now facing
this peril.
The first massed attack against Von Hindenburg's lines since the
offensive in the south began was delivered on June 13, 1916, when,
after a systematic artillery preparation by the heaviest guns at the
Russians' disposal, troops in dense formation launched a furious
assault against the Austro-German positions north of Baranovitchy. The
attack was repeated six times, but each broke down under the Teuton
fire with serious losses to the attackers, who in their retreat were
placed under the fire of their own artillery.
Baranovitchy is an important railway intersection of great
strategical value and saw some of the fiercest fighting during the
Russian retreat in the fall of 1915. It is the converging point of
the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow and Vilna-Rovno railways. Sixty-one miles
to the west lies Lida, one of the commanding points of the entire
railway systems of western Russia.
Again, on June 14, 1916, the number of prisoners in the hands of the
Russians was increased by 100 officers and 14,000 men, bringing the
grand total up to over 150,000. All along the entire front the
Russians pressed their advance, gaining considerable ground, without,
however, achieving any success of great importance.
Closer and closer the lines were drawn about Czernowitz, though on
June 16, 1916, the city was still reported as held by the Austrians.
On that day furious fighting also took place south of Buczacz, where
the Russians in vain attempted to cross the Dniester in order to join
hands with their forces which were advancing from the north against
Czernowitz with Horodenka, on the south bank of the Dniester as a
base. To the west of Lutsk in the direction toward Kovel, now
apparently the main objective of General Brussilov, the
Austro-Hungarians had received strong German reenforcements under
General von Linsingen and successfully denied to the Russians a
crossing over the Stokhod and Styr Rivers.
June 17, 1916, was a banner day in the calendar of the Russian troops.
It brought them once more into possession of the Bukowinian capital,
Czernowitz.
Czernowitz is one of the towns whose people have suffered most
severely from the fluctuating tide of war.
Its cosmopolitan population, the greater part of whom are Germans,
have seen it change hands no less than five times in twenty-one
months. The first sweep of the Russian offensive in September, 1914,
carried beyond it, but they had to capture it again two months later,
when they proceeded to drive the Austrians out of the whole of the
Bukowina. By the following February, however, the Austrians, with
German troops to help them, were again at its gates, and they forced
the Russians to retire beyond the Pruth. For a week the battle raged
about the small town of Sudagora, opposite Czernowitz, the seat of a
famous dynasty of miracle-working rabbis, but the forces of the
Central Powers were in overwhelming numbers, and with the loss of
Kolomea--the railway junction forty-five miles to the west, which the
Russians were again rapidly approaching--the whole region became
untenable and the Russians retired to the frontier.
Czernowitz is a clean and pleasant town of recent date. A century ago
it was an insignificant village of 5,000 people. To-day it has several
fine buildings, the most conspicuous of which is the Episcopal Palace,
with a magnificent reception hall. In one of the squares stands the
monument erected in 1875 to commemorate the Austrian occupation of
the Bukowina.
The population consists for the most part of Germans, Ruthenes,
Rumanians, and Poles. Among these are 21,000 Jews and there are also a
number of Armenians and gypsies. With all these diverse elements,
therefore, the town presents a very varied appearance, and on market
days the modern streets are crowded with peasants, attired in their
national dress, who mingle with people turned out in the latest
fashions of Paris and Vienna.
How violently the Russians assaulted Czernowitz is vividly described
in a letter from a correspondent of a German newspaper who was at
Czernowitz during this attack.
"The attack began on June 11, 1916. Shells fell incessantly, mostly in
the lower quarter of the town and the neighborhood of the station.
They caused a terrible panic. Incendiary shells started many fires.
"Austrian artillery replied vigorously. The Russians during the night
of June 12, 1916, attempted a surprise attack against the northeast
corner defenses, launching a tremendous artillery fire against them
and then sending storming columns forward. These were stopped,
however, by the defenders, who prevented a crossing of the Pruth,
inflicting severe losses upon the Russians.
"The Russian artillery attack on the morning of June 16, 1916, was
terrific. It resembled a thousand volcanoes belching fire. The whole
town shook. Austrian guns replied with equal intensity. The Russians
advanced in sixteen waves and were mown down and defeated. Hundreds
were drowned. Russian columns were continually pushed back from the
Pruth beyond Sudagora."
Serious, though, this loss was to the Central Powers, they had one
consolation left. Before the fall of Czernowitz the Austro-Hungarian
forces were able to withdraw and only about 1,000 men fell into
Russian captivity. In one respect then the Russians had not gained
their point. The Austrian army in the Bukowina was still in the field.
Slowly but steadily the force of Von Hindenburg's offensive in the
north increased. On the day on which Czernowitz fell attacks were
delivered at many points along the 150-mile line between Dvinsk in the
north and Krevo in the south. Some local successes were gained by the
Germans, but generally speaking this offensive movement failed in its
chief purpose, namely, to lessen the strength of the Russian attack
against the Austrian lines.
A more substantial gain was made by the combined German and
Austro-Hungarian forces, opposing the Russians west of Lutsk, in order
to stop their advance against Kovel. There the Germans drove back the
center of General Brussilov's front and captured 3,500 men, 11
officers, some cannon, and 10 machine guns.
On the day of Czernowitz's fall the official English newspaper
representative with the Russian armies of General Brussilov secured a
highly interesting statement from this Russian general who, by his
remarkable success, had so suddenly become one of the most famous
figures of the great war.
"The sweeping successes attained by my armies are not the product of
chance, or of Austrian weakness, but represent the application of all
the lessons which we have learned in two years of bitter warfare
against the Germans. In every movement, great or small, that we have
made this winter, we have been studying the best methods of handling
the new problems which modern warfare presents.
"At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked
the preparations which the Germans have been making for the past fifty
years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian
troops and Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that,
given the munitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past
two weeks.
"The main element of our success was due to the absolute coordination
of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with
which the various branches of the service supported each other.
"On our entire front the attack began at the same hour and it was
impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to
another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points.
"The most important fighting has been in the sector between Rovno, and
here we have made our greatest advances, which are striking more
seriously at the strategy of the whole enemy front in the east.
"If we are able to take Kovel there is reason to believe that the
whole eastern front will be obliged to fall back, as Kovel represents
a railway center which has been extraordinarily useful for the
intercommunications of the Germans and Austrians.
"That this menace is fully realized by the enemy is obvious from the
fact that the Germans are supporting this sector with all the
available troops that can be rushed up. Some are coming from the west
and some from points on the eastern front to the north of us.
"In all of this fighting the Russian infantry has proved itself
superb, with a morale which is superior even to that of 1914, when we
were sweeping through Galicia for the first time. This is largely due
to the fact that the army now represents the feeling of the whole
people of Russia, who are united in their desire to carry the war to
its final and successful conclusion."
To the question how he had been able to make such huge captures of
prisoners the Russian general replied:
"The nature of modern trenches, which makes them with their deep
tunnels and maze of communications, so difficult to destroy, renders
them a menace to their own defenders once their position is taken in
rear or flank, for it is impossible to escape quickly from these
elaborate networks of defenses.
"Besides, we have for the first time had sufficient ammunition to
enable us to use curtain fire for preventing the enemy from retiring
from his positions, save through a scathing zone of shrapnel fire,
which renders surrender imperative."