CALIPHATE OF OTHMAN. GENERAL REVIEW.
A.H. XXIV.-XXXV. A.D. 645–656.
[Sidenote: Dynastic issues of the Caliphate.]
Having now traced the progress of Islam to its firm establishment in
the world, I do not propose to pursue the history of its conquests and
further spread, otherwise than in a very brief and general way; but
shall confine what remains of this work chiefly to a review of the
facts bearing on the dynastic issues of the Caliphate.
[Sidenote: Causes of Othmân’s unpopularity:]
The reign of Othmân lasted twelve years. It is usual to say that the
first six were popular, and the last six the reverse; that is to say,
that, during the latter half, the tide turned, and, discontent ripening
into sedition, the storm burst at length with fatal force upon the
aged Caliph. This is true if we look at the outward appearance. But in
reality the causes of unpopularity were busily at work from the very
beginning. These were twofold: _first_, antagonism between the
Arab nation at large and the Coreish; _secondly_, jealousy between
the house of Hâshim, and that of Abd Shems (the Omeyyads) to which
Othmân and Muâvia belonged.
[Sidenote: I. Antagonism between Arab tribes at large and Coreish.]
The Arab soldiery, flushed with the glory and the fruits of victory,
were scattered all over the empire. In Syria, they were held in check
by the powerful hand of Muâvia, whose authority was strengthened by the
larger settlement there than elsewhere of influential citizens from
Mecca and Medîna. In every other province, conscious of their power,
the Arab tribes were rapidly getting the bit between their teeth. Their
arrogant and factious spirit found its focus at Kûfa and Bussorah in
both of which cities, indeed, it had already ominously shown itself
during the reign of Omar; for even he had not been able effectually to
curb it there. Impatience of control on the part of the Arabs was based
partly on the spread of Islam having been due to the prowess of their
arms; and partly on the brotherhood of the faith, in virtue of which
all believers, and specially those of Arab blood, stood on the common
ground of civil equality. The Caliph, it is true, as successor to the
Prophet, was absolute, uncontrolled by any constitutional authority
whatever. But even he, yielding to the sentiment, not only took counsel
on all critical occasions with the leading men around him, but, as a
rule, held himself bound by the popular voice at large, and enjoined
the same upon his lieutenants in the provinces. And so it was that in
the recall of Sád, the arraigning of Abu Mûsa, and other concessions to
the clamour of the citizens of Bussorah and Kûfa, Omar had already set
a baneful lesson to his successor, and given to those constituencies a
foretaste of power which they were not slow to take advantage of. Thus
the turbulent spirit grew from day to day--a spirit of opposition to
all authority, and of impatience in particular of the pretensions of
the Coreish.
[Sidenote: II. Aly and the house of Hâshim jealous of Othmân and the
house of Omeyya.]
The second cause, though less threatening to Islam, was more insidious,
and fraught with greater danger to the Caliphate and the person of
Othmân himself. Had the Coreish rallied loyally around the throne, the
Arab factions might have been nipped in the bud. But the weakness of
Othmân, and the partiality with which he favoured his own friends and
relatives, stirred the jealousy of the house of Hâshim, which began
vaunting the claims of Aly and the Prophet’s family, and depreciating
the Omeyyad branch to which the Caliph belonged. That branch,
unfortunately for the Omeyyads, had been the tardiest to recognise the
mission of Mahomet; and the kinsmen on whom Othmân now lavished his
favours had been the most inveterate in their opposition to it. Every
unfavourable expression uttered by the Prophet during that period of
bitter enmity was now raked up against them, and used to blacken their
names, and to cast discredit on a government which promoted them to
power and honour. Thus the Coreish were divided; rivalry paralysed
their influence, and Othmân lost the support which would otherwise
have enabled him to check the machinations of the Arab malcontents.
Still worse, Aly and his party lent themselves to the disloyal policy
of the Bedouin faction, which was fast sapping the foundations of the
Caliphate, and which, as Aly should have foreseen, would in the end
recoil against himself.[440]
[Sidenote: Factious spirit diverted by military service.]
It was not, however, till the later part of Othmân’s reign that these
influences, though early at work, assumed dangerous prominence. Their
retardation was in great measure due to the military operations, which,
busily pursued in all directions by the Moslem arms, diverted attention
from domestic trouble. Campaigns were annually prosecuted, with more or
less vigour, throughout the twelve years of Othmân’s Caliphate. A very
brief outline of them will suffice.
[Sidenote: Operations in _Persia_.]
In Persia, as we have seen, the Mussulman invasion had resulted
hitherto rather in the dispersion of great armies than in the effectual
reduction of the country. Most of the provinces resented the first
imposition of tribute, and rose against their new masters, one
after another, in repeated and sometimes long-continued rebellion.
Expeditions were time after time equipped from Kûfa and Bussorah
to crush these risings, from the Caspian Sea and the Oxus to the
shores of the Indian Ocean, and even as far as Kabul.[441] It was
not till near the close of Othmân’s reign that the Moslem yoke was
firmly settled on the neck of Persia. [Sidenote: A.H. XXXI.
A.D. 652.]In the eighth year of his Caliphate, Yezdegird died;
and thereafter, though in a desultory and sporadic fashion opposition
might still survive, anything like national or dynastic antagonism
was at an end. Success, indeed, did not invariably attend the Moslem
arms. The progress, on the whole, was steadily forward; but there
were reverses, and these sometimes of a serious type. In the year
A.H. 32, the Turks on the western shore of the Caspian had an
advantage, in which the Arab leaders and a great body of the veterans
were slain. To retrieve the disaster, Othmân ordered levies from Syria
to cross Mesopotamia and reinforce the Kûfan army. Bad blood bred
between the two; the Syrians refused to serve under the captain of the
rival body; and an altercation ensued which nearly led to bloodshed.
This, adds the historian, was the first symptom of the breach between
the Kûfans and the men of Syria, which subsequently broke out into
prolonged hostilities. About the same time, a whole army was lost in
deep snow upon the heights of Kermân, only two men escaping to tell the
tale. There were also very serious reverses in Turkestan. But Arabia
continued to cast forth its swarms of fighting tribes in such vast
numbers, and the wild fanaticism of the faith still rolled so rapidly
onward, that these and similar disasters soon disappeared in the
swelling tide of conquest.
[Sidenote: _Syria_, _Asia Minor_, and _Armenia_. A.H. XXV. A.D. 646.]
Excepting raids of little import, Syria had for some time past enjoyed
rest,[442] when suddenly in the second year of this Caliphate, Muâvia
was startled by the approach of an army from Asia Minor, which he had
not the means to oppose. Othmân ordered troops to pass over from
the eastern provinces, and eight thousand volunteers soon joined the
Syrian army. Thus reinforced, the Arabs repulsed the Byzantine attack.
Following up their success, they overran Asia Minor, and, piercing the
heart of Armenia, joined their comrades on the Persian border within
sight of the Caspian. Thence they penetrated as far north as Tiflis,
and even to the shores of the Black Sea. Thereafter hostilities were
renewed for a long period every summer; and eventually, aided by naval
expeditions from the ports of Africa, the Syrian generals pushed
forward their conquests in the Levant and Asia Minor, enlarged their
coasts, and strengthened their border.
[Sidenote: _Africa._ A.H. XXV. A.D. 646.]
In Africa, I have already noticed the desperate attack made early in
the reign of Othmân on Alexandria from seaward. The Byzantine forces,
for a little while, regained possession of the city, but (as we have
before related) were finally driven out by Amru; and against the Moslem
power in Egypt no further attack was made. The Imperial arms, however,
were still active in Africa; and along the northern shores of the
Mediterranean, strong Arab columns were long actively engaged. Among
the chiefs who had joined the Egyptian army was Abu Sarh,[443] already
noticed as the foster-brother of Othmân. He did not bear an enviable
reputation in Islam; for having been employed by Mahomet as amanuensis
to record his early revelations, he had proved in some way unfaithful
to the trust; and on the capture of Mecca, was in consequence
proscribed from the amnesty, and only at the intercession of Othmân
escaped being put to death. [Sidenote: Abu Sarh supersedes Amru in
Upper Egypt. A.H. XXVI. A.D. 647.] Possessed of administrative ability,
he had been appointed by Omar to the government of Upper Egypt. But
some years after, he fell out with Amru, in whom was vested the supreme
control of the province; and each appealed to Othmân. Amru was
declared to be in fault, and the Caliph deposed him altogether from
the civil charge of Egypt. Amru objected. ‘To be over the army,’ he
said, ‘and not over the revenue, was but holding the cow’s horns, while
another milked her.’ He repaired angrily to Othmân, who, after some
words of bitter altercation, transferred the entire administration,
civil and military, into the hands of Abu Sarh. The act was unfortunate
for the Caliph. It threw Amru into the ranks of the disaffected party
at Medîna; while the bad repute of ‘the renegade’ Abu Sarh, though
he was an able warrior, gave point to the charges of partiality and
nepotism now rife against Othmân.[444]
[Sidenote: Conquest in Northern Africa. A.H. XXVI. A.D. 647.]
Abu Sarh, left thus in sole command, carried his arms vigorously along
the coast beyond Tripoli and Barca, and threatened Carthage and the
far west. The Byzantine Governor, Gregory, reinforced by the Emperor,
advanced against him with an army, we are told, of one hundred and
twenty thousand men. Othmân, warned of the danger, strengthened Abu
Sarh by a large contingent of Arab troops; and with them marched a
numerous company of veterans and ‘Companions,’ including the sons
of Abu Bekr, of Abbâs, and of Zobeir. The field was long and hotly
contested; and Abu Sarh, to stimulate his men, promised the hand of
Gregory’s daughter, with a large dower, to the warrior who should slay
her father. The enemy was at last discomfited with great slaughter,
and a citizen of Medîna gained the lady for his prize. He carried her
off on his camel to Medîna; and the martial verses which he sang by the
way are still preserved.[445] In this campaign, Othmân incurred much
odium by granting Abu Sarh a fifth of the royal share of the booty as
personal prize. The rest was sent as usual to Medîna; and here again
Othmân is blamed for allowing Merwân his cousin to become the purchaser
of the same at an inadequate price.[446]
[Sidenote: Naval operations, forbidden by Omar.]
But it is as the first commander of a Moslem fleet that Abu Sarh
is chiefly famous, in which capacity he both added largely to the
conquests of Islam, and also by his pre-eminence contributed anew to
the obloquy Cast on his master’s name. Muâvia had for a long time
keenly missed the support of a fleet, and had sought permission of
Omar to embark his soldiery in ships. ‘The isles of the Levant,’ he
wrote, ‘are so close to the Syrian shore, that you might almost hear
the barking of the dogs and the cackling of the hens: give me leave to
attack them.’ But Omar dreaded the sea, and wrote to consult Amru, who
answered thus:--‘The sea is a boundless expanse, whereon great ships
look but tiny specks; there is nought saving the heavens above and the
waters beneath; when the wind lulls, the sailor’s heart is broken;
when tempestuous, his senses reel. Trust it little, fear it much. Man
at sea is an insect floating on a splinter, now engulfed, now scared
to death.’ On receipt of this alarming account, Omar forbade Muâvia
to have anything to do with ships. ‘The Syrian sea, they tell me, is
longer and broader than the dry land, and is instant with the Lord,
night and day, seeking to swallow it up. How should I trust my people
on the bosom of the cursed infidel? Remember Alâ. Nay, my friend, the
safety of my people is dearer to me than all the treasures of Greece.’
[Sidenote: But undertaken by Othmân.]
Nothing, therefore, was attempted by sea in the reign of Omar. But on
his death, Muâvia renewed the petition, and, at his reiterated request,
Othmân at last relaxed the ban, on condition that the service should
be voluntary. [Sidenote: Cyprus occupied. A.H. XXVIII. A.D. 649.] The
first fleet equipped against Cyprus, in the twenty-eighth year of the
Hegira, was commanded by Abu Cays as admiral; it was joined by Abu
Sarh with a complement of ships manned by Egyptians, and carried a
body of Arab warriors from Alexandria. Cyprus was taken easily, and a
great multitude of captives carried off. The Cypriots agreed to pay the
same revenue as they had done to the Emperor; but, unable as yet to
guarantee their protection, the Caliph remitted the ordinary poll-tax.
Of Abu Cays we are told that he headed fifty expeditions by land and by
sea, but was killed at the last, while engaged in exploring a Grecian
sea-port.[447]
[Sidenote: Naval victory off Alexandria. A.H. XXXI. A.D. 652.]
Three years after the fall of Cyprus, driven now from the harbours of
Africa, and seriously threatened in the Levant, the Byzantines gathered
a fleet of five or six hundred vessels of war, and defied the Arabs at
sea. Abu Sarh was appointed to take up the challenge. He manned every
available ship in the ports of Egypt and Africa; and his squadron,
though much inferior in weight and equipment to the enemy’s, was
crowded with valiant warriors from the army. The Byzantine fleet came
in sight near Alexandria. The wind lulled, and both sides lay for a
while at anchor. The night was passed by the Moslems in recitation of
the Corân and prayer, while the Greeks kept up the clangour of their
bells. In the morning, a fierce engagement took place. The Arab ships
grappled with their adversaries, and a hand-to-hand encounter with
sword and dagger ensued. The slaughter was great on both sides; but
the Greeks, unable to withstand the wild onset of the Saracens, broke
and dispersed. Constantine, who had been in command, sailed away to
Syracuse, where the people, infuriated at the defeat, despatched him in
his bath.[448]
[Sidenote: Obloquy cast on Othmân in this affair.]
In this expedition, the discontent against Othmân, notwithstanding
the splendid victory, for the first time found open and dangerous
expression among some of the leading Companions. Mohammed son of
Abu Bekr, and Mohammed son of Abu Hodzeifa (afterwards leaders in
rebellion), murmured against the Caliph for appointing Abu Sarh
admiral. ‘Othmân hath changed the ordinances of his predecessors,’
they said, ‘and made captain of the fleet a man whom the Prophet
proscribed, and desired to have put to death; and such like men also
hath he put in chief command at Kûfa and Bussorah, and elsewhere.’
The clamour reaching the ears of Abu Sarh, he declared that none of
these men should fight in his line of battle. Excluded thus from the
victory, they were the more incensed. Spite of the threats of Abu Sarh,
the inflammatory language spread, and men began to speak openly and
unadvisedly against Othmân.[449]
[Sidenote: Caliph’s outlook darkens.]
The clouds were louring, and the horizon of the unfortunate Caliph
darkening all around.