THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, OR BATTLE OF AUGUST 8
I
The ambitious offensive which the Germans had launched on July 15 had
collapsed. Our somewhat tentative counter-offensive at Hamel had been
surprisingly successful, and there had been a complete change in the
general military situation.
The German reserves were, it would seem, nearly used up, while
ours--fresh troops which had become available during the spring and
early summer--had now been incorporated and trained. Better still, the
American Army was growing rapidly.
We were at last ready again to take the offensive on a grand scale.
On July 23, when the success of the battles of the 18th was well
assured, a conference was held in which General Foch asked that the
British, French, and American Armies should each simultaneously take
the offensive.
Their assaults were to be immediate.
On the British front, after some consideration of the rival merits
of various battle sites, it was decided that the attack was to be
delivered to the east of Amiens on a front extending from Albert to
Montdidier, and was to have for its immediate object the freeing of the
Paris-Amiens railway, whose proximity to the German lines had proved so
exceedingly hampering to our transport arrangements.
If the battle was successful, our advance could be exploited in a
second attack directed towards the St. Quentin-Cambrai line. This line
was one whose integrity was of vital importance to the enemy, as he had
long ago confessed in the labour and money which he had poured out upon
the vast elaborations of the Hindenburg defences.
For, twenty miles behind the Hindenburg Line lay the great railway
centres round Maubeuge, the key position of his whole system of lateral
communication.
If we could once penetrate so far, we should cut the only
communications by which the German forces to the south in Champagne
could be supplied and maintained, and should sever these troops
completely from the group of German Armies operating in Flanders.
Of this great enterprise the first step was the ever memorable Battle
of Amiens.
II
Preparations for the great attack were instantly begun. The battle
plans were first made known in the last days of July to the commanders
who were to take part, “Z” day being fixed for August 8.
The three Brigades of Tanks which were to fight, (the 5th, 3rd, and
4th) had their first intimation of what was afoot on July 27, and their
orders were confirmed on August 4.
Briefly, these were the general lines on which the battle was to be
fought.
Preparations were to be rushed through. They were to be as secret as
brief.
The battle itself was to be in two phases.
First, an attack without artillery preparation, but under the
protection of a creeping barrage. The whole action was to be very much
on the lines of the First Battle of Cambrai, save that this time (1)
an even larger number of Tanks--about 430 including Whippets--were to
head the battle; (2) that light skirmishing lines of infantry were to
be used; and that (3) as at Hamel we were this time attacking a more
or less improvised defence line. The second phase of the attack, which
was to be made by a fresh wave of troops, was to start about four hours
after zero, that is, after the first objective had been taken.
During this second phase, the artillery was to be moved up and we were
to advance without a barrage.
_On the right_ was to be the Canadian Corps, and with them the 4th
Brigade[67] of Tanks was to fight.
_In the centre_, with the Australian Corps its usual battle partner,
the 5th Tank Brigade,[68] was again to operate.
_On the left_, north of the Somme, two Divisions of the 3rd Corps were
to have the 10th Tank Battalion attached to them.
Behind these three bodies three cavalry Divisions, the 3rd Brigade of
Whippet Tanks, and the 17th Battalion of Armoured Cars, were to be
concentrated.
Their work was chiefly the exploitation of the second phase. The
Armoured Car Battalion had only just returned from operations with the
French.
[69]“When the 6th French Cavalry Division was withdrawn to rest,
the 17th Battalion proceeded to Senlis, and at 9 a.m., having
just entered this town, it received orders to proceed forthwith
to Amiens and report to the Headquarters of the Australian Corps.
Amiens, which was nearly 100 miles distant, was reached the same
night.
“On arriving, Lieut.-Colonel Carter was informed that his unit was
to take part in the projected attack east of that town. The chief
difficulty foreseen in an armoured car action in this neighbourhood
was the crossing of the trenches. Although only one day was
available wherein to find a solution to this difficulty, it was
accomplished by attaching a small force of Tanks to the Battalion.
These Tanks were used to tow the armoured cars over the obstacles,
or rather along the tracks the Tanks formed through them. This
solution proved eminently successful.”
Short as was the time for preparations, an elaborate deceptive scheme
was planned and carried out, to make it seem that we intended to
fight in Flanders. Canadians were put into the line on the Kemmel
front, where in due course the enemy identified them. Ostentatious
Headquarters and Casualty Clearing Stations were conspicuously
disposed about the area. Throughout the 1st Army sector our wireless
stations hummed with messages about the concentration of troops, and
arrangements were made to make it seem that a great assembling of Tanks
was taking place near St. Pol. Here, indeed, Tanks elaborately trained
with infantry on fine days--days, that is to say, on which the enemy’s
long-distance reconnaissance and photographic aeroplanes were likely to
be at work behind our lines.
The ruse was perfectly successful and--as we found out afterwards--the
news of our “great projected attack in Flanders” soon spread, and by
the time we were ready to strike on the Somme the enemy was momentarily
expecting to be attacked in force in the north.
III
Meanwhile, hectic days and still more hectic nights were being passed
near Amiens.
The reader is to imagine that elaborate preparations such as were
described as the preliminaries to Cambrai and which took a month to
carry out, had now to be executed in a little over a week.
Reconnaissance had to be carried out, details of plans and liaison
arranged, and dumps had to be made, the last on an unprecedentedly
large scale, so great a number of Tanks never having gone into action
together before.
In the centre (the Australian sector) certain units in the 5th Brigade
had been newly equipped with Mark V. star infantry-carrying Tanks. No
one was very familiar with these machines, and so, in addition to other
preparations, such units had infantry-carrying to practise with their
Australians. One circumstance greatly added to the fraternal feeling of
the 5th Brigade towards their familiar battle partners. As soon as the
final conference was ended, General Monash laid down the principle that
on no consideration should any alteration be allowed in the plans as
then approved. It was therefore possible for all the Tank units to work
out the details of their schemes in perfect confidence.
The battlefield lay on either bank of the river Somme, which ran to the
north of the area of attack, and as far as Péronne, almost at right
angles to the lines of the two armies.
South of it, a number of gullies, roughly parallel to the battle front,
ran down to the river from high ground which formed the watershed
between the Somme and the small river Luce.
Two of these steep gullies, the Cérisy Valley, and another which ran
from Morcourt almost to Harbonnières, were to be great features in the
battle, forming as they did admirable cover for the concealment of
batteries or for the assembling of troops for a counter-attack.
The following notes on the Luce were given to the author by Major
Hotblack:--
“The river Luce, though only a small marshy stream, formed _the_ great
difficulty of the plan of operations.
“Part of it was in the French lines, and as to put up fresh bridges
would have attracted the enemy’s attention, the attacking troops had to
cross it in a few places and deploy afterwards in the dark.
“In that sector where the Luce flowed within the enemy’s lines, it ran
diagonally across the front of attack of the Canadian Division.
“A great deal of trouble was taken in finding out all possible details
of this little river, and it caused anxiety to every one concerned from
the Field-Marshal himself downwards.
“The Luce sector of the front lay within the lines then held by
the French, and in addition to various Reconnaissance Officers,
Major-General Lipsett, commanding the 3rd Canadian Division, and
Brig.-General Hankey, commanding the 4th Tank Brigade, carried out
personal reconnaissance of the river in general and Domarat Bridge in
particular.
“Both these General Officers had great reputations for personal
gallantry, and always endeavoured to see for themselves what the
conditions really were before committing their troops.
“The French troops then holding the line, knowing nothing beyond the
fact that they were to be relieved by the British, expressed the
greatest astonishment and admiration for our thoroughness and for the
remarkable conscientiousness and pertinacity of our Generals and
General Staff Officers, in so frequently visiting the forward positions
of an unhealthy sector. We had no choice but blandly to assure them
that this was their unvarying practice whenever a relief of any sort
was contemplated.”
As another result of the great secrecy that had been imposed, no
officer knew who else was in the secret, and on one occasion Major
Hotblack and another British officer met on the banks of the Luce and
each made lengthy explanations which explained everything except the
real reason why they were there. Two days later these officers met at
a conference on the operations, and congratulated each other on the
plausibility of their several explanations. It had been no easy matter
to pretend that it was quite a normal thing for them to paddle in the
Luce in close proximity to the enemy.
On the day all went well, however, and the information about the river
proved to be correct to the last detail, and as had been anticipated,
though the bridges in the enemy lines had been blown up, the gaps were
sufficiently small for Tanks to cross on the abutments.
Generally speaking, the going was good, and the fact that the weather
had been reasonably fine for some time before the day of attack made
our preparations the easier.
All night, for four or five nights before the battle, the carrying
Tanks had plied up and down, forming dumps of tens of thousands of
gallons of petrol and water and millions of rounds of ammunition.
At last the time came for the final moving up of both the fighting and
supply Tanks to their assembly positions, about two miles behind the
lines.
No. 1 Gun Carrier Company of Tanks had been allotted to the
5th Australian Division, and lay up in an orchard north of
Villers-Bretonneux.
All went well till the late afternoon of August 7, when a chance shot
from the enemy set one of these Tanks blazing.
The enemy promptly began to shell the area heavily, and destroyed
nearly the whole Company of Tanks and their loads. It was on this
occasion that Second Lieutenant Henderson Smith was awarded the
Military Cross.
The following account of his action appears in the list of “Honours and
Awards”:--
“As soon as the first Tank was hit, Second Lieutenant Smith rushed
to the scene and collected men to aid him, and so initiated
the work of rescuing the Tanks. He showed the utmost skill in
organising the withdrawal of Tanks from the blaze.
“Although several of his helpers were men from other units and
inexperienced in Tank work, this gallant officer succeeded in
moving two Tanks away from the heart of the fire. This bold action
undoubtedly enabled the people on his right to save three Tanks.
Unfortunately these two Tanks were hit and set on fire by the
explosions on other Tanks. On each occasion Second Lieutenant
Smith was the last to leave the blazing machine. The Tanks were
loaded with explosives for the infantry, gun-cotton, bombs, trench
mortars, etc., besides two fills of petrol each.”
The shelling was an uncomfortable incident, not only because of the
loss at the last moment of the machines and of the masses of stores
which they carried, but because such a bombardment might be an
indication that the enemy suspected the presence of Tanks.
However, as at Cambrai, there was nothing to be done, and it remained
only to try to hurry forward more stores to replace those which had
been burnt. This was successfully accomplished.
Final lying-up places for the 300 heavy Tanks had been arranged all
along the front at about 4000 yards from the front line.
At about the time when the Tanks were moving up to these “jumping-off
places” the enemy may have been somewhat puzzled to observe that a
number of large aeroplanes with exceedingly noisy engines kept flying
about between the lines. In any case, what he did not observe was the
noise made by 300 advancing Tanks.
IV
The night of the 7th-8th was damp and still, and at about four o’clock
on the 8th a dense ground mist had begun to drift up the river valley.
Soon the whole air was one silent white sea of vapour. So thick was it
that the assaulting infantry and Tanks had immediately to prepare to
move entirely by compass, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead
through the dense silent blanket.
Nothing, it would seem, was further from the Germans’ thoughts than
that the steaming quiet of the early autumn morning was to be so
terribly broken. At a quarter past four his lines were perfectly
silent. He was far from being in a truculent mood in this sector, and
for a week his attitude had been unobtrusive. Here and there a German
sentry, his grey greatcoat silvered like gossamer by the pearls of the
mist, would cough, stamping his feet as he peered listlessly through
the fog for stray trespassers in No Man’s Land.
Suddenly at 4.20 our massed artillery opened an intense fire along the
eleven miles of front.
The German front line was drenched in a hurricane of shells, and
behind, his unprepared batteries were for some time completely
smothered by the violence of our fire.
Before the Germans had had time to recover their wits, all along the
line the Tanks emerged by tens and twenties upon them out of the fog.
The forward positions were completely overwhelmed, the Tanks not so
much destroying the enemy with their fire as simply running down his
machine-gun emplacements and crushing crews and guns beneath them.
Our first wave was soon out beyond the enemy’s lightly held
front-trench system, and the survivors and the second wave were
fighting their way through his scattered machine-gun emplacements
towards the first phase objective.
With the Australians in the centre, a Company of the 13th Battalion
advanced rapidly over undulating country, apparently “swallowing the
ground” of both first and second phases at a run.
[70]“The method of attack was adapted to suit the ground; leaving
the infantry established on a crest, Tanks would go forward across
the valley, maintaining fire on isolated machine-gun posts, and
gain positions on the forward ridge. In all cases this induced the
enemy to give themselves up, and enabled the infantry to advance
to the next crest. On the right of this sector ‘B’ Company quickly
placed their infantry in their final first phase objective north
of the main road. ‘C’ Company on the left had more trouble; a
field gun placed on the high ground across the river near Chipilly
was in position to enfilade the advance, and knocked out three
Tanks. This for some time caused a withdrawal by the infantry.
By noon, however, the remaining Tanks had placed their infantry
in the required final positions, and all active opposition had
ceased. Throughout the operation there was abundant evidence of the
hasty retreat of the enemy. In the gully south-east of Morcourt a
transport-park, complete with wagons and harness, was left behind,
and at the southern end of the same gully a field canteen was found
well stocked with light wines and German beer.”
With the Canadians also the advance was rapid, but here the mist was so
thick that Tank sections got completely mixed up and fought cheerfully
all over each other’s areas.
The carefully planned and methodical assault had to give place to a
more or less primitive _mêlée_ in which each Tank generally sought out
and slew Germans wherever they might happen to find them.
Though far from scientific, this method when allied with the _élan_ of
the Canadian infantry proved highly successful.
With the 3rd Corps the fighting was heavier, and more difficulty was
experienced in advancing. The heavy Tanks and infantry, however, soon
everywhere held the line whose capture was to mark the end of the
first phase (_i.e._, Marcelcave, and the Cérisy Valley to south of
Morlancourt).
V
The second phase of the attack, which started four hours after zero,
was very different from the first. The mist which had hampered but
concealed our approach had now given place to brilliant sunshine. The
enemy had had ample warning and had time to dispose his “stout-hearted
artillery and machine-gunners” to meet the advance. In these conditions
his resistance stiffened. With the Australians,[71] “Enemy field
batteries firing over open sights engaged and knocked out Tanks, some
in the neighbourhood of Bayonvillers and near Cérisy Village. The crews
were, however, in many cases able to move forward with their Hotchkiss
guns and put the hostile batteries out of action. The surviving Tanks
pressed on to the final objective, the Australian infantry being quick
to seize the openings that had been made.”
The final objective allotted to the 2nd Tank Battalion was Harbonnières
Village.
The machine-gun and artillery fire had been heavy. However, the
first-wave Tanks rallied at the Cérisy Valley and with the rest of the
Battalion launched the attack on the second objective.
Lieut.-Colonel Bryce led his Tanks triumphantly to the successive
capture of all the objectives allotted to them--Warfusée, Lamotte,
Bayonvillers, and a number of other villages.
At last they reached Harbonnières, their last objective, and, still on
foot, Colonel Bryce entered the place with his leading Tanks and ran up
an Australian flag over the village.
In the naïve words of “Honours and Awards,” “This had a most
stimulating effect on every one.”
In the same sector, Lieutenant Percy Eade and his Tank (of the 2nd
Battalion) appear to have captured a village single-handed, and, best
of all, to have solemnly demanded a receipt upon handing it over to the
Australians.
[72]“During the attack on the 8th inst. this officer showed great
initiative, skill and bravery in dealing with unexpected resistance
by the enemy.
“On being informed by the infantry that Marcelcave was still
holding out and was endangering their right flank, he arranged
a scheme of attack with the infantry commander and proceeded to
quell the opposition. He destroyed at least six machine-guns with
their crews, besides taking many prisoners. He then handed over
the village to the infantry, from whom he took a receipt. After
regaining his position and during the second phase of the attack,
he heard opposition coming from Bayonvillers, so he proceeded
towards that village. As he was approaching it from the south-west
he discovered a group of three light field guns, two of which were
firing at him at short range. These guns had already knocked out
several Tanks. With great gallantry and determination he manœuvred
his Tank in their direction, and so directed the fire of his own
guns that he dispersed the gunners. After running over one of the
field guns, he proceeded into the village, where his Tank was
directly responsible for capturing at least forty of the enemy.
“Throughout the whole of the operation, this Tank Commander set his
crew a magnificent example of courage and determination. (Immediate
Reward.)”
The 13th Battalion History is particularly full of allusions to
the excellence of their relations with their battle partners, the
Australians.
All Tanks of this Battalion displayed on a painted board the colours of
their own infantry, of whom one N.C.O. stayed with each crew and rode
as an observer in the Tank on the day of battle. It may here be noted
that these Australian N.C.O.’s were of the greatest use in keeping
touch with the infantry, and incidentally returned to their units with
a largely enhanced opinion of the courage and endurance of the Tank
Corps personnel.
In the second phase one Tank was of service in keeping touch between
two Companies of infantry, until a gap in the line could be closed.
With the Canadians, the second phase was equally hot. A typical action
was fought by a machine belonging to the 14th Battalion.
[73]“Second Lieutenant Gould’s Tank was pushing on towards the Red
Line, which overlooked the valley running south. Here the enemy
were found to be organising for a counter-attack. Enemy transport
with a large number of stragglers, estimated at 1000, was in full
retreat up the road, and in the valley itself a force estimated
at half a battalion was forming up and being reinforced by other
parties coming over the hill in rear. All the time this Tank was
under heavy fire from machine-guns and snipers from the left
flank and rear. Fire was opened with 6-pounders on the transport
and direct hits observed. M.G. fire was also directed with good
effect on the excellent targets in the valley, causing confusion
and disorganisation in the enemy ranks. With the prolonged running
at high speed the interior of the Tank rapidly became unbearable
through heat and petrol fumes, and the crew were forced to evacuate
it and to take cover underneath. At this moment two of the crew
were wounded, one was sick, one fainted and one was delirious.
Fortunately, before the enemy could take advantage of the lull, two
Whippet Tanks and a body of cavalry came up, and the enemy in the
valley began to retreat over the hill.”
The 1st Tank Battalion, with the Canadians, suffered extremely severely.
[74]“Owing to the French having been held up, the British were
subjected to a heavy enfilade fire from the villages of Beaucourt
and Le Quesneu and nine of the eleven Tanks belonging to ‘A’
Company received direct hits from a field battery firing over open
sights from Le Quesneu. The majority caught fire and were burnt
out, and very severe casualties resulted, three out of the four
Section Commanders being killed and the remaining one wounded and
captured. This disaster was followed by a particularly heroic
action on the part of Second Lieutenant Cassell, who observed the
destructive fire of the battery, and, passing through the burning
victims of its shells, steered straight on to it, in an attempt to
avenge the destruction of his comrades. His heroism was in vain,
for before he had proceeded many yards he received a shell through
the front of his Tank which put it out of action and killed Second
Lieutenant Cassell and most of his crew.”
Meanwhile, the Whippets and the cavalry had pushed forward.
They and the armoured cars were to press on beyond the limits of the
infantry and heavy Tank attack.
Generally the Whippets were to precede the cavalry, in order to silence
machine-guns, deal with wire, if any, and generally to pave the way.
In practice, however:
[75]“Difficulty was found in maintaining touch with cavalry owing
to the impossibility of keeping up with galloping horsemen on the
one hand, and to the impossibility of a mounted advance in the face
of heavy machine-gun fire on the other hand. Thus, two sections
of ‘C’ Company, 3rd Battalion lost touch with their cavalry in
climbing a steep hill out of Ignaucourt Valley.”
There were, in fact, innumerable instances of liaison difficulties.
“Another Company was ordered to obtain touch with 3rd Cavalry
Brigade, but on reporting to the rendezvous, no cavalry was seen.
“Zero hour had been postponed three hours, but this was not known
till later.
“Being unable to obtain touch with the cavalry, assistance was
rendered about noon to Canadian infantry attacking Beaufort and
Warvillers. This attack was successful and Whippets rendered great
assistance.”
Far happier was the lot of certain Whippets which played an independent
part. The following is a first-hand account of the adventures of one
such machine, the ever-to-be-remembered Whippet, “Musical Box.”
[Illustration: SMOKE SCREEN AND SEMAPHORE]
[Illustration: A TANKADROME]
As the story will show, for many months no news was obtained of the
fate of the machine or of her crew of one officer, Lieutenant C. B.
Arnold, and two men, Gunner Ribbans and Driver Carney, and it was not
till January 1919 that the following amazing tale appeared in _Weekly
Tank Notes_:--
“On August 8, 1918, I commanded Whippet ‘Musical Box’ in ‘B’
Company, 6th Battalion. We left the lying-up point at zero (4.20
p.m.) and proceeded across country to the south side of the
railway at Villers-Bretonneux. We crossed the railway, in column
of sections, by the bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town. I
reached the British front line and passed through the Australian
infantry and some of our heavy Tanks (Mark V.), in company with
the remainder of the Whippets of ‘B’ Company. Four sections of
‘B’ Company proceeded parallel with the railway (Amiens-Ham)
across country due east. After proceeding about 2000 yards in this
direction I found myself to be the leading machine, owing to the
others having become ditched, etc. To my immediate front I could
see more Mark V. Tanks being followed very closely by Australian
infantry. About this time we came under direct shell-fire from a
4-gun field battery, of which I could see the flashes, between
Abancourt and Bayonvillers. Two Mark V. Tanks, on my right, were
knocked out. I saw clouds of smoke coming out of these machines
and the crews evacuate them. The infantry following the heavy
machines were suffering casualties from this battery. I turned
half-left and ran diagonally across the front of the battery, at
a distance of about 600 yards. Both my guns were able to fire on
the battery, in spite of which they got off about eight rounds at
me without damage, but sufficiently close to be audible inside
the cab, and I could see the flash of each gun as it fired. By
this time I had passed behind a belt of trees running along a
roadside. I ran along this belt until level with the battery, when
I turned full-right and engaged the battery in rear. On observing
our appearance from the belt of trees, the gunners, some thirty
in number, abandoned their guns and tried to get away. Gunner
Ribbans and I accounted for the whole lot. I cruised forward,
making a detour to the left, and shot a number of the enemy, who
appeared to be demoralised, and were moving about the country in
all directions. This detour brought me back to the railway siding
N.N.W. of Guillaucourt. I could now see other Whippets coming up
and a few Mark V.’s also. The Australian infantry, who followed
magnificently, had now passed through the battery position which
we had accounted for and were lying in a sunken road about 400
yards past the battery and slightly to the left of it. I got out
of my machine and went to an Australian full Lieutenant and asked
if he wanted any help. Whilst talking to him, he received a bullet
which struck the metal shoulder title, a piece of the bullet-casing
entering his shoulder. While he was being dressed, Major Rycroft
(horse) and Lieutenant Waterhouse (Tanks) and Captain Strachan of
‘B’ Company, 6th Battalion, arrived and received confirmation from
the Australian officer of our having knocked out the field battery.
I told Major Rycroft what we had done, and then moved off again at
once, as it appeared to be unwise for four machines (Lieutenant
Watkins had also arrived) to remain stationary at one spot. I
proceeded parallel with the railway embankment in an easterly
direction, passing through two cavalry patrols of about twelve
men each. The first patrol was receiving casualties from a party
of enemy in a field of corn. I dealt with this, killing three or
four, the remainder escaping out of sight into the corn. Proceeding
further east, I saw the second patrol pursuing six enemy. The
leading horse was so tired that he was not gaining appreciably
on the rearmost Hun. Some of the leading fugitives turned about
and fired at the cavalryman when his sword was stretched out and
practically touching the back of the last Hun. Horse and rider
were brought down on the left of the road. The remainder of the
cavalrymen deployed to right, coming in close under the railway
embankment, where they dismounted and came under fire from the
enemy, who had now taken up a position on the railway bridge, and
were firing over the parapet, inflicting one or two casualties. I
ran the machine up until we had a clear view of the bridge, and
killed four of the enemy with one long burst, the other two running
across the bridge and on down the opposite slope out of sight. On
our left I could see, about three-quarters of a mile away, a train
on fire being towed by an engine. I proceeded further east, still
parallel to the railway, and approached carefully a small valley
marked on my map as containing Boche hutments. As I entered the
valley (between Bayonvillers and Harbonnières) at right angles,
many enemy were visible packing kits and others retiring. On our
opening fire on the nearest, many others appeared from huts, making
for the end of the valley, their object being to get over the
embankment and so out of our sight. We accounted for many of these.
I cruised round, Ribbans went into one of the huts and returned,
and we counted about sixty dead and wounded. There were evidences
of shell-fire amongst the huts, but we certainly accounted for most
of the casualties counted there. I turned left from the railway
and cruised across country, as lines of enemy infantry could be
seen retiring. We fired at these many times at ranges of 200 yards
to 600 yards. These targets were fleeting, owing to the enemy
getting down into the corn when fired on. In spite of this, many
casualties must have been inflicted, as we cruised up and down for
at least an hour. I did not see any more of our troops or machines
after leaving the cavalry patrols already referred to. During the
cruising, being the only machine to get through, we invariably
received intense rifle and machine-gun fire. I would here beg to
suggest that no petrol be carried on the outside of the machine,
as under orders we were carrying nine tins of petrol on the roof,
for refilling purposes when well into the enemy lines (should
opportunity occur). The perforated tins allowed the petrol to run
all over the cab. These fumes, combined with the intense bullet
splash and the great heat after being in action (by this time) nine
to ten hours, made it necessary at this point to breathe through
the mouth-piece of the box respirator, without actually wearing the
mask.
[Illustration: MOVING UP. BATTLE OF AMIENS]
[Illustration: THE ARMOURED CARS GOING UP]
“At 2 p.m. or thereabouts I again proceeded east, parallel to
the railway and about 100 yards north of it. I could see a large
aerodrome and also an observation balloon at a height of about 200
ft. I could also see great quantities of motor and horse transport
moving in all directions. Over the top of another ridge on my left
I could see the cover of a lorry coming in my direction; I moved
up out of sight and waited until he topped the bridge, when I shot
the driver. The lorry ran into a right-hand ditch. The railway
had now come out of the cutting in which it had rested all the
while, and I could see both sides of it. I could see a long line of
men retiring on both sides of the railway, and fired at these at
ranges of 400 to 500 yards, inflicting heavy casualties. I passed
through these and also accounted for one horse and the driver of
a two-horse canvas-covered wagon on the far side of the railway.
We now crossed a small road which crossed the main railway, and
came in view of large horse and wagon lines--which ran across the
railway and close to it. Gunner Ribbans (R.H. gun) here had a view
of south side of railway and fired continuously into motor and
horse transport moving on three roads (one north and south, one
almost parallel to the railway, and one diagonally between these
two). I fired many bursts at 600 to 800 yards at transport blocking
roads on my left, causing great confusion. Rifle and machine-gun
fire was not heavy at this time, owing to our sudden appearance, as
the roads were all banked up in order to cross the railway. There
were about twelve men in the middle aisle of these lines. I fired
a long burst at these. Some went down and others got in amongst
the wheels and undergrowth. I turned quarter-left towards a small
copse, where there were more horses and men, about 200 yards away.
On the way across we met the most intense rifle and machine-gun
fire imaginable from all sides. When at all possible, we returned
the fire, until the L.H. revolver port cover was shot away. I
withdrew the forward gun, locked the mounting and held the body of
the gun against the hole. Petrol was still running down the inside
of the back door. Fumes and heat combined were very bad. We were
still moving forward and I was shouting to Driver Carney to turn
about, as it was impossible to continue the action, when two heavy
concussions closely followed one another and the cab burst into
flames. Carney and Ribbans got to the door and collapsed. I was
almost overcome, but managed to get the door open and fell out on
to the ground, and was able to drag out the other two men. Burning
petrol was running on to the ground where we were lying. The fresh
air revived us, and we all got up and made a short rush to get away
from the burning petrol. We were all on fire. In this rush Carney
was shot in the stomach and killed. We rolled over and over to try
to extinguish the fumes. I saw numbers of the enemy approaching
from all round. The first arrival came for me with a rifle and
bayonet. I got hold of this, and the point of the bayonet entered
my right forearm. The second man struck at my head with the butt
end of his rifle, hit my shoulder and neck, and knocked me down.
When I came to, there were dozens all round me, and any one who
could reach me did so and I was well kicked. They were furious.
Ribbans and I were taken away and stood by ourselves about
twenty yards clear of the crowd. An argument ensued, and we were
eventually marched to a dug-out where paper bandages were put on
our hands. Our faces were left as they were. We were then marched
down the road to the main railway. There we joined a party of about
eight enemy, and marched past a field kitchen, where I made signs
for food. We had had nothing since 8.30 p.m. on the night previous
to the action, and it was 3.30 p.m. when we were set on fire. We
went on to a village where, on my intelligence map, a Divisional
Headquarters had been marked. An elderly stout officer interrogated
me, asking if I was an officer. I said ‘Yes.’ He then asked various
other questions, to which I replied, ‘I do not know.’ He said, ‘Do
you mean you do not know or you will not tell me?’ I said, ‘You can
take it whichever way you wish.’ He then struck me in the face,
and went away. We went on to Chaulone to a canvas hospital, on the
right side of the railway, where I was injected with anti-tetanus.
Later I was again interrogated, with the same result as above,
except that instead of being struck, I received five days’ solitary
confinement in a room with no window, and only a small piece of
bread and a bowl of soup each day. On the fifth day I was again
interrogated, and said the same as before. I said that he had no
right to give me solitary confinement, and that unless I were
released, I should, at first opportunity, report him to the highest
possible authority. The next day I was sent away, and eventually
reached the camp at Freiburg, when I found my brother, Captain
A. E. Arnold, M.C., Tank Corps. The conduct of Gunner Ribbans and
Driver Carney was beyond all praise throughout. Driver Carney drove
from Villers-Bretonneux onwards.
“(_Signed_) C. B. ARNOLD, Lieut.,
“6th Tank Battalion.
“_January 1, 1919._”
The Tank was found close to the small railway on the eastern side of
the Harbonnières-Rosières Road.
VI
The final stage of the day’s battle had been reached by early afternoon.
The armoured cars, moving rapidly east along the main roads, did much
to complete the demoralisation of the enemy.
[76]“The enemy, once in retreat, became completely demoralised. One
heard from the commanders of the armoured cars which were returning
on the main Villers-Bretonneux road, how they chased excited German
Staff cars and officers through the ruined village of Faucourt, and
eventually had been held up, because the enemy’s traffic was so
congested on the roads behind his lines that they could penetrate
no further. The Air Force were then reported to have completed this
confusion, by obtaining some excellent results in flying low over
these roads....
“The cars which had turned northwards entered Proyart and
Chuignolles, two moving up to the river Somme. At Proyart the
cars found the German troops at dinner; these they shot down and
scattered in all directions, and then moving westwards met masses
of the enemy driven from their trenches by the Australians. In
order to surprise these men who were moving eastwards, the cars
hid in the outskirts of Proyart and only advanced when the enemy
was between fifty and one hundred yards distant, when they moved
forward, rapidly shooting down great numbers. Scattering from
before the cars at Proyart, the enemy made across country towards
Chuignolles, only to be met by the cars which had proceeded to
this village, and they were once again fired on and dispersed.
Near Chuignolles one armoured car obtained ‘running practice’ with
its machine-guns at a lorry full of troops, and kept up fire until
the lorry ran into the ditch. There were also several cases of
armoured cars following German transport vehicles, without anything
unusual being suspected, until fire was opened at point-blank range.
“Although more than half the cars were out of action by the evening
of the 8th, there were no casualties amongst their personnel
sufficiently serious to require evacuation.”
The Mark V. star Tanks successfully reached the day’s final objective
and delivered their infantry machine-gunners on the line which was to
be the limit of our advance.
That they were duly “delivered” is, however, about as much as can be
said of many of these unfortunates.
The motion, the heat, and the fumes of the inside of a Tank closed for
action, almost invariably proved too much for all but the Tank’s own
well-salted crew.
Consequently where little fire had been met with, the machine-gunners
had come up either riding or walking behind it.
Where the fire had been heavy and they had been sternly ordered in and
the Tank closed up, they had been delivered flushed, feverish, and
either vomiting or extremely faint and quite unfit for duty until they
had been given at least a couple of hours’ rest.
The Australian Corps and their Tanks had alone taken about 7900
prisoners, and our total captures amounted to over 13,000 prisoners,
and more than 300 guns, besides all kinds of stores and ammunition.
Along the eleven miles of attack we had advanced to a depth of nearly
seven miles, and (except Le Quesnoy, which we captured before dawn on
the 9th) the whole of the outer defences of Amiens had been taken. The
armoured cars and some of the cavalry had, as we have seen, been in
action far beyond. It was north of the Somme that our advance had been
most hotly contested, but even here we had pushed forward considerably
and the enemy’s casualties had been particularly heavy.
The Paris-Amiens railway was completely disengaged, and the Despatch
characterises the first day’s fighting as a “sweeping success.”
VII
All night, to the east beyond the limit of our advance, we could hear
the enemy blowing up his ammunition dumps.
All night his transport and limbers streamed eastwards, and all night
our airmen hung upon his retreating columns.
Next morning we attacked again along the whole line, no less than 155
Tanks being actually engaged.
The Australians advanced upon Lihons, Framerville and Vauxvillers,
while on their right the Canadians continued the attack south of the
Amiens-Chaulnes railway.
In the attack on Framerville, out of thirteen Tanks engaged, only one
was hit.
This fact was attributable to the admirable co-operation between the
infantry and Tanks.
[77]“Riflemen working hand in hand with the machines picking
off the enemy’s field gunners, as soon as the Tanks came into
observation. At Vauxvillers, seven Tanks went into action just
before noon, unaccompanied by infantry and without artillery
support. After the Tanks had gone forward a little way, the 5th
Australian Division followed up and not only captured the high
ground, but the village itself, which was not included in their
original objective.”
Near Rosières the opposition stiffened, and here no less than eight
Tanks were knocked out by a German battery which came into action near
Lihons. It was not until 5 p.m. that this battery was silenced, and we
did not reach Lihons that night.
[78]“The day’s operations were especially interesting through
the rapidity with which the enemy got his field batteries into
action from commanding positions against Tanks advancing in broad
daylight. He also employed a number of low-flying aeroplanes
against the infantry, but as these did not carry bombs their fire
had no effect upon the Tanks. The resistance put up by his riflemen
and machine-gunners was feeble, and showed clearly the moral effect
of the victorious advance of the previous day.”
With the Canadians as many Tanks as possible were rallied and about
fifty-five went into action. They went forward, as before, in waves,
the same Tank Battalions working with the same Infantry Divisions as on
the previous day.
North of the Somme, with the 3rd Corps (which included the 33rd
American Division) the 10th Tank Battalion put sixteen Tanks into
action.
They had a hard task round Chipilly, where the enemy had a large number
of machine-guns cleverly concealed in woods and gullies. By the early
evening, however, all the objectives were taken, and our positions
advanced in line with those which we held south of the river, an
advance achieved at a cost of five casualties to the sixteen machines
engaged.
The Whippets’ action, in as far as they were billed to act with the
cavalry, was disappointing. By some fault of liaison they were kept too
long at Brigade Headquarters.
At Beaufort and Warvillers, however, they were able to give great help
to the infantry by chasing hostile machine-gunners out of the standing
corn and shooting them down as they fled.
On the whole August 9th was a successful day, for we continued to push
forward steadily all along our line.
VIII
We had, in fact, pushed forward so far that all along the line during
the next day’s fighting we reached the old trench systems of the First
Battle of the Somme. And it was this fact, combined with the usual
and inevitable petering out of all attacks which are not supported by
immense reserves, that now slowed our rate of advance down to nothing.
Two days later we left off hammering.
The 10th proved an unfortunate day for the Tanks, for though we
advanced, the eighty-five Tanks engaged suffered heavily in every
sector.
With the Canadians, owing to orders having been issued late, the hour
of attack had to be altered, and it finally took place in daylight
without smoke.
A stubborn resistance was encountered, and of the forty-three Tanks
engaged no less than twenty-three received direct hits.
Before Warvillers the cavalry and Whippets had a particularly poor time
of it, the old trench systems and the old shelled area, of which the
enemy had taken ingenious and thorough advantage, proving too much for
both arms.
With the Australians a rather remarkable night attack was arranged.
During the three previous days’ fighting it had been found very
inconvenient to have the Somme Valley as an inter-corps boundary, and
General Monash was allowed to extend his territory northward in such a
way that the Australians should hold both sides of the valley.
An encircling movement was, therefore, undertaken, of which Captain
Denny, M.C., M.P., gives the following account in his article on the
work of the Australians which appeared in the _Daily Telegraph_ of
April 1919:
“The 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions were ordered to carry out
an encircling operation on the night of August 10–11 in order to
cut off the Etinehem spur north of the Somme and the ridge east of
Proyart, south of the Somme. The general lines of the operation
both to the north and the south of the river were similar. Columns
were to move along defined roads leaving the objectives well to
the flanks, and then encircle the enemy positions. Each column was
accompanied by Tanks, and was to move in an easterly direction, and
then to wheel inwards towards the Somme. It was recognised that
this action involved certain risks, as Tanks had never been tried
by night in this way, but in view of the condition of the enemy’s
_moral_ at this stage it was considered that the effect of the
advance of the Tanks and infantry would lead immediately to the
collapse of the defence.
“The action north of the river was entirely successful. South of
the river the enemy bombed the forward area heavily early in the
night, causing considerable delay in the preparations for the
attack. Progress was at first slow owing to heavy enemy artillery
and machine-gun fire and the disorganisation caused by the bombing.
Two of the Tanks allotted for the operations were destroyed or put
out of action very soon after zero hour.”
Almost from the outset of the attack heavy enemy machine-gun fire was
encountered from the large enemy dump by the side of the main road.
Tanks were unable in the dark to locate these machine-guns, and could
not do much to assist the infantry. It was therefore decided to abandon
the operation and withdraw the infantry under cover of unaimed fire
from the Tanks, who were themselves recalled when the infantry had got
clear away.
It was not till the evening of August 12 that Tanks and infantry were
able to advance in this sector, and that we gained the positions east
of Proyart.
By August 11 the Tank Corps reserves were used up, and the Tanks and
their crews were almost fought to a standstill. They had had three
days of continuous fighting and marching, and of the thirty-eight
Tanks which went into action on the 11th there was not one but badly
needed overhauling. The crews were completely exhausted. We have
already described the conditions under which the men fought in the
Mark V. Tank, and how after an average of three hours in a closed Tank
whose guns are in action, all men begin to suffer from severe headache
and giddiness, and most from sickness, a high temperature and heart
disturbance.
After the Battle of Amiens the crews of most of the surviving Tanks
had fought for three days, not three hours, and 50 per cent. of them
were on the verge of collapse. However, as we have said, thirty-eight
machines and crews were scraped together, and on August 11 ten Tanks of
the 2nd Battalion helped in the taking of Lihons by the Australians.
These Tanks had an approach march of eight miles before they reached
their jumping-off places.
With the Canadians, Tanks attacked Domeny and twice entered the
village, but the 4th Canadian Division could not get forward to
consolidate, owing to lack of support on the right.
On the 12th, while six Tanks were still thrashing out the Proyart
affair north of the Somme, the 4th and 5th Brigades were withdrawn, to
be followed next day by the remainder of the Tanks.
IX
We called a halt, and the Battle of Amiens was at an end, for it was
again at last the Allies who chose the time and the place where they
would offer battle.
Commanders who had the bitter taste of the forced actions of the
March retreat in their mouths, must have savoured this easy choice
extraordinarily. There is something thrilling in the assured words of
the Despatch. We did not care for the new battle site! We would change
it and fight elsewhere!
“The derelict battle area which now lay before our troops, seared
by old trench lines, pitted with shell-holes, and crossed in all
directions with tangled belts of wire, the whole covered by the
wild vegetation of two years, presented unrivalled opportunities
for stubborn machine-gun defences....
“I therefore determined to break off the battle on this front, and
transferred the front of attack from the 4th Army to the sector
north of the Somme, where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy.
My intention was for the 3rd Army to operate in the direction of
Bapaume so as to turn the line of the old Somme defences from the
north.”
We struck at once. Only four days were given to the Tanks for
overhauling machines and patching up the crews, for on August 21 we
opened the new battle.
Meanwhile it was hard to realise how great was the moral and physical
blow which we had dealt the Germans. The July attacks had been
tentative, but the Battle of Amiens was the decisive victory, the sure
proof that the Germans had lost all hope of winning the War by force of
arms.
But at the time we could not read the thundering sign of our
deliverance with certainty. We could see only what were the more
immediate results of the battle.
[79]“Within the space of five days the town of Amiens and the
railway centring upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German
Divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British Infantry
Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions, assisted by a regiment of
the 33rd American Division and supported by some 400 Tanks. Nearly
22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by us, and our
line had been pushed forward to a depth of some twelve miles in a
vital sector. Further, our deep advance, combined with the attacks
of the French Armies on our right, had compelled the enemy to
evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the south of us.
“The effect of this victory--following so closely after the Allied
victory on the Marne--upon the _moral_ both of the German and
British troops was very great. Buoyed up by the hope of immediate
and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favourable
peace, constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted,
the German soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two
fronts and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important
portions of their earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of
a deep and lasting character.
“On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last their
opportunity had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery
and numerous Tanks they could now press forward resolutely to reap
the reward of their patient, dauntless, and successful defence in
March and April.”
We knew, however, that we had still hard fighting before us, and we
were careful to analyse every phase of the action to see if we could
not learn some practical lesson from it that should help us in the
coming months.
The Tank Command noted several points “for reference.” In the first
place, the battle would have been ended the quicker if the Tanks had
had a larger general reserve.
Then neither the Mark V. nor the Whippet was fast enough for open
warfare.
Had we then possessed machines such as we have now,[80] of double the
speed of the Mark V., and having a radius of action of 100 miles and
more, we should, at a modest estimate, have finished the battle on the
first day.
Last, we had not used our Whippets to the best advantage.
The 3rd (Light) Brigade Commander, Brig.-General Hardress-Lloyd,
thus admirably summarised the lessons of the battle, and laid down
alternative principles upon which the light machines might be used:
“I do not think it advisable to attempt to use the present Whippet
in conjunction with cavalry. Better results would have been
obtained during these operations if Whippets had been working in
close liaison with Mark V. Tanks and infantry.
“The Whippet is not fast enough to conform to cavalry tactics in
the early stages of a battle.
“The Whippets’ rôle should be to push on amongst the retreating
enemy and prevent him from reorganising, engage reinforcements
coming up, eventually enabling the infantry to make a further
advance, capture prisoners, guns, etc.
“... They must move forward in close touch with the heavy Tanks so
as to be near enough up to go though when required. If kept back
with the cavalry the speed of the Whippet is not sufficient to
enable the machine to be in the forward position at the required
moment, and its offensive power will be seriously diminished.”
But it was not for us that the battle of August 8 had its chief lessons.
The German High Command waxed eloquent with indignant exhortation, and
demanded passionately that the experiences of the German Army should be
utilised, and that such things as had occurred on the 8th should never
happen again.
On August 11 General Ludendorff issued a secret Order:
“Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a mass attack of
Tanks, and lost all cohesion when the Tanks suddenly appeared
behind them, having broken through under cover of a mist, natural
and artificial. The defensive organisation, both of the first
line and in the rear, was insufficient to permit of a systematic
defence.... As a weapon against Tanks, the prepared defence of the
ground must play a larger part than ever, and the aversion of the
men to the pick and shovel must be overcome at all hazards....
Especially there must be defences against Tanks. It was absolutely
inadmissible that the Tanks, having penetrated into our advance
line without meeting with obstacles or anything, should be able
to push on along the roads or beside them for miles.... The
principle that a body of troops even when surrounded must defend
their ground, unless otherwise ordered, to the last man and the
last cartridge, seems to have fallen into oblivion ... a large
proportion of our ranks fight unskilfully against Tanks. A Tank is
an easy prey for artillery of all calibres....”
An account follows of measures for the proper disposition of artillery
against Tanks, and the rest of the Order is occupied with directions
to the infantry concerning the question at what range the anti-Tank
rifle and gun are most effective. The consideration of these points is
long and exhaustive. Ludendorff further hopes much from “the active and
inventive genius of the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers
to arrange Tank traps, and demands that every encouragement should be
shown to those who show any inventive talent.”
These were but peddling remedies. When, as at Amiens, the understanding
between infantry and Tanks is almost perfect, and when the magnificent
_élan_ of an assault by Australians and Canadians is supported by the
weight of 400 Tanks, not even the troops of what was the best-trained
Army in the world can stand the concerted shock of their attack.
A Special Order was issued on August 16 by General Sir Henry Rawlinson,
the 4th Army Commander:
“_Tank Corps._--The success of the operations of August 8 and
succeeding days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by
the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I desire to
place on record my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services
rendered both by the Mark V. and the Mark V. star and the Whippets.
“The task of secretly assembling so large a number of Tanks
entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or
five nights previous to the battle.
“The tactical handling of the Tanks in action made calls on the
skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met
with a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise.
“I desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid
success that they achieved, and to heartily congratulate the Tank
Corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the
admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this
occasion. There are many vitally important lessons to be learned
from their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to heart by
all concerned and made full use of when next the Tank Corps is
called upon to go into battle.
“The part played by the Tanks and Whippets in the battle on August
8 was in all respects a very fine performance.
“(_Signed_) H. RAWLINSON, _General_,
“Commanding 4th Army.
“Headquarters, 4th Army,
“_August 16, 1918_.”
Nor were the Australians less generous.
The following message is typical of many. It was sent to Brig.-General
Courage (commanding 5th Tank Brigade) by the 4th Australian Divisional
Commander:
“G.O.C. 5th Tank Brigade.
“I wish to express to you and the command associated with us on
August 8 and following days, on behalf of the 4th Australian
Division, our deep appreciation of the most gallant service
rendered during our offensive operations by the Tank Corps. The
consistent skill and gallantry with which the Tanks, individually
and collectively, were handled during the battle, was the
admiration of all ranks of the infantry with whom they were so
intimately associated, and our success was due in a very large
measure to your efforts.
“We hope sincerely, that in future offensive operations in which we
may take part, we shall have the honour to be associated with the
same units of the Tank Corps as during the operations on August 8
and following days.
“(_Signed_) E. G. SINCLAIR MCLAGAN,
“Major-General,
“Commanding 4th Australian Division.”
Finally, in a congratulatory telegram after the battle, the
Commander-in-Chief paid a high tribute to the skill and bravery
displayed by the Tank Corps in the gaining of this signal victory.