PART VIII.

_LEE'S LAST CAMPAIGNS AND LAST DAYS_.

I.

GENERAL GRANT CROSSES THE RAPIDAN.

In the first days of May, 1864, began the immense campaign which was

to terminate only with the fall of the Confederacy.

For this, which was regarded as the decisive trial of strength, the

Federal authorities had made elaborate preparations. New levies were

raised by draft to fill up the ranks of the depleted forces; great

masses of war material were accumulated at the central depots at

Washington, and the Government summoned from the West an officer of

high reputation to conduct hostilities on what was more plainly than

ever before seen to be the theatre of decisive conflict--Virginia. The

officer in question was General Ulysses S. Grant, who had received the

repute of eminent military ability by his operations in the West;

he was now commissioned lieutenant-general, and President Lincoln

assigned him to the command of "all the armies of the United States,"

at that time estimated to number one million men.

General Grant promptly accepted the trust confided to him, and,

relinquishing to Major-General Sherman the command of the Western

forces, proceeded to Culpepper and assumed personal command of the

Army of the Potomac, although nominally that army remained under

command of General Meade. The spring campaign was preceded, in

February, by two movements of the Federal forces: one the advance of

General B.F. Butler up the Peninsula to the Chickahominy, where for a

few hours he threatened Richmond, only to retire hastily when opposed

by a few local troops; the other the expedition of General Kilpatrick

with a body of cavalry, from the Rapidan toward Richmond, with the

view of releasing the Federal prisoners there. This failed completely,

like the expedition up the Peninsula. General Kilpatrick, after

threatening the city, rapidly retreated, and a portion of his command,

under Colonel Dahlgren, was pursued, and a large portion killed,

including their commander. It is to be hoped, for the honor of human

nature, that Colonel Dahlgren's designs were different from those

which are attributed to him on what seems unassailable proof. Papers

found upon his body contained minute directions for releasing the

prisoners and giving up the city to them, and for putting to death the

Confederate President and his Cabinet.

To return to the more important events on the Rapidan. General Grant

assumed the direction of the Army of the Potomac under most favorable

auspices. Other commanders--especially General McClellan--had labored

under painful disadvantages, from the absence of coöperation and good

feeling on the part of the authorities. The new leader entered upon

the great struggle under very different circumstances. Personally and

politically acceptable to the Government, he received their hearty

coöperation: all power was placed in his hands; he was enabled to

concentrate in Virginia the best troops, in large numbers; and the

character of this force seemed to promise him assured victory. General

McClellan and others had commanded troops comparatively raw, and

were opposed by Confederate armies in the full flush of anticipated

success. General Grant had now under him an army of veterans, and the

enemy he was opposed to had, month by month, lost strength. Under

these circumstances it seemed that he ought to succeed in crushing his

adversary.

The Federal army present and ready for duty May 1, 1864, numbered one

hundred and forty-one thousand one hundred and sixty-six men. That of

General Lee numbered fifty-two thousand six hundred and twenty-six.

Colonel Taylor, adjutant-general of the Army, states the strictly

effective at a little less, viz.:

Ewell 13,000

Hill 17,000

Longstreet 10,000

Infantry 40,000

Cavalry and artillery 10,000

Total 50,000

The two statements do not materially differ, and require no

discussion. The force at Lee's command was a little over one-third

of General Grant's; and, if it be true that the latter commander

continued to receive reënforcements between the 1st and 4th days of

May, when he crossed the Rapidan, Lee's force was probably less than

one-third of his adversary's.

Longstreet, it will be seen, had been brought back from the West, but

the Confederates labored under an even more serious disadvantage than

want of sufficient force. Lee's army, small as it was, was wretchedly

supplied. Half the men were in rags, and, worse still, were but

one-fourth fed. Against this suicidal policy, in reference to an army

upon which depended the fate of the South, General Lee had protested

in vain. Whether from fault in the authorities or from circumstances

over which they could exercise no control, adequate supplies of food

did not reach the army; and, when it marched to meet the enemy, in the

first days of May, the men were gaunt, half-fed, and in no condition

to enter upon so arduous a campaign. There was naught to be done,

however, but to fight on to the end. Upon the Army of Northern

Virginia, depleted by casualties, and unprovided with the commonest

necessaries, depended the fate of the struggle. Generals Grant and Lee

fully realized that fact; and the Federal commander had the acumen to

perceive that the conflict was to be long and determined. He indulged

no anticipations of an early or easy success. His plan, as stated in

his official report, was "to _hammer continuously_ against the armed

force of the enemy and his resources, until _by mere attrition_, if

by nothing else, there should be nothing left of him but an equal

submission with the loyal section of our common country to the

Constitution and the laws." The frightful cost in blood of this policy

of hammering continuously and thus wearing away his adversary's

strength by mere attrition, did or did not occur to General Grant. In

either case he is not justly to be blamed.

It was the only policy which promised to result in Federal success.

Pitched battles had been tried for nearly three years, and in victory

or in defeat the Southern army seemed equally unshaken and dangerous.

This fact was now felt and acknowledged even by its enemies. "Lee's

army," said a Northern writer, referring to it at this time, "is an

army of veterans: it is an instrument sharpened to a perfect edge. You

turn its flanks--well, its flanks are made to be turned. This effects

little or nothing. All that we reckon as gained, therefore, is the

loss of life inflicted on the enemy." With an army thus trained in

many combats, and hardened against misfortune, defeat in one or a

dozen battles decided nothing. General Grant seems to have

understood this, and to have resolutely adopted the programme of

"attrition"--coldly estimating that, even if he lost ten men to

General Lee's one, he could better endure that loss, and could afford

it, if thereby he "crushed the rebellion."

The military theory of the Federal commander having thus been set

forth in his own words, it remains to notice his programme for the

approaching campaign. He had hesitated between two plans--"one to

cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other

above, moving by his left." The last was abandoned, from the

difficulty of keeping open communication with any base of supplies,

and the latter adopted. General Grant determined to "fight Lee between

Culpepper and Richmond, if he would stand;" to advance straight upon

the city and invest it from the north and west, thereby cutting its

communications in three directions; and then, crossing the James River

above the city, form a junction with the left of Major-General Butler,

who, moving with about thirty thousand men from Fortress Monroe, at

the moment when the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, was to

occupy City Point, advance thence up the south side of James River,

and reach a position where the two armies might thus unite.

It is proper to keep in view this programme of General Grant. Lee

completely reversed it by promptly moving in front of his adversary

at every step which he took in advance; and it will be seen that the

Federal commander was finally compelled to adopt a plan which does not

seem to have entered his mind, save as a _dernier ressort_, at the

beginning of the campaign.

On the morning of the 4th of May, General Grant commenced crossing the

Rapidan at Germanna and other fords above Chancellorsville, and by the

morning of the 5th his army was over. It appears from his report that

he had not anticipated so easy a passage of the stream, and greatly

felicitated himself upon effecting it so successfully. "This I

regarded," he says, "as a great success, and it removed from my mind

the most serious apprehension I had entertained, that of crossing

the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and

ably-commanded army." Lee had made no movement to dispute the passage

of the stream, from the fact, perhaps, that his army was _not_ either

"large" or "well-appointed." He preferred to await the appearance of

his adversary, and direct an assault on the flank of his column as it

passed across his front. From a speech attributed to General Meade, it

would seem to have been the impression in the Federal army that Lee

designed falling back to a defensive position somewhere near the South

Anna. His movements were, however, very different. Instead of retiring

before General Grant in the direction of Richmond, he moved with his

three corps toward the Wilderness, to offer battle.

[Illustration: Routes of Lee & Grant, May and June 1864.]

The head of the column consisted of Ewell's corps, which had retained

its position on the Rapidan, forming the right of Lee's line. General

A.P. Hill, who had been stationed higher up, near Liberty Mills,

followed; and Longstreet, who lay near Gordonsville, brought up the

rear. These dispositions dictated, as will be seen, the positions of

the three commands in the ensuing struggle. Ewell advanced in front

down the Old Turnpike, that one of the two great highways here running

east and west which is nearest the Rapidan; Hill came on over the

Orange Plank-road, a little south of the turnpike, and thus formed

on Ewell's right; and Longstreet, following, came in on the right of

Hill.

General Grant had plunged with his army into the dense and melancholy

thicket which had been the scene of General Hooker's discomfiture. His

army, followed by its great train of four thousand wagons, indicating

the important nature of the movement, had reached Wilderness Tavern

and that Brock Road over which Jackson advanced in his secret

flank-march against the Federal right in May, 1863. In May of 1864,

now, another Federal army had penetrated, the sombre and depressing

shadows of the interminable thickets of the Wilderness, and a more

determined struggle than the first was to mark with its bloody hand

this historic territory.

II.

THE FIRST COLLISION IN THE WILDERNESS.

To understand the singular combat which now ensued, it is necessary to

keep in view the fact that nothing more surprised General Grant than

the sudden appearance of his adversary face to face with him in the

Wilderness.

It had not been supposed, either by the lieutenant-general or his

corps-commanders, that Lee, with his small army, would have recourse

to a proceeding so audacious. It was anticipated, indeed, that,

somewhere on the road to Richmond, Lee would make a stand and fight,

in a carefully-selected position which would enable him to risk

collision with his great adversary; but that Lee himself would bring

on this collision by making an open attack, unassisted by position

of any sort, was the last thing which seems to have occurred to his

adversary.

Such, however, as has been said, was the design, from the first, of

the Southern commander, and he moved with his accustomed celerity

and energy. As soon as General Grant broke up his camps north of the

Rapidan, Lee was apprised of the fact, and ordered his three corps

to concentrate in the direction of Chancellorsville. Those who were

present in the Southern army at this time will bear record to the

soldierly promptness of officers and men. On the evening of the 3d of

May the camps were the scenes of noise, merriment, and parade: the

bands played; the woods were alive; nothing disturbed the scene of

general enjoyment of winter-quarters. On the morning of the 4th all

this was changed. The camps were deserted; no sound was anywhere

heard; the troops were twenty miles away, fully armed and ready for

battle. General Lee was in the saddle, and his presence seemed to push

forward his column. Ewell, marching with celerity, bivouacked

that night directly in face of the enemy; and it was the

suddenly-discovered presence of the troops of this commander which

arrested General Grant, advancing steadily in the direction of

Spottsylvania Court-House.

He must have inwardly chafed at a circumstance so unexpected and

embarrassing. It had been no part of his plan to fight in the thickets

of the Wilderness, and yet an adversary of but one-third his own

strength was about to reverse his whole programme, and dictate the

terms of the first battles of the campaign. There was nothing to do,

however, but to fight, and General Grant hastened to form order of

battle for that purpose, with General Sedgwick commanding his right,

Generals Warren and Burnside his centre, and General Hancock his left,

near the Brock Road. The line thus formed extended from northwest to

southeast, and, as the right wing was in advance with respect to Lee,

that circumstance occasioned the first collision.

This occurred about mid-day on the 5th of May, and was brought on by

General Warren, who attacked the head of Swell's column, on the Old

Turnpike. An obstinate engagement ensued, and the division which

received the assault was forced back. It quickly, however, reformed,

and being reënforced advanced in turn against General Warren, and,

after a hard fight, he was driven back with a loss of three thousand

men and two pieces of artillery.

This first collision of the armies on the Confederate left was

followed almost immediately by a bloody struggle on the centre. This

was held by A.P. Hill, who had marched down the Plank-road, and was

near the important point of junction of that road with the Brock Road,

when he was suddenly attacked by the enemy. The struggle which ensued

was long and determined. General Lee wrote: "The assaults were

repeated and desperate, but every one was repulsed." When night fell,

Hill had not been driven back, but had not advanced; and the two

armies rested on their arms, awaiting the return of light to continue

the battle.

III.

THE BATTLE OF THE 6TH OF MAY.

The morning of the 6th of May came, and, with the first light of dawn,

the adversaries, as by a common understanding, advanced at the same

moment to attack each other.

The battle which followed is wellnigh indescribable, and may be said,

in general terms, to have been naught but the blind and desperate

clutch of two great bodies of men, who could scarcely see each other

when they were but a few feet apart, and who fired at random, rather

by sound than sight. A Southern writer, describing the country and

the strange combat, says: "The country was sombre--a land of thicket,

undergrowth, jungle, ooze, where men could not see each other twenty

yards off, and assaults had to be made by the compass. The fights

there were not even as easy as night attacks in open country, for

at night you can travel by the stars. Death came unseen; regiments

stumbled on each other, and sent swift destruction into each other's

ranks, guided by the crackling of the bushes. It was not war--military

manoeuvring: science had as little to do with it as sight. Two wild

animals were hunting each other; when they heard each other's steps,

they sprung and grappled. The conqueror advanced, or went elsewhere.

The dead were lost from all eyes in the thicket. The curious spectacle

was here presented of officers advancing to the charge, in the jungle,

_compass in hand_, attacking, not by sight, but by the bearing of the

needle. In this mournful and desolate thicket did the great campaign

of 1864 begin. Here, in blind wrestle as at midnight, did two hundred

thousand men in blue and gray clutch each other--bloodiest and

weirdest of encounters. War had had nothing like it. The genius of

destruction, tired apparently of the old commonplace killing, had

invented the 'unseen death.' At five in the morning, the opponents

closed in, breast to breast, in the thicket. Each had thrown up here

and there slight, temporary breastworks of saplings and dirt; beyond

this, they were unprotected. The question now was, which would succeed

in driving his adversary from these defences, almost within a few

yards of each other, and from behind which crackled the musketry.

Never was sight more curious. On the low line of these works, dimly

seen in the thicket, rested the muzzles spouting flame; from the

depths rose cheers; charges were made and repulsed, the lines scarcely

seeing each other; men fell and writhed, and died unseen--their

bodies lost in the bushes, their death-groans drowned in the steady,

continuous, never-ceasing crash."

These sentences convey a not incorrect idea of the general character

of this remarkable engagement, which had no precedent in the war. We

shall now proceed to speak of General Lee's plans and objects, and to

indicate where they failed or succeeded. The commanders of both armies

labored under great embarrassments. General Grant's was the singular

character of the country, with which he was wholly unacquainted; and

General Lee's, the delay in the arrival of Longstreet. Owing to the

distance of the camps of the last-named officer, he had not, at dawn,

reached the field of battle. As his presence was indispensable to a

general assault, this delay in his appearance threatened to result in

unfortunate consequences, as it was nearly certain that General Grant

would make an early and resolute attack. Under these circumstances,

Lee resolved to commence the action, and did so, counting, doubtless,

on his ability, with the thirty thousand men at his command, to at

least maintain his ground. His plan seems to have been to make a heavy

demonstration against the Federal right, and, when Longstreet arrived,

throw the weight of his whole centre and right against the Federal

left, with the view of seizing the Brock Road, running southward,

and forcing back the enemy's left wing into the thickets around

Chancellorsville. This brilliant conception, which, if carried out,

would have arrested General Grant in the beginning of his campaign,

was very near meeting with success. The attack on the Federal right,

under General Sedgwick, commenced at dawn, and the fighting on both

sides was obstinate. It continued with indecisive results throughout

the morning, gradually involving the Federal centre; but, nearly

at the moment when it began, a still more obstinate conflict was

inaugurated between General Hancock, holding the Federal left, and

Hill, who opposed him on the Plank-road. The battle raged in this

quarter with great fury for some time, but, attacked in front and

flank at once by his able opponent, Hill was forced back steadily, and

at last, in some disorder, a considerable distance from the ground

which had witnessed the commencement of the action. At this point,

however, he was fortunately met by Longstreet. That commander rapidly

brought his troops into line, met the advancing enemy, attacked

them with great fury, and, after a bloody contest, in which General

Wadsworth was killed, drove them back to their original position on

the Brock Road.

It now seemed nearly certain that Lee's plan of seizing upon this

important highway would succeed. General Hancock had been forced back

with heavy loss, Longstreet was pressing on, and, as he afterward

said, he "thought he had another Bull Run on them," when a singular

casualty defeated all. General Longstreet, who had ridden in front of

his advancing line, turned to ride back, when he was mistaken by

his own men for a Federal cavalryman, fired upon, and disabled by

a musket-ball. This threw all into disorder, and the advance was

discontinued. General Lee, as soon as he was apprised of the accident,

hastened to take personal command of the corps, and, as soon as order

was restored, directed the line to press forward. The most bloody and

determined struggle of the day ensued. The thicket filled the valleys,

and, as at Chancellorsville, a new horror was added to the horror

of battle. A fire broke out in the thicket, and soon wrapped the

adversaries in flame and smoke. They fought on, however, amid the

crackling flames. Lee continued to press forward; the Federal

breastworks along a portion of their front were carried, and a part of

General Hancock's line was driven from the field. The struggle had,

however, been decisive of no important results, and, from the lateness

of the hour when it terminated, it could not be followed up. On the

left Lee had also met with marked but equally indecisive success.

General Gordon had attacked the Federal right, driven the force at

that point in disorder from their works, and but for the darkness this

success might have been followed up and turned into a complete defeat

of that wing of the enemy. It was only discovered on the next morning

what important successes Gordon had effected with a single brigade;

and there is reason to believe that with a larger force this able

soldier might have achieved results of a decisive character.[1]

[Footnote 1: General Early, in his "Memoir of the Last Year of the War

for Independence," bears his testimony to the important character of

the blow struck by General Gordon. He says: "At light, on the morning

of the 7th, an advance was made, which disclosed the fact that the

enemy had given up his line of works in front of my whole line and a

good portion of Johnson's. Between the lines a large number of his

dead had been left, and at his breastworks a large number of muskets

and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was every indication of

great confusion. It was not till then that we understood the full

extent of the success attending the movement of the evening before."

General Gordon had proposed making the attack on the _morning_ of the

6th, but was overruled.]

Such had been the character and results of the first conflicts between

the two armies in the thickets of the Wilderness. As we have already

said, the collision there was neither expected nor desired by General

Grant, who, unlike General Hooker, in May of the preceding year, seems

fully to have understood the unfavorable nature of the region for

manoeuvring a large army. His adversary had, however, forced him to

accept battle, leaving him no choice, and the result of the actions of

the 5th and 6th had been such as to determine the Federal commander to

emerge as soon as possible from the tangled underwood which hampered

all his movements. On the 7th he accordingly made no movement to

attack Lee, and on the night of that day marched rapidly in the

direction of Hanover Junction, following the road by Todd's Tavern

toward Spottsylvania Court-House.

For this determination to avoid further fighting in the Wilderness,

General Grant gives a singular explanation. "On the morning of the

7th," he says, "reconnoissance showed that the enemy _had fallen

behind his intrenched lines_, with pickets to the front, covering a

part of the battle-field. From this it was evident that the two-days'

fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain

the contest in the open field, _notwithstanding his advantage of

position_, and that he would wait an attack behind his works." The

"intrenched lines" and "advantage of position" of Lee, were both

imaginary. No lines of intrenchment had been made, and the ground was

not more favorable on General Lee's side than on General Grant's. Both

armies had erected impromptu breastworks of felled trees and earth,

as continued to be their habit throughout the campaign, and the flat

country gave no special advantage to either. The forward movement of

General Grant is susceptible of much easier explanation. The result of

the two-days' fighting had very far from pleased him; he desired

to avoid further conflict in so difficult a country, and, taking

advantage of the quiescence of Lee, and the hours of darkness, he

moved with his army toward the more open country.

IV.

THE 12TH OF MAY.

Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great conflict,

General Lee remained quiet, watching for some movement of his

adversary. His success in the preliminary straggle had been

gratifying, considering the great disproportion of numbers, but he

indulged no expectation of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan,

on the part of General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and

anxiously awaited some development of this intention. There were no

indications of such a design up to the night of the 7th, but at that

time, to use the words of a confidential member of Lee's staff, "he

all at once seemed to conceive the idea that his enemy was preparing

to forsake his position, and move toward Hanover Junction _via_ the

Spottsylvania Court-House, and, believing this, he at once detailed

Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the

court-house."

General Anderson commenced his march about nine o'clock at night, when

the Federal column was already upon its way. A race now began for

the coveted position, and General Stuart, with his dismounted

sharp-shooters behind improvised breastworks, harassed and impeded the

Federal advance, at every step, throughout the night. This greatly

delayed their march, and their head of column did not reach the

vicinity of Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General

Warren, leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed

by General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of

breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had

succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and Richmond.

On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were facing each other

on the line of the Po.

By the rapidity of his movements General Lee had thus completely

defeated his adversary's design to seize on the important point,

Spottsylvania Court-House. General Grant, apparently conceiving some

explanation of this untoward event to be necessary, writes: "The

enemy, having become aware of our movement, and _having the shorter

line_, was enabled to reach there first." The statement that General

Lee had the shorter of the two lines to march over is a mistake. The

armies moved over parallel roads until beyond Todd's Tavern, after

which the distance to the south bank of the Po was greater by Lee's

route than General Grant's. The map will sufficiently indicate this.

Two other circumstances defeated General Grant's attempt to reach the

point first--the extreme rapidity of the march of the Confederate

advance force, and the excellent fighting of Stuart's dismounted men,

who harassed and delayed General Warren, leading the Federal advance

throughout the entire night.

An additional fact should be mentioned, bearing upon this point, and

upon General Lee's designs. "General Lee's orders to me," says General

Early, who, from the sickness of A.P. Hill, had been assigned to the

command of the corps, "were to _move by Todd's Tavern along the Brock

Road_, to Spottsylvania Court-House, as soon as our front was clear of

the enemy." From this order it would appear either that General Lee

regarded the Brock Road, over which General Grant moved, as the

"shorter line," or that he intended the movement of Early on the

enemy's rear to operate as a check upon them, while he went forward to

their front with his main body.

These comments may seem tedious to the general reader, but all that

illustrates the military designs, or defends the good soldiership of

Lee, is worthy of record.

We proceed now to the narrative. In the Wilderness General Grant had

found a dangerous enemy ready to strike at his flank. He now saw in

his front the same active and wary adversary, prepared to bar the

direct road to Richmond. General Lee had taken up his position on the

south bank of one of the four tributaries of the Mattapony. These four

streams are known as the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the

same relation to the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do

to the wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the Nye,

the northernmost of these water-courses. Both were difficult to cross,

and their banks heavily wooded. It was now to be seen whether, either

by a front attack or a turning movement, General Grant could oust his

adversary, and whether General Lee would stand on the defensive or

attack.

All day, during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks

along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan to the

banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet in existence. On the evening of

this day a Federal force was thrown across the Po, on the Confederate

left, but soon withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took

place near the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody

conflict, during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting

troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then recalled,

and, during that night and the succeeding day, nothing of importance

occurred, although heavy skirmishing and an artillery-fire took place

along the lines.

On the morning of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant

made a more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken in

the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General Lee's right

centre, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and was one

of the bloodiest and most terrible incidents of the war. For this

assault General Grant is said to have selected his best troops. These

advanced in a heavy charging column, through the half darkness of

dawn, passed silently over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely

firing a shot, and, just as the first streak of daylight touched the

eastern woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point

of the bayonet. In consequence of the suddenness of the assault and

the absence of artillery--against whose removal General Johnston is

stated to have protested, and which arrived too late--the Federal

forces carried all before them, and gained possession of the works, in

spite of a stubborn and bloody resistance.

Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and the

Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly the whole of

Johnson's division were taken prisoners--the number amounting to about

three thousand--and eighteen pieces of artillery fell into the hands

of the assaulting column.

The position of affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless

General Lee could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing

was left him but an abandonment of his whole position. The Federal

army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and, to

prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain possession of

the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy on his right and left

wings. It is probable that at no time during the war was the Southern

army in greater danger of a bloody and decisive disaster.

At this critical moment General Lee acted with the nerve and coolness

of a soldier whom no adverse event can shake. Those who saw him will

testify to the stern courage of his expression; the glance of the eye,

which indicated a great nature, aroused to the depth of its powerful

organization. Line of battle was promptly formed a short distance

in rear of the salient then in the enemy's possession, and a fierce

charge was made by the Southerners, under the eye of Lee, to regain

it. It was on this occasion that, on fire with the ardor of battle,

which so seldom mastered him, Lee went forward in front of his line,

and, taking his station beside the colors of one of his Virginian

regiments, took off his hat, and, turning to the men, pointed toward

the enemy. A storm of cheers greeted the general, as he sat his gray

war-horse, in front of the men--his head bare, his eyes flashing, and

his cheeks flushed with the fighting-blood of the soldier. General

Gordon, however, spurred to his side and seized his rein.

"General Lee!" he exclaimed, "this is no place for you. Go to the

rear. These are Virginians and Georgians, sir--men who have never

failed!--Men, you will not fail now!" he cried, rising in his stirrups

and addressing the troops.

"No, no!" was the reply of the men; and from the whole line burst the

shout, "Lee to the rear! Lee to the rear!"

Instead of being needed, it was obvious that his presence was an

embarrassment, as the men seemed determined not to charge unless he

retired. He accordingly did so, and the line advanced to the attack,

led by General Gordon and other officers of approved ability and

courage. The charge which followed was resolute, and the word

ferocious best describes the struggle which followed. It continued

throughout the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct

assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight involved the

troops on both flanks, and was desperate and unyielding. The opposing

flags were at times within only a few yards of each other, and so

incessant and concentrated was the fire of musketry, that a tree of

about eighteen inches in diameter was cut down by bullets, and is

still preserved, it is said, in the city of Washington, as a memorial

of this bloody struggle.

[Illustration: The Wilderness. "Lee to the Rear"]

The fighting only ceased several hours after dark. Lee had not

regained his advanced line of works, but he was firmly rooted in an

interior and straighter line, from which the Federal troops had found

it impossible to dislodge him. This result of the stubborn action was

essentially a success, as General Grant's aim in the operation had

been to break asunder his adversary's army--in which he very nearly

succeeded.

At midnight all was again silent. The ground near the salient was

strewed with dead bodies. The loss of the three thousand men and

eighteen guns of Johnson had been followed by a bloody retaliation,

the Federal commander having lost more than eight thousand men.

V.

FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

After the bloody action of the 12th of May, General Grant remained

quiet for many days, "awaiting," he says, "the arrival of

reënforcements from Washington." The number of these fresh troops is

not known to the present writer. General Lee had no reinforcements to

expect, and continued to confront his adversary with his small army,

which must have been reduced by the heavy fighting to less than forty

thousand men, while that of General Grant numbered probably about one

hundred and forty thousand.

Finding that his opponent was not disposed to renew hostilities.

General Lee, on the 19th of May, sent General Ewell to turn his right

flank; but this movement resulted in nothing, save the discovery by

General Ewell that the Federal army was moving. This intelligence was

dispatched to General Lee on the evening of the 21st, and reached

him at Souther's House, on the banks of the Po, where he was calmly

reconnoitring the position of the enemy.

As soon as he read the note of General Ewell, he mounted his horse,

saying, in his grave voice, to his staff, "Come, gentlemen;" and

orders were sent to the army to prepare to move. The troops began

their march on the same night, in the direction of Hanover Junction,

which they reached on the evening of the 22d. When, on May 23d,

General Grant reached the banks of the North Anna, he found Lee

stationed on the south bank, ready to oppose his crossing.

The failure of General Grant to reach and seize upon the important

point of Hanover Junction before the arrival of Lee, decided the fate

of the plan of campaign originally devised by him. If the reader will

glance at the map of Virginia, this fact will become apparent. Hanover

Junction is the point where the Virginia Central and Richmond and

Fredericksburg Railroads cross each other, and is situated in the

angle of the North Anna and South Anna Rivers, which unite a short

distance below to form the Pamunkey. Once in possession of this point,

General Grant would have had easy communication with the excellent

base of supplies at Aquia Creek; would have cut the Virginia Central

Railroad; and a direct march southward would have enabled him to

invest Richmond from the north and northwest, in accordance with his

original plan. Lee had, however, reached the point first, and from

that moment, unless the Southern force were driven from its position,

the entire plan of campaign must necessarily be changed.

The great error of General Grant in this arduous campaign would seem

to have been the feebleness of the attack which he here made upon

Lee. The position of the Southern army was not formidable, and on

his arrival they had had no time to erect defences. The river is not

difficult of crossing, and the ground on the south bank gives

no decided advantage to a force occupying it. In spite of

these facts--which it is proper to say General Grant denies,

however--nothing was effected, and but little attempted. A few words

will sum up the operations of the armies during the two or three days.

Reaching the river, General Grant threw a column across some miles

up the stream, at a point known as Jericho Ford, where a brief but

obstinate encounter ensued between Generals Hill and Warren, and

this was followed by the capture of an old redoubt defending the

Chesterfield bridge, near the railroad crossing, opposite Lee's right,

which enabled another column to pass the stream at that point. These

two successful passages of the river on Lee's left and right seemed to

indicate a fixed intention on the part of his adversary to press both

the Southern flanks, and bring on a decisive engagement; and, to

coöperate in this plan, a third column was now thrown over opposite

Lee's centre.

These movements were, however, promptly met. Lee retired his two

wings, but struck suddenly with his centre at the force attempting to

cross there; and then active operations on both sides ceased. In spite

of having passed the river with the bulk of his army, and formed line

of battle, General Grant resolved not to attack. His explanation of

this is that Lee's position was found "stronger than either of his

previous ones."

Such was the result of the able disposition of the Southern force

at this important point. General Grant found his whole programme

reversed, and, on the night of the 26th, silently withdrew and

hastened down the north bank of the Pamunkey toward Hanovertown

preceded by the cavalry of General Sheridan.

That officer had been detached from the army as it approached

Spottsylvania Court-House, to make a rapid march toward Richmond,

and destroy the Confederate communications. In this he partially

succeeded, but, attempting to ride into Richmond, was repulsed

with considerable loss. The only important result, indeed, of the

expedition, was the death of General Stuart. This distinguished

commander of General Lee's cavalry had been directed to pursue General

Sheridan; had done so, with his customary promptness, and intercepted

his column near Richmond, at a spot known as the Yellow Tavern; and

here, in a stubborn engagement, in which Stuart strove to supply his

want of troops by the fury of his attack, the great chief of cavalry

was mortally wounded, and expired soon afterward. His fall was a

grievous blow to General Lee's heart, as well as to the Southern

cause. Endowed by nature with a courage which shrunk from nothing;

active, energetic, of immense physical stamina, which enabled him to

endure any amount of fatigue; devoted, heart and soul, to the cause

in which he fought, and looking up to the commander of the army with

childlike love and admiration, Stuart could be ill spared at this

critical moment, and General Lee was plunged into the deepest

melancholy at the intelligence of his death. When it reached him he

retired from those around him, and remained for some time communing

with his own heart and memory. When one of his staff entered, and

spoke of Stuart, General Lee said, in a low voice, "I can scarcely

think of him without weeping."

The command of the cavalry devolved upon General Hampton, and it

was fought throughout the succeeding campaign with the nerve and

efficiency of a great soldier; but Stuart had, as it were, formed and

moulded it with his own hands; he was the first great commander of

horse in the war; and it was hard for his successors, however great

their genius, to compete with his memory. His name will thus remain

that of the greatest and most prominent cavalry-officer of the war.

Crossing the Pamunkey at Hanovertown, after a rapid night-march,

General Grant sent out a force toward Hanover Court-House to cut off

Lee's retreat or discover his position. This resulted in nothing,

since General Lee had not moved in that direction. He had, as soon as

the movement of General Grant was discovered, put his lines in motion,

directed his march across the country on the direct route to Cold

Harbor, and, halting behind the Tottapotomoi, had formed his line

there, to check the progress of his adversary on the main road from

Hanovertown toward Richmond. For the third time, thus, General Grant

had found his adversary in his path; and no generalship, or rapidity

in the movement of his column, seemed sufficient to secure to him the

advantages of a surprise. On each occasion the march of the Federal

army had taken place in the night; from the Wilderness on the night of

May 7th; from Spottsylvania on the night of May 21st; and from near

the North Anna on the night of May 26th. Lee had imitated these

movements of his opponent, interposing on each occasion, at the

critical moment, in his path, and inviting battle. This last statement

may be regarded as too strongly expressed, as it seems the opinion of

Northern writers that Lee, in these movements, aimed only to maintain

a strict defensive, and, by means of breastworks, simply keep his

adversary at arm's length. This is an entire mistake. Confident of the

efficiency of his army, small as it was, he was always desirous to

bring on a decisive action, under favorable circumstances. General

Early bears his testimony to the truth of this statement. "I happen to

know," says this officer, "that General Lee had always the greatest

anxiety to strike at Grant in the open field." During the whole

movement from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, the Confederate commander

was in excellent spirits. When at Hanover Junction he spoke of the

situation almost jocosely, and said to the venerable Dr. Gwathmey,

speaking of General Grant, "If I can get one more pull at him, I will

defeat him."

This expression does not seem to indicate any depression or want of

confidence in his ability to meet General Grant in an open pitched

battle. It may, however, be asked why, if such were his desire, he did

not come out from behind his breastworks and fight. The reply is, that

General Grant invariably defended his lines by breastworks as powerful

as--in many cases much more powerful than--his adversary's. The

opposing mounds of earth and trees along the routes of the two armies

remain to prove the truth of what is here stated. At Cold Harbor,

especially, the Federal works are veritable forts. In face of them,

the theory that General Grant uniformly acted upon the offensive,

without fear of offensive operations in turn on the part of Lee,

will be found untenable. Nor is this statement made with the view of

representing General Grant as over-cautious, or of detracting from his

merit as a commander. It was, on the contrary, highly honorable to

him, that, opposed to an adversary of such ability, he should have

neglected nothing.

Reaching the Tottapotomoi, General Grant found his opponent in a

strong position behind that sluggish water-course, prepared to dispute

the road to Richmond; and it now became necessary to force the passage

in his front, or, by another flank march, move still farther to the

left, and endeavor to cross the Chickahominy somewhere in the vicinity

of Cold Harbor. This last operation was determined upon by General

Grant, and, sending his cavalry toward Cold Harbor, he moved rapidly

in the same direction with his infantry. This movement was discovered

at once by Lee; he sent Longstreet's corps forward, and, when the

Federal army arrived, the Southern forces were drawn up in their

front, between them and Richmond, thus barring, for the fourth time in

the campaign, the road to the capital.

During these movements, nearly continuous fighting had taken place

between the opposing columns, which clung to each other, as it were,

each shaping its march more or less by that of the other. At last they

had reached the ground upon which the obstinate struggle of June,

1862, had taken place, and it now became necessary for General Grant

either to form some new plan of campaign, or, by throwing his whole

army, in one great mass, against his adversary, break through all

obstacles, cross the Chickahominy, and seize upon Richmond. This was

now resolved upon.

Heavy fighting took place on June 2d, near Bethesda Church and at

other points, while the armies were coming into position; but this was

felt to be but the preface to the greater struggle which General Lee

now clearly divined. It came without loss of time. On the morning of

the 3d of June, soon after daylight, General Grant threw his whole

army straightforward against Lee's front--all along his line. The

conflict which followed was one of those bloody grapples, rather

than battles, which, discarding all manoeuvring or brain-work in the

commanders, depend for the result upon the brute strength of the

forces engaged. The action did not last half an hour, and, in that

time, the Federal loss was thirteen thousand men. When General Lee

sent a messenger to A.P. Hill, asking the result of the assault on

his part of the line, Hill took the officer with him in front of his

works, and, pointing to the dead bodies which were literally lying

upon each other, said: "Tell General Lee it is the same all along my

front."

The Federal army had, indeed, sustained a blow so heavy, that even the

constant mind and fixed resolution of General Grant and the Federal

authorities seem to have been shaken. The war seemed hopeless to many

persons in the North after the frightful bloodshed of this thirty

minutes at Cold Harbor, of which fact there is sufficient proof. "So

gloomy," says a Northern historian,[1] "was the military outlook after

the action on the Chickahominy, and to such a degree, by consequence,

had the moral spring of the public mind become relaxed, that there was

at this time great danger of a collapse of the war. The history of

this conflict, truthfully written, will show this. The archives of the

State Department, when one day made public, will show how deeply the

Government was affected by the want of military success, and to what

resolutions the Executive had in consequence come. Had not success

elsewhere come to brighten the horizon, it would have been difficult

to have raised new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac, which,

shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of

its ablest officers killed and wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no

more."

[Footnote 1: Mr. Swinton, in his able and candid "Campaigns of the

Army of the Potomac."]

The campaign of one month--from May 4th to June 4th--had cost

the Federal commander sixty thousand men and three thousand

officers--numbers which are given on the authority of Federal

historians--while the loss of Lee did not exceed eighteen thousand.

The result would seem an unfavorable comment upon the choice of the

route across the country from Culpepper instead of that by the James.

General McClellan, two years before, had reached Cold Harbor with

trifling losses. To attain the same point had cost General Grant

a frightful number of lives. Nor could it be said that he had any

important successes to offset this loss. He had not defeated his

adversary in any of the battle-fields of the campaign; nor did it

seem that he had stricken him any serious blow. The Army of Northern

Virginia, not reënforced until it reached Hanover Junction, and then

only by about nine thousand men under Generals Breckinridge and

Pickett, had held its ground against the large force opposed to it;

had repulsed every assault; and, in a final trial of strength with a

force largely its superior, had inflicted upon the enemy, in about an

hour, a loss of thirteen thousand men.

These facts, highly honorable to Lee and his troops, are the plainest

and most compendious comment we can make upon the campaign. The whole

movement of General Grant across Virginia is, indeed, now conceded

even by his admirers to have been unfortunate. It failed to accomplish

the end expected from it--the investment of Richmond on the north and

west--and the lives of about sixty thousand men were, it would seem,

unnecessarily lost, to reach a position which might have been attained

with losses comparatively trifling, and without the unfortunate

prestige of defeat.

VI.

FIRST BATTLES AT PETERSBURG.

General Lee remained facing his adversary in his lines at Cold Harbor,

for many days after the bloody struggle of the 3d of June, confident

of his ability to repulse any new attack, and completely barring the

way to Richmond. The Federal campaign, it was now seen, was at an end

on that line, and it was obvious that General Grant must adopt some

other plan, in spite of his determination expressed in the beginning

of the campaign, to "fight it out on that line if it took all the

summer." The summer was but begun, and further fighting on that line

was hopeless. Under these circumstances the Federal commander resolved

to give up the attempt to assail Richmond from the north or east, and

by a rapid movement to Petersburg, seize upon that place, cut the

Confederate railroads leading southward, and thus compel an evacuation

of the capital.

[Illustration: Map of Petersburg and Environs.]

It would be interesting to inquire what the course of General Lee

would have been in the event of the success of this plan, and how the

war would have resulted. It would seem that, under such circumstances,

his only resource would have been to retire with his army in the

direction of Lynchburg, where his communications would have remained

open with the south and west. If driven from that point, the

fastnesses of the Alleghanies were at hand; and, contemplating

afterward the possibility of being forced to take refuge there, he

said: "With my army in the mountains of Virginia, I could carry on

this war for twenty years longer." That spectacle was lost to the

world--Lee and his army fighting from mountain fastness to mountain

fastness--and the annals of war are not illustrated by a chapter so

strange. That Lee was confident of his ability to carry on such a

struggle successfully is certain; and Washington had conceived the

same idea in the old Revolution, when he said that if he were driven

from the seaboard he would take refuge in West Augusta, and thereby

prolong the war interminably.

To return from these speculations to the narrative of events. General

Grant remained in front of Lee until the 12th of June, when, moving

again by his left flank, he crossed the Chickahominy, proceeded in

the direction of City Point, at which place the Appomattox and James

Rivers mingle their waters, and, crossing the James on pontoons,

hastened forward in order to seize upon Petersburg. This important

undertaking had been strangely neglected by Major-General Butler,

who, in obedience to General Grant's orders, had sailed from Fortress

Monroe on the 4th of May, reached Bermuda Hundred, the peninsula

opposite City Point, made by a remarkable bend in James River, and

proceeded to intrench himself. It was in his power on his arrival to

have seized upon Petersburg, but this he failed to do at that time,

and the appearance of a force under General Beauregard, from the

south, soon induced him to give his entire attention to his own

safety. An attack by Beauregard had been promptly made, which nearly

resulted in General Butler's destruction. He succeeded, however, in

retiring behind his works across the neck of the Peninsula, in which

he now found himself completely shut up; and so powerless was his

situation, with his large force of thirty thousand men, that General

Grant wrote, "His army was as completely shut off ... as if it had

been in a bottle strongly corked."

The attempt of General Grant to seize upon Petersburg by a surprise

failed. His forces were not able to reach the vicinity of the place

until the 15th, when they were bravely opposed behind impromptu works

by a body of local troops, who fought like regular soldiers, and

succeeded in holding the works until night ended the contest.

When morning came long lines were seen defiling into the breastworks,

and the familiar battle-flags of the Army of Northern Virginia rose

above the long line of bayonets giving assurance that the possession

of Petersburg would be obstinately disputed.

General Lee had moved with his accustomed celerity, and, as usual,

without that loss of time which results from doubt of an adversary's

intentions. If General Grant retired without another battle on the

Chickahominy, it was obvious to Lee that he must design one of two

things: either to advance upon Richmond from the direction of Charles

City, or attempt a campaign against the capital from the south of

James River. Lee seems at once to have satisfied himself that the

latter was the design. An inconsiderable force was sent to feel the

enemy near the White-Oak Swamp; he was encountered there in some

force, but, satisfied that this was a feint to mislead him, General

Lee proceeded to cross the James River above Drury's Bluff, near

"Wilton," and concentrate his army at Petersburg. On the 16th he was

in face of his adversary there. General Grant had adopted the plan of

campaign which Lee expected him to adopt. General McClellan had

not been permitted in 1862 to carry out the same plan; it was now

undertaken by General Grant, who sustained better relations toward

the Government, and the result would seem to indicate that General

McClellan was, after all, a soldier of sound views.

As soon as General Lee reached Petersburg, he began promptly to draw a

regular line of earthworks around the city, to the east and south, for

its defence. It was obvious that General Grant would lose no time in

striking at him, in order to take advantage of the slight character

of the defences already existing; and this anticipation was speedily

realized. General Lee had scarcely gotten his forces in position on

the 16th when he was furiously attacked, and such was the weight of

this assault that Lee was forced from his advanced position, east of

the city, behind his second line of works, by this time well forward

in process of construction. Against this new line General Grant threw

heavy forces, in attack after attack, on the 17th and 18th, losing, it

is said, more than four thousand men, but effecting nothing. On the

21st General Lee was called upon to meet a more formidable assault

than any of the preceding ones--this time more to his right, in the

vicinity of the Weldon Railroad, which runs southward from Petersburg.

A heavy line was advanced in that quarter by the enemy; but, observing

that an interval had been left between two of their corps, General Lee

threw forward a column under General Hill, cut the Federal lines, and

repulsed their attack, bearing off nearly three thousand prisoners.

On the same night an important cavalry expedition, consisting of the

divisions of General Wilson and Kautz, numbering about six thousand

horse, was sent westward to cut the Weldon, Southside, and Danville

Railroads, which connected the Southern army with the South and West.

This raid resulted in apparently great but really unimportant injury

to the Confederate communications against which it was directed. The

Federal cavalry tore up large portions of the tracks of all three

railroads, burning the wood-work, and laying waste the country around;

but the further results of the expedition were unfavorable. They were

pursued and harassed by a small body of cavalry under General W. H.F.

Lee, and, on their return in the direction of Reams's Station, were

met near Sapponey Church by a force of fifteen hundred cavalry under

General Hampton. That energetic officer at once attacked; the fighting

continued furiously throughout the entire night, and at dawn the

Federal horse retreated in confusion. Their misfortunes were not,

however, ended. Near Reams's, at which point they attempted to cross

the Weldon Railroad, they were met by General Fitz Lee's horsemen

and about two hundred infantry under General Mahone, and this force

completed their discomfiture. After a brief attempt to force their

way through the unforeseen obstacle, they broke in disorder, leaving

behind them twelve pieces of artillery, and more than a thousand

prisoners, and, with foaming and exhausted horses, regained the

Federal lines.

Such was the result of an expedition from which General Grant

probably expected much. The damage done to Lee's communications was

inconsiderable, and did not repay the Federal commander for the losses

sustained. The railroads were soon repaired and in working order

again; and the Federal cavalry was for the time rendered unfit for

further operations.

It was now the end of June, and every attempt made by General Grant

to force Lee's lines had proved unsuccessful. It was apparent that

surprise of the able commander of the Confederate army was hopeless.

His works were growing stronger every day, and nothing was left to

his great adversary but to lay regular siege to the long line of

fortifications; to draw lines for the protection of his own front from

attack; and, by gradually extending his left, reach out toward the

Weldon and Southside Railroads.

To obtain possession of these roads was from this time General Grant's

great object; and all his movements were shaped by that paramount

consideration.

VII.

THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND BEGUN.

The first days of July, 1864, witnessed, at Petersburg, the

commencement of a series of military manoeuvres, for which few, if

any, precedents existed in all the annals of war. An army of forty or

fifty thousand men, intrenched along a line extending finally over

a distance of nearly forty miles, was defending, against a force of

about thrice its numbers, a capital more than twenty miles in its

rear; and, from July of one year to April of the next, there never

was a moment when, to have broken through this line, would not

have terminated the war, and resulted in the destruction of the

Confederacy.

A few words in reference to the topography of the country and the

situation will show this. Petersburg is twenty-two miles south of

Richmond, and is connected with the South and West by the Weldon and

Southside Railroads, which latter road crosses the Danville Railroad,

the main line of communication between the capital and the Gulf

States. With the enemy once holding these roads and those north of the

city, as they were preparing to do, the capital would be isolated, and

the Confederate Government must evacuate Virginia. In that event the

Army of Northern Virginia had also nothing left to it but retreat.

Virginia must be abandoned; the Federal authority would be extended

over the oldest and one of the largest and most important members of

the Confederacy; and, under circumstances so adverse, it might well be

a question whether, disheartened as they would be by the loss of so

powerful an ally, the other States of the Confederacy would have

sufficient resolution to continue the contest.

These considerations are said to have been fully weighed by General

Lee, whose far-reaching military sagacity divined the exact situation

of affairs, and the probable results of a conflict so unequal as

that which General Grant now forced upon him. We have noticed, on

a preceding page, his opinions upon this subject, expressed to a

confidential friend as far back as 1862. He then declared that the

true line of assault upon Richmond was that now adopted by General

Grant. As long as the capital was assailed from the north or the east,

he might hope with some reason, by hard fighting, to repulse the

assault, and hold Richmond. But, with an enemy at Petersburg,

threatening with a large force the Southern railroads, it was

obviously only a question of time when Richmond, and consequently

Virginia, must be abandoned.

General Lee, we repeat, fully realized the facts here stated, when

his adversary, giving up all other lines, crossed James River to

Petersburg. Lee is said, we know not with what truth, to have coolly

recommended an evacuation of Richmond. But this met with no favor.

A powerful party, including both the friends and enemies of the

Executive, spoke of the movement as a "pernicious idea." If

recommended by Lee, it was speedily abandoned, and all the energies of

the Government were concentrated upon the difficult task of holding

the enemy at arm's length south of the Appomattox and in Charles City.

In a few weeks after the appearance of the adversaries opposite each

other at Petersburg, the lines of leaguer and defence were drawn,

and the long struggle began. General Grant had crossed a force into

Charles City, on the north bank of James River, and thus menaced

Richmond with an assault from that quarter. His line extended thence

across the neck of the Peninsula of Bermuda Hundred, and east and

south of Petersburg, where, day by day, it gradually reached westward,

approaching nearer and nearer to the railroads feeding the Southern

army and capital. Lee's line conformed itself to that of his

adversary. In addition to the works east and southeast of Richmond, an

exterior chain of defences had been drawn, facing the hostile force

near Deep Bottom; and the river at Drury's Bluff, a fortification of

some strength, had been guarded, by sunken obstructions, against the

approach of the Federal gunboats. The Southern lines then continued,

facing those of the enemy north of the Appomattox, and, crossing that

stream, extended around the city of Petersburg, gradually moving

westward in conformity with the works of General Grant. A glance at

the accompanying diagram will clearly indicate the positions and

relations to each other of the Federal and Confederate works. These

will show that the real struggle was anticipated, by both commanders,

west of Petersburg; and, as the days wore on, it was more and more

apparent that somewhere in the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court-House the

last great wrestle of the opposing armies must take place.

To that conclusive trial of strength we shall advance with as few

interruptions as possible. The operations of the two armies at

Petersburg do not possess, for the general reader, that dramatic

interest which is found in battles such as those of Chancellorsville

and Gettysburg, deciding for the time the fates of great campaigns.

At Petersburg the fighting seemed to decide little, and the bloody

collisions had no names. The day of pitched battles, indeed, seemed

past. It was one long battle, day and night, week after week, and

month after month--during the heat of summer, the sad hours of autumn,

and the cold days and nights of winter. It was, in fact, the siege

of Richmond which General Grant had undertaken, and the fighting

consisted less of battles, in the ordinary acceptation of that word,

than of attempts to break through the lines of his adversary--now

north of James River, now east of Petersburg, now at some point in

the long chain of redans which guarded the approaches to the coveted

Southside Railroad, which, once in possession of the Federal

commander, would give him victory.

Of this long, obstinate, and bloody struggle we shall describe only

those prominent incidents which rose above the rest with a species

of dramatic splendor. For the full narrative the reader must have

recourse to military histories aiming to chronicle the operations of

each corps, division, and brigade in the two armies--a minuteness of

detail beyond our scope, and probably not desired by those who will

peruse these pages.

VIII.

LEE THREATENS WASHINGTON.

The month of July began and went upon its way, with incessant fighting

all along the Confederate front, both north of James River and south

of the Appomattox. General Grant was thus engaged in the persistent

effort to, at some point, break through his opponent's works, when

intelligence suddenly reached him, by telegraph from Washington, that

a strong Confederate column had advanced down the Shenandoah Valley,

crossed the Potomac, and was rapidly moving eastward in the direction

of the Federal capital.

This portentous incident was the result of a plan of great boldness

devised by General Lee, from which he expected much. A few words will

explain this plan.

A portion of General Grant's plan of campaign had been an advance up

the Valley, and another from Western Virginia, toward the Lynchburg

and Tennessee Railroad--the two columns to coöperate with the main

army by cutting the Confederate communications. The column in Western

Virginia effected little, but that in the Valley, under General

Hunter, hastened forward, almost unopposed, from the small numbers of

the Southern force, and early in June threatened Lynchburg. The news

reached Lee at Cold Harbor soon after his battle there with General

Grant, and he promptly detached General Early, at the head of about

eight thousand men, with orders to "move to the Valley through

Swift-Run Gap, or Brown's Gap, attack Hunter, and then cross the

Potomac and threaten Washington." [Footnote: This statement of his

orders was derived from Lieutenant-General Early.]

General Early, an officer of great energy and intrepidity, moved

without loss of time, and an engagement ensued between him and General

Hunter near Lynchburg. The battle was soon decided. General Hunter,

who had more cruelly oppressed the inhabitants of the Valley than even

General Milroy, was completely defeated, driven in disordered flight

toward the Ohio, and Early hastened down the Valley, and thence into

Maryland, with the view of threatening Washington, as he had been

ordered to do by Lee. His march was exceedingly rapid, and he found

the road unobstructed until he reached the Monocacy near Frederick

City, where he was opposed by a force under General Wallace. This

force he attacked, and soon drove from the field; he then pressed

forward, and on the 11th of July came in sight of Washington.

It was the intelligence of this advance of a Confederate force into

Maryland, and toward the capital, which came to startle General Grant

while he was hotly engaged with Lee at Petersburg. The Washington

authorities seem to have been completely unnerved, and to have

regarded the capture of the city as nearly inevitable. General Grant,

however, stood firm, and did not permit the terror of the civil

authorities to affect him. He sent forward to Washington two army

corps, and these arrived just in time. If it had been in the power of

General Early to capture Washington--which seems questionable--the

opportunity was lost. He found himself compelled to retire across the

Potomac again to avoid an attack in his rear; and this he effected

without loss, taking up, in accordance with orders from Lee, a

position in the Valley, where he remained for some months a standing

threat to the enemy.

Such was the famous march of General Early to Washington; and there

seems at present little reason to doubt that the Federal capital had a

narrow escape from capture by the Confederates. What the result of so

singular an event would have been, it is difficult to say; but it

is certain that it would have put an end to General Grant's entire

campaign at Petersburg. Then--but speculations of this character are

simply loss of time. The city was not captured; the war went upon its

way, and was destined to terminate by pure exhaustion of one of the

combatants, unaffected by _coups de main_ in any part of the theatre

of conflict.

We have briefly spoken of the engagement between Generals Early and

Hunter, near Lynchburg, and the abrupt retreat of the latter to the

western mountains and thence toward the Ohio. It may interest the

reader to know General Lee's views on the subject of this retreat,

which, it seems, were drawn from him by a letter addressed to him by

General Hunter:

"As soon after the war as mail communications were opened," writes

the gentleman of high character from whom we derive this incident,

"General David Hunter wrote to General Lee, begging that he would

answer him frankly on two points:"

'I. His (Hunter's) campaign in 1864 was undertaken on information

received by General Halleck that General Lee was about to detach forty

thousand picked troops to send to Georgia. Did not his (Hunter's) move

prevent this?

'II. When he found it necessary to retreat from Lynchburg, did he not

take the most feasible route?'

General Lee wrote a very courteous reply, in which he said:

'I. General Halleck was misinformed. I had _no troops to spare_, and

forty thousand would have taken nearly my whole army.

'II. I am not advised as to the motives which induced you to adopt

your line of retreat, and am not, perhaps, competent to judge of the

question; _but I certainly expected you to retreat by way_ of the

Shenandoah Valley.'

"General Hunter," adds our correspondent, "never published this

letter, but I heard General Lee tell of it one day with evident

pleasure."

Lee's opinion of the military abilities of both Generals Hunter

and Sheridan was indeed far from flattering. He regarded those two

commanders--especially General Sheridan--as enjoying reputations

solely conferred upon them by the exhaustion of the resources of

the Confederacy, and not warranted by any military efficiency in

themselves.

IX.

THE MINE EXPLOSION.

The end of the month of July was now approaching, and every attempt

made by General Grant to break through Lee's lines had resulted in

failure. At every point which he assailed, an armed force, sufficient

to repulse his most vigorous attacks, seemed to spring from the earth;

and no movement of the Federal forces, however sudden and rapid, had

been able to take the Confederate commander unawares. The campaign was

apparently settling down into stubborn fighting, day and night, in

which the object of General Grant was to carry out his programme of

attrition. Such was the feeling in both armies when, at dawn on the

30th of July, a loud explosion, heard for thirty miles, took place on

the lines near Petersburg, and a vast column of smoke, shooting upward

to a great height, seemed to indicate the blowing up of an extensive

magazine.

Instead of a magazine, it was a mine which had thus been exploded; and

the incident was not the least singular of a campaign unlike any which

had preceded it.

The plan of forming a breach in the Southern works, by exploding a

mine beneath them, is said by Northern writers to have originated with

a subordinate officer of the Federal army, who, observing the close

proximity of the opposing works near Petersburg, conceived it feasible

to construct a subterranean gallery, reaching beneath those of General

Lee. The undertaking was begun, the earth being carried off in

cracker-boxes; and such was the steady persistence of the workmen that

a gallery five hundred feet long, with lateral openings beneath the

Confederate works, was soon finished; and in these lateral recesses

was placed a large amount of powder.

All was now ready, and the question was how to utilize the explosion.

General Grant decided to follow it by a sudden charge through the

breach, seize a crest in rear, and thus interpose a force directly in

the centre of Lee's line. A singular discussion, however, arose, and

caused some embarrassment. Should the assaulting column consist of

white or negro troops? This question was decided, General Grant

afterward declared, by "pulling straws or tossing coppers"--the white

troops were the fortunate or unfortunate ones--and on the morning of

July 30th the mine was exploded. The effect was frightful, and the

incident will long be remembered by those present and escaping

unharmed. The small Southern force and artillery immediately above the

mine were hurled into the air. An opening, one hundred and fifty feet

long, sixty feet wide, and thirty feet deep, suddenly appeared, where

a moment before had extended the Confederate earthworks; and the

Federal division, selected for the charge, rushed forward to pierce

the opening.

The result did not justify the sanguine expectations which seem to

have been excited in the breasts of the Federal officers. A Southern

writer thus describes what ensued:

"The 'white division' charged, reached the crater, stumbled over

the _débris_, were suddenly met by a merciless fire of artillery,

enfilading them right and left, and of infantry fusillading them in

front; faltered, hesitated, were badly led, lost heart, gave up the

plan of seizing the crest in rear, huddled into the crater, man on

top of man, company mingled with company; and upon this disordered,

unstrung, quivering mass of human beings, white and black--for the

black troops had followed--was poured a hurricane of shot, shell,

canister, musketry, which made the hideous crater a slaughter-pen,

horrible and frightful beyond the power of words. All order was lost;

all idea of charging the crest abandoned. Lee's infantry was seen

concentrating for the carnival of death; his artillery was massing to

destroy the remnants of the charging divisions; those who deserted the

crater, to scramble over the _débris_ and run back, were shot down;

then all that was left to the shuddering mass of blacks and whites in

the pit was to shrink lower, evade the horrible _mitraille_, and wait

for a charge of their friends to rescue them or surrender."

These sentences sufficiently describe the painful scene which followed

the explosion of the mine. The charging column was unable to advance

in face of the very heavy fire directed upon them by the Southern

infantry and artillery; and the effect of this fire was so appalling

that General Mahone, commanding at the spot, is said to have ordered

it to cease, adding that the spectacle made him sick. The Federal

forces finally succeeded in making their way back, with a loss of

about four thousand prisoners; and General Lee, whose losses had been

small, reëstablished his line without interruption.

Before passing from this incident, a singular circumstance connected

with it is deserving of mention. This was the declaration of the

Congressional Committee, which in due time investigated the whole

affair.

The conclusion of the committee was not flattering to the veteran Army

of the Potomac. The report declared that "the first and great cause of

disaster was the employment of white instead of black troops to make

the charge."

X.

END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

Throughout the months of August and September, Lee continued to be

attacked at various points along his entire front, but succeeded

in repulsing every assault. General Grant's design may be said, in

general terms, to have been a steady extension of his left toward

the Confederate communications west of Petersburg, while taking the

chances, by attacks north of James River, to break through in that

quarter and seize upon Richmond. It is probable that his hopes of

effecting the last-mentioned object were small; but operations in that

direction promised the more probable result of causing Lee to weaken

his right, and thus uncover the Southside Railroad.

An indecisive attack on the north of James River was followed, toward

the end of August, by a heavy advance, to seize upon the Weldon

Railroad near Petersburg. In this General Grant succeeded, an event

clearly foreseen by Lee, who had long before informed the authorities

that he could not hold this road. General Grant followed up this

success by sending heavy forces to seize Reams's Station, on the same

road, farther south, and afterward to destroy it to Hicksford--which,

however, effected less favorable results, Lee meeting and defeating

both forces after obstinate engagements, in which the Federal troops

lost heavily, and were compelled to retreat.

These varying successes did not, however, materially affect the

general result. The Federal left gradually reached farther and farther

westward, until finally it had passed the Vaughan, Squirrel Level, and

other roads, running south-westward from Petersburg, and in October

was established on the left bank of Hatcher's Run, which unites with

Gravelly Run to form the Rowanty. It was now obvious that a further

extension of the Federal left would probably enable General Grant to

seize upon the Southside Railroad. An energetic attempt was speedily

made by him to effect this important object, to which it is said

he attached great importance from its anticipated bearing on the

approaching presidential election.

On the 27th of October a heavy column was thrown across Hatcher's

Run, in the vicinity of Burgess's Mill, on the Boydton Road, and

an obstinate attack was made on Lee's lines there with the view of

breaking through to the Southside Road. In this, however, General

Grant did not succeed. His column was met in front and flank by

Generals Hampton--who here lost his brave son, Preston--and W.H.F.

Lee, with dismounted sharp-shooters; infantry was hastened to the

threatened point by General Lee, and, after an obstinate struggle,

the Federal force was driven back. General Lee reporting that General

Mahone charged and "broke three lines of battle."[1]

[Footnote 1: _Dispatch of Lee, October_ 28, 1864.--It was the habit

of General Lee, throughout the last campaign of the war, to send to

Richmond, from time to time, brief dispatches announcing whatever

occurred along the lines; and these, in the absence of official

reports of these occurrences on the Confederate side, are valuable

records of the progress of affairs. These brief summaries are reliable

from the absence of all exaggeration, but cannot be depended upon

by the historian, for a very singular reason, namely, that almost

invariably the Confederate successes are understated. On the present

occasion, the Federal loss in prisoners near Burgess's Mill and east

of Richmond--where General Grant had attacked at the same time to

effect a diversion--are put down by General Lee at eight hundred,

whereas thirteen hundred and sixty-five were received at Richmond.

Lee's dispatch of October 28th is here given, as a specimen of these

brief military reports.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

_October_ 28, 1864.

_Hon. Secretary of War_:

General Hill reports that the attack of General Heth upon the enemy

on the Boydton Plank-road, mentioned in my dispatch last evening, was

made by three brigades under General Mahone in front, and General

Hampton in the rear. Mahone captured four hundred prisoners, three

stand of colors, and six pieces of artillery. The latter could not be

brought off, the enemy having possession of the bridge.

In the attack subsequently made by the enemy General Mahone broke

three lines of battle, and during the night the enemy retreated from

the Boydton Road, leaving his wounded and more than two hundred and

fifty dead on the field.

About nine o'clock P.M. a small force assaulted and took possession of

our works on the Baxter Road, in front of Petersburg, but were soon

driven out.

On the Williamsburg Road General Field captured upward of four hundred

prisoners and seven stand of colors. The enemy left a number of dead

in front of our works, and to-day retreated to his former position.

R.E. Lee]

With this repulse of the Federal forces terminated active operations

of importance for the year; and but one other attempt was made, during

the winter, to gain ground on the left. This took place early in

February, and resulted in failure like the former--the Confederates

losing, however, the brave General John Pegram.

The presidential election at the North had been decided in favor

of Mr. Lincoln--General McClellan and Mr. Pendleton, the supposed

advocates of peace, suffering defeat. The significance of this fact

was unmistakable. It was now seen that unless the Confederates

fought their way to independence, there was no hope of a favorable

termination of the war, and this conclusion was courageously faced by

General Lee. The outlook for the coming year was far from encouraging;

the resources of the Confederacy were steadily being reduced; her

coasts were blockaded; her armies were diminishing; discouragement

seemed slowly to be invading every heart--but, in the midst of this

general foreboding, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia

retained an august composure; and, conversing with one of the Southern

Senators, said, "For myself, I intend to die sword in hand."

That his sense of duty did not afterward permit him to do so, was

perhaps one of the bitterest pangs of his whole life.

XI.

LEE IN THE WINTER OF 1864-'65.

Before entering upon the narrative of the last and decisive campaign

of the war, we shall speak of the personal demeanor of General Lee at

this time, and endeavor to account for a circumstance which astonished

many persons--his surprising equanimity, and even cheerfulness, under

the pressure of cares sufficient, it would seem, to crush the most

powerful organization.

He had established his headquarters a mile or two west of Petersburg,

on the Cox Road, nearly opposite his centre, and here he seemed to

await whatever the future would bring with a tranquillity which was a

source of surprise and admiration to all who were thrown in contact

with him. Many persons will bear their testimony to this extraordinary

composure. His countenance seldom, if ever, exhibited the least traces

of anxiety, but was firm, hopeful, and encouraged those around him in

the belief that he was still confident of success. That he did not,

however, look forward with any thing like hope to such success, we

have endeavored already to show. From the first, he seems to have

regarded his situation, unless his army were largely reënforced, as

almost desperate; those reënforcements did not come; and yet, as he

saw his numbers day by day decreasing, and General Grant's increasing

a still larger ratio, he retained his courage, confronting the

misfortunes closing in upon him with unmoved composure, and at no time

seemed to lose his "heart of hope."

Of this phenomenon the explanation has been sought in the

constitutional courage of the individual, and that instinctive

rebound against fate which takes place in great organizations. This

explanation, doubtless, is not without a certain amount of truth; but

an attentive consideration of the principles which guided this eminent

soldier throughout his career, will show that his equanimity, at a

moment so trying, was due to another and more controlling sentiment.

This sentiment was his devotion to Duty--"the sublimest word in our

language." Throughout his entire life he had sought to discover and

perform his duty, without regard to consequences. That had been with

him the great question in April, 1861, when the war broke out: he had

decided in his own mind what he ought to do, and had not hesitated.

From that time forward he continued to do what Duty commanded without

a murmur. In the obscure campaign of Western Virginia--in the unnoted

work of fortifying the Southern coast--in the great campaigns which he

had subsequently fought--and everywhere, his consciousness of having

performed his duty to the best of his knowledge and ability sustained

him. It sustained him, above all, at Gettysburg, where he had done his

best, giving him strength to take upon himself the responsibility of

that disaster; and, now, in these last dark days at Petersburg, it

must have been the sense of having done his whole duty, and expended

upon the cause every energy of his being, which enabled him to meet

the approaching catastrophe with a calmness which seemed to those

around him almost sublime.

If this be not the explanation of the composure of General Lee,

throughout the last great struggle with the Federal Army, the writer

of these pages is at a loss to account for it. The phenomenon was

plain to all eyes, and crowned the soldier with a glory greater than

that which he had derived from his most decisive military successes.

Great and unmoved in the dark hour as in the bright, he seemed to have

determined to perform his duty to the last, and to shape his conduct,

under whatever pressure of disaster, upon the two maxims, "Do your

duty," and "Human virtue should be equal to human calamity."

There is little reason to doubt that General Lee saw this "calamity"

coming, for the effort to reënforce his small army with fresh levies

seemed hopeless. The reasons for this unfortunate state of things must

be sought elsewhere. The unfortunate fact will be stated, without

comment, that, while the Federal army was regularly and largely

reënforced, so that its numbers at no time fell below one hundred

and fifty thousand men. Lee's entire force at Petersburg at no time

reached sixty thousand, and in the spring of 1865, when he still

continued to hold his long line of defences, numbered scarcely half

of sixty thousand. This was the primary cause of the failure of the

struggle. General Grant's immense hammer continued to beat upon his

adversary, wearing away his strength day by day. No new troops arrived

to take the places of those who had fallen; and General Lee saw,

drawing closer and closer, the inevitable hour when, driven from his

works, or with the Federal army upon his communications, he must cut

his way southward or surrender.

A last circumstance in reference to General Lee's position at this

time should be stated; the fact that, from the autumn of 1864 to the

end in the spring of 1865, he was felt by the country and the army to

be the sole hope of the Confederacy. To him alone now all men

looked as the _deus ex machinâ_ to extricate them from the dangers

surrounding them. This sentiment needed no expression in words. It was

seen in the faces and the very tones of voice of all. Old men visited

him, and begged him with faltering voices not to expose himself, for,

if he were killed, all would be lost. The troops followed him with

their eyes, or their cheers, whenever he appeared, feeling a singular

sense of confidence from the presence of the gray-haired soldier in

his plain uniform, and assured that, as long as Lee led them, the

cause was safe. All classes of the people thus regarded the fate

of the Confederacy as resting, not partially, but solely, upon the

shoulders of Lee; and, although he was not entitled by his rank in the

service to direct operations in other quarters than Virginia, there

was a very general desire that the whole conduct of the war everywhere

should be intrusted to his hands. This was done, as will be seen,

toward the spring of 1865, but it was too late.

These notices of General Lee individually are necessary to a clear

comprehension of the concluding incidents of the great conflict. It is

doubtful if, in any other struggle of history, the hopes of a people

were more entirely wrapped up in a single individual. All criticisms

of the eminent soldier had long since been silenced, and it may,

indeed, be said that something like a superstitious confidence in his

fortunes had become widely disseminated. It was the general sentiment,

even when Lee himself saw the end surely approaching, that all was

safe while he remained in command of the army. This hallucination must

have greatly pained him, for no one ever saw more clearly, or was less

blinded by irrational confidence. Lee fully understood and represented

to the civil authorities--with whom his relations were perfectly

friendly and cordial--that if his lines were broken at any point, the

fate of the campaign was sealed. Feeling this truth, of which his

military sagacity left him in no doubt, he had to bear the further

weight of that general confidence which he did not share. He did not

complain, however, or in any manner indicate the desperate straits to

which he had come. He called for fresh troops to supply his losses;

when they did not arrive he continued to oppose his powerful adversary

with the remnant still at his command. These were now more like old

comrades than mere private soldiers under his orders. What was left

of the army was its best material. The fires of battle had tested the

metal, and that which emerged from the furnace was gold free from

alloy. The men remaining with Lee were those whom no peril of the

cause in which they were fighting could dishearten or prompt to desert

or even temporarily absent themselves from the Southern standard; and

this _corps d' élite_ was devoted wholly to their commander. For this

devotion they certainly had valid reason. Never had leader exhibited a

more systematic, unfailing, and almost tender care of his troops. Lee

seemed to feel that these veterans in their ragged jackets, with their

gaunt faces, were personal friends of his own, who were entitled to

his most affectionate exertions for their welfare. His calls on the

civil authorities in their behalf were unceasing. The burden of

these demands was that, unless his men's wants were attended to, the

Southern cause was lost; and it plainly revolted his sense of the

fitness of things that men upon whom depended the fate of the South

should be shoeless, in tatters, and forced to subsist on a quarter

of a pound of rancid bacon and a little corn bread, when thousands

remaining out of the army, and dodging the enrolling-officers, were

well clothed and fed, and never heard the whistle of a bullet. The

men understood this care for them, and returned the affectionate

solicitude of their commander in full. He was now their ideal of a

leader, and all that he did was perfect in their eyes. All awe of him

had long since left them--they understood what treasures of kindness

and simplicity lay under the grave exterior. The tattered privates

approached the commander-in-chief without embarrassment, and his

reception of them was such as to make them love him more than ever.

Had we space we might dwell upon this marked respect and attention

paid by General Lee to his private soldiers. He seemed to think them

more worthy of marks of regard than his highest officers. And there

was never the least air of condescension in him when thrown with them,

but a perfect simplicity, kindness, and unaffected sympathy, which

went to their hearts. This was almost a natural gift with Lee, and

arose from the genuine goodness of his heart. His feeling toward his

soldiers is shown in an incident which occurred at this time, and was

thus related in one of the Richmond journals: "A gentleman who was in

the train from this city to Petersburg, a very cold morning not long

ago, tells us his attention was attracted by the efforts of a young

soldier, with his arm in a sling, to get his overcoat on. His teeth,

as well as his sound arm, were brought into use to effect the object;

but, in the midst of his efforts, an officer rose from his seat,

advanced to him, and very carefully and tenderly assisted him, drawing

the coat gently over his wounded arm, and buttoning it up comfortably;

then, with a few kind and pleasant words, returning to his seat. Now

the officer in question was not clad in gorgeous uniform, with a

brilliant wreath upon his collar, and a multitude of gilt lines upon

the sleeves, resembling the famous labyrinth of Crete, but he was clad

in a simple suit of gray, distinguished from the garb of a civilian

only by the three stars which every Confederate colonel in the

service, by the regulations, is entitled to wear. And yet he was no

other than our chief, General Robert E. Lee, who is not braver than he

is good and modest."

To terminate this brief sketch of General Lee, personally, in the

winter of 1864. He looked much older than at the beginning of the war,

but by no means less hardy or robust. On the contrary, the arduous

campaigns through which he had passed seemed to have hardened

him--developing to the highest degree the native strength of his

physical organization. His cheeks were ruddy, and his eye had that

clear light which indicates the presence of the calm, self-poised

will. But his hair had grown gray, like his beard and mustache, which

were worn short and well-trimmed. His dress, as always, was a plain

and serviceable gray uniform, with no indications of rank save the

stars on the collar. Cavalry-boots reached nearly to his knees, and he

seldom wore any weapon. A broad-brimmed gray-felt hat rested low upon

the forehead; and the movements of this soldierly figure were as firm,

measured, and imposing, as ever. It was impossible to discern in

General Lee any evidences of impaired strength, or any trace of the

wearing hardships through which he had passed. He seemed made of iron,

and would remain in his saddle all day, and then at his desk half the

night, without apparently feeling any fatigue. He was still almost an

anchorite in his personal habits, and lived so poorly that it is said

he was compelled to borrow a small piece of meat when unexpected

visitors dined with him.

Such, in brief outline, was the individual upon whose shoulders,

in the last months of 1864 and the early part of 1865, rested the

Southern Confederacy.

XII.

THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1865.

In approaching the narrative of the last tragic scenes of the

Confederate struggle, the writer of these pages experiences emotions

of sadness which will probably be shared by not a few even of those

readers whose sympathies, from the nature of things, were on the side

of the North. To doubt this would be painful, and would indicate a

contempt for human nature. Not only in the eyes of his friends and

followers, but even in the eyes of his bitterest enemies, Lee must

surely have appeared great and noble. Right or wrong in the struggle,

he believed that he was performing his duty; and the brave army at

his back, which had fought so heroically, were inspired by the same

sentiment, and risked all on the issue.

This great soldier was now about to suffer the cruellest pang which

the spite of Fate can inflict, and his army to be disbanded, to return

in poverty and defeat to their homes. That spectacle was surely

tragic, and appealed to the hardest heart; and if any rejoiced in such

misery he must have been unsusceptible of the sentiment of admiration

for heroism in misfortune.