BREAKING THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE--THE BATTLE OF EPEHY
I
We have said that August 22 had, in the original plan, been devoted
to consolidation and to the moving up of guns. Only the 3rd Corps
in the 4th Army area, with its twenty-four Tanks of the 4th and 5th
Battalions, launched an interim attack on the Bray-Albert front.
We gained all our objectives. The 18th Division crossed the river
Ancre, captured Albert by an enveloping movement from the south-east,
and our line between the Somme and the Ancre was now advanced well to
the east of the Bray-Albert road.
The left of the 4th Army was taken forward in conformity with the rest
of our line.
The way had now been cleared for what was really the main attack,
though it was not the attack in which the greatest number of Tanks were
employed.
The assault opened on August 23 by a series of attacks on the whole
of a thirty-three-mile front, that is to say, from our junction with
the French, north of Lihons, to the spot near Mercatel, where the
Hindenburg Line from Quéant and Bullecourt joined the old Arras-Vimy
defence of 1916.
The hundred Tanks which went into action on this day were nearly all
fresh machines which had not fought on the 21st.
They were distributed in groups along the fronts of both the 3rd and
4th Armies.
South of the Somme, with the Australians near Chuignolles, the largest
group of nearly sixty Tanks went into action. They were machines
belonging to the 2nd, 8th and 13th Battalions.
The enemy had withdrawn their anti-Tank guns to the top of the ridge,
which it was impossible for Tanks to climb except at one spot. Upon
this one crossing-place they had trained their guns, and here several
Tanks suffered direct hits.
We attacked as usual without a preliminary bombardment and met with a
desperate resistance, the German machine-gunners defending their posts
with extraordinary heroism, and often firing their guns till the very
moment when they and their weapons were crushed to the earth by an
attacking Tank.
A particularly interesting account of the action is given in the 13th
Battalion History--
“It was soon evident that the enemy were prepared to make a stout
resistance; there was no definite trench system, but nests of
machine-guns were encountered in organised shell-holes almost from
the start; while Saint Martin’s Wood and the gully to the east of
this, Herleville Wood, and the quarry at its southern end, were
all strongly held by machine-guns in prepared emplacements. As
before, the German gunners fought with magnificent pertinacity
and courage; one Tank Commander claimed to have knocked out over
thirty machine-guns, and this claim was supported by the infantry
with him; the estimates of several other Tanks were almost as high.
These machine-guns were provided with armour-piercing bullets,
and Tanks were pitted all over and in many places penetrated by
these. There is no doubt that by themselves becoming the targets
for these batteries, the Tanks saved many casualties among the
infantry. With the machine-guns well in hand, the Australian
infantry were quick to seize the chances of advance, and by 6.30
a.m. were all established in their final objectives. After sunrise
the heat of the day became oppressive in the open air, and in the
Tanks intolerable. Several cases were reported of men becoming
delirious during the action. The cause appears to be three-fold:
the weather conditions were trying even to fresh men; in many
cases the composite crew had recently endured the strain of action
without a complete rest to follow; and a third disadvantage, which
was inherent in the design of the Mark V. Tank, was now for the
first time becoming evident. In these engines the heat generated
by the explosion of the propelling gases is very great, and the
exhaust pipes speedily become red, and even white hot. In a new
engine this is merely an inconvenience, but after a certain period
of use the joints of the exhaust pipes tend to warp, and thus to
release into the inner air the carbon gases of the explosion.
These gases, if breathed continuously, even in small quantities,
produce exhaustion, mental confusion and finally unconsciousness.
Further, the effect is cumulative, and a man once poisoned by the
fumes becomes more quickly affected by further exposure to them.
The study of these conditions and the remedy for them became
henceforward a matter of the first importance.
“Of the twelve Tanks of the 13th Battalion which started in this
action, seven reached their final objectives. Five Tanks received
direct hits from enemy field guns, the crews in these cases going
on with their Hotchkiss guns and assisting the infantry forward.
“Eventually nine Tanks rallied to Company Headquarters, two of
these being towed out of action by their friends.”
Altogether in this part of the battle 2000 prisoners and the important
villages of Chuignolles, Herleville and Chuignes had fallen to us
before nightfall.
It was the same story all along the line.
In the 3rd Army area, where altogether sixty-five Tanks fought
in several fairly widely separated groups, the battle was opened
rather earlier by a moonlight attack, which began just before 4 a.m.
against the village of Gomiécourt. In the 6th Corps’ domain, the 3rd
Division was supported by ten Mark IV. Tanks of the 12th Battalion.
They attacked Gomiécourt, carried it triumphantly and captured 500
prisoners. To the north of them, in the second phase, the Guards
Division, with four Mark IV.’s, captured the village of Hamelincourt.
At Bihucourt, just beyond Achiet-le-Grand, 300 of the enemy were forced
by Tanks to surrender to the infantry. In one Whippet Tank, the officer
and the sergeant were both killed, and the private drove his Tank into
action by himself, when a target presented itself, locking his back
axle and firing his Hotchkiss gun.
Later in the morning, some of the Whippets of the 6th Battalion were
operating with the infantry of the 4th Corps to the east of Courcelles.
It was suddenly noticed that the artillery barrage table had been
altered, and that the rate of progress of the barrage was now 100
yards in four minutes, that is to say, considerably slower than it
had been originally intended. The Tanks were therefore obliged to
manœuvre and wheel about, in order to let the barrage keep ahead. They
were constantly under anti-Tank gun fire at this time. Seven of the
Whippets, however, did not wait, but passed through our barrage, and
getting beyond it, surprised and scattered large numbers of the enemy
who had taken cover. As the Germans ran, the Whippet machine-gunners
were able to inflict heavy casualties upon them. Meanwhile, these
seven Tanks were played upon by a perfect hail of machine-gun
fire, especially from the direction of Achiet-le-Grand. Changing
their direction, they advanced upon the troublesome machine-guns
and succeeded in cutting off several hundred of the enemy north of
the village, who had been holding up an attack by our infantry. The
Whippets headed and drove them neatly towards our lines, where the
King’s Royal Rifles immediately took them prisoners. Achiet-le-Grand
was captured with extraordinary small losses.
Owing to the better weather conditions, aeroplane co-operation was much
more successful throughout the day than it had been on August 21.
Messages dropped by aeroplanes were invaluable in keeping the whole
straggling action in hand, and in giving information, by means of which
commanders could send up reserves where they were wanted.
The following will give the reader an idea of the sort of information
that the aeroplanes were constantly furnishing.
“_Messages dropped on H.Q., 1st Brigade._
“Lieutenant Wittal (pilot). Lieutenant Mitchell (observer). _12
noon._
“Four Whippets seen in G. 21, two Mark IV. and several Whippets
seen in G. 15d, all moving S.E.
“Several Whippets and Mark V. seen in G. 16a, G. 10 and 11d,
proceeding S.E.
“We do not hold Bihucourt.”
The counter-Tank gun work done on this day was also exceedingly
successful, the following is the report of an action fought by a
counter Gun Machine:
“_No. 73 Squadron._
“At 1.15 p.m. batteries were observed unlimbering and coming
into action near Béhagnies. Twenty-four bombs were dropped and
nearly 2000 rounds fired at these batteries, causing the greatest
confusion. Several limbers were overturned, and horses stampeded,
and the personnel scattered in all directions.”
Altogether we had every reason to be satisfied by the events of the
day, and we prepared to continue the action with all possible vigour on
the morrow.
II
But by August 24, there were only fifty-three Tanks of the 1st, 3rd
and 4th Brigades fit for action, and nearly all the units which went
in on this day were motley collections from various Battalions. One
composite unit of the 11th Battalion fought a very successful action in
conjunction with the 4th Corps, in spite of the fact that their orders
reached them late and that they had an approach march of six or seven
miles. They managed to catch up the infantry and all their objectives
were taken.
In the course of the afternoon, Tanks belonging to the 9th Battalion
attacked and met with very stubborn resistance opposite Mory Copse,
where the Hindenburg Line was strongly held. Here more than one enemy
garrison refused to surrender and had all to be killed. One party of
about sixty was accounted for by four rounds of 6-pounder case shot.
One machine, which was doing a piece of reconnaissance work near
Croisilles later in the day, had a particularly exciting experience.
The crew was forced to evacuate the Tank on account of the phosphorus
bombs with which the enemy had drenched it. Before leaving it, the
officer in command turned the head of his machine towards home and
started the Tank on its lonely way; then, almost choked with the
fumes, he got out and walked between the front horns of the moving
machine till the inside of the Tank was clear of phosphorus. All the
while, he and the machine were completely surrounded by the enemy. In
the end, he got his Tank home in safety.
On the 4th Army front, five Tanks of the 1st Battalion attacked at
dawn with the 47th Division in an effort to recapture Happy Valley,
which had been lost by us on the previous afternoon. The attack was
exceedingly successful, and besides our original objective, the large
village of Bray was added to our gains.
For the next week, the fighting consisted of a series of small local
engagements for the most part improvised on the spot by the Divisions
concerned.
Tanks fought every day in one part of the line or another, and every
day we forced a stubbornly resisting enemy further and further back.
We propose only to give a short account of most of the actions of this
period.
On August 25, about forty-two Tanks were again in action in little
“blobs,” strung out on the fronts of the 4th and 6th Corps. Tanks from
the 3rd, 7th, and 10th Battalions went into action, the 9th Battalion
attacking with the Guards Division, north of Mory. Owing to the
dense mist, co-operation between Tanks and infantry was phenomenally
difficult and the attack was not very successful. During the engagement
one Tank had five of its crew wounded by anti-Tank rifle bullets.
On the Canadian Corps front an attack was carried out on August 26,
near Fampoux and Neuville-Vitasse, with the help of Tanks of the 9th
and 11th Battalions.
Near Monchy several Tanks were knocked out, the crews joining the
infantry to repel a local counter-attack. The sergeant of one crew
hearing that the enemy had captured his Tank, collected his men and
charged forward to recover it, arriving at one sponson door of the
machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one.
The Tank Corps records characterise August 27 as “an uneventful day.”
Fourteen Tanks of the 9th and 11th Battalions were used for mopping up
points of resistance.
On the 28th no Tanks went into action at all.
But the 29th was more memorable, for on this day the enemy evacuated
Bapaume, and in a minor attack on Frémicourt Lieutenant C. H. Sewell
won the V.C.
It was a very small engagement south-west of Beugnâtre, in which only
four Whippet Tanks took part.
The following is extracted from the report of the engagement sent in by
Lieutenant Sewell’s Commanding Officer:
“At about 2 p.m. on the afternoon of August 29, ‘Whippets’ of the
3rd (Light) Tank Battalion reached the Quarry near the ‘Monument
Comémoratif,’ south-west of Favreuil. Acting under instructions
received from the New Zealand Division, one Section of ‘Whippets’
under Lieutenant C. H. Sewell was ordered forward to clear up the
situation on the front of the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade before
Frémicourt and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the infantry were
reported to be held up by machine-gun fire.
“On reaching the railway line south-east of Beugnâtre in advance of
our infantry, enemy batteries and machine-guns opened heavy fire
on the Section of ‘Whippets.’ In manœuvring to avoid the fire and
to retain formation, Car No. A.233, commanded by Lieutenant O. L.
Rees-Williams, side-slipped in a deep shell crater and turned
completely upside down, catching fire at the same time.
“Lieutenant Sewell, in the leading ‘Whippet,’ on seeing the plight
of Lieutenant Rees-Williams’ car, immediately got out of his own
‘Whippet’ and came to the rescue; with a shovel he dug an entrance
to the door of the cab, which was firmly jammed and embedded in the
side of the shell-hole, forced the door open and liberated the crew.
“Had it not been for Lieutenant Sewell’s prompt and gallant action,
the imprisoned crew might have been burnt to death, as they were
helpless to extricate themselves without outside assistance.
“During the whole of this time ‘Whippets’ were being very heavily
shelled and the ground swept by machine-gun fire at close range.
On endeavouring to return to his own car, Lieutenant Sewell was
unfortunately hit several times, his body being subsequently found
lying beside that of his driver, Gunner Knox. W., also killed, just
outside the Tank, which at that time was within short range of
several machine-guns and infantry gun-pits.”
The rescued men were emphatic in their praise of the gallant manner in
which Lieutenant Sewell had saved them from a peculiarly horrible form
of death.
On the 30th, the 3rd Division was to undertake operations designing
to seize the villages of Ecoust and Longâtte with the trench system
beyond. Six Tanks of the 12th Battalion were to operate, and in
anticipation of their orders had already moved forward to the head
of the Sensée Valley. Unfortunately their orders did not reach the
Battalion till 9 p.m. on the night before the battle. The night was
intensely dark, and as luck would have it, the Reconnaissance Officer
who alone knew the ground had been recalled to England that day, and
there still remained nearly four miles by the shortest route before
the Tanks reached the jumping-off place. It was clear the machines
would have their work cut out if they were to reach the place in time.
The whole operation was dogged by misfortune. The taping party took
the wrong direction in the pitch dark, and when at last the Tanks
reached the point where the infantry guides were to lead them the rest
of the way, the guide for the left-hand section lost himself and the
Tanks completely before they had gone half the distance. For an hour
the Tanks and their conductor wandered about the devastated wastes
about Ecoust. The guide could not even point out on the map where the
infantry were formed up. At last the Section Commander went forward
by himself and managed to discover the whereabouts of the front line
and his own position, but only to find he was nearly a mile away and
it wanted five minutes to “zero.” It was impossible that he should
reach the battle in time, and he withdrew his Section according to
instructions as he was in an exposed position. Thus the unfortunate
infantry went over the top unaccompanied by a single Tank. The assault
was a complete failure and the infantry suffered heavy casualties.
[84]“On August 31 a further action took place. ‘C’ Company of
the 15th Battalion under Captain G. A. Smith assisting the 185th
Brigade in attacking Vaulx-Vraucourt from the south.
“Five Tanks reached their objectives, one failing owing to
mechanical trouble; these Tanks did considerable execution and
rendered great assistance to the infantry. Again heavy machine-gun
and anti-Tank rifle fire were encountered. After the show the
Tanks themselves bore mute witness to what they had been through.
In particular the Tank ‘Opossum,’ commanded by Lieutenant C. F.
Uzielli, had very little paint left on its sides because of bullet
marks. The infantry suffered heavily. In one case the strength of a
platoon on reaching its objective was only three men.”
III
But we had reached a stage of the battle when it was clear that another
considerable effort on our part would be well worth the making.
The enemy’s resistance showed him passionately anxious to gain time. He
retreated with extreme reluctance.
It was the moment to redouble our blows.
The actual small operations carried out by the Tanks during these last
few days were only a minor consideration. Tanks and infantry were
busy preparing for a considerable attack which was to take place on
September 2. On this day, the whole vast battle reached its zenith and
we broke the famous Drocourt-Quéant Line which we had failed to reach
in April 1917. This line was a switch which joined on to the Hindenburg
system. Though we had had scant time for elaborate preparation, the
attack was to be practically a full-dress affair, eighty-one Tanks
being put in on a comparatively small area. We were expecting a heavy
resistance and our dispositions were very carefully made. The order of
our attack was as follows, starting from the south:
With the 4th Corps near Villers-au-Flos the 7th Tank Battalion.
With the 6th Corps near Lagnicourt and Moreuil the 12th and 6th
Battalions of the 1st Brigade, and against the actual Drocourt-Quéant
Line with the Canadians and the 17th Corps as many Tanks as the 9th,
11th and 14th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade could muster (about forty
in all).
The battle was to be fought in the intricate country of the Sensée
Valley, and active operations were taking place throughout the time of
preparation for the renewed battle. It was, therefore, under conditions
of exceptional difficulty that the Tanks assembled, some of them
being obliged to travel along our front across areas which were far
from healthy. The enemy’s defences had been built in the Spring of
1917. They were remarkable for extremely strong belts of wire, and we
expected that every effort would be made by the Germans to hold these
defences at all cost.
Zero was at 5.30 a.m. and a clear dawn was just breaking when we
launched our attack.
On the Lagnicourt sector, Tanks of the 12th Battalion immediately came
under tremendous fire from field guns and anti-Tank rifles.
As it grew lighter, we discovered that a number of the heavy rifles
were being fired with great effect from a derelict Whippet. This nest
was soon dealt with by a male Tank.
One female Tank in this sector fired over 4000 rounds of S.A.A., until,
having all its Lewis guns except one disabled, and five of its crew
severely wounded, it endeavoured to return, its Commander, Lieutenant
Saunders, alternately driving, working the brakes and firing the
remaining gun. As the Tank was thus being successfully withdrawn, a
direct hit set it on fire and the wounded men were rescued with great
difficulty.
It was not far from Lagnicourt that the Whippets of the 6th Battalion
operated.
They were commanded by Lieut.-Colonel West, of whose action on August
21 we have already told the story:
[85]“On the night of September 1–2, nine Whippets, under Captain
C. H. Strachan, left Gomiécourt to attack in the direction of
Lagnicourt. Owing to the pressure at which the Tanks had been
working for the last five weeks, little time had been available
for overhauling, and as the Tanks were running badly, it was
impossible to get them up in time for zero hour. The Commanding
Officer, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. West, D.S.O., M.C., left camp early
on the morning of September 2, with two mounted orderlies. It was
his intention to get up with the Whippets before they went into
action, by Lagnicourt. He went as far as the infantry on horseback,
in order to watch the progress of the battle, and to ascertain when
to send the Whippets forward. He arrived at the front line when the
enemy were in process of delivering a strong local counter-attack.
The infantry battalion had suffered heavy officer casualties, and
its flanks were exposed. Realising that there was a danger of the
Battalion giving way, he at once rode in front of them, under
extremely heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and rallied the men. In
spite of the fact that the enemy were now close upon him, he took
charge of the situation, and detailed N.C.O.’s to replace officer
casualties. He then rode up and down in front of the men, in face
of certain death, encouraging all, and calling upon them to ‘Stick
it, men and show them fight.’ His last words were ‘For God’s sake
put up a good fight.’ He fell, riddled by machine-gun bullets.”
The infantry had been inspired to redoubled efforts by Colonel West’s
example and the hostile attack was defeated. He had originally come to
the Battalion as a Company Commander, and had been awarded the D.S.O.
for his work in the Arras battle. Between August 8 and September 2, he
was awarded the M.C., a bar to his D.S.O., and, for his last action,
the V.C.
Elsewhere the fighting was not so heavy, and on the whole we met with
less opposition than we had expected.
In the Canadian sector, the armoured cars were working in close
conjunction with Tank Corps aeroplanes. At one moment a number of cars
were going along a road, when four machines were hit by shells from
hidden batteries. Their accompanying aeroplanes, however, immediately
attacked the German guns so vigorously that the crews of the disabled
cars, though completely surrounded by the enemy, were able to escape
capture.
By noon, on the Canadian section, the whole elaborate maze of wire,
trenches and strong points, which constituted the Drocourt-Quéant Line,
was in our hands, but elsewhere there was hard fighting until dusk,
especially on the reverse slopes of Dury Ridge. Dury itself we took,
capturing the Town Major. Our task had not, however, we considered,
been quite completed that day, and next morning Tanks and infantry
prepared to “tidy up” the line, especially Maricourt Wood.
But long before zero hour, at 5.20, a glare of burning dumps in the
east seemed to show that the enemy were already withdrawing, and,
in fact, when the Tanks went over just after dawn, they encountered
scarcely any opposition at all, save a perfunctory fire from rearguard
machine-gunners. Small parties of the enemy were found in dug-outs,
waiting to be captured. His infantry and guns were already well on
their way back to the Canal du Nord.
IV
The Second Battle of Arras was over and we had pierced the renowned
Drocourt-Quéant Line and had delivered a blow from which the enemy’s
_moral_ never quite recovered.
Since August 21, in all, some 500 Tanks had been in action, and except
for one or two minor failures every attack had culminated in a cheap
success. We had pushed forward for fifteen or twenty miles along about
thirty miles of front.
[86]“During the night of September 2–3, the enemy fell back
rapidly on the whole front of the 3rd Army and the right of the
1st Army. By the end of the day, he had taken up positions along
the general line of the Canal du Nord, from Péronne to Ypres, and
thence east of Hermies, Inchy-en-Artois and Ecoust St. Quentin to
the Sensée, east of Lecluse. On the following day he commenced to
withdraw also from the east bank of the Somme, south of Péronne,
and by the night of September 8 was holding the general line
Vermand--Epehy--Havrincourt, and thence along the east bank of the
Canal du Nord.
“The withdrawal was continued on the front of the French forces on
our right.
“Throughout this hasty retreat our troops followed up the enemy
closely. Many of his rearguards were cut off and taken prisoner;
on numerous occasions our forward guns did great execution among
his retiring columns, while our airmen took full advantage of the
remarkable targets offered them. Great quantities of material and
many guns fell into our hands.”
But the Tank Brigades were, all of them, in such urgent need of
refitting, of new machines and of fresh crews, that after the 3rd they
had to be withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve, and, “faint with pursuing,”
were unable to take any further part in the battle for just over a
fortnight.
Even so, that fortnight was spent, not in rest, but in feverish
preparation of the most arduous kind. We had begun to practise the
fitting of Cribs, for we were getting back to the Hindenburg Line.
The other dogs of war were in full cry. The Tanks did not propose to
waste time.
By September 18, the 5th Brigade was able to put a few machines into
the field. They belonged to the 2nd Battalion, which had not fought
since the earlier stages of the last battle.
V
This time the Tanks were to be put in the south, in the 4th Army area.
There were to be about twenty Tanks, and they were to work with the
Australians and the 9th and 3rd Corps on a wide front between Epehy and
Villeret.
[87]“The operations about to be undertaken by the 4th Army aimed at
the capture of the Hindenburg Outpost Line in order (1) to secure
direct observation over the main Hindenburg Line, and (2) to allow
our artillery positions to be advanced in preparation for the
assault on the main positions.”
The area attacked had a front of about fourteen miles, thus a Battalion
of twenty Tanks could merely be employed against certain known strong
points.
Eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps on the left, eight Tanks
in the centre were to work with the 1st and 4th Divisions of the
Australian Corps.
On the 9th Corps sector on the right, four Tanks were allotted to the
6th Division.
The night had been fine, but when zero hour came (5.20) it was raining
heavily, and all day the weather was dull and cloudy, visibility being
often bad enough to make the Tank Commanders glad of their compasses.
[88]“The company operating with the 3rd Corps had for their two
main objectives the villages of Epehy and Ronssoy. The former place
was taken with no great resistance, the enemy surrendering in
numbers on the appearance of the Tanks. Ronssoy was more stoutly
defended; here machine-gun fire with armour-piercing bullets was
very heavy, and anti-Tank rifles were also freely used. Two Tanks
had for their objective the very strong organisation of trenches
and fortified cottages known as the Quadrilateral, which formed the
key to the German Defensive System between Fresnoy and Selency.”
During the attack two Tanks belonging to “C” Company fought an
extremely gallant action.
[89]“Fresnoy was the line of the first objective, but in going
forward, the infantry came under heavy machine-gun fire from the
Quadrilateral on their right flank. Both officers, unseen by one
another in the mist and smoke, headed their Tanks straight for the
thickest of the fire. Second Lieutenant G. F. Smallwood arrived
first and encountered terrific resistance, with which he was
successfully dealing when his Tank became ditched while crossing
a sunken road, all guns but one being covered. It was impossible
to use the unditching beam owing to the intense fire from short
range. At this moment Second Lieutenant W. R. Hedges, driving his
own Tank, as the driver had been killed and the second driver badly
wounded, appeared from the mist heading for the Quadrilateral with
all guns firing. Captain Hamlet, the Section Commander, was also
inside this Tank. Just as Second Lieutenant Hedges was appearing
to get the upper hand of the enemy his Tank burst into flames.
Desperate efforts were apparently made to put these out, but after
five minutes Captain Hamlet and the crew jumped out of the Tank on
the right-hand side straight into the arms of the Huns, who had
surrounded the Tank. Second Lieutenant Hedges, however, sprang
out from the other side and darted through them though subject
to a heavy fire. Though hit two or three times he reached the
shelter of the sunken road about fifty yards from Second Lieutenant
Smallwood’s Tank. The latter left the Tank and brought Second
Lieutenant Hedges back with him. Heavy shelling all round the Tank
compelled its evacuation, and Second Lieutenant Smallwood and crew
took up a position with their machine-guns and successfully held
off the enemy. Later on, the infantry, who had been held up some
200 yards behind, were able to come up and take over the post.
Meanwhile Second Lieutenant Hedges had been sent to a Dressing
Station, but he never arrived there. This very gallant officer’s
fate is still unknown.”
On the 9th Corps front progress was slow, but by the end of the day we
held Ronssoy and Hargicourt.
A good idea is given of the minor mechanical difficulties of this part
of the campaign in the 2nd Battalion History:
“Liaison, reconnaissance and Tank maintenance were rendered far
more difficult than usual owing to the lack of transport, which was
in such a state that no car, box-body, lorry or motor-cycle could
be relied upon. The nearest M.T. Park for repairs was twenty-five
miles away. Long treks by night meant work on Tanks by day.
Reconnaissance and liaison had often to be carried out on foot with
consequent loss of time. There was very little rest or sleep for
any one between September 13 and 18.”
We did not renew the advance till the 21st, when nine Tanks helped the
attack on the 3rd Corps front against the Knoll and Guillemont and
Quennemont Farms. Two of these Tanks were of the Mark V. Star pattern
and carried forward infantry machine-gunners.
But we were up against a desperate enemy resistance, machine-guns
firing armour-piercing bullets, anti-Tank rifles, field guns and land
mines all being used against us.
The attack did not succeed in gaining us the coveted positions, and we
were to pay dearly for this failure.
Again two days elapsed, and meanwhile (on the 20th) the 8th, 16th and
13th Battalions, and the 5th Supply Co. had been brought forward.
There was a big enterprise in view.
This hitherto more or less isolated sector of attack was to be
“federated” with the new vast projected attack which was to be made
by no fewer than three Armies, their blows timed to fall in rapid
succession.
Meanwhile a piece of ground which we coveted remained in enemy hands.
We were anxious to hold the high ground north of Selency and to clear
up the formidable Quadrilateral south of Fresnoy.
The 9th Corps, therefore, was to attack on a two-division front with
the aid of twenty Tanks of the newly arrived 13th Battalion.
The plans were discussed at a conference held on September 22, and the
Tanks brought up to the assembly points by skeleton crews that same
night.
The fighting crews were brought up by lorry the following afternoon,
according to the wise practice which was now beginning to be generally
employed, whenever there was enough personnel to make it possible. The
final approach march was begun at 8.30 p.m. the night of the 23rd.
[90]“After Clearing St. Quentin Wood, in which some delay was
caused by overhead signal wires, which had to be passed from hand
to hand to avoid catching the semaphore standards, Tanks had
to pass through a heavy harassing fire in which gas shell was
largely employed. Thus the latter part of the march was made with
Tanks closed and gas masks often worn; in consequence the crews,
especially of the company working on the left, suffered greatly
from gas and petrol fumes. While waiting on the Start Lines, Tanks
were heavily shelled, and enemy ’planes twice during the night
dropped flares exactly over the sections with the 6th Division on
the right.”
Anti-Tank guns were extremely active throughout the operation.
Three Tanks, which with their infantry penetrated right into the
Quadrilateral, were all put out of action by a single gun.
Altogether, the Tanks suffered a 50 per cent. loss of machines in this
action.
However, we won some of the points of observation that were needed for
the next attack, and though we failed to hold the Quadrilateral we had
practically outflanked and sterilised it by the end of the day.
So ended the little Battle of Epehy.
Our advance had not been a long one, for the enemy had contested every
yard with a desperate valour.
His losses had been enormous, and this minor battle added no less than
12,000 prisoners and 100 guns to the Allied “bag.”