OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.
1. The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. 2. That trust
is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What injury is.
4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract.
5. The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of
actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and distributive
justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to him that is
willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9.
The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.
10. The fifth law, of mercy. 11. The sixth law, that punishments
regard the future only. 12. The seventh law, against reproach.
13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, of
humility. 15. The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of
persons. 16. The eleventh, of things to be had in common. 17.
The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth,
of birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth, of the
safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. 20. The
fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no
man is judge in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires
must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to
be judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth,
that there can no contract be made with the umpire. 25. The
twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the
use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may presently know,
whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not.
27. The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience.
28. The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things
agreeable to those laws. 29. The laws of nature are
unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of
nature, is a just man. 31. The natural and moral law are one.
32. How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws
of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered
concerning the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not properly a
law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.
[Sidenote: The second law of nature, to perform contracts.]
1. Another of the laws of nature is, to _perform contracts_, or _to
keep trust_. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that
the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to
obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that
this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract.
But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall
perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or
omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to
them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith,
is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by
the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the
natural law.
[Sidenote: That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.]
2. Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with
whom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that
none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For
he that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to
be in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing
in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking
so he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who
contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep
faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain,
and not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold
trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either
there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.
[Sidenote: Injury defined.]
3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift,
(which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an
injury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an
injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing,
and both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it
seems the word _injury_ came to be given to any action or omission,
because they were _without right_; he that acted or omitted, having
before conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness
between that which in the common course of life we call _injury_,
and that which in the Schools is usually called _absurd_. For even
as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he
first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like
manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which
before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an
injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the
Schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some
future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not
done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time,
which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity
in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
[Sidenote: An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.]
4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no
man[6] but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is
made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of
bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined.
For if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him,
to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the
servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but
he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any
man offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages
him to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom
the power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt
should expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus:
_what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than
mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and
not my mind?_ In which speech, where there hath no manner of
pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.
Footnote 6:
_Injury can be done to no man, &c._] The word _injustice_ relates
to some law: _injury_, to some person, as well as some law. For
what is unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done,
and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes
against no private person, but the magistrate only; sometimes also
neither against the magistrate, nor any private man, but only
against God. For through contract and conveyance of right, we say,
that an injury is done against this or that man. Hence it is,
which we see in all kind of government, that what private men
contract between themselves by word or writing, is released again
at the will of the obliger. But those mischiefs which are done
against the laws of the land, as theft, homicide, and the like,
are punished, not as he wills to whom the hurt is done, but
according to the will of the magistrate; that is, the constituted
laws.
[Sidenote: The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.]
5. These words, _just_ and _unjust_, as also _justice_ and
_injustice_, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are
attributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are
attributed to actions, _just_ signifies as much as what is done with
right, and _unjust_, as what is done with injury. He who hath done
some just thing, is not therefore said to be a _just_ person, but
_guiltless_; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not
therefore say he is an _unjust_, but _guilty_ man. But when the
words are applied to persons, _to be just_ signifies as much as to
be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or
to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and _to be
unjust_ is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be
measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So
as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man,
is one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable
actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But
that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the
law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and
he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of
the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason
of the iniquity of his mind.
[Sidenote: The distinction of commutative and distributive justice,
examined.]
6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds,
commutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists
in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is
conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending,
location and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to
contractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they
say, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the
dignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man
κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that
deserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth
distributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of
equality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when
two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of
silver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an
equality _secundum quod_; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided
to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and
four hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six
hundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same
inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every
one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal
distribution. But such like equality is the same thing with
geometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither
if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure
the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide
more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the
other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our
Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore
is no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot
be denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in
this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not
arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he
have fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken
against this distinction of justice, although now almost generally
received by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be
somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been
defined above.
[Sidenote: No injury can be done to him that is willing.]
7. It is an old saying, _volenti non fit injuria_, the willing man
receives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our
principles. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done
which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by
his will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being
willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the
contract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter)
becomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it
is done by right; wherefore it is no injury.
[Sidenote: The third law of nature, of ingratitude.]
8. The third precept of the natural law is, _that you suffer not him
to be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you,
first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a
mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to
repent him of his gift_. For without this, he should act without
reason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost;
and by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind
of benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there
be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of
gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would
necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But
because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract,
(for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore
is it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and
thanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called _ingratitude_.
[Sidenote: The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself
useful.]
9. The fourth precept of nature is, _that every man render himself
useful unto others_: which that we may rightly understand, we must
remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter
into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not
unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the
building, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For
as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up
more room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because
of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or
easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly
compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the
harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself,
and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by
reason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be
useless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by
right only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his
main might to intend the procurement of those things which are
necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the
other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war;
because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he
therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it
follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature,
that every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this
law may be called _useless_ and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth
_inhumanity_ to this _usefulness_, as having regard to this very
law.
[Sidenote: The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.]
10. The fifth precept of the law of nature is, _that we must forgive
him who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken
caution for the time to come_. The pardon of what is past, or the
remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace
to him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is
become penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is,
to him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for
the future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not
properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature.
Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future
caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to
the natural law.
[Sidenote: The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.]
11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, _that in revenge and
punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the
future good_: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for
any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that
others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is
confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of
nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the
future, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore,
because revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing
else but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no
end; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing
to come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge
therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory,
and is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason,
introduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature.
It is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we
look not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is
commonly called _cruelty_.
[Sidenote: The seventh law of nature, against slander.]
12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all
to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose
their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it
follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of
nature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or
laughter, _do declare himself to hate or scorn another_. The breach
of which law is called _reproach_. But although nothing be more
frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak,
and namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate
to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these
kind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed
for contumelious.
[Sidenote: The eighth law, against pride.]
13. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not
to the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before
(Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore
the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of
kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his
first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole
political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to
command, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were
distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a
certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is
not only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also
against experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of
understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than
to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser
and stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand
of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is
to be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to
contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace,
_that they be esteemed as equal_; and therefore it is in the eighth
place a precept of the law of nature, _that every man be accounted
by nature equal to another_; the contrary to which law is _pride_.
[Sidenote: The ninth law, of humility.]
14. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he
should part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to
the same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right
of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all
necessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are
retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many
peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of
the natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges
to himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise
he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For
what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making
up of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom
no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe
_equal things to equals_, is the same with giving things
_proportional_ to _proportionals_. The observation of this law is
called _meekness_, the violation πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the
Latins are styled _immodici et immodesti_.
[Sidenote: The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of
persons.]
15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, _that
every man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either
party_. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right
by nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if
we will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any
time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are
forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For
he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural
equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is
declared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The
observance of this precept is called _equity_; the breach, _respect
of persons_. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.
[Sidenote: The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.]
16. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, _those things
which cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if
the quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists;
but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and
proportionally to the number of the users_. For otherwise that
equality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the
foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.
[Sidenote: The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.]
17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by
the law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, _that the use
of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot;
and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who
shall have the first use of it_. For here also regard is to be had
unto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.
[Sidenote: The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.]
18. But all lot is twofold, _arbitrary_ or _natural_.
_Arbitrary_ is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders,
and it consists in mere chance, as they say, or fortune. _Natural_
is primogeniture, in Greek κληρονομια, as it were, given by lot; or
first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided
nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessor; as also
those things which belonged to the father are due to the son, unless
the father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some
other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature.
[Sidenote: The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are
mediators for peace.]
19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, _that safety
must be assured to the mediators for peace_. For the reason which
commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But
the first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to
obtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can
peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is
therefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we
must give all security to the mediators for peace.
[Sidenote: The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.]
20. Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these
and whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep
them, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the
application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was
done were against the law or not, which we call the question of
right; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides
supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the
preservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can
possibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the
matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to
stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom
they thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore
the fifteenth precept of the natural law, _that both parties
disputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the
opinion and judgment of some third_.
[Sidenote: The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own
cause.]
21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the
differing parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the
arbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to
seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for
peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same
equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man
would do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the
law of nature, _that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own
cause_.
[Sidenote: The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all
hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be
judged.]
22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, _that no
man must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or
glory from the victory of either part_: for the like reason sways
here, as in the foregoing law.
[Sidenote: The eighteenth law, of witnesses.]
23. But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit,
whether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural
law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is,
because they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He
must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or
more, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as
by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth
law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, _that
where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule
their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both
parts_.
[Sidenote: The nineteenth law, that no contract is to be made with
the judge.]
24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter may be
furthermore understood, _that no contract or promise must pass
between him and the parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue
whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or
be obliged to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such
sentence as he shall truly judge to be equal_. The judge is indeed
bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal, by the
law of nature recounted in the 15th article: to the obligation of
which law nothing can be added by way of compact. Such compact
therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgment he
should contend for the equity of it, except such compact be of no
force, the controversy would remain after judgment given: which is
contrary to the constitution of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as
both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which
he should pronounce. The law of nature therefore commands the judge
to be disengaged, which is its nineteenth precept.
[Sidenote: The twentieth law, against gluttony and such things as
hinder the use of reason.]
25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but
the dictates of reason; so as, unless a man endeavour to preserve
the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of
nature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or willingly doth
aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he
knowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no
difference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who does
such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it. But
they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do that which
disturbs the mind from its natural state; that which most manifestly
happens to drunkards, and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the
twentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.
[Sidenote: The rule by which a man may presently know, whether what
he is about to act be against the law of nature or not.]
26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of nature derived
by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us
to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will say
that the deduction of these laws is so hard, that it is not to be
expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will
they prove obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not, nay
indeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is true, that hope, fear,
anger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and other perturbations
of mind, do hinder a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of
these laws whilst those passions prevail in him: but there is no man
who is not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there
is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and
unlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts whether what he
is now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not, he
conceive himself to be in that other’s stead. Here instantly those
perturbations which persuaded him to the fact, being now cast into
the other scale, dissuade him as much. And this rule is not only
easy, but is anciently celebrated in these words, _quod tibi fieri
non vis, alteri ne feceris_: _do not that to others, you would not
have done to yourself_.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature oblige only in the court of
conscience.]
27. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of
present profit, are very unapt to observe these laws, although
acknowledged by them; if perhaps some, more humble than the rest,
should exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates,
the others not practising the same, surely they would not follow
reason in so doing: nor would they hereby procure themselves peace,
but a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the law
become a mere prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be
imagined, that by nature, that is, by reason, men are obliged to the
exercise of all these laws[7] in that state of men wherein they are
not practised by others. We are obliged yet, in the interim, to a
readiness of mind to observe them, whensoever their observation
shall seem to conduce to the end for which they were ordained. We
must therefore conclude, that the law of nature doth always and
everywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of conscience; but
not always in the external court, but then only when it may be done
with safety.
Footnote 7:
_The exercise of all these laws._ Nay, among these laws some
things there are, the omission whereof, provided it be done for
peace or self-preservation, seems rather to be the fulfilling,
than breach of the natural law. For he that doth all things
against those that do all things, and plunders plunderers, doth
equity. But on the contrary, to do that which in peace is a
handsome action, and becoming an honest man, is dejectedness and
poorness of spirit, and a betraying of one’s self, in the time of
war. But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth
not even in the time of war itself. For I cannot understand what
drunkenness or cruelty, that is, revenge which respects not the
future good, can advance toward peace, or the preservation of any
man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what is just and unjust, is
not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and
conscience of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out
of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done
with right, otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach
of the natural law, and an injury against God.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act
agreeable to those laws.]
28. But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act
not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be
that he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act
itself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against
them.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature are immutable and eternal.]
29. _The laws of nature are immutable and eternal_: what they
forbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be
unlawful. For _pride_, _ingratitude_, _breach of contracts_ (or
_injury_), _inhumanity_, _contumely_, will never be lawful, nor the
contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for
dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the
court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws. Yet
actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law,
that what is done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at
another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it
another. Yet reason is still the same, and changeth not her end,
which is peace and defence, nor the means to attain them, to wit,
those virtues of the mind which we have declared above, and which
cannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever.
[Sidenote: He who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is just.]
30. It is evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the
laws of nature are to be observed, because they require the
endeavour only, (but that must be true and constant); which whoso
shall perform, we may rightly call him _just_. For he who tends to
this with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squared
according to the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he hath a
mind to fulfil all those laws; which is all we are obliged to by
rational nature. Now he that hath done all he is obliged to, is a
just man.
[Sidenote: The natural law is the same with the moral.]
31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is the same with the
moral. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know, therefore,
that good and evil are names given to things to signify the
inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given. But the
inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse
constitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we
apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more
in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what
this man commends, that is to say, calls _good_, the other
undervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse
times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do,
necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are,
therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the
diversity of the present appetite, they mete good and evil by
diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as
they are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good.
They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree
concerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for
things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our
reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the
same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and
therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy, (which we
have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or
habits, that is, virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace,
commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore
it is called _moral_.
[Sidenote: Whence it comes to pass, that what hath been said
concerning the law, is not the same with what hath been
delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues.]
32. But because men cannot put off this same irrational appetite,
whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict
consequence, many unforseen evils do adhere) before the future; it
happens, that though all men do agree in the commendation of the
foresaid virtues, yet they disagree still concerning their nature,
to wit, in what each of them doth consist. For as oft as another’s
good action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of
some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions which please them,
are ever intituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass that the
same action is praised by these, and called virtue, and dispraised
by those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found
by philosophers for this matter. For since they could not observe
the goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to
peace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord, they built
a moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law, and
unconstant to itself. For they would have the nature of virtues
seated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes, and the
vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false. For _to
dare_ is commended, and, under the name of _fortitude_ is taken for
a virtue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also
the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great or little, or
between both, makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it.
Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more of what is mine own
than I owe him. The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of
_moral_ philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such precepts in
this place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against
those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts
of _rational_ nature, from whence spring other virtues; for
temperance, also, is a precept of reason, because intemperance tends
to sickness and death. And so fortitude too, that is, that same
faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, and which are more
hardly declined than overcome; because it is a means tending to the
preservation of him that resists.
[Sidenote: The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is
delivered in Holy Scripture.]
33. But those which we call the laws of nature, (since they are
nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of
things to be done and omitted; but a law, to speak properly and
accurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to
others to be done or omitted), are not in propriety of speech laws,
as they proceed from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by God in
holy Scriptures, as we shall see in the chapter following, they are
most properly called by the name of laws. For the sacred Scripture
is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right.
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