least ten years in the future. The British do not think it should be
hurried. Careful, rather pragmatic, they advocate methodical progress
in which new international organizations could be tested against actual
conditions. Those that work will survive. Those that do not will
disappear.
Is the Grand Design a new name for a third force to be interposed
between the Sino-Russian bloc in the East and the United States in
the West? The British say emphatically not. They see it as a method
of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance by uniting Europe. Naturally,
they believe their flair for diplomacy and politics, their industrial
strength, and, not least, Europe's distaste for German leadership will
give them an important role in the new Europe. Obviously, that role, as
spokesman for both a united Europe and a global Commonwealth, will be
more suitable and, above all, more practical in the world of 1960 than
the obsolete concept of Empire.
The development of British action toward the accomplishment of the
Grand Design will be accompanied by the gradual transformation of
what is left of the Empire into the Commonwealth. Ghana, established
as an independent member of the Commonwealth in March 1957, will be
followed by Singapore, Malaya, Nigeria, Rhodesia, and many more. Since
1945 Britain has given self-government and independence to well over
500,000,000 souls (at the same time the Soviet Union was enslaving
100,000,000) and the process is not over. Certainly there have been
shortcomings and failures--Cyprus is one. But it seems to me that a
people prepared on one hand to abdicate power and turn that power over
to others and at the same time ready to conceive and develop a new plan
for Europe is showing an elasticity and toughness of mind the rest of
the world might envy. We are not attending the birth of a new British
Empire but watching the advent of a new position for Britain in the
world--one less spectacularly powerful than the old, but important
nonetheless. The speed of its development is inextricably connected
with an expanding and prosperous economy at home.
Bravery is associated with tough-mindedness. But bravery is not the
exclusive possession of any nation. The British are a courageous
people, certainly. As certain classes are apt to combine courage with
the national habit of understatement, the bravery of the British has an
attraction not evident in the somewhat self-conscious heroism of the
Prussians. Of course, it can be argued that the apparent unwillingness
of the British to exploit the fact that Pilot Officer Z brought
his plane back from Berlin on one engine or that Sergeant Major Y
killed thirty Germans before his morning tea is a form of national
advertisement more subtle and sure than that obtained by battalions of
public-relations officers.
Although they revere regimental traditions, the British seldom express
their reverence openly. In war they are able to maintain an attitude
of humorous objectivity. During the fighting on the retreat to Dunkirk
I encountered two Guards officers roaring with laughter. They had
learned, they said, that the popular newspapers in London had reported
that the nickname of the Commander in Chief, General the Viscount Gort,
was "Tiger." "My dear chap," said one, "in the Brigade [of Guards]
we've always called him 'Fat Boy.'"
Coupled with tough-mindedness is another positive characteristic:
love of justice. This may be disputed by the Irish, the Indians, the
Cypriotes. But it is true that in all the great international crises in
which Britain has been involved, from the War of Independence onward,
there has been a strong, sometimes violent opposition to the course
that the government of the day pursued. Beginning with Burke, the
Americans, the Irish, the Indians, the Cypriotes have had defenders in
the House of Commons, on political platforms, and in the press.
This is not the result of partisan politics, although naturally that
helps. Englishmen did not assail the Black and Tans in Ireland because
of love for Irishmen. Indian independence did not find a redoubtable
champion in Earl Mountbatten because of his particular fondness for
Indians. The impulse was the belief that justice or, to put it better,
right must be done.
It is because a large section of the nation believes this implicitly
that the British over the years have been able to make those gestures
of conciliation and surrenders of power which will ever adorn her
history: the settlement with the Boers after the South African war, the
withdrawal from India, the treaty with Ireland.
The British people suffered greatly during both world wars. Yet any
ferocious outbreak of hatred against "the Huns" was promptly answered
by leaders who even in the midst of war understood that the right they
were fighting to preserve must be preserved at home as well as abroad.
It was this belief in justice, a justice that served all, incorruptible
and austere, which enabled a comparative handful of Britons to rule
the Indian subcontinent for so long. It was this belief in justice,
interpreted in terms of social evolution, which moved the reformers of
the present century in the direction of the Welfare State. The British
concept of justice is inseparably bound to the strong reformist element
within the British people. As long as that element flourishes, as it
does today, we can expect that British society will continue to change
and develop.
Tough-mindedness, a quiet form of bravery, a love of justice; what else
is there? One characteristic I have noted earlier: a living belief in
the democratic process. The British know the world too well to believe
that this delicate and complex system of government can immediately
be imposed upon any people. They themselves, as they will admit, have
trouble making it work. But neither fascism nor communism has ever made
headway. Any political expert can provide long and involved reasons
for this. I prefer the obvious one: the British believe in democracy,
they believe in people. Long ago, as a young man entering politics,
Winston Churchill, grandson of a Duke of Marlborough, product of Harrow
and a fashionable Hussar regiment, adopted as his own a motto of his
father's. It was simply: "Trust the People."
The actual practice of democracy over a long period of years can be
successful only if it is accompanied by a wide measure of tolerance.
Despite all their vicissitudes, this virtue the British preserve in
full measure. The British disliked Senator McCarthy because they
thought he was intolerant; they were themselves slightly intolerant,
or at least ill-informed, about the causes that inflated the Senator.
In their own nation the British tolerate almost any sort of political
behavior as long as it is conducted within the framework of the law.
Communists, fascists, isolationists, internationalists all may speak
their pieces and make as much noise as they wish. There will always be
a policeman on hand to quell a disturbance.
Toleration of the public exposition of political beliefs that aim at
the overthrow of the established parliamentary government implies
a stout belief in the supremacy of democracy over other forms of
government. Even in their unbuttoned moments, British politicians will
seldom agree to the thesis, lately put about by many eminent men, that
complete suffrage prevents a government from acting with decision in an
emergency.
Early in 1951 I talked late one night with a British diplomat about the
rearmament of Germany. He was a man of wide experience, aristocratic
bearing, and austere manner. During our conversation I suggested that
the British, who had suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans in
two world wars, would be most reluctant to agree to the rearmament of
their foes and that the ensuing political situation would be made to
order for the extremists of the Labor Party.
"I don't think so," he replied. "Our people fumble and get lost at
times, but they come back on the right track. They'll argue it out in
their minds or in the pubs. They'll reject extreme measures. The Labor
Party and the great mass of its followers will be with the government.
The people, you know, are wiser than anyone thinks they are."
Tolerance is coupled with kindness. British kindness is apt to be
abstract, impersonal. There is the gruff, unspoken kindness of the
members of the working class to one another in times of death. The
wealthy wearer of the Old School Tie will go to great lengths to succor
a friend fallen on evil days. He will also do his best to provide for
an old employee or to rehabilitate an old soldier, once under his
command, who is in trouble with the police. This is part of the sense
of responsibility inculcated by the public school. Even in the Welfare
State it persists. "I've got to drive out into Essex this afternoon," a
friend said, "and see what I can do for a sergeant that served with me.
Bloody fool can't hold onto a farthing and makes a pest of himself with
the local authorities. Damn good sergeant, though."
I remembered another sergeant in Germany. He was a man who had felt
the war deeply, losing a brother, a wife, and a daughter to German
bombs. When it was all over and the British Army rested on its arms
in northern Germany he installed his men in the best billets the
neighboring village could provide. The Germans were left to shift for
themselves in the barns and outbuildings. Within a week, he told me,
the situation was reversed. The Germans were back in their homes.
The soldiers were sleeping in the barns. I told a German about it
afterward. "Yes," he said, "the British would do that. We wouldn't, not
after a long war. They are a decent people."
It is upon such characteristics, a basic, stubborn toughness of mind,
bravery, tolerance, a belief in democracy, kindness, decency, that
British hopes for the future rest.
Any objective study of Britain must accept that, although there has
been a decline in power at home and abroad, the national economy
has recovered remarkably and the physical basis of the economy has
improved. Far from being decadent, idle, and unambitious, the nation
as a whole is pulsing with life. The energy may be diffused into paths
that fail to contribute directly to the general betterment of the
nation. But it is there, and the possession of the important national
characteristics mentioned above promises that eventually this energy
will be directed to the national good.
In the end we return to our starting-point. Although there is a
cleavage between the working class and the middle class, it is not deep
enough to smash the essential unity of the people. No great gulfs of
geography, race, or religion separate them. The differences between
employer and employed are serious. But there is no basic difference,
nurtured by the hatred of a century and a half, as there is between
revolutionary France and conservative France. The constant change in
the character of the classes, the steady movement of individuals and
groups up the economic and social ladders insures that this will never
develop. From the outside the society seems stratified. On the inside
one sees, hears, feels ceaseless movement of a flexible society.
The long contest with Russia has induced Americans to follow Napoleon's
advice and think about big battalions. But national power and influence
should not be measured solely in terms of material strength. By that
standard the England of the first Elizabeth and the Dutch Republic of
the seventeenth century would have been blotted out by the might of
Spain just as our own struggling colonies would have been overcome by
the weight of England. The character of a people counts.
So it is with Britain. The ability of the British people to survive
cannot be measured only in terms of steel production. The presence of
grave economic and social problems should not be accepted as proof
that they cannot be solved by people of imagination and ability. The
existence of external class differences should not blind observers to
the basic unity of political thought.
It is natural that in their present position Britons are far more aware
of the ties that bind them to the United States, ties that include
a common language, much common history, dangers shared, and enemies
overcome, than the people of the United States are aware of the ties
that bind them to Britain. But Americans must guard against the easy
assumption that, because Britain is weaker than she was half a century
ago, because she has changed rapidly and will change further, Britain
and the British are "through."
It is often said in Washington that the leading politicians of the
Republican and Democratic parties and the chief permanent officials of
the Treasury, State Department, and other departments did not recognize
the extent to which Britain had been weakened by World War II. It is
hard to understand why this should have been so. The sacrifice in blood
was written large on a hundred battlefields. The cost in treasure was
clearly outlined in the financial position of the United Kingdom in
1945.
Americans should not fear political differences between the United
States and the United Kingdom on foreign policies. As long as
the British are worth their salt as allies they will think, and
occasionally act, independently. What would be dangerous to the future
of the alliance in a period of crisis would be the growth in Britain
of a belief that Britain's problems, internal or international, can be
blamed on the United States. A similar belief about Britain existed
in France in 1940. Verdun occupied the position in French minds that
the Battle of Britain does today in some British minds, that of a
great heroic national effort that exhausted the nation and left it
prey to the post-war appetite of its supposed friend and ally. If this
concept were to be accepted by any sizable proportion of the British
people, then the alliance would be in danger. The possibility that this
will happen is slight. The British retain confidence in themselves,
undaunted by the changes in the world.
The United States can help sustain this confidence. It is difficult to
see why the political, industrial, and social accomplishments of the
British since 1945 are so casually ignored in the United States and why
Americans accept so readily the idea that Britain's day is done.
Certainly many Americans criticized the establishment of the Welfare
State. Certainly ignorance led many to confuse socialism in Britain
with communism in the Soviet Union. Certainly the achievement of power
by the great trade unions has alienated those Americans who still decry
the powerful position of organized labor in the modern democratic state.
But it is folly to expect that even our closest friends and truest
allies can develop economically and politically along paths similar
to those trod by the people of the United States. It is time that we
looked on the positive side of Britain's life since the end of World
War II. We must remember that this is a going concern. The new nuclear
power stations rising throughout Britain are part of the general
Western community which we lead. British advances in the sciences or
in any other field of human endeavor should not be thought of as the
activities of a rival but as the triumphs of an ally that has in the
past given incontrovertible proof of her steadfastness in adversity,
her willingness to do and dare at the side of the United States.
There they are, fifty millions of them. Kindly, energetic, ambitious,
and, too often, happily complacent in peace; most resolute, courageous,
and tough-minded in the storms that have beaten about their islands
since the dawn of the Christian era.
What is at stake in the relationship between the two nations is
something far greater than whether we approve of Aneurin Bevan or the
British approved of Senator McCarthy. The union of the English-speaking
peoples is the one tried and tested alliance in a shaky world. Three
times within living memory its sons have rallied to defeat or forestall
the ambitions of conquerors. To understand Britain, to share with her
the great tasks that lie before the Western community is much more than
a salute by Americans to common political thought, a common tongue, or
common memories. It is the easiest and most certain method by which we
in our time can preserve the freedom of man which has been building in
all the years since King and barons rode to Runnymede.
_INDEX_
Air Force, 239-40
Albert, Prince Consort, 19-20, 27, 30
Alexander, Field Marshal Earl, 235
Amery, Julian, 55, 183
Anglo-American relations, 47-8, 109, 159-86;
tensions, 66, 163-76
Anne, Queen, 45
Anson, Sir William, 17, 18
armed forces, 84-6, 238-44;
Air Force, 239-40;
Army, 238-9;
Navy, 239
Army, 238-9
Atomic Energy Authority, 214
Attlee, Clement, 36, 58, 77, 78, 87, 88, 108, 113, 152, 235, 280
Bagehot, Walter, 22, 28, 97-8
Baldwin, Stanley, 55, 74, 95, 152
Beaverbrook, Lord (William Maxwell Aitken), 20, 30, 31, 54, 85, 140;
influence of, 224-5
Bevan, Aneurin, 18, 19, 61, 84-9 _passim_, 121, 152;
anti-Americanism, 47, 81, 109, 176;
opposition to hydrogen bomb, 48;
leader of opposition within Labor Party, 72, 73, 78-80, 269;
supporters, 82-3
Bevin, Ernest, 62, 77, 80, 108, 143;
opposition to communism, 109
Boyle, Sir Edward, 55
Bradlaugh, Charles, 30
British Empire, 91, 107
British Productivity Council, 196
Brogan, D.W., 164
Butler, R.A., 18-19, 49, 52, 54, 58, 59, 74
Cabinet, 43-6
Castle, Mrs. Barbara, 84
Chamberlain, Neville, 17, 35, 37, 63, 74, 95, 152, 166, 259, 280
Charles II, 25, 44
Charles, Prince, 15
China (Communist), 79, 184;
British attitude toward, 149-50
Churchill, Sir Winston, 17, 18, 37, 51, 52, 59, 76, 80, 82, 95, 113-14,
133, 152, 200, 235, 239, 252, 259, 279, 285-6;
party peacemaker, 35;
skill in debate, 40;
on monarchy, 276
clubs, 257-9
Commons, House of, 38-43, 46
Commonwealth, 29, 91, 107, 137-41, 283
Communist Party in Britain, 35, 49, 142-4, 146, 147, 164, 179, 180;
in labor unions, 72, 82, 83-4, 109, 200, 208-15
Connor, William, 202, 227
Conservative Party, 50-69
conurbation, 6, 7
Cooke, Alistair, 222
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 77, 95, 107, 113
Crossman, R.H.S., 84
Delmer, Sefton, 226, 228
Dilke, Sir Charles, 30
Dulles, John Foster, 170-1;
British attitude toward, 47, 48, 155, 167, 172
Eccles, Sir David, 282
Eden, Sir Anthony, 18, 20, 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 133, 143,
171-2, 183, 224, 280
Edward VII, 27
Egypt, 54, 55, 61, 66, 88, 143, 151, 155, 156, 168, 183, 184
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 37, 41, 60, 80, 183
Elizabeth II, 13-33, 114, 251, 252
Elizabeth, Queen Mother, 22, 27
European Defense Community, 171
Foot, Michael, 56, 84-5
Forrest, William, 228
Foulkes, Frank, 213
France, British attitude toward, 150-1
Franks, Sir Oliver, 85
Freedman, Max, 222
Fyfe, Sir David Maxwell, 52
Gaitskell, Hugh, 18, 20, 36, 49, 56, 73, 77-8, 80, 87, 89, 235, 280;
opposed by Bevan, 88, 269
George I, 45
George IV, 25
George V, 16, 19, 25
George VI, 16, 17
Germany, British attitude toward, 151-3
Gorer, Geoffrey, 275
Gort, General the Viscount, 284
Grand Design, The, 282-3
Griffiths, James, 18, 49
Halifax, Earl of, 17
Harding, Gilbert, 107
Hardy, Keir, 36
Horner, Arthur, 210
Howard, Ebenezer, 116
India, 36, 96, 105-7, 170
Italy, British attitude toward, 153-4
Jacobson, Sydney, 202
King, Cecil, 226
Korean war, economic influence of, 192-3
labor unions, 200-13, 215, 266-7;
communist influence in, 208-13, 215
Lancaster, Osbert, 225, 226
Laski, Harold, 97, 113
Lloyd, Selwyn, 52, 282
Lloyd George, David, 19, 56
Lords, House of, 39, 42-3, 44
MacLeod, Iain, 52, 130
Macmillan, Harold, 18, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 65, 89,
155, 269, 282
Margaret, Princess, 15, 22, 26
Massingham, Hugh, 223
Maulding, Reginald, 52, 130
McCarthy, Joseph, 60, 164-6, 167, 286
McCarthyism, 36, 163-4
McKenzie, Robert T., 59
McNeil, Hector, 62
Middle East, 155;
British influence in, 156-7
Miller, Webb, 218
monarchy, 13-33, 133, 276;
power of, 16, 22;
influence of, 21, 37;
finances of, 26-8, 30-1
Montgomery, Field Marshal the Viscount, 46
Morrison, Herbert, 36, 51, 77, 87, 88, 89, 278;
opposition to communism, 143
Mosley, Sir Oswald, 35
Mountbatten, Earl, 21, 31, 134, 285
Muggeridge, Malcolm, 147
Nasser, Abdel, 54, 155, 156
National Health Service Act, 102-5
nationalization, 97-101, 102, 104-5, 107
Navy, 239
Nehru, Shri Jawaharlal, 106, 166, 235
New Towns, 116-18, 121, 122, 124, 125
newspapers, 77-81, 218-30;
_Daily Express_, 31, 219, 225-6;
_Daily Herald_, 31, 87, 125;
_Daily Mirror_, 31, 87, 125, 202, 210, 219, 220, 226-7;
_Daily Telegraph_, 163, 219;
_Evening Standard_, 31;
_Manchester Guardian_, 163, 218-19, 220, 222-3;
_New Statesman and Nation_, 31-2, 84, 85;
_Sunday Express_, 15, 20, 31;
_Times_, 19, 130, 163, 183, 218, 220-2;
_Tribune_, 56, 84-5, 89
Norwich, Viscount (Alfred Duff Cooper), 152
Odger, George, 30
Orwell, George, 252
Parliament, 37-43, 45;
Commons, 38-43, 46;
Lords, 39, 42-3, 44
Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, 19-20, 21-8 _passim_, 31
Plumb, J.H., 45
public schools, 81-4, 230-7
pubs, 254-7
Reynolds, Quentin, 8
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 37, 82, 174
Salisbury, Marquess of, 18, 44, 49, 54, 58, 59, 134
Sandys, Duncan, 282
Scott, Richard, 223
Shinwell, Emanuel, 77
Smith, Walter Bedell, 172
Soviet Union, British attitude toward, 143-8
sports, 87-9, 244-54
sterling area, 138
Strachey, Lytton, 20
Strang, Lord, 232
Thorneycroft, Peter, 282
Townsend, Peter, 26
Trades Union Congress, 55, 73, 88, 143, 196;
power of, 71-2, 86-7, 200-2;
communist opposition, 83, 143, 212
Truman, Harry S., 25, 37
Victoria, Queen, 20, 25, 27, 30
Waithman, Robert, 229
Watson, Sam, 200, 210
Wavell, Field Marshal Earl, 108, 152
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 73
Welfare State, 101-2, 104, 105, 107, 118, 123, 264, 285, 289
Williams, Francis, 227
Wilson, Harold, 49
Windsor, Duchess of, 15, 31
Windsor, Duke of, 20
Woolton, Lord (Frederick William Marquis), 52, 53
Zilliacus, Konni, 84
A NOTE ON THE TYPE
_The text of this book was set on the Linotype in a face called_ TIMES
ROMAN, _designed by_ STANLEY MORISON _for_ The Times (_London_), _and
first introduced by that newspaper in the middle nineteen thirties_.
_Among typographers and designers of the twentieth century, Stanley
Morison has been a strong forming influence, as typographical adviser
to the English Monotype Corporation, as a director of two distinguished
English publishing houses, and as a writer of sensibility, erudition,
and keen practical sense._
_In 1930 Morison wrote: "Type design moves at the pace of the most
conservative reader. The good type-designer therefore realises that,
for a new fount to be successful, it has to be so good that only very
few recognise its novelty. If readers do not notice the consummate
reticence and rare discipline of a new type, it is probably a good
letter." It is now generally recognized that in the creation of_ Times
Roman _Morison successfully met the qualifications of this theoretical
doctrine_.
_Composed, printed, and bound by_ H. WOLFF, _New York. Paper
manufactured by_ S.D. WARREN CO., _Boston_.
[Illustration]
A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Drew Middleton _was born in New York City in 1913. After being
graduated from Syracuse University, he went into newspaper work, and in
1938 became a foreign correspondent. Since then he has been chief of_
The New York Times _bureaus in England, Russia, and Germany. In 1940,
during the Battle of Britain, he was in London covering the operations
of the Royal Air Force, and he later sent his dispatches from Supreme
Headquarters of the AEF. In the decade since the war, Mr. Middleton's
reporting and interpreting of the Cold War struggle between East and
West have earned him a wide and respectful audience both here and
abroad. His earlier books include_ The Struggle for Germany (_1949_)
_and_ The Defense of Western Europe (_1952_).