WAZIRS: OPERATIONS.[136]
_Darwesh Khels._—Immediately after the annexation of the Punjab, the
Umarzai sub-division of the Ahmadzai Wazirs began and continued to give
trouble on our border. A dispute which commenced with a disagreement
with a Bannuchi chief, responsible for the collection of the revenue
from Wazir villages in our territory, gradually developed into a
grievance against the local British authority, and finally, early in
1850, men from several divisions of the Ahmadzai, to the number of 1500,
attacked our post at Gumatti, immediately north of Bannu, but were
repulsed. Later in the same year the Umarzais, joined by the Mahsud
Wazirs, collected a force of several thousand men, intending to make an
attack upon Bannu itself, but finding it too strongly defended, they
dispersed. During the next two years the outposts of Bannu were
constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Wazirs, who came down almost
daily, occupying the foothills and firing at long range into Gumatti.
Attempts were made to effect a settlement with them, but they resisted
all overtures, and operations were then decided upon against them.
Before, however, these could be undertaken, the southern Umarzais,
living between the Tochi River and the Gabar Mountain, made a raid
towards the Kurram, but were headed off by Major John Nicholson, then
Deputy-Commissioner of Bannu, who at once made arrangements for the
punishment of this particular section.
_Expedition against the Umarzai Wazirs, 1852._—The punitive force was
divided into three columns. One column, composed of the 2nd Punjab
Infantry, was to leave Bannu at 10 p.m. on the 20th December, and march
through the Gumatti Pass upon Derabina and Garang, distant respectively
fourteen and seventeen miles, attacking both places simultaneously at
daybreak. Garang was at the foot of a narrow precipitous chasm in the
Kafirkot Range, through which ran the road to Sappari, near the summit
of the ridge. The Gumatti Pass was entered at midnight, the valley and a
low range of hills were crossed, and Derabina was reached and destroyed.
The hills above the Garang ravine were occupied just as the head of the
second column was seen emerging from the village of Garang.
This force—two companies 1st Punjab Infantry and 350 men 4th Punjab
Infantry, and accompanied by Major Nicholson—had moved from Latammar on
Sappari by the Barganatu Pass, which was entered at midnight, the crest
of the Kafirkot Range being reached about daybreak. Sappari was taken by
surprise and destroyed, as were other encampments of the Umarzais in the
Garang Pass. The surprise had been complete and but small resistance was
made, but none the less the force suffered a loss of twenty-three men
killed and wounded.
The third column—forty sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, fifty Mounted Police,
and 400 of the 6th Punjab Police Battalion—moved on the Umarzai
settlements at the north of the Khaisora and Sein Passes, and these were
destroyed and the cattle captured, the whole force returning to Bannu on
the 22nd by the Kurram Pass. The Umarzais now appeared thoroughly
humbled, and made complete submission.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1859–60]
_Expedition against the Kabul Khel Wazirs, 1859–1860._—The Ahmadzai were
not the only clan of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs which gave trouble in those
early days, for in 1850 the Kabul Khel sub-division of the Utmanzai clan
made an audacious attack—in conjunction with some of the Khattaks—upon
Bahadur Khel and the salt mines. Our troops being quickly brought up
they dispersed, but they did not fail to collect again for the
harassment of the working parties engaged in building a fort at Bahadur
Khel. They joined the Umarzais in 1851 in their various raids against
our posts, and gave some annoyance to our troops during Captain Coke’s
Miranzai expedition of 1851. During the next two years they were
particularly aggressive, committing nineteen raids and carrying off
cattle, but on Captain Coke commencing reprisals they made terms, and
for a time were more careful in their behaviour. They, however, cut up
some of our cavalry grasscutters near Thal during the Miranzai
expedition of 1855–6, and in 1859 some of the Hathi Khel sub-division of
the Ahmadzais, having murdered a British officer near Latammar, took
refuge with the Kabul Khels. As was only to be expected, these refused
to hand over the murderers, and a force of nearly 4000 men was assembled
in December of this year at Kohat and marched to Thal, where, on the
19th, it was joined by Bangash and Khattak levies, raising the strength
of the force to some 5400 men: the whole was under the command of
Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B. On the 20th December the force
crossed the Kurram River and encamped at Biland Khel, then in Afghan
territory, the ruler of which had sanctioned our movements; and it was
found that the main body of the Kabul Khels had taken their stand on a
high range of hills called Maidani, whither they had removed their
belongings, and where they had stored grain, and raised defences.
Maidani is about eight miles south-west of Biland Khel, near Zakha
Narai, and consists of two parallel ranges contiguous to each other,
terminating at either end in a gorge and enclosing a long, narrow
valley; the inward slopes of both mountains are tolerably easy, and
covered with grass and bushes, but the outward sides or faces are rugged
and precipitous. The two gorges, forming the water channels, were the
entrances to the valley—the one facing east being called Gandiob, the
one to the south Zakha. The enemy were believed to be from 2000–3000
strong.
It was resolved to attack before other clans could join the enemy, or
before the tribesmen should be led to evacuate the position by seeing
the preparations made to assault it.
[Sidenote: Operations about Gandiob]
At 6 a.m. on the 22nd the following marched upon Gandiob:
Four guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Three guns, Hazara Mountain Battery.
Guides Infantry.
4th Sikh Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
4th Punjab Infantry.
The enemy had evidently expected the advance upon Maidani by the Zakha
gorge, where most of the defenders had taken post, and the defences at
Gandiob were incomplete, consequently the resistance was comparatively
feeble; the heights were taken with but small loss, and after destroying
the defences, the force returned unmolested to its camp at Gandiob. Next
day the advantage gained was followed up; the bulk of the force returned
to Maidani, marched down the valley near to the Zakha exit, and crossed
over the range into the Durnani Valley, where the night was passed; a
large amount of Kabul Khel stock was captured, and on the return to
Shiwa, whither the camp had been moved from Gandiob, representatives of
the clans came in asking for terms. The Utmanzais were directed to give
up two of the murderers or the actual leader of the gang. On the 29th
the main body moved to Spinwam, whence the tribesmen could more easily
be coerced, while the remainder marched up the river nearer to Biland
Khel. The tribesmen now brought in a man who had harboured the
murderers, and on the 2nd January the troops moved back to Karera in the
Kurram, having now satisfactorily settled with the Wazirs on the left
bank of that river.
On the 4th January, while two battalions and a mountain battery remained
on the right bank of the Kurram to keep open communications, the
Brigadier-General marched to Sappari with the Hazara Mountain Battery, a
detachment of Sappers and Miners, the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry, and
one company 24th Punjab Infantry. There was no opposition, the Ahmadzai
maliks were told they must assist in the capture of the murderers, and
the force was then broken up. As might, however, have been expected, the
dispersal of the troops did not facilitate the attainment of the object
for which the expedition had mainly been undertaken; but eventually,
through the personal influence of Lieutenant-Colonel Reynell Taylor, the
Commissioner, the tribesmen were induced themselves to assemble a force,
and capture and bring in one of the murderers, who was ultimately hanged
on the very spot where he had committed the crime.
[Sidenote: Trouble in 1869]
The next occasion when we came in contact with the Darwesh Khels was in
1869, when in retaliation for an attack made upon a party of them by the
Turis, they came down upon the village of Thal, and carried off about
7000 head of cattle. They refused restitution, but on Lieutenant-Colonel
Keyes, commanding the Kohat district, collecting and moving a strong
force out to Thal in April, the chief men of the division implicated
tendered their submission and paid up the fines demanded. In the year
following, the Muhammad Khel section of the Ahmadzai, hitherto a
well-behaved community, began to give a good deal of trouble. Beginning
with a grievance about a fine, and a judgment against them in regard to
water-rights—Oliver tells us that across the border more than half the
trouble arises about women, money, land or water—it culminated in
ambuscading and shooting down seven sepoys of a party marching from
Bannu for the relief of the Kurram outpost, by a raiding party of 140
Muhammad Khels. The section concerned was at once outlawed; all members
found in British territory were arrested, and their lands in the Bannu
district were sequestered until the whole clan submitted, and gave up
the men who had committed this last outrage. This they refused to do,
and for some fifteen months they lived among other clans, who
sympathised with, and befriended them in their exile. They committed
several further raids, but eventually expressed their anxiety to come to
terms and surrendered unconditionally. Their six headmen were sentenced
to various terms of imprisonment, and the fines inflicted on the section
had to be paid up before they were permitted to return to their holdings
in British territory. Nor did the lesson taught end here; every division
which had harboured or befriended the Muhammad Khels was called to
account, and punishments suitable to the degree of their offences were
inflicted.
For some years after this the Darwesh Khel Wazirs gave but little
trouble, but this unusual abstinence was not due to any consideration
for the British Government, but was necessitated by the tedious war they
were engaged in against the Mahsuds, and which endured—to the general
disadvantage of the Darwesh Khels—until September 1878, when the feud
was patched up.
On the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan a convoy route was opened
between Thal and Bannu, and which, following for the most part the line
of the Kurram River, passed through the independent territory of the
Utmanzais and Ahmadzais; it had been traversed during the Kabul Khel
expedition of 1859, but had not since been used by us. Many detachments
and contingents of all arms marched by this route during the winter of
1878–79, and Wazir camels were extensively used in the carriage of
supplies for the Kurram Valley Field Force. For assisting in these
arrangements, allowances amounting to Rs. 1000 per mensem were made to
the more important Utmanzai and Ahmadzai chiefs, and the route remained
open until the latter part of March 1880, when, in view of a fanatical
excitement fanned by the Mullah Adkar, the road was closed.
During the time the Thal-Bannu route was in use, the number of offences
or raids committed was particularly small, considering the number of
valuable convoys passed through; but almost immediately the road was
closed, a serious raid was committed on a Turi caravan near Thal by a
mixed band of Darwesh Khels, Mahsuds and Dawaris, and on a Khattak
labour camp on the Thal-Kurram road. A few weeks later—on the night of
the 1st–2nd May—a determined attack was made on the military post at
Chupri, eight miles to the north-west of Thal, garrisoned by fifty
bayonets and thirty sabres. The raiders were some 200 men of the Darwesh
Khels, Mahsuds and Dawaris; and forty of these, having by some means
gained access to the enclosure of the post, inflicted upon our troops a
loss of eleven killed (including a British officer), and sixteen wounded
before they were beaten off. No reparation for this outrage ever appears
to have been exacted.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1880]
_Expedition against the Malik Shahi Wazirs, October 1880._—By October
1880, the fines due from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi Wazirs had
amounted to a considerable sum, chiefly on account of thefts committed
by them in the Kurram and near Thal during the Afghan war; and there
appearing to be some difficulty in collecting the amount, a force, under
Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., entered the Kabul Khel Hills on
the evening of the 27th October. The force was composed of:
Two guns, 1/8th Royal Artillery.
250, 85th King’s Own Light Infantry.
250, 18th Bengal Cavalry.
250, 20th Punjab Infantry.
The object of the expedition was to seize men and cattle of the Malik
Shahi section as security for their share of the fine. These people are
almost entirely nomadic, spending the summer on the slopes of the Siah
Koh Mountains, and wintering on both banks of the Kurram River between
the ninth and sixteenth milestones on the Thal-Bannu road. In order to
reach them it was necessary to traverse the whole of the Kabul Khel
settlements; and the difficulty, therefore, of the enterprise lay in
moving through Kabul Khel country without warning reaching the Malik
Shahi section, and so giving them time to escape from the comparatively
open country watered by the Kurram River, into the more intricate hill
country to the west in the direction of the Siah Koh.
The force left Thal at 9.30 p.m.; the advance party surrounded the Malik
Shahi encampment at the south-west of the valley, another party,
detached to the left, surrounded other settlements on the Charkhanai
plateau; while a third small party went to the right to try and capture
some noted Wazir thieves; the supports remained at Drozanda on the
Thal-Bannu road. The surprise was complete, 2000 head of cattle and 109
prisoners were taken, and the force returned to Thal on the 28th, where,
two days later, the jirgahs came in, and within a few weeks the whole of
the fines due had been realised from the Malik Shahi and Kabul Khels;
their conduct did not, however, materially improve, despite the
punishment they had received and the knowledge they had acquired of our
ability to exact reparation from them whenever it should suit us to do
so.
Our later dealings with the Darwesh Khel Wazirs will be described
further on in this chapter.
[Sidenote: The Mahsud Wazirs]
_Mahsud Wazirs._—The reputation of the Mahsuds has never been good; they
have from the earliest days been notorious robbers, and their raids upon
British territory have been frequent and serious. The Powindah caravans
of the warrior traders, mostly Ghilzais, which pass to and fro by the
Gomal Pass between Afghanistan and India, bringing Central Asian
merchandise as far as the markets of Benares and Patna, have ever been
the objects of constant attack and harassment by the Mahsuds, whose
country commands the Gomal; and both in 1855 and 1857 John Lawrence, the
Chief Commissioner, urged the Government to undertake retributive
measures against them. Again, in 1859 and 1860, Brigadier-General
Chamberlain, Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, made similar appeals,
but Lord Canning, to whom the matter was then referred, decided against
an expedition as not being actually urgent at the moment.
In March 1860, however, the Mahsuds committed a most serious and
unprovoked act of aggression. This was nothing less than the arrival
before Tank of some 3000 Wazirs, under one Jangi Khan, with the
intention of sacking the town, which stands on the plains some five
miles from the foot of the hills. Warning of the intended attack had,
however, been received, and Ressaldar Saadat Khan, of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry, commanding the post, had taken the necessary steps to oppose
the tribesmen. He had called in mounted men from other posts in the
neighbourhood, and had collected levies and horsemen in the service of
the Nawab of Tank, and on the 13th March he moved out towards the hills
at the head of 158 sabres of his regiment and thirty-seven mounted
levies. He found the Wazir lashkar drawn up near the mouth of the Tank
Pass, and, feigning retreat, he drew the enemy after him into the
plains. The cavalry then turned and, having cut off the enemy’s retreat,
Saadat Khan charged in the most dashing manner. The Wazirs were cut
down, ridden over and put to flight, leaving 300 dead on the ground,
including six leading maliks, and having many more wounded. The
Ressaldar’s force had only one man killed and sixteen wounded.[137]
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1860]
_Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs, 1860._—It was now felt that
operations must be undertaken against the Mahsuds, and Brigadier-General
Chamberlain was accordingly ordered to take a force into their hills.
The general decided to advance by way of Tank; this line was better
known than that via Bannu, and it led more directly to the country of
the tribesmen concerned in the recent outrage; he intended, moreover,
should the Mahsuds not early come to terms, to advance to their chief
places, Kaniguram and Makin, returning to British territory by the
Khaisora defile debouching near Bannu. It was expected that the Mahsuds
would probably make a stand, either at an advanced position at Hinis
Tangi or at the more retired Shingi Kot, protecting the actual entrance
to their country. As a matter of fact, however, they did not seriously
defend either position, and as this was the first occasion upon which
operations in the Mahsud country had been undertaken, there was no
precedent to guide the commander and troops as to the amount of
resistance which was to be expected, or where it would most probably be
met.
A large number of levies—about 1600,—chiefly drawn from the hereditary
enemies of the Mahsuds, were called up to take part in the expedition,
while the regular portion of the force, assembled on the 16th April at
Tank, was composed as under:
Three guns, No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery.[138]
Three guns, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.[139]
Four guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Three guns, Hazara Mountain Battery.
108 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
131 sabres, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
100 sabres, Multani Cavalry.[140]
60 bayonets, 1st Company Sappers and Miners.
407 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
427 bayonets, 4th Sikh Infantry.
397 bayonets, 1st Punjab Infantry.
684 bayonets, 2nd Punjab Infantry.
373 bayonets, 3rd Punjab Infantry.
381 bayonets, 4th Punjab Infantry.
400 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.
207 bayonets, 14th Punjab Infantry.[141]
418 bayonets, 24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers).[142]
464 bayonets, Hazara Gurkha Battalion.[143]
394 bayonets, 6th Police Battalion.
The force started on the 17th, and arrived unopposed at Palosin Kach
next day, a party being detached to destroy Shingi Kot. A halt was made
during the 20th to give the Mahsuds an opportunity for submission; but
nothing resulting, the Headquarters and main column moved on the 20th to
Haidari Kach, so as to survey the country and punish certain especially
troublesome sections, leaving a small force at Palosin and at Jandola
(the latter a Batanni village) to keep open communications with the
plains. From Haidari Kach the Brigadier advanced as far as Barwand,
meeting with no opposition and seeing few of the enemy; and on the
morning of the 24th returned to Palosin, where in the meantime the camp
under Colonel Lumsden, with six guns, some 200 sabres and about
1400–1500 bayonets, had been very seriously attacked.
The camp had been placed on the Kach[144] land, on the left bank of the
Tank stream, with its right resting on an old tower (distant some 800
yards) overlooking the stream; the left was protected by a picquet on an
abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the river in
its front and the edge of the high table-land immediately in the rear.
On the night of the 22nd, the outlying picquets were at their posts on
the ridge behind the camp; a complete company occupied the tower, three
other parties, each of a havildar and eight sepoys, were posted along
the rear, while one of thirty men was on the high peak above mentioned.
Each picquet had a support of equal strength close in rear.
[Sidenote: A Night Attack]
No information as to any tribal gathering had been received, and the
night had passed quietly enough, when just at _reveille_ the rear
picquet fired a volley, and a rush of 3000 Wazirs overpowered and nearly
destroyed the picquets holding the high bank. Fortunately the whole body
did not come on; some 500 swordsmen stormed into the camp, while the
remainder kept up a heavy fire from the ridge. For some little time
confusion reigned in the camp, but then discipline prevailed, and the
Guides, 4th Sikhs and Gurkhas drove out the enemy at the point of the
bayonet, pursuing them for three miles and punishing them heavily. Our
losses had been serious—63 killed and 166 wounded—but those of the enemy
were even more so. The attack had been a complete surprise, and was
carried out with great gallantry and determination: we shall see another
instance of such an attack further on in this chapter.
It had been intended to commence the march on Kaniguram on the 2nd May,
forcing _en route_ the position at the Ahnai Tangi, which the Wazirs
were said to have occupied; but on the 1st some Mahsud maliks arrived in
camp, purporting to represent the whole tribe, and expressing their
anxiety to make terms. They were offered the option of a heavy fine,
with security for its payment and hostages for good behaviour, or the
unopposed passage of the force to their capital, Kaniguram. Neither
alternative recommended itself to the maliks, who asked for a day to
consider the matter, and the General decided to move the camp on to
Shingi Kot for greater convenience of supply, and here the maliks were
to bring their decision on the 2nd. Nothing, however, was heard from
them this day, and on the 3rd the onward march was resumed, the Ahnai
gorge being found abandoned, and the force encamped at Zeriwam, where
another, and an unsuccessful, attempt was made to effect a peaceful
settlement with the Mahsuds. Next day the troops moved on, the defile
becoming narrower and the Barari gorge turning out to be the most
difficult of any that had been yet seen, being a narrow cleft cut by the
Tank stream through a chain of mountains crossing its course at right
angles. Both sides of the passage are perpendicular cliffs of forty or
fifty feet in height, from which the mountains slope upwards at a
considerable incline, while the actual mouth of the pass was hidden by a
thick grove of trees.
It was soon abundantly evident that here the enemy had made every
preparation for defence, while the position itself was one of great
natural strength. Both sides of the pass-mouth were very steep, while
everywhere sangars had been placed in terraces, and there was a safe
line of retreat, but the ground to the north seemed just practicable for
infantry and mules. There was, however, a ravine which joined the Tank
stream at the mouth of the pass on this side, and there was no means of
knowing whether, after the northern heights had been seized, the actual
position might not still be inaccessible owing to the presence of this
ravine.
[Sidenote: General Chamberlain’s Operations]
General Chamberlain decided to attack on both sides, and formed two
columns for this purpose, the left under Colonel Lumsden, the right or
northern under Colonel Green. On the right the attack was at first
conducted without loss, but thereafter the advance became difficult, the
ground was much cut up by ravines, the fire was very heavy, and the men
attacking became a good deal exposed and dispersed. There was something
of a check, and the Wazirs, leaping out of their sangars, charged down
upon the 3rd Punjab Infantry sword in hand. These gave way and fell back
upon the support, which also retired, and the Mahsuds prepared to charge
the guns and the reserve. The 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain Keyes,
now stemmed the tide; the enemy, met by these men and by the fire of the
guns, fell back in their turn hotly pursued. The 1st Punjab Infantry
followed them into the breastworks, the other troops rallied, and the
right of the position was now taken.
Colonel Lumsden’s party had an easier task; disheartened at seeing the
northern part of their position in our hands, and fired on by Colonel
Green’s guns, the Mahsuds on this flank offered but a feeble resistance,
and the force marched through the gorge and camped three miles beyond
it. Our losses in this affair were thirty killed and eighty-six wounded.
On the 5th the force arrived, unopposed, at Kaniguram, remaining there
until the 8th, and receiving the expression of a desire for peace from
the Mahsud maliks, but nothing satisfactory was arranged. On the 9th a
move was then made to Makin, which was reached with but little
opposition on the following day. Next to Kaniguram, Makin is the most
important and best built town in the Mahsud country, the seat of their
iron trade; it is situated at the point where the mountains of Shuidar
and Pirghal close in upon each other, a spur from each forming its
northern and southern face. As the Mahsuds still failed to come to
terms, towers were destroyed and villages burnt; but the state of the
supplies rendering it impossible for the force to remain longer in the
country, the General directed the return march on Bannu to commence on
the 12th. Moving by Razmak, Razani and Saroba, on the 20th Bannu was
reached, and the force was broken up.
Although the operations had been successful, they had not resulted in
the submission of the Mahsud Wazirs; the tribe was therefore put under
blockade, thus inflicting increased financial loss on them, and at last
in June 1862 they gave in, agreed to the principle of sectional
responsibility for outrages committed, and gave hostages, but they had
hardly concluded this treaty before they broke it.
The next sixteen years form a continuous record of raids on the Bannu
and Dera Ismail Khan borders; attacks on posts, cattle-lifting, highway
robbery, abduction, murder and wounding. The offenders were punished
when they could be met with, and the divisions and sections to which
they belonged were made to suffer for their misdeeds; blockades were
imposed, additional posts were built for the overawing of the Mahsud
Wazirs, service was offered to them in the frontier militia, and at
last, in 1878, it was reported that the Tank border had never before
been in so settled a condition, or life and property so secure. Within a
year, however, the peace of this part of the frontier was rudely broken
by a raid on a large scale and of a particularly audacious character.
[Sidenote: Descent upon Tank]
About Christmas 1878 rumours of an intended attack upon Tank reached the
local authorities, and precautions were accordingly taken. All the posts
on this border were doubled, and in some of the more important the
strength of the garrison had been trebled, so that when, on New Year’s
Day 1879, the attack, instigated by emissaries of the Amir Sher Ali,
actually commenced, nearly half the available force in the district was
concentrated in the Tank Valley. All the villages had also been warned.
On the 1st January, however, the Mahsuds descended from their hills to
the number of between 2000 and 3000, brushed aside the opposition met
with from the post at the mouth of the pass, and, descending upon Tank,
burnt the bazaar and many houses, and finally regained the hills before
they could be intercepted, carrying off a considerable amount of
property with them.
The Mahsuds engaged in this affair belonged chiefly to the Alizai clan;
but men from all the country round, within and without our border,
joined the marauders, being unable to resist so unusually favourable an
opportunity for fomenting disorder and obtaining plunder, and lawless
and predatory bands destroyed and robbed several border villages.
The news of the outrage did not reach Dera Ismail Khan until the morning
of the 2nd, when a force of cavalry and infantry at once moved out to
Tank, came up with some clansmen about four miles from that place, took
a number of prisoners, recovered a certain amount of plunder, and
reached Tank the following night, having marched nearly fifty miles.
During the next fortnight minor operations were carried out from Tank
and from the border posts with the comparatively small force available,
and the enemy were everywhere driven from the positions they took up and
suffered considerable loss, order being eventually restored on this
border. All the local tribesmen implicated in the recent attacks had now
been punished, with the exception of the Mahsuds, and these were offered
certain terms for acceptance, failing which a punitive expedition was to
be sent into their country so soon as a favourable opportunity should
occur. Meanwhile a strict blockade was enforced.
In March 1880 the Mahsuds, stirred up by the preachings of a fanatical
mullah, commenced hostilities against the British Government, and
collected up the Tank stream within ten miles of our border. A force was
at once—on 5th April—moved out from Dera Ismail Khan (3 guns, 50 sabres,
300 bayonets) and marched to Tank. The Mahsuds could not make up their
minds where their blow should fall, and many consequently returned to
their homes, while the remainder, moving south, attacked the town of
Gomal, but, being driven off, dispersed. As it was apparent that the
Batannis of Jandola had given passage to this raiding party, the Dera
Ismail Khan force advanced on Jandola from Kot Khirgi on the morning of
the 12th, forced the Hinis Tangi and, having destroyed Jandola, returned
unopposed to Tank.
[Sidenote: Renewed Outrages]
During 1880 the Mahsuds, associated with the Darwesh Khels and Dawaris,
committed several serious outrages on our border, and, with the
termination of the operations in Afghanistan, the Government now found
itself able to send the long contemplated expedition into the Mahsud
country. Accordingly, early in 1881 arrangements were put in hand for
coercing that tribe. While the force was in process of assembly, the
Mahsuds, who had been offered a final opportunity of peaceful
submission, sent in certain headmen to make terms and thus avoid
punishment; but these belonged almost exclusively to clans living
immediately without our borders, while those sections among the more
inaccessible hills, and which had for long been opposed to peace with
the British Government, were still entirely unrepresented among those
suing for peace.
During the third week in April, after a great council at Kaniguram, our
terms were to some extent complied with, but the submission of the tribe
generally was still incomplete. Several important sub-divisions, notably
the Nana Khel division of the Bahlolzais, were still defiant, and it was
decided that this division must be coerced. The force assembled at Tank,
composed entirely of troops of the Punjab Frontier Force with some
additions, was placed under command of Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy,
C.B., and consisted of twelve guns, 290 sabres and 3662 bayonets; while
a reserve brigade—eight guns, 326 sabres and 3380 bayonets—under
Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., was formed at Bannu.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1881]
_Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs, 1881._—The main force moved from
Tank by Kot Khirgi to Jandola, which was reached on the 23rd April, when
the pass leading to the Shahur Valley was reconnoitred without
opposition. The column then moved on by Haidari Kach and Turam China to
Barwand, and so far, although the rearguard was always fired on, there
had been no casualties and nothing in the way of serious opposition had
been experienced, while some of the headmen had already submitted. The
force now moved on towards the Khaisora Valley, and on arrival in this
neighbourhood the Alizais made terms, but the troops were now in the
country of the Nana Khels, who showed a good deal of hostility. On the
5th May General Kennedy arrived at Kaniguram via Kundiwan, having had a
sharp affair with some 500 Bahlolzais holding the densely wooded slopes
about Shah Alum. Makin was reached on the 10th, by which date the Bannu
column was encamped at Razmak, only seven miles distant.
On the 16th April this brigade had moved from Bannu and had taken up a
position on the right bank of the Tochi River near Miriam, commanding
the entrances of the Khaisora, Tochi and Shakto valleys. General Gordon,
in compliance with instructions received from General Kennedy, marched
up the Khaisora Valley to Razmak via Saroba and Razani practically
unopposed, being accompanied by representatives of the sections
inhabiting the valley. A convoy of supplies was passed from here to
Makin, and on the 12th May the Bannu column began to retire, visiting
the Shakto Valley _en route_ and having only one casualty in the force.
On the next day General Kennedy marched from Makin via Janjal to
Jandola, and arrived on the 18th unmolested at Tank, where the column
was broken up. The total British casualties during these operations only
amounted to thirty-two killed and wounded.
The Mahsuds seemed now ready and eager to make peace, but still our
terms remained uncomplied with, and the blockade consequently was
reimposed; and it was not until September of this year, and after
several fruitless attempts to play off the Amir against the British
Government, that the Mahsuds finally gave in. They surrendered the
remaining ones among the proscribed ringleaders in the 1879 outrages,
but since the aggregate of the fines accumulated against them now
appeared quite beyond their powers of payment, it was agreed that the
amount should gradually be liquidated by a tax imposed on all Mahsud
goods imported into our territory, and for a breathing space at least
quiet reigned on this portion of the border.
_Mahsud and Darwesh Khels._—The behaviour of all the Wazirs, Mahsuds and
Darwesh Khels, may be said to have been uniformly good for a further
period of ten years, dating from the conclusion of the expedition of
1881. In 1883 the Mahsuds gave facilities for the survey of the country
about Khajuri Kach; in 1889 the Zhob Valley was traversed by us; the
Gomal Pass was opened up, and our protectorate extended over the Zhob
Valley and the country between the Gomal and Pishin; a railway survey
was carried out in the Gomal; and our influence was strengthened among
the Mahsuds and the Wazirs of Wana by the granting of new or increased
allowances. There had, of course, been periods of disquiet, occasioned
and accentuated by the fact that at this time there was no definite
boundary line demarcating British and Afghan spheres of influence. The
difficulty of restraining the tribesmen within limits and of inflicting
punishment for outrages was increased, and a delicate situation thereby
created, owing to the fact that it was often impossible to determine
whether offenders were subjects of the Amir of Afghanistan, or came
within the pale of British influence. It was then, in October 1893,
that, after long negotiations, Sir Mortimer Durand went to Kabul and
returned with an agreement signed by the Amir. By this settlement the
respective spheres of influence of the British Government and of the
ruler of Afghanistan were carefully defined. The Amir agreed to retire
from Chageh in Baluchistan, and withdrew his objections to the extension
of the railway to New Chaman, west of the Kwaja Amran Range, and to the
establishment of a British cantonment at that place; the Bajauris,
Afridis and Wazirs were left outside the limits of his influence, but
Asmar, and the Kunar valley above it as far as Chanak, and the tract of
Birmal, bordering on the Wazir country, were included within his
territory; on the other hand, a somewhat clumsy arrangement, and one
almost certain to be fruitful of future trouble, had been come to,
whereby the country of the Mohmands had been arbitrarily divided by the
watershed of the Kunar and Panjkhora rivers.
[Sidenote: Delimitation Commission]
Early in 1894 the Government of India began to make preparations for the
demarcation, in co-operation with the Commissioners appointed by the
Amir, of the western boundaries of Waziristan; and the attitude of the
Wazirs being, as ever, uncertain, it was decided to maintain a
considerable force on the frontier. Work was to commence at Domandi on
the 15th October, and some weeks prior to this a proclamation was issued
to the tribesmen, fully explaining the objects and limitations of the
expedition; the news seemed to be generally received in Waziristan in a
friendly spirit.
The following troops under Brigadier-General Turner were detailed to
form the escort:
129 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
6 guns, No. 3 Punjab Mountain Battery.
189 bayonets, No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners.
748 bayonets, 1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
744 bayonets, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
741 bayonets, 20th Punjab Infantry,
while, in addition, the following units were held in readiness at Multan
and Dera Ismail Khan to form a reserve brigade, viz.:
2nd Battalion Border Regiment.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
4th Punjab Infantry.
38th Dogras.
On the 1st October the escort was concentrated at Dera Ismail Khan, and
within ten days the Ahmadzai clan of the Darwesh Khels from Wana had
sent in their jirgah, _unanimously repeating a previous invitation to
the British Government to take over their country and permit them to
become British subjects_.
_Operations of the Waziristan Field Force, 1894._—The escort finally
left Dera Ismail Khan on the 13th October, concentrating again at
Khajuri Kach and reaching Wana—via Spin and Karab Kot—on the 25th. A
jirgah of the Wana Ahmadzai came in here and expressed pleasure at the
arrival of the troops, but none the less the camp was fired into two
nights in succession, and it was reported that the mullahs were
endeavouring to stir up strife and to prevent a really representative
jirgah from coming in.
[Sidenote: The Camp at Wana]
The plain of Wana is about 13 miles long, 11 broad, and very stony; the
camp was placed at the eastern end of it, the ground in the vicinity
being much cut up by ravines. The position, moreover, which had been
chosen for the camp of the British Joint Commissioner, was a source of
weakness and of anxiety to the General in command of the escort, having
been pitched some 210 yards from the south-east corner of the military
camp, so as to afford the jirgahs free access to the Political Officers.
Up to the end of October there was no reason to anticipate an attack
upon the escort by any large body of Mahsuds; but on the 1st November it
became known that the Mullah Powindah, a noted firebrand, was in the
neighbourhood with not less than 1000 followers, and that he had
expressed his intention of attacking the Wana camp. Picquets were
accordingly doubled, the defences were strengthened, and the troops
ordered to be under arms at 4 a.m. every day.
The camp was surrounded by some thirteen picquets, furnished by the 3rd
Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry and 1st Gurkhas, in addition to an old
Darwesh Khel fort held by 100 rifles of the last-named regiment; but,
contrary to the procedure usually followed in frontier warfare, the
majority of these picquets were no more than observation posts, and were
not intended to hold their own in any serious attack, but were to fall
back, in some cases on their supports, in others on their regiments in
camp.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 2nd November, while it was still dark, the camp was
suddenly aroused by three shots, and a desperate rush of some 500
fanatics, supported by fire from the left front, was made on the left
flank and left rear of the camp, held by the 1st Gurkhas. It appears
that the enemy—consisting for the most part of Mahsuds, with a few
Darwesh Khels—had crept up two large ravines on the west, overwhelmed
the picquets there posted, from one of which the three warning shots had
issued, and came on so rapidly that the leading assailants had climbed
the camp defences and penetrated into the middle of the camp, before the
defenders had turned out of their tents. Another party, swinging round
to the right, made their way into the camp by the rear or south, did
much damage among the transport animals, and cut loose some of the
cavalry horses.
By this time the troops had turned out and got to work. The Gurkhas
stopped the main rush down the centre of the camp; reinforced then by
two companies of the 20th and one of the 3rd Sikhs, the men swept
through the camp, clearing it with the bayonet; and though two further
but less determined attacks were made, no second rush followed the
first, and soon after 6 a.m. the enemy were in full retreat. They were
followed by a small column for six miles, and were charged into again
and again by the cavalry, who inflicted serious loss upon them. Our
casualties were forty-five killed and seventy-five wounded, while the
enemy carried off many rifles and much loot, but left some 350 killed
behind them in camp or on the line of their retreat, out of 3000 who
were present, but not all of whom joined in the actual attack on the
camp.
On the 18th a jirgah came into camp but nothing resulted, and on the
27th a large tribal meeting, attended by the Mullah and some 2000 or
3000 men, took place in Shakai, where the Government terms were
fruitlessly discussed. The maliks then returned to our camp at Wana,
stating they could not carry our terms out at once, but that if given
until the 12th December all demands would be met. The extension was
sanctioned, but the headmen were informed that on that date our troops
would move forward unless all claims had been satisfied. All
preparations were also made for the prosecution of further operations.
[Sidenote: The Punitive Force]
On the 2nd December the formation was ordered of a punitive force, under
the command of Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B.,
consisting of three brigades, the first being composed of the original
escort, strengthened by the inclusion of the 2nd Battalion Border
Regiment, and later by the arrival of the 1st Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
The composition of the Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General W. P.
Symons, was as under:
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
One Squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
One Squadron 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
33rd Punjab Infantry.[145]
38th Dogras.
4th Punjab Infantry.
1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
One Maxim Gun.
This brigade concentrated at Tank for Jandola.
The Third Brigade was under the command of Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B.,
and assembled at Miriam, near Bannu; it was made up as follows:
No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.[146]
1st Sikh Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
In the meantime the Mahsuds had added to their already long list of
offences, and finally, on the 12th December, the jirgah came in and
admitted that there appeared no hope of the tribe complying with our
terms. Consequently, on the 16th, Sir William Lockhart was ordered to
advance, when the following instructions were issued by him: The First
Brigade to move from Wana by the Tiarza Pass and the Sharawangi Kotal on
Kaniguram; the Second Brigade to advance on Makin from Jandola by the
Tank stream; the Third to proceed by the Khaisora Valley, in Darwesh
Khel limits, to Razmak. Each column to arrive at its destination on the
21st December.
Before leaving Wana the Officer commanding First Brigade established
there a military post in a fortified village, occupying it with two
guns, twenty sabres and a battalion of infantry. Moving then by the
Tiarza Pass, the column arrived at Kaniguram on the 21st, encountering
only slight opposition _en route_, but the road was found to be very
bad, and the rearguard never reached camp before midnight. Meanwhile the
Second Brigade, accompanied by Sir William Lockhart, marched from
Jandola via Marghaband, Shilmanzai Kach and Janjal, and reached Makin on
the 21st, having _en route_ destroyed the Mullah’s village at Marobi.
The camp was fired into every night, but no really active opposition was
met with, and the mullah was reported to have fled to the Darra Valley,
north of Pirghal.
[Sidenote: Kaniguram and Makin]
The Third Brigade, marching on the 17th, was at Razmak on the 23rd—the
rearguard having been fired at from one village only—and arrived on the
following day at Makin. The force was now split up into a number of
smaller columns, and all parts of the country were visited—the Baddar,
Shakto, Sheranna, Shinkai, Nargao, Tangai and Janjara Valleys—and only
in the first of these was opposition experienced. Cattle were driven in,
forage collected, and towers destroyed; nearly all the divisions
implicated in the attack on Wana camp had been punished, our terms had
to some extent been complied with, and by the last week in January the
delimitation party was able to commence work. On the 4th March the last
of the Mahsud hostages required were surrendered, and the force was then
gradually reduced, troops remaining in occupation of Jandola, Barwand,
Wana, and in the Tochi Valley—this last offering the means for
maintaining a hold over the Darwesh Khels. By the end of the operations
all concerned in the attack on Wana had been punished, our terms had
been fully complied with, and the boundary from Domandi to Laram had
been demarcated.
In 1895 there were several murderous attacks upon individuals, chiefly
in the Tochi Valley, and it was evident that the establishment of
military posts, and the permanent military occupation of the Tochi
Valley, had done little to counteract the natural lawlessness of the
inhabitants.
In the summer of 1896 a British subject had been murdered at Sheranni in
the Tochi, and the Madda Khel, who inhabit Maizar in the lower part of
the Shawal Valley, considered they had been unfairly treated in the
apportionment of the blood money, levied according to tribal custom for
the murdered man. The matter was still unsettled in June of the
following year, when the Political Officer gave notice that he would
visit Maizar to discuss the case, and further to select a site for a new
levy post, the construction of which had been decided upon. On the 10th
June, then, Mr. Gee, the Political Officer, left Datta Khel, which since
the autumn of the year previous had been the civil and military
headquarters of the district, with an escort of two mountain guns,
twelve sabres, and 300 rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, 1st Sikhs.
On arrival at Maizar the maliks evinced every sign of friendship,
pointing out a halting place, and, with an excess of treachery unusual
even among Pathans, provided food for the Muhammadan soldiers of the
escort. The halting place chosen was close to a Madda Khel village and
commanded by other villages from 100 to 400 yards distant, but, so far
as the position admitted, all possible precautions were taken. The meal
promised was produced and partaken of, and then, while the pipers of the
1st Sikhs were playing for the benefit of the villagers, a hubbub
suddenly arose in the village, from the top of a tower in which a man
was seen to wave a sword. The villagers quickly drew off, and firing at
once commenced on the escort from the houses on three sides.
[Sidenote: The Maizar Outrage]
Colonel Bunny and three officers were hit almost immediately, and the
baggage animals, carrying most of the reserve ammunition, stampeded; but
the guns at once came into action, driving back into the village the men
who seemed upon the point of charging, and giving time for preparations
for the retirement of the escort, now inevitable. The circumstances were
trying in the extreme for the troops, and their staunchness is worthy of
the highest praise. By this time every one of the British officers had
been hit, two of them mortally, but the native officers of the 1st
Punjab Infantry and 1st Sikhs nobly filled their places. Getting
together a party of men, a most determined stand was made by a garden
wall, whereby the first withdrawal was covered, the wounded were helped
away, and the guns were able to retire to a fresh position, whence they
fired “blank” to check the enemy, the small number of service rounds
brought out having now been exhausted. The retirement was continued, the
enemy coming on and enveloping the flanks, until the Sheranni plain was
reached; and about 5.30 p.m., reinforcements coming out from Datta Khel,
the enemy were at last beaten off, and the further withdrawal to camp
was unmolested.
_Operations of the Tochi Field Force, 1897–98._—The decision to send a
punitive expedition into the Tochi was arrived at on the 17th June, and
by the 8th July the concentration at Bannu was completed. The force was
placed under command of Major-General Corrie-Bird, C.B., and comprised
two brigades.
FIRST BRIGADE.
Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B.
2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
1st Sikh Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
33rd Punjab Infantry.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery.
No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
14th Sikhs.
6th Jats.
25th Punjab Infantry.
One squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry.
Four guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.
[Sidenote: Punitive Operations]
The field force concentrated at Datta Khel on the 19th July, and on the
next day the First Brigade marched to Sheranni, finding that place and
Maizar deserted, the Madda Khel being reported to have fled to the hills
preliminary to seeking a refuge in Afghanistan. All the defences in the
neighbourhood were destroyed, and a proclamation embodying our terms was
issued, but to these the Maizar and Sheranni maliks on the 3rd September
definitely refused to agree. The Kazha, Shawal and Khina Valleys were
visited by columns, and strong places were destroyed, but with the
exception of some sniping into camp there was no sign of opposition. It
was not, however, until the 31st October that the head of the Madda Khel
gave himself up, and a fortnight later the whole tribe formally
submitted, paid up a first instalment of all fines, including the
overdue blood money which had occasioned the outrage, and early in 1898
the field force began to be gradually broken up.
The total casualties at Maizar and in the subsequent operations amounted
to twenty-nine killed and forty wounded; but during this expedition the
troops suffered to an altogether unusual extent from sickness, chiefly
diarrhoea and dysentery. The climate of the Tochi Valley is always
trying, while the forced march in the hot weather from Khushalgarh to
Bannu had no doubt affected the men’s constitutions.
_Operations against the Mahsuds in 1900–1901._—No sooner were operations
concluded in the Tochi Valley than the Mahsuds began again to be
troublesome. During 1898 and 1899 raids were of frequent occurrence, and
in the year following a levy post at Zam and a police post near Tank
were attacked. The maliks seemed quite unable to restrain, still less to
coerce, the tribesmen. The fines for past offences now amounted to no
less a sum than Rs. 100,000, and, no portion of it being forthcoming, a
blockade was declared, which came into operation on the 1st December,
1900. To ensure its effectiveness movable columns were mobilised from
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and by their means cordons were drawn on the
east and south of the Mahsud country. These measures were so far
effectual that the Mahsuds made a commencement with the payment of their
fine, but in January 1901, fresh offences were committed, raids
continued, and more serious attacks were not infrequent.
A new procedure was now introduced into the ordinary measures of a
purely passive blockade. Hitherto the tribesmen had invariably received
notice prior to the commencement of active operations—they had always
been afforded an opportunity of coming belatedly to terms—but it was now
decided that, while the blockade should continue, it should be varied
and accompanied by sharp attacks, carried on during three or four days
by small mobile columns acting simultaneously and by surprise. The first
series of such operations, for which preparations had been made in
secret, commenced on the 23rd November, and was directed against the
Mahsuds of the Khaisora and Shahur Valleys, combined with demonstrations
from Jandola into the Takhi Zam, and from Datta Khel against the
north-west portion of the Mahsud country; the general object being to
demolish all defences, capture prisoners and cattle, and destroy grain
and fodder. Four columns, each consisting almost exclusively of
infantry, and varying in strength from 900 to 1250 men, started from
Datta Khel, Jandola, Sarwekai and Wana; all were opposed, and each
suffered some loss, but the combined operations were very successful.
Moreover, no sooner were these at an end than a further series was
projected. On the 4th December Brigadier-General Dening left Jandola
with 2500 rifles and four guns and moved to Shingi Kot, where he divided
his force into two columns. Marching north-west up the Tazar Tang, Dwe
Shinkai and Guri Khel were visited, and the force returned by way of
Marghaband to Jandola. The enemy fought fiercely, following up the
columns and driving home their attacks with great determination; their
losses were consequently very severe.
[Sidenote: Mobile Columns]
The third series of operations began on the 19th December, and was
undertaken by two columns starting from Jandola and Sarwekai converging
on Dwe Shinkai, where, as well as in the Spli Toi Algad, there were now
known to be many Mahsud settlements. The Jandola column under General
Dening (four guns, thirteen sabres, and 2052 rifles, exclusive of the
South Waziristan Militia), marched via Shingi Kot and Umar Ragzha to
Paridai up the Tre Algad, destroyed all defences, and joined the other
columns at Dwe Shinkai on the 21st. The Sarwekai column under Colonel
Hogge (two guns and three battalions) had marched to Dwe Shinkai by way
of the Shahur Nala, Badshah Khan, Nanu Narai and the Spli Toi Algad. On
the 22nd the whole combined force, told off into three columns, raided
up the Dwe Shinkai, and, after destroying a number of fortified towers
and other defences, returned on the 24th to Jandola.
The Mahsuds still, however, evinced no inclination to submit, and a
fourth series of operations was consequently planned against them, the
object of these being the punishment of the sections living in the
Shakto, Sheranna and Shuza Algads. For this three columns were formed,
based respectively on Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel, and varying in
strength from 2500 to 1400 men, and their operations were uniformly
successful, resulting in the capture of a large number of cattle and the
destruction of many fortified places. Standing camps were now formed at
Zam, Miramshah and Baran, whence it was intended that punitive measures
should be resumed so soon as the troops had enjoyed a much needed rest.
The Mahsuds had by this, however, lost heavily in men and cattle, and
had throughly realised that the innermost parts of their country could
be reached and traversed by our troops. They consequently opened
negotiations for peace and for the removal of the blockade, and after
the usual delays they paid up their fines in full, restored all the
rifles they had captured, and gave hostages for the return of all
plundered cattle.
Our casualties during these operations had amounted to thirty-two killed
and 114 wounded.
The punishment inflicted on the Mahsuds did not, however, appear to have
had any particular effect upon all Wazirs, and before the end of 1901
another expedition became necessary against the Kabul Khel sub-division
of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels, who inhabit the wedge of hilly country
lying between the Kohat and Bannu districts and east of the Kurram
River.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1901–02]
_Expedition against the Kabul Khels (Darwesh Khels) in
1901–1902._—During the years between 1896 to 1899 many outrages were
committed upon our border by men living at the village of Gumatti, some
eight miles north of Bannu. In February of the latter year this village
was surrounded by our troops and the surrender of all outlaws demanded.
This was refused, and some of the men “wanted” shut themselves up in two
strong towers, from which, owing to the short time available, it was not
found possible to dislodge them. The force had consequently to withdraw
with its object only partially accomplished, and its retirement was
harassed by the tribesmen all the way back to Bannu. Crimes of all kinds
continued to be committed on this part of the border, and it was finally
decided to send an expedition into the district. Four small columns
directed by Major-General Egerton were accordingly formed, comprising
all three arms, and varying from 600 to 1000 men in numbers. These
concentrated at Thal, Idak, Barganatu and Bannu, and started, the Idak
column on the 17th November and the others on the next day. By these
forces the Kabul Khel country was traversed in all directions, many of
the outlaws were killed or captured, over 5000 head of cattle were
carried off by us, and a large number of fortified towers were
destroyed. Since the close of this expedition the Darwesh Khels have
given us but little trouble, the Mahsuds continuing, however, to be
almost as turbulent as ever.
APPENDIX A.
THE ARMS TRADE AND THE TRIBESMEN.
No book dealing with the military relations, now and in the past, of the
Indian Government and the frontier tribes, can be said to be complete,
which does not contain some allusion to the armament of these men. In
the matter of small arms we have not invariably possessed the
conspicuous superiority which might have been expected of a
highly-civilised nation warring against a semi-savage people. Readers of
Kaye’s _History of the War in Afghanistan_ will not need to be reminded
how frequently both the Afghans, and the tribes which followed our
columns, proved that their firearms were better in range and in
man-killing power than were the weapons with which in those days, and
even for some years after, our soldiers were armed. We read of our
muskets: “Little could they do against the far-reaching Afghan
matchlocks.... The muskets of our infantry could not reach the
assailants.... The two forces were at a distance from each other, which
gave all the advantage to the enemy, who shot down our men with ease,
and laughed at the musket balls, which never reached their position....
But, again, the British muskets were found no match for the Afghan
jazails ... the Afghan marksmen mowed down our men like grass.”[147]
At the time of the second Afghan war we had completely re-established
the superiority of our armament; but since then arms factories have been
set up in many places within and without our border, and by this means
and by a well-organised, large-scale system of rifle-stealing—not only
from regiments in our frontier garrisons, but from others far down
country—the tribesmen, who could pay the prices asked, gradually became
well equipped with modern rifles and the necessary ammunition. At the
time of the Tirah Expedition of 1897–98 the old-fashioned, home-made
jazail had practically been everywhere replaced by the breech-loader,
many of which, if not actually made at Enfield, had probably been
manufactured in the Kohat Pass with all the Government “marks” carefully
reproduced. Such confidence had their improved armament inspired in the
men of the border, that the feeling found expression in an offer made
from more than one clansman at the close of the Tirah campaign: “if we
would only leave our artillery behind, they would fight us all over
again.”
[Sidenote: Bushire and Muscat]
But the improvement noticed in 1897 in the armament of the tribes,
seemed to point to the existence of other and more open markets for the
supply of modern rifles, than those known to exist to the west of our
border; and the Government of India now set inquiries on foot relative
to statements, of late years often repeated and as persistently
disregarded, of the existence of a well-established and flourishing
trade in arms carried on in the Persian Gulf. There can be no doubt that
the arms traffic both at Bushire and at Muscat was originally begun and
maintained by British subjects; but the demand for modern rifles in
Southern Persia, in Afghanistan, and on the north-west frontier was now
so great, that other nations quickly went into the business, and it has
been computed that in 1906 four European nations between them imported
£278,000 worth of rifles into Muscat alone. The traffic at Bushire does
not appear to have exercised any perceptible influence on the arming of
the north-west frontier tribes; but that which originated at Muscat in
the early nineties soon grew and flourished exceedingly, “parcels” of
rifles and ammunition being shipped in native craft from Muscat to the
Mekran coast, where they were met by the caravans of the Afghan traders,
and being taken thence along the Perso-Baluch frontier into Southern
Afghanistan, were distributed among the tribes on our border. This trade
was permitted to flourish for fully ten years before any adequate steps
were taken to stop it.
In the reports of the Baluchistan Agency during the last five years, so
far as these have appeared up to the time of writing, it is possible in
some degree to trace the growth of the traffic, and to note the steps
belatedly taken for its suppression. Thus, in the Report for 1906–07 we
read: “During the months of October to December over a thousand rifles
imported from Muscat are reported to have been landed and distributed
throughout Persian Baluchistan.”
Report for 1907–08: “Not so satisfactory to record is the enormous
increase in the arms trade between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. A
very large number of rifles and a vast amount of ammunition are reported
to have been landed on the Persian coast during the year under report.
Arrangements were being made at the close of the year under report to
reinforce the military garrison at Robat, with a view to preventing
these arms being taken through British territory. The Afghan arms
traders have since successfully brought all their large consignments of
arms into Afghanistan through Persian territory.”
Report for 1908–09: “In the year under review very large numbers of
rifles, with great quantities of ammunition, were again imported into
Afghanistan and into Persian Baluchistan from the Persian Gulf. A force
of 500 infantry, with two machine guns, was sent to Robat in April to
reinforce the military detachment already there, and to assist in
intercepting any caravans which might attempt to reach Afghanistan
through the Chagai District. This additional force returned in August at
the close of the arms-running season. Though no captures were made, the
traffic by this route was effectively checked. In the absence of any
effective measures on the Persian side, however, this was of little
advantage, and the trade through Persia, being practically completely
unchecked, increased considerably in volume.”
[Sidenote: Naval Operations in 1909]
In 1909 the Admiral of the East Indian station took the matter seriously
in hand, and the result of the efforts of the Navy is recorded in the
Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1909–10. After making some
complaint of the increase in the number of raids from across the border,
and stating that “owing to the possession of modern rifles and abundant
ammunition these outlaws have been more daring and difficult to deal
with,” the Report goes on to say: “Throughout the year under review
reports continued to be received regarding the landing of arms and
ammunition on the Persian Gulf coast. It is estimated that over 16,500
rifles, 352 revolvers and pistols, 1,079,000 rounds, as well as 137
boxes of ammunition, were landed between the 31st March, 1909, and 1st
April, 1910. Owing to the frequency of these reports regarding the
landing of arms, the Government of India, in September 1909, decided to
resume naval operations on the Persian Gulf coast. It is satisfactory to
note that these operations proved far more successful than previous
ones, some 6307 rifles and 619,700 rounds of ammunition being captured
between July 1909 and April 1910, and 4260 rifles with 520,000 rounds
being accounted for after the close of the year. As a result of a
conference held at Simla in July 1909, Mr. Gregson, Superintendent of
Police, North-West Frontier Police, was placed on special duty in
November, with a view of preventing Ghilzais and other trans-frontier
tribesmen from getting to the Gulf through India. This measure resulted
in some 152 Afghans with about Rs. 73,000 in their possession being
detained, and it has been proved that another Rs. 26,000 was returned
from Muscat.
“Half a battalion of Native Infantry, with a maxim gun section, left
Quetta for Robat on the 3rd January, 1910, with a view to protecting the
trade-route and closing the road leading through British territory to
arms-runners. No attempts were made by the Afghans to make use of these
routes, but as the Persian authorities made no attempt to close the
routes leading through Persian Baluchistan, the Afghans experienced no
difficulty in entering Afghanistan by skirting Robat and travelling a
few miles to the west of that place. It is, however, satisfactory to
note that several of the caravans are reported to have had to return
empty owing to the naval operations referred to above.... One attempt
was made during the year to land arms on the coast on the British side
of the Persian boundary. A consignment, estimated at from 9500–15,000
rifles, was landed at Pishukan, near Gwadar, which is a Muscat
possession within British territory. It is, however, satisfactory to
note that the fate of this consignment should act as a warning to
arms-runners not to make the attempt again; for 850 of these rifles were
captured by a party landed by H.M.S. _Perseus_.... But for the active
steps taken to check the arms traffic, the trade during the year would
have attained abnormal proportions. Very large numbers of Afghans went
down to the coast, and with them large numbers of Afridis and men of the
north-west border tribes. Very great discouragement was caused to them
by the failure of their ventures, and how far the success of our
operations will diminish the number of those who will make similar
ventures next year remains to be seen.”
[Sidenote: Combined Operations in 1910]
The Report of the Baluchistan Agency for 1910–11 hardly does sufficient
justice to the success met with by the naval operations of the twelve
months under review. “The combined naval and military operations in the
Persian Gulf,” we read, “were continued during the year. Several large
consignments of arms and ammunition were captured by His Majesty’s
ships, and the landing of arms on the Mekran coast was rendered more
difficult than ever. Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced by
arms-runners last season, large numbers of Afghans and tribesmen again
proceeded to the Gulf for the purpose of obtaining arms, but it is
satisfactory to note that a large proportion of these are said to have
returned either with unladen camels or with ordinary merchandise. Those
that managed to procure arms are reported to have purchased them mostly
from the local Baluch, with the result that prices have risen and very
few arms are now obtainable even at the high prices offered by the
arms-runners. Half a battalion of Native Infantry, with a maxim gun
detachment, was maintained at Robat throughout the year, and prevented
any attempts being made to use the routes leading through British
territory. The routes followed by the Afghans, both when proceeding to
and returning from the coast, were those to the west of Robat, which the
Persian Government is incapable of closing. Reports from all sides show
that the active measures again taken to stop the arms traffic are keenly
felt both in Afghanistan and among the gun-running community generally.
The trade is now looked upon as an extremely difficult and hazardous
undertaking.”
It was, of course, hardly to be expected that so independent a people as
these border folk would take “lying down” this interference with their
supply of arms and ammunition—the less that the business appears to have
been conducted on the “payment-in-advance” principle, and, the money
being already in the hands of the traders for the rifles seized by
British ships, whole communities were not merely disappointed but
ruined. Much ill-feeling and disaffection was aroused on the frontier;
and the Kohat Pass Afridis actually put in a claim against the Indian
Government for compensation—a demand which was not entertained.
Thanks to the energy of the naval authorities, the Muscat gun-trade
would appear to have been scotched, but it is very far from being
killed, while the operations in the Gulf have cost something like
£100,000 each season. How, too, can any preventive service, however well
organised, deal with cases such as that reported in August 1911 in the
Indian papers—of a steamer of the Hansa Line which arrived in Bombay,
having among its cargo a number of cases labelled “Loaf Sugar”—shipped
at Hamburg, through Antwerp, for Koweit via Bombay? Unfortunately for
the consignees, one of these cases was damaged in trans-shipment, when
the “loaf sugar” was found to be magazine rifles, fifty in number, of
·203 bore, and with a quantity of ammunition to match.
Mr. Lovat Fraser has told us that when he was on the north-west frontier
in 1909, he tried to ascertain what proportion of the tribesmen were
then armed with modern rifles. The lowest estimate was 80,000, and many
frontier officers seemed of the opinion that there were probably 150,000
good rifles in possession of men of the border. “Not only,” says Mr.
Lovat Fraser, “does this great influx of arms affect the character of
our relations with the tribesmen, by giving them greater confidence in
their offensive capacity, but it may also have very grave results should
it ever be necessary for us to advance again into Afghanistan.”[148]
[Sidenote: The Sultan of Oman]
But coincident with the departure from Indian waters of Rear-Admiral Sir
Edward Slade, whose vigorous measures have done so much during the last
three years for the suppression of the arms traffic between Muscat and
Mekran, comes the opportune announcement that the Sultan of Oman has
happily decided to control the trade himself—hitherto protected by a
treaty, dating back to the Second Empire, between the Sultan and the
Government of the French Republic. The Sultan of Oman has come to the
decision to store all arms and ammunition imported into his dominions in
a bonded warehouse, from which they are not to be released except upon
production of certificates of destination, while no such certificates
are to be issued for the Mekran coast. If the supervision of the bonded
warehouse is thorough, the traffic in arms should be effectively
controlled, and a considerable relaxation of British naval activities
should be possible; unfortunately, however, the continued existence of
the trade benefits many others besides the men of the “Bloody
Border”—Oriental officials and European manufacturers and exporters—and
it is possible that, though the traffic is to all appearance dead, it
may ere long be surreptitiously revived.
APPENDIX B.
TABLE OF EXPEDITIONS AGAINST THE FRONTIER TRIBES MENTIONED IN THE
PRECEDING CHAPTERS.
[Sidenote: Expeditions 1847–1908]
───────┬────────────┬────────────────┬──────────────┬───────────────
YEAR. │ TRIBE. │ COMMANDER. │ NUMBERS │ CASUALTIES.
│ │ │EMPLOYED.[149]│
───────┼────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────┼───────┬───────
│ │ │ │ K. │ W.
───────┼────────────┼────────────────┼──────────────┼───────┼───────
│ │Lt.-Col. │ │ │
1847 │Baizais, │ Bradshaw, │ Mixed Brigade│ 1│ 13
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1849 │Do., │Do., │ 2300│ 7│ 40
│Afridis, │Brig. Sir C. │ │ │
1850 │ Kohat │ Campbell, │ 3200│ 19│ 74
│ Pass, │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│Miranzai │ │ 2050,│ │
1851 │ Tribes, │Capt. J. Coke, │ including│ 2│ 3
│ │ │ levies│ │
│ │Brig. Sir C. │ │ │
1851–2 │Mohmands, │ Campbell, │ 1597│ 4│ 5
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
1852 │Do., │Do., │ 600│ 2│ 8
〃 │Ranizais, │Do., │ 3270│ 11│ 29
〃 │Utman Khels,│Do., │ 2200│ 3│ 15
│Wazirs, │Major J. │ │ │
〃 │ Darwesh │ Nicholson, │ 1500│ 24│ 7
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Col. │ 3800,│ │
1852–3 │Hassanzais, │ Mackeson, │ including│ 5│ 10
│ │ C.B., │ levies, etc.│ │
1853 │Hindustani │Do., │ 2000│ Nil
│ Fanatics, │ │ │
〃 │Afridis, │Col. Boileau, │ 1740│ 8│ 29
│ Adam Khel,│ │ │ │
1854 │Mohmands, │Col. Cotton, │ 1782│ 1│ 16
1855 │Afridis, Aka│Lt.-Col. │ 1500│ 9│ 25
│ Khel, │ Craigie, C.B.,│ │ │
1855 │Miranzai │Brig. │ 3766│ —│ 14
│ Tribes, │ Chamberlain, │ │ │
│Orakzais, │ │ │ │
〃 │ Rabia │Do., │ 2457│ 11│ 4
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│ │ │ 4896,│ │
1856 │Turis, │Do., │ including│ 5│ 3
│ │ │ levies│ │
1857 │Yusafzais, │Major Vaughan, │ 400│ 2│ 3
│ │ │ 990│ 5│ 21
│ │ │ 1625,│ │
│ │ │ including│ 1│ 8
│ │ │ levies│ │
│Khudu Khels,│M.-Gen. Sir S. │ │ │
1858 │ etc., │ Cotton, │ 4877│ 6│ 29
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ 5372,│ │
1859–60│ Darwesh │ Chamberlain, │ including│ 1│ 19
│ Khel, │ C.B., │ levies│ │
│Wazirs, │ │ 6796,│ │
1860 │ Mahsuds, │Do., │ including│ 100│ 261
│ │ │ levies│ │
1863 │Ambela │Do., │ 9000│ 238│ 670
│ Expedition│ │ │ │
│(Hindustani │(later M.-Gen. │ │ │
│ Fanatics, │ Garvock), │ │ │
│ etc.), │ │ │ │
1864 │Mohmands, │Col. Macdonell, │ 1801│ 2│ 17
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1868 │Orakzais, │Major Jones, │970, including│ 11│ 44
│ │ │ levies, etc.│ │
│Black │M.-Gen. Wilde, │ │ │
〃 │ Mountain │ C.B., C.S.I., │ 12,544│ 5│ 29
│ Tribes, │ │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Col. Keyes, │ 2080,│ │
1869 │Orakzais, │ C.B., │ including│ 3│ 33
│ │ │ levies│ │
1872 │Dawaris, │Brig.-Gen. │ 1826│ —│ 6
│ │ Keyes, C.B., │ │ │
1877 │Afridis, │Col. Mocatta, │ 1750│ 1│ 10
│ Jowaki, │ │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gens. │ │ │
1877–8 │Do., │ Keyes and │ 7400│ 11│ 51
│ │ Ross, │ │ │
1878 │Utman Khels,│Capt. Battye, │ 280│ —│ 8
1878 │Ranizais, │Major Campbell, │ 860│ Nil
〃 │Utman Khels,│Lt.-Col. │ 875│ —│ 1
│ │ Jenkins, │ │ │
│Afridis, │Lt.-Gen. Maude, │ │ │
〃 │ Zakha │ V.C., C.B., │ 2500│ 2│ 9
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
1879 │Do., │Do., │ 3750│ 5│ 13
〃 │Mohmands, │Capt. Creagh and│ 600│ 6│ 18
│ │ Major Dyce, │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Zaimukhts, │ Tytler, V.C., │ 3226│ 2│ 2
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
1880 │Mohmands, │Brig.-Gen. │ 2300│ 2│ 3
│ │ Doran, C.B., │ │ │
〃 │Batannis, │Lt.-Col. Rynd, │ 721│ —│ 5
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ │
〃 │ Darwesh │ Gordon, C.B., │ 800│ Nil
│ Khel, │ │ │
│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gens. │ │ │
1881 │ Mahsuds, │ Gordon and │ 8531│ 8│ 24
│ │ Kennedy, │ │ │
1887 │Bunerwals, │Col. Broome, │ 460│ 3│ 2
│Black │B.-Gen. J. │ │ │
1888 │ Mountain │ McQueen, C.B.,│ 9416│ 25│ 57
│ Tribes, │ A.D.C., │ │ │
1891 │Do., │M.-Gen. W. K. │ 7289│ 9│ 39
│ │ Elles, C.B., │ │ │
│ │B.-Gen. Sir W. │ │
〃 │Orakzais, │ Lockhart, │ 4600│ Nil
│ │ K.C.B., │ │
〃 │Do., │Do., │ 8000│ 28│ 73
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
1894 │Wazirs, │ Turner and │ 11,150│ 45│ 75
│ │ Lt.-Gen. │ │ │
│ │Sir W. Lockhart,│ │ │
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
1895 │Chitralis, │M.-Gen. Sir R. │ 15,249│ 21│ 101
│ │ Low, K.C.B., │ │ │
1895 │Chitralis, │Col. Kelly, │ 1400[150]│ 165│ 88
│Wazirs, │M.-Gen. │ │ │
1897 │ Darwesh │ Corrie-Bird, │ 8000│ 29│ 61
│ Khel, │ C.B., │ │ │
│Akozais │Col. Meiklejohn,│ │ │
〃 │ (Swat), │ C.B., C.M.G., │ 12,650│ 97│ 386
│ │ and │ │ │
│ │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ │ │
│ │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
〃 │Mohmands, │Brig.-Gen. E. │ 8500│ 12│ 96
│ │ Elles, C.B., │ │ │
〃 │Akozais and │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ 12,200│ 61│ 218
│ Tarkanris │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
│(Dir and │ │ │ │
│ Bajaur) │ │ │ │
〃 │Utman Khels,│Colonel A. Reid,│ 2900│ Nil
│ │ C.B., │ │
│ │M.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Orakzais, │ Yeatman-Biggs,│ 9500│ 26│ 54
│ │ C.B., │ │ │
│ │Lt.-Gen. Sir W. │ │ │
〃 │Afridis, │ Lockhart, │ 34,550│ 287│ 853
│ │ K.C.B., │ │ │
│ │Brig.-Gen. │ │ │
〃 │Chamkannis, │ Gaselee, C.B.,│ 9700│ 46│ 35
│ │ and │ │ │
│ │Col. Hill, C.B.,│ │ │
1898 │Bunerwals, │M.-Gen. Sir B. │ 8800│ —│ 1
│ │ Blood, K.C.B.,│ │ │
│ │Capt. │ 1200,│ │
1899 │Chamkannis, │ Roos-Keppel, │ including│ —│ 1
│ │ │ levies│ │
1900–01│Wazirs, │Brig.-Gen. │ Small│ 32│ 114
│ Mahsud, │ Dening, │ Columns[151]│ │
│Wazirs, │M.-Gen. Egerton,│ │ │
1901–02│ Darwesh │ C.B., │ Do.,[151]│ 4│ 15
│ Khel, │ │ │ │
│Afridis, │M.-Gen. Sir J. │ │ │
1908 │ Zakha │ Willcocks, │ 14,000│ 3│ 37
│ Khel, │ K.C.M.G., │ │ │
〃 │Mohmands, │Do., │ 12,000│ 38│ 184
───────┴────────────┴────────────────┴──────────────┴───────┴───────
APPENDIX C.
TABLE SHOWING BY WHOM THE TRIBES ARE CONTROLLED.
[Sidenote: Tribal Control]
───────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────
Dep.-Commissioner, Hazara. │Cis-Indus Swatis—Allai, Tikari,
│ Deshi, Nandihar and Thakot.
│Yusafzais—Trans-Indus Utmanzai,
│ Mada Khel, Amazai, Hassanzai,
│ Akazai and Cis-Indus Chagarzai.
│
Political Agent, Dir, Swat and │Yusafzais—Trans-frontier Akozai.
Chitral. │
│Sam Ranizais.
│Bajauris.
│Chitralis.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Peshawar. │Yusafzais—Trans-Indus Chagarzai,
│ Khudu Khel, Chamlawals, Sam
│ Baizai and Cis-Indus Utmanzai.
│Utman Khel.
│Mohmands.
│Gaduns.
│Bunerwals.
│Afridis—Adam Khel of Janakor and
│ Kandar.
│
Political Agent, Khyber. │Afridis—except Adam Khel.
│Mullagoris.
│Mohmands—Shilmani.
│Shinwaris.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Kohat. │Orakzais—except Massuzai.
│Afridis—Adam Khel.
│Bangash.
│
Political Agent, Kurram. │Zaimukhts.
│Turis.
│Orakzais—Massuzai.
│Chamkannis.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Bannu. │Bannuchis.
│
Political Agent, Tochi. │Dawaris.
│Wazirs—Darwesh Khel.
│
Political Agent, Wana. │Wazirs—Mahsuds.
│
Dep.-Commissioner, Dera Ismail │Batannis.
Khan. │
───────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────
INDEX.
A
Abazai, fort, 108, 146–9, 153, 211, 218, 232, 252, 254, 258, 314.
Abazais, 118.
Abbott, Colonel, 10, 35.
Abbottabad, 37, 38, 41, 66, 83.
Abdul Khalik, 116, 131.
Abdul Manan, 116, 129, 130, 131.
Abdur Rahman Khan, 183.
Abu, 36.
Abuwa, 141.
Adam Khel, Afridis, 212, 224, 268, 278–281 _et seq._
Adinzai, 168, 176.
Afghan, 1, 2.
Afridis, 19, 89, 218, 247, 261 _et seq._, 346, 376.
Afzul-ul-Mulk, 191.
Agra, 153, 154, 178, 180.
Agror, 25, 29, 35–38, 41, 42, 45, 57.
Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, 67 _et seq._, 113.
Ahmadzai, Wazirs, 426, 435, 437, 438, 440, 441, 460.
Ain, 107.
Ajun Khan, 146.
Aka Khel, Afridis, 212, 268, 278, 298–300, 308, 318, 331, 336, 371,
376.
Akazais, 28–30, 34, 35, 39, 41–43, 45, 47, 49.
Akhel, Orakzais, 352, 363, 378, 382.
Akhor, 282, 283.
Akhund Baba, 46.
Akhund Khels, 32.
Akhund of Swat, 73, 89, 98, 106, 112 _et seq._, 124, 235.
Akozais, 56, 58, 107 _et seq._, 116 _et seq._
Alachi Pass, 335.
Aladand, 118, 131, 137, 139.
Alexander the Great, 110, 215, 406.
Alikandi, 220.
Ali Khel, Orakzais, 323, 352, 356, 359, 364, 372, 382.
Ali Musjid, 237, 256, 257, 269, 272, 275, 276, 303, 304, 307, 315 _et
seq._, 334, 335.
Alisherzai, Orakzais, 353, 372, 382, 397, 400, 404.
Alizai, Wazirs, 428, 454, 457.
Alizai, Utman Khels, 145.
Allai, 24, 46.
Amandara, 133, 137.
Aman-ul-Mulk, 190–192.
Amazai, 3, 56, 59, 60, 64, 67, 105, 106.
Amb, 26, 28, 32, 33, 36, 57, 69, 71, 72, 79, 82.
Ambahar, 143, 145, 148, 224, 260.
Ambela, 52, 59, 61, 63, 82 _et seq._, 123, 178.
Amir Ayub Khan, 243.
Amir Khan, 68.
Amir Sher Ali, 236, 415, 453.
Amir-ul-Mulk, 193, 195.
Amir Yakub Khan, 240.
Anderson, General, 253, 254, 257, 339.
Aornos, 66.
Arhanga Pass, 319, 330.
Arnawai, 183, 193, 217.
Asmar, 157, 162, 172, 183, 193, 209, 212, 217, 253.
Astor, 202.
Attock, 68, 112, 293.
Avitabili, General, 302.
B
Babukarra, 155–157, 174, 181.
Babuzai, 119, 120.
Bada Khel, Chamkannis, 407.
Badakshan, 185, 188, 191, 217.
Badal, 7.
Badan, 178.
Badelai, 178, 181.
Bagh, Tirah, 269, 330–333.
Bagrian, 40.
Bahlolzai, Wazirs, 428, 456, 457.
Baio, 51, 52.
Baird, Captain, 196.
Baizai, Bangash, 396.
Baizai, Mohmands, 219, 221, 223, 225, 250, 259.
Baizai, Yusafzais, 57, 58, 117, 119 _et seq._
Bajaur, 55, 89, 110, 155 _et seq._, 182, 192, 211, 253.
Bajkatta, 105.
Bakrai, 45, 50.
Balakot, 70.
Baliamin, 363, 375, 376.
Balish Khel, 398, 400, 402.
Baluchistan, 1.
Bampokha, 104.
Banda, 99.
Bangash, 14, 15, 261, 278, 284, 285, 346, 394 _et seq._
Bannu, 17, 18, 21–23, 391, 418, 426, 428, 429, 432, 433, 435, 446, 452,
464, 468, 469, 473.
Bara Fort, 334.
Bara River and Valley, 2, 261, 268, 270, 309, 318, 332, 334, 346, 351,
382.
Baradar, 26, 29, 34–36, 48.
Baran, 433.
Barandu River, 60, 62, 105.
Barangola, 112, 118.
Baraul, 156, 157, 160, 167.
Barchar, 40, 41, 43.
Barg, 307, 336.
Barkeli, 104.
Barkilai, 63.
Baroghil Pass, 185, 186, 217.
Barrett, General, 254, 257, 340.
Barwa, 172, 176.
Barwand, 448, 456, 465.
Basawal, 237, 306, 307.
Bashgul Valley, 193, 194, 217.
Bashkar, 119, 173, 209.
Basi Khel, Afridis, 298.
Batai Pass, 176.
Batannis, 418, 420, 428–429, 455.
Battye, Colonel, 10, 169, 170, 171.
Battye, Captain W., 149, 150.
Battye, Lieut., 409.
Bazar Pass, 335.
Bazar Valley, 261, 268, 273, 304 _et seq._, 334 _et seq._
Bazdara Valley, 122.
Bedmanai Pass, 178, 249–251.
Beka, 112, 113.
Bela, 44, 49.
Bellew, Dr., 3, 159, 261, 394, 406, 419.
Berar Kats, 307.
Bhogarmang, 24, 25.
Bholu, 41.
Biddulph, Major, 190.
Biland Khel, 387, 438, 440.
Biliani, 29.
Bilot, 179.
Bimarai, 145.
Bimbal, 29.
Birkot, 193.
Bizotis, Orakzais, 284, 354, 355, 367–369.
Black Mountain, 24 _et seq._
Blood, Major-General Sir B., 102, 137 _et seq._, 152, 175 _et seq._,
248, 249.
Bohai Dag, 223, 259.
Bohai Valley or Darra, 176.
Boisragon, Colonel, 241–242.
Bori Pass, 335.
Borradaile, Captain, 203, 204.
Bradshaw, Colonel, 121, 122, 124.
Bright, Colonel, 39, 40.
Browne, General Sir S., 237.
Brownlow, Major, 86, 91, 93, 94.
Bruce, Colonel, 195.
Buchanan, Colonel, 294.
Budh Sing, 68.
Bukar Pass, 308, 335.
Buner, 16, 30.
Buner Pass, 63, 99.
Bunerwals, 56, 60 _et seq._, 83 _et seq._, 139, 165.
Buni, 198, 200, 201.
Bunji, 194.
Bunny, Colonel, 466, 467.
C
Campbell, General Sir C., 125, 146, 229–231, 282.
Campbell, Colonel R., 130.
Campbell, Captain F., 171.
Campbell, Captain, 196, 206.
Cavagnari, Sir L., 10, 149, 262, 274, 306, 368–9, 400.
Cawnpore, 38.
Chagarzais, 28, 30, 39, 41, 56, 63, 87, 105, 106.
Chagru Kotal, 319 _et seq._, 373, 378, 384.
Chaharmung, 155–157, 177.
Chaila Mountain, 46.
Chajri, 43.
Chakalwat, 205.
Chakdara, 105, 107, 118, 132, 133, 136, 137, 152, 159, 167, 169, 173.
Chakesar, 117.
Chamberi, 34, 35, 82.
Chamberlain, General Sir N., 82 _et seq._, 97, 364, 426, 438, 445, 446,
451.
Chamkannis, 332, 346, 381, 389 _et seq._, 405 _et seq._
Chamla, 55, 57, 82, 85, 89, 99, 104.
Chamlawals, 56, 63, 64.
Chanjal, 46.
Channer, General, 42, 46, 164.
Charsada, 126, 146.
Chatta, 33, 34, 43.
Chilas, 194, 201, 202.
China, 307, 335, 336.
Chinglai, 77, 78.
Chirmang, 46.
Chirori, 82.
Chitabat, 26, 30, 40, 43, 45, 46.
Chitral, 2, 22, 118, 160, 162, 172, 182 _et seq._
Chora, 256, 269, 304, 307, 309, 335, 336, 340, 341.
Chorbanda, 104.
Chutiatun, 160.
Coke, Captain J., 147, 284–286, 364–366, 437.
Cole, Captain H., 179.
Corrie-Bird, General, 468.
Cotton, General Sir S., 72, 76.
Cotton, Colonel, 232, 233.
“Crag Picquet,” Ambela, 90 _et seq._
“Crag Picquet,” Samana, 384, 386.
Creagh, Captain O’M., 238–9.
Crookshank, Colonel, 44.
D
Dab, 229–233.
Dabbar Pass, 224, 226.
Dakka, 211, 219, 237–43, 277, 304, 307, 309.
Dand, 249.
Daradar Valley, 352, 374.
Darbanai, 51.
Darband, Black Mountain, 29, 34, 38, 42, 46, 48, 51, 52, 82, 83.
Darband, Miranzai, 375–377.
Dargai, Swat, 128, 135, 153, 165, 166, 185.
Dargai, Tirah, 321 _et seq._, 346.
Darhan Pass, 78, 83.
Darsamand, 399, 415.
Darwesh Khels, 418, 419, 426 _et seq._
Datta Khel, 466, 468–472.
Daulatzai, Orakzais, 351, 354, 355, 370, 381, 382.
Daulatzai, Yusafzais, 59.
Davidson, Captain, 35.
Davidson, Lieut., 94, 96.
Dawaris, 418, 429 _et seq._, 455.
Dawezai, Mohmands, 222, 224, 225, 244, 251, 260.
Delhi, 72, 105.
Dening, General, 471.
Dera Ghazi Khan, 17.
Dera Ismail Khan, 17–22, 418, 429, 453–455, 460, 470.
Deshi, 24–28, 39.
Des Vœux, Major, 387.
Dhana, Batannis, 429.
Dhar, 384, 386.
Digar Pass, 117.
Dilazaks, 54, 64, 156, 222, 224.
Dilbori, 46.
Diliarai, 49, 50.
Dir, 22, 89, 118, 155 _et seq._, 182, 192.
Doha, 52.
Domandi, 424, 459, 466.
Dorah Pass, 185–187, 191, 217.
Doran, General, 242, 294.
Dost Muhammad Khan, 113, 301, 431.
Dufferin, Lord, 190.
Dukarai, 79.
Dunsford, General, 124.
Durand, Colonel, 191.
Durand Mission, 131, 162, 212, 214, 243, 459.
Dusha Khel, 118, 119, 131, 139.
Dwa Toi, 331, 333.
E
“Eagle’s Nest” Picquet, 88, 89.
Edwardes, Colonel, 234, 299, 426.
Edwardes, Lieut., 197, 200.
Egerton, General, 464, 468, 473.
Elles, General E., 177, 178, 246, 248 _et seq._
Elles, General W., 48, 49.
Elsmie, Mr., 8.
Enriquez, Lieut., 9, 60, 160, 220, 392, 413, 425.
F
Fateh Khan, 69.
Feroz Shah, 105.
Firoz Khel, 354.
Fosbery, Lieut., 91.
Fowler, Lieut., 197–199.
G
Gaduns, 54 _et seq._, 57–59, 64–67, 104.
Galai, Afridis, 281, 285.
Galbraith, General, 42.
Gandab Valley, 220, 222, 230, 244, 247, 251, 255.
Gandamak, 277.
Gandera, 147.
Gandhara, 110.
Gandhari, 54, 211.
Gandiali Pass, 290, 292.
Gandiob, 438, 439.
Ganthar, 31.
Gar, 15.
Gara Heights, 240, 241.
Gardiner, Colonel, 292.
Garhi, 45, 46, 52.
Garhwis, 119.
Garvock, General, 97, 98, 100, 101.
Gaselee, Colonel, 50;
General, 343.
Gasht, 204.
Gat, 180.
Gatacre, General, 163, 171–173.
Gauraios, 108.
Gawakki, 401.
Ghalanai, 249.
Ghalegai, 141.
Ghandaki, 329, 352.
Ghariba, 295, 296.
Ghazi Kot, 45, 50.
Ghazis, 11.
Ghazni, 155, 211, 421, 423.
Ghilzai, 2, 5, 224.
Ghizr, 194, 197, 203.
Ghor, 54.
Ghorapher Pass, 46.
Ghoria Khel, 211.
Ghosam, 176.
Ghulam Haidar, 214.
Ghurban Valley, 117.
Ghurghusht, 66.
Gilgit, 183, 190–192, 197, 201, 202.
Gomal River and Valley, 2, 418, 419, 421, 428, 445, 458.
Gordon, Colonel, 400, 443, 456.
Goshta, 221, 223, 237, 240.
Gough, Lieut., 197.
Green, Colonel, 451, 452.
Gujar Garhi, 125, 128.
Gujars, 64, 109, 112.
Gulistan Fort, 321, 326, 377, 383–388.
Gumatti, 435, 436, 473.
Gumbat, Miranzai, 290, 292.
Gumbat, Swat, 168, 169.
Gupis, 194, 203.
Gurai, Utman Khel, 145.
Gurdon, Lieut., 194.
Gurgurra, 271, 272, 276, 316.
Gurohs, 119.
Guru Mountain, 60, 92, 96.
H
Hadda Mullah, 132, 139, 176, 178, 244, 245, 247, 249–251.
Haines, General Sir F., 273, 394.
Haji Khel, Chamkannis, 407.
Hajizai Ferry, 245, 247.
Halimzai, Mohmands, 222, 223, 232, 235, 237, 238, 244, 245, 249, 251,
253, 259.
Hammond, General, 50, 51, 173, 345.
Hamsayas, 13.
Hangu, 22, 357, 364, 367, 372, 375–377, 381, 385–387.
Hariankot, 153, 154.
Hari Singh, 29, 68.
Harley, Lieut., 194, 209.
Hart, General, 343.
Hashim Ali, 52.
Hassan Khel, Afridis, 281, 285, 288.
Hassanzais, Black Mountain, 28 _et seq._, 39, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 64,
87, 105.
Hassazai, Gaduns, 67.
Hastnagar, 55, 58, 126, 146, 226.
Haughton, Colonel, 337.
Hazara, 17, 21, 23, 26, 37, 39, 55, 65, 73, 81, 82.
Hazaras, 2, 5.
Hephæstion, 110.
Hildai, 104.
Hill, Colonel, 345, 408, 409.
Hindu Kush, 183, 185, 187, 191, 215, 217, 225.
Hindustani Fanatics, 39, 45, 67 _et seq._, 87, 105, 106, 115.
Hiro Shah, 128.
Hodson, Lieut. W., 35, 287.
Holdich, Colonel Sir T., 8, 10, 186, 187, 214, 215, 265, 314, 346, 349,
421.
Hoti, 69.
Hotiwal, 3.
Hughes, Lieut., 147.
Hujra, 13.
Hund, 69, 113.
Hunza, 191, 192, 202, 205.
Hutchinson, Colonel, 324.