CONDITIONS IN SWITZERLAND ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
—THE SWISS ARMY
On my arrival in Berne, I found an unusual state of affairs. The
Minister and members of his Staff were being besieged by thousands of
British visitors in Switzerland clamouring to return to England, every
one of whom had to be provided with a special permit or passport. The
same thing was happening in a minor degree at the American Legation,
where the American Minister and his Staff, like ourselves, had to face
the question of difficulty of transport through France and across the
Channel.
There were some eight thousand British subjects derelict in Switzerland,
many of whom, besides, had momentarily exhausted their financial
resources. Mobilization was taking place both in France and Switzerland,
and the amount of rolling-stock available for through transit was
extremely limited, so that it was clear that many of these visitors
would have to remain in Switzerland for a certain length of time.
At this juncture, the Swiss hotel proprietors behaved in a very
public-spirited manner. The Swiss banks, owing to the financial crisis
temporarily supervening, were unable to cash cheques on England, with
the result that visitors, willing as they might be, could not, in many
cases, settle their hotel accounts before departure. Realizing the
situation, the hotel proprietors not only declared their readiness to
accept deferred payment, but further offered their British clientèle the
use of their hotels for as long as necessary. This attitude on the part
of the proprietors at a moment of extreme difficulty not only reflects
credit on themselves, but is one on which our national pride may dwell
with pleasure, since it makes clear the confidence inspired by the
British visitor abroad.
The financial situation was further complicated by the fact that ready
money was practically unobtainable, H.M.'s Minister himself being only
allowed by his own bank to draw frs. 50 per week. A solution, however,
was soon happily found in a provision in the regulations of the Swiss
National Bank to the effect "that if gold be deposited at an authorized
centre, the Bank might issue notes against such gold." At the request of
the Minister, H.M.'s Government deposited £25,000 at the Swiss
Bankverein in London, upon which the Swiss National Bank opened an
equivalent credit in notes in favour of the Minister at Berne. Mr. Grant
Duff was thus enabled to issue cash in exchange for cheques, and so
facilitate the return of stranded British visitors.
Mr. G. P. Skipworth, the representative in Berne of the Westinghouse
Brake Company, volunteered to undertake the detailed work in connection
with this transportation, which, as a matter of fact, lasted over two
months. It suffices to say that it was no light matter to assemble
parties of three to four hundred visitors scattered all over
Switzerland, and to see them safely off to their satisfaction, if not
comfort, whenever through conveyance could be placed at their disposal
by the Swiss and French authorities.
Mr. Skipworth was, later on, appointed Assistant Commercial Attaché to
the British Legation in Switzerland, a post he still happily occupies.
On taking up my duties in Berne, I made the acquaintance of the heads of
the Military and Political Departments, of my Allied colleagues, and
also of the Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army—General Ulrich
Wille—and his Staff.
Based on the territorial system, the Swiss Army, in times of peace,
possesses no officer of the rank of General; but on occasions of
emergency, the appointment of a General as Commander-in-Chief is at once
proceeded with. His choice finally rests with the Federal Assembly. The
powers vested in him are of a very comprehensive nature; so
comprehensive indeed during this war as to cause no little alarm among
some sections of the community. In the emergency created by the
declarations of war in August, 1914, the choice of a General
Commander-in-Chief lay between Colonel Ulrich Wille, a citizen of the
Canton of Zürich, married to a member of the Bismarck family, and
Colonel Sprecher v. Bernegg, a citizen of the Canton of the Grisons,
married to a member of the family of Von Bülow; and it was some time
before the Government finally declared itself in favour of the former,
appointing Colonel Sprecher v. Bernegg as his Chief of Staff.
With my Allied colleagues, Colonels Pageot, Gourko, and Golovane, the
French and Russian Military Attachés, I maintained the most pleasant
relations, and our mutual frank co-operation under sympathetic
conditions will ever remain one of my most cherished memories. Colonel
Gourko is the son of the Field Marshal Gourko (later Governor-General of
Poland), of Shipka Pass fame. He had seen much active service, and is
said to have received more wounds than any other officer in the Russian
Army. Ever anxious to find himself in the trenches, he succeeded in
returning to Russia in 1915, where he fought on several fronts until
disabled by wounds, from which I am glad to know he again made a good
recovery. Since the Revolution in Russia, he, like so many others, has
given no sign of himself, and I have heard nothing further of him.
Colonel Pageot returned to the Western Front in 1916, in command of a
regiment, and greatly distinguished himself, receiving the "Croix de
Guerre avec Palmes," a distinction which gave much pleasure to his
former colleagues in Berne.
Prior to my departure from Thoune, I had been witness to the
mobilization of the Swiss Army, and was much impressed by the smoothness
with which that operation was conducted. There is nothing which touches
more profoundly the life of each individual citizen than the exigencies
of the defence of his country. Obligatory service has always been at the
basis of the life of the Swiss people from the early dawn of their
national history. The primitive cantons, even before 1290, were
persuaded of the importance of a preparation for war, a persuasion which
succeeding centuries have done much to develop and strengthen. The very
first cantonal pacts laid stress on the dispositions regarding military
organization, and as early as 1476, the Confederates placed contingents
in the field numbering 50,000 fighting men.
The principle of universal service as adapted to present day
requirements finds a willing acceptance amongst a people whose
instincts, though ultra-democratic, make them realize that their
independence rests on the attitude of the Confederation vis-à-vis of her
powerful, and sometimes aggressive, neighbours. I have never in my
experience of Switzerland heard a word of complaint of the burden borne
by the State owing to the obligation entailed by universal service,
though anger is deeply felt for the sacrifices imposed upon the country
due to the ambitions of those responsible for the Great War.
On the outbreak of war the Confederation manifested their determination
to maintain neutrality as against all comers, and, by the mobilization
of some 300,000 men, made clear to the belligerents their strength of
purpose.
The following table[1] gives a résumé of the gradual evolution of the
military organization from the point of view of numbers legislated for
at different periods:—
------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------
Year. | Elite. | Reserve. | Landwehr. | Landsturm | Total
| | | | and Complementary | Effectives.
| | | | Services. |
------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------
1640 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 36,000
1782 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 63,697
1817 | 33,758 | 33,748 | -- | -- | 67,506
1850 | 69,569 | 34,785 | -- | -- | 104,354
1874 | 105,368 | -- | 97,012 | -- | 202,380
1899 | 148,435 | -- | 87,290 | 275,596 | 511,321
1911 | 142,054 | -- | 69,513 | 275,284 | 486,851
------+---------+----------+-----------+-------------------+------------
The Army is now composed of the whole of the fit male population between
the ages of 20 to 48; the Elite being drawn from men of the ages of 20
to 32 years, the Landwehr from 33 to 40 years, the Landsturm from 41 to
48 years. The effectives increase from year to year with the increase of
population. As regard instruction, the training of the infantry recruit
lasts 65 days, of the cavalry 90 days, of the artillery 75 days, per
annum. Repetition courses for the trained soldier take place annually,
and vary, according to the branch of the service, from eleven to
fourteen days. The Landwehr has a "repetition course" once every four
years. The Landsturm is only occasionally called up for a few days at a
time at long intervals.
According to Colonel Egli, the expenditure for military purposes for the
year 1911 amounted in all to frs. 44,777,894, being 25·9 per cent. of
the revenue of the country. The fact that Switzerland is able to
maintain a force of nearly half a million men at an expenditure of less
than £2,000,000 sterling speaks for itself. The war has, of course,
added greatly to the annual Budget. The additional expenditure from 1914
to 1918, owing to mobilization, extra material, higher rates of pay and
living, etc., form no small part of the accumulated deficit of the
country, which cannot be far short of £40,000,000 sterling, and is
steadily increasing.
The Military Regulations are so framed as to interfere in the least
possible degree with the civil life of the soldier, and yet, despite the
shortness of training, a very fair state of efficiency is reached and
maintained.
The Corps of Officers is highly educated, and embraces in its ranks all
the best brains of the country. It receives its military instruction at
special military schools.
A valuable adjunct to the training of the rank and file is supplied by
the Shooting Clubs, of which thousands exist, and as shooting is the one
national sport, this important branch of instruction receives special
attention.
The disorganization which immediately resulted in the economic and
industrial life of Switzerland on the outbreak of war, became a matter
of great concern to the Government, who, under their first impression of
the World War, feared that economic ruin might become inevitable. It
looked as though the business of the hotels, in which enormous capital
has been invested, would cease to exist, whilst the future of hundreds
of thousands of skilled artisans and mechanics would be imperilled.
Foreign markets would certainly find their purchasing power greatly
reduced, and there was every likelihood of a shortage in the
half-finished products received from Germany and Austria, which finally
reached foreign markets after receiving at the hands of the Swiss
workmen that finish which gave them so great a part of their value. The
future was painted in the blackest of colours, but the outcome has
differed greatly from the first crude picture.
Never in the history of the peasant have such large profits been made as
during the last four years. The hotel industry has no doubt been
crippled, but it has been kept alive by the not inconsiderable influx of
wealthy refugees from Central Europe and neutral countries, and the
hospitalization of some 30,000 French, British, Belgian, and German
Interned prisoners of war. The watch and clock, automobile, electric,
and other mechanical industries, have made good by devoting their
attention to the manufacture of munitions or other war requisites, in
which the exceptional skill of the Swiss artisan has proved of
inestimable worth. The dye industry has been developed to such an
extent, that Switzerland may confidently expect to retain a portion of
this trade in competition with Germany in the future.
The war will, I would fain believe and hope, have given to Swiss
economics an elasticity and adaptability of which they stood in need,
and from many points of view will not have proved that unmixed evil
foreseen by her pessimists under the influence of their first fears.
German industrial circles have watched this development with misgivings,
and are busily taking precautionary measures to turn it to their
advantage by the loan of capital, by the infiltration of expert
management into all those concerns in which they foresee rivalry, and
often by the purchase outright of commercial undertakings likely to be
useful in supplementing the work of the Fatherland in the economic
struggle it will have to face after the war.
It is a matter of common knowledge that sympathies in Switzerland were
divided at the outbreak of hostilities, the French and Italian speaking
cantons having a decided bias in favour of the Allies, and the German
cantons one in favour of the other side. After the early successes of
the Germans, the opinion was generally held that Germany would press the
war to a conclusion so rapidly, that England would not be able to make
her weight felt in time to avert a calamity. Swiss military circles,
however, did not wholly share this view, as the following account of a
conversation, which in August, 1914, I had with a well-known Swiss
officer of standing shows. This conversation appeared to me at the time
all the more interesting as my informant was a Professor of Military
History, and, judging by his name, might have been expected to have his
views coloured by German sympathies. He spoke in the following
sense:— "Now that England has thrown in her lot with France and Russia,
the combination will probably be too great for Germany and her Allies,
but the struggle will be a bitter one. Remember the Seven Years' War,
and what Prussia was capable of in opposition to a host of enemies. You
will have many surprises; Switzerland, however, will welcome the
weakening of Germany, provided she is not completely crushed. A
weakening of Germany would be useful to us Swiss, for we see a great
danger to ourselves in the economic dominance she is obtaining in our
country. Any relaxation in that respect will be to our advantage."
The events of the last four years have done much to change feeling in
the German-speaking cantons, inasmuch as the invasion of Belgium, the
employment of poison gas, the sinking of the _Lusitania_, the brutality
of the submarine campaign, the destruction of Serbia, the harshness
shown to Roumania, have made an unfavourable impression on all classes
of the population. German propaganda has also thoroughly awakened the
country to the danger it was incurring from the stranglehold which
German financiers and industrials were establishing upon her economic
life.
The revolutionary fiasco in Russia also, in no small degree, affected
public opinion. As a republican nation possessed with the ideal of the
rights of smaller nations to dispose of themselves, they feared and
abhorred the Russian form of government as represented by Czarism; and
this, no doubt, had a good deal to do with the way in which they
regarded Germany as a protector and a bulwark against the submergence of
Europe by a Slav wave. That danger now removed, they probably feel
Germany's support may be more easily dispensed with; and with a weakened
Germany they foresee the possibility of re-organizing their economic
life free from the trammels of an overbearing neighbour. The crushing of
Germany, however, would, they think, mean economic ruin to them; and at
this they draw the line.
[1] From _L'Armée Suisse_, by Colonel C. H. Egli, Colonel
d'Etat-Major Général, 1913.