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Transcriber's note:
Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. Hyphenation
and accentuation have been made consistent. All other
inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's
spelling has been retained.
Page 26: "notwithstanding he or they may believe to the
contrary" has been changed to "notwithstanding what he or
they may believe to the contrary".
Pages 178/179: Words are missing between "cross-" and "of"
in the sentence: Ten miles west of Kolki the Russians
succeeded in cross-of Gruziatin, two miles north of
Godomitchy, the small German garrison of which, consisting
of some five hundred officers and men, fell into Russian
captivity.
Page 200: "during pursuit of the Russians" has been
changed to "during pursuit by the Russians".
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: Jutland.]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Battle of Jutland Bank . Russian
Offensive . Kut-El-Amara
East Africa . Verdun . The
Great Somme Drive . United
States and Belligerents
Summary of Two Years' War
VOLUME V
P . F . Collier & Son . New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
PART I.--AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER Page
I. Austrian Ambassador Implicated in Strike Plots--his
Recall--Ramifications of German Conspiracies 9
II. The Plot To Destroy Ships--Pacific Coast
Conspiracies--Hamburg-American Case--Scope of New York
Investigations 15
III. Von Rintelen's Activities--Congressman Involved--Germany's
Repudiations--Dismissal of Captains Boy-Ed and
Von Papen 22
IV. Great Britain's Defense of Blockade--American
Methods in Civil War Cited 28
V. British Blockade Denounced As Illegal and Ineffective
by the United States--The American Position 35
VI. Great Britain Unyielding--Effect of the Blockade--The
Chicago Meat Packers' Case 44
VII. Seizure of Suspected Ships--Trading With the Enemy--The
Appam--The Anglo-French Loan--Ford Peace Expedition 49
VIII. American Pacificism--Preparedness--Munition Safeguard 54
PART II.--OPERATIONS ON THE SEA
IX. Naval Engagements in Many Waters 59
X. Minor Engagements and Losses 66
XI. The Battle of Jutland Bank--Beginning 70
XII. Some Secondary Features of the Battle 89
XIII. Losses and Tactics 94
XIV. Death of Lord Kitchener--Other Events of the Second Year 108
PART III.--CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XV. The Eastern Front at the Approach of Spring, 1916 116
XVI. The Russian March--Offensive from Riga to Pinsk 122
XVII. Resumption of Austro-Russian Operations 133
XVIII. Thaw and Spring Floods 141
XIX. Artillery Duels 149
XX. The Great Russian Offensive 154
XXI. The Russian Reconquest of the Bukowina 162
XXII. In Conquered East Galicia 173
XXIII. The German Counteroffensive Before Kovel 178
XXIV. Progress of the Bukowinian Conquest 183
XXV. Temporary Lull in the Russian Offensive 188
XXVI. Advance Against Lemberg and Kovel 192
XXVII. The Germans' Stand on the Stokhod 198
XXVIII. Increased Strength of the Russian Drive 207
PART IV.--THE BALKANS
XXIX. Holding Fast in Saloniki 212
XXX. Military and Political Events in Greece 216
PART V.--AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
XXXI. Resumption of Operations on the Italian Front 229
XXXII. The Spring of 1916 on the Austro-Italian Front 235
XXXIII. The Austrian May Drive in the Trentino 244
XXXIV. The Rise and Failure of the Austro-Hungarian Drive 255
XXXV. The Italian Counteroffensive in the Trentino 265
XXXVI. Continuation of the Italian Counteroffensive 276
XXXVII. Minor Operations on the Austro-Italian Front in
Trentino Offensive 283
PART VI.--RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XXXVIII. Russian Successes After Erzerum 292
PART VII.--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA
XXXIX. Renewed Attempt To Relieve Kut-el-Amara 307
XL. The Surrender of Kut-el-Amara 318
XLI. Spring and Summer Trench War on the Tigris 326
XLII. Russian Advance Toward Bagdad 330
XLIII. Turkish Offensive and Russian Counteroffensive in
Armenia and Persia 335
PART VIII.--OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT
XLIV. Renewal of the Battle of Verdun 340
XLV. The Struggle for Vaux Fort and Village--Battle of
Mort Homme 348
XLVI. Battle of Hill 304 and Douaumont--The Struggle at
Fleury 361
XLVII. Spring Operations in Other Sectors 371
XLVIII. Battle of the Somme--Allied Preparations--Position
of the Opposing Forces 377
XLIX. The British Attack 382
L. The French Attacks North and South of the Somme 387
LI. The British Attack (Continued) 392
LII. The Second Phase of the Battle of the Somme 401
PART IX.--THE WAR IN THE AIR
LIII. The Value of Zeppelins in Long-Distance
Reconnoitering--Naval Auxiliaries 412
LIV. Aeroplane Improvements--Giant Machines--Technical
Developments 418
LV. Losses and Casualties in Aerial Warfare--Discrepancies
in Official Reports--"Driven Down" and "Destroyed" 424
LVI. Aerial Combats and Raids 427
PART X.--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
LVII. War Cloud in Congress 433
LVIII. The President Upheld in Armed-Merchantmen Issue--Final
Crisis With Germany 439
LIX. The American Ultimatum--Germany Yields 449
TWO YEARS OF THE WAR. _By Frank H. Simonds_
The German Problem 461
The Belgian Phase 463
The French Offensive 466
The Battle of the Marne 469
The End of the First Western Campaign 472
The Russian Phase 476
Tannenberg and Lemberg 476
Warsaw and Lodz 479
The Galician Campaign 480
The Battle of the Dunajec 481
Russia Survives 484
The Balkan Campaign 484
In the West 487
Italy 488
Verdun 488
The February Attack 490
Later Phases 491
Gettysburg 493
The Austrian Offensive 494
Germany Loses the Offensive 495
The Russian Attack 496
The Battle of the Somme 499
Gorizia 499
As the Third Year Begins 501
THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR, STATEMENTS FROM THE BRITISH,
FRENCH, AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS TO THE UNITED STATES 503
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Jutland _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
Queen Mary, British Battle Cruiser 78
Earl Kitchener 110
Austrian 30.5-Centimeter Gun 158
Austrian Intrenchment High on a Mountain 238
German Crown Prince Giving Crosses for Valor 350
French Aviation Camp Near Verdun 366
U-C-5, German Mine-Laying Submarine 446
Motor-Mounted French 75's 494
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Expansion of the War--Dates on Which Declarations of War
Were Made (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Battle of Jutland Bank, the
Plate I--Distribution of Forces 74
Plate II--Running Fight to the Southward 77
Plate III--Running Fight to the Northward 79
Plate IV--British Grand Fleet Approaching from Northwest 81
Plate V--British Grand Fleet Coming into Action 83
Plate VI--Jellicoe and Beatty Acting Together to "Cap"
German Fleet 85
Plate VII--Jellicoe and Beatty Pass Around the German
Flank, "Capping" It 86
Plate VIII--British Forces Heading Off to Southward to
Avoid Attack During Darkness 88
Plate IX--Movement of Forces 103
Plate X--Movement of Jellicoe's Forces on May 31 105
Plate XI--What Von Scheer Should Have Done 106
Eastern Battle Front, August, 1916 119
Russian Offensive from Pinsk To Dubno, The 157
Russian Offensive in Galicia, The 175
Italian Front, The 241
Austrian Offensive, May, 1916, Detail of 263
Gorizia 272
Kut-el-Amara 322
Russians in Persia, The 333
Russians in Armenia, The 338
Western Battle Front, August, 1916 343
Four Zone Maps (_colored_) _Opposite_ 344
Verdun, First Attack on 346
Verdun, Northeast District in Detail 352
Verdun, Northwest District in Detail 356
Mort Homme Sector in Detail 364
Verdun to St. Mihiel 366
Verdun Gain up to August, 1916 369
Sector Where Grand Offensive was Started 379
English Gains, The 394
French Gains, The 406
Two Years of the War
August 18, 1914, When the Belgian Retreat to Antwerp
Began 465
August 23, 1914, After the Allies Had Lost All the First
Battles 467
September 6, 1914, the Battle of the Marne 471
September 20, 1914, the Deadlock 473
November 15, 1914, the End of the Western Campaign 475
October 24, 1914, the Battle of the Vistula 478
October 1, 1915, at the End of the Russian Retreat 483
The Conquest of Serbia, December, 1915 485
The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916 497
Austro-Italian Campaigns, May to September, 1916 500
PART I--AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER I
AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS--HIS
RECALL--RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES
Public absorption in German propaganda was abating when attention
became directed to it again from another quarter. An American war
correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, a passenger on the liner
_Rotterdam_ from New York, who was suspected by the British
authorities of being a bearer of dispatches from the German and
Austrian Ambassadors at Washington, to their respective Governments,
was detained and searched on the steamer's arrival at Falmouth on
August 30, 1915. A number of confidential documents found among his
belongings were seized and confiscated, the British officials
justifying their action as coming within their rights under English
municipal law. The character of the papers confirmed the British
suspicions that Archibald was misusing his American passport by acting
as a secret courier for countries at war with which the United States
was at peace.
The seized papers were later presented to the British Parliament and
published. In a bulky dossier, comprising thirty-four documents found
in Archibald's possession, was a letter from the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, to Baron Burian, the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. In this letter Dr. Dumba took "this
rare and safe opportunity" of "warmly recommending" to the Austrian
Foreign Office certain proposals made by the editor of a
Hungarian-American organ, the "Szabadsag," for effecting strikes in
plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and others in the Middle West
engaged in making munitions for the Allies.
The United States Government took a serious view of the letter
recommending the plan for instigating strikes in American factories.
Dr. Dumba, thrown on his defense, explained to the State Department
that the incriminating proposals recommended in the document did not
originate from him personally, but were the fruit of orders received
from Vienna. This explanation was not easily acceptable. The
phraseology of Dr. Dumba far from conveyed the impression that he was
submitting a report on an irregular proposal inspired by instructions
of the Austrian Government. Such a defense, however, if accepted, only
made the matter more serious. Instead of the American Government
having to take cognizance of an offensive act by an ambassador, the
Government which employed him would rather have to be called to
account. Another explanation by Dr. Dumba justified his letter to
Vienna on the ground that the strike proposal urged merely represented
a plan for warning all Austrians and Hungarians, employed in the
munition factories, of the penalties they would have to pay if they
ever returned to their home country, after aiding in producing weapons
and missiles of destruction to be used against the Teutonic forces.
This defense also lacked convincing force, as the letter indicated
that the aim was so to cripple the munition factories that their
output would be curtailed or stopped altogether--an object that could
only be achieved by a general strike of all workers.
The Administration did not take long to make up its mind that the time
for disciplining foreign diplomats who exceeded the duties of their
office had come. On September 8, 1915, Austria-Hungary was notified
that Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba was no longer acceptable as that
country's envoy in Washington. The American note dispatched to
Ambassador Penfield at Vienna for transmission to the Austrian Foreign
Minister was blunt and direct. After informing Baron Burian that Dr.
Dumba had admitted improper conduct in proposing to his Government
plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants, the
United States thus demanded his recall:
"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba to conspire
to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States
and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant
violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen,
protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official
dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the
President directs us to inform your excellency that Dr. Dumba is no
longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the
Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty at Washington."
Dr. Dumba was not recalled by his Government until September 22, 1915,
fourteen days after the American demand. Meanwhile Dr. Dumba had
cabled to Vienna, requesting that he be ordered to return on leave of
absence "to report." His recall was ostensibly in response to his
personal request, but the Administration objected to this resort to a
device intended to cloak the fact that he was now _persona non grata_
whose return was really involuntary, and would not recognize a recall
"on leave of absence." His Government had no choice but to recall him
officially in view of the imminent contingency that otherwise he would
be ousted, and in that case would be denied safe conduct from capture
by an allied cruiser in his passage across the ocean. His request for
passports and safe conduct was, in fact, disregarded by the
Administration, which informed him that the matter was one to be dealt
directly with his Government, pending whose official intimation of
recall nothing to facilitate his departure could be done. On the
Austrian Government being notified that Dr. Dumba's departure "on
leave of absence" would not be satisfactory, he was formally recalled
on September 28, 1915.
The seized Archibald dossier included a letter from the German
military attache, Captain Franz von Papen, to his wife, containing
reference to Dr. Albert's correspondence, which left no doubt that the
letters were genuine:
"Unfortunately, they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the
elevated (a New York street railroad). The English secret service of
course. Unfortunately, there were some very important things from my
report among them such as buying up liquid chlorine and about the
Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents regarding the
buying up of phenol and the acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patent.
But things like that must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to
see how we protect ourselves. We composed the document to-day."
The "document" evidently was Dr. Albert's explanation discounting the
significance and importance of the letters. This explanation was
published on August 20, 1915.
The foregoing disclosures of documents covered a wide range of
organized German plans for embarrassing the Allies' dealings with
American interests; but they related rather more to accomplished
operations and such activities as were revealed to be under way--e. g.,
the acquisition of munitions combined with propaganda for an
embargo--were not deemed to be violative of American law. But this
stage of intent to clog the Allies' facilities for obtaining sinews of
war, in the face of law, speedily grew to one of achievement more or
less effective according to the success with which the law interposed
to spoil the plans.
The autumn and winter of 1915 were marked by the exposure of a number
of German plots which revealed that groups of conspirators were in
league in various parts of the country, bent on wrecking munition
plants, sinking ships loaded with Allies' supplies, and fomenting
strikes. Isolated successes had attended their efforts, but
collectively their depredations presented a serious situation. The
exposed plots produced clues to secret German sources from which a
number of mysterious explosions at munition plants and on ships had
apparently been directed. Projected labor disturbances at munition
plants were traced to a similar origin. The result was that the docket
of the Federal Department of Justice became laden with a motley
collection of indictments which implicated fifty or more individuals
concerned in some dozen conspiracies, in which four corporations were
also involved.
These cases only represented a portion of the criminal infractions of
neutrality laws, which had arisen since the outbreak of the war. In
January, 1916, an inquiry in Congress directed the Attorney General to
name all persons "arrested in connection with criminal plots affecting
the neutrality of our Government." Attorney General Gregory furnished
a list of seventy-one indicted persons, and the four corporations
mentioned. A list of merely arrested persons would not have been
informative, as it would have conveyed an incomplete and misleading
impression. Such a list, Mr. Gregory told Congress, would not include
persons indicted but never arrested, having become fugitives from
justice; nor persons indicted but never arrested, having surrendered;
but would include persons arrested and not proceeded against. Thus
there were many who had eluded the net of justice by flight and some
through insufficient evidence. The seventy-one persons were concerned
in violations of American neutrality in connection with the European
war.
The list covered several cases already recorded in this history,
namely:
A group of Englishmen, and another of Montenegrins, involved in
so-called enlistment "plots" for obtaining recruits on American soil
for the armies of their respective countries.
The case of Werner Horn, indicted for attempting to destroy by an
explosive the St. Croix railroad bridge between Maine and New
Brunswick.
A group of nine men, mainly Germans, concerned in procuring bogus
passports to enable them to take passage to Europe to act as spies.
Eight were convicted, the ninth man, named Von Wedell, a fugitive
passport offender, was supposed to have been caught in England and
shot.
The Hamburg-American case, in which Dr. Karl Buenz, former German
Consul General in New York, and other officials or employees of that
steamship company, were convicted (subject to an appeal) of defrauding
the Government in submitting false clearance papers as to the
destinations of ships sent from New York to furnish supplies to German
war vessels in the Atlantic.
A group of four men, a woman, and a rubber agency, indicted on a
similar charge, their operations being on the Pacific coast, where
they facilitated the delivery of supplies to German cruisers when in
the Pacific in the early stages of the war.
There remain the cases which, in the concatenation of events, might
logically go on record as direct sequels to the public divulging of
the Albert and Archibald secret papers. These included:
A conspiracy to destroy munition-carrying ships at sea and to murder
the passengers and crews. Indictments in these terms were brought
against a group of six men--Robert Fay, Dr. Herbert O. Kienzie, Walter
L. Scholz, Paul Daeche, Max Breitung, and Engelbert Bronkhorst.
A conspiracy to destroy the Welland Canal and to use American soil as
a base for unlawful operations against Canada. Three men, Paul Koenig,
a Hamburg-American line official, R. E. Leyendecker, and E. J.
Justice, were involved in this case.
A conspiracy to destroy shipping on the Pacific Coast. A German baron,
Von Brincken, said to be one of the kaiser's army officers; an
employee of the German consulate at San Francisco, C. C. Crowley; and
a woman, Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell, were the offenders.
A conspiracy to prevent the manufacture and shipment of munitions to
the allied powers. A German organization, the National Labor Peace
Council, was indicted on this charge, as well as a wealthy German,
Franz von Rintelen, described as an intimate friend of the German
Crown Prince, and several Americans known in public life.
In most of these cases the name of Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the German
naval attache, or Captain Franz von Papen, the German military
attache, figured persistently. The testimony of informers confirmed
the suspicion that a wide web of secret intrigue radiated from sources
related to the German embassy and enfolded all the conspiracies,
showing that few, if any, of the plots, contemplated or accomplished,
were due solely to the individual zeal of German sympathizers.
CHAPTER II
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS--PACIFIC COAST
CONSPIRACIES--HAMBURG-AMERICAN CASE--SCOPE OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATIONS
The plot of Fay and his confederates to place bombs on ships carrying
war supplies to Europe was discovered when a couple of New York
detectives caught Fay and an accomplice, Scholz, experimenting with
explosives in a wood near Weehawken, N. J., on October 24, 1915. Their
arrests were the outcome of a police search for two Germans who
secretly sought to purchase picric acid, a component of high
explosives which had become scarce since the war began. Certain
purchases made were traced to Fay. On the surface Fay's offense seemed
merely one of harboring and using explosives without a license; but
police investigations of ship explosions had proceeded on the theory
that the purchases of picric acid were associated with them.
Fay confirmed this surmise. He described himself as a lieutenant in
the German army, who, with the sanction of the German secret
information service, had come to the United States after sharing in
the Battle of the Marne, to perfect certain mine devices for
attachment to munition ships in order to cripple them. In a Hoboken
storage warehouse was found a quantity of picric acid he had deposited
there, with a number of steel mine tanks, each fitted with an
attachment for hooking to the rudder of a vessel, and clockwork and
wire to fire the explosive in the tanks. In rooms occupied by Fay and
Scholz were dynamite and trinitrotoluol (known as T-N-T), many caps of
fulminate of mercury, and Government survey maps of the eastern coast
line and New York Harbor. The conspirators' equipment included a fast
motor boat that could dart up and down the rivers and along the water
front where ships were moored, a high-powered automobile, and four
suit cases containing a number of disguises. The purpose of the
enterprise was to stop shipments of arms and ammunitions to the
Allies. The disabling of ships, said Fay, was the sole aim, without
destruction of life. To this end he had been experimenting for several
months on a waterproof mine and a detonating device that would operate
by the swinging of a rudder, to which the mine would be attached,
controlled by a clock timed to cause the explosion on the high seas.
The German secret service, both Fay and Scholz said, had provided them
with funds to pursue their object. Fay's admission to the police
contained these statements:
"I saw Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen on my arrival in this
country. Captain Boy-Ed told me that I was doing a dangerous thing. He
said that political complications would result and he most assuredly
could not approve of my plans. When I came to this country, however, I
had letters of introduction to both those gentlemen. Both men warned
me not to do anything of the kind I had in mind. Captain von Papen
strictly forbade me to attach any of the mines to any of the ships
leaving the harbors of the United States. But anyone who wishes to,
can read between the lines.
"The plan on which I worked was to place a mine on the rudder post so
that when it exploded it would destroy the rudder and leave the ship
helpless. There was no danger of any person being killed. But by this
explosion I would render the ship useless and make the shipment of
munitions so difficult that the owners of ships would be intimidated
and cause insurance rates to go so high that the shipment of
ammunition would be seriously affected, if not stopped."
The Federal officials questioned the statement that Fay's design was
merely to cripple munition ships. Captain Harold C. Woodward of the
Corps of Engineers, a Government specialist on explosives, held that
if the amount of explosive, either trinitrotoluol, or an explosive
made from chlorate of potash and benzol, required by the mine caskets
found in Fay's possession, was fired against a ship's rudder, it would
tear open the stern and destroy the entire ship, if not its passengers
and crew, so devastating would be the explosive force. A mine of the
size Fay used, three feet long and ten inches by ten inches, he said,
would contain over two cubic feet:
"If the mine was filled with trinitrotoluol the weight of the high
explosive would be about 180 pounds. If it was filled with a mixture
of chlorate of potash and benzol the weight would be probably 110
pounds. Either charge if exploded on the rudder post would blow a hole
in the ship.
"The amount of high explosive put into a torpedo or a submarine mine
is only about 200 pounds. It must not be forgotten that water is
practically noncompressible, and that even if the explosion did not
take place against the ship the effect would be practically the same.
Oftentimes a ship is sunk by the explosion of a torpedo or a mine
several feet from the hull.
"Furthermore, if the ship loaded with dynamite or high explosive, and
the detonating wave of the first explosion reaches that cargo, the
cargo also would explode. In high explosives the detonating wave in
the percussion cap explodes the charge in much the same manner in
which a chord struck on a piano will make a picture wire on the wall
vibrate if both the wire and the piano string are tuned alike.
"Accordingly, if a ship carrying tons of high explosive is attacked
from the outside by a mine containing 100 pounds of similar explosive,
the whole cargo would go up and nothing would remain of either ship or
cargo."
Therefore the charge made against Fay and Scholz, and four other men
later arrested, Daeche, Kienzie, Bronkhorst, and Breitung, namely,
conspiracy to "destroy a ship," meant that and all the consequences to
the lives of those on board. Breitung was a nephew of Edward N.
Breitung, the purchaser of the ship _Dacia_ from German ownership,
which was seized by the French on the suspicion that its transfer to
American registry was not bona fide.
The plot was viewed as the most serious yet bared. Fay and his
confederates were credited with having spent some $30,000 on their
experiments and preparations, and rumor credited them with having
larger sums of money at their command.
The press generally doubted if they could have conducted their
operations without such financial support being extended them in the
United States. A design therefore was seen in Fay's statement that he
was financed from Germany to screen the source of this aid by
transferring the higher responsibility _in toto_ to official persons
in Germany who were beyond the reach of American justice. These and
other insinuations directed at the German Embassy produced a statement
from that quarter repudiating all knowledge of the Fay conspiracy, and
explaining that its attaches were frequently approached by "fanatics"
who wanted to sink ships or destroy buildings in which munitions were
made.
A similar conspiracy, but embracing the destruction of railroad
bridges as well as munition ships and factories, was later revealed on
the Pacific Coast. Evidence on which indictments were made against the
men Crowley, Von Brincken, and a woman confederate aforementioned,
named Captain von Papen, the German military attache, as the director
of the plot. The accused were also said to have had the cooperation of
the German Consul General at San Francisco. The indictments charged
them, _inter alia_, with using the mails to incite arson, murder, and
assassination. Among the evidence the Government unearthed was a
letter referring to "P," which, the Federal officials said, meant
Captain von Papen. The letter, which related to a price to be paid for
the destruction of a powder plant at Pinole, Cal., explained how the
price named had been referred to others "higher up." It read:
"Dear Sir: Your last letter with clipping to-day, and note what you
have to say. I have taken it up with them and 'B' [which the Federal
officials said stood for Franz Bopp, German Consul at San Francisco]
is awaiting decision of 'P' [said to stand for Captain von Papen in
New York], so cannot advise you yet, and will do so as soon as I get
word from you. You might size up the situation in the meantime."
The indictments charged that the defendants planned to destroy
munition plants at Aetna and Gary, Ind., at Ishpeming, Mich., and at
other places. The Government's chief witness, named Van Koolbergen,
told of being employed by Baron von Brincken, of the German Consulate
at San Francisco, to make and use clockwork bombs to destroy the
commerce of neutral nations. For each bomb he received $100 and a
bonus for each ship damaged or destroyed. For destroying a railway
trestle in Canada over which supply trains for the Allies passed, he
said he received first $250, and $300 further from a representative of
the German Government, the second payment being made upon his
producing newspaper clippings recording the bridge's destruction. It
appeared that Van Koolbergen divulged the plot to the Canadian
Government.
The three defendants and Van Koolbergen were later named in another
indictment found by a San Francisco Federal Grand Jury, involving in
all sixty persons, including the German Consul General in that city,
Franz Bopp, the Vice Consul, Baron Eckhardt, H. von Schack, Maurice
Hall, Consul for Turkey, and a number of men identified with shipping
and commercial interests.
The case was the first in which the United States Government had asked
for indictments against the official representatives of any of the
belligerents. The warrants charged a conspiracy to violate the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law by attempting to damage plants manufacturing munitions
for the Allies, thus interfering with legitimate commerce, and with
setting on foot military expeditions against a friendly nation in
connection with plans to destroy Canadian railway tunnels.
The vice consul, Von Schack, was also indicted with twenty-six of the
defendants on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by
sending supplies to German warships in the earlier stages of the war,
the supplies having been sent from New York to the German Consulate in
San Francisco. The charges related to the outfitting of five vessels.
One of the latter, the _Sacramento_, now interned in a Chilean port,
cleared from San Francisco, and when out to sea, the Government
ascertained, was taken in command by the wireless operator, who was
really a German naval reserve officer. Off the western coast of South
America the _Sacramento_ was supposed to have got into wireless
communication with German cruisers then operating in the Pacific.
There she joined the squadron under a show of compulsion, as though
held up and captured. In this guise the war vessels seemingly convoyed
the _Sacramento_ to an island in the Pacific, where her cargo of food,
coal, and munitions were transferred to her supposed captors. The
_Sacramento_ then proceeded to a Chilean port where her commanding
officer reported that he had been captured by German warships and
deprived of his cargo. The Chilean authorities doubted the story and
ordered the vessel to be interned.
Far more extensive were unlawful operations in this direction
conducted by officials of the Hamburg-American line, as revealed at
their trial in New York City in November, 1915. The indictments
charged fraud against the United States by false clearances and
manifests for vessels chartered to provision, from American ports,
German cruisers engaged in commerce destroying. The prosecution
proceeded on the belief that the Hamburg-American activities were
merely part of a general plan devised by German and Austrian
diplomatic and consular officers to use American ports, directly and
indirectly, as war bases for supplies. The testimony in the case
involved Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attache, who was named as
having directed the distribution of a fund of at least $750,000 for
purposes described as "riding roughshod over the laws of the United
States." The defense freely admitted chartering ships to supply German
cruisers at sea, and in fact named a list of twelve vessels, so
outfitted, showing the amount spent for coal, provisions, and charter
expenses to have been over $1,400,000; but of this outlay only $20,000
worth of supplies reached the German vessels. The connection of
Captain Boy-Ed with the case suggested the defense that the implicated
officials consulted with him as the only representative in the United
States of the German navy, and were really acting on direct orders
from the German Government, and not under the direction of the naval
attache. Military necessity was also a feasible ground for pleading
justification in concealing the fact that the ships cleared to deliver
their cargoes to German war vessels instead of to the ports named in
their papers. These ports were professed to be their ultimate
destinations if the vessels failed to meet the German cruisers. Had
any other course been pursued, the primary destinations would have
become publicly known and British and other hostile warships
patrolling the seas would have been on their guard. The defendants
were convicted, but the case remained open on appeal.
About the same time the criminal features of the Teutonic propaganda
engaged the lengthy attention of a Federal Grand Jury sitting in New
York City. A mass of evidence had been accumulated by Government
agents in New York, Washington, and other cities. Part of this
testimony related to the Dumba and Von Papen letters found in the
Archibald dossier. Another part concerned certain revelations a former
Austrian consul at San Francisco, Dr. Joseph Goricar, made to the
Department of Justice. This informant charged that the German and
Austrian Governments had spent between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 in
developing an elaborate spy system in the United States with the aim
of destroying munition plants, obtaining plans of American
fortifications, Government secrets, and passports for Germans desiring
to return to Germany. These operations, he said, were conducted with
the knowledge of Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Captains
Boy-Ed and Von Papen were also named as actively associated with the
conspiracy, as well as Dr. von Nuber, the Austrian Consul General in
New York, who, he said, directed the espionage system and kept card
indices of spies in his office.
The investigation involved, therefore, diplomatic agents, who were
exempt from prosecution; a number of consuls and other men in the
employ of the Teutonic governments while presumably connected with
trustworthy firms; and notable German-Americans, some holding public
office.
Contributions to the fund for furthering the conspiracy, in addition
to the substantial sums believed to be supplied by the German and
Austrian Governments, were said to have come freely from many Germans,
citizens and otherwise, resident in the United States. The project,
put succinctly, was "to buy up or blow up the munition plants." The
buying up, as previously shown, having proved to be impracticable, an
alternative plan presented itself to "tie up" the factories by
strikes. This was Dr. Dumba's miscarried scheme, which aimed at
bribing labor leaders to induce workmen, in return for substantial
strike pay, to quit work in the factories. Allied to this design was
the movement to forbid citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary from
working in plants supplying munitions to their enemies. Such
employment, they were told, was treasonable. The men were offered high
wages at other occupations if they would abandon their munition work.
Teutonic charity bazaars held throughout the country and agencies
formed to help Teutons out of employment were regarded merely as means
to influence men to leave the munition plants and thus hamper the
export of war supplies. Funds were traced to show how money traveled
through various channels from the fountainhead to men working on
behalf of the Teutonic cause. Various firms received sums of money, to
be paid to men ostensibly in the employ of the concerns, but who in
reality were German agents working under cover.
Evidence collected revealed these various facts of the Teutonic
conspiracy. But the unfolding of such details before the Grand Jury
was incidental to the search for the men who originated the scheme,
acted as almoners or treasurers, or supervised, as executives, the
horde of German and Austrian agents intriguing on the lower slopes
under their instructions.
CHAPTER III
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES--CONGRESSMAN INVOLVED--GERMANY'S
REPUDIATIONS--DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED AND VON PAPEN
In this quest the mysterious movements and connections of one German
agent broadly streaked the entire investigation. This person was Von
Rintelen, supposed to be Dr. Dumba's closest lieutenant ere that
envoy's presence on American soil was dispensed with by President
Wilson. Von Rintelen's activities belonged to the earlier period of
the war, before the extensive ramifications of the criminal phases of
the German propaganda were known. At present he was an enforced
absentee from the scenes of his exploits, being either immured by the
British in the Tower of London, or in a German concentration camp as a
spy. This inglorious interruption to the role he appeared to play
while in the United States as a peripatetic Midas, setting plots in
train by means of an overflowing purse, was due to an attempt to
return to Germany on the liner _Noordam_ in July, 1915. The British
intercepted him at Falmouth, and promptly made him a prisoner of war
after examining his papers.
Whatever was Von Rintelen's real mission in the United States in the
winter of 1914-15, he was credited with being a personal emissary and
friend of the kaiser, bearing letters of credit estimated to vary
between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000. The figure probably was
exaggerated in view of the acknowledged inability of the German
interests in the United States to command anything like the lesser sum
named to acquire all they wanted--control of the munition plants. His
initial efforts appeared to have been directed to a wide advertising
campaign to sway American sentiment against the export of arms
shipments. His energies, like those of others, having been fruitless
in this field, he was said to have directed his attention to placing
large orders under cover for munitions with the object of depleting
the source of such supplies for the Allies, and aimed to control some
of the plants by purchasing their stocks. The investigation in these
channels thus contributed to confirm the New York "World's" charges
against German officialdom, based on its expose of the Albert
documents. Mexican troubles, according to persistent rumor, inspired
Von Rintelen to use his ample funds to draw the United States into
conflict with its southern neighbor as a means of diverting munition
supplies from the Allies for American use. He and other German agents
were suspected of being in league with General Huerta with a view to
promoting a new revolution in Mexico.
The New York Grand Jury's investigations of Von Rintelen's activities
became directed to his endeavors to "buy strikes." The outcome was the
indictment of officials of a German organization known under the
misleading name of the National Labor Peace Council. The persons
accused were Von Rintelen himself, though a prisoner in England; Frank
Buchanan, a member of Congress; H. Robert Fowler, a former
representative; Jacob C. Taylor, president of the organization; David
Lamar, who previously had gained notoriety for impersonating a
congressman in order to obtain money and known as the "Wolf of Wall
Street," and two others, named Martin and Schulties, active in the
Labor Peace Council and connected with a body called the Antitrust
League. They were charged with having, in an attempt to effect an
embargo (which would be in the interest of Germany) on the shipment of
war supplies, conspired to restrain foreign trade by instigating
strikes, intimidating employees, bribing and distributing money among
officers of labor organizations. Von Rintelen was said to have
supplied funds to Lamar wherewith the Labor Peace Council was enabled
to pursue these objects. One sum named was $300,000, received by Lamar
from Von Rintelen for the organization of this body; of that sum Lamar
was said to have paid $170,000 to men connected with the council.
The Labor Peace Council was organized in the summer of 1915, and met
first in Washington, when resolutions were passed embracing proposals
for international peace, but were viewed as really disguising a
propaganda on behalf of German interests. The Government sought to
show that the organization was financed by German agents and that its
crusade was part and parcel of pro-German movements whose
ramifications throughout the country had caused national concern.
Von Rintelen's manifold activities as chronicled acquired a tinge of
romance and not a little of fiction, but the revelations concerning
him were deemed sufficiently serious by Germany to produce a
repudiation of him by the German embassy on direct instructions from
Berlin, i. e.:
"The German Government entirely disavows Franz Rintelen, and
especially wished to say that it issued no instructions of any kind
which could have led him to violate American laws."
It is essential to the record to chronicle that American sentiment did
not accept German official disclaimers very seriously. They were too
prolific, and were viewed as apologetic expedients to keep the
relations between the two governments as smooth as possible in the
face of conditions which were daily imperiling those relations.
Germany appeared in the position of a Frankenstein who had created a
hydra-headed monster of conspiracy and intrigue that had stampeded
beyond control, and washed her hands of its depredations. The
situation, however, was only susceptible to this view by an inner
interpretation of the official disclaimers. In letter, but not in
spirit, Germany disowned her own offspring by repudiating the deeds of
plotters in terms which deftly avoided revealing any ground for the
suspicion--belied by events--that those deeds had an official
inception. Germany, in denying that the plotters were Government
"agents," suggested that these men pursued their operations with the
recognition that they alone undertook all the risks, and that if
unmasked it was their patriotic duty not to betray "the cause," which
might mean their country, the German Government, or the German
officials who directed them. Not all the exposed culprits had been
equal to this self-abnegating strain on their patriotism; some, like
Fay, were at first talkative in their admissions that their pursuits
were officially countenanced, another recounted defense of Werner
Horn, who attempted to destroy a bridge connecting Canada and the
United States, even went so far as to contend that the offense was
military--an act of war--and therefore not criminal, on the plea that
Horn was acting as a German army officer. In other cases incriminating
evidence made needless the assumption of an attitude by culprits of
screening by silence the complicity of superiors. Yet despite almost
daily revelations linking the names of important German officials,
diplomatic and consular, with exposed plots, a further repudiation
came from Berlin in December, 1915, when the New York Grand Jury's
investigation was at high tide. This further disavowal read:
"The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly accepted the
support of any person, group of persons, society or organization
seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by
illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contravention of law, or by
any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride
of their own authority.... I can only say, and do most emphatically
declare to Germans abroad, to German-American citizens of the United
States, to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of
conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness of
thought, suggestion or deed against life, property, and order in the
United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause and a source of
embarrassment to the German Government, notwithstanding what he or they
may believe to the contrary."
The stimulus for this politic disavowal, and one must be sought, since
German statements always had a genesis in antecedent events--was not
apparently due to continued plot exposures, which were too frequent,
but could reasonably be traced to a ringing address President Wilson
had previously made to Congress on December 7, 1915. The President,
amid the prolonged applause of both Houses, meeting in joint session,
denounced the unpatriotism of many Americans of foreign descent. He
warned Congress that the gravest threats against the nation's peace
and safety came from within, not from without. Without naming
German-Americans, he declared that many "had poured the poison of
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life," and called
for the prompt exercise of the processes of law to purge the country
"of the corrupt distempers brought on by these citizens."
"I am urging you," he said in solemn tones, "to do nothing less than
save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of
passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out."
Three days before this denunciation, the Administration had demanded
from Germany the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, respectively
the military aid and naval attache of the German embassy. Unlike the
procedure followed in requesting Dr. Dumba's recall, no reasons were
given. None according to historic usage were necessary, and if
reasons were given, they could not be questioned. It was sufficient
that a diplomatic officer was _non persona grata_ by the fact that his
withdrawal was demanded.
Germany, through her embassy, showed some obduracy in acting upon a
request for these officials' recall without citing the cause of
complaint. There was an anxiety that neither should be recalled with
the imputation resting upon them that they were concerned, say, in the
so-called Huerta-Mexican plot--if one really existed--or with the
conspiracies to destroy munition plants and munition ships, or, in
Captain Boy-Ed's case, in the Hamburg-American line's chartered ships
for provisioning of German cruisers, sailing with false manifests and
clearance papers.
An informal note from Secretary Lansing to Count von Bernstorff so far
acceded to the request for a bill of particulars, though not
customary, that the German embassy professed to be satisfied.
Secretary Lansing stated that Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen had
rendered themselves unacceptable by "their activities in connection
with naval and military affairs." This was intended to mean that such
activities here indicated had brought the two officials in contact
with private individuals in the United States who had been involved in
violation of the law. The incidents and circumstances of this contact
were of such a cumulative character that the two attaches could no
longer be deemed as acceptable to the American Government. Here was an
undoubted implication of complicity by association with wrongdoers,
but not in deed. The unofficial statement of the cause of complaint
satisfied the embassy in that it seemed to relieve the two officers
from the imputation of themselves having violated American laws. The
record stood, however, that the United States had officially refused
to give any reasons for demanding their recall. Germany officially
recalled them on December 10, 1915, and before the year was out they
quitted American soil under safe conducts granted by the British
Government.
Captain von Papen, however, was not permitted to escape the clutches
of the British on the ocean passage. While respecting his person, they
seized his papers. These, duly published, made his complicity in the
German plots more pronounced than ever. His check counterfoils showed
a payment of $500 to "Mr. de Caserta, Ottawa." De Caserta was
described in British records as "a dangerous German spy, who takes
great risks, has lots of ability, and wants lots of money." He was
supposed to have been involved in conspiracies in Canada to destroy
bridges, armories, and munition factories. He had offered his services
to the British Government, but they were rejected. Later he was
reported to have been shot or hanged in London as a spy.
Another check payment by Captain von Papen was to Werner Horn for
$700. Horn, as before recorded, was the German who attempted to blow
up a railroad bridge at Vanceboro, Maine. Other payments shown by the
Von Papen check book were to Paul Koenig, of the Hamburg-American
line. Koenig was arrested in New York in December, 1915, on a charge
of conspiracy with others to set on foot a military expedition from
the United States to destroy the locks of the Welland Canal for the
purpose of cutting off traffic from the Great Lakes to the St.
Lawrence River.
The German consul at Seattle was shown to have received $500 from
Captain von Papen shortly before an explosion occurred there in May,
1915, and $1,500 three months earlier. Another payment was to a
German, who, while under arrest in England on a charge of being a spy,
committed suicide.
CHAPTER IV
GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE--AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL WAR
CITED
Issues with Great Britain interposed to engage the Administration's
attention, in the brief intervals when Germany's behavior was not
doing so, to the exclusion of all other international controversies
produced by the war. In endeavoring to balance the scales between the
contending belligerents, the United States had to weigh judicially the
fact that their offenses differed greatly in degree. Germany's crimes
were the wanton slaughter of American and other neutral noncombatants,
Great Britain's the wholesale infringements of American and neutral
property rights. Protests menacing a rupture of relations had to be
made in Germany's case; but those directed to Great Britain, though
not less forceful in tone, could not equitably be accompanied by a
hint of the same alternative. Arbitration by an international court
was the final recourse on the British issues. Arbitration could not be
resorted to, in the American view, for adjusting the issues with
Germany.
The Anglo-American trade dispute over freedom of maritime commerce by
neutrals during a war occupied an interlude in the crisis with
Germany. The dispatch of the third _Lusitania_ note of July 21, 1915,
promised a breathing spell in the arduous diplomatic labors of the
Administration, pending Germany's response. But a few days later the
Administration became immersed in Great Britain's further defense of
her blockade methods, contained in a group of three communications,
one dated July 24, and two July 31, 1915, in answer to the American
protests of March 31, July 14, and July 15, 1915. The main document,
dated July 24, 1915, showed both Governments to be professing and
insisting upon a strict adherence to the same principles of
international law, while sharply disagreeing on the question whether
measures taken by Great Britain conformed to those principles.
The United States had objected to certain interferences with neutral
trade Great Britain contemplated under her various Orders in Council.
The legality of these orders the United States contested. Great
Britain was notified by a caveat, sent July 14, 1915, that American
rights assailed by these interferences with trade would be construed
under accepted principles of international law. Hence prize-court
proceedings based on British municipal legislation not in conformity
with such principles would not be recognized as valid by the United
States.
Great Britain defended her course by stating the premise that a
blockade was an allowable expedient in war--which the United States
did not question--and upon that premise reared a structure of argument
which emphasized the wide gap between British and American
interpretations of international law. A blockade being allowable,
Great Britain held that it was equally allowable to make it effective.
If the only way to do so was to extend the blockade to enemy commerce
passing through neutral ports, then such extension was warranted. As
Germany could conduct her commerce through such ports, situated in
contiguous countries, almost as effectively as through her own ports,
a blockade of German ports alone would not be effective. Hence the
Allies asserted the right to widen the blockade to the German commerce
of neutral ports, but sought to distinguish between such commerce and
the legitimate trade of neutrals for the use and benefit of their own
nationals. Moreover, the Allies forebore to apply the rule, formerly
invariable, that ships with cargoes running a blockade were
condemnable.
On the chief point at issue Sir Edward Grey wrote:
"The contention which I understand the United States Government now
puts forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his
commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through
ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere and
must restrict his measure of blockade in such a manner as to leave
such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary.
"This is a contention which his Majesty's Government feel unable to
accept and which seems to them unsustained either in point of law or
upon principles of international equity. They are unable to admit that
a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law
by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut out the enemy's
commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the
circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade
the only means of making it effective."
In this connection Sir Edward Grey recalled the position of the United
States in the Civil War, when it was under the necessity of declaring
a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast line, a military operation for
which the number of vessels available was at first very small:
"It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great struggle
that they should be able to cut off the trade of the Southern States.
The Confederate armies were dependent on supplies from overseas, and
those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the cotton
wherewith to pay for them.
"To cut off this trade the United States could only rely upon a
blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in
part due to the fact that neighboring neutral territory afforded
convenient centers from which contraband could be introduced into the
territory of their enemies and from which blockade running could be
facilitated.
"In order to meet this new difficulty the old principles relating to
contraband and blockade were developed, and the doctrine of continuous
voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods destined for the
enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports
from which they were to be reexported. The difficulties which imposed
upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old
rules are somewhat akin to those with which the Allies are now faced
in dealing with the trade of their enemy."
Though an innovation, the extension of the British blockade to a
surveillance of merchandise passing in and out of a neutral port
contiguous to Germany was not for that reason impermissible. Thus that
preceded the British contention, which, moreover, recognized the
essential thing to be observed in changes of law and usages of war
caused by new conditions was that such changes must "conform to the
spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war." The phrase
was cited from the American protest by way of buttressing the argument
to show that the United States itself, as evident from the excerpt
quoted, had freely made innovations in the law of blockade within this
restriction, but regardless of the views or interests of neutrals.
These American innovations in blockade methods, Great Britain
maintained, were of the same general character as those adopted by the
allied powers, and Great Britain, as exemplified in the _Springbok_
case, had assented to them. As to the American contention that there
was a lack of written authority for the British innovations or
extensions of the law of blockade, the absence of such pronouncements
was deemed unessential. Sir Edward Grey considered that the function
of writers on international law was to formulate existing principles
and rules, not to invent or dictate alterations adapting them to
altered circumstances.
So, to sum up, the modifications of the old rules of blockade adopted
were viewed by Great Britain as in accordance with the general
principles on which an acknowledged right of blockade was based. They
were not only held to be justified by the exigencies of the case, but
could be defended as consistent with those general principles which
had been recognized by both governments.
The United States declined to accept the view that seizures and
detentions of American ships and cargoes could justifiably be made by
stretching the principles of international law to fit war conditions
Great Britain confronted, and assailed the legality of the British
tribunals which determined whether such seizures were prizes. Great
Britain had been informed:
"... So far as the interests of American citizens are concerned the
Government of the United States will insist upon their rights under
the principles and rules of international law as hitherto established,
governing neutral trade in time of war, without limitation or
impairment by order in council or other municipal legislation by the
British Government, and will not recognize the validity of prize-court
proceedings taken under restraints imposed by British municipal law in
derogation of the rights of American citizens under international
law."
British prize-court proceedings had been fruitful of bitter grievances
to the State Department from the American merchants affected. Sir
Edward Grey pointed out that American interests had this remedy in
challenging prize-court verdicts:
"It is open to any United States citizen whose claim is before the
prize court to contend that any order in council which may affect his
claim is inconsistent with the principles of international law, and
is, therefore, not binding upon the court.
"If the prize court declines to accept his contentions, and if, after
such a decision has been upheld on appeal by the judicial committee of
His Majesty's Privy Council, the Government of the United States
considers that there is serious ground for holding that the decision
is incorrect and infringes the rights of their citizens, it is open to
them to claim that it should be subjected to review by an
international tribunal."
One complaint of the United States, made on July 15, 1915, had been
specifically directed to the action of the British naval authorities
in seizing the American steamer _Neches_, sailing from Rotterdam to an
American port, with a general cargo. The ground advanced to sustain
this action was that the goods originated in part at least in Belgium,
and hence came within the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, which
stipulated that every merchant vessel sailing from a port other than a
German port, carrying goods of enemy origin, might be required to
discharge such goods in a British or allied port. The _Neches_ had
been detained at the Downs and then brought to London. Belgian goods
were viewed as being of "enemy origin," because coming from territory
held by Germany. This was the first specific case of the kind arising
under British Orders in Council affecting American interests, the
goods being consigned to United States citizens.
Great Britain on July 31, 1915, justified her seizure of the _Neches_
as coming within the application of her extended blockade, as
previously set forth, which with great pains she had sought to prove
to the United States was permissible, under international law. Her
defense in the _Neches_ case, however, was viewed as weakened by her
citing Germany's violations of international law to excuse her
extension of old blockade principles to the peculiar circumstances of
the present war. In intimating that so long as neutrals tolerated the
German submarine warfare, they ought not to press her to abandon
blockade measures that were a consequence of that warfare, Great
Britain was regarded as lowering her defense toward the level of the
position taken by Germany. Sir Edward Grey's plan was thus phrased:
"His Majesty's Government are not aware, except from the published
correspondence between the United States and Germany, to what extent
reparation has been claimed from Germany by neutrals for loss of
ships, lives, and cargoes, nor how far these acts have been the
subject even of protest by the neutral governments concerned.
"While these acts of the German Government continue, it seems neither
reasonable nor just that His Majesty's Government should be pressed to
abandon the rights claimed in the British note and to allow goods from
Germany to pass freely through waters effectively patrolled by British
ships of war."
Such appeals the American Government had sharply repudiated in
correspondence with Germany on the submarine issue. Great Britain,
however, unlike Germany, did not admit that the blockade was a
reprisal, and therefore without basis of law, on the contrary, she
contended that it was a legally justifiable measure for meeting
Germany's illegal acts.
The British presentation of the case commanded respect, though not
agreement, as an honest endeavor to build a defense from basic facts
and principles by logical methods. One commendatory view, while not
upholding the contentions, paid Sir Edward Grey's handling of the
British defense a generous tribute, albeit at the expense of Germany:
"It makes no claim which offends humane sentiment or affronts the
sense of natural right. It makes no insulting proposal for the barter
or sale of honor, and it resorts to no tricks or evasions in the way
of suggested compromise. It seeks in no way to enlist this country as
an auxiliary to the allied cause under sham pretenses of humane
intervention."
The task before the State Department of making a convincing reply to
Sir Edward Grey's skillful contentions was generally regarded as one
that would test Secretary Lansing's legal resources. The problem was
picturesquely sketched by the New York "Times":
"The American eagle has by this time discovered that the shaft
directed against him by Sir Edward Grey was feathered with his own
plumage. To meet our contentions Sir Edward cites our own seizures and
our own court decisions. It remains to be seen whether out of strands
plucked from the mane and tail of the British lion we can fashion a
bowstring which will give effective momentum to a counterbolt launched
in the general direction of Downing Street."
CHAPTER V
BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL AND INEFFECTIVE BY THE UNITED
STATES--THE AMERICAN POSITION
Secretary Lansing succeeded in accomplishing the difficult task
indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter. The American
reply to the British notes was not dispatched until October 21, 1915,
further friction with Germany having intervened over the _Arabic_. It
constituted the long-deferred protest which ex-Secretary Bryan vainly
urged the President to make to Great Britain simultaneously with the
sending of the third _Lusitania_ note to Germany. The President
declined to consider the issues on the same footing or as susceptible
to equitable diplomatic survey unless kept apart.
The note embraced a study of eight British communications made to the
American Government in 1915 up to August 13, relating to blockade
restrictions on American commerce imposed by Great Britain. It had
been delayed in the hope that the announced intention of the British
Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible
consideration for the interest of neutrals," and their intention of
"removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American
cargoes," and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience
to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurance
to the United States Government that they would make it their first
aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken
by the allied governments," would in practice not unjustifiably
infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in
trade and commerce. The hope had not been realized.
The detentions of American vessels and cargoes since the opening of
hostilities, presumably under the British Orders in Council of August
20 and October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915, formed one specific
complaint. In practice these detentions, the United States contended,
had not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of
seizure. Many vessels had been detained while search was made for
evidence of the contraband character of cargoes, or of intention to
evade the nonintercourse measures of Great Britain. The question
became one of evidence to support a belief--in many cases a bare
suspicion--of enemy destination or of enemy origin of the goods
involved. The United States raised the point that this evidence should
be obtained by search at sea, and that the vessel and cargo should not
be taken to a British port for the purpose unless incriminating
circumstances warranted such action. International practice to support
this view was cited. Naval orders of the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 to the opening of
the present war showed that search in port was not contemplated by the
government of any of these countries.
Great Britain had contended that the American objection to search at
sea was inconsistent with American practice during the Civil War.
Secretary Lansing held that the British view of the American sea
policy of that period was based on a misconception:
"Irregularities there may have been at the beginning of that war, but
a careful search of the records of this Government as to the practice
of its commanders shows conclusively that there were no instances when
vessels were brought into port for search prior to instituting prize
court proceedings, or that captures were made upon other grounds than,
in the words of the American note of November 7, 1914, evidence found
on the ship under investigation and not upon circumstances ascertained
from external sources."
Great Britain justified bringing vessels to port for search because of
the size and seaworthiness of modern carriers and the difficulty of
uncovering at sea the real transaction owing to the intricacy of
modern trade operations. The United States submitted that such
commercial transactions were essentially no more complex and disguised
than in previous wars, during which the practice of obtaining evidence
in port to determine whether a vessel should be held for prize-court
proceedings was not adopted. As to the effect of size and
seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon search at sea, a board of naval
experts reported:
"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in
fact greater than in former times, and no difference, so far as the
necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen between the search
of a ship of a thousand tons and one of twenty thousand tons, except
possibly a difference in time, for the purpose of establishing fully
the character of her cargo and the nature of her service and
destination."
The new British practice, which required search at port instead of
search at sea, in order that extrinsic evidence might be sought (i. e.,
evidence other than that derived from an examination of the ship
at sea), had this effect:
"Innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on mere
suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous
sources to justify the detention and the commencement of prize
proceedings. The effect of this new procedure is to subject traders to
risk of loss, delay and expense so great and so burdensome as
practically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States
to neutral countries of Europe."
The American note next assailed the British interpretation of the
greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great
Britain's enemies. These increases, Sir Edward Grey contended, raised
a presumption that certain commodities useful for military purposes,
though destined for those countries, were intended for reexportation
to the belligerents, who could not import them directly. Hence the
detention of vessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries
was justified. Secretary Lansing denied that this contention could be
accepted as laying down a just and legal rule of evidence:
"Such a presumption is too remote from the facts and offers too great
opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if the rule were
adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with
impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a rule of legal presumption
this Government cannot accede, as it is opposed to those fundamental
principles of justice which are the foundation of the jurisprudence of
the United States and Great Britain."
In this connection Secretary Lansing seized upon the British
admission, made in the correspondence, that British exports to those
neutral countries had materially increased since the war began. Thus
Great Britain concededly shared in creating a condition relied upon as
a sufficient ground to justify the interception of American goods
destined to neutral European ports. The American view of this
condition was:
"If British exports to those ports should be still further increased,
it is obvious that under the rule of evidence contended for by the
British Government, the presumption of enemy destinations could be
applied to a greater number of American cargoes, and American trade
would suffer to the extent that British trade benefited by the
increase. Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to
such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be
so seriously impaired.
"When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of
merchandise for sale in a neutral country it is an unwarranted and
inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to
whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or
use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from
trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain
evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell
goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as
illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere
with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous
supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew
or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the
neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his
rights of trade."
The British practice had run counter to the assurances Great Britain
made in establishing the blockade, which was to be so extensive as to
prohibit all trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the
ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain admitted
that the blockade should not, and promised that it would not,
interfere with the trade of countries contiguous to her enemies.
Nevertheless, after six months' experience of the "blockade," the
United States Government was convinced that Great Britain had been
unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish between enemy and neutral
trade.
The United States challenged the validity of the blockade because it
was ineffective in stopping all trade with Great Britain's enemies. A
blockade, to be binding, must be maintained by force sufficient to
prevent all access to the coast of the enemy, according to the
Declaration of Paris of 1856, which the American note quoted as
correctly stating the international rule as to blockade that was
universally recognized. The effectiveness of a blockade was manifestly
a question of fact:
"It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to trade with
the Scandinavian countries and that German naval vessels cruise both
in the North Sea and the Baltic and seize and bring into German ports
neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. Furthermore,
from the recent placing of cotton on the British list of contraband of
war it appears that the British Government had themselves been forced
to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent
shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are
doubtful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have
sought to maintain."
Moreover, a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all
nations. The American note cited the Declaration of London and the
prize rules of Germany, France, and Japan, in support of that
principle. In addition, "so strictly has this principle been enforced
in the past that in the Crimean War the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council on appeal laid down that if belligerents themselves
trade with blockaded ports they cannot be regarded as effectively
blockaded. (The Franciska, Moore, P. C. 56). This decision has
special significance at the present time since it is a matter of
common knowledge that Great Britain exports and reexports large
quantities of merchandise to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland,
whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she regards as
blockaded."
Finally, the law of nations forbade the blockade of neutral ports in
time of war. The Declaration of London specifically stated that "the
blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts."
This pronouncement the American Government considered a correct
statement of the universally accepted law as it existed to-day and
prior to the Declaration of London. Though not regarded as binding
upon the signatories because not ratified by them, the Declaration of
London, the American note pointed out, had been expressly adopted by
the British Government, without modification as to blockade, in the
Order in Council of October 9, 1914. More than that, Secretary Lansing
recalled the views of the British Government "founded on the decisions
of the British Courts," as expressed by Sir Edward Grey in instructing
the British delegates to the conference which formulated the
Declaration of London, and which had assembled in that city on the
British Government's invitation in 1907. These views were:
"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coast of the enemy, but
it may be instituted of one port or of several ports or of the whole
of the seaboard of the enemy. It may be instituted to prevent the
ingress only, or egress only, or both."
The United States Government therefore concluded that, measured by the
three universally conceded tests above set forth, the British policy
could not be regarded as constituting a blockade in law, in practice,
or in effect. So the British Government was notified that the American
Government declined to recognize such a "blockade" as legal.
Stress had been laid by Great Britain on the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States on the _Springbok_ case. The ruling was
that goods of contraband character, seized while going to the neutral
port of Nassau, though actually bound for the blockaded ports of the
South, were subject to condemnation. Secretary Lansing recalled that
Sir Edward Grey, in his instruction to the British delegates to the
London conference before mentioned, expressed this view of the case,
as held in England prior to the present war:
"It is exceedingly doubtful whether the decision of the Supreme Court
was in reality meant to cover a case of blockade running in which no
question of contraband arose. Certainly if such was the intention the
decision would _pro tanto_ be in conflict with the practice of the
British courts. His Majesty's Government sees no reason for departing
from that practice, and you should endeavor to obtain general
recognition of its correctness."
The American note also pointed out that "the circumstances surrounding
the _Springbok_ case were essentially different from those of the
present day to which the rule laid down in that case is sought to be
applied. When the _Springbok_ case arose the ports of the confederate
states were effectively blockaded by the naval forces of the United
States, though no neutral ports were closed, and a continuous voyage
through a neutral port required an all sea voyage terminating in an
attempt to pass the blockading squadron."
Secretary Lansing interjected new elements into the controversy in
assailing as unlawful the jurisdiction of British prize courts over
neutral vessels seized or detained. Briefly, Great Britain arbitrarily
extended her domestic law, through the promulgation of Orders in
Council, to the high seas, which the American Government contended
were subject solely to international law. So these Orders in Council,
under which the British naval authorities acted in making seizures of
neutral shipping, and under which the prize courts pursued their
procedure, were viewed as usurping international law. The United
States held that Great Britain could not extend the territorial
jurisdiction of her domestic law to cover seizures on the high seas. A
recourse to British prize courts by American claimants, governed as
those courts were by the same Orders in Council which determined the
conditions under which seizures and detentions were made, constituted
in the American view, the form rather than the substance of redress:
"It is manifest, therefore, that, if prize courts are bound by the
laws and regulations under which seizures and detentions are made, and
which claimants allege are in contravention of the law of nations,
those courts are powerless to pass upon the real ground of complaint
or to give redress for wrongs of this nature. Nevertheless, it is
seriously suggested that claimants are free to request the prize court
to rule upon a claim of conflict between an Order in Council and a
rule of international law. How can a tribunal fettered in its
jurisdiction and procedure by municipal enactments declare itself
emancipated from their restrictions and at liberty to apply the rules
of international law with freedom? The very laws and regulations which
bind the court are now matters of dispute between the Government of
the United States and that of His Britannic Majesty."
The British Government, in pursuit of its favorite device of seeking
in American practice parallel instances to justify her prize-court
methods, had contended that the United States, in Civil War contraband
cases, had also referred foreign claimants to its prize courts for
redress. Great Britain at the time of the American Civil War,
according to an earlier British note, "in spite of remonstrances from
many quarters, placed full reliance on the American prize courts to
grant redress to the parties interested in cases of alleged wrongful
capture by American ships of war and put forward no claim until the
opportunity for redress in those courts had been exhausted."
This did not appear to be altogether the case, Secretary Lansing
pointed out that Great Britain, during the progress of the Civil War,
had demanded in several instances, through diplomatic channels, while
cases were pending, damages for seizures and detentions of British
ships alleged to have been made without legal justification. Moreover,
"it is understood also that during the Boer War, when British
authorities seized the German vessels, the _Herzog_, the _General_ and
the _Bundesrath_, and released them without prize court proceedings,
compensation for damages suffered was arranged through diplomatic
channels."
The point made here was by way of negativing the position Great
Britain now took that, pending the exhaustion of legal remedies
through the prize courts with the result of a denial of justice to
American claimants, "it cannot continue to deal through the diplomatic
channels with the individual cases."
The United States summed up its protest against the British practice
of adjudicating on the interference with American shipping and
commerce on the high seas under British municipal law as follows:
"The Government of the United States has, therefore, viewed with
surprise and concern the attempt of His Majesty's Government to confer
upon the British prize courts jurisdiction by this illegal exercise of
force in order that these courts may apply to vessels and cargoes of
neutral nationalities, seized on the high seas, municipal laws and
orders which can only rightfully be enforceable within the territorial
waters of Great Britain, or against vessels of British nationality
when on the high seas.
"In these circumstances the United States Government feels that it
cannot reasonably be expected to advise its citizens to seek redress
before tribunals which are, in its opinion, unauthorized by the
unrestricted application of international law to grant reparation, nor
to refrain from presenting their claims directly to the British
Government through diplomatic channels."
The note, as the foregoing series of excerpts show, presented an array
of legal arguments formidable enough to persuade any nation at war of
its wrongdoing in adopting practices that caused serious money losses
to American interests and demoralized American trade with neutral
Europe. Great Britain, however, showed that she was not governed by
international law except in so far as it was susceptible to an elastic
interpretation, and held, by implication, that a policy of expediency
imposed by modern war conditions condoned, if it did not also
sanction, infractions.
Nothing in Great Britain's subsequent actions, nor in the utterances
of her statesmen, could be construed as promising any abatement of the
conditions. In fact, there was an outcry in England that the German
blockade should be more stringent by extending it to all neutral
ports. Sir Edward Grey duly convinced the House of Commons that the
Government could not contemplate such a course, which he viewed as
needless, as well as a wrong to neutrals.
As to the hostility of the neutrals to British blockade methods, Sir
Edward Grey said:
"What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to
be answered--Do they admit our right to apply the principles which
were applied by the American Government in the war between the North
and South--to apply those principles to modern conditions, and to do
our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries?
"If they say 'Yes'--as they are bound in fairness to say--then I would
say to them: 'Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever they may be, do
their best to make it easy for us to distinguish.'
"If, on the other hand, they answer it that we are not entitled to
interrupt trade with the enemy through neutral countries, I must say
definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line, it is a
departure from neutrality."
CHAPTER VI
GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING--EFFECT OF THE BLOCKADE--THE CHICAGO MEAT
PACKERS' CASE
The existing restrictions satisfied Great Britain that Germany,
without being brought to her knees, was feeling the pinch of food
shortage. To that extent--and it was enough in England's view--the
blockade was effective, the contentions of the United States
notwithstanding. So Great Britain's course indicated that she would
not relax by a hair the barrier she had reared round the German coast;
but she sought to minimize the obstacles to legitimate neutral trade,
so far as blockade conditions permitted, and was disposed to pay ample
compensation for losses as judicially determined. The outlook was
that American scores against her could only be finally settled by
arbitral tribunals after the war was over. Satisfaction by arbitration
thus remained the only American hope in face of Great Britain's
resolve to keep Germany's larder depleted and her export trade at a
standstill, whether neutrals suffered or not. Incidentally, the United
States was reminded that in the Civil War it served notice on foreign
governments that any attempts to interfere with the blockade of the
Confederate States would be resented. The situation then, and the
situation now, with the parts of the two countries reversed, were
considered as analogous.
A parliamentary paper showed that the British measures adopted to
intercept the sea-borne commerce of Germany had succeeded up to
September, 1915, in stopping 92 per cent of German exports to America.
Steps had also been taken to stop exports on a small scale from
Germany and Austria-Hungary by parcel post. The results of the
blockade were thus summarized:
"First, German exports to overseas countries have almost entirely
stopped. Exceptions which have been made are cases in which a refusal
to allow the export goods to go through would hurt the neutral country
concerned without inflicting injury upon Germany.
"Second, all shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany have
been carefully scrutinized with a view to the detection of a concealed
enemy destination. Wherever there has been a reasonable ground for
suspecting the destination, the goods have been placed in charge of a
prize court. Doubtful consignments have been detained pending
satisfactory guarantees.
"Third, under agreement with bodies of representative merchants of
several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, stringent guarantees
have been exacted from importers. So far as possible all trade between
neutrals and Germany, whether arising from oversea or in the country
itself, is restricted.
"Fourth, by agreements with shipping lines and by vigorous use of the
power to refuse bunker coal in large proportions the neutral
mercantile marine which trades with Scandinavia and Holland has been
induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent the goods of these
ships from reaching Germany.
"Fifth, every effort is being made to introduce a system of rationing
which will insure that the neutrals concerned will import only such
quantities of articles as are specified as normally imported for their
own consumption."
The case of the Chicago meat packers, involving food consignments to
neutral European countries since the war's outbreak, came before a
British prize court before the American protest had been lodged.
Apparently the issues it raised dictated in some degree the
contentions Secretary Lansing made. The British authorities had seized
thirty-three vessels mainly bearing meat products valued at
$15,000,000, twenty-nine of which had been held without being
relegated for disposal to the prize courts. The remaining four
cargoes, held for ten months, and worth $2,500,000 were confiscated by
a British prize court on September 15, 1915. The goods were declared
forfeited to the Crown. One of the factors influencing the decision
was the sudden expansion in shipments of food products to the
Scandinavian countries immediately after the war began. The president
of the prize court, Sir Samuel Evans, asserted that incoming vessels
were carrying more than thirteen times the amount of goods to
Copenhagen--the destination of the four ships involved--above the
volume which under normal conditions arrived at that port. He cited
lard, the exportation of which by one American firm had increased
twentyfold to Copenhagen in three weeks after the war, and canned
meat, of which Denmark hitherto had only taken small quantities, yet
the seized vessels carried hundreds of thousands of tins.
The confiscation formed the subject of a complaint made by Chicago
beef packers to the State Department on October 6, 1915. The British
Court condemned the cargoes on the grounds: (1) that the goods being
in excess of the normal consumption of Denmark, raised a presumption
that they were destined for, i. e., eventually would find their way
into Germany. (2) That, owing to the highly organized state of
Germany, in a military sense, there was practically no distinction
between the civilian and military population of that country and
therefore there was a presumption that the goods, or a very large
proportion of them, would necessarily be used by the military forces
of the German Empire. (3) That the burden of proving that such goods
were not destined for, i. e., would not eventually get into the hands
of the German forces, must be accepted and sustained by the American
shippers.
The Chicago beef firms besought the Government to register an
immediate protest against the decision of the prize court and demand
from the British Government adequate damages for losses arising from
the seizure, detention and confiscation of the shipments of meat
products. They complained that the judgment and the grounds on which
it was based were contrary to the established principles of
international law, and subversive of the rights of neutrals. The
judgment, they said, was unsupported by fact, and was based on
inferences and presumptions. Direct evidence on behalf of the American
firms interested, to the effect that none of the seized shipments had
been sold, consigned or destined to the armed forces or to the
governments of any enemy of Great Britain, was uncontradicted and
disregarded and the seizures were upheld in the face of an admission
that no precedent of the English courts existed justifying the
condemnation of goods on their way to a neutral port.
An uncompromising defense of the prize court's decision came to the
State Department from the British Government a few days later. Most of
the seizures, it said, were not made under the Order in Council of
March 11, 1915, the validity of which and of similar orders was
disputed by the United States Government. The larger part of the
cargoes were seized long before March, 1915. The ground for the
seizures was that the cargoes were conditional contraband destined
from the first by the Chicago beef packers, largely for the use of the
armies, navies and Government departments of Germany and Austria, and
only sent to neutral ports with the object of concealing their true
destination.
From cablegrams and letters in the possession of the British
Government and produced in court, the statement charged, "it was clear
and that packers' agents in these neutral countries, and also several
of the consigners, who purported to be genuine neutral buyers, were
merely persons engaged by the packers on commission, or sent by the
packers from their German branches for the purpose of insuring the
immediate transit of these consignments to Germany.... No attempt was
made by any written or other evidence to explain away the damning
evidence of the telegrams and letters disclosed by the Crown. The
inference was clear and irresistible that no such attempt could be
made, and that any written evidence there was would have merely
confirmed the strong suspicion, amounting to a practical certainty,
that the whole of the operations of shipment to Copenhagen and other
neutral ports were a mere mask to cover a determined effort to
transmit vast quantities of supplies through to the German and
Austrian armies."
A portion of the Western press had denounced the confiscation as a
"British outrage" and as "robbery by prize court"; but the more
moderate Eastern view was that, while American business men had an
undoubted right to feed the German armies, if they could, they were in
the position of gamblers who had lost if the British navy succeeded in
intercepting the shipments.
Exaggerated values placed on American-owned goods held up for months
at Rotterdam and other neutral ports by British became largely
discounted on October 1, 1915, under the scrutiny of the Foreign Trade
Advisers of the State Department. These goods were German-made for
consignment to the United States, and would only be released if the
British Government were satisfied that they were contracted for by
American importers before March 1, 1915, the date on which the British
blockade of Germany began. Early protests against their detention
complained that $50,000,000 was involved; later the value of the
detained goods was raised to $150,000,000. But actual claims made by
American importers to the British Embassy, through the Foreign Trade
Advisers, seeking the release of the consignments, showed that the
amount involved was not much more than $11,000,000 and would not
exceed $15,000,000 at the most.
CHAPTER VII
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS--TRADING WITH THE ENEMY--THE APPAM--THE
ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN--FORD PEACE EXPEDITION
The next issue the United States raised with Great Britain related to
the seizure of three ships of American registry--the _Hocking_,
_Genesee_ and the _Kankakee_--in November, 1915, on the ground that
they were really German-owned. France had also confiscated the
_Solveig_ of the same ownership for a like reason. The four vessels
belonged to the fleet of the American Transatlantic Steamship Company,
the formation of which under unusual circumstances was recorded
earlier in this history. Great Britain and France served notice that
this company's vessels were blacklisted, and became seizable as prizes
of war because of the suspicion that German interests were behind the
company, and that its American officials with their reputed holdings
of stock were therefore really prizes for German capital. The Bureau
of Navigation had at first refused registry to these vessels, but its
ruling was reversed, and the vessels were admitted, the State
Department taking the view that it could not disregard the company's
declaration of incorporation in the United States, and that its
officers were American citizens. Great Britain sought to requisition
the vessels for navy use without prize-court hearings, but on the
United States protesting she agreed to try the cases.
Another dispute arose, in January, 1916, over the operation of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, one of Great Britain's war measures, the
provisions of which were enlarged to forbid British merchants from
trading with any person or firm, resident in a neutral country, which
had German ownership or German trade connections. The United States
objected to the prohibition as constituting a further unlawful
interference with American trade. It held that in war time the trade
of such a person or firm domiciled in a neutral country had a neutral
status, and consequently was not subject to interference; hence goods
in transit of such a trader were not subject to confiscation by a
belligerent unless contraband and consigned to an enemy country.
An example of the working of the act was the conviction of three
members of a British glove firm for trading with Germany through their
New York branch. They had obtained some $30,000 worth of goods from
Saxony between October, 1915, and January, 1916, the consignments
evading the blockade and reaching New York, whence they were reshipped
to England. One defendant was fined $2,000; the two others received
terms of imprisonment.
While the act would injure American firms affiliated with German
interests, it aimed to press hardest upon traders in neutral European
countries contiguous to Germany who were trading with the Germans and
practically serving as intermediaries to save the Germans from the
effect of the Allies' blockade.
The appearance of a captured British steamer, the _Appam_, at Newport
News, Va., on February 1, 1916, in charge of a German naval
lieutenant, Hans Berg, and a prize crew, involved the United States in
a new maritime tangle with the belligerents. One of the most difficult
problems which Government officials had encountered since the war
began, presented itself for solution. The _Appam_, as elsewhere
described, was captured by a German raider, the _Moewe_ (Sea Gull),
off Madeira, and was crowded with passengers, crews, and German
prisoners taken from a number of other ships the _Moewe_ had sunk.
Lieutenant Berg, for lack of a safer harbor, since German ports were
closed to him, sought for refuge an American port, and claimed for his
prize the privilege of asylum under the protection of American
laws--until he chose to leave. Count von Bernstorff, the German
Ambassador, immediately notified the State Department that Germany
claimed the _Appam_ as a prize under the Prussian-American Treaty of
1828, and would contend for possession of the ship.
This treaty was construed as giving German prizes brought to American
ports the right to come and go. The British Government contested the
German claim by demanding the release of the _Appam_ under The Hague
Convention of 1907. This international treaty provided that a
merchantman prize could only be taken to a neutral port under certain
circumstances of distress, injury, or lack of food, and if she did not
depart within a stipulated time the vessel could not be interned, but
must be restored to her original owners with all her cargo. Were the
_Appam_ thus forcibly released she would at once have been recaptured
by British cruisers waiting off the Virginia Capes. The view which
prevailed officially was that the case must be governed by the
Prussian treaty, a liberal construction of which appeared to permit
the _Appam_ to remain indefinitely at Newport News. This was what
happened, but not through any acquiescence of the State Department in
the German contention. The _Appam_ owners, the British and African
Steam Navigation Company, brought suit in the Federal Courts for the
possession of the vessel, on the ground that, having been brought into
a neutral port, she lost her character as a German prize, and must be
returned to her owners. Pending a determination of this action, the
_Appam_ was seized by Federal marshals under instructions from the
United States District Court, under whose jurisdiction the vessel
remained.
After twelve months of war Great Britain became seriously concerned
over the changed conditions of her trade with the United States.
Before the war the United States, despite its vast resources and
commerce, bought more than it sold abroad, and was thus always a
debtor nation, that is, permanently owing money to Europe. In the
stress of war Great Britain's exports to the United States, like those
of her Allies, declined and her imports enormously increased. She sold
but little of her products to her American customers and bought
heavily of American foodstuffs, cotton, and munitions. The result was
that Great Britain owed a great deal more to the United States than
the latter owed her. The unparalleled situation enabled the United
States to pay off her old standing indebtedness to Europe and became
a creditor nation. American firms were exporting to the allied powers,
whose almoner Great Britain was, commodities of a value of
$100,000,000 a month in excess of the amount they were buying abroad.
Hence what gold was sent from London, at the rate of $15,000,000 to
$40,000,000 monthly, to pay for these huge purchases was wholly
insufficient to meet the accumulating balance of indebtedness against
England.
The effect of this reversal of Anglo-American trade balance was a
decline in the exchange value of the pound sterling, which was
normally worth $4.86-1/2 in American money, to the unprecedented level
of $4.50. This decline in sterling was reflected in different degrees
in the other European money markets, and the American press was
jubilant over the power of the dollar to buy more foreign money than
ever before. Because Europe bought much more merchandise than she sold
the demand in London for dollar credit at New York was far greater
than the demand in New York for pound credit at London. Hence the
premium on dollars and the discount on pounds. It was not a premium
upon American gold over European gold, but a premium on the means of
settling debts in dollars without the use of gold. Europe preferred to
pay the premium rather than send sufficient gold, because, for one
reason, shipping gold was costly and more than hazardous in war time,
and, for another, all the belligerents wanted to retain their gold as
long as they could afford to do so.
An adjustment of the exchange situation and a reestablishment of the
credit relations between the United States and the allied powers on a
more equitable footing was imperative. The British and French
Governments accordingly sent a commission to the United States,
composed of some of their most distinguished financiers--government
officials and bankers--to arrange a loan in the form of a credit with
American bankers to restore exchange values and to meet the cost of
war munitions and other supplies. After lengthy negotiations a loan of
$500,000,000 was agreed upon, at 5 per cent. interest, for a term of
five years, the bonds being purchasable at 98 in denominations as low
as $100. The principal and interest were payable in New York City--in
gold dollars. The proceeds of the loan were to be employed exclusively
in the United States to cover the Allies' trade obligations.
The loan was an attractive one to the American investor, yielding as
it did a fraction over 5-1/2 per cent. It was the only external loan
of Great Britain and France, for the repayment of which the two
countries pledged severally and together their credit, faith, and
resources. No such an investment had before been offered in the United
States.
Strong opposition to the loan came from German-American interests. Dr.
Charles Hexamer, president of the German-American Alliance, made a
country-wide appeal urging American citizens to "thwart the loan" by
protesting to the President and the Secretary of State. Threats were
likewise made by German depositors to withdraw their deposits from
banks which participated in the loan. The Government, after being
consulted, had given assurances that it would not oppose the
transaction as a possible violation of neutrality--if a straight
credit, not as actual loan, was negotiated. Conformity to this
condition made all opposition fruitless.
Toward the close of 1915 an ambitious peace crusade to Europe was
initiated by Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer. Accompanied by
148 pacifists, he sailed on the Scandinavian-American liner, _Oscar
II_, early in December, 1915, with the avowed purpose of ending the
war before Christmas. The expedition was viewed dubiously by the
allied powers, who discerned pro-German propaganda in the presence of
Teutonic sympathizers among the delegates. They also suspected a
design to accelerate a peace movement while the gains of the war were
all on Germany's side, thus placing the onus of continuing hostilities
on the Allies if they declined to recognize the Ford peace party as
mediators. The American Government, regardful of the obligations of
neutrality, notified the several European Governments concerned that
the United States had no connection with the expedition, and assumed
no responsibility for any activities the persons comprising it might
undertake in the promotion of peace.
CHAPTER VIII
AMERICAN PACIFICISM--PREPAREDNESS--MUNITION SAFEGUARD
The Ford peace mission, lightly regarded though it was, nevertheless
recorded itself on the annals of the time as symptomatic of a state of
mind prevailing among a proportion of the American people. It might
almost be said to be a manifestation of the pacifist sentiment of the
country. This spirit found a channel for expression in the Ford
project, bent on hurling its protesting voice at the chancellories of
Europe, and heedless of the disadvantage its efforts labored under in
not receiving the countenance of the Administration.
"The mission of America in the world," said President Wilson in one of
his speeches, "is essentially a mission of peace and good will among
men. She has become the home and asylum of men of all creeds and
races. America has been made up out of the nations of the world, and
is the friend of the nations of the world."
But Europe was deaf alike to official and unofficial overtures of the
United States as a peacemaker. The Ford expedition was foredoomed to
failure, not because it was unofficial--official proposals of
mediation would have been as coldly received--but more because the
pacifist movement it represented was a home growth of American soil.
The European belligerents, inured and case-hardened as they were to a
militarist environment, had not been sufficiently chastened by their
self-slaughter.
The American pacifists, with a scattered but wide sentiment behind
them, consecrated to promoting an abiding world peace, and espousing
the internationalism of the Socialists to that end, and President
Wilson, standing aloof from popular manifestations, a solitary
watchman on the tower, had perforce to wait until the dawning of the
great day when Europe had accomplished the devastating achievement of
bleeding herself before she could extend beckoning hands to American
mediation.
In the autumn of 1915 the President inaugurated his campaign for
national defense, or "preparedness," bred by the dangers more or less
imminent while the European War lasted. "We never know what to-morrow
might bring forth," he warned. In a series of speeches throughout the
country he impressed these views on the people:
The United States had no aggressive purposes, but must be prepared to
defend itself and retain its full liberty and self-development. It
should have the fullest freedom for national growth. It should be
prepared to enforce its right to unmolested action. For this purpose a
citizen army of 400,000 was needed to be raised in three years, and a
strengthened navy as the first and chief line of defense for
safeguarding at all costs the good faith and honor of the nation. The
nonpartisan support of all citizens for effecting a condition of
preparedness, coupled with the revival and renewal of national
allegiance, he said, was also imperative, and Americans of alien
sympathies who were not responsive to such a call on their patriotism
should be called to account.
This, in brief, constituted the President's plea for preparedness. But
such a policy did not involve nor contemplate the conquest of other
lands or peoples, nor the accomplishment of any purpose by force
beyond the defense of American territory, nor plans for an aggressive
war, military training that would interfere unduly with civil
pursuits, nor panicky haste in defense preparations.
The President took a midway stand. He stood between the pacifists and
the extremists, who advocated the militarism of Europe as the
inevitable policy for the United States to adopt to meet the dangers
they fancied.
The country's position, as the President saw it, was stated by him in
a speech delivered in New York City:
"Our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we
gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our
relations with the rest of the world, not our commercial relations,
about those we have thought and planned always, but about our
political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force
in the world to ourselves, our neighbors and the world itself.
"Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible, a
great European conflict involving many of the greatest nations of the
world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All
Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and
imperious voice in a Titanic struggle of governments, and from one end
of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what
our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves
against any interference with our national action or development.
"We have it in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for
defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the
principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of
history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not
by the use of hostile force.
"No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The country
is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations
with all the world. Her resources are known and her self-respect and
her capacity to care for her own citizens and her own rights. There is
no fear among us. Under the new-world conditions we have become
thoughtful of the things which all reasonable men consider necessary
for security and self-defense on the part of every nation confronted
with the great enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is
all."
Readiness for defense was also the keynote of the President's address
to Congress at its opening session in December, 1915; but despite its
earnest plea for a military and naval program, and a lively public
interest, the message was received by Congress in a spirit approaching
apathy.
The President, meantime, pursued his course, advocating his
preparedness program, and in no issue abating his condemnation of
citizens with aggressive alien sympathies.
In one all-important military branch there was small need for anxiety.
The United States was already well armed, though not well manned. The
munitions industry, called into being by the European War, had grown
to proportions that entitled the country to be ranked with first-class
powers in its provision and equipment for rapidly producing arms and
ammunition and other war essentials on an extensive scale. Conditions
were very different at the outset of the war. One of the American
contentions in defense of permitting war-munition exports--as set
forth in the note to Austria-Hungary--was that if the United States
accepted the principle that neutral nations should not supply war
materials to belligerents, it would itself, should it be involved in
war, be denied the benefit of seeking such supplies from neutrals to
amplify its own meager productions.
But the contention that the country in case of war would have to rely
on outside help could no longer be made on the face of the sweeping
change in conditions existing after eighteen months of the war. From
August, 1914, to January, 1916, inclusive, American factories had sent
to the European belligerents shipment after shipment of sixteen
commodities used expressly for war purposes of the unsurpassed
aggregate value of $865,795,668. Roughly, $200,000,000 represented
explosives, cartridges, and firearms; $150,000,000 automobiles and
accessories; and $250,000,000 iron and steel and copper manufacturing.
This production revealed that the United States could meet any war
emergency out of its own resources in respect of supplies. Its army
might be smaller than Switzerland's and its navy inadequate, but it
would have no cause to go begging for the guns and shells needful to
wage war.
How huge factories were built, equipped, and operated in three months,
how machinery for the manufacture of tinware, typewriters, and countless
other everyday articles was adapted to shell making; and how methods for
producing steel and reducing ores were revolutionized--these
developments form a romantic chapter in American industrial history
without a parallel in that of any other country.
The United States, in helping the European belligerents who had free
intercourse with it, was really helping itself. It was building better
than it knew. The call for preparedness, primarily arising out of the
critical relations with Germany, turned the country's attention to a
contemplation of an agreeable new condition--that the European War,
from which it strove to be free, had given it an enormous impetus for
the creation of a colossal industry, which in itself was a long step
in national preparedness, and that much of this preparedness had been
provided without cost. The capital sunk in the huge plants which
supplied the belligerents represented, at $150,000,000, an outlay
amortized or included in the price at which the munitions were sold.
Thus, when the last foreign contract was fulfilled, the United States
would have at its own service one of the world's greatest munition
industries--and Europe will have paid for it.
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS
The months which brought the second year of war to a close were marked
by increased activity on the part of all the navies engaged. Several
single-ship actions took place, and the Germans pursued their
submarine tactics with steady, if not brilliant, results.
It was during this period that they sent the first submersible
merchant ship across the Atlantic and gave further proof of having
developed undersea craft to an amazing state of efficiency. On their
part the British found new and improved methods of stalking submarines
until it was a hazardous business for such craft to approach the
British coast. A considerable number were captured; just how many was
not revealed.
After a slackening in the submarine campaign against merchant ships,
due partly to a division of opinion at home and largely to the growing
protests of neutrals, Germany declared that after March 1, 1916, every
ship belonging to an enemy that carried a gun would be considered an
auxiliary, and torpedoed without warning. (For an account of the
negotiations with the United States in relation to this edict, see
United States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
A spirited fight took place in the North Sea on March 24, 1916, when
the _Greif_, a German auxiliary of 10,000 tons, met the _Alcantara_,
15,300 tons, a converted British merchantman. The _Greif_ was
attempting to slip through the blockade under Norwegian colors when
hailed. She parleyed with the British vessel until the latter came
within a few hundred yards of her. Then, seeing a boat put out, the
German unmasked her guns and opened fire. Broadside after broadside.
In twelve minutes the _Greif_ was on fire and the _Alcantara_ sinking
from the explosion of a torpedo. The _Greif_ might have got away had
not two other British vessels come on the scene, the converted cruiser
_Andes_ ending her days with a few long-range shots. One hundred and
fifteen men and officers out of 300 on the _Greif_ were saved, and the
British lost five officers and sixty-nine men. Both vessels went to
the bottom after as gallant an action as the war had produced. The
_Greif_ was equipped for a raiding cruise and also was believed to
have had on board a big cargo of mines. When the fire started by
exploding shells reaching her hold she blew up with a terrific
detonation and literally was split in twain. Officers of the
_Alcantara_ spoke warmly of their enemy's good showing. One of them
said that they approached to within two hundred yards of the _Greif_
before being torpedoed and boarding parties actually had been ordered
to get ready. They were preparing to lash the rigging of the two
vessels together in the time-honored way and settle accounts with
sheath knives when the torpedo struck and the _Alcantara_ drifted away
helpless.
On the stroke of midnight, February 29, 1916, the German edict went
into effect placing armed merchantmen in a classification with
auxiliary cruisers. The opening of March also was marked by the
deliverance of a German ultimatum in Lisbon, demanding that ships
seized by the Portuguese be surrendered within forty-eight hours.
Thirty-eight German and Austrian steamers had been requisitioned,
striking another blow at Teutonic sea power. Most of these belonged to
Germany. Coincident with Portugal's action Italy commandeered
thirty-four German ships lying in Italian ports, and several others in
her territorial waters. All Austrian craft had been seized months
before, but the fiction of peace with Germany still was punctiliously
observed by both nations. Despite this action Germany did not declare
war upon her quondam ally.
Italy brought another issue sharply to the fore in the early days of
March. A few of her passenger vessels running to America and other
countries had been armed previous to that time. It was done quietly,
and commanders found many reasons for the presence of guns on their
vessels. Of a sudden all Italian passenger craft sailed with 3-inch
pieces fore and aft.
Berlin announced that on the first day of March, 1916, German
submarines had sunk two French auxiliaries off Havre, and a British
patrol vessel near the mouth of the Thames. Paris promptly denied the
statement, and London was noncommittal. No other particulars were made
public. Russian troops landed on the Black Sea coast on March 6, 1916,
under the guns of a Russian naval division and took Atina,
seventy-five miles east of Trebizond, the objective of the Grand Duke
Constantine's army. Thirty Turkish vessels, mostly sailing ships
loaded with war supplies, were sunk along the shore within a few days.
Winston Spencer Churchill, former First Lord of the Admiralty, on
March 7, 1916, delivered a warning in the House of Commons against
what he believed to be inadequate naval preparations. He challenged
statements made by Arthur J. Balfour, his successor, on the navy's
readiness. Mr. Balfour had just presented naval estimates to the
House, and among other things set forth that Britain had increased her
navy by 1,000,000 tons and more than doubled its personnel since
hostilities began. This encouraging assurance impressed the world, but
Colonel Churchill demanded that Sir John Fisher, who had resigned as
First Sea Lord, be recalled to his post.
An announcement from Tokyo, March 8, 1916, served to show the new
friendship between Russia and Japan. Three warships captured by the
Japanese in the conflict with Russia were purchased by the czar and
added to Russian naval forces. They were the _Soya_, the _Tango_ and
the _Sagami_, formerly the _Variag_, _Poltava_ and _Peresviet_, all
small but useful ships. Following the capture of Atina, the Russians
took Rizeh on March 9, 1916, a city thirty-five miles east of
Trebizond, an advance of forty miles in three days toward that
important port. The fleet cooperated, and it was announced that the
defenses of Trebizond itself were under fire and fast crumbling away.
On March 16, 1916, the Holland-Lloyd passenger steamer _Tubantia_, a
vessel of 15,000 tons, was sunk near the Dutch coast by a mine or
torpedo. She was commonly believed to have been the victim of a
submarine. Her eighty-odd passengers and 300 men reached shore.
Several Americans were aboard. Statements by some of the crew that
four persons lost their lives could not be verified, but several of
the _Tubantia's_ officers made affidavit that the vessel was
torpedoed.
The incident aroused public feeling in Holland to fever pitch, and
there were threats of war. Germany hastened to deny that a submarine
attacked the ship, and made overtures to the Dutch Government,
offering reparation if it could be established that a German torpedo
sank the steamer. This was never proved, and nothing came of the
matter. But it cost Germany many friends in Holland and intensified
the fear and hatred entertained toward their neighbor by the majority
of Hollanders. It served to keep Dutch troops, already mobilized,
under arms, and gave Berlin a bad quarter hour.
Fast on the heels of this incident came the sinking of another Dutch
steamer, the _Palembang_, which was torpedoed and went down March 18,
1916, near Galloper Lights in a Thames estuary. Three torpedoes struck
the vessel and nine of her crew were injured. This second attack in
three days upon Dutch vessels wrought indignation in Holland to the
breaking point. The Hague sent a strong protest to Berlin, which again
replied in a conciliatory tone, hinting that an English submarine had
fired on the _Palembang_ in the hope of embroiling Holland with
Germany. This suggestion was instantly rejected by the Dutch press and
people. Negotiations failed to produce any definite result, save to
prolong the matter until tension had been somewhat relieved. The
French destroyer _Renaudin_ fell prey to a submarine in the Adriatic
on the same day. Three officers, including the commander, and
forty-four of her crew, were drowned. Vienna also announced the loss
in the Adriatic of the hospital ship _Elektra_ on March 18, 1916. She
was said to have been torpedoed, although properly marked. One sailor
was killed and two nuns serving as nurses received wounds.
German submarine activity in the vicinity of the Thames was emphasized
March 22, 1916, when the Galloper Lightship, well known to all
seafaring men, went to the bottom after being torpedoed. The vessel
was stationed off dangerous shoals near the mouth of the river. The
Germans suffered the loss of a 7,000-ton steamship on this day, when
the _Esparanza_ was sunk by a Russian warship in the Black Sea. She
had taken refuge in the Bulgarian port of Varna at the outbreak of the
conflict and attempted to reach Constantinople with a cargo of
foodstuffs, but a Russian patrol vessel ended her career.
Another tragedy of the sea came at a moment when strained relations
between Germany and the United States made almost anything probable.
The _Sussex_, a Channel steamer plying between Folkestone and Dieppe,
was hit by a torpedo March 24, 1916, when about three hours' sail from
the former port, and some fifty persons lost their lives. A moment
after the missile struck there was an explosion in the engine room
that spread panic among her 386 passengers, many of whom were Belgian
women and children refugees bound for England. One or two boats
overturned, and a number of frightened women jumped into the water
without obtaining life preservers. Others strapped on the cork jackets
and were rescued hours later. Some of the victims were killed outright
by the impact of the torpedo and the second explosion. Fortunately the
vessel remained afloat and her wireless brought rescue craft from both
sides of the Channel.
The rescuers picked up practically all of those in the water who had
donned life belts and took aboard those in the boats. Many of the
passengers, including several Americans, saw the torpedo's wake. It
was stated that the undersea craft approached the _Sussex_ under the
lee of a captured Belgian vessel, and when within easy target distance
fired the torpedo. According to this version, the Belgian ship then
was compelled to put about and leave the stricken steamer's passengers
and crew to what seemed certain destruction. The presence of this
third craft never was definitely established, although vouched for by
a number of those on the _Sussex_.
Of thirty American passengers five or six sustained painful injuries.
The victims included several prominent persons, one of whom was
Enrique Granados, the Spanish composer, and his wife. They had just
returned from the United States where they had witnessed the
presentation of his opera "Goyescas."
The _Sussex_, which flew the French flag, although owned by a British
company, had no guns aboard and was in no wise an auxiliary craft. She
reached Boulogne in tow, and the American consul there reported that
undoubtedly she had been torpedoed. (For an account of the
negotiations between the United States and Germany in relation to this
affair see United States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
Ambassador Gerard, in Berlin, was instructed to ask the German
Government for any particulars of the incident in its possession, so
as to aid the United States in reaching a conclusion. Berlin, after
much evasion, admitted that a submarine had sunk a vessel near the
spot where the _Sussex_ was lost, but gave it an entirely different
description.
The British converted liner _Minneapolis_, used as a transport, was
torpedoed in the Mediterranean with a loss of eleven lives, although
this vessel also stayed afloat, according to a statement issued in
London, March 26, 1916. She was a ship of 15,543 tons and formerly ran
in the New York-Liverpool service. In a brush between German and
British forces near the German coast, March 25, 1916, a British light
cruiser, the _Cleopatra_, rammed and sunk a German destroyer. The
British destroyer _Medusa_ also was sunk, but her crew escaped to
other vessels. In addition the Germans lost two of their armed fishing
craft.
Fourteen nuns and 101 other persons were killed or drowned March 30,
1916, when the Russian hospital ship _Portugal_ was sunk in the Black
Sea between Batum and Rizeh on the Anatolian coast by a torpedo. The
_Portugal_ had stopped and was preparing to take aboard wounded men on
shore. Several of those on the vessel saw the periscope of a
submarine appear above the waves, but had no fear of an attack, as the
_Portugal_ was plainly marked with the Red Cross insignia and was
flying a Red Cross flag from her peak.
The submarine circled about the ships twice and then, to the horror of
those who were watching, fired a torpedo. The missile went astray, but
another followed and found its mark. Although the ship was at anchor,
with the shore near by, it was impossible to get all of her crew and
wounded to safety.
This attack greatly incensed Russia. She sent protests to all of the
neutral powers, calling attention to the deed perpetrated against her.
The flame of national anger was fanned higher when Constantinople
issued a statement saying that a Turkish submarine had sunk the
_Portugal_, claiming that she flew the Russian merchant flag without
any of the usual Red Cross markings upon her hull. It was said that
the explosion which shattered the vessel was caused by the presence of
ammunition.
On the morning of March 30, 1916, the steamship _Matoppo_, a British
freighter, put into Lewes, Delaware, with her master and his crew of
fifty men held prisoners by a single individual. Ernest Schiller, as
he called himself, had gone aboard the _Matoppo_ in New York, March
29, 1916, and hid himself away until the vessel passed Sandy Hook,
bound for Vladivostok. Then he came out and with the aid of two
weapons which the captain described as horse pistols, proceeded to cow
the master and crew. Schiller announced that the _Matoppo_ was a
German prize of war and that he would shoot the first man who moved a
hostile hand. The crew believed him. They also had an uneasy fear that
certain bombs which Schiller mentioned would be set off unless they
obeyed.
With Schiller in command the _Matoppo_ headed down the coast, her
captor keeping vigil. Off Delaware he ordered the captain to make
port. The latter obeyed, but also signaled to shore that a pirate was
aboard. Port authorities then sent a boat alongside, and Schiller was
arrested. He admitted under examination that he and three other men
had plotted to blow up the Cunard liner _Pannonia_. They bought the
dynamite and made the bombs, but his companions' courage failed, and
the plan was abandoned. Then it was proposed to stow away on some
outward bound ship, seize her at sea and make for Germany. With this
purpose in mind Schiller got aboard the _Matoppo_, but the other
conspirators deserted him. Not to be foiled, he captured the vessel
single-handed. It developed that his name was Clarence Reginald
Hodson, his father having been an Englishman, but he was born of a
German mother, had been raised in Germany, and was fully in sympathy
with the German cause. After a trial he was sent to prison for life,
the only man serving such a sentence in the United States on a charge
of piracy.
CHAPTER X
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES
The beginning of April found growing discontent among neutrals against
the British blockade of Germany and the virtual embargo on many other
nations. Sweden especially demonstrated resentment. The United States
made new representations about the seizure and search of first-class
mail. All of this did not deter the Allies from pursuing their policy
of attrition toward Germany.
The opening day of the month saw the arrival in New York harbor of the
first armed French steamer to reach that port. The _Vulcain_, a
freighter, tied up at her dock with a 47-millimeter quick-firing gun
mounted at the stern. Inquiries followed, with the usual result, and
the advancing days found other French vessels arriving, some of the
passenger liners carrying three and four 75-millimeter pieces, the
famous 75's.
On April 5, 1916, Paris announced that French and British warships had
sunk a submarine at an unnamed point and captured the crew. In this
connection it should be said that many reports were current of
frequent captures made by the Allies of enemy submersibles. The
British seldom admitted such captures, seeking to befog Berlin as to
the fate of her submarines. But there was little doubt that numbers of
them had been taken by both French and British.
An Austrian transport was torpedoed by a French submarine and lost in
the Adriatic, April 8, 1916. Neither the loss of life nor the name of
the vessel was made public by Vienna.
Two days later a Russian destroyer, the _Strogi_, rammed and sunk an
enemy submersible near the spot where the hospital ship _Portugal_ was
torpedoed.
Reports from Paris, April 18, 1916, stated that the French had
captured the submarine that torpedoed the _Sussex_. It was said that
her crew and commander were prisoners, and that documentary evidence
had been obtained on the vessel to prove that she sank the _Sussex_.
The report could not be verified, but Paris semiofficially intimated
that she had indisputable proof that the _Sussex_ was a submarine's
victim. The two incidents coincided so well that the capture of the
vessel was believed to have been made.
Trebizond fell April 18, 1916, the Russian fleet cooperating in a
grand assault. This gave Russia possession of a fine port on the
Turkish side of the Black Sea and marked important progress for her
armies in Asia.
Zeebrugge, Belgium, was shelled by the British fleet, April 25, 1916,
the city sustaining one of the longest and heaviest bombardments which
it had suffered since its capture by the Germans. As a convenient base
for submarines it was a particularly troublesome thorn to the Allies,
and the bombardment was directed mainly at buildings suspected of
being submarine workshops, and the harbor defenses. Several vessels
were sunk and much damage wrought, the German batteries at Heyst,
Blankenberghe, and Knocke coming in for the heavy fire.
Naval vessels on guard engaged the Germans and succeeded in driving
them off, although outnumbered. Two British cruisers were hit, without
serious injury. The attack was part of a concerted plan which
contemplated a smashing blow at the British line, while the Irish
trouble engaged attention.
One British auxiliary was lost and her crew captured and a destroyer
damaged in a scouting engagement off the Flanders coast on April 25,
1916. The identity of the vessel was never learned. The _E-22_, a
British submarine, went down April 25, 1916, in another fight. The
Germans scored again when they sank an unidentified guard vessel off
the Dogger Bank after dusk April 26, 1916.
Reports from Holland, April 28, 1916, told of the sinking by an armed
British trawler of a submarine near the north coast of Scotland. The
enemy vessel had halted two Dutch steamers when the trawler appeared.
The submersible was said to be of the newest and largest type and
sixty men were believed to have been lost with her. The British
announced the sinking of a submarine on the same day off the east
coast, one officer and seventeen men being taken prisoners. It was
believed that the two reports concerned the same craft.
London also admitted the loss on April 28, 1916, of the battleship
_Russell_, which struck a mine or was torpedoed in the Mediterranean.
Admiral Freemantle, whose flag she bore, was among the 600 men saved.
The loss of life included one hundred and twenty-four officers and
men.
The _Russell_ was a vessel of 14,000 tons, carried four 12-inch guns,
twelve 6-inch pieces, and a strong secondary battery. She belonged to
the predreadnought period, but was a formidable fighting ship.
The quality of Russia's determination to win victory, despite serious
reverses in the field, was well indicated by an announcement made in
Petrograd, May 1, 1916. A railroad from the capital to Soroka, on the
White Sea, begun since the war started, had just reached completion.
It covered a distance of 386 miles and made accessible a port that
hitherto had been practically useless, where it was proposed to divert
commercial shipments. This left free for war purposes the port of
Archangel, sole window of Russia looking upon the west until Soroka
was linked with Petrograd. German activity had halted all shipping to
Russian Baltic ports. At the moment announcement was made of this
event more than 100 ships were waiting for the ice to break up,
permitting passage to Archangel and Soroka, which are held in the
grip of the north for many months of each year. A majority of these
vessels carried guns, ammunition, harness, auto trucks and other
things sorely needed by the Czar's armies. Additional supplies were
pouring in through Vladivostok for the long haul across Siberia.
May 1, 1916, witnessed the destruction of a British mine sweeper, the
_Nasturtium_, in the Mediterranean along with the armed yacht
_Aegusa_, both said to have been sunk by floating mines.
The _Aegusa_ formerly was the _Erin_, the private yacht of Sir Thomas
Lipton, and valued at $375,000 when the Government took it over. The
craft was well known to Americans, as Sir Thomas, several times
challenger for the international cup held in America, had made more
than one trip to our shores on the vessel.
The French submarine _Bernouille_ was responsible for the sinking of
an enemy torpedo boat in the Adriatic, May 4, 1916.
Washington received a note from Germany, May 6, 1916, offering to
modify her submarine orders if the United States would protest to
Great Britain against the stringent blockade laid upon Germany. This
offer met with prompt rejection, President Wilson standing firm and
insisting upon disavowal for the sinking of the _Sussex_ and search of
merchantmen before attack. (See United States and the Belligerents,
Vol. V, Part X.)
Laden with munitions, the White Star liner _Cymric_ was torpedoed and
sunk May 9, 1916, near the British coast with a loss of five killed.
The vessel remained afloat for several hours, and the remainder of her
110 officers and men were saved. She had no passengers aboard.
An Austrian transport, name unknown, went down in the Adriatic, May
10, 1916, after a French submarine torpedoed her. She was believed to
have had a heavy cargo of munitions, but few soldiers, and probably
was bound for Durazzo, Albania, from Pola, the naval base.
The _M-30_, a small British monitor, was struck by shells from a
Turkish battery upon the island of Kesten in the Mediterranean and
sunk on the night of May 13, 1916. Casualties consisted of two killed
and two wounded.
The sunny weather of May brought a resumption of attacks by British
and Russian submarines in the Baltic. May 18, 1916, London announced
that four German steamers, the _Kolga_, _Biancha_, _Hera_ and _Trav_,
had been halted and destroyed in that sea within a few days. Other
similar reports followed and German shipping was almost driven from
the Baltic, thereby cutting off an important source of supply with
Sweden and Norway, the only neutrals still trading with Germany to any
considerable extent. For her part, Germany alleged that several
merchant ships torpedoed by the British were sunk without warning and
some of the crews killed. London denied the charge and there was none
to prove or disprove it.
An Italian destroyer performed a daring feat on the night of May 30,
1916, running into the harbor at Trieste and sinking a large transport
believed to have many soldiers aboard. Scarcely a soul was saved,
current report stated. The raider crept out to sea again and made good
her escape.
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK--BEGINNING
A great naval battle was fought in the North Sea off Jutland, where,
in the afternoon and evening hours of May 31, 1916, the fleets of
England and Germany clashed in what might have been--but was not--the
most important naval fight in history. Why it missed this ultimate
distinction is not altogether clear. Nor is it altogether clear to
which side victory leaned. To pronounce a satisfactory judgment on
this point we need far more information than we have at present, not
only as to the respective losses of the contending fleets, but as to
the objects for which the battle was fought and the degree of success
attained in the accomplishment of these objects. The official German
report states that the German fleet left port "on a mission to the
northward." No certain evidence is at hand as to the nature of this
mission; but whatever it was, it can hardly have been accomplished, as
the most northerly point reached was less than 180 miles from the
point of departure, and the whole fleet, or what was left of it, was
back in port within thirty-six hours of the time of leaving.
It has been surmised, and there is some reason to believe, that the
German plan was to force a passage for their battle cruisers through
the channel between Scotland and Norway into the open sea, where, with
their high-speed and long-range guns, they might, at least for a time,
have paralyzed transatlantic commerce with very serious results for
England's industries, and still more serious results for her supplies
of food.
Another and a somewhat more plausible theory is that the plan
contemplated the escape to the open sea, not of the battle cruisers
themselves, but of a number of very fast armed merchant cruisers of
the _Moewe_ type, which were to repeat the _Moewe's_ exploit on a
large scale, serving the same purpose that the submarines served
during the period of their greatest activity. Color is lent to this
theory by what is known of the controversy now going on in Germany
between those who advocate a renewal of the submarine warfare against
commerce, and those who are opposed to this. It is evident that if
fast cruisers could be maintained on England's trade routes they might
do all that the submarine could do and more, and this without raising
any question as to their rights under international law.
Whatever the plan was, we must assume that it was thwarted by the
interposition of the British fleet; and from this point of view the
battle takes on the aspect of a British victory. The German fleet is
back behind the fortifications and the mine fields of the Helgoland
Bight, in the waters which have been its refuge for nearly two years
of comparative inactivity. And the British fleet still holds the
command of the sea with a force which makes its command complete, and,
in all human probability, permanent.
From the narrower point of view of results on the actual field of
battle, it appears from the evidence at present available that,
although the Germans were first to withdraw, they had the advantage
in that they lost fewer ships than their opponents and less important
ones. This is not admitted by the British, and it may not be true, but
we have the positive assurance of the German Government that it is so,
and no real evidence to the contrary. It must therefore be accepted
for the present, always with remembrance of the fact that the first
reports given out by the German authorities are admitted to have been
understated "for military reasons." Only time can tell us whether the
world has the whole truth even now. But taking the situation as it
appears from the official statements on both sides the losses are as
follows:
BRITISH: GERMAN:
_Battleships_ _Battleships_
None One
_Battle Cruisers_ _Battle Cruisers_
Three One
_Armored Cruisers_ _Armored Cruisers_
Three None
_Light Cruisers_ _Light Cruisers_
None Four
_Destroyers_ _Destroyers_
Eight Five
It is certain that the British losses as here given are substantially
correct. It is possible, as has been said, that the German losses are
much understated. British officers and seamen claim to have actually
seen several large German ships blow up, and they are probably quite
honest in these claims. They may be right. But it is only necessary to
picture to one's self the conditions by which all observers were
surrounded while the appalling inferno of the battle was at its height
to understand how hopelessly unreliable must be the testimony of
participants as to what they saw and heard. Four or five 15-inch
shells striking simultaneously against the armor of a battleship and
exploding with a great burst of flame and smoke might well suggest to
an eager and excited observer the total destruction of the ship. And
an error here would be all the easier when to the confusion of battle
was added the obscurity of darkness and of fog.
No doubt the time will come when we shall know, if not the full truth,
at least enough to justify a conclusion as to the comparative losses.
Until that time comes, we may accept the view that, measured by the
narrow standard of ships and lives lost, the Germans had the
advantage. This may be true, and yet it may be also true that the real
victory was with the British, since they may have bought with their
losses, great as these were, that for which they could well afford to
pay an even higher price.
According to the statement of Admiral Jellicoe, the British fleet has
for some months past made a practice of sweeping the North Sea from
time to time with practically its whole force of fighting ships, with
a view to discouraging raids by the German fleet, and in the hope of
meeting any force which might, whether for raiding or for any other
purpose, have ventured out beyond the fortifications and mine fields
of the Helgoland Bight.
On May 31, 1916, the fleet was engaged in one of these excursions,
apparently with no knowledge that the German fleet was to be abroad at
the same time.
In accordance with what appears to have been the general practice, the
Grand Fleet was divided; the main fighting force under the command of
Admiral Jellicoe himself occupying a position near the middle of the
North Sea, while the two battle-cruiser divisions under Vice Admiral
Beatty, supported by a division of dreadnoughts of the _Queen
Elizabeth_ class under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, were some seventy
miles to the southward (Plate I). Admiral Jellicoe had a division of
battle cruisers and another of armored cruisers in addition to his
dreadnoughts, and both he and Admiral Beatty were well provided with
destroyers and light cruisers.
[Illustration: PLATE I. Map of Distribution of Forces. 2:30 P.M., May
31, 1916. Not drawn to scale, all distances distorted.]
The day was pleasant, but marked by the characteristic mistiness of
North Sea weather; and as the afternoon wore on the mist took on more
and more the character of light drifting fog, making it impossible at
times to see clearly more than two or three miles.
At two o'clock in the afternoon Admiral Beatty's detachment was
steaming on a northerly course, being then about ninety miles west of
the coast of Denmark, accompanied by several flotillas of destroyers
and with a screen of light cruisers thrown out to the north and east.
At about 2.20 p. m. the _Galatea_, one of the light cruisers engaged
in scouting east of Beatty's battle cruisers, reported smoke on the
horizon to the eastward, and started to investigate, the battle
cruisers taking up full speed and following. The _Galatea_ and her
consorts were soon afterward engaged with a German force of similar
type, and at 3.30 p. m. a squadron of five battle cruisers was made
out some twelve miles farther to the eastward.
Beatty immediately swung off to the southeast in the hope of getting
between the German squadron and its base; but the German commander,
Vice Admiral von Hipper, changed course correspondingly, and the two
squadrons continued on courses nearly parallel but somewhat converging
until, at about 3.45 p. m., fire was opened on both sides, the range
at that time being approximately nine miles. About ten minutes after
the battle was fully joined, the _Indefatigable_, the rear ship of the
British column, was struck by a broadside from one or more of the
enemy ships, and blew up; and twenty minutes later the _Queen Mary_,
latest and most powerful of the British battle cruisers, met the same
fate. The suddenness and completeness of the disaster to these two
splendid ships has not yet been explained and perhaps never will be.
Their elimination threw the advantage of numbers actually engaged from
the British to the German side, but very shortly afterward the leading
ships of Rear Admiral Thomas's dreadnought division came within range
and opened fire (Plate II), thus throwing the superiority again to the
British side. For the next half hour or thereabouts, Von Hipper's five
battle cruisers were pitted against four battle cruisers and four
dreadnoughts, and Beatty reports that their fire fell off materially,
as would naturally be the case. They appear, however, to have stood up
gallantly under the heavy punishment to which they must have been
subjected.
Beatty was drawing slowly ahead, though with little prospect of being
able to throw his force across the enemy's van, as he had hoped to do,
his plan being not only to cut the Germans off from their base, but to
"cap" their column and concentrate the fire of his whole force on Von
Hipper's leading ships. Had he been able to do this he would have
secured the tactical advantage which is the object of all maneuvering
in a naval engagement, and would at the same time have compelled Von
Hipper to run to the northward toward the point from which Jellicoe
was known to be approaching at the highest speed of his dreadnoughts.
With this thought in mind, Beatty was holding on to the southward,
taking full advantage of his superiority in both speed and gunfire,
when a column of German dreadnoughts was sighted in the southeast
approaching at full speed to form a junction with Von Hipper's
squadron (Plate II). Seeing himself thus outmatched, Beatty made a
quick change of plan. There was no longer any hope of carrying out the
plan of throwing himself across the head of the German column, but if
Von Hipper could not be driven into Jellicoe's arms it was conceivable
that he might be led there, and with him the additional force that Von
Scheer was bringing up to join him. So Beatty turned to the northward,
and, as he had hoped, Von Hipper followed; not, however, until he had
run far enough on the old course to effect a junction with Von Scheer,
whose battleships fell in astern of the battle cruisers as these last
swung around to the northward and took up a course parallel to that of
Beatty and Thomas. Thus the running fight was resumed, with the
difference that both forces were now heading at full speed toward the
point from which Beatty knew Jellicoe to be approaching. Von Hipper's
delay in turning had permitted Beatty to draw ahead, and the relative
positions of the engaged squadrons were now those shown in Plate III.
[Illustration: PLATE II. Map of The Running Fight to the Southward.
3:48 to 4:40 P.M.]
It is during this part of the fight that the British accounts speak of
Beatty as engaging the whole German fleet and as being thus
tremendously overmatched. A moment's study of Plate III will make it
clear that this claim is not tenable. Without fuller information
than we have of positions and distances, it is impossible to say
exactly how many of Von Scheer's ships were able to fire on Beatty's
column, but certainly the total German force within effective range
could not have been materially larger than the British force it was
engaging.
As far as can be figured out from Beatty's own report, the only time
when he was actually pitted against a force superior to his own,
within fighting range, was after he had lost the _Indefatigable_ and
the _Queen Mary_, and before the dreadnoughts of Admiral Thomas's
force had reached a point from which they were able to open an
effective fire. He entered the fight with six battle cruisers opposed
to five. He then, for a short time, had four opposed to five. A little
later he had four battle cruisers and four dreadnoughts opposed to
five battle cruisers, and a little later still, as has just been
stated, the forces actually opposed within firing range became
practically equal.
About six o'clock, having gained enough to admit of an attempt to
"cap," Beatty turned his head to the eastward, but Von Hipper refused
to accept this disadvantage and turned east himself, thus continuing
the parallel fight on a large curve tending more and more to the east
(Plate IV). It was about this time that the _Luetzow_, Von Hipper's
flagship and the leader of the German column, dropped out of the
formation, having been so badly damaged that she could no longer
maintain her position in the formation. Von Hipper, calling a
destroyer alongside, boarded her and proceeded, through a storm of
shell, to the _Moltke_, on which he resumed his place at the head of
the fleet.
[Illustration: The "Queen Mary," sister ship of the "Lion" and the
"Princess Royal" and capable of a speed of 28-1/2 knots an hour. The
modern British battle cruiser was sunk about half an hour after the
battle was fully joined.]
Jellicoe, seventy miles to the northward with the main fighting force,
received word about three o'clock that the scouting force was in
contact with the enemy, and started at once to effect a junction with
Beatty. He may well have wished at that moment that his forces were
separated somewhat less widely. Under his immediate command he had
three squadrons of the latest and most powerful fighting ships in the
world, twenty-five in all, including his own flagship, the _Iron
Duke_. His squadrons were led by three of the youngest and most
efficient vice admirals in the service, Sir Cecil Burney, Sir Thomas
Jerram, and Sir Doveton Sturdee (Plate V). With him also were Rear
Admirals Hood and Arbuthnot, the former commanding three of the
earlier battle cruisers, _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, and
_Indomitable_, the latter commanding four armored cruisers, of which
we shall hear more hereafter.
[Illustration: PLATE III. Map of Running Fight to Northward. 4:40 to
6:00 P.M.]
A majority of the battleships were capable of a speed of 21 to 22
knots, but it is improbable that the force, as a whole, could do
better than 20 knots. Hood, with his "Invincibles," was capable of
from 27 to 28 knots, and Jellicoe appears to have sent him on ahead to
reenforce Beatty at the earliest possible moment, while following
himself at a speed which, he says, strained the older ships of his
force to the utmost. The formation of the fleet was probably somewhat
like that shown at A, Plate V, which doubtless passed into B before
fighting range was reached.
Of the southward sweep of this great armada, the most tremendous
fighting force the world has ever seen on sea or land, we have no
record. They started. They arrived. Of the hours that intervened no
word has been said. Yet it is not difficult to picture something of
the dramatic tenseness of the race. The admirals, their staffs, the
captains of the individual ships, all were on the bridges, and there
remained not only through the race to reach the battle area, but
through all the fighting after they had closed with the enemy. The
carefully worked-out plans for directing everything from the shelter
of the conning tower were thrown aside without a thought. So there we
see them, grouped in the most exposed positions on their ships,
straining their eyes through the haze for the first glimpse of friend
or foe, and urging those below, at the fires and the throttle, to
squeeze out every fraction of a knot that boilers and turbines could
be made to yield.
[Illustration: PLATE IV. British Grand Fleet Approaching from
Northwest. Beatty turns eastward at 6 P.M. to meet Jellicoe and cap
Von Hipper. Von Hipper turns east to avoid cap.]
Word must have been received by wireless of the loss of the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_, while the battleships were still
fifty or sixty miles away, for Beatty at this time was running south
faster than Jellicoe could follow. It was perhaps at this time that
Hood was dispatched at full speed to add his three battle cruisers to
the four that remained to Beatty. They arrived upon the scene about
6.15 p. m., shortly after Beatty had turned eastward, and swung in
ahead of Beatty's column, which, as thus reenforced, consisted of
seven battle cruisers and four dreadnoughts (Plate IV). Admiral Beatty
writes in terms of enthusiastic admiration of the way in which Hood
brought his ships into action, and it is easy to understand the thrill
with which he must have welcomed this addition to his force.
But his satisfaction was not of long duration. Hardly had the
_Invincible_, Hood's flagship, settled down on her new course and
opened fire than she disappeared in a great burst of smoke and flame.
Here, as in the case of the _Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_, the
appalling suddenness and completeness of the disaster makes it
impossible of explanation. The survivors from all three of the ships
totaled only about one hundred, and none of these are able to throw
any light upon the matter.
By this time Beatty's whole column had completed the turn from north
to east, and Jellicoe was in sight to the northward with his
twenty-five dreadnoughts, coming on at twenty knots or more straight
for the point where Beatty's column blocked his approach. Jellicoe
writes of this situation:
"Meanwhile, at 5.45 p. m., the report of guns had become audible to
me, and at 5.55 p. m. flashes were visible from ahead around to the
starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished,
and the position of the enemy's fleet could not be determined.
"... At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle
cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to
ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels."
[Illustration: PLATE V. British Grand Fleet Coming into Action. 6:30
P.M. (Probable Formation.)]
Here is a bald description of a situation which must have been charged
with almost overwhelming anxiety for the commander in chief. He knew
that just ahead of him a tremendous battle was in progress, but of the
disposition of the forces engaged he had only such knowledge as he
could gather from the few fragmentary wireless messages that Beatty
had found time to flash to him. He could see but a short distance, and
he knew that through the cloud of mingled fog and smoke into which he
was rushing at top speed, all ships would look much alike. That he
was able to bring his great force into action and into effective
cooperation with Beatty without accident or delay is evidence of high
tactical skill on his part and on that of every officer under his
command; and, what is even more creditable, of supremely efficient
coordination of all parts of the tremendous machine which responded so
harmoniously to his will.
As Jellicoe's leading ships appeared through the fog, Beatty realized
that he must make an opening in his column to let them through.
Accordingly, he called upon his own fast battle cruisers for their
highest speed and drew away to the eastward, at the same time
signaling Admiral Evan-Thomas to reduce speed and drop back (Plate
VI). The maneuver was perfectly conceived and perfectly timed. As
Jellicoe approached he found Beatty's column opening before him. As he
swept on through, steering south toward the head of the German line,
Beatty also swung south on a course parallel and a little to the
eastward, and, by virtue of his high speed, a little ahead. The result
was that neither force blanketed the other for a moment, and the head
of the German column a little later found itself under the
concentrated fire of practically the whole British fleet. It may well
have "crumpled" as Jellicoe says it did; and whether it is true or
not, as British reports insist, that several of the leading ships were
destroyed at this time, it appears to be true, at least, that a second
battle cruiser dropped out, leaving only three of this type under Von
Hipper's command.
[Illustration: PLATE VI. Jellicoe and Beatty acting together to "cap"
German Fleet Germans turn to Westward.]
The situation quickly passed from that shown in Plate VI to that shown
in Plate VII. The British had succeeded in establishing a cap, and
their position was so favorable that it looked as if nothing could
save the Germans from destruction. But night was coming on, the mist
was thickening into fog, and the only point of aim for either fleet
was that afforded by the flash of the enemy's guns. Von Scheer, who,
as Von Hipper's senior, was in command of the German forces as a
whole, turned from east to west, each ship swinging independently, and
sent his whole force of destroyers at top speed against the enemy. It
would be difficult to imagine conditions more favorable for such an
attack. Jellicoe saw the opportunity and acted upon it as quickly
as did Von Scheer, with the result that as the German destroyers swept
toward the British fleet they met midway the British destroyers bent
on a similar mission, and a battle followed in the fog between
destroyers, which broke up both attacks against the main fleets and
saved the capital ships on both sides from what must otherwise have
been very serious danger. Meantime, as the German fleet drew off to
the westward, Jellicoe and Beatty passed completely around the German
flank and reached a position to the southward and between the German
fleet and its base at Helgoland (Plate VIII). By the time this was
accomplished it was nearly ten o'clock, and the long day of that high
northern latitude was passing into darkness rendered darker by the
fog. Contact between the main fleets had been lost, and firing had
ceased. Both sides continued destroyer attacks through the night, and
some of these were delivered with great dash and forced home with
splendid determination. The British claim to have sunk at least two of
the German capital ships during these attacks. But this the Germans
deny.
[Illustration: PLATE VII. Jellicoe and Beatty pass around flank of
German Fleet, "capping" it and interposing between the Fleet and its
base. Both sides send out destroyer attacks, which continue throughout
the night.]
The Battle of Horn Reef, if that is to be its name, was at an end. The
German fleet, now heading west, evidently soon afterward headed south
toward the secure waters of the Helgoland Bight, which it was allowed
to reach without interference by the British main fleet and apparently
without discovery. The British may well have been cautious during the
night about venturing far into the fog, which, as they knew, if it
concealed the capital ships of Von Hipper and Von Scheer, concealed
also their destroyers, and possibly a stretch of water strewn with
mines laid out by the retreating enemy. It must not be forgotten,
however, that the British were between the German fleet and its base
when they ceased the offensive for the night, and that only a few
hours, in that high latitude, separate darkness from dawn.
With daylight, which was due by two o'clock or thereabouts, and with
the lifting of the fog, Jellicoe reports that he searched to the
northward and found no enemy. The following day, June 2, 1916, his
fleet was back in port taking account of its losses, which were
undeniably great, though whether or not they were greater than those
of the enemy, only the future can prove.
[Illustration: PLATE VIII. 10:00 P.M. Darkness and Fog. British Forces
heading off to Southward to avoid attack during darkness and to keep
between German Fleet and its Base. Protecting rear with Destroyers
and Light Cruisers.]
CHAPTER XII
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES OF THE BATTLE
One of the most inexplicable incidents of the day occurred as
Jellicoe's fleet approached the battle area and shortly before the
leading ship of his column passed through the opening in Beatty's
column as already described. The four armored cruisers, _Duke of
Edinburgh_, _Defence_, _Warrior_, and _Black Prince_, under Rear
Admiral Arbuthnot, were in company with Jellicoe, but separated from
his main force by several miles. These ships were lightly armed and
very lightly armored, and had absolutely no excuse for taking part in
the main battle. Yet they now appeared, somewhat in advance of the
main fleet and to the westward of it, standing down ahead of
Evan-Thomas's division of battleships, which, as has been explained,
had dropped back to allow Jellicoe to pass ahead of them. As Arbuthnot
appeared from the mist, several German ships opened on him at short
range, and within a very few moments three of his four ships were
destroyed. The _Defence_ and _Black Prince_ were sunk immediately. The
_Warrior_ was so badly damaged that she sank during the night while
trying to make port. The _Duke of Edinburgh_ escaped.
Another incident belonging to this phase of the battle was the jamming
of the steering gear of the _Warspite_, of Admiral Evan-Thomas's
division of dreadnoughts. Apparently the helm jammed when in the
hard-over position, and the ship for some time ran around in a circle.
Through the whole of this time she was under heavy fire, and is
reported to have been struck more than one hundred times by heavy
shells, in spite of which she later returned to her position in column
and continued the fight. In the course of her erratic maneuvers, while
not under control, she circled around the _Warrior_ and received so
much of the fire intended for that ship as to justify the belief that
her accident saved the _Warrior_ from immediate destruction and made
it possible, later, to rescue her crew before she finally sank, as she
did during the night following the battle. It was for a time believed
that the _Warspite_ had deliberately intervened to save the _Warrior_,
and there was much talk of the "chivalry" of the _Warspite's_
commander in thus risking his own ship to save another--this from
those who overlooked the fact that the duty of the _Warspite_, as one
of the most valuable fighting units of the fleet, was to keep place in
line as long as possible, and to carry out the general battle plan;
which, of course, is exactly what the _Warspite_ did to the best of
her ability.
It is an interesting fact that of the small number of capital ships
lost or disabled, four were flagships. Two rear admirals, Hood and
Arbuthnot, went down with their ships. Two vice admirals, Von Hipper
and Burney, shifted their flags in the thickest of the fight, Von
Hipper from the _Luetzow_ to the _Moltke_, Burney from the
_Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_.
A large part of Admiral Jellicoe's official report deals with the work
of the light cruisers and destroyers, which, while necessarily
restricted to a secondary role, contributed in many ways to the
operations of the main fighting forces, securing and transmitting
information, attacking at critical times, and repelling attacks from
the corresponding craft of the enemy. All of these tasks took on a
special importance as the afternoon advanced, because of the
decreasing visibility due to fog and darkness. The light cruisers were
constantly employed in keeping touch with the enemy, whose capital
ships they approached at times to within two or three thousand yards.
And the destroyers of both fleets were repeatedly sent at full speed
through banks of fog within which the enemy battleships were known to
be concealed. It is rather remarkable that so few of either type were
lost, and still more remarkable, so far as the destroyers are
concerned, that so few of the large ships were torpedoed.
The _Marlborough_ was struck and badly damaged, but she made her way
safely to port. The _Frauenlob_, _Rostock_, and _Pommern_ were sunk.
And that is the whole story so far as known at present. Yet several
hundred torpedoes must have been discharged, most of them at ranges
within 5,000 yards. It looks a little as if the world would be obliged
to modify the view that has been held of late with reference to the
efficiency of the torpedo--or at least of the torpedo as carried by
the destroyer.
The loss of the three large battle cruisers, _Indefatigable_,
_Invincible_, and _Queen Mary_ is, and will always remain, the most
dramatic incident of the battle, and the most inexplicable. It is
doubtful if we shall ever know the facts, but that something more than
gunfire was involved is made clear by the fact that in each case the
ship was destroyed by an explosion. Whether this was due to a shell
actually penetrating the magazine, or to the ignition of exposed
charges of powder, or to a torpedo or a mine exploding outside in the
vicinity of the magazine, it is impossible to do more than conjecture.
There is a suggestion of something known, but kept back, in the
following paragraph from a description of the battle by Mr. Arthur
Pollen, which is presumably based upon information furnished by the
British admiralty:
"As to the true explanation of the loss of the three ships that did
blow up, the admiralty, no doubt, will give this to the public if it
is thought wise to do so. But there can be no harm in saying this. The
explanation of the sinking of each of these ships by a single lucky
shot--both they and practically all the other cruisers were hit
repeatedly by shots that did no harm--is, in the first place,
identical. Next, it does not lie in the fact that the ships were
insufficiently armored to keep out big shell. Next, the fatal
explosion was not caused by a mine or by a torpedo. Lastly, it is in
no sense due to any instability or any other dangerous characteristic
of the propellants or explosives carried on board. I am free to
confess that when I first heard of these ships going down as rapidly
as they did, one of two conclusions seemed to be irresistible--either
a shell had penetrated the lightly armored sides and burst in the
magazine, or a mine or torpedo had exploded immediately beneath it.
But neither explanation is right."
One of the most striking and surprising features about the battle is
the closeness with which it followed conventional lines, both in the
types of vessels and weapons used and in the manner of using them.
Neither submarines nor Zeppelins played any part, although both were
at hand. Some effective scouting was done by an aeroplane sent up from
one of the British cruisers early in the afternoon, and the British
report that they saw and fired on a Zeppelin early in the morning of
June 1, 1916. But this is all.
There have been stories for many months of a 17-inch gun of marvelous
power carried by German dreadnoughts, but no such weapon made its
appearance on this occasion.
And the tactics employed on both sides were as conventional as the
weapons used. The fight was a running fight in parallel columns from
the moment when Beatty and Von Hipper turned simultaneously toward the
south upon their first contact with each other, until night and fog
separated them at the end. Beatty's constant effort to secure a "cap"
contained no element of novelty, and Von Hipper's reply, refusing the
cap by turning his head away and swinging slowly on a parallel
interior curve, was the conventional, as it was the proper, reply.
Unfortunately, as we shall presently have occasion to note, the German
fleet ultimately allowed itself to be capped, with results which ought
to have been far more disastrous than they actually were. The
destroyers availed themselves of the opportunities for attack
presented from time to time by smoke and fog, and their drive was
stopped by opposing destroyers.
So little is known of the German injuries that there is hardly
sufficient ground for comment on the British marksmanship, but it does
not appear to have been what the world had expected. Exactly the
reverse is true of the German marksmanship, especially at long ranges.
It was surprisingly good, and the most surprising thing about it was
the promptness with which it found the target. The _Indefatigable_ was
blown up ten minutes after she came under fire. Hood, in the
_Invincible_, had barely gained his place in line ahead of Beatty's
column when the ship was smothered by a perfect avalanche of shells.
If it is true that the Germans had the best of the fight so far as
material damage is concerned, the explanation must be sought in their
unexpectedly excellent marksmanship, with, perhaps, some sinister
factor added, either of weakness in the British ships or of amazing
power in the German shells, yet to be made known. It should be noted
that the sinking of the _Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ belongs
to a phase of battle in which Beatty had a distinct advantage of
force, his six battle cruisers being opposed to five.
While the torpedo, as has been said, played no important part in the
action, the destroyers on both sides appear to have been active and
enterprising, and if they accomplished little in a material way, the
threat involved in their presence and their activity had an important
moral effect at several critical stages of the battle. When Jellicoe
decided not to force his offensive during the night he was no doubt
influenced in a large degree by the menace of the German destroyers.
Destroyers, too, contributed indirectly to the loss of Arbuthnot's
armored cruisers. When Jellicoe's fleet was seen approaching,
"appearing shadowlike from the haze bank to the northeast," the German
destroyers were thrown against them, and it was apparently to meet and
check this threat that Rear Admiral Arbuthnot pushed forward with his
armored cruisers into the area between the two main battle lines. It
may be that he could not see what lay behind the thrust he sought to
parry. Both the British and the German stories of the battle assume
that he was surprised. But whether this is true or not, the fact is
that it was in seeking to shield the battleships from a destroyer
attack that he came under fire of the main German force and lost three
of his ships almost immediately; for the _Warrior_, although she
remained afloat for several hours, was doomed from the first.
CHAPTER XIII
LOSSES AND TACTICS
The British losses as reported officially, and no doubt truthfully,
are as follows:
BATTLE CRUISERS: Tonnage Officers and Men
_Queen Mary_ 27,500 1,000
_Invincible_ 17,250 790
_Indefatigable_ 18,750 780
ARMORED CRUISERS:
_Defence_ 14,600 850
_Black Prince_ 13,500 750
_Warrior_ 13,500 750
DESTROYERS:
_Tipperary_ 1,850 160
_Turbulent_ 980 100
_Fortune_ 950 100
_Sparrowhawk_ 935 100
_Ardent_ 950 100
_Nestor_ 950 100
_Nomad_ 950 100
_Shark_ 950 100
The reported German losses are as follows. The actual losses may be
much greater:
BATTLE CRUISERS: Tonnage Officers and Men
_Luetzow_ 28,000 1,150
BATTLESHIP:
_Pommern_ 13,040 736
LIGHT CRUISERS:
_Wiesbaden_ ...... ...
_Frauenlob_ 2,657 281
_Elbing_ ..... ...
_Rostock_ 4,820 373
DESTROYERS:
Five .... ...
_Total Tonnage Lost_
British 117,150
German 60,720 (acknowledged)
_Total Personnel Lost_
British 6,105
German 2,414 (acknowledged)
When the losses above given are analyzed they are found to be much
less favorable to the German side than they appear to be on the
surface. To begin with, we may eliminate the three armored cruisers on
the British side as of no military value whatever. This reduces the
_effective_ tonnage lost on the British side by more than 40,000 tons.
The _Queen Mary_ and the _Luetzow_ offset each other.
If we accept the German claim that the _Pommern_, which was lost, was
actually the old predreadnought of that name, it is fair to say that
she offsets the _Invincible_. There is, however, very good reason for
believing that she was a new and very powerful dreadnought. If this is
the case, her loss easily offsets that of both the _Invincible_ and
the _Indefatigable_. Accepting the German statement, however, as we
have done at all other points, we may say that so far as _effective_
capital ships are concerned, the British lost one more than the
Germans. This, after all, is not a very great difference, and it is to
a large extent offset by the loss of four light cruisers which the
German admiralty admit. In destroyers the advantage is with the
Germans.
With regard to the armored cruisers already referred to, it is
interesting to note the fact that these three ships were practically
presented to the Germans, thus paralleling the fate of their sister
ships, the _Cressy_, _Hogue_ and _Aboukir_, which, as will be
remembered, were destroyed by a submarine in September, 1914, under
conditions of inexplicable carelessness. The military loss represented
by all six of these ships was small (disregarding the loss of
personnel), but they all selected a fate which was so timed, and in
its character so spectacular, as to contribute enormously to the
lessening of the prestige with which the British navy had entered upon
the war.
As bearing still further upon the comparative losses of the battle,
account must be taken of ships seriously injured. Of these, reports
from sources apparently unprejudiced insist that the German fleet has
a large number and that the number includes several of the most
powerful ships that took part in the battle. It is known that the
_Seydlitz_, one of the latest and largest of the German battle
cruisers, was so badly damaged that it will be many months before she
can take the sea again. There are stories of two other large ships
which reached port in such a condition that it was necessary to dock
them at once to keep them from sinking. Contrasted with this is the
fact that the British ships which reached port were but little
injured. This gives an air of probability to the story that the German
fire tactics provided for concentrating the fire of several of their
ships on some one ship of the enemy's line until she was destroyed.
This would explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that, while the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ were being overwhelmed, the ships
ahead and astern of them were hardly struck at all.
It may well be that the total damage done the German ships by the
steady pounding of the whole line vastly exceeds the total received by
the British ships. Something will be known on this subject when it
becomes clear that the Germans are, or are not, ready to take the sea
again. If their losses and their injuries were as unimportant as they
would have the world believe, if their victory was as great as they
claim that it was, they should be ready at an early date to challenge
the British again, this time with a fleet practically intact as to
ships, and with a personnel fired with enthusiastic confidence in its
own superiority. If, instead of this, they resume the attitude of
evasion which they have maintained so long, the inference will be
plain that they have not given the world the truth with regard to what
the battle of May 31, 1916, meant to them.
A significant fact in this connection is that, regardless of what
others may say on the subject, the officers and men of the British
navy are convinced that the victory was with them, and are eager for
another chance at the enemy, which they fully believe they would have
destroyed if night and fog had not intervened to stay their hand.
The net result of the battle as seen by the world, after careful
appraisement of the claims and counterclaims on both sides, is that
England retains the full command of the sea, with every prospect of
retaining it indefinitely, but that the British navy has, for the
moment, lost something of the prestige which it has enjoyed since the
days of Nelson and Jervis. There is nothing to support the belief that
the control of the North Sea or of any other sea has passed, or by any
conceivable combination of circumstances can pass, into the hands of
Germany during the present war, or as a result of the war.
All accounts of the battle by those who participated in it represent
the weather as capricious. The afternoon came in with a smooth sea, a
light wind, and a clear, though somewhat hazy, atmosphere. The smoke
of the German ships was made out at a distance which must have been
close to twenty miles, and the range-finding as Beatty and Von Hipper
closed must have been almost perfect, as is proved by the promptness
with which the Germans began making hits on the _Queen Mary_ and the
_Indefatigable_. But this did not continue long. Little wisps of fog
began to gather here and there, drifting about, rising from time to
time and then settling down and gathering in clouds that at times cut
off the view even close at hand.
As the sun dropped toward the horizon it lighted up the western sky
with a glow against which the British ships were clearly outlined,
forming a perfect target, while the dark-colored German ships to the
eastward were projected against a background of fog as gray as
themselves. It is interesting to recall the fact that these are
exactly the conditions which existed when the British and German
squadrons in the Pacific met off Coronel. In that case, as in the
present one, the British fleet was to the westward, clearly
silhouetted against the twilight sky. And the fate of the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ was not more sudden or more
tragic than that of the _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_. It may be that
the unfavorable conditions were a matter of luck in both cases. But it
may be also that the Germans chose the time of day for fighting in
each case to accord with the position which they expected to occupy.
The British complain much of their bad luck, but there are
well-recognized advantages of position with regard to light and wind
and sea, and the Germans seem to have the luck, if luck it be, to find
these advantages habitually on their side.
The British call it luck that both in the battle off Horn Reef and
that off Dogger Bank the Germans escaped destruction through the
coming on of night. But how would this claim look if it were shown
that the Germans timed their movements with direct regard for
this--allowing themselves time for a decided thrust, to be followed by
withdrawal under cover of night before they could be brought to a
final reckoning? A careful study of the operations of the present war
shows, on both sea and land, a painstaking attention on the German
side to every detail, however small; and instances are not rare in
which they have benefited from this in ways which could hardly have
been anticipated.
TACTICS
There has been much discussion of the tactics of the battle. And
critics, not in foreign countries alone, but in England, have pointed
out errors of Beatty and Jellicoe, while many more have come to their
defense and shown conclusively that everything done was wisely done,
and that the escape of the German fleet and the losses by the British
fleet were due not to bad management but to bad luck.
The first point selected for criticism by those who venture to
criticize is the initial separation of Beatty's force from Jellicoe's
by from sixty to seventy miles. This certainly proved unfortunate, and
if it was deliberately planned it is undoubtedly open to criticism. A
reference, however, to the letter which Mr. Balfour addressed to the
mayors of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on May 8, 1916, suggests an
explanation which makes the separation of the two forces seem a
reasonable one. Mr. Balfour states, for the reassurance of the mayors
and their people, that a policy is to be adopted of keeping a force of
fast and powerful ships in certain ports near the English Channel,
where they will be ready to sally forth at short notice to run down
any force which may venture to cross the North Sea, whether for
raiding or for any other purpose. This foreshadows the assignment of a
force of battle cruisers to the south of England, and it is altogether
probable that Beatty, instead of having been detached by Jellicoe for
operations to the southward, had, in fact, gone out directly from the
mouth of the Thames to sweep northward toward a junction with the main
fleet. This view of the matter is confirmed by the opening sentence of
Beatty's official report to Jellicoe:
"I have the honor to report that at 2.37 p. m. on 31st May, 1916, I
was cruising and steering to the northward to join your flag."
Another point which has been criticized is the action of Beatty in
turning south instead of north when he first found himself in touch
with Von Hipper.
It is not clear from the evidence at hand whether he followed Von
Hipper in this move or whether Von Hipper followed him. If Von Hipper
headed south, Beatty could not well refuse to follow him. Beatty was
there to fight if there was a chance to fight, and there is no
question that in heading south, whether he was following Von Hipper's
lead or taking the lead himself, he took the one course which made the
existing chance a certainty.
From this point of view he was right. From another point of view he
was wrong, for he was running at full speed directly away from his own
supports and directly toward those of his opponent. He thought, and
Jellicoe appears to have thought, that the Germans did not wish to
fight. But when Beatty finally turned north, both Von Hipper and Von
Scheer followed readily enough, although they must have known pretty
accurately what lay ahead of them. Beatty's error, then, if error it
was, seems to have been not so much in judging the tactical situation
as in judging the spirit of his opponent.
Very severe criticism has been directed against Beatty for fighting at
comparatively short ranges--9,000 to 14,000 yards--when he had a
sufficient excess of speed to choose his distance. This is hardly a
fair criticism of the early stages of the battle, as he was then
opposed to ships of the same type as his own, so that if he was
accepting a disadvantage for himself, he was forcing the same
disadvantage upon his opponent. And after all, 14,000 yards is not a
short range, though it is certainly much shorter to-day than it would
have been ten years ago.
When, in the later stages of the battle, he was opposed to
dreadnoughts, it would perhaps have been wiser to maintain a range of
from 18,000 to 20,000 yards, but the situation was complicated by the
necessity of holding the enemy and leading him to the northward, and
it is not possible to say with any confidence that he could have done
this if he had held off at a distance as great as prudence might have
suggested. Circumstances placed him in a position where it seemed to
him desirable to forget the distinction between his ships and
battleships, and this is exactly what he did.
Broadly speaking, it must be said that Beatty's course throughout the
day was, to quote the favorite expression of British writers on naval
matters, "in keeping with the best traditions of the service." And
while it was bold and dashing, it was entirely free from the rashness
which the British public has been a little inclined to attribute to
him since the Dogger Bank engagement.
The only further criticism of the conduct of the battle is that which
insists that the German fleet should not have been allowed to escape.
And here it is difficult to find an explanation which is at the same
time an excuse. Of the situation at 9 p. m. Admiral Jellicoe writes
that he had maneuvered into a very advantageous position, _in which
his fleet was interposed between the German fleet and the German
base_. He then goes on to say that the threat of destroyer attack
during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary to dispose
the fleet with a view to its safety, _while providing for a renewal of
the action at daylight_. Accordingly, he "maneuvered so as to remain
between the Germans and their base, placing flotillas of destroyers
where they could protect the fleet and attack the heavy German ships."
Admiral Beatty reported that he did not consider it desirable or
proper to engage the German battle fleet during the dark hours, _as
the strategical position made it appear certain he could locate them
at daylight under most favorable circumstances_.
Here, then, is the situation between nine and ten o'clock at night,
when the approach of darkness made it seem desirable to call a halt
for the night--a huge fleet, of more than thirty capital ships, was
interposed between the Germans and their base. The general position of
the Germans was known, and destroyers, of which the British had at
least seventy-five available, were so disposed as to keep in touch
with the Germans and attack them during the night. The German fleet
was slower than the British fleet by several knots, and if the
statements by Jellicoe and Beatty of the damage done are even
approximately true, Von Hipper and Von Scheer must have been
embarrassed by the necessity of caring for a large number of badly
crippled ships. The night is short in that high latitude--not over
five hours at the maximum.
And this is the report of what happened at daylight:
"At daylight on the first of June the battle fleet, being southward of
Horn Reef, turned northward in search of the enemy vessels, and for
the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat
destroyers. The visibility early on the first of June was three to
four miles less than on May 31, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being
out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet until 9 a. m. The
British fleet remained in the proximity of the battle field and near
the line of approach to German ports until 11 a. m., in spite of the
disadvantages of long distances from fleet bases and the danger
incurred in waters adjacent to the enemy's coasts from submarines and
torpedo craft.
"The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to
the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port.
Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our
position must have been known to the enemy, as, at 4 a. m., the fleet
engaged a Zeppelin about five minutes, during which time she had ample
opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of
the British fleet."
Here is the mystery of the Battle of Horn Reef, and here we may place
our finger on the point at which the explanation lies (if we could
only make out what the explanation is) of the reason why this battle
cannot take rank, either in its conduct or in its results, with the
greatest naval battles of history--with Trafalgar and the Nile, to
speak only of English history. It is an unfinished battle;
inconclusive, indecisive. And in this respect it cannot be changed by
later news of greater losses than are now known. When Jellicoe, with a
force materially superior to that commanded by Von Scheer _and with
higher speed_, had interposed between the latter and his base, it
would seem that there should have been no escape for the German fleet
from absolute destruction. It should have been "played" during the
night, and either held or driven northward. How it could work around
the flank of the British fleet and be out of sight at dawn is
impossible of comprehension even when we have made due allowance for
low visibility. And its disappearance was complete. The only German
force that was seen was a lone Zeppelin, which was engaged for five
minutes. The mystery is increased by Jellicoe's statement that at
daylight he "turned northward in search of the enemy's vessels."
His story ends with something in the nature of a reproach for the
Germans because they did not return, although "our position must have
been known to them."
[Illustration: PLATE IX. Movement of Forces. 10 P.M. May 31st to 4
A.M. June 1st.]
Let us consider what the situation actually was at daylight. The
German fleet, as a whole, had a maximum speed of perhaps 18 knots when
fresh from port, and with every ship in perfect condition. According
to the English account it had suffered very severely, many of its
units being badly crippled. It is inconceivable that it was in a
condition when Jellicoe lost touch with it at ten o'clock at night to
make anything like its maximum speed without deserting these cripples.
Let us suppose, however, that it could and did make 18 knots in some
direction between 10 p. m. and 4 a. m. It would run in that time 108
miles. If, therefore, we draw a circle around the point at which it
was known to have been at ten o'clock, with 108 miles as a radius, we
shall have a circle beyond which it cannot have passed at 4 a. m.
(Plate IX).
If we assume a lower limit for its speed, say 12 knots, we may draw
another circle with 72 miles as a radius, and say that in all
probability the fleet has passed beyond this circle, in some
direction, by 4 a. m. We have now narrowed the space within which the
German fleet may be at 4 a. m. of June 1, 1916, to the narrow area
between our two circles.
But we know that the fleet, if it is in reality badly crippled, will
be under the necessity of making its way back to a base at once, and
that the detour which it makes to avoid the British fleet will
accordingly be as slight as possible. It certainly will not attempt to
reach Helgoland by running north or east. It will doubtless start off
toward the west or southwest and swing around to the south and
southeast as soon as Von Scheer feels confident of having cleared the
western flank of the British fleet. We may then draw two bounding
lines from the point which the Germans are known to have occupied at
ten o'clock, and feel reasonably sure that four o'clock will find them
between these lines. In other words, Jellicoe knew with almost
mathematical certainty that at four o'clock on the morning of June 1,
1916, the German fleet was within the area _A_, _B_, _C_, _D_, Plate
IX. His own more powerful fleet was at _E_ and _F_, _still between the
Germans and their base_, with an excess of speed of at least three
knots, and probably much more than this. He searched _to the north_,
and not finding them there, "was reluctantly compelled to the
conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port." He
accordingly returned to port himself.
THE GERMAN TACTICS
[Illustration: PLATE X. Movements of Jellicoe's Forces--3:30 P.M. to
9:30 P.M. May 31st. (as shown in Jellicoe's Official Report). Note:
The movements of the German Forces here shown correspond nearly, but
not exactly, with the information on which plates VI and VII are
based.]
If it is true that the British blundered in allowing the Germans to
escape from a trap from which escape should have been impossible,
it is equally true that the Germans blundered in allowing
themselves to be caught in such a trap. In the early part of the
battle the German tactics were all that they should have been. In
turning south, when Beatty's force was sighted, Von Hipper was right
from every point of view, for he was closing with Von Scheer while
drawing Beatty away from Jellicoe. He was equally sound a little later
when he turned north, for he did not turn until he had been joined by
Von Scheer. He was still sound when at six o'clock he turned east,
refusing to be capped, for there was as yet no threat of any important
increase in the force to which he was opposed. His mistake--or that of
his superior, Von Scheer--came when the British battleships were
sighted to the northeastward, heading down across his course. He knew,
or should have known, that he was now opposed by a force
overwhelmingly superior to his own and with considerably higher speed;
and yet he not only did not attempt to withdraw, but held his course
and allowed himself to be capped, thus deliberately accepting battle
with a greatly superior force and with conditions the most unfavorable
that could have been devised. That he suffered much at this point, as
he undoubtedly did, was the result of his own bad tactics. That he
suffered less than he deserved was the result of the equally bad
tactics on the part of his opponent.
[Illustration: PLATE XI. What Von Scheer should have done when British
battleship fleet was sighted. NOTE: Compare this with Plates VII and
VIII.]
As soon as the British battleships were seen approaching the German
fleet should have turned south and proceeded at full speed (Plate X),
not necessarily with intent to refuse battle permanently, but with
intent to refuse it until conditions could be made more favorable than
they were at this time. There would have been no difficulty about
reproducing on a larger scale the parallel fight which had marked the
earlier phases of the battle; and with night coming on and the weather
thickening, this would have reduced the British advantage to a
minimum. This plan would, moreover, have led the British straight
toward the mine and submarine area of the Helgoland Bight; or, if they
refused to be so led, would have made it necessary for them to abandon
the fight.
It is true, of course, that they did abandon the fight in spite of
the great advantage which the German tactics gave them, but it is
equally true that the German admiral had no reason to hope for
anything so amazingly fortunate for his reputation as a tactician.
CHAPTER XIV
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER--OTHER EVENTS OF THE SECOND YEAR
The night of June 7, 1916, a storm raged along the Scottish shore.
There was wind, rain, and high seas. Toward dusk a British cruiser
approached a point on the extreme northerly end of the coast and took
aboard Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, and his staff.
Among those with him were Lieutenant Colonel Oswald Arthur Fitzgerald,
his military secretary; Brigadier General Arthur Ellershaw, one of the
war secretary's advisers; Sir Hay Frederick Donaldson, munitions
expert, and Hugh James O'Beirne, former counselor at the British
embassy in Petrograd and for some time secretary of the embassy in
Washington.
The cruiser, which was the _Hampshire_, of an old class, put to sea
and headed for Archangel, whence Lord Kitchener was to travel to
Petrograd for a war council with the czar and his generals. About
eight o'clock, only an hour after the party embarked, a mine or
torpedo struck the _Hampshire_ when she was two miles from land
between Merwick Head and Borough Brisay, west of the Orkney Islands.
It is supposed that the cruiser's magazine blew up. Persons on shore
saw a fire break out amidships, and many craft went to her assistance,
although a northwest gale was blowing and the sea was rough.
Four boats got away from the _Hampshire_, all of which were swamped.
According to one report Lord Kitchener and his staff were lost after
leaving the cruiser, but a survivor said that he was last seen on the
bridge with Captain Herbert J. Savill, her commander. According to
this man Kitchener had on a raincoat and held a walking stick in his
hand. He said that the two men calmly watched preparations for
departure and saw at least two lifeboats smashed against the ship's
side.
Twenty minutes after being torpedoed the _Hampshire_ sank, with a loss
of 300 lives.
On July 9, 1916, two days after the _Hampshire_ went down, eleven men
of the cruiser reached the Orkneys, after forty-eight hours buffeting
by the waves upon a raft. The body of Colonel Fitzgerald was washed
ashore the same day of the sinking, but the sea did not give up
Kitchener or any of the other members of his staff.
The Italian admiralty made known June 9, 1916, that the transport
_Principe Umberto_ had fallen victim to a submarine in the Adriatic
with a large loss of life. Estimates of the dead ran from 400 to 500.
King George and Queen Mary attended a memorial service at St. Paul's
in honor of Kitchener on June 13, 1916, when many of the most
prominent officials and citizens of the realm were present. They had a
large military escort to and from the cathedral in respect to the dead
war minister. Other services were held at Canterbury and in many
cities through the kingdom.
On the night of June 18, 1916, a squadron of Russian submarines,
destroyers and torpedo boats surprised a German convoy of merchant
vessels at a point southeast of Stockholm and not far from Swedish
waters. Owing to the heavy losses of German shipping in the Baltic
practically all Teuton ships in that sea traveled under escort only,
and there was a dozen or more vessels in the convoy. An engagement
took place lasting forty-five minutes, during which the Russians sank
the auxiliary cruiser _Herzmann_, capturing her crew and two other
craft, one of which was believed to have been a destroyer. In the
confusion all of the merchant ships reached the Swedish coast and
other destroyers and armed trawlers accompanying them made good their
escape. Berlin admitted the loss, adding that the _Herzmann's_
commander and most of her crew were saved.
During the night of June 16, 1916, the British destroyer _Eden_
collided with the transport _France_ in the English Channel and sank.
Thirty-one men and officers escaped.
The German submarine _U-35_, commanded by Lieutenant von Arnauld, put
into Cartagena, Spain, June 21, 1916, after a 1,500 mile run from Pola
with a personal letter to King Alfonso, signed by Kaiser Wilhelm. The
missive bore thanks for the treatment of German refugees from the
Kameruns who had been interned in Spain, and the submarine also
brought hospital supplies for the fugitives. Its arrival made a strong
impression on the Spanish public and was taken as a new sign of
Germany's power. No such trip ever had been made before for such a
purpose. It was a precedent in the communication of kings.
The British steamship _Brussels_, carrying freight and a number of
passengers, most of whom were Belgian refugees bound from Rotterdam to
Tillbury, a London suburb, was captured in the channel by German
destroyers and taken to Zeebrugge, Belgium on the night of June 23,
1916. The incident proved that German warcraft were again far afield.
It was said that the capture had been made by means of previous
information as to the time of the _Brussels's_ sailing and with the
aid of a spy. Her course lay about forty miles north of Zeebrugge, and
a suspected passenger was seen to wave a lantern several times before
the destroyers came up.
Captain Fryatt attempted to ram the nearest vessel and escape, but the
effort failed and he was arrested and charged with piracy. Germany had
announced early in the war that she would consider any merchant
captain who made a hostile move, even in defense of his vessel, as a
franc-tireur.
Loss of the Italian auxiliary cruiser _Citta di Messina_, 3,495 tons,
and the French destroyer _Fourche_ was announced by Paris June 25,
1916. The _Messina_ was carrying troops across the Strait of Otranto
when a submarine torpedoed her. The _Fourche_, serving as a convoy,
gave pursuit without result, then turned back to save such survivors
as she could. Within a few minutes she was struck by a second torpedo
and sunk. All on board the two vessels, probably 300 men, were
drowned.
[Illustration: Earl Kitchener.]
The Austrians lost two transports in the harbor of Durazzo, June 26,
1916, when Italian submarines succeeded in passing the forts and
inflicting a heavy blow. Both ships had troops, arms and ammunition
aboard, according to a Rome report. The casualties were unknown.
Petrograd announced that Russian torpedo craft intercepted a large
convoy of Turkish sailing vessels in the Black Sea on June 29, 1916,
and destroyed fifty-four ships. The attack took place off the
Anatolian coast, and several hundred men were believed to have been
drowned. If the number of ships sunk was correct it established a
record for the war.
The former German warship _Goeben_, renamed the _Sultan Selim_,
shelled Tournose, a Russian Black Sea port, on July 3, 1916, and did
considerable damage. One steamship in the harbor went down as a result
of shell fire and large oil works near the city broke into flames. The
_Breslau_, called the _Midullu_ by the Turks, bombarded Scotchy, a
near-by port, about the same time. Several fires started in the latter
city and there were some casualties at both points.
A second Russian hospital ship, the _Vperiode_, was torpedoed in the
Black Sea, July 9, 1916, with a loss of seven lives. She was a ship of
850 tons, having accommodations for about 120 wounded. Like the
_Portugal_, sunk by a submarine some weeks before the _Vperiode_ was
plainly marked with the usual Red Cross emblem. The attack came in
daylight and was accepted by the Russians as having been deliberately
made, which once more aroused the indignation of the Russian people.
Berlin announced July 7, 1916, that the British steamer _Lestris_,
outward bound from Liverpool had been captured near the British East
Coast and taken to a German port. This second capture in the channel
within a few days caused considerable criticism in England.
As dawn was breaking on July 10, 1916, a submarine came alongside a
tug in Hampton Roads and asked for a pilot. The pilot went aboard and
found himself on the subsea freighter _Deutschland_, first merchant
submarine to be built and the first to make a voyage. She came from
Bremerhaven, a distance of 4,000 miles, in sixteen days. Reports had
been current since the _U-35_ made her trip to Cartagena that the
kaiser would send a message to President Wilson by an undersea boat.
The American public scouted the idea as being impossible of
accomplishment, but the report persisted, and cities along the
Atlantic Coast line had been on the watch for several days. The
_Deutschland_ eventually turned into Hampton Roads, piloted by a
waiting tug, and tied up at a Baltimore dock.
The submarine, which was the largest ever seen in American waters,
became a seven days' wonder. Captain Paul Koenig and his twenty-nine
men and officers told some interesting stories of their trip across
the ocean. It was said that the _Deutschland_ could remain submerged
for four days. When they got into the English Channel there was a
cordon of warships barring exit to the Atlantic that made them
extremely cautious. So Captain Koenig let his vessel lay on the bottom
of the channel for a day and a night while the men enjoyed themselves
with a phonograph and rousing German songs. When their enemies thinned
out to some extent the submarine started again on her way and headed
directly for Baltimore, which she reached without special incident.
The _Deutschland_ immediately received the name of supersubmarine.
Some thousand tons of dyes and other valuable products filled her
hold. They were reported to be worth $1,000,000. The vessel was able
to make twelve knots an hour on the surface and about seven knots when
submerged. She traveled most of the way across on the surface, being
under water about one-third of the time. In addition to her valuable
cargo, she brought a special message from Kaiser Wilhelm to the
president.
No other submarine, so far as known, had made a trip of such distance
as the _Deutschland_ up to that time. Longer voyages have been
accredited to several British submarines, but they were either made
with a convoy or broken by stops enroute. Soon after the beginning of
the war, several Australian submarines journeyed from their far-away
home ports to the Dardanelles, traveling 13,000 miles. They called at
various points in the two Americas. Submarines built in America and
assembled in Canada proceeded from Newfoundland to Liverpool before
the _Deutschland_ crossed the Atlantic, but they had another ship as
convoy.
The _Sultan Selim_ and the _Midullu_ clashed with Russian ships in the
Black Sea, July 11, 1916, sinking four merchant vessels. They also
bombarded harbor works on the Caucasian Coast near Puab. Both
attacking vessels made their escape without injury.
Vienna reported on the same day the sinking of five British patrol
boats in the Otranto Road, between Italy and Albania, by the cruiser
_Novara_. Only nine men were saved.
Seaham Harbor, a small coal port near Sunderland, on the British
Channel coast, was shelled by a submarine the night of July 11, 1916.
Thirty rounds of shrapnel started several fires and caused the death
of one woman. Berlin also claimed the sinking of a British auxiliary
cruiser of 7,000 tons and three patrol vessels on the night of that
day. The statement was never denied in London, and no details were
made public as to the fate of the crews.
The Italian destroyer _Impetuoso_ was torpedoed in the Adriatic, July
16, 1916, with a loss of 125 lives.
In retaliation for Turkish attacks upon her hospital ships, Russia
announced July 21, 1916, that she would no longer respect hospital
ships of the Ottomans. It was pointed out that hitherto all vessels
bearing the markings of the Red Crescent Society, which is the Turkish
equivalent of the Red Cross, had been uniformly respected. This
declaration by Russia implied a depth of resentment that had swept
through all of the allied countries because of deeds said to have been
committed by the Teutons and their Turkish cohorts. Some few reprisals
were taken by France in the way of air raids in retaliation for the
bombardment of open cities. But this was the first recorded step of
Russia in that direction and foretold a war in which all quarter would
disappear.
Two years of fighting had cost both sides heavily upon the sea. Up to
August 1, 1915, according to the best available figures, the allied
navies lost seventy-one warships, with a tonnage of 326,855. Great
Britain was a sufferer to the extent of forty-two ships in that first
year, aggregating 254,494 tons, represented by eight battleships,
three armored cruisers, four protected cruisers, four light cruisers,
and twenty-three smaller craft. In the same period France lost twelve
ships of 28,027 tons; Russia six ships of 21,775 tons; Japan seven
ships of 4,801, and Italy four ships of 17,758 tons.
The losses of Germany, Austria and Turkey in 1915 were placed at
eighty-nine ships, with a gross tonnage of 262,791. Of these Germany
lost sixty-nine vessels, aggregating 238,904 tons, and consisting of
one battle cruiser, five armored cruisers, ten protected cruisers and
fifty smaller craft. Austria lost seven ships of 7,397 tons, and
Turkey thirteen ships of 16,490 tons.
Curiously enough the second year's figures show smaller losses for
both sides. The Allies are accredited with forty-one ships having a
tonnage of 202,600, and the Teutonic allies with thirty-three ships,
having a tonnage of 125,120. Thirty-four British ships were sunk,
including two battleships, three battle cruisers, seven protected
cruisers, two light cruisers, and seventeen smaller craft. The other
losses were distributed between her partners in arms.
Germany's loss in 1916 was twenty-six ships--four battleships, one
battle cruiser, six protected cruisers, and fifteen smaller craft,
approximating 114,620 tons. The remaining casualties on the German
side were divided between Austria and Turkey.
These figures do not take into account several vessels claimed to have
been sunk by both sides but are predicated upon known sea casualties.
During the two years Germany sustained a reduction of 18.5 of her
strength in battleships and battle cruisers of the dreadnought era,
which means ships built since 1904, and these are the units that
really count in modern warfare. Britain is believed to have lost 6.6
of similar vessels. In light cruisers her loss was only 5.2 per cent,
while Germany was weakened nearly 45 per cent in that class of vessel.
The figures shift for vessels of an older type, showing a ratio of
about two to one against Great Britain. This is due largely to the
Dardanelles enterprise and because in some instances older craft were
assigned to many dangerous undertakings where the newer ships were
held in reserve.
In every engagement of any consequence that took place during the
first two years of war, with the single exception of the fight off
Chile, Britain won and Germany lost. But Germany inflicted greater
injury upon her opponent than any other nation in all the years of
Britain's maritime supremacy. The actual material loss to her enemies
was larger than her own. Despite this and the fact of Germany's
strongest efforts Britain still ruled the waves.
PART III--CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT