WITH THE FRENCH--THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL
The 5th Brigade and the Australians had sworn eternal friendship with a
refreshing enthusiasm.
They were like two schoolgirl friends, not to be separated, and at
Vaux, whither they had retired for combined training, metaphorically
went about all day with their arms round each other’s waists.
Therefore, when on July 17 orders reached the 5th Tank Brigade
that they were to send a Battalion south to fight with the French,
consternation reigned.
If anybody went it would have to be the 2nd Battalion, which had not
fought at Hamel at all.
But surely some way out could be found by which the Australians’ own
Brigade of Tanks should not be thus cruelly dismembered?
And the authorities, with positively avuncular benevolence--after
a little humming and hahing--were actually induced to make
another arrangement; as the friends firmly believed, solely upon
their representations. There were, however, other more military
considerations.
The attack was still to be under Brigadier-General Courage, but an
extra Battalion, the 9th, should be added to the Brigade for the
occasion.
This apparently whimsical outcry of the new-found affinities, and the
yielding of the authorities, were to be justified thrice over in the
events of the next few months.
For at this early period a little thing might upset the forging of a
weapon which was to prove the two-edged sword with which we were to
“smite Amalek hip and thigh.”
As soon as it had been decided that the 9th Battalion was to go,
preparations were at once begun.
The French plans were already well advanced before the Tanks came upon
the scene at all. The attacking troops had indeed been in the area
since April, but the Tanks felt that they would be eternally disgraced
if they were obliged so much as to hint that they would like even a
day’s postponement of this, their first battle with the French.
Indeed in this battle we see the first instance of the wonderful
“speeding up” which the Allied Army underwent almost as soon as the
joint command was concentrated in the hands of Marshal Foch.
An officer who was present throughout the battle and its preliminaries
writes:
“On a certain Wednesday General Elles and General Courage had an
interview at 3 p.m. with the 4th Army Commander and were consulted
as to the project.
“At 4.30 they saw General Debeney (the French Army Commander) and
the French Corps Commander, when railheads and a general scheme of
movement were decided upon.
“That night the 9th Battalion was warned, and the battle took place
at dawn on the following Tuesday.”
Practice makes perfect, and we gradually discovered that the kind of
full-dress attacks for which we had always, as a matter of course,
allowed a month of preparation, could, in fact, be staged in half that
time.
We see in the huge Battle of Amiens, of which only ten days’ notice was
given to the troops who took part, how great a reform we managed to
accomplish.
II
The attack was to be at dawn on July 23, and was to be--like Hamel--a
more or less limited and experimental battle.
Its immediate object was to seize St. Ribert Wood in order to outflank
Mailly Raineval from the south, to abolish certain highly objectionable
German batteries which lay near St. Ribert, and to advance the French
field guns eastward in such a way that they would bear upon the high
ridges which dominate the right bank of the river Avre.
The country here was undulating and the soil well drained, and, except
for a number of large and very dense woods, there were very few Tank
obstacles.
There were to be three objectives. The first was a line which
ran through the Bois des Sauvillers, Adelpare Farm, and
Les-Trois-Boqueleaux. Twelve Tanks and four Battalions of French
infantry were detailed for its capture.
The second objective included the clearing of the plateau to the north
of the Bois des Sauvillers, and the capture of a corner of the Bois
de Harpan. Twenty-four Tanks were allotted to this objective and four
infantry Battalions.
The third was a line of German posts, known as the “Blue Line,”
covering the second objective, and was to be attacked by a strong
force of infantry and all the surviving Tanks. The whole attack
was to be preceded by a short intense bombardment, including heavy
counter-battery work, and the creeping barrage was to consist of a
mixture of high explosive and smoke. The Tanks were to attack in
sections of three, two in front and one in immediate support, the
infantry advancing in small groups close behind the Tanks.
Three days before the battle the officers of the 9th Battalion and some
of the Staff of the 5th Brigade came down to the battle site, and,
helped by the Staff of the French 3rd Division, made a pretty thorough
reconnaissance of the ground. That same evening the Tanks detrained at
Contay.
The 9th Battalion had been busy doing such tactical training as was
possible with its new colleagues on the 5th Brigade training ground.
The time was short and the difficulties of language great, but in spite
of this a very friendly understanding had been come to.
Besides this, it had had an unusual amount of trekking to do.
It had had over eight miles to travel across country to its place of
entrainment. From Contay, the rail terminus, the Tanks moved in all
over another eight miles before they got into action.
At ten o’clock on the night before the battle the Tanks were informed
that the attack, which was to have been at dawn, was postponed
until 5.30. By this time it would, the Tank crews somewhat ruefully
reflected, be broad daylight.
However, there was nothing to be done but to hope that the wind would
help our smoke screens.
The weather had for some time been fine, but on the morning of attack
heavy rain began to fall, driven up by a south wind.
The prospect of a really effective smoke cloud did not seem very great.
However, it was in the best of fighting spirits that the Tanks and
their infantry went forward at zero hour--indeed, though it was no
walk-over and all arms suffered fairly heavily, high spirits seem to
have particularly characterised both French and British in this battle.
A member of the Tank Corps testifies naïvely to the way in which the
Tanks had got their tails up.
“Brigadier-General Courage, who was much in evidence, was
continually visiting the Battalion and conversing with the
officers. From the nature of his suggestions and advice, a very
ordinary thinker could easily come to the conclusion that he did
not care for the Germans.”
As the first wave Tanks and infantry advanced, they found that the
enemy was putting down a fairly heavy barrage in many places. However,
moving ahead of the infantry, the Tanks cleared Arrachis Wood,
destroying a number of machine-guns, and after a slight resistance,
captured the first objective--Sauvillers Village, Adelpare Farm and
Les-Trois-Boqueleaux--fifteen minutes before the infantry arrived. Two
Tanks were knocked out by shells.
In the second phase, the Tanks of “B” and “C” Companies moved forward
in support of their infantry on either side of Sauvillers Wood. As
they swept forward, they outstripped the French patrols, but after a
while turned back to maintain touch. It was by now about 9.30 a.m. The
Tanks could not immediately find their partners, and unfortunately, as
they were thus cruising about, no less than six Tanks were put out of
action, one after another, by a single battery, apparently one of those
lurking to the south of St. Ribert Wood, and whose destruction was one
of the objects of the attack.
In another sector a Battalion Commander in the 51st Regiment of French
Infantry, which was moving up in support, determined that if possible
he would attack Harpon Wood, and asked the officer commanding “B”
Company of Tanks for assistance. The Company Commander immediately
entered into the scheme with alacrity and between them a plan of attack
for the French infantry and the seven Tanks was rapidly arranged. This
little improvised action was a great success, Tanks and infantry duly
capturing the Wood and at least one hostile battery. Only two Tanks
were damaged.
It was not far from Harpon that Captain Dalton’s Tank, in the confusion
due to the smoke, got some distance ahead of its infantry. Near
the Wood, Captain Dalton located an enemy battery. After a little
manœuvring he managed to get a direct hit upon one of the guns and
drove off the crews of the other pieces with machine-gun fire, thus
silencing the whole battery. He then manœuvred his Tank into position
to tow back one of the enemy guns, but at this moment his machine
received a direct hit, and shortly after, a second shell added to
the damage. Captain Dalton evacuated his crew, and, having done so,
made every effort to get back to the derelict Tank, for it must be
remembered that as yet no Mark V. had ever fallen into German hands.
He was under intense machine-gun fire and in direct view of the enemy,
but, realising the importance of blowing up the remains of his Tank, he
still attempted the adventure. But it was in vain, for as he was thus
trying to crawl up, he was severely wounded in the thigh. He managed,
however, to drag himself back into the French lines.
Nor was Second Lieutenant C. Mecredy, a Section Commander, less anxious
that his knocked-out Tank should be completely destroyed rather than
fall into the hands of the enemy.
He had been advancing ahead of his infantry, when a shell from a
concealed field gun hit the Tank in which he was leading the attack.
At once seizing up a number of smoke bombs, he got out of his machine,
went back, and, throwing down his bombs, put up a smoke curtain to
cover the Tanks that were following him, lest they should share the
fate of his own machine. His manœuvre was perfectly successful, for
under cover of the smoke the other Tanks changed their direction and
escaped the guns. With some difficulty Mr. Mecredy managed to dodge
his way back to his Tank, under heavy hostile shelling and machine-gun
fire, successfully blew it up, and was preparing to go back when he
discovered that one of his crew was lying wounded in the leg in a very
exposed place. This man he managed to bring back with him to safety.
By the evening all the three objectives had been gained, and the French
Command were very well satisfied with the success of the action.
Especially delighted was the General Commanding the 3rd
Division--General Bourgon--who was a great friend of the British Tank
Corps, and who had been as anxious as we that no hitch should mar this
first combined battle.
Both French and British had suffered rather heavy casualties, the
French 3rd Division, with whom we had acted, losing over seven hundred
officers and men.
Fifteen Tanks out of thirty-six had been knocked out by direct hits,
and of the fifteen rather a large proportion were beyond salving.
However, the enemy’s losses were also heavy. The prisoners totalled
over eighteen hundred, and we took 5 field guns, 45 trench mortars and
275 machine-guns.
Before the 9th Battalion went back to the training area it had the
honour of being inspected by General Debeney, commanding the 1st French
Army.
He was kind enough to express extreme pleasure at the way in which the
Tanks fought, and in his special Order of the Day gave the Battalion
praise of which they will ever be proud.
“Finally, I owe a special tribute of thanks to the Battalion of
British Tanks, whose powerful and devoted assistance has aided and
assured our success.
“Commanded by an experienced and skilful leader, the Tanks have
again added to that rich harvest of laurels which this new arm has
not ceased to gather since its first appearance in September 1916.
They have given to the Division the finest example of bravery, of
energy, of comradeship in action, and of training for war carried
to the highest degree of perfection. Their assistance has enabled
the infantry to gain a brilliant victory in which they themselves
share largely.”
Finally, as a token of comradeship between the French troops of the 3rd
Division and the 9th Tank Battalion, this Battalion had the honour of
being presented with the badge of the 3rd French Division. Since that
day they have worn it proudly on their left sleeve.