THE SECOND BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, OR THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN
The enemy was in full retreat, but we had every reason to suppose that
once he had got “home,” back to the Hindenburg Line, he would resist
our further attempts to advance with all his strength.
If we attacked the line and our assault was successful, and we could
break his defences, the way, as we have said, lay clear to the heart
of his great system of lateral railway communications. We could cut
his forces completely in two. But besides this, if we could beat him
here on his chosen battleground, if we could wound him, even behind
the rampart upon which he had for years spent such an infinity of
toil, where, in the open unprepared country behind, could he hope to
withstand us? The lists were set for a struggle _à outrance_, the two
forces faced each other grimly, for upon the fortunes of the champions
in this combat hung the fate of the German nation. It was to be a Tank
attack. We were to make the assault on a very wide front, and were to
continue our system of hitting in rapid succession in alternate Army
areas. The last blow had been delivered by the 4th Army on September
18. The new battle was to be begun by the 1st and 3rd Armies.
[91]“On the 1st and 3rd Army fronts, strong positions covering
the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Schelde Canals,
including the section of the Hindenburg Line itself north of
Gouzeaucourt, were still in the enemy’s possession. His trenches in
this sector faced south-west, and it was desirable that they should
be taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render it
easier for the artillery of the 4th Army to get into position.”
To the south, as soon as certain points of vantage, Quennemont Farm,
the Knoll and Bellicourt, were in our hands, there was to be a lull,
and the 4th Army was to attack in strength on the 29th, two days
later--as soon, that is, as the Germans had had time thoroughly to
involve their reserves in the first mêlée.
Meanwhile the Tank Brigades had to be rapidly reorganised and
redistributed, the Battalions being almost all reshuffled. About
one-third of the available machines were to be put in on the northern
part of the front, and the other two-thirds were to fight with the 4th
Army on the 29th.
For the sake of clarity, it is simpler to treat the two halves of the
battle separately, for though they were completely interdependent and
formed part of one strategic conception, each offered very distinct
tactical problems of its own. In each the ground had very marked
topographical features, features that gave to each half a special
character.
PART I
I
We have said that the 1st and 3rd Armies were to strike first.
Tanks belonging to the 7th and 11th Battalions of the 1st Brigade
were to fight with the Canadians and the 4th Corps opposite Bourlon
and Gouzeaucourt, and the 2nd Brigade was to contribute the 15th
Battalion, which was to co-operate with the 17th Corps opposite
Graincourt and Flesquières.
Altogether fifty-three fighting Tanks were to be employed.
As in the 4th Army sector, the peculiar lie of the country was the
chief influence which shaped our battle tactics, as in the 4th Army
area a canal was the central feature of the attack.
In the First Battle of Cambrai the Tanks had all attacked from south of
the northward bend of the Canal du Nord near Havrincourt, and so worked
up the enemy’s side of this great obstacle.
Now we were in a better position to force a direct crossing, both
strategically and mechanically, and the hazardous venture was to
be attempted. Direct ground reconnaissance of the Canal itself was
impossible, as the enemy held the hither bank in strength, but every
conceivable source of information was exhaustively exploited in the
endeavour to find crossing-places for the Tanks, that might offer at
least a possibility of success.
Daring flights were made by special observers in low-flying aeroplanes,
and a wonderful mosaic was pieced together from successive sets of
air-photographs.
This was annotated, re-photographed, enlarged, and circulated to all
concerned for further amplification and annotation as additional
information was collected; Major Macavity of the Canadian Corps
Intelligence, and Captain Oswald Birly of 1st Army Headquarters, being
largely responsible for the thoroughness of this, as well as of several
previous “over-the-line” surveys.
In addition, the _Garde Champêtre_, the _Ponts et Chaussées_ service,
and the engineers’ working drawings for the Canal, were all laid under
contribution, as well as the evidence of a number of prisoners,
refugees and _repatriés_.
From such sources and on such evidence the requisite number of
crossings were at length determined on, and the Tanks definitely and
severally allotted to them, for good or ill.
But when all had been done, there were one or two points about which
there still remained a disquieting element of doubt.
At one of these, where aerial photographs showed a breach through
the retaining banks of the dry Canal that just might, or that just
might not, allow sufficient width for Tanks to cross, a crossing was
imperative for the local success of the attack. Somehow, a passage had
to be positively assured--and there seemed but one sure way of keeping
our contract with the infantry, who were to storm the Canal at that
place.
A bridge was to be formed of three old and obsolete Tanks, upon the
broad backs of which their juniors and betters might scramble across
and get to close quarters with the enemy. Four elderly machines,
warranted unsound, were accordingly sought out, specially stiffened up
with internal timber struts, and allotted the self-sacrificing task of
slithering down into the Canal bed, and there swinging and shunting
until they lay side by side ready for the fighters to crawl over them.
Under the heading “A BRIDGE OF TANKS,” the actual crossing was very
vividly described in the Press.
“_Paris, September 28._
“A French correspondent relates the following interesting episode
which happened in the battle yesterday.
“It had been decided that a Tank detachment of the older types
should lead the attack, expose themselves to the enemy fire, and,
on arriving at the brink of the Canal, drop themselves into the
bed so as to form an improvised bridge from one Tank to the other.
The fast Tanks were to follow, and this new rapid type was to pass
over the backs of their older comrades, opening out a path for the
infantry. Volunteers were asked for this post of danger, and for
one crew wanted ten crews offered themselves. Lots had to be drawn
finally to choose the heroic winners of this contest of honour. The
wonderful feat was accomplished. The old scarred Tanks, covered
with ancient gashes and wounds proudly gained in the fighting on
the Somme, and in the fighting of over a year ago before Cambrai,
took for the last time their slow and massive way, and plunged
with noble abnegation over the edge. Over their bodies the new
strong Tanks passed with giant strides, our soldiers followed
them to victory, and shortly after eight o’clock they penetrated
Flesquières.”
As a matter of fact, the actuality fell somewhat short of this
description. The veteran machines found themselves quite unequal to the
long trek, and even the least decrepit of the four finally doddered to
a standstill whilst yet miles away from the Canal.
So there was no “Bridge of Tanks” after all, though, as things turned
out, its absence embarrassed no one, with the possible though unlikely
exception of the “close-up” correspondent.
Most fortunately the doubtful crossing proved practicable, and all
machines, save one that struck a land-mine, passed safely over.
II
The attack was, as usual, at dawn, and, as the first-wave Tanks and
infantry went over the top, they met with fierce resistance. On the
right we encountered particularly strong opposition near Beaucamp Ridge.
The 11th Battalion History remarks upon the extraordinarily gallant
fighting of the enemy on this sector.
“In some cases they even attempted to pull the machine-guns and
6-pounders out of the Tanks. We inflicted many casualties by
actually running over machine-guns and infantry, as well as by our
fire.”
Indeed, the Germans here constantly counter-attacked throughout the
day, so important did they deem the position. In spite of them,
however, we successfully established our right flank.
Just to the north of them the Guards and the 3rd Division forced a
crossing of the Canal in face of their heavy machine and field gun
fire, captured Ribecourt and Flesquières, the Guards taking Arival Wood
and pushing north of Premy Chapel, where the 2nd Division took up the
advance.
The 15th Battalion History tells the story of four Tanks which were
co-operating with the Guards Division. It is typical of this part of
the battle. On the northern outskirts of Flesquières they awaited the
arrival of the 1st Grenadiers, filling in the interval by helping the
Gordons in their occupation of the village.
When the Guards arrived the situation was still somewhat obscure,
and Major Skeggs, commanding the Tanks, made a daring forward
reconnaissance from Flesquières towards Premy Chapel.
The Tanks were brought round north of the village immediately, engaging
a number of machine and field guns, which were firing from Arival Wood.
In order to cover the advance of the infantry, the Tanks had to come up
over a bare stretch of country, exposed to direct fire from a number of
field pieces.
Two Tanks, “Orchid” and “Othello,” were soon knocked out, and 2nd
Lieutenant Riddle’s “Orestes” and Sergeant Whatley’s “Oribi” only were
left.
But it was in the centre that the Tanks fought their chief battle.
Under cover of darkness, the Canadians and the 63rd Division had moved
down the west bank of the Canal near Mœuvres and Sains-lez-Marquion. In
the half light of dawn they stormed the Canal itself. The resistance
here was far from well organised.
[92]“Silkem Chapel and Wood Switch were packed with enemy infantry,
who were in great confusion, unable to move one way or the other.
The Tank ‘Odetta,’ commanded by Second Lieutenant C. W. Luck, did
great execution there, bringing all his guns to bear on the enemy,
and using case shot at point-blank range.”
All day the 15th Battalion fought.
“About 4.30 p.m. the G.S.O.3, 63rd Division, brought up a
Brigadier-General (brigade not ascertained), who asked if Tanks
could go forward with his Brigade, who were then about to resume
the advance. He was informed that they had very little petrol
left, but would go on if he (the Brigadier-General) would accept
responsibility for Tanks being stranded right forward without
petrol. The Brigadier-General agreed to this, and said he wanted to
get his Brigade on to the Marquion Line.
“The two Tanks went forward and picked up the infantry north
of Graincourt. From this point they preceded the infantry,
encountering practically no opposition.
“Beyond Anneux, the Tanks came under a lot of machine-gun fire
from the direction of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Both Tanks were
turned broadside on, and fire was brought to bear on the German
machine-guns in order to support the infantry advancing on the
left. Parties of the enemy, who were seen coming over the crest
towards the Marquion Line, were engaged by all Tank guns which
could be brought to bear. The enemy ran away and many casualties
were caused.
“Soon after this some heavy shells, believed to have been fired
from trench mortars, fell very close to the Tanks. These two Tanks
reached a point about 1000 yards from Cantaing before completing
their work.
“Petrol was then almost finished, crews were much exhausted,
having left the final lying-up place at about twelve midnight, on
September 26–27. The work required of the Tanks was completed, so
they were withdrawn to a point well east of the Canal.”
Meanwhile our line had been pushed on east of Anneux to
Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Bourlon Village had been carried by the 7th Tank
Battalion and the Canadians. We had passed through Bourlon Wood, which
was now wholly in our possession.
On the extreme left a Division of the 22nd Corps had also crossed the
Canal, cleared Sauchy-Lestrée and had moved on northward.
The air co-operation had been particularly effective throughout the
day. The work of the 8th Squadron had, however, been a good deal
hampered, as they had concentrated on the 4th Army front for the recent
fighting there, and therefore had a long flight and difficult signal
communications when ordered to work with the 3rd and 1st Armies.
However, their arrangements with their Tank partners were, as usual,
admirable. With the 7th Battalion, who, with the Canadians, had been
set the task of crossing the Canal du Nord opposite Inchy, and then
taking Bourlon Village, co-operation was particularly good; not only
were vital messages dropped at Battalion Headquarters, but a gun which
was firing on three of our Tanks from Bourlon Wood was effectively
bombed, and twice the airman chased its crew away with his machine-gun.
[Illustration: INFANTRY ADVANCING BEHIND TANKS. A PRACTICE ATTACK AT
BERMICOURT]
[Illustration: THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL, BELLICOURT]
[Illustration: CARRIER PIGEON BEING RELEASED]
On September 28 Tanks of the 7th and 11th Battalions fought again at
Baillencourt. Seven Tanks of the 11th Battalion with the 5th Corps
captured Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu.
By the evening of the 28th we had taken all our objectives, and had
advanced beyond our old high-water line of the First Battle of Cambrai.
Fontaine-Notre-Dame, Bourlon Village, Epinoy and Haynecourt were all
ours, and we had captured over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. The Tanks
had suffered heavy casualties, but they had not suffered them in vain.
PART II
I
We have said that in the original battle scheme, certain points of
vantage, Quennemont, the Knoll, and Bellicourt, were assumed to be in
our hands a day or so before the main attack on the 4th Army front was
launched.
These fortified heights were of importance owing to the singular
geography of this sector of the line.
All along this piece of the front, more or less parallel to the lines
of the armies, runs--deep and broad--the St. Quentin Canal.
For three and a half miles, however, between Bellicourt and Vendhuille
it runs underground through a tunnel.
We have seen how, in the northern part of the line, the enemy had
relied upon the Canal du Nord to form the principal obstacle to an
attack.
In August we had captured a document which proved that he realised
that if we attacked at all in the south, and whether we attacked with
Tanks or not, it would be in that three-and-a-half-mile gap that our
heaviest blow would fall.
The photograph gives an excellent notion why we had to avoid certain
sectors of the Canal at all costs, and Sir Douglas Haig, in his
Despatch, gives an admirable idea of some of the complex features which
the topography here possessed.
“The general configuration of the ground through which this sector
of the Canal runs, produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of
some sixty feet; while between Bellicourt and the neighbourhood
of Vendhuille the Canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of
6000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed
numerous tunnelled dug-outs and concrete shelters. Along the top
edge of them he had concealed well-sited concrete or armoured
machine-gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide
living accommodation for troops, and was connected by shafts with
the trenches above. South of Bellicourt the Canal cutting gradually
becomes shallow, till at Bellenglise the Canal lies almost at
ground level. South of Bellenglise the Canal is dry.
“On the western side of the Canal, south of Bellicourt, two
thoroughly organised and extremely heavily wired lines of
continuous trench run roughly parallel to the Canal, at average
distances from it of 2000 and 1000 yards respectively. The whole
series of defences, with the numerous defended villages contained
in it, formed a belt of country varying from 7000 to 10,000 yards
in depth, organised by the employment of every available means into
a most powerful system, well meriting the great reputation attached
to it.”
On the three and a half miles of front, where alone Tanks and artillery
could cross the line of the Canal, the outpost system which everywhere
protected the Hindenburg Line, was doubly reinforced, and gained a
natural strength from its position on the heights, beneath which the
Canal had burrowed.
Only a very “full dress” attack on so highly organised a system as the
Hindenburg Line was likely to be successful, and in order to launch
such an attack it was essential that we should already hold the Knoll
and Guillemont and Quennemont Farms.
We have seen how in the last day or two of the battle of Epehy we
assaulted the line again and again, duly captured the sector opposite
Bellicourt, but how, two days before the main attack was to be
launched, the Knoll and Quennemont were still in the hands of the enemy.
This state of affairs caused grave anxiety, as the whole set-piece
attack was based on the idea of using this line as a “jumping-off”
position.
It had been intended that the two American Divisions, which were to
fight on this sector, should only be put in when this line had been
secured.
It was now decided that they must themselves make a final effort to
capture the outpost line before the main assault, which was due for
dawn on September 29.
Therefore, at dawn on the 27th, the 27th American Division, assisted
by twelve Tanks of the 4th Battalion, again attacked under cover of a
creeping barrage.
[93]“The attack met with strong opposition, and the final position
reached was the subject of conflicting reports from the troops
engaged and from the air observers. Subsequent events showed that
small parties of Americans and Tanks had reached the vicinity of
their objective, and had very gallantly maintained themselves
there; but the line as a whole was not materially advanced by the
day’s operations.... The barrage could not now be brought back on
this flank owing to the knowledge that parties of American troops,
as well as a number of American wounded, would be exposed to our
own fire. Also any alteration in the barrage plans, which had
already been issued, would inevitably lead to confusion.”
Either, therefore, the whole main attack must be delayed, or the
American divisions and some of the British troops north of them must
start some 1000 yards behind their barrage, and from a very indefinite
jumping-off line.
The latter course was decided upon.
[94]“The artillery start line, as originally planned, was to hold
good, and the troops of the 27th American Division would form up
for the attack on a line as far forward as possible, and would be
assisted by an additional number of Tanks. The strength in Tanks
was augmented to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the
enemy resistance west of the start line. It was thought that this,
with the slow rate of barrage, would enable the Americans to carry
out their task.”
But there was yet one more difficulty, a serious obstacle of which
we were serenely unaware. A British anti-Tank minefield, consisting
of rows of buried heavy trench-mortar bombs, each holding 50 lb. of
ammonal, had been put down just prior to our loss of the area in March
1918, and of this minefield no information had reached the Tanks.
It will thus be seen that the dice were very heavily loaded against
success on this part of the front before day dawned on the eventful
29th of September, 1918.
The whole attack was to be on a twelve-mile front. The infantry were to
take advantage of a number of foot-bridges, which our bombardment had
prevented the enemy from getting out to destroy, and in some places our
men were prepared to wade or swim through the water.
It was expected, however, that the chief resistance would be offered on
the famous three and a half miles.
Altogether about 175 Tanks, including the new American Battalion, were
to be launched, and four Corps were to be involved.
To the 9th Corps on the right, the 5th, 6th and 7th Tank Battalions of
the 3rd Brigade were allotted.
In the centre, with the Australian and American Corps, the 1st, 4th and
301st American Battalions of the 4th Brigade were to fight.[95]
The 8th, 13th and 16th Battalions of the 5th Tank Brigade were to be
held in 4th Army Reserve.
Almost up to zero hour on the 29th we still hoped to get news that we
held the Knoll and Quennemont. But no reassuring message came through.
It was thus in a very singular world that the 301th American Tank
Battalion was destined to make its debut.
[96]“The 301st’s reconnaissance before the battle was very
efficiently carried out in spite of many disadvantages. The taping
especially was a classic example of pluck and efficiency. It
must be borne in mind that this was no quiet front, and that the
attempts to take his outpost line had made the Boche exceedingly
nervous and alert. In consequence, the nights preceding the battle
were some of the dirtiest I’ve experienced. The Battalion R.O.
(I’ve forgotten his name), one Company R.O. (Lieutenant T. C.
Naedale) and a sergeant were knocked out whilst supervising the
taping. Lieutenant Naedale got his wounds dressed and continued
his work up till zero hour. It is worthy of mention, in connection
with this incident, that each American Tank had its own tape laid
out over our front line towards the Boche by the Company R.O.’s.
Tank Commanders told me afterwards that they had to start fighting
before the end of their tape was reached.”
II
When the dawn broke the usual mist lay thick and added its quota of
confusion to the uncertainties of the morning.
All along the line, the battle swayed confusedly, developing into what
was perhaps the most complete “mix-up” of any battle of the War.
To the north, the fighting was extremely heavy.
Owing to the employment of an effective barrage having been impossible,
the American 27th Division suffered severely from the fire of massed
hostile machine-guns from the moment the attack began.
Just as the Tanks of the 301st were moving up in support, ready to
deal with the machine-guns which were, as an eye-witness describes it,
by now “mowing down the other Americans in swathes,” no less than ten
machines struck upon the forgotten minefield.
The American Tanks experienced the bitterest of war’s accidents,
useless destruction at the hands of their own colleagues.
The explosions were terrific, the whole bottom of many machines being
torn out and a large proportion of the crews being killed.
A little further to the south our attack was progressing well.
Tanks of the 4th and 5th Battalions and their infantry had pushed
forward. The intricate trench system and the confusion of wire and
dug-outs, however, were responsible for a certain loss of cohesion,
so that by the time the village of Bellicourt had been reached the
attacking troops were some distance behind the barrage, and a good deal
of the weight had gone out of the assault.
But though several large parties of the enemy still held out, we had,
on this sector, actually penetrated the Hindenburg Line before noon.
But now the mist began to lift. The enemy still held Quennemont Farm
and the land to the north of it in great strength, and from that high
ground they were now beginning to be able to see well enough to pour a
devastating fire into the backs of the troops who were advancing in the
Bellicourt Sector. The situation was critical and called for immediate
action.
Major Hotblack, the Head of the Tank Corps Intelligence, who was
watching the progress of the battle near this point, luckily realised
the situation before the enemy and rushed to try to improvise a
diversion. He fortunately found two Tanks[97] which were waiting, ready
to take part in a later stage of the attack. With the permission of the
Battalion Commander, the two machines were hastily set going, and Major
Hotblack jumped into the leading Tank. The machines were driven rapidly
towards Quennemont Ridge. There was no body of infantry immediately
available, and with the weather in its present mood, there was no
time to wait; so the two Tanks without artillery or infantry support
attacked what afterwards proved to be an unbroken sector of the enemy’s
front.
But if confusion reigned in the British line, there is no doubt
that the Germans, though fighting exceedingly well, were far from
clear about the actual position. In the confusion, they appear to
have mistaken the two isolated machines for a considerable force.
The two Tanks successfully made their way on to the heretofore
impregnable Ridge, and actually succeeded in driving the enemy off
it, killing large numbers of the defenders and capturing a quantity
of machine-guns. Then at last the German field gunners awoke to the
situation, and being otherwise unharassed, opened a devastating fire
upon the two presumptuous machines. They succeeded in hitting and
setting fire to both of them, the crews being obliged to evacuate,
having suffered considerable casualties.
Major Hotblack, though partially blinded, was able to carry on, but
the only other officer was severely wounded, and a derisory little
force--one officer and five or six men, was thus left to hold the
Ridge. Quite undaunted, they immediately set to work to prepare for the
German counter-attack which, now that the Tanks were out of action and
ablaze, seemed imminent. There was an abundance of enemy machine-guns
lying about, and some of these were got ready for action, for the
Tanks’ own guns had been destroyed when the machines were knocked out.
While these guns were being turned round ready for their late owners,
the tiny garrison was joined, first by an Australian and then by an
American officer, each with an orderly, who had each separately come
out to try and find out the position of affairs. The situation was
rapidly explained to them, and was soon made clearer still by the
expected counter-attack from the Germans. Twice during the previous
week’s fighting, the enemy had regained this Ridge when it was held
in force. This time less than a dozen men successfully held it against
them, and although almost every one of the defenders was wounded, they
held out until relief came, several hours later.
For his part in this action Major Hotblack was awarded a bar to his
Military Cross. This was his last action in the war, as the wounds he
received on this occasion incapacitated him till the Armistice had been
signed.
It is rather interesting to note that this officer was wounded five
times during the course of the war--on four occasions in the head; but
so admirable is our hospital system that he is now practically none the
worse for his experiences.
On the extreme right of the battle the attack of the 9th Corps was a
complete success, the 46th Division particularly distinguishing itself
in the capture of Bellenglise.
[98]“Equipped with lifebelts, and carrying mats and rafts, the 46th
Division stormed the western arm of the Canal at Bellenglise and to
the north of it, some crossing the Canal on foot bridges, which the
enemy was given no time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer
sides of the Canal wall, and, having swum or waded to the far side,
climbing up the farther wall to the German trench lines on the
eastern bank.”
The Tanks were, of course, unable to cross with their infantry. They
moved on Bellicourt, crossed over the tunnel at the nearest point, and
swung south, working down the further bank of the Canal and arriving
just in time to take part in the attack on Monchy.
Our success here was so complete that one division alone captured 4000
prisoners and seventy guns.
Many of these batteries were taken from the rear by Tanks and infantry
while they were still in action, the enemy not realising in the least
that they had been outflanked.
III
At the end of the day it was pretty clear what must be the ultimate
result of the battle. But our front was extremely ragged and the
breaches we had driven in the Hindenburg Line but narrow.
So for some days our attacks continued on all fronts; from north of
Cambrai, where the 7th Battalion Tanks and the Canadians met with a
desperate resistance, right down to our junction with the French 1st
Army south of St. Quentin.
With the exception of a party of six machines belonging to the 1st
Brigade, who helped in an attack just north of Cambrai, all the Tank
actions of this period were fought in the 4th Army area, where we were
busied in driving in the wedge whose thin end we had inserted with so
much effort on September 29.
On the 30th, twenty Tanks belonging to the 5th, 6th, 13th and 7th
Battalions fought in different groups, none with striking success, in
one or two cases owing to the fact that the fresh infantry who had been
brought up were unaccustomed to Tanks, and that liaison was therefore
defective.
The village of Bony, which had just been entered by the Armoured Cars
on the 29th, still held out stubbornly.
On October 1, Tanks of the 9th Battalion were engaged with the 32nd
Division in an attack on a part of the line near Joncourt. In this
action the Tanks made very successful use of smoke screens.
On the 2nd no Tanks fought, but on October 3 about forty machines went
into action.
As on the previous days, we met with stubborn resistance, and as on the
previous days, foot by foot, inch by inch, we pushed our line forward,
always patiently enlarging the width of the holes we had pierced.
A new attack on a large scale was now contemplated, and for this
assault the Tank Corps had to furnish between eighty and ninety
machines, some on the 3rd, some on the 4th Army front. Preparations
were immediately begun, and no Tanks fought on the 4th.
Our line, however, had just reached the outskirts of two large
villages, Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and we were anxious not to begin
the day of our new attack with street fighting--of all forms of warfare
the most incalculable.
Therefore, the Australians and the 16th Tank Battalion attacked
Montbrehain, and after fighting a strenuous but brilliant little
action, captured it.
The last phase of the Cambrai-St. Quentin battle was at hand; nay more,
the last phase of the warfare we had known for nearly four years.
The next day we were to match our strength against that torn and
breached, but still formidable ruin, that had once been the Hindenburg
Line.
CHAPTER XXI
THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU--THE RUNNING FIGHT
I
“TANK CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, OCTOBER 8TH”
“An attack was launched this morning between Cambrai and St.
Quentin on a front of eighteen miles, which was entirely
successful--all objectives being gained--in spite of obstinate
machine-gun defence.
“Heavy Tanks and Whippets co-operated.
“The line now runs N. and E. of Niergnies--E. of Seranvillers
and La Targette--Esnes Mill--E. edge of Esnes--through Briseux
Wood--Walincourt--Audigny trench line to Walincourt Wood--W. of
Walincourt--N. and E. of Serain--E. of Prémont--E. of Brancourt--E.
of Beauregard.
“Depth of penetration varies, the maximum being 6000 yards.
“The French continued the attack on the southern portion of the
battle front and made progress in the vicinity of Fontaine Utetre
and Essigny le Petit.
“A large number of prisoners have been taken, but the actual
numbers are not yet known.
“The enemy made a heavy counter-attack from the direction of
Awoingt against our line between Niergnies and Seranvillers, and
the situation at Forenville is not quite clear.
“In this counter-attack the enemy used captured British Tanks.
Seven appeared in the sunken road N.E. of Niergnies without any
infantry support. Our infantry used enemy anti-Tank rifles, and
four or five enemy Tanks are reported to have been put out of
action.”
This was the form in which the news of what proved the last set
action of the war reached resting Tank Battalions, and the great Tank
organisation behind the lines.
The whole action had somehow seemed unusually dramatic. There was
now everywhere a sense of momentousness of events. We knew in our
hearts that the hour had come. Still, the enemy had so often revealed
unexpected strengths, we had so often been tricked into optimism,
and now we fought with a sort of surprised joy in thrusting home, of
feeling the German resistance really crumble under our blows.
Every time we struck we were feverishly impatient at our own weariness,
a weariness which delayed the next blow. We longed to be sure, to
strike again and again, no matter how, and so end the long nightmare.
All through that last month we hurried on, blind with fatigue, too
eager for the next battle to have been fought, too deeply concerned
with the culmination of the great drama, to care what had been the
details of our achievements in the last action.
It is difficult in attempting any chronicle of this period not to feel
again the impatience of the hour, or to achieve enough detachment to
describe the individual threads out of which the great pattern of
victory was woven.
II
To return to the attack of October 8.
Besides the very good action fought by Whippets of the 3rd and 6th
Battalions near Serain and Prémont, there were two particularly
interesting features in the attack: first, the action fought by the
301st American and 1st Tank Battalions; and, second, the German
counter-attack with Tanks which is mentioned in the Summary.
Nineteen Tanks of the 301st went into action opposite Serain, doing
great execution.
[99]“In one railway cutting near Brancourt, which was a mass
of machine-guns, I counted nearly fifty mangled Boches who had
been caught in enfilade with case shot as the Tanks crossed the
line. The infantry casualties were very low, and all agreed on
the masterly way the American Tank gunners had dealt with M.G.
opposition.
“The _pièce de résistance_ of the battle was the performance of
Major Sasse, D.S.O., for which he received his decoration.
“As on a former occasion, he went into action in the Wireless Tank.
After the capture of Brancourt he left his Tank this side of the
village and went forward to reconnoitre. He eventually ascended
the church tower in order to get a forward view of the battle.
While doing this a very heavy bombardment of the village commenced,
and Major Sasse noticed that the infantry had begun to retire.
He accordingly descended and tried to find the officer in charge
of the troops on the spot. Not being able to do this he assumed
command himself, stopped the retirement and organised the troops
as a defensive force round the outskirts of the village. Lewis
guns were posted and the men ordered to resist any attempt on the
part of the Boche to retake the village, should this be made. As
was expected, a determined counter-attack developed, which was
successfully beaten off by Major Sasse’s detachment. This occurred
a second time, and Major Sasse sent off a wireless message for
help. He was rescued some hours later from a somewhat precarious
position by American reinforcements.”
It was to Tanks of the 12th Battalion that the interesting lot fell of
meeting captured British Mark IV. Tanks in action.
Four Tanks belonging to “A” Company were in the neighbourhood of
Niergnies when the enemy launched a strong counter-attack. The
battlefield was thick with smoke and it was not yet fully light, and
when in the half-dark the Tank crews and infantry saw four Tanks
advancing to meet them, they supposed that the strangers belonged to
“C” Company, who had been sent to execute an encircling movement, and
who had, they imagined, somehow been able to outflank the enemy with
extraordinary speed. “L 16,” commanded by Captain Rowe, was near a
farm named Mont St. Meuve when the Tanks appeared in sight, and the
foremost was within fifty yards before Captain Rowe realised that it
was an enemy machine. He immediately fired a 6-pounder shot at it which
disabled it, but almost at the same time “L 16” was hit by two shells,
one of which came through the cab, wounding Captain Rowe and killing
his driver. The Tank Commander immediately got his crew out and crossed
over to “L 19,” which was near at hand, and led it forward towards the
German machines, of whose presence it was still unaware. “L 19” had
already had five men wounded, had been on fire, and having no gunners
left, could not use its 6-pounders. Its Commander, Second Lieutenant
Worsap, however, nothing daunted, immediately engaged the enemy with
his Lewis guns until the Tank received a direct hit which set it on
fire a second time. There was nothing now to be done but to evacuate
the machine, and as the German counter-attack seemed to be succeeding,
Mr. Worsap blew up the wreck of his Tank.
“L 12,” the third Tank, a male, was hit and finally disabled before its
Commander and crew had discovered that the strange Tanks did not belong
to “C” Company. There remained “L 8” under Lieutenant Martell, but this
Tank had a leaky radiator and was almost out of water. It, too, had
been hit, and three of its Lewis guns put out of action. Lieutenant
Martell, however, sent his crew back, and he and an artillery officer
managed to get up to a captured German field gun, which the two
turned round and used against the enemy’s Tanks, almost immediately
obtaining a direct hit on one of them. Two of the German machines
were now accounted for. And now at last a genuine “C” Company Tank--a
female--appeared and finally drove or scared away the two remaining
German machines. The situation was restored, and the infantry, who had
retired before the counter-attack, went forward again and reoccupied
the ridge beyond Niergnies. A comparison of the British and German
accounts of this action is not unentertaining.
_German Wireless News_
“During the heavy fighting south of Cambrai on October 8, German
... Tanks and a column of infantry advanced ... behind a wall of
artificial fog. The German Tanks, which were feeling their way
forward, surprised a large number of Englishmen who were standing
in disordered groups. By means of machine-gun fire and Tank
gunfire the English were driven back. The English troops on the
eastern outskirts of Niergnies took to flight and evacuated. On
the Cambrai-Crévecœur Road there were five English Tanks advancing
in support of their own infantry. As they came into sight of the
German Tanks the English Tanks stopped, and they were set on fire
by their own crews.”
By the end of the day we had advanced and widened our line along
the whole front of the attack, and the next day was devoted to
exploitation.
[Illustration: HIS MAJESTY THE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF AND GENERAL ELLES]
SPECIAL ORDER NO. 18.
By Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding TANK CORPS
in the Field.
18th October, 1918.
1. His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to become
COLONEL-IN-CHIEF of the Tank Corps on the 17th instant.
2. The following telegram was sent on behalf of the TANK CORPS:
“To H. M. the King,
“The news that your Majesty has graciously consented to
become Colonel-in-Chief of the Tank Corps has just been
received here. All ranks are deeply sensible of this signal
honour conferred upon the Corps and are determined to
continue worthy of it.
GENERAL ELLES.
“Advanced H. Q. Tank Corps.
In the Field. 17th October.”
3. The following reply has been received:
“To MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. ELLES.
H. Q. Tank Corps, In the Field.
“I sincerely thank you for the message which you have
conveyed to me in the name of all ranks of the Tank Corps.
“I am indeed proud to be Colonel-in-Chief of this great
British organization invented by us which has played so
prominent a part in our recent victories.
“I wish you all every possible good luck.
GEORGE R. I., Colonel-in-Chief.
Buckingham Palace.
LONDON, 18th October.”
(Signed) H. J. ELLES, Major-General.
Commanding Tank Corps in the Field.
The enemy was in full retreat and a rapid advance met with the feeblest
opposition. The contemporary record in the Tank Corps Intelligence
Summary remarks this feature.
[Illustration: MANUFACTURE]
“_October 9._
“A penetration of over six miles has been made towards Le Cateau,
and in the area gained, twenty-six villages have been occupied.
“Tanks again co-operated.
“Shortly after midnight our troops commenced the attack N. of
Cambrai, capturing Ramillies and securing a bridgehead over the
Escaut Canal at Pont D’Aire.
“The whole of Cambrai was occupied this morning....
“Air reports state that there is great confusion on roads N.E.
and S.E. of Le Cateau, and that our low-flying scouts have been
shooting at record targets....
“The number of prisoners taken in yesterday’s attack by the British
Armies amounted to 6300, and by the French in the St. Quentin area
1200. No detail yet received of captures to-day.”
The Battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin was at an end, and the Hindenburg
Line had now to all intents and purposes ceased to exist, broken as it
was on a front of nearly thirty miles.
Before the whole British forces in France, from north of Menin to
Bohain, seven miles north-west of Guise, open country stretched, uncut
by trench, unhung by wire. The time for exploitation had arrived.
Considering our comparative numerical weakness, the lateness of the
season and the nature of the country, to have fought their way so far
had been a notable performance. Now to carry out a rapid pursuit was
beyond even the endeavours of the infantry. For the German Army, though
beaten, was not yet broken.
[100]“A pursuit by cavalry was unthinkable, for the German
rearguards possessed many thousands of machine-guns, and as long
as these weapons existed, pursuit, as cavalry dream it to be, was
utterly impossible. One arm alone could have turned the present
defeat into a rout--the Tank, but few of these remained, for since
August 8 no less than 819 machines had been handed over to salvage
by the Tank Battalions, and these Battalions themselves had lost
in personnel 550 officers and 2557 other ranks, out of a fighting
state of some 9500.”
The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 15th Battalions--or what was left of
them--had all to be withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve on October 12.
III
THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE
As fast, however, as the weariness of our infantry and the fewness of
our Tanks allowed, we pursued the flying but still coherent German
Divisions.
Again and again the enemy tried to turn, to stand just so long behind
some natural defence as should enable him to organise his retreat. He
still had a hope that a shortened line might enable him to make a final
rally, if only, meantime, too headlong a flight had not reduced his
army to a mob, and if the advance of the Allies could be stemmed for a
little before the vital centre of Maubeuge.
Seven Tanks of the 5th Battalion had advanced with the French and the
9th Corps near Riquerval Wood; but the first action of this new type,
in which any considerable number of machines took part, was the Battle
of the Selle River, which began in the 4th Army area on October 17.
[101]“Our operations were opened on October 17 by an attack by the
4th Army on a front of about ten miles from Le Cateau southwards,
in conjunction with the French 1st Army operating west of the
Sambre and Oise Canal. The assault, launched at 5.20 a.m., was
delivered by the 9th, 2nd American and 13th Corps.... The enemy was
holding the difficult wooded country east of Bohain, and the line
of the Selle north of it, in great strength, his infantry being
well supported by artillery.”
The 4th was the Tank Brigade concerned.
The 1st Battalion was allotted to the 9th Corps on the right.
The 2nd American Corps in the centre fought as usual with the 301st
American Battalion.
On the left the 13th Corps had the 16th Battalion, while the 6th Tank
Battalion was in Army reserve.
The Germans had chosen their battle ground with great skill. They held
the right bank of the Selle, and the river itself, therefore, threaded
No-Man’s-Land. This particular choice of a defence was undoubtedly
dictated by a fear of Tanks. There had been heavy rain, and the river
was in flood.
[102]“Very little was known of the stream, except that it varied
every few yards in nature, breadth and depth; and the only way of
establishing safe crossing-places for the Tanks, was by personal
reconnaissance.
“This work was done successfully by the R.O.’s of the 1st and 301st
Battalions, which were fighting alongside each other.
“The reconnaissance necessary on the front of the 301st promised
to be extremely dangerous and the success rather doubtful, owing
to the presence of several unlocated Boche posts on our side of
the stream. It was a question of slipping through these unobserved,
gaining the necessary information, and coming back again through
their lines.
“Lieutenant T. C. Naedale, Battalion R.O., undertook to do this
in the company of an infantry guide from the sector. This officer
walked down the stream 500 yards, literally under the noses of
the Boche posts, and returned to our lines with the requisite
intelligence. He was thus able to pick safe crossings for all his
Tanks.”
At 5.30 a.m. on October 17, the fog was so thick that Tanks had to move
forward on compass bearings. The infantry could see nothing, and had,
in many cases, to rely almost entirely on the Tanks as guides. Every
Tank of the forty-eight carried a crib, and with their help, north of
St. Souplet and of Molain, both Tank Battalions crossed the river in
safety at the previously selected fords.
The Germans had clearly relied almost entirely upon the flooded river
for their defence, and it was only here and there that we met with any
opposition. Isolated posts would, however, occasionally hold out with
great vigour, and what with the fog and the irregular speed of our
advance, the whole battle was an exceedingly confused one. The enemy
was well supplied with artillery, and wherever the fog permitted made
good use of it.
At about 10 a.m. the infantry, who were badly held up by machine-guns
near Demilieue, summoned Whippets of the 6th Battalion to their help.
A number of machines immediately hurried up, but even then, so heavy
was the machine-gun fire, that it was only with great difficulty that
the infantry could advance even under cover of the Whippets. Just as
they were approaching the village, three Whippets were knocked out
in rapid succession by a single field gun. Deprived of the cover of
these machines, the infantry had to retire again. It was not till
considerably later that the village was taken.
On the 18th and 19th the infantry managed to make good progress, and
at 2 p.m. on the 20th we made another attack, still on the line of the
Selle, north of Le Cateau.
Only four Tanks of the 11th Battalion were employed. The enemy’s
resistance was serious, for he had been able to erect strong wire
entanglements along the greater part of the line. This time, there
being no available fords, the Tanks successfully crossed the river by
means of an under-water sleeper bridge, which the Sappers had secretly
constructed at night, the enemy being quite unaware of its existence,
until, to their dismay, they saw the Tanks crossing over it.
There was severe fighting round Neuvilly, Solesmes and Haspres, but we
gained all our objectives on the high ground east of the Selle, all the
four Tanks successfully reaching their final goal.
Our capture of these positions on the river Selle was immediately
followed up by a larger bid, this time for the general line running
from the Sambre Canal along the edge of Mormal Forest to the
neighbourhood of Valenciennes. We were to make a night attack on a
fifteen-mile line in the 4th Army area, the 9th, 5th and 13th Corps
being supported by thirty-seven Tanks from the 10th, 11th, 12th and
301st (American) Battalions.
Zero hour was 1.30 a.m. Unfortunately the hoped-for moonlight was
shrouded, and the night misty and dark. To add to our difficulties,
the enemy was shelling freely with gas. Gas-masks had to be worn, and
through them it was impossible to see anything. Consequently we did
not make much progress until dawn. But directly it was light we went
ahead, the Tanks had fine shooting at “ground game,” and a great amount
of case shot was fired, and both Tanks and infantry ultimately won
through to their objectives.
Next day the 17th Corps took up the attack in the 1st Army area, so
extending our line of assault a further five miles north to the Schele.
No Tanks, however, operated at this stage of the 1st Army’s offensive,
but six machines belonging to the 10th Battalion attacked near
Robewsart. One of these Tanks managed to explode a German ammunition
dump with a lucky shot from one of its 6-pounders. This threw the enemy
into great confusion, whilst the explosion of his own shells helped us
considerably with the killing.
IV
We had now reached another--the last--stage of the battle. The nature
of the terrain had begun to change, for we were travelling at last.
[103]“Despite the unfavourable weather and the determined
opposition at many points from the German machine-gunners, in two
days our infantry and Tanks had realised an advance of five or six
miles over difficult country.”
We had now reached the half wooded, half pasture and orchard country
which lay on the outskirts of the Forest of Mormal, “like fringe upon a
petticoat,” and the last of our battles had been fought amid the trees
of the Bois L’Evêque and of Pommereuil.
We were within a mile of Le Quesnoy, which lay in a clearing in the
Forest.
There was no chance of giving our machines an overhaul. It was
therefore in a state of mechanical “efficiency,” which a little while
before we should have said made any sort of fighting out of the
question, that most of the remaining Tanks gaily tackled this difficult
piece of the advance.
CHAPTER XXII
THE ROUT--MORMAL FOREST--THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE--THE ARMISTICE
I
“Some greater issue was at stake, some mightier cause, than ever
before the sword had pleaded or the trumpet had proclaimed.”
DE QUINCEY.
On November 4, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies were to deliver an attack
on a combined front of about thirty miles, from the Sambre to the
north of Oisy and Valenciennes. The country across which our advance
was to be made was exceedingly difficult: in the south, the river
Sambre had to be crossed almost at the outset. In the centre the great
Forest of Mormal, though here and there thinned by German foresters,
still presented a formidable obstacle. In the north lay the strongly
fortified town of Le Quesnoy, which was defended naturally by several
streams which ran parallel to the line of our advance, offering the
enemy repeated opportunities for a successful defence.
On November 2, we fought a small action west of Landrecies. We were
anxious to improve our position near Happegarbes before the big attack
on the 4th.
Only three Tanks of the 10th Battalion took part.
Unfortunately, although we took all our objectives, the Germans
suddenly plucked up heart, launched a surprise attack, and we lost them
again before nightfall.
The Battle of Mormal Forest was the last set Tank attack of the War,
and for it we could only scrape together just thirty-seven machines.
Tank units were bled almost white. Sections took the place of
companies, companies of battalions, and Tanks were parcelled out in
such a way that the very most might be made of their scanty numbers.
At dawn, after an intense bombardment, Tanks and infantry moved forward
to the assault under a heavy barrage, and it was not long before they
had penetrated the enemy’s positions on the whole battle front.
On the right of the attack, zero was at 5.45. The 9th Corps, which, it
will be remembered, was supported by four sections of the 10th Tank
Battalion, pushed forward and captured Catillon, where the Tanks fought
a particularly good action. The infantry were able to cross the Sambre
at this place, capturing a lock some two miles to the south of it. By
two hours after zero two battalions of infantry were east of the river.
The Tanks with the 13th Corps were also extremely successful,
especially in the neighbourhood of Hecq, Preux and the north-western
edge of the Forest of Mormal.
An account of the fighting on this central part of the line is given in
the Tank Corps Intelligence Summary.
“The early morning was fine and clear, but a dense mist came up
with the dawn and persisted until about 8.30. In addition, the
country S.W. of Mormal Forest is peculiarly enclosed with thick
orchards, quick-set fences and hedgerow trees, confining visibility
to no more than fifty yards or so, under the best conditions.
The infantry largely depended on the Tanks to give them their
direction, and many of the latter had to steer exclusively by
compass. By this means they were able to keep approximately
to their allotted routes, and were of considerable help to the
infantry in breaking through the dense hedges (some wired) and in
dealing with machine-guns. In places the enemy barrage came down
heavily with a high proportion of gas, whilst elsewhere it was
inconsiderable. Resistance also was unusually ‘patchy,’ some few
M.G. posts holding out well, whilst many others, though well sited
and camouflaged, were found not to have fired a round. A show of
resistance was put up at Landrecies bridge by some 300 German
infantry and machine-gunners, but they gave in when outflanked by
the crossing of the canal on rafts further to the south. The enemy
had lined some of the hedges with deep and very well camouflaged
rifle-pits, which here and there were held in strength. The main
body of the enemy, however, appears to have been withdrawn a
kilometre or so in rear of his forward positions just prior to our
attack. French inhabitants of the most forward villages state that
he started withdrawing at five o’clock this morning. In a number
of instances the enemy was found hiding, unarmed, awaiting an
opportunity to surrender. In one village over fifty Germans emerged
from the house cellars where they had been hiding together with the
inhabitants. Other Germans attempted to hide themselves in trees
and were dealt with with case shot. A number of anti-Tank rifles
were found in rifle-pits, etc., but appear to have been made little
or no use of. There were instances of detached field guns being
sited to enfilade hedges and cover crests, but so far no reports
have come in as to their effect--if any. One Brigade operating
with Tanks is reported to have had over 350 prisoners through its
cage before 11 a.m., including a Regimental Commander and part of
his Staff, whilst one Division reported over 1000 prisoners by
12.30. A German pigeon loft (complete with birds) was captured
in Landrecies. Air visibility was nil until after 9 a.m., and
communication therefore difficult.
“_Later._--Prisoners now reported 10,000 with 200 guns.”
It was at Landrecies that three supply Tanks managed, despite their
almost complete lack of arms or armour, to take a most gallant and
effective part in the battle.
These three Tanks were working for the 25th Division, and were carrying
up material to rebuild one of the numerous bridges that the Germans
had destroyed; as they drew near their rendezvous they found that the
enemy was still holding the place in some strength, and had succeeded
in stopping the advance of our infantry. As the Tanks approached they
began to draw fire and their situation became precarious. With great
pluck and resource the Tanks decided to go on, and rely on their
appearance (which was similar to that of the fighting Tanks) to drive
the enemy from his position. One Tank became a casualty, but the other
two went straight for the enemy. Even when the Tanks got close up, the
Germans were still under the impression that they were being faced
by fighters, and part of the garrison put up their hands, whilst the
remainder fled.
With the 5th Corps, the 1st Company of the 9th Battalion encountered
stiff resistance, but nevertheless they pushed forward far into the
Forest of Mormal.
The Tanks were particularly active in the attack on Jolimetz, just
south of Le Quesnoy, when they and the 37th Division took upwards
of 1000 prisoners, and later in the afternoon and evening pushed on
into the heart of the Forest. North of them the New Zealanders had
surrounded Le Quesnoy by 8 a.m. Here also Tanks were operating.
By the end of the day we had made a five-mile advance, reaching the
general line Fesny-Landrecies--centre of Mormal Forest--and five miles
beyond Valenciennes.
[104]“In these operations and their developments twenty British
Divisions utterly defeated thirty-two German Divisions, and
captured 19,000 prisoners and more than 450 guns. On our right the
French 1st Army, which had continued the line of attack southwards
to the neighbourhood of Guise, kept pace with our advance, taking
5000 prisoners and a number of guns.
“By this great victory the enemy’s resistance was definitely
broken. On the night of November 4–5 his troops began to fall back
on practically the whole battle front.”
II
But the Tank Corps was at last at an end of its resources both in
machines and in men.
Pending reinforcements from England, they could at the moment muster
but eight machines that could be sent after the flying enemy, and
therefore, though the Armoured Cars went on, it was on November 5 that
the last Tank action of the War was fought, when eight Whippets of the
6th Battalion took part in an attack of the 3rd Guards Brigade, on the
northern outskirts of the Forest of Mormal.
The weather was atrocious and the country most difficult for a combined
operation, for it was intersected by numerous ditches and fences, which
rendered it ideal for the rearguard actions which the Germans were now
fighting all along their front.
[105]“At 10 a.m. on the morning of November 5 the 3rd Guards
Brigade, having pushed through the 1st and 2nd Brigades, were
ordered to continue the advance by bounds.”
[Illustration: THE WESTERN EDGE OF MORMAL FOREST]
[Illustration: A “WIRELESS” TANK]
No definite orders had reached the Whippets’ Company Commander as to
what part--if any--his machines were to play.
He and the General commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade, however, came to
the conclusion that in view of the nature of the ground and the fact
that the Bultiaux River would have to be crossed in the first stage of
the battle, the Whippets should lead the attack upon the second, third
and final objectives only.
Two Tanks proved unfit for action, owing to mechanical trouble.
The three Tanks which covered the advance of the Grenadiers found
themselves in a country of small orchards divided by extremely high
hedges, where it was most difficult to locate the enemy machine-guns
whose fire was here considerable.
The Whippets therefore worked up and down the hedges like ratting
terriers, being ordered to[106]“fire short bursts along them for moral
effect even when no enemy were visible.” This they did, and found a few
fleeting targets before returning to get in touch with the infantry.
Two Whippets which were co-operating with the Scots Guards met with a
good deal of opposition. Twice had they and the infantry attempted to
capture and consolidate high ground beyond the village of Buvignies.
The driver of the first Tank was hit as he was endeavouring to put
right a minor mechanical trouble, and the second Tank went on alone.
In attempting to run over an enemy rifle-pit, it ran on to a jagged
tree stump and was damaged, finally breaking down in the enemy’s lines
beyond Buvignies. [107] From accounts of civilians, who were behind
the enemy’s lines, it appears that the crew held out till midnight,
the Tank being then blown up.
“They also reported that after the Tanks had been through Buvignies
the enemy hurriedly departed, and also vacated the railway, which
had been holding up the Grenadiers.”
The 3rd Guards Brigade pushed forward unopposed for a mile and a half
during the night, but when darkness came the four remaining Whippets
were ordered to rally.
“It was decided not to use these four on the following day, and
work was concentrated on getting fit the six Whippets which might
be made available to trek or fight.”
For, though that through all this period we knew well enough that the
end had come, in these last few days of the War we acquired a new
tradition. It became the magnificent custom of the British Army to act
as though the War would go on for ever.
The spirit that says, “I’ve been lucky so far. Why tempt Providence
with the War won, anyway?” must have reared its head in every man.
But it was rigorously kept down, and never among the attacking troops
in these last tense days was there found any inclination to spare
themselves or to spoil our victory by undue chariness of life and limb.
Not only in the racking circumstances of the battlefield, but also
behind the lines, this new tradition was manifest, and after the 5th
the Tank crews were everywhere feverishly engaged, day and night, in
refitting and furbishing up their machines on the complete assumption
that they would surely be called upon to fight again. Everywhere, too,
the Staffs were busy endeavouring to build up an organised fighting
force from the scarred, battle-weary remnants of the Corps.
The Tank Corps’ record since August 8 was indeed a remarkable one.
There had been ninety-six days of almost continuous battle since that
great Tank attack, and in these ninety-six days about two thousand
Tanks and Armoured Cars had been engaged.
Nearly half this number of machines had been handed over to salvage. Of
these, 313 had been sufficiently badly damaged to be sent to Central
Workshops, who had repaired no less than 204 of them and reissued them
to battalions. Of the whole 887, only fifteen machines had been struck
off the strength as beyond repair.
The personnel, too, had been lamentably reduced. However, the total
strength of the Tank Corps on August 7, 1918, had been considerably
under that of a single infantry division, and in the old days of
the artillery battles, such as the First Battle of the Somme, an
infantry division often sustained 4000 casualties in twelve hours. In
comparison, the Tanks’ losses of just 3000 in three months, out of a
fighting strength of under 10,000, seem comparatively light. They were
heavy enough, however, effectually to cripple the Corps for several
weeks.
III
Meanwhile the last act of the great drama was being played out.
Though there were for the moment no Tanks to share in the culminating
glories, our forces were pushing forward along the whole front. On
November 6 and 7 the enemy’s resistance had very much weakened. Early
on the morning of the 7th the Guards entered Bavay; next day Avesnes
fell. Six cars of the Tank 17th Armoured Car Battalion here did
excellent service in conjunction with “Bethell’s Force,” the cars,
“full out,” putting roadside machine-guns out of action and in many
cases preventing the flying enemy from blowing up the crossroads behind
his rearguards. Hautmont was captured, and our troops reached the
outskirts of Maubeuge, the goal upon which our eyes had for so long
been fixed. To the north of Mons the enemy was now rapidly withdrawing.
All through the night of November 7–8 we could see the glare of burning
dumps behind the German lines, and could hear the irregular clamour
of their detonations. At Tournai the enemy abandoned his bridgehead
without a fight.
On the 9th the enemy was in full retreat on the whole front; the Guards
entered Maubeuge at the moment when the Canadians were approaching
Mons. The whole of our 2nd Army crossed the Schelde, and next day all
five British Armies advanced in line, preceded by cavalry, cyclists and
Armoured Cars.
Only round Mons was any opposition met with, and at dawn on November
11 the Third Canadian Division captured the town, killing or taking
prisoner the whole of the German garrison.
It was the last of the tasks of slaughter to which our hands were to be
forced.
For four days there had been a coming and going of envoys and of
messages. For four days men and women in England had listened and
waited, restless and sick with expectancy, with a sudden realisation of
their longing to emerge from the long nightmare.
On November 11, just after eleven in the morning, the church bells
were rung in every town and village at home; and in France the expected
message was quietly passed from mouth to mouth. There is no need to
describe a moment which no reader of this book will ever forget.
EPILOGUE
I
And what, the reader will ask, is the conclusion of the whole matter?
First, how far did Tanks really contribute to our overthrow of the
Germans?
Secondly, what would be the place of the Tank if another war broke out
within the next generation; and, thirdly, what place are Tanks going to
be given in the reconstituted British Army?
As far as they can be answered, we will reply to these questions in
order. For upon the performances of the Tanks in this war, will be--or
should be--based the answers to the other questions, and on this point
we propose to call the evidence of three or four expert witnesses.
For the rest, the reader has had an opportunity of studying a large
mass of evidence for himself.
He has seen how, when the line from Switzerland to the sea had been
formed, both armies sought some means of putting an end to the
stalemate.
How to both the Allies and the Germans the solution by artillery was
the first to occur. How, secondly, we and the Germans each according
to our national habits of mind, thought of another solution. The
Germans--who were chemists--of gas, used treacherously in despite of
signed undertakings to the contrary; we, who were mechanics, of a
self-propelled shield, from behind which we could direct an effective
fire.
He knows how gas was countered, after the first surprise, by
means of various air-filtering devices; but how the Tank gradually
revolutionised warfare, because there was no particular specific or
antidote to the Tank, which depended not so much upon surprise as
on the simple factors of its enormous fire power, and its ability
to surmount obstacles. For whether the troops attacked had fought
against Tanks before or no, the Tank crushed down wire and smothered
machine-gun fire just the same.
Marshal Foch is the first of our witnesses.
He sketches the evolution of the Tank, and describes the circumstances
which called it into being, in his foreword to the English translation
of his republished _Principles of War_. He has dealt with the old
slowness of “digging in.”
We translate his words literally:
“The machine-gun and the barbed-wire entanglement have permitted
defences to be organised with indisputable rapidity. These
have endowed the trench, or natural obstacle, with a strength
which has permitted offensive fronts to be extended over areas
quite impracticable until this time.... The offensive for the
time was powerless, new weapons were sought for, and, after a
formidable artillery had been produced Tanks were invented--_i.e._
machine-guns or guns protected by armour, and rendered mobile by
petrol, capable, over all types of ground, to master the enemy’s
entanglements and his machine-guns....
“Thus it is the industrial power of nations that has alone
permitted armies to attack, or the want of this power has reduced
them to the defensive.”
Monsieur Loucheur--in January 1919 French Minister of Munitions--was a
strong advocate for Tanks in the French Army.
“There are two kinds of infantry: men who have gone into action
with Tanks, and men who have not; and the former never want to go
into action without Tanks again.”
Sir Douglas Haig’s summing up in his Despatch, though necessarily
conservative, is not therefore the less significant:
“Since the opening of our offensive on _August 8_ Tanks have been
employed in every battle, and the importance of the part played
by them in breaking the resistance of the German infantry can
scarcely be exaggerated. The whole scheme of the attack of _August
8_ was dependent upon Tanks, and ever since that date on numberless
occasions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted
or confirmed by their timely arrival. So great has been the effect
produced upon the German infantry by the appearance of British
Tanks that in more than one instance, when for various reasons real
Tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, valuable results
have been obtained by the use of dummy Tanks painted on frames of
wood and canvas.
“It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry or of the
skill and devotion of our artillery, to say that the achievements
of those essential arms would have fallen short of the full measure
of success achieved by our armies had it not been for the very
gallant and devoted work of the Tank Corps, under the command of
Major-General H. J. Elles.”
Lastly, what is the opinion of the enemy?
Herr Maximilian Harden in a speech upon the causes of the German
defeat, gave first place to the “physical shock of the Tank,” at which
“Ludendorff had laughed.”
Speaking for the Minister of War in the Reichstag, General Wrisberg
said:
“The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre was not
unexpected by our leaders. When, nevertheless, the English
succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought
in the massed employment of Tanks and surprise under the protection
of fog....
“The American Armies should not terrify us.... More momentous for
us is the question of Tanks.”
The G.O.C. of the 51st German Corps, in an Order dated July 23, 1918,
remarks: “As soon as the Tanks are destroyed the whole attack fails.”
On October 23 the German Wireless published the following statement by
General Scheuch, Minister of War:
“Germany will never need to make peace owing to a shortage of war
material.
“The superiority of the enemy at present is principally due to
their use of Tanks.
“We have been actively engaged for a long period in working at
producing this weapon (which is recognised as important), in
adequate numbers.
“We shall thus have an additional means for the successful
continuance of the war, if we are compelled to continue it.”
The following passage occurred in a German Order issued on August 12,
1918:
“It has been found that the enemy’s attacks have been successful
solely because the Tanks surprised our infantry, broke through our
ranks, and the infantry thought itself outflanked.”
The German Press was also very generally inclined to attribute the
German failure to the Allied use of Tanks, and their attitude is well
illustrated by the following paragraph which appeared early in October,
a time when German journalists seem to have been most carefully
instructed from official quarters. It was their task to prepare the
German people for surrender.
“The successes which the Allies have gained since the First Battle
of Cambrai do not rest on any superior strategy on the part
of Foch or on superiority in numbers, although the latter has
undoubtedly contributed to it. The real reason has been the massed
use of Tanks. Whereas the artillery can only cut wire and blot
out trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition, the Tank
takes all these obstacles with the greatest of ease, and will make
broad paths in which the advancing infantry can follow. They are
the most dangerous foe to hostile machine-guns. They can approach
machine-gun nests and destroy them at close range. The great
danger of the Tank is obvious when one considers that the defence
of the front battle zone chiefly relies on the defensive value
of the machine-guns, and that the armour of the Tank renders it
invulnerable to rifle fire, and that only seldom and in exceptional
cases is machine-gun fire effective. The infantry is therefore
opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no harm.”
II
The question of the place of Tanks in the next war has been answered
with the greatest emphasis by some enthusiastic advocates of this arm.
The possession of a superior weapon, they say, ensures victory to the
army which possesses it. In war, any army, even if led by a mediocre
General, can safely meet an army of the previous century, though the
old force be led by the greatest military genius of his age.
[108]“Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than Lord Raglan,
yet Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have beaten any army Napoleon could
have brought against him, because Lord Raglan’s men were armed with
the Minie rifle.
“Eleven years after Inkerman Moltke would have beaten Lord Raglan’s
army hollow, not because he was a greater soldier than Lord Raglan,
but because his men were armed with the needle gun.
“Had Napoleon, at Waterloo, possessed a company of Vickers
machine-guns, he would have beaten Wellington, Blücher, and
Schwartzenburg combined, as completely as Lord Kitchener beat the
Soudanese at Omdurman. It would have been another ‘massacre of the
innocents.’”
In every case, they say, the superior weapon would have defeated the
great tactician before he had had time to show his mettle. To repeat
the words of the German journalist: “Their infantry would be opposed to
an enemy to whom it could do little or no harm.”
We shall not discuss here the materialistic argument, except to say
that if it were entirely true, savages and badly-equipped Tribesmen
would never have completely beaten well-armed civilised troops. Yet
they have done so on frequent occasions. Witness the First Afghan War,
the Zulu Wars, the American-Indian Wars, and a host of minor actions.
Material only wins hands down when the _moral_ of the side possessing
it is at least fairly comparable to that of its opponents. Otherwise
Byzantium with its “Greek Fire” would have ruled the world.
According to this “material” school of thought, we have in Tanks our
superior weapon. They will be developed upon more than one line, and we
shall have cross-country equivalents for all arms and services except
heavy artillery, the Navy and the Air Force.
Mr. Hugh Pollard, writing in the _English Review_ of January 1919
states the case of the mechanical warfare and Tank enthusiasts, with
great vigour and ingenuity.
“Even at present there is no effective answer to Tanks but
possibly other Tanks, and in the Tank we have rediscovered a
modern application of a very old principle. The Tank is the most
economical method of using man-power in war, and it also affords
the highest possible percentage of invulnerability to the soldiers
engaged.
“The armament problems of the future will be limited to three
fleets of armoured machines, in which a very limited highly
specialised number of men operate the largest possible number of
weapons in the most effective way. Armoured fleets at sea, armoured
aeroplanes, and armoured landships, or Tanks--these will be our
forces for war.”
Tanks of various speeds and carrying various weapons, will replace
both infantry and cavalry, for one full size modern heavy Tank holding
eight men has the aggressive power of a hundred infantry with rifles,
bayonets, bombs and Lewis guns. The Whippet has about the same speed
and radius as cavalry, and one Whippet holding two men “could withstand
the onslaught of a cavalry regiment and kill it off to the last man
and the last horse without being exposed to the least danger or
inconvenience.” We shall soon regard the heroic tale of how men once
exposed their defenceless bodies to machine-gun fire and shells, and
depended for the élan of their assault upon the weight of human limbs
and the endurance of human muscles as almost legendary.
“Most people think of a Tank as a rather ludicrous but effective
engine of war. They look upon it as a mechanical novelty, and
are content to assume that the Tank of to-day is not much of an
improvement upon the earliest Tanks of the Somme battle, and that
it is a war implement of indifferent importance. The real facts are
entirely different, for the Tank of to-day is simply an infant, a
lusty two-year-old, and there is no mechanical limit to its future.
This may seem the remark of a fanatic, but it is perfectly true....
“The Tank of to-day is a little thing compared with the obvious
developments which will result in the Tank of the future, but even
as it stands to-day it is the most economical fighting machine yet
devised. A Tank uses petrol instead of muscle, and it extracts the
highest possible fighting or killing value out of the men inside
it; they can give their blows without being exposed to injury in
return, and, above all things, they can fight while moving--a thing
outside the powers of the infantry or guns of the land forces.”
The arguments of those who maintain that the Tank must always be
dependent upon the older arms are nearly all based upon the assumption
that the Tank is already limited. “It is pointed out that they cannot
cross rivers, that they are not proof against shell-fire, against
mines, against special forms of attack. The answer is that the Tank of
to-day may be subject to casualties, but all the skill and resources
of the German nation have failed to produce an effective answer to
Tanks, that river after river has been crossed, that line after line
of ‘impregnable’ defences have fallen, that deeply écheloned artillery
particularly arranged to fight Tanks has failed before Tank and
aeroplane attack. We come to a war of sea, air, and land fleets acting
in co-operation. Anti-Tank artillery is vulnerable to armoured planes.
The big commercial freight-carrying planes of the future might even fly
light Tanks into the heart of hostile territory. The unprotected men
and arms of the present day must disappear.”
And here another question is suggested--a question upon which the
civilian ought to satisfy himself. Let us for the moment assume that it
is superiority in weapons, not better generalship, not a more stubborn
“will to win,” that decides the fate of war.
What reason have we to suppose that it will be superiority in Tanks and
not in some other weapon, in aeroplanes for example, that will decide
the next conflict?
At present, when we try to imagine war upon a foreign army waged on one
side by air alone, we encounter a dozen mechanical difficulties even in
our attempted picture of the first stages: the enormous paraphernalia
of bases, the ground-staff, fuel, weather conditions, difficulties of
landing, and finally, what is perhaps the fundamental difficulty.
The aeroplane alone, like the big gun, is not an engine by whose means
it is possible to come into decisive contact with an enemy who chooses
to remain on the ground. The rabbits can always go to earth when they
see the gliding shadow of the hawk.
Till both sides are equipped solely for air combat, Tanks or infantry
will still be needed to play the part of ferret.
But these difficulties will almost certainly some day be overcome.
When they have been solved, then the day of the comparatively
cumbersome Tank, with its dependence upon shipping and rail transport
will be over. But that will not be in our time we are assured. To us,
therefore, “War in the Air” remains of a somewhat academic interest.
We have got to see to it that we survive the present.
For can the most optimistic of us truthfully declare, as he casts his
eye over the world, as he looks from Middle Europe to the Far East,
from Russia to Mexico, from the Balkans to Egypt, or from Asia Minor to
the confines of India, that we need not even consider the possibility
of a war within his own generation? Alas, no!
Now having for the moment dismissed the purely air war from our
calculations, we can be pretty certain that a war between civilised
countries fought within that period would not differ utterly from the
war which is just over, and that a war between a civilised and an
uncivilised country would differ from it only along well-known lines.
We have heard a good deal of evidence which makes it appear certain
that, every other factor having cancelled out, the fact that the French
and British possessed Tanks and the Germans did not, was just enough
to win the last war for the Allies. Let us then sedulously cultivate
the grub of the present that we may survive to see the more glorious
butterfly of the future--perhaps the aerial Tank. Shall we neglect the
Tank because it seems likely that in this (as please Heaven in most
other affairs) our sons will go one better?
The British and French led, and in 1919 still lead, absolutely with
Tanks.
If we like to carry on, we have such a start both in design and
manufacturing experience, that we could easily make it impossible for
any other nation to draw abreast of us during the period after which we
are assuming the “Tank Age” in military evolution may conceivably be
over.
It is, of course, impossible to be too discreet as to the new machines
which have already been made and tested, or as to the new projects
which exist.
Perhaps the position can be best indicated by saying that progress has
been so rapid of late that those who know, would probably be delighted
to sell any number of Mark V. Tanks to a prospective enemy.
III
The present writers are ignorant whether we have determined to keep
our lead or no. Shall we have the foresight, when it comes to the
remodelling of the Army, to give to Tanks the place they ought to hold
in it? Shall we be willing to spend money on experiments, money which
we must spend if we want to keep that lead? Will the Tanks be given
the facilities for both mechanical and tactical training that they
ought to have? We may so easily slide back into our old groove. It is
always hard to turn to new ways, and to give a preponderating place in
the “New Model” to Tanks, would certainly be to effect a very radical
change. There does seem to be a certain fear that the Army and the
public may feel that the Tanks are all right for War, but hardly the
thing for soldiering.
And yet how well the requirements of a strong force of Tanks would in
reality fit the kind of framework which the wisest minds seem agreed
should be our Army of the future. We ought to have, they say, a small
and highly specialised Standing Army, and behind that a vast Citizen
Army on the basis of the Territorial system. What weapon could be
more suitably added to the gun and the aeroplane than the Tank in the
Regular Army? Our Standing Army would thus consist of a nucleus of
mechanical experts.
Nor need the question of finance ever rise spectre-like between us and
the idea of a strong force of Tanks, for the Tank is an absurdly cheap
weapon compared with its co-efficient of infantry.
But there is another direction in which, if it claim any considerable
place in our Standing Army, the Tank must make good. That army may at
any moment be called upon to undertake police work in any part of the
world.
The Tank, even the old Mark I., is, as we saw at Gaza, suitable for
desert warfare. The Mark V. and Whippets with General Denikin’s force
in Russia have been prodigiously successful, and there are probably few
species of campaign against a semi-civilised enemy in which the newer
“Medium” Tanks would not do admirably.
Another point is that “minor wars” are fought by us with as much
avoidance of bloodshed as is compatible with the bringing of our
opponents to reason.
A weapon which admittedly affected the _moral_ even of admirably
disciplined troops like the Germans to a phenomenal degree, is
particularly well adapted to this purpose.
It is infinitely more humane to appal a rioter or a savage by showing
him a Tank than to shoot him down with an inoffensive looking
machine-gun.[109]
There is yet one final consideration.
The reader may still very properly object: “Though the Tank may, as
it rather begins to appear, have been the decisive factor in the last
War, and though it might be very convenient to use it again, before
we put our money on it, literally and metaphorically, for the future,
are we sure that it is a weapon which suits the British soldier? Time
was when at the direction of Military Experts we spent a great deal of
money upon the building of forts at home and abroad which were never of
the slightest use to any one, because they did not suit our style of
fighting. What reason have we to suppose that we shall like the Tank as
a permanent addition on a large scale to the equipment of our Army?”
The present authors consider this line of criticism a very proper one.
They differ from the “hardshell” advocates of the superior weapon in
considering it of the greatest importance that the balance and poise
of the broadsword should suit the hand that is to wield it. But they
believe that the Tank, like the ship and the aeroplane, is a weapon
peculiarly suited to the British temperament, and that fundamentally it
was for that reason that we, and not some other nation, first evolved
it. For good or ill, our Commanders both on land and sea have certain
peculiarities. Our men dislike standing on the defensive. They hate
digging, and in the present War were beaten by the Germans every time
at this particularly unpopular form of activity. Also, almost worse
than digging, do they hate carrying things on their backs, and we are
noted among all nations as the least tolerant of burdens. All these
peculiarities have filled the ranks of the Navy and of the Cavalry,
and all these peculiarities are suited by the aeroplanes and the Land
Ships. Our Commanders, like their men, prefer to be the attackers, and
like a war of movement. Almost the whole creed of Nelson, our most
popular fighting-hero, was expressed in his assertion that the first
and last duty of an Admiral was to find out the enemy’s fleet and to
attack it, and in his famous signal, “Engage the enemy more closely.”
Further, our leaders particularly and temperamentally dislike a large
butcher’s bill. It was, indeed, their extreme reluctance to send
unprotected men to meet the hail of bullets from German machine-guns,
that lay behind most of the ostensible reasons for which the Tanks were
first given a trial. It was a deciding factor. We may even perhaps say
without seeming fantastic that it was their inhumanity which cost the
Germans the War. They had no bowels of compassion, and were just as
ready to send the “infantry equivalent” (say seventy unprotected men)
over the top as they were to put in seven men enclosed in armour. To
them it was the coldest question of military expediency. Purely upon
military considerations they decided against the seven clad in armour.
Our Commanders, though in theory they were inclined to agree with the
German Higher Command, though they recognised the ultimate cruelty of
the policy of “cheap war,” and knew, with Nelson, that they had not
come to the Western Front to preserve their lives, were yet tempted by
the idea of using steel and petrol in place of flesh and blood. More
than once in the course of the chequered career of the Tanks it was
this consideration which saved the Corps from extinction.
But it is not, of course, enough that the Tank offers protection to
those who fight in it. A trench or a hole in the ground will do the
same. But the Tank is essentially a mobile weapon of _offence_. It is
the weapon for the nation which does not fight willingly, but when it
fights, fights to win, and to win quickly with as little bloodshed as
possible. It is the weapon for men who, if they must fight, like to
fight like intelligent beings still subjecting the material world to
their will, and who are most unwillingly reduced to the rôles of mere
marching automata, bearers of burdens and diggers of the soil, rôles
from which the patient German did not seem averse.
IV
The creed of the present writers can be very briefly summarised. A
considerable amount of evidence points to the conclusion that in the
phase at which military science has arrived, and at which it will
probably remain for at least a generation, a superior force of Tanks
can always tip the scales of the military balance of power.
Within the period of a generation, a time may again come when we shall
have to defend our lives and our liberties. We lead the world in the
design and manufacture of Tanks. Let us not abandon that lead in the
production and use of a vital weapon.
We know too well the tragic cost of one day of war, and it has been
said that had we been visibly prepared the Germans would not have
attacked.
Obviously we cannot be going to fall again so quickly into an old
error. We certainly intend to be armed, but who can say that through
sheer absence of mind it will not be with arquebuses? Surely not for
the sake of Army precedent, for the sake of emphasising our pacific
intentions, for the sake of saving a little money, or even--dearest of
all--for the luxury of “not bothering” about our Army, must we lose our
present unparalleled position of advantage. This advantage is not only
a material one. The Tanks are accustomed to win. Do not let us throw
away a fine tradition of victory.
Of all that, in our agony of striving we gained by the way, let us lose
nothing.
[Illustration: _TANK OPERATIONS._
AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER & NOVEMBER, 1918.
_NOTE._
Thick black lines indicate position of British line on dates noted.
Red wash indicates areas in which Tanks operated, with numbers of
Tanks operating and date.
Red lines indicate the ground gained on day of Tank operations.
Thick black dotted lines indicate army boundaries.
Headquarters
Tank Corps
INDEX
Acheux, 72
Achicourt, 94
Achiet-le-Grand, 344
Achiet-le-Petit, 337, 340
Adelpare Farm, 282, 284
Albert, 255, 288, 341
Allenby, General, 230
American Tanks, 191, 218–223
in Second Battle of Cambrai, 371–374
in Battle of the Selle, 386–390
Amiens, Battle of, 288–322
the town, 261, 265, 268
Anneux, 367
Archbald, Corporal, S., D.C.M., 252
Arival Wood, 366
Armin, General von, 126
Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., 303–309
Arrachis Wood, 284
Arras, Battle of, 89–109
Auchonvillers, 72, 259
Auchy, 252
Australians, and the Tanks, 106, 272–289, 297–300, 310–314
Australian co-operation with the French, 280
Aveluy Driving School, 256
Avesnes, 400
Bacon, Admiral, 35, 120
Bailleul, 252
Baker-Carr, Colonel, 108, 149, 178
_Ballon d’Essai_, 272
Bapaume, Battle of, 334–340
the town, 254, 348
Battalion Histories, quotations from:
“B” 3rd Battalion, 114;
3rd Battalion, 139, 258, 302, 339;
7th Battalion, 148;
“F” 6th Battalion, 176;
13th Battalion, 194;
5th Battalion, 251;
2nd Battalion, 254;
1st Battalion, 260, 266;
8th Battalion, 274;
13th Battalion, 297;
14th and 1st Battalions, 301,
A Battalion History, 311;
13th Battalion, 342;
15th Battalion, 350;
6th Battalion, 353, 396–397;
11th Battalion, 366;
15th Battalion, 367.
(_See also_ Brigade and Unit Histories.)
Bavay, 400
Bayliss, Second Lieutenant, 253
Bayonvillers, 299
Beaucamp Ridge, 365
Beaucourt, 73, 301
Beaufort, 303, 313
Beaumont-Hamel, 55, 68, 71, 74, 258
Beaurevoir, 379
Bellenglise, 370, 377
Bellicourt, 362, 370, 371, 375
Belloy, 271
Bermicourt, 77, 108, 110, 196, 200, 269
Béthune, 268
Beugnâtre, 348
Bihucourt, 344
Bingham, Captain, M.C., 251
Birly, Captain, Oswald, 363
Blangy, 254
Bohain, 385
Bois d’Abbé, 266
Bois d’Aquenne, 265
Bois de Harpon, 282
Bony, 378
Bourgon, General, 286
Bourlon, Wood and Village, 162, 177, 183–185, 187, 362, 368
Bouzencourt, 259
Bradley, Colonel, 46–59
Brancourt, 382
Bray, 255, 341, 347
“Bridge of Tanks,” 364
Brie, 249
Brigade Histories, quotations from:
5th Brigade, 273, 298;
A Brigade, 356, 357–360.
(_See also_ Battalion and Unit Histories.)
Broome, General, 149
Brough, Colonel, 58
Brown, Captain F. C., M.C., 262
Bryce, Lieut.-Colonel, 299
Buchan, Colonel: _History of the War_, quotations from, 68, 125–127,
225, 246.
Bucquoy, 271, 335
Bullecourt, 105–108, 244
Bultiaux River, 397
Buvignies, 398
Bung, General Sir Julian, 160, 181
Cachy, 262
Caix, 250
Cambrai, First Battle of, 160–184
German Counter-attack at, 185–189
Second Battle of, 361–379
Canal du Nord, 162, 363–368
Cantaing, 181
Capper, General, 86
Carney, driver, 303–308
Carter, Colonel, 270, 290
Carter, Second Lieutenant, 253
Cartigny, 248
Cassell, Second Lieutenant, 302
Cérisy Valley, 292, 298
Ching, Second Lieut. S. S., 103
Chipilly, 312
Chuignies, 343
Chuignolles, 309, 342, 343
Churchill, Mr., 34–36, 38
Cockcroft, 149
Colincamps, 258
Contay, 270, 283
Courage, Brigadier-General, 186, 280–283
Courcelles, 337, 344
Croisilles, 107, 346
Dalton, Captain, 285
Dawson, Second Lieutenant, 253
Debeney, General, 281, 287
Demilieue, 388
Deniken, General, 413
Denny, Colonel, M. C., M. P., 314, 371
Desert Wood, 168
Diplock, Mr., 31–34
Domeny, 315
Drocourt-Quéant Line, breaking, 341–355
Duel between Tanks, First, 263
Dummy Tanks, 110
Dury Ridge, 354
Eade, Lieutenant Percy, 299
Ecoust, 350
Edwards, Second Lieutenant, 277
Elles, General, 80, 85, 137, 160, 171–175, 178, 184, 223, 237 257,
264, 281, 404
Epehy, Battle of, 356–360
the Town, 248, 356
Epinoy, 369
Erin, 119, 196
Estienne, General, 210–218
Etinehem, 314
Exploits of Individual Tanks, 63, 99, 103, 139–142, 248, 285, 299,
301–308, 348, 367
Fampoux, 347
Fanny’s Farm, 114
Faucourt, 309
Favreuil, 348
Fesny, 395
Fifth Army Headquarters, adverse report of, 145–146
Fighting Side, 46, 190
Flers, 63
Flesquières, 173, 177, 188, 363, 365
Fleury Redobut, 99
Foch, Marshal, on the Tanks, 403
Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 182, 187, 367
Forsyth-Major, Major, 225
Framerville, 311
Frémicourt, 348
French Tanks Corps, 209–218
Fresnoy, 357, 359
Frezenberg, 142, 145, 152
Fuller, Lieut.-Colonel, 165
Gauche Wood, 187
Gaza, Second and Third Battles of, 224–234
German Press, and the Tanks, 405
German Tanks, fights with, 261, 383
Germans and the Tanks, 55, 64, 106, 117, 323–333
Ginchy, 61
Glencorse Wood, 142, 152
Gomiécourt, 344
Gonnelieu, 369
Gould, Second Lieutenant, 301
Gouzeaucourt, 185, 362
Graincourt, 177, 179, 363
Groves, Captain, 266
Gueudecourt, 70
Guillemont, 359, 371
Guise, 385
Haig, Sir Douglas, despatches of, 41, 65, 128, 143, 159, 177, 186,
268, 316, 323, 355, 361, 370, 377, 387, 390, 396, 404
Haldane, Lieut.-General Aylmer, 108
Hamelincourt, 344
Hamel Wood and Village, 274, 278
Hangard Wood, 263, 267
Hankey, Brigadier-General, 293
Hankey, Colonel Sir Maurice, 34
Happegarbes, 392
Happy Valley, 347
Harbonnières, 250, 299
Harden, Herr Maximilian, on the Tanks, 404
Hardress-Lloyd, Brigadier-General, 318
Hargicourt, 358
Harpon Wood, 282
Harp, the, 97
Haspres, 389
Hatton-Hall, Captain, 373, 382, 387
Hautmont, 400
Havrincourt, 161, 168, 177, 184
Haynecourt, 369
Hazebrouck, 268
Hébuterne, 258
Hecq, 393
Hedecourt, 105
Hedges, Second Lieutenant, W. R., 358
Henriques, Captain, 51, 60
Herleville Wood, 342
Hervilly Wood, 248
Hetherington, Major, 31, 36
Hickson, Second Lieutenant, 338
High Wood, 66
Hillock Farm, 149
Hotblack, Major, D.S.O., M.C., 75, 80, 120, 293, 375
“Hush Operation,” proposed, on the Belgian coast, 118–123
Ignaucourt Valley, 302
Inchy, 368
“Instructions for Training of Tank Corps in France,” 202–207
Inverness Copse, 153
Jerk House, 153
Johnson, Lieut. Col. Philip, 120
Jolimetz, 395
Jones, Second Lieutenant, 267
Juniper Cottage, 154
Kemmel, 253, 291
Knoll, The, 359, 362, 369
La Fère, 244
Lagnicourt, 352
Lamotte, 299
Landrecies, 392–395
Langemarck, 148
La Signy Farm, 72
Lateau Wood, 175
Latham, Sergeant F., M.M., 102
La Vacquerie, 187
Le Cateau, Second Battle of, 380–386
Le Maistre, General, 270
Le Quesneu, 301
Le Quesnoy, 310, 390, 395
Les-Trois-Boqueleaux, 282, 284
Le Tréport, 200
Lewis Gun Detachments, 251
Lihons, 312, 315
Lipsett, Major-General, 293
Littledale, Sergeant: Account of Tank Training at Bermicourt, 77–80
Logeast, Wood, 340
Longâtte, 349
Loop, The, 57–60
Losses of the Tank Corps, 268–269
Loucheur, M., on the Tanks, 403
Luce River, 292
Luck, Second Lieutenant C. W., 367
Ludendorff, General, and the Tanks, 319, 325
“Lusitania” Tank, Exploit of, 99, 103
Lyon, Private W., M.M., 252
Macavity, Major, 363
Machine Gun Corps, Heavy Section of, 50
Heavy Branch of, 80
Mailly-Raineval, 282
Mailly-Maillet Wood, 258
Marcelcave, 298
March, 1918, British Retreat of, 243–264
Marcoing, 187
Marcourt, 250
Maricourt, 254
Martell, Lieutenant, 384
Martinpuich, 61
Marwitz, General von der, 185
Masnières, 175, 185
Masvillers, 250
Maubeuge, 289, 386, 400
Maxse, General, 149
McFee, Mr., 34
McLagan, Major-General E. G. S., 321–322
Mecredy, Second Lieutenant C., 286
Menin, 385
Mercatel, 341
Merlaincourt, 250
Merlimont, 202
Merville, 256
Messines, Battle of, 110–117
Meteren, 252
Metz, 185
Mitchell, Lieutenant, 262
Molain, 388
Monash, General, 292, 314
Monchy, 104, 108, 347, 377
Mons, 400
Montbrehain, 379
Mont des Cats, 253
Montdidier, 288
Mont du Hibou, 149
Mont Rouge, 254
Morcourt, 292, 298
Moreuil, Battle of, 280–287
Mormal Forest, 389–396
Moroccans, and Tanks, 267
Mory Copse, 347
Moyenneville, 335, 340
Murray, General, 226
“Musical Box” Tank, adventures of, 303–308
Naedale, Lieutenant T. C., 374, 388
Neuve Eglise, 252
Neuville-Vitasse, 104, 347
Neuvilly, 389
Nieppe Forest, 256
Niergnies, 383
Noel, Sergeant J., D.C.M., 107
Norton, Major, 256
Nutt, Major, 225
Oisy, 392
O’Kelly, Colonel, 250
Oosthoek Wood, 130
Oosttaverne, 114
Palestine, Tanks in, 224–234
Pankhurst, Mrs., 38
Passchendaele, 143, 156, 159
Pear-Shaped Trench, 274
Peizière, 248
Péronne, 292
“Pill-Boxes,” 127, 148–151
Pitt, Lieutenant, 251
Poelcapelle Village, 154–158
Poelcapelle Road, Disaster on, 157
Pollard, Hugh, on the Future of Tanks, 408
Ponsonby, General John, 178
Pozières, 61
Prémont, 381
Premy Chapel, 366
Preux, 393
Proyart, 309, 314
Quadrilateral, 61, 357, 359
Quennemont Farm and Ridge, 359, 362, 369, 375
Ravenel, 270
Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 320
Reconnaissance Branch, 29
Reconnaissance Officer, Narrative of, 256
Reconnaissance Service, 80, 133
Rees-Williams, Lieutenant O. L., 348
Renouf, Major, 46
Reutelbeek, 154
Ribbans, gunner, 303–308
Ribecourt, 360
Riddle, Second Lieutenant, 367
Riencourt, 105
Riquerval Wood, 386
Robertson, Captain, V.C., 155
Roeux, 107
Ronssoy, 357
Rosières, 312
Rossignol, 259
Rowe, Captain, 383
Rumilly, 175
St. Julien, the town, 142, 148, 158
Tanks’ Success at, 136
St. Léger, 107
St. Martin’s Wood, 342
St. Pol, 268, 291
St. Quentin, 244
St. Quentin Canal, 369–373
St. Quentin Wood, 360
St. Ribert Wood, 282
St. Souplet, 388
Sambre and Oise Canal, 387
Sambre, the River, 392
Sasse, Major, D.S.O., 382
Sauchy-Lestrée, 368
Saunders, Lieutenant, 352
Sauvillers, 282, 284
“Savage Rabbits,” 237
Schele, The, 390
Scheuch, General, on the Tanks, 405
Selency, 357, 359
Selle, Battle of the, 386–391
Sensée Valley, 349, 252
Serain, 381
Seranvillers, 175
Sewell, Lieutenant C. H., V.C., 349
Skeggs, Major, 366
Smallwood, Second Lieutenant G. F., 358
Smith, Captain G. A., 350
Smith, Second Lieutenant Henderson, M.C., 295
Soldier’s Treachery, a, 129
Solesmes, 389
Somme, Battle of the, 57–65
_Spectator_, on the Battle of Gaza, 233
Staden, 143
Steenbeek, 133, 137, 142
Stern, Sir Albert, 37, 44, 84, 87
Stewart, Ian, 257
Storm, Second Lieutenant, 251
Strachan, Captain C. H., 353 46, 50, 53
Swinton, General E. D., 31–34, 38, 39
Tactics, new, 246
Tanks, inception of the, 25
Different types of, 26
Uses of, 27–28
Training of the crews of, 30
Pre-1914 designs for, 31
First steps in designing of, 32
War Office and the, 33–39
Admiralty and the, 33–41
Further steps in progress of, 41–56
150 sanctioned, 53
Production, problem of, 81
Mechanical War Supply Department, 44, 82
Tank Committees, 86
Mark I. Tanks, 40, 44, 49, 62, 90, 114
Mark II. Tanks, 114
Mark IV. Tanks, 111, 117, 193, 194
Mark V. Tanks, the uses of, 27–30, 193, 269
Mark VI. Tanks, 193
Whippets, 193
Fascines, manufacture of, 164
Cribs, 269
Central workshops, 195, 199, 269, 399
Tank actions, minor, 270
“Tank Corps Intelligence Summary,” 380, 385, 393
Tank Commanders, Maintenance Course, etc., for, 203–207
Tank Crew, Military History of Member of, 199–202
Tank, itinerary of a, 196–199
Tank Officers, narrative by, 71, 94, 96, 178–181, 284
Tanks: destroying, 249
future of, 402–416
Tennyson-d’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 36, 87
Thetford, 48
Thiepval, 68
Tournai, 400
Triangle Farm, 149, 153
Tritton, Mr., 36
Tulloch, Major, 31–35
Tunnelling Company (184th), work of, 131
“Unditching Beam,” 131
Unit Histories, quotations from, 357–360
(_See also_ Battalion and Brigade Histories.)
Uzielli, Lieutenant, C. F., 350
Vaire Wood, 274, 278
Valenciennes, 389, 392, 395
Van Zeller, Second Lieutenant, T. E., M.C., 249
Vaulx-Vraucourt, 350
Vauvillers, 311
Vaux, 280
Vendhuille, 370
Villeret, 356
Villers Bretonneux, 251, 261–265, 272, 295
Villers Guislain, 187, 369
Vimy, the village, 98
Canadians at, 98
Wailly, the town, 108, 202
training ground at, 108
Wanbeke, 116
Warfusée, 251, 299
Warvillers, 303, 313
Watson, Major, on Battle of Bullecourt, 106
Weber, Second lieutenant, 99
_Weekly Tank Notes_, quotations from, 54, 125, 126, 135, 149, 184,
260, 275, 278, 293, 303–309, 330, 386, 406
West, Captain Richard Annesley, D.S.O. 337
West, Lieut.-Colonel R. A., D.S.O., M.C., 352
Westhoek, 143
Whatley, Sergeant, 367
Whyte, Second Lieutenant, M.C., 251
Wig, Comedy of a, 176
Wilkes, Major G. L., D.S.O., 158
Williams, Major-General, 108
Wilson, Lieutenant, 266
Wilson, Major, 36
Wool, 199, 207, 238
Worsap, Second Lieutenant, 383
Wrisberg, General, on the Tanks, 404–405
Wurst Farm, 154
Wytschaete, 114, 128
Ypres Salient, sand model of, 134
Ypres, Third Battle of, 124–159
Yvrench, training center at, 57
Zonnebeke, 152
FOOTNOTES
[1] “I am building secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable,
and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even
the largest enemy masses must retreat, and behind them the infantry can
follow in safety and without opposition.”
[2] It differed from an ordinary chariot in that the two little fat
hollow-backed horses, which are depicted as providing the motive power,
were like the crew, enclosed within the wooden armour.
[3] It appears to have been the Committee which investigated Mr.
Diplock’s machine, with some additional members.
[4] Although the appeal was necessarily tentative and unofficial,
and no details of the nature of the work could be given, sixty women
immediately volunteered.
[5] Major Renouf.
[6] Major Renouf.
[7] Most of these Tanks were training machines, in the sense that their
“armour” was boiler-plate instead of hardened steel.
[8] Colonel Swinton.
[9] Captain Henriques.
[10] From _Weekly Tank Notes_, a confidential official periodical for
private circulation.
[11] _W.T.N._
[12] See Plate, Chapter VIII. (An unannotated air photograph of badly
crumped ground.)
[13] Among other Army Commanders was General Sir H. S. Rawlinson,
who was later to be so good a friend to the Tanks. On this occasion,
however, it is said that their performances left him completely cold
and unconvinced.
[14] Captain Henriques.
[15] Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the _Atlantic
Monthly_.
[16] Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the _Atlantic
Monthly_.
[17] The progress of this decision has been slightly telescoped, the
“operative” resolutions only being recorded, and the story of a good
deal of proposal and counter-proposal omitted.
[18] The list was as follows:
_Chairman._--Major-General Sir J. Capper.
_War Office._--Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Keane.
Lieut.-Colonel Mathew-Lannaw.
_Ministry of Munitions._--Lieut.-Colonel Stern.
Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt.
[19] Achicourt.
[20] Letter from a Tank officer dated “April 9, evening.”
[21] Letter from an eye-witness written on the evening of April 9.
[22] The Harp.
[23] Major Watson, the Tank Company Commander, writing in _Blackwood’s
Magazine_.
[24] “B” (2) Battalion History.
[25] _W.T.N._
[26] Official paper.
[27] Indirect fire may be defined as fire directed towards the spot
where you believe the enemy to be. Fire is called “direct” when the
target can be seen.
[28] Mr. Buchan’s _History of the War_.
[29] _W.T.N._
[30] Mr. Buchan’s _History of the War_.
[31] _W.T.N._
[32] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[33] The size of these dumps was now always computed in “Tank Fills.”
1 fill consisting of:
60 galls. of Petrol.
10 galls. of Oil.
20 galls. of Water.
10 lb. of Grease.
10,000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Female Tank,
or
200 rounds of 6-pdr. Ammunition
and
6000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Male.
[34] _W.T.N._
[35] 3rd Battalion History.
[36] From Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[37] From the History of 7th Battalion.
[38] _W.T.N._
[39] _W.T.N._
[40] The second Tank detailed for this strong point had--in common with
the two reserve Tanks--bellied or become ditched on the way up.
[41] Official Summary.
[42] Major Wilkes was awarded the D.S.O. for this piece of work.
[43] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[44] “A” Battalion was borrowed from 2nd Brigade.
[45] From “F” (6th) Battalion History.
[46] _W.T.N._
[47] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[48] _W.T.N._
[49] Artillery of Assault, _i.e._, Tanks.
[50] An aiming instrument.
[51] _W.T.N._
[52] Mr. Buchanan’s _History of the War_.
[53] Major Forsyth-Major (the Second in Command of the E.T.D.), on
whose report through Colonel Fuller this summary is largely based,
was torpedoed on his return to England in 1918 and all his maps and
documents were lost.
[54] General Murray’s Despatch.
[55] 5th Battalion History.
[56] 2nd Battalion History.
[57] Major Norton, commanding the Lewis gun detachment.
[58] 3rd Battalion History.
[59] 1st Battalion History.
[60] _W.T.N._
[61] Case shot: bullets not enclosed in a shell, but fired direct from
a 6-pounder and scattering like the charge of a shot gun.
[62] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[63] 5th Brigade History.
[64] 8th Battalion History.
[65] _W.T.N._
[66] _W.T.N._
[67] The 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Battalions.
[68] The 8th, 13th, 2nd, and 15th Battalions.
[69] From _W.T.N._
[70] 13th Battalion History.
[71] From the 5th Brigade History.
[72] Honours and Awards.
[73] From 14th Battalion History.
[74] From 1st Battalion History.
[75] From 3rd Battalion History.
[76] From 8th Battalion History
[77] From a Battalion History.
[78] From a Battalion History.
[79] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[80] Summer, 1919.
[81] _i.e._, In the Battle of Amiens, 8.8.18.
[82] _W.T.N._
[83] 3rd Battalion History.
[84] 15th Battalion History.
[85] 6th Battalion History and “Honours and Awards.”
[86] Despatch.
[87] A Brigade History.
[88] Unit History.
[89] _Ibid._
[90] Unit History.
[91] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[92] 15th Battalion Tank History.
[93] Captain Denny, _Daily Telegraph_, April 1, 1919.
[94] Captain Denny, _Daily Telegraph_, April 1, 1919.
[95] The 301st was attached to the 27th American Division.
[96] From information specially given to the author by Captain
Hatton-Hall, Reconnaissance Officer of the Brigade.
[97] 16th Battalion.
[98] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[99] Captain Hatton-Hall.
[100] _W.T.N._
[101] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[102] Captain Hatton-Hall.
[103] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[104] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.
[105] 6th Battalion History.
[106] 6th Battalion History.
[107] _Ibid._
[108] _W.T.N._
[109] Tradition relates that had General Swinton had his way, the Tanks
for Palestine would have had hideous faces and minatory texts from the
Koran painted upon them.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
the corresponding illustrations.
The text always uses “moral”, not “morale”.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references.
Chapter XV does not have a Section “V”; the section after “IV” is “VI”;
no pages or text are missing.