CHAPTER VI

ARISTOTLE

In the writings of Aristotle, we find a much richer source for a history

of Greek economic thought. Though no extant work of his is devoted to

economics, he left a multitude of writings on diverse subjects, as a

monument to his wonderful versatility and tireless industry.[517] Of

these, the _Politics_ and the _Ethics_ are especially fruitful in

economic ideas, though, as in the case of Plato, such material is

incidental to the main discussion. His general attitude toward wealth

and some of its problems, we shall find to be often substantially in

agreement with that of Plato. His economic vision was prejudiced by the

same ethico-aristocratic spirit. Yet his practical, scientific mind

caused him to deal with many economic questions more extensively, more

directly, and more incisively than is true of any other Greek thinker.

Caution must be observed, however, against reading into his statements

more meaning than he purposed to convey. He was not the creator of the

science of political economy,[518] though his apprehension of many of

the chief concepts of economics was probably clearer than has often been

admitted by modern economists.[519]

At the very threshold of economic speculation, Aristotle advanced beyond

Plato and Xenophon, in that he perceived the fallacy in the confusion of

household and public economy. He saw that they differed, not only in

size or numbers, but in essential type.[520] In his later discussion of

wealth, however, he overlooked his distinction, and fell into the old

Greek confusion.

VALUE

The extent of Aristotle’s contribution to the theory of value has been

very diversely estimated.[521] In a classic passage of the _Politics_,

he distinguishes between the two uses of an object, the direct use for

which it was produced, and the indirect as an article for exchange.[522]

This has often been heralded as an anticipation of Adam Smith’s

distinctions between value in use and value in exchange.[523] Such an

interpretation, however, is hardly warranted.[524] The entire emphasis

of Aristotle in the passage is upon use rather than upon value. The

exchange use is declared subordinate, and the context shows that the

purport of the statement is to teach the uneconomic doctrine that

exchange (μεταβλητική) is an artificial use, especially when pursued for

gain.

Moreover, the passage fails to develop the definition further by

distinguishing between economic utilities that involve a cost of

production, and other necessities that are devoid of exchange value

because of their universality.[525] Need is recognized as an element in

exchange value,[526] but it is not differentiated from economic demand

that has the means to purchase. All that can safely be said of this

statement of Aristotle, therefore, is that he accidentally hit upon a

basal distinction, which, had it been his purpose, he might have used as

starting-point for the development of the modern theory of value.

Certain other passages from his writings reveal a clearer apprehension

of the distinction. In the _Rhetoric_, he states the principle that

exchange value is measured by rarity, though this may not be a criterion

of the actual value of the commodity to life.[527] The latter is

measured by its necessity or practical utility.[528]

A paragraph from the _Nicomachaean Ethics_, though it does not treat the

problem directly, is also an evidence of Aristotle’s insight into the

elements of economic value.[529] It has been strangely slighted by most

historians of economic thought, though its significance has been

recognized by editors of the _Ethics_.[530] It grows out of his

discussion of fair exchange, which is a part of the larger subject of

justice. He observes that a proportional equality (κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν

ἴσον) between diverse products must exist before exchange can take

place,[531] since the labor involved in their production is not

equal.[532] This equality he obtains through a proportion, in which the

objects of exchange stand in inverse ratio to the producers.[533] The

equalization of the commodities is thus based, according to Aristotle,

upon an estimate of the labor or cost of production in each case.[534]

Again, he points out that the standard by which all products are

measured is need or demand (χρεία) for reciprocal services,[535] thereby

making demand a social fact dependent upon organized society. It is, in

his thought, the “common denominator of value” which finally determines

the actual basis on which all goods are exchanged or services rendered.

Elsewhere Aristotle’s conception of value is more individualistic, like

that of Xenophon and Plato, but Haney[536] overlooks this passage in

asserting that his notion of value is “purely subjective.” It is not

merely “equal wants” that are considered, as he states, but equal costs

as well.[537] This demand, or common measure of value, is expressed in

terms of money (νόμισμα).[538]

It is clear then, from this passage in the _Ethics_, that Aristotle

understood that economic value is determined by demand, as measured in

money, and by labor invested or cost of production.[539] This latter

element, of course, involves the condition that the product be limited

in supply, though this is not expressly stated.[540] To be sure, the

interest of the moral philosopher is also paramount here,[541] as in the

_Politics_ passage. The thought is centered on fair exchange, as a phase

of justice, rather than upon the problem of value. Nevertheless, his

discussion reveals a clear insight into demand and cost of production as

the two most important elements in economic value.[542]

WEALTH

Since Aristotle had a better apprehension of the theory of value than

other Greek thinkers, we may expect him also to define more clearly the

concept of wealth. In the _Politics_, he names the following attributes

of genuine (ἀληθινός) wealth (πλοῦτος): necessary to life; useful to

persons associated in a household or a state; capable of accumulation

(θησαυρισμός); limited in extent (οὐκ ἄπειρος).[543] According to

Mill,[544] from the “economic” standpoint, wealth is “all useful and

agreeable things” of a “material nature” possessing “exchange value”;

and, to have exchange value, they must be “capable of accumulation.”

In comparing these two definitions, it should be recognized at the

outset that Aristotle’s term “genuine” does not mean “truly economic,”

as it might in Mill, but rather “legitimate wealth” as distinguished

from that gained from false finance (χρηματιστική);[545] also that his

“necessary to life” and “limited in extent” are not used in the economic

but in the moral sense, as opposed to luxury and extreme interest in

money-making. Mill’s “all useful and agreeable things” presents a marked

contrast to this in spirit. Aristotle’s “useful” means “what subserves

the final good” (πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν), while Mill’s means “things that give

sensations of comfort or pleasure.” Thus Aristotle’s wealth is

necessarily limited, while Mill’s is unlimited, since, as Barker

observes, “only an infinity of wealth can satisfy an infinity of

need.”[546] It will be seen from the following discussion, however, that

Aristotle includes more than “necessary things” in his category of

economic wealth. He does not specify “material things,” as does Mill,

but it seems probable that this is his meaning.[547] In all the passages

where he enumerates the different kinds of wealth, only material things

are included, except slaves, who are counted as mere tools.[548] One of

these passages specifically excludes intellectual wealth by defining

property as a “separable instrument.”[549] The use of the term for value

(ἀξία) probably implies the same limitation.[550] Though Aristotle does

not mention exchange value specifically, it is clearly implied in his

definition. “Things useful for the association of a state” and things

“capable of accumulation” must have exchange value, thus excluding

illimitable utilities such as air and light.[551] His use of κτῆμα,

“possession,” and his recognition of cost of production and economic

demand as the main factors in determining value,[552] are further

evidence of this. Moreover, as seen above, in the _Ethics_, he clearly

makes exchange value an attribute of all wealth.[553]

From our comparison of the two definitions, then, it is evident that,

though Aristotle is antithetical to Mill in putting the ethical interest

first, and though his definition is not so scientifically specific, yet

the two agree in recognizing the qualities of materiality, exchange

value, and possibility of accumulation as necessary attributes of

wealth. We shall see below, also, that the Greek philosopher was the

forerunner of the orthodox English economists in criticizing the common

confusion of money with wealth.[554]

But, despite his grasp of the leading principles in the economics of

wealth, he takes the same negative moral attitude toward wealth as does

Plato, though his hostility is also directed primarily against the

spirit that commercializes life and makes unlimited wealth the _summum

bonum_. To his mind, this idea that wealth is the sum of all goods is

almost the necessary accompaniment of the possession of superfluous

wealth, but it is especially characteristic of the new-rich (νεωστὶ

κεκτημένοις).[555] Yet Aristotle is too practical to be ascetic. He

realizes that leisure (σχολή) is necessary for moral development and for

good citizenship, and that this cannot be enjoyed except on a basis of

sufficient wealth. A fair competency is therefore desirable for the best

life,[556] for men should live not only temperately, but liberally.[557]

Poverty produces civic strife and crime.[558] Wealth in the absolute

sense (ἁπλῶς) is always good, though it may not always be fitted to a

certain individual, or be property used by him.[559] Each, therefore,

should choose what is good for himself, and use it accordingly.[560] All

this sounds saner than the subjective notion of wealth taught by Plato.

But right here is the secret of the difficulty as Aristotle sees it.

Just because all external wealth is good in the absolute sense, the

popular error has arisen that it is the final cause (αἰτία) of all

happiness,[561] whereas the actual relation of wealth to happiness is

the same as that of the lyre to the tune. There can be no music without

the intervention of the musician.[562] External goods are therefore not

of primary importance to life. The goods of the soul should be placed

first,[563] for the virtues of life are not gained and preserved by

material wealth, but vice versa,[564] and the men of high character and

intelligence are most happy, even though their wealth is moderate.[565]

The common attitude of the money-maker that wealth is unlimited is

contrary to nature.[566] Genuine wealth cannot be unlimited,[567] since

external goods are strictly defined by their utility for a certain

thing. Excessive wealth thus either harms the owner, or is, at least,

useless to him.[568] Neither can wealth be rightly made the _summum

bonum_, for it is really not an end at all, but only a collection of

means to an end (ὀργάνων πλῆθος).[569] The inevitable result of making

it the end and measure of all is moral degeneration.[570] If the highest

interests of life are to be preserved, it must always be kept

subservient. First things must be placed first, both by the

individual[571] and by the state.[572]

PRODUCTION

It is often asserted that Aristotle denied the very existence of a

problem of production.[573] This statement has been based primarily on

certain passages in the _Politics_.[574] These passages, however, are

not a denial of the importance of production. Their purport is merely to

show that the chief aim of life is not to produce or to provide wealth,

but to use it for the advancement of life’s highest interest. From this

standpoint, both acquisition (κτητική) and production (ποιητική) are

subordinate arts.[575] So far is Aristotle from giving no place to

production, that a later chapter of the _Politics_ is devoted to the

consideration of the scheme of supply, including production.[576] To be

sure, he does not lay much emphasis on genuine production in his

enumeration. Industry is barely mentioned, while agriculture is

discussed in detail. His “free-holder” is a consumer of the gifts of

nature, rather than a real producer.[577] He classifies the truly

productive employments that work for themselves (αὐτόφυτον) as those of

the nomad, the farmer, the brigand, the fisherman, and the hunter, and

makes those that live by barter (ἁλλαγῆς) or trade (καπηλείας)

parasitic.[578]

In another passage, finance, strictly defined (οἰκειατάτη), is limited

to all forms of agriculture, and even the hired labor (μισθαρνία) of

industry is included in unnatural finance.[579] Aristotle has thus often

been compared to the physiocrats, who distinguished between creative and

parasitic classes of workers, upheld the “natural” order as the ideal,

and eulogized agriculture and the “extractive” industries as the only

productive ones. As Souchon[580] has observed, however, the resemblance

is only superficial. Yet the fact that he fails to see that exchange is

productive of a time and place value, and the fact that he includes

hired labor, skilled and unskilled, among the unnatural activities, are

sufficient evidence that he had only a superficial grasp of the

principles of production.[581] But the frequent assertion that he

includes brigandage and war among the productive arts is unwarranted,

for he classifies them only among the acquisitive means.[582]

Aristotle almost outdoes Plato in his subordination of all production to

ethics, though he keeps their respective aims more distinct. According

to him, the productive arts are not ends in themselves. They are means

to the supreme end of the moral life, whose first interest is not in

production, but in right action.[583] As seen in our discussion of

Plato, such a doctrine is not fruitful, economically. If interpreted too

rigidly, it stifles commerce and industry. Yet, at bottom, it holds a

great truth which modern economists are emphasizing—the fact that wealth

and production alike must be subordinated to the general individual and

social good. Moreover, the philosopher should not be interpreted in too

hard-and-fast a manner. Barker is extreme in his statement that the

economic theory of Aristotle is a mere treatise on “the ethics of family

life” and that “the fundamental characteristic of his idea of production

is a reactionary archaism, which abolishes all the machinery of

civilization in favor of the self-supporting farm and a modicum of

barter.”[584] Bonar’s assertion is also unwarranted, that “Aristotle

thinks it beneath the dignity” of his discourse to give the practical

details of agriculture and industry “more than a cursory notice.”[585]

Such details were not germane to the plan of his work, and would

certainly be considered out of place in a modern general text on

economics. Aristotle’s economic doctrine, as a whole, is certainly far

broader in scope than the family, and, while based upon ethics, is

something more than an ethical treatise. As seen above, he recognizes

the necessity of a moderate acquisition of wealth, both for the

prosperous state and for the virtuous man, and demands only that the

human interest be put first.[586]

_Agriculture._—Of the factors that enter into production, Aristotle is,

like the other Socratics, most interested in natural resources. He

emphasizes especially the agricultural life. To his mind, it is the only

true foundation of “natural finance,” since the financial means should

be provided in nature herself.[587] Natural finance (οἰκειατάτη) is made

to include only a proper knowledge of the care of land, cattle, bees,

fowl, and other natural resources.[588] It is natural, since it does not

earn at the expense of others, as do retail trade and other methods of

false finance. Aristotle also reveals his interest in agriculture by

giving a bibliography of the subject. He names Charetides of Paros,

Apollodorus of Lemnos, “and others on other branches”—a hint that many

such works on practical economics may be lost to us.[589] However, his

interest, even in this primary industry, is not of a practical nature,

like that of Xenophon. He relegates it to the non-citizen classes, along

with commerce and the mechanical arts.[590]

_Capital._—Aristotle is the only Greek thinker who has given a clear

definition of capital. After defining the slave as an instrument

(ὅργανον), in order to distinguish still more sharply, he differentiates

between the two kinds of wealth—that which is used for consumption, and

that which is employed for further production.[591] As an example of the

former, he uses the bed and the dress, and of the latter the weaver’s

comb (κερκίς).[592] He points out that all wealth is produced for

consumption, but that part of it is consumed indirectly in manufacture.

Here is an approach to Adam Smith’s[593] definition of capital, as “that

part of a man’s stock which he expects to afford him revenue.”

Unfortunately, however, the Greek fails to pursue his distinction

farther. The theme of his thought is, after all, not capital or

production either, but the status of the slave, though, from his

standpoint, the slave is capital. He proceeds with the very uneconomic

assertion that life consists in action (πρᾶξις), not in production

(ποίησις),[594] and concludes with the real goal of his argument, that

the slave is an assistant (ὑπερέτης), or an animate instrument in the

realm of action, not of production.[595] The slave is therefore an

instrument to increase the life or action of his master, who himself is

not represented as a producer, but as a consumer of the present stock.

Thus what bids fair to be a fruitful distinction ends in a denial of the

primary importance of production. The purpose of Aristotle is here

similar to that in some passages of Ruskin[596] and Adam Smith,[597] to

emphasize consumption rather than production.

In another passage, he repeats his definition of capital in different

terms. Goods are classified as for “purposes of production” or for “mere

enjoyment,”[598] but here again no theory of capital is developed. Yet

these two definitions are sufficient evidence that he advanced beyond

his predecessors in his apprehension of the meaning of the term.[599]

His division of production and finance, however, into the natural or

limited, which deals only with natural resources,[600] and the

unnatural, which is unlimited, and includes commerce, usury, and even

industry,[601] reveals a mind neither greatly interested in capital, nor

clear as to its true economic importance. His assertion in the

_Ethics_[602] that the prodigal (ἄσωτος) benefits many by his reckless

expenditures, and that parsimoniousness (ἀνελευθερία) is a worse evil

than prodigality also shows that he did not sufficiently emphasize the

importance to society of economy, the mother of stored capital. On this

point, Plato has the saner view,[603] and the extreme attitude of

Aristotle is certainly not characteristic of the Greeks in general.[604]

His failure to grasp the true theory of interest is a further evidence

of his superficial apprehension of the function of money capital. He

does not see, with Adam Smith, that money represents so much stored

capital, potentially productive, and that “since something can

everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought everywhere to be

paid for the use of it.”[605] In justice to him, however, it should be

observed that, though he failed to see the importance of unlimited

economic progress through constant increase in the capitalistic stock,

there is after all a sense in which he was right. There is a natural

limit to just acquisition, and it is especially with the individual in

relation to wealth that he is dealing. He is thus, with Plato, a

forerunner of the present tendency in economics, which is inclined to

set a limit to the amount that one can justly earn in a lifetime by his

own work.[606]

_Labor and industry._—Aristotle’s attitude to labor, the third factor in

production, is similar to that of Plato, though he lays greater emphasis

on the evil physical and moral effect of the “banausic” arts. They are

defined as those that “render men unfit for the practice of

virtue.”[607] They not only cause the body to degenerate,[608] but,

being “mercenary” employments, they also vulgarize the soul.[609] The

occupations that require the most physical labor are the most

“slavish.”[610] The life of artisans and laborers is mean (φαῦλος) and

has no business with virtue.[611] The citizen youth should be taught

none of the illiberal pursuits of the tradesmen.[612] No citizen should

enter into industrial labor or retail trade, since they are ignoble

(ἀγεννής) and hostile to virtue.[613] Even all the agricultural work

must be performed by slaves, that the citizens may have leisure for

personal development and for service to the state.[614] In addition to

his other objections to retail trade and the arts, Aristotle considers

them to be naturally unjust, since they take something from him with

whom they deal.[615] Indeed, the productive classes have but slight

recognition in his ideal state. They seem to be tolerated only as a

necessary evil, and are in a state of limited slavery ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ

δουλείαν. Virtue is even less possible for them than for slaves, and

they lead a less tolerable life.[616] All hired labor belongs to the

category of “false finance” which degrades individual and state

alike.[617] The state that produces a multitude of mechanics and but few

hoplites can never be great.[618]

Here we have the very antithesis of the modern commercial standpoint.

However, the truth is not all with the moderns, for a highly developed

commerce and industry and the general prosperity of the mass of the

people are not always necessarily coincident. Moreover, it is hardly

fair to interpret Aristotle too rigidly. He understood well the

necessity of craftsmen and all other industrial workers to the

state.[619] The burden of his attack was directed against retail trade.

Like Plato’s his prejudice had a moral and political root,[620] and was

arrayed against the extreme application to labor, and against its false

purpose, rather than against labor itself. He insisted that even

intellectual work, when carried to an extreme, and pursued with the

wrong aim, might become equally demoralizing.[621]

Here is a doctrine which our modern age, that would place even education

on a bread-and-butter basis, and that tends to kill initiative and

vision by extreme specialization, might well consider. Even Latin

literature, when taught as it too often is, merely as a syntactical

grind to prepare teachers to pursue the same folly is no more one of the

humanities than is industrial chemistry.[622] Furthermore, Aristotle and

Plato are doubtless right in their belief that a necessary extreme

application to physical labor to earn the daily bread inevitably

prevents mental and moral development and the proper performance of the

duties of citizenship. And our modern democracies with their boasts of

universal suffrage are still something of a farce, as long as economic

conditions are such that the mass of the population has left no time to

think of anything, except how to provide the bare physical necessities.

Aristotle’s insistence upon leisure for the life of the citizen is no

demand for aristocratic indolence.[623] Neither is it Jowett’s

“condition of a gentleman,” or merely the idealized notion of an

“internal state” in which “the intellect, free from the cares of

practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.” It

is rather a demand for release from material cares, so as to insure the

highest degree of activity in self-development and political

service.[624]

It may well be observed too, that Aristotle, the special champion of

slavery, and reputed scorner of physical labor for freemen, exhibits a

real interest in industry, in unguarded moments. One of his arguments

against communism is that it would take from the citizen the desire to

work.[625] He repudiates the life of indolence, and finds happiness in

action.[626] He considers a practical knowledge of agriculture as

essential to the successful economist,[627] and defines the just as

those who live upon their own resources or labor, instead of making

profit from others, especially the farmers, who live from the land which

they cultivate.[628] We have seen above also that he makes labor one of

the prime factors that determine value, and thus the most important

element in production.[629] Moreover, he shows that he has a practical

grasp of the importance of productive employment for the citizens of a

democracy. He advises the rich to furnish plots of land (γήδια) to the

poor, from the public revenues, or else that they give the poor a start

(ἀφορμή) in other business, and thus turn them to industry.[630]

On the division of labor, Aristotle adds little to Plato’s and

Xenophon’s theory. He agrees with Xenophon against Plato that it implies

a necessary distinction between the work of men and women.[631] He also

applies the principle more extensively, so as to include all nature,

whereas Plato seems to limit its application to man. Nature (ἡ φύσις) he

observes, does not produce things like the Delphian knife, in a

poverty-stricken manner (πενιχρῶς) to serve many purposes, but each for

a single purpose (ἓν πρὸς ἓν).[632] Like Plato, he makes the principle

of reciprocity (τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπεπονθός) out of which the division of labor

arises, the saving element in the state.[633] He is also fully as

emphatic in his application of the law to politics and citizenship.[634]

SLAVERY

We have seen that the references to slavery in Xenophon and Plato are

incidental, and reveal a certain unconscious naïveté as to the actual

social problem involved. By Aristotle’s day, however, the criticisms of

the Sophists had shaken the foundations of all traditional institutions,

and their thesis that slavery is contrary to nature had become through

the Cynics a prominent social theory.[635] The thought on the subject

had crystallized into two leading doctrines—one including benevolence in

justice, and hence denying the right of slavery; and the other

identifying justice with the rule of the stronger, and hence upholding

slavery as based on mere force.[636] The practical Aristotle, an

upholder of slavery, not from tradition, but through conscious belief in

its economic necessity, thus takes his stand midway between the two

opposing theories. He champions the old view of natural slavery, but

rejects the basis of mere force for that of morality and

benevolence.[637] His thesis is that slavery is a natural and necessary

relation in human society, not accidental or conventional. The slave,

being property, which is a multitude of instruments (ὀργάνων πλῆθος), is

an animate instrument (ὄργανον ἔμψυχον) conducive to life (πρὸς

ζωήν).[638] He is just as necessary to the best life of the citizen as

are inanimate instruments, and will be, until all tools work

automatically, like the mythical figures of Daedalus or the tripods of

Hephaestus.[639] The slave is a servant in the realm of action (πρᾶξις),

not of production (ποίησις). He is not a producer of commodities

(ποιητικός), but of services (πρακτικός),[640] and just as property is

merely a part or member (μόριον) belonging wholly to something else, so

the slave, as property, belongs entirely to his master, and has no true

existence apart from him.[641] From these facts, the whole nature and

power of the slave are evident. One who, though a human being, is merely

property is a natural slave, since he is naturally not his own master,

but belongs to another, in whom he finds his true being.[642] As Barker

has observed, this conclusion of the first part of Aristotle’s argument

is inevitable if we admit his premises of the identity of “instruments”

and property, but this is an unreal identity.[643] “Natural” (φύσει) is

the saving word in his argument, but “human” (ἄνθρωπος) refutes it, as

the philosopher practically admits later.

He now proceeds to ask the question whether this “natural” slave of his

hypothesis actually exists, for whom such a relation is just, or whether

all slavery is contrary to nature, as some allege. He answers in the

affirmative. The principle of rule and subjection he declares to be a

foundation law of all life.[644] Men are constituted for either

condition from birth, and their development follows this natural

bent.[645] This law may be observed in inanimate things,[646] in the

natural subordinate relation of the body to the soul, of domestic

animals to man, of female to male, of child to parent, and of subjects

to rulers.[647] Thus all who are capable only of physical service hold

the same relation to higher natures as the body holds to the soul, and

are slaves by nature.[648] This is the only relation for which the slave

is naturally fitted, since he can apprehend reason without himself

possessing it, being midway between animals and truly rational men.[649]

Usually also nature differentiates both the bodies and the souls of

freemen and slaves, suiting them to their respective spheres and

functions.[650]

This relation of slavery, Aristotle argues, is not only natural and

necessary, but also beneficial for those who are so constituted.[651]

Just as the body is benefited by the rule of the soul, and domestic

animals by the rule of man, so it is distinctly to the advantage of the

“natural slave” to be ruled by a rational master. This is universally

true, wherever one class of persons is as inferior to another as is the

body to the soul.[652]

The philosopher’s frank admissions, in which he opposes the doctrine

that slavery is founded on mere force, are fatal to his first argument

on the natural slave. He admits that nature does not always consummate

her purpose; that the souls of freemen are sometimes found in the bodies

of slaves, and vice versa;[653] that it is difficult to distinguish the

quality of the soul, in any event;[654] that the claim that slavery is

neither natural nor beneficial has in it a modicum of truth, as there

are sometimes merely legal slaves, or slaves by convention;[655] that

slavery based on mere might without virtue is unjust;[656] that captives

of war may be wrongly enslaved;[657] that only those who actually

deserve it, should meet this fate;[658] that the accidents of life may

bring even the noblest of mankind into slavery;[659] and that only

non-Greeks are ignoble and worthy of it.[660] He even insists that the

terms “slave-master,” “freeman,” “slave,” when rightly used, imply a

certain virtue or the lack of it, and therefore that to be justly a

master, one must be morally superior.[661] The question of the

possession of the higher virtues by slaves is recognized by him to be a

difficult problem, for an affirmative answer breaks down his distinction

of “natural” slave, yet it seems paradoxical to deny these virtues to

him as a human being.[662] Nor can the difficulty be avoided by positing

for the slave a mere difference in degree of virtue, for the distinction

between ruler and subject must be one of kind.[663] In any event,

temperance and justice are necessary even for good slave service.[664]

Aristotle therefore evades the difficulty, and begs the question by

concluding that both master and slave must share in virtue, but

differently, in accord with their respective stations.[665]

With this admission, he places slaves on a higher plane than free

artisans, in that he denies virtue to such classes, since it cannot be

produced in them, except as they are brought into contact with a

master.[666] He thus makes slavery a humanitarian institution, and the

slave a real member of the family.[667] But the admission most fatal to

his theory is in agreeing that the slave _qua_ man may be a subject of

friendship,[668] and in advocating his manumission as a reward for good

behavior. With this, the attempted distinction between him, _qua_ slave

and _qua_ man, utterly breaks down, and the existence of natural slaves

is virtually denied.[669] Thus the great champion of slavery in the

ancient world, by his very defense of it, repudiates its right as a

natural institution. His actual conception of the relation is, indeed,

not far from the ideal of Plato, a union for the best mutual service of

rulers and ruled, in which the slave receives from his master a moral

exchange value for his physical service.[670]

There is a certain economic and moral truth, also, in the attitude of

Aristotle toward slavery, that, as Ruskin has observed,[671] higher

civilization and culture must have a foundation of menial labor, and

that the only justification of such a situation is in the assumption

that some are naturally fitted for the higher, and some for the lower,

sphere.[672] Such modern laborers are not technically slaves, but

Aristotle would insist that they are in a still worse condition, since

they are deprived of the humanizing and moralizing influences of a

rational master. The plausibility of such a contention would be well

illustrated by the wretched condition of multitudes of negroes after the

Civil War, as also by the hopeless life of a large portion of the modern

industrial army. Moreover, the economic slavery of many of the common

toilers today is less justifiable than the domestic slavery advocated by

Aristotle, for it too often means a life of indolence and

self-indulgence for the masters, instead of that Greek leisure which

gave opportunity for higher activity.[673]

MONEY

To the theory of money Aristotle makes a substantial contribution. He

agrees with Plato that money found its origin in the growth of necessary

exchange, which in turn resulted from an increased division of labor.

Unlike Plato, however, he gives a detailed history of the development of

money.[674] Before its invention, all exchange was by barter.[675] But

with the growth of commerce, barter became difficult, and a common

medium of exchange was agreed upon.[676] Something was chosen that was a

commodity, having intrinsic value (ὁτῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν) and that was

easy to handle (εὐμεταχείριστον) in the business of life such as iron,

silver, or other metal.[677] It was first uncoined, defined merely by

size and weight.[678] Finally, to avoid the inconvenience, it was given

a stamp (χαρακτήρ) representative of the quantity (σημεῖον τοῦ

πόσου).[679] Thus arose the use of money as a convenience in necessary

exchange, but once having arisen, it became the foundation of false

finance and retail trade, which are pursued as a science of gain.[680]

All this accords well with the facts as now accepted, yet how utterly

different is Aristotle’s standpoint from that of the modern historian of

economic institutions is revealed by his last statement, and indeed by

the setting of the entire passage. His history of money is merely

incidental to his purpose of showing that money is the parent and the

very life of the false finance which he decries.

He is also more explicit than the other Greek theorists on the function

of money. He clearly recognizes the two functions noted by Plato,[681]

but he deals with them in a much more detailed manner. His discussion

grows out of his theory of distributive justice presented in the

_Ethics_.[682] Money was introduced as the exchangeable representative

of demand (ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας),[683] since diverse products must be

reduced to some common denominator.[684] It is thus a medium of

exchange, acting as a measure of all inferior and superior values, by

making them all commensurable (συμβλητά).[685]

The other important function of money recognized is as a guaranty

(ἐγγυητής) of future exchange. It represents the abiding, rather than

the temporary, need, and is thus a standard of deferred payments.[686]

The importance of money in the fulfilment of these functions is great,

in the opinion of Aristotle. The possibility of fair exchange, or indeed

the very existence of organized society depends upon it.[687]

He is also clearer than Plato and Xenophon in his definition of the

relation between money and wealth. He severely criticizes the current

mercantilistic theory of his day, which identified wealth with a

quantity of current coin (νομίσματος πλῆθος).[688] He immediately

follows this, however, with a more extended presentation of the opposite

error of the Cynics, that money is mere trash (λῆρος), depending for its

value entirely upon convention (νόμῳ). This theory, he points out, is

based on the fact that, if money ceased to be recognized as legal

tender, it would be useless; that it satisfies no direct necessity; and

that one might starve like Midas, though possessed of it in

superabundance.[689]

Aristotle is here somewhat ambiguous as to his own attitude toward this

doctrine. He fails to object that money does not necessarily become

valueless when it ceases to be legal tender, and that a similar argument

might be used to prove that clothing is not wealth. Instead, he uses the

idea as a means of refuting the opposite error, which is more obnoxious

to him, and on the basis of it he plunges into his discussion of the

true and false finance.[690] This, together with a passage in the

_Ethics_, might point to the conclusion that he agreed with the doctrine

of the Cynics on money. He states that it was introduced by agreement

(κατὰ συνθήκην); that, owing to this, it is called νόμισμα, because its

value is not natural but legal; and that it may, at any time, be changed

or made useless.[691] In the light of other evidence, however, it seems

probable that he here meant to emphasize merely the fact that the

general agreement of a community is necessary before anything can be

used as a symbol of demand. In stating that it may be made useless, he

probably referred to money itself, rather than the material of it, which

is, of course, true. His determined opposition to the mercantile theory

of money, as the basis of false finance, caused him to appear to

subscribe to the opposite error. That, in actual fact, he did recognize

the necessity of intrinsic value as an attribute of money is clearly

evidenced by another passage, where he specifies it. He says that the

material chosen as money was a commodity and easy to handle.[692] This

can mean only that it is subject to demand and supply, like any other

object of exchange. This inference is substantiated by another passage,

which declares that the value of money fluctuates, like that of other

things, only not in the same degree.[693] Moreover, in his enumeration

of the diverse kinds of wealth, money is regularly included.[694] It

seems evident, therefore, that he did not fall a victim of either error,

but recognized that, though money is only representative wealth, yet it

is itself a commodity, whose value changes with supply and demand, like

other goods.[695] Since he understood the use of money as a standard of

deferred payments, he also saw clearly the necessity of a stable

monetary standard.[696]

Though Aristotle defines money as representative wealth, like Plato, he

fails to apprehend its meaning as representative, and therefore

productive capital.[697] In his eyes, such a use of money is unjust and

contrary to nature. He counts usury (τοκισμός) to be a large part of

that false finance, which turns money from its true function to be made

an object of traffic.[698] Those who lend small sums at a high rate of

interest are contemptible,[699] and petty usury (ἡ ὀβολοστατική) is the

most unnatural and violent form of chrematistik, since it makes money

reproduce money.[700] It is to be observed, however, that his criticism

is directed chiefly against petty interest, and that he does not appear

to be thinking of “heavy loans on the security of a whole cargo, but of

petty lendings to the necessitous poor, at heavy interest.”[701] Though

his entire account of false finance exhibits an animus against the

precious metals, as its basal cause, and as the source of individual and

national degeneration,[702] yet he clearly appreciates their necessary

function in the state, and his hostility is actually directed against

the spirit of commercialism. Money, the means, has usurped the place of

the end, until domestic and public economy alike have come to mean only

the vulgar art of acquisition.[703]

The usual explanation of the fact that the Greek theorists failed to

grasp the fact of the productive power of money is that loans were

almost entirely for consumption, and hence seemed like an oppression of

the poor.[704] This explanation, however, does not accord with the facts

of Athenian life, at least for Aristotle’s day. It is clear from the

_Private Orations_ of Demosthenes that there did exist an extensive

banking and credit system for productive purposes in the Athens of his

time.[705] Moreover, the hostility to interest and credit was not the

rule, but the exception, for Demosthenes and not the philosophers should

be accepted as voicing public opinion on this point. He considered

credit to be of as much importance as money itself in the business

world,[706] and declared one who ignored this elementary fact to be a

mere know-nothing.[707] Indeed, the money-lenders were, to him, the very

foundation of the prosperity of the state.[708] The prejudice of Plato

and Aristotle represent merely the exceptional attitude of the pure

moralist, who because of the questionable tactics of money-lenders, and

the injustice and greed in some phases of contemporary business life,

became critics of all money-making operations.[709]

EXCHANGE

Aristotle, in both the _Politics_ and the _Ethics_, deals at

considerable length with the subject of exchange.[710] He states that it

arose out of the natural situation (κατὰ φύσιν) and defines this as “the

fact that men had more of some commodities and less of others than they

needed.”[711] At first, all exchange was by barter (ἀλλαγή) and there

was no trading except for specific need.[712] The development of an

international commerce of import and export was made possible by the

invention of money. It is this significant fact that furnishes the line

of division between the old natural economy and the era of commerce and

finance, when exchange and money have become the tools for unlimited

individual enrichment.[713]

His theory of exchange and just price grows out of his application to

exchange of his definition of corrective justice, as a mean between two

extremes of injustice.[714] Trade is just when each party to it has the

exact equivalent (ἴσον) in value with which he began. Exchange is a mean

between profit and loss, which themselves have no proper relation to its

true purpose.[715] This does not mean that the traders must receive the

same in return (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἰσότητα), but an equivalent, or

proportional requital (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν).[716] It is this

fact of proportional requital that makes exchange, and indeed human

society, possible.[717] The meaning is illustrated by a proportion in

which the producers bear the same relation to each other as their

products.[718] By joining means and extremes, the exchangers are brought

to a basis of proportional equality (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον).[719]

Thus is determined how many shoes, the shoemaker’s product, must be

given for a house, the builder’s product, and the prices of the two

commodities are justly settled, with relation to each other.[720] It is

very necessary for just exchange, that such proportional equality be

effected before the requital or actual transfer takes place. Otherwise

one will gain both superiorities (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς), and equality

becomes impossible,[721] since the cost of production of things is very

diverse.[722] Indeed, the arts themselves could not exist, unless the

advantage to the consumer were similar in quantity and quality to the

cost to the producer.[723]

The common element in diverse products that makes them commensurable is

need, or demand (ἡ χρεία), for reciprocal services.[724] But on the

basis of the need of the moment, or under the régime of barter, just

exchange would be practically impossible, since the concrete needs of A

and B, at any given moment, are not likely to correspond. In such a

case, exchange would be a gross disregard of the cost of production.

This has been avoided by the introduction of money as a substitute for

demand,[725] a symbol of general, rather than specific need. Thus just

exchange becomes possible, for money, as the representative of general

need, is always equally in demand by all, and, as the common denominator

of value, it alone renders it possible for proportional amounts of each

product to be exchanged.[726]

Aristotle’s basal premise in this theory of fair exchange, that unless

an equal quantum of value is received by each party, one must lose what

the other gains, has been severely criticized by Menger.[727] He objects

that the determining consideration in exchange is not the equal value of

exchanged goods. On the contrary, men trade only when they expect to

better their economic condition. “Um ihres economischen Vortheils

willen, nicht um gleiches gegen gleiches hinzugeben; sondern um ihre

Bedürfnisse so vollständig als unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen dies

zulässig ist zu befriedigen.” Each gives the other only so much of his

own goods as is necessary to secure this end, and it is this competition

in open market that fixes prices. Barker[728] also criticizes Aristotle

on the ground that he takes no account of demand in his theory of just

price. He states that if the cost of production were the only element to

be considered, the doctrine might be correct, but with the entrance of

demand, one may buy at a low price and sell at an advance without

injustice.

Of course, the bald theory that, in exchange, one necessarily loses what

the other gains, is untenable. Yet there is still something to be said

for Aristotle. He recognized, as well as Menger, that exchange, as

pursued by the retailers, did not square with his idea of just price.

This is the very reason why he objects to retail trade. He is presenting

exchange, not as it is, but as he believes it should be pursued. His

doctrine, in a nutshell, is that the primary purpose of exchange is

profit, _defined as economic satisfaction of mutual needs_, not profit

in dollars and cents. The equality that he seeks, too, is not so much an

equality of value in obols and drachmas, but that each shall receive an

equal quantum of economic satisfaction. This is the true standpoint at

bottom, and when, as is common, the mere purpose of money-making

dominates in the pursuit of exchange, the profit is too often at the

expense of the other party. Such exchange certainly does not mean

economic advance or general prosperity. It merely makes possible an

increase in the inequalities of wealth and poverty. There is much of

fallacy in the prevalent idea that business necessarily increases the

wealth of a state. Ruskin, though like Aristotle extreme and one-sided

in his view, struck at the root of this error. He also declared that the

result of exchange should be advantage, not profit, and repudiated the

idea that the mere fact that goods change hands necessarily means

general enrichment.[729] The central truth in their protest needed to be

spoken, though both erred in not sufficiently recognizing that the labor

involved in exchange creates an added time and place value, and

therefore has a right to be called productive. They also failed to

observe the fact of the necessary risk involved in the business of

exchange, which should be repaid with a fair additional profit. For the

cornering of markets and the manipulation of prices, for the sake of

individual enrichment, modern economists and statesmen, with Aristotle

and Ruskin, are fast coming to have only words of protest.

Moreover, contrary to Barker’s assertion, demand, as an element of

price, is prominent throughout this discussion of Aristotle. He objects,

however, to allowing the effect of demand to overcome unduly the cost of

production, thus causing inequality and injustice. According to his

idea, each receives the equivalent in value of what he gives, in the

sense that it is a resultant of the proportionate influence of both cost

and need.[730] We may, nevertheless, observe an excellent example of

inconsistency in the fact that, despite his insistence upon just

exchange, he appears to treat monopoly as a legitimate principle of

finance for both men and states,[731] though his intention in the

passage may have been to discuss actual conditions, rather than to

idealize.

Naturally, the philosopher shows no concern for a tax on imports as a

means of building up the industry and commerce of his state, since he is

especially desirous of limiting both. However, he is not blind to the

advantages of export and import trade for a nation,[732] but would

regulate them with an ethical, rather than an economic purpose.[733] His

doctrine of exchange as a form of production has been discussed

above,[734] and will be touched upon further in the following pages. His

general criticism of what he terms “false finance” or “chrematistik”

(χρηματιστική) remains for more extended treatment.

We have seen that he recognizes the necessity of a limited form of

exchange, free from the purpose of gain, and considers such trading to

be natural and in accord with that interdependence which nature

demands.[735] He calls it the very bond of the social organization,[736]

and even considers international commerce to be necessary for the

prosperity of a state.[737] We have also seen that he goes so far as to

advise the rich in a democracy to give the poor a start in

business,[738] but that exchange, in its prevalent form, is to him a

method of cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses.[739]

On the basis of this prejudice, he builds his argument for domestic

economy (οἰκονομική) as opposed to false finance.[740] We will therefore

consider his entire theory of this relation at this point, for the term

“chrematistik,” though more inclusive than exchange (μεταβλητική), has

trade in either goods or money (καπηλική) as its predominating element,

and the two terms are often used by him as synonyms. He employs the word

χρηματιστική in several significations—usually of unnatural finance, or

the art of money-making by exchange of goods or money; sometimes as

synonymous with κτητική, the general term for the entire business of

acquisition, including both natural and unnatural finance;[741] again,

of the natural finance, which is a part of domestic economy. His

confusion results partly from his futile attempt to separate landed

property from general industry and commerce.

His main contention is that there is a vital distinction between

domestic economy, whether of householder (οἰκονόμος) or statesman, and

the art of acquisition or finance, as usually pursued. The primary

function of the art of finance is to provide, while that of domestic

economy is to use what is provided.[742] There are, however, many

methods of acquisition (κτητική; χρηματιστική), some of which truly

belong to the sphere of domestic economy.[743] The provision of all that

is furnished by nature herself, as necessary to human existence, then,

if not already at hand (ὑπάρχειν), belongs properly to domestic

economy.[744] It both uses and provides genuine wealth, such as is

limited in amount (οὐκ ἄπειρος) yet sufficient for independence

(αὐτάρκεια) and the good life.[745] But the use of such wealth is its

chief business.[746] The other kind of acquisition, which is unlimited,

or chrematistik, is contrary to nature, and is not in the province of

domestic economy.[747] This unnatural finance, since it deals chiefly in

the exchange of money and other commodities, may be termed retail trade

(καπηλική).[748] Though itself false, it is a logical outgrowth (κατὰ

λόγον) of the true form of exchange that is limited to actual needs[749]

as a result of the invention of money.[750] But the real reason for its

pursuit is to satisfy an evil and unlimited desire for material

things.[751] It produces money merely through the exchange of money

(δι1α χρημάτων μεταβολῆς),[##] and its beginning and end is unlimited

currency.[752]

This false form of acquisition is often confused with necessary

exchange, because both deal with money.[753] Their aims, however, are

quite diverse. The latter treats the accumulation of money (αὔξησις) as

a means, while the former treats it as the supreme end of life.[754] In

fine, then, Aristotle teaches that necessary chrematistik has to do with

the supply and use of life’s necessities, is natural (κατὰ φύσιν or

οἰκειοτάτη) and limited,[755] its prime function being the proper

disposal of products.[756] It is an honorable pursuit,[757] dependent

chiefly upon fruits and animals,[758] and involves a practical knowledge

of stock (κτηνή), farming, bee-culture, trees, fish, and fowl.[759] The

false finance, on the other hand, is unnatural, dishonorable, and

enriches at the expense of another.[760] Its chief business is commerce

(ἐμπορία), including sea-trade (ναυκληρία), inland trade (φορτηγία), and

shop-trade, (παράστασις).[761] It also comprises usury (τοκισμός) and

hired labor, both skilled and unskilled (μισθαρνία ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων

τέχνων ἡ δὲ ἀτεχνῶν).[762]

Aristotle also distinguishes a third type of finance (χρηματιστική)

which shares in the nature of both those above described. It deals with

natural resources and their products, but with things which, though

useful, are not fruits (ἀκάρπιμα), such as wood-cutting (ὑλοτομία) and

mining in all its branches (μεταλλευτική).[763] The meaning may be best

apprehended if, with Ashley,[764] we observe that οἰκονομική is

characterized, not only by direct acquisition of nature’s products, but

also by a personal use of the same, while the unnatural finance has

neither of these qualities. The medium kind, then, is like the former,

in that it involves direct acquisition of natural resources, but like

the latter, in that it does not acquire for directly personal use, but

for exchange. It consists, therefore, not so much in the arts

themselves, as in the exchange that is based on them.

In the discussion of the so-called false finance, Aristotle thus reveals

a markedly hostile attitude to any extensive development of exchange.

The middleman is considered to be a parasite and necessarily degenerate

by the very fact of his business.[765] As seen above, his criticism was

doubtless directed chiefly against the mean and dishonest spirit in the

actual retail trade and money-loaning of his day.[766] Yet here also,

just as in the _Ethics_ passage above discussed, his prejudice blinds

him to the fact that exchangers may be real producers, and that, after

all, even the alleged false finance is not unlimited, but that it is

distinctly bounded by economic demand.[767] Still worse, he includes

hired labor of every kind under unlimited acquisition, merely because it

has some of the other qualities of that type of economy, though it

certainly does not tend to unlimited enrichment even as much as

agriculture.[768] However, he should be given credit of being a

forerunner of the modern humanitarian economy, which insists that the

final goal of all economics should be proper consumption, and that

acquisition must be relegated to its true place as a means, the supreme

end being human welfare.[769]

POPULATION

Aristotle exhibits an interest in the problem of population in relation

to subsistence in his criticism of Plato for limiting the amount of

property and making it indivisible, while failing to provide against a

too high birth-rate.[770] He states the principle that, if property is

to be limited, there must be a corresponding limitation on the increase

of population,[771] and that the let-alone policy must be followed by

increased poverty.[772] He therefore criticizes the Spartan law, for

encouraging the largest possible families.[773] It is evident, however,

that, as in the case of Plato, his interest in the problem is prompted

chiefly by a moral and political motive. It arises merely from his

desire to limit individual acquisition, in a small state, artificially

constructed, and is to him in no sense a question of world

food-supply.[774]

DISTRIBUTION

In the _Ethics_ passage discussed above,[775] Aristotle approaches a

scientific theory of distribution. He observes that just distribution

will be a mean between two extremes of unfairness.[776] Unlike some

moderns, however, he realizes that this will not mean equal shares for

all. There must be the same ratio between the persons, or services, and

the things.[777] In the “mutual exchange of services,” the law must be

proportional requital.[778] In other words, each should receive an

equivalent to what he contributes.[779] Distribution must thus proceed

according to a certain standard of worth or desert (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν

τινά).[780] If the individuals are unequal, their shares cannot be

equal, and it is a prolific source of dispute, whenever equals receive

unequal shares, or unequals receive equal.[781] On the other hand,

Aristotle recognizes that it is a difficult matter to determine this

standard, by which just distribution is to proceed.[782] At this point,

again, he shows clearly that his paramount interest in the problem is

not economic. He names four possible standards—freedom, wealth, noble

birth, and general excellence—all of which are distinctly political in

their reference.[783]

Though he insists on a fair distribution of wealth to the citizens, he

can hardly be said to exhibit as much interest in the welfare of the

common people as does Plato. He had not a very ideal conception of human

nature in general. He would have thought it not only impracticable, but

undesirable to give his doctrine of leisure any extensive application.

As seen above, he includes all hired labor under false finance, and

relegates all industry, including agriculture, to the slaves and

strangers. The life of mechanic and commercial alike is to him

ignoble.[784] He advises that measures be taken to hold the workers in

submission and obedience.[785] His unfair criticism of Plato’s

_Republic_, however, on the ground that it fails to emphasize

sufficiently the welfare of the parts of the state, and that it does not

distinguish clearly enough the status of the commons, reveals a spirit

that does not entirely disregard the masses.[786] His demand that no

citizen shall lack subsistence,[787] his provision of the _sussitia_ for

all,[788] his insistence that, in the market, mere economic

self-interest shall not rule,[789] and his emphasis on the importance of

a strong middle class in the state,[790] all show that, in the interest

of the perpetuity of the state at least, he had some regard for the

economic well-being of all classes. It would be wrong to infer from his

suggestions for the aid of the masses in a democracy, that he would

offer similar advice for the ideal state. Moreover, his chief emphasis

in the passage is upon the idea of Mill, that mere hand-to-mouth help of

the poor is wasteful, and that what is needed is to aid them to become

economically independent.[791] Nevertheless his suggestion does show

that he saw clearly the relation that exists in a democracy between the

economic condition of the masses and the stability of the state.[792] He

says that the genuine friend of the people (ἀληθινῶς δημοτικός) will see

that the masses are not very poor, for the best assurance of the abiding

welfare of the state is the solid prosperity of the great majority of

the population. He therefore advises the rich to contribute money for

furnishing plots of land or capital for small business enterprises to

the needy poor.[793] However, while the advice seems, on the surface, to

favor the commons, it is really a prudent suggestion to the upper

classes, appealing to their selfish interest to avoid by this method the

danger of a discontented proletariat.[794] Nevertheless, the general

economic attitude of Aristotle would warrant including him, with the

other Greek thinkers, in the statement of Roscher: “Die hellenische

Volkswirtschaftslehre hat niemals den grossen Fehler begangen, über dem

Reichtume die Menschen zu vergessen, und über der Vermehrung der

Menschenzahl, der Wohlstand der einzelnen gering zu achten.”[795]

Aristotle makes clear his attitude toward the institution of private

property and other related questions, both in his criticism of other

thinkers, and in his own positive suggestions for the ideal state.

Through his objections to the systems of Phaleas and Plato, he has

acquired the reputation of being the great defender of private property

in Greece. We shall see the extent to which this interpretation of him

is correct. Our consideration of his theory may be summarized under

certain topics which are fundamental to the problem of distribution.

He admits that the doctrine of economic equality may have some wisdom in

it.[796] The attempt to equalize possessions may tend slightly to

prevent civic discord.[797] Yet it is liable to arouse sedition on the

part of the exploited classes,[798] and such relief measures will

satisfy the masses only for a time, for they are notoriously

insatiate.[799] In his opinion, therefore, the saner remedy is

equalization of desires rather than of property,[800] which must be

realized by proper education and a right constitution, whereby the upper

classes shall not oppress, and the masses shall be held in check. We

have here still a valid argument against the more radical type of

socialism. It is suggestive of the modern doctrine of private property

as a public trust,[801] and presents clearly the antithesis between the

attitude of Greek thinkers and that of the modern social democracy.[802]

Aristotle argues further that equalization of property would be

powerless to prevent anything more than the merely petty crimes, for the

grossest ones are the result of inordinate desire, rather than of

inability to provide life’s necessities.[803] Moreover, there are many

other natural inequalities of life what would remain to arouse

discontent.[804] This is a sensible observation that has often been

overlooked by modern radical socialists, though its author might have

objected further that such personal diversities would also render an

abiding equality of property impossible. His previous argument, however,

that immorality and crimes are the result of inordinate desire, rather

than of economic need, might be answered today by the results of

investigations upon the relation of wages to morality.

The doctrine of communistic equality, as preached by some theorists in

fifth- and fourth-century Greece, and as satirized by Aristophanes,[805]

had no appeal for Aristotle. It was, to him, merely a thinly veiled

individualism. He saw through the selfish partisanship of both oligarchs

and democrats, and recognized that all men are poor judges in matters

that concern themselves.[806] The excessive individualism of the radical

democrat of his day, which permitted the majority to confiscate the

property of the minority in the name of a false equality, was as hateful

to him as it was to Plato.[807] As seen above, he insisted that economic

or political equality should not be demanded, except on the basis of

equality of service.[808] Exploitation by the radical democracy was, in

his eyes, as bad as the rule of a tyrant,[809] and the ruthless

individualism of the classes was no better.[810] Like Plato, he would

oppose to both of these the common interest, and would unite both masses

and classes in the aim to realize the highest moral life for the

individual through the state.[811] He refuted the Sophist’s theory of

social contract and of justice as a mere convention.[812] As Stewart has

observed he realized that “more powerful causes than the mere perception

of material advantage brought men into social union and keep them in

it.”[813] Each citizen, he held, is not his own master, but all belong

to the state. Each is a member (μόριον) of the social body, and the

concern of each is naturally relative to the good of the whole.[814]

Aristotle’s further criticisms, of minor significance, on the

suggestions of Phaleas and Plato for equality of possessions are as

follows: They have taken no precautions to regulate population

accordingly.[815] They set no proper limit between luxury and penury for

individual possessions.[816] Plato’s system is not thoroughgoing, since

it allows inequalities in personal property, a criticism also valid

against his own proposals.[817] Phaleas failed to include personal

property in his system of equality.[818] Such strictures seem to proceed

from his pedantic desire to criticize inconsistency. However, he may

have apprehended more clearly than did Plato the danger of the press of

poverty that must eventually result from a system like that of the

_Laws_.[819]

Our author is also strong in his denial of either the wisdom or

feasibility of the communism in the _Republic_.[820] He argues that

Plato’s proposed family communism is based upon the false principle that

a state must be composed of like elements,[821] and shows that it must

fail to accomplish its end of harmony, for Plato’s “all” must mean all

collectively.[822] But this must result, if realized, in a decrease of

devotion,[823] and thus in a lack of the very harmony sought,[824] since

one of the chief sources of attachment in the world is exclusive

ownership.[825] He would deem such a measure, therefore, more fitting

for the third class, since a weakening of their ties of affection might

result in greater submission to the rulers,[826] another striking

evidence of the gulf that separates the ideal of Greek political thought

from the spirit of modern democracy.

Moreover, he considers Plato’s assumption that a state, to be a unity,

must be devoid of all private interests, to be gratuitous,[827] and

argues that the common possession of anything is more likely to cause

strife than harmony.[828] In his opinion, the present system of private

property, if accompanied by a right moral tone and proper laws, combines

the advantages of both common and individual ownership.[829] The tenure

of property should therefore be private, but there should be a certain

friendly community in its actual use.[830] Thus will be avoided the

double evil of strife and neglect, which must result from

dissatisfaction and lack of personal interest under communism.[831] He

offers as a substitute for the Platonic doctrine, then, his own ideal of

reciprocal equality (τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός) as the real cement of

society.[832] In any event, he asserts, the present evils do not result

from private property, but from the depravity of human nature

(μοχθηρίαν),[833] and the aim should be to improve this by moral and

intellectual culture, rather than to attempt amelioration by the

establishment of an entirely new system.[834] The latter method would

result, even if successful, not only in escape from some of the present

evils, but also in the loss of the present advantages of private

tenure.[835]

The foregoing arguments all show remarkable practical insight, and have

been common in the modern criticism of socialism. The objection that

individual effort and industry would be paralyzed if bereft of the

stimulus of personal interest and ownership, while a general fact of

human nature, need not be valid against a system where each has

opportunity to develop up to his capacity. There is certainly little to

impel the great mass of people to industry under an individualistic

system, except the proverbial wolf at the door. But Aristotle is not

thinking of the masses. The objection that the evils result from human

nature, not from the economic system, may well be pondered by modern

socialists and doctrinaire reformers, yet this very fact is an

additional reason why the system should be reformed so as to curb such

wrong tendencies. The emphasis upon education as a cure for the existing

ills is wise, and it might well be more fully recognized by modern

socialists, though both Aristotle and later critics of proposed social

reforms are wrong in implying that the two methods are mutually

exclusive. The warning that, by giving up the régime of private

properly, we should not only be rid of its evils, but also lose its

advantages, should be pondered by agitators against the existing

economic system. Modern socialists might also learn much from Aristotle

and the other Greek thinkers in regard to the true social ideal, as not

primarily materialistic and selfish, but moral and social. On the whole,

it may be observed that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s alleged

communism in the _Republic_ would be far more applicable against modern

socialism.

As to the _sussitia_, Aristotle proposes a system similar to that of

Plato’s _Laws_.[836] He harshly criticizes the Spartan method, which

required every citizen, rich and poor alike, to contribute to the common

meals on pain of loss of citizenship.[837] He praises, on the other

hand, the Cretan system, which permitted the entire citizenship,

including women and children, to be nourished at the common table, at

public expense.[838]

We have seen that Plato, in the _Laws_, while apparently granting

private property in land, really denies this, since he makes the product

of the land practically public property.[839] Aristotle, despite his

strictures against communism, advocates a system of land tenure quite

similar. His limitation of the freedom of donation or testament,

purchase or sale; his demands that the lot shall never leave the family,

that it shall always be handed down by legitimate succession, and that

no citizen shall ever be allowed to hold more than one allotment, are

all Platonic, and make him unquestionably an advocate of family, rather

than of private ownership of land.[840] His collectivism is more direct

than that of the _Laws_, since he makes part of the land entirely

public, to defray the expense of worship and the common meals.[841] The

assignment of lots to the citizens is on the same terms as in the

_Laws_, with the exception that the owners are masters of the product of

their lots.[842] Despite his criticism of Plato’s division of

homesteads, he has the same plan.[843] As in the _Laws_, only citizens

are landowners, and this includes only the governing and military

classes,[844] while all husbandmen are to be public or private

slaves.[845] Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle does not attempt to avoid

undue inequalities in personal property.[846] He sets no maximum above

which limit goods must be confiscated, nor does he, as Plato, establish

a rigorous system of laws to hamper trade and to make money-making

operations practically impossible. He recognizes that such regulations

are not feasible, and his legislation is therefore more considerate of

human nature, despite the fact that his hostility to the ideal of

commercialism is even more pronounced than is that of Plato.[847]

It is evident from the preceding outline of Aristotle’s negative and

positive doctrine on the matter of private property that his system is

in substantial agreement with that of Plato’s second state.[848] Besides

the points of similarity noted above, he agrees with his predecessor in

emphasizing strongly the power of the state over the life of the

citizens. Both insist that the citizen belongs, not to himself, but to

the state, and can realize his best life only through the state.[849]

Thus Aristotle is far from being a defender of private property in the

absolute sense. On the other hand, his emphasis upon the social

obligation of individual possession is, if not socialistic, at least

very modern. He is certainly a much better socialist than the alleged

communist of the _Republic_, whom he criticizes so severely. Like the

Plato of the _Laws_, he is a semi-collectivist. As Barker has

observed,[850] Aristotle thought in terms of land, while modern

socialism thinks in terms of capital and labor. Both standpoints involve

social ownership and the limitation of the individual, and in this

respect the Greek thinker was socialistic in tendency. But despite their

social spirit and their trend toward nationalism, which is so strong in

all progressive countries today, neither he nor Plato was a socialist,

in the modern sense, in spirit or in aim.[851] Any attempts at direct

comparison with modern socialism, therefore, are likely to be fanciful

and confusing. Whatever analogy there is between them is of a very

general nature and should not be pressed.[852]

Footnote 517:

Cf. _infra_ for the _Economica_, which is generally recognised to be

from a later member of the Peripatetic school, about 250-200 B.C.; cf.

Susemihl, _Economica_, Intro. to the ed.; Croiset, _op. cit._, IV,

710; Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 944 ff. Moreover, it deals chiefly

with the practical phase of economics. On the other hand, we shall

cite _Eud. Eth._ and _Mag. mor._ under Aristotle, since, though later

than him, they merely imitate his thought, in so far as they touch

economics. For the numerous and diverse writings ascribed to

Aristotle, cf. Christ, _op. cit._, IV [1905], 684 ff.

Footnote 518:

B. St. Hilaire (preface to his French translation of the _Politics_,

pp. 4-11) calls him “le créateur de l’économie politique.” Zmavc

(_Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos._ [1899], pp. 407 ff.) also tends to

overestimate him.

Footnote 519:

Zmavc (_ibid_, and also _Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss._ [1902],

pp. 48 ff.) emphasizes this fact.

Footnote 520:

_Pol._ i. 1. 1252_a_7-13, cited on p. 9, n. 5, a criticism of Plato’s

_Politics_ 258E-259C; on the truth in this confusion, cf. p. 10. Even

Adam Smith said: “What is wise with a family can hardly be foolish

with a great kingdom.”

Footnote 521:

Besides St. Hilaire and Zmavc, cited above, among those favorable are

Cossa, _Hist. des doctrines economiques_, p. 149; Blanqui, _op. cit._,

I, 49, 86. More reserved are Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 127; DuBois, _op.

cit._, p. 50; Haney, _op. cit._, pp. 47 f.; unfair interpretation,

Dühring, _op. cit._, pp. 20 f.

Footnote 522:

i. 9. 1257_a_6-9: ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν ἀμφότεραι

δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ

οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος οἱον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική.

Footnote 523:

_Wealth of Nations_, I, chap. iv.

Footnote 524:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 127; Haney, _op. cit._, p. 47.

Footnote 525:

Unless this is implied in κτήματος, 1257_a_6, as ἔστι γὰρ ἡ

μεταβλητικὴ πάντων (14 f.) might seem to indicate. Zmavc (_Archiv._,

etc., p. 410) points to 1253_b_33-39, on the automatic tripods of

Hephaestus, as implying it, but if so it was unintended by Aristotle.

But cf. _infra_, pp. 84 and 86, n. 4, where it is recognized.

Footnote 526:

1257_a_11; 5-19, but not specifically stated, and the term χρεία does

not occur here.

Footnote 527:

i. 7. 14: καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου

ἀχρηστότερος ὤν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τε ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις

ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον

μὲν ὕδωρ. Cf. Pind. _Ol._ i. 1 and Cope-Sandys ed. of Ar. _Rhet._ (I,

pp. 130 f., 1877).

Footnote 528:

_Ibid._

Footnote 529:

V, v. 8-14. 1133_a_5-1133_b_10 ff.

Footnote 530:

E.g., Stewart.

Footnote 531:

1133_a_5-12; 15 f.; 18; cf. _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10. 1243_b_28-38.

Footnote 532:

_N. Eth._ 1133_a_5-12, etc., 12 f.: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι το

θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου. The emphasis seems to be on quality of

labor, as suggested by κρεῖττον. Cf. both ὅσον and οἷον (15) and p. 84

n. 3.

Footnote 533:

_Ibid._ 7-10; by joining means and extremes together, the

proportionate exchange is effected. Cf. also 1133_b_4 ff.; 1133_a_32

f. As observed by Ritchie (Palgrave’s _Dictionary_, art. “Aristotle”)

and H. Sewall (_op. cit._, p. 3, n. 2), the proportion is clearer to

moderns if we make our standard one hour of labor of each workman

instead of the men themselves.

Footnote 534:

Stewart (_Notes to N. Eth._ I, 449) suggests that this gives what the

economists call “natural value,” but that the market value oscillates

from this because of supply and demand.

Footnote 535:

1133_a_25-27; 1133_b_6 f. Cf. p. 34, n. 5, for Plato’s use of the

term.

Footnote 536:

_Op. cit._, pp. 47 f.

Footnote 537:

Cf. the discussion and notes above; also 1133_a_15 f., where both

elements seem to be recognized, though the meaning of the passage is

disputed. Cf. _infra_, p. 108, n. 3.

Footnote 538:

1133_a_19 ff.; 29; 1133_b_10 ff., cited _infra_, on money. It clearly

distinguishes the quality of exchangeableness. Cf. iv. 1. 1119_b_26

f., cited _infra_, n. 7. Cf. pp. 38 f. for Plato’s theory.

Footnote 539:

So Stewart, _op. cit._, _in loc._; Zmavc, _Archiv._, etc., p. 415, who

criticizes Karl Marx (_Kapital_, 4th ed., I, 26) for denying this.

Barker (_op. cit._, p. 379) says that Aristotle did not recognize the

“seller’s cost of production”; but cf. 384, where he implies the

opposite.

Footnote 540:

But cf. his definition of wealth, pp. 85 f.

Footnote 541:

Bonar (_op. cit._, p. 40) criticizes him for this. The words ἀξία and

τίμη are not used in the passage, but for the former in a very dear

economic sense, cf. iv. 1. 1119_b_26-27; χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων

ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

Footnote 542:

For further discussion of this _Ethics_ passage, cf. _infra_ on money,

exchange, and distribution. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_19-1194_b_2

repeats the idea, citing Plato _Rep._ on the exchange of the four

producers in his primitive state.

Footnote 543:

i. 8. 1256_b_28-32. The term ἄπειρος, as applied to wealth, is used by

Plato and Aristotle of undue love of money (_Rep._ 373D, 591D; _Laws_

870A); for Aristotle, cf. passage above and _infra_. There is a sense,

even from the economic standpoint, in which wealth is not unlimited.

Footnote 544:

_Prin. of Pol. Econ._, preliminary remarks, and Book I, chap. iii, 3.

Footnote 545:

On this term in Plato and Aristotle, cf. _infra_ under exchange.

Footnote 546:

_Op. cit._, p. 374; cf. _infra_ on the moral attitude of Aristotle to

wealth.

Footnote 547:

His unfair criticism of Plato seems to argue otherwise (_Rep._ 369C

ff.; _Pol._ 1291_a_12-19), but cf. _infra_.

Footnote 548:

ii. 7. 1267_b_10 ff.; 1254_a_16 f.; _Rhet._ i. 5. 1361_a_12 ff.

Footnote 549:

_Pol._ 1254_a_16 ff.: κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν, similar

to Walker’s term “transferability” (_Pol. Econ._, 3d ed., p. 5); cf.

Mill, _op. cit._, preliminary remarks on the term.

Footnote 550:

_N. Eth._ iv. 1. 1119_b_26 f., cited on p. 84, n. 7.

Footnote 551:

Cf. the discussion above on value; cf. Mill, _op. cit._, Book I, chap,

iii, 3, on the quality of “storableness” as an attribute of wealth.

Newman (_Pol. of Ar._, II, note to 1256_b_26 ff.) asks if θησαυρισμός

can be applied to slaves and cattle, and if the definition can include

land. These are all included; cf. n. 1, above.

Footnote 552:

_Pol._ i. 9. 1257_a_6 and 14 f., and the discussion above of _N. Eth._

1133_a_5 ff.

Footnote 553:

Cf. n. 3.

Footnote 554:

Cf. Smith, _op. cit._, IV, for criticism of this basal confusion of

the mercantile theory.

Footnote 555:

_Rhet._ B. 16. 1390-91.

Footnote 556:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_31 f.; _N. Eth._ i. 8. 1099_a_31-33, especially

ἁδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα; 1101_a_14

f., in the definition of the εὐδαίμων man.

Footnote 557:

_Pol._ iii. 6. 1265_a_32 f.: ἐλευθέρως; _N. Eth._ iii., chaps. 13-14

on σωφροσύνη, and iv, chaps. 1, 2, on ἐλευθεριότης and ἀσωτία; but

display of wealth is vulgar (iv. 2. 1123_a_19-22). Ruskin (_Stones of

Venice_, VIII, 69 [Vol. X, 389]) refers to Aristotle on liberality.

Footnote 558:

ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καί κακουργίαν.

Footnote 559:

v. 1. 1129_b_3; so _Mag. mor._ B. 3. 1199_b_6-9, 14-35; cf. _N. Eth._

i. 8. 1098_b_31 ff. for a similar distinction between habit (ἕξις) and

practice (χρῆσις) of virtue.

Footnote 560:

v. 1. 1129_b_4-6; cf. _Pol._ i. 10. 1258_a_23-27 on the duty of the

weaver or statesman; iv (vii). 15. 1334_a_36 f.; 13. 1332_a_22 f.

Footnote 561:

_Pol._ 1332_a_25 f.

Footnote 562:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 13. 1332_a_26 f.

Footnote 563:

_N. Eth._ i. 8. 1098_b_12-15; cf. _Pol._ 1323_a_25 f.; _Rhet._ i. 5.

1360_b_25 ff.; also _Mag. mor._ A. 3. 1184_b_1-5 and _Eud. Eth._ ii.

1. 1218_b_32.

Footnote 564:

_Pol._ 1323_a_40 f.; cf. Jesus’ sentence, “Seek ye first,” etc.; cf.

also 1323_b_19 f.; also pp. 24 ff., Plato.

Footnote 565:

_Pol._ 1323_b_, 1-6.

Footnote 566:

_N. Eth._ i. 5. 1096_a_5 f.: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιος τίς ἐστιν. Cf.

also _Pol._ 1256_b_28-32, discussed above, and i., chaps. 8 and 9,

discussed under exchange.

Footnote 567:

Cf. n. 2.

Footnote 568:

_Pol._ 1323_b_7-11, and discussion above.

Footnote 569:

1256_b_36; _N. Eth._ i. 5. 1906_a_6 f.; χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν;

7. 1097_a_27: δῆλον ὡς οὔκ ἐστι πάντα τέλεια.

Footnote 570:

_Pol._ i. 9. 1258_a_2 ff.; cf. also _Mag. mor._ B. 3. 1200_a-b_.

Footnote 571:

1258_a_10-14, similar to Plato _Rep._ i. on the arts and their

function; cf. a similar passage from _Isocrates_ (_Paneg._ 76) on the

virtues of the Persian War heroes.

Footnote 572:

_Pol._ iii. 9. 1280_a_25-32; the chief ambition of a state is not τῶν

κτημάτων χάριν, but εῦ ζῆν. Cf. above on the similar preachments of

Plato, for their relation to modern economic ideas and conditions. Cf.

Plato _Crito_ 48B: οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εῦ ζῆν.

Footnote 573:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 69; for Greek terms for production, cf. p.

66 and notes.

Footnote 574:

i. 10. 1258_a_19-38; 4. 1254_a_7: ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστιν.

Footnote 575:

10. 1258_a_33 ff., τῆς ὑπερετικῆς, impossible for the economist, but

true, for the moralist; cf. p. 69 for his distinction (1254_a_1 ff.)

between ὄργανα ποιητικά and κτῆμα πρακτικόν.

Footnote 576:

i. 2.; on both the above, cf. Newman, _op. cit., in loc._

Footnote 577:

Cf. especially 1258_a_34 ff.: μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρεται πρότερον,

δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. Cf. Susemihi and Hicks, _Pol. of Ar._, I

(1894), Intro., p. 30.

Footnote 578:

1256_a_40 ff., αὐτόφυτος, “self-existent,” with ἔργασία, as here,

equals αὐτουργία, “agriculture.”

Footnote 579:

1258_b_9-27.

Footnote 580:

_Op. cit._, pp. 96, 98 f., n. 1; cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 47; Kautz,

_op. cit._, p.138; Ingram, _op. cit._, p. 18. The physiocrats thought

that commerce and industry increased the value of raw materials only

enough to pay for labor and capital expended. Commerce was an

expensive necessity, a tax on agriculture. For a good summary, cf.

Haney, pp. 138 ff. Quesnay (_Tableau Econ._ [1776]) followed Xenophon

(_Econ._ v. 17) as his motto. But the motive of the physiocrats was

economic, not moral and political, as was that of Aristotle.

Footnote 581:

_Pol._ 1258_b_21 ff.; probably implied also in 1256_a_40 ff.; but cf.

vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff., where the mechanic and hired laborer are

counted among the necessary parts of the state.

Footnote 582:

1256 ff.; 1256_b_23 f. To him, production is a branch of acquisition.

Cf. p. 28, on Plato’s use of the terms.

Footnote 583:

1258_a_19-38; 1254_a_7, cited on p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 584:

_Op. cit._, pp. 358, 375 f.

Footnote 585:

_Op. cit._, p. 39, on the basis of _Pol._ 1258_b_34 f.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ

μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ

ἐνδιατρίβειν. φορτικόν may mean merely “tiresome,” not “vulgar.”

Footnote 586:

Cf. Zmavc, _Archiv._, etc., p. 431; cf. passages cited _infra_, on the

attitude of Aristotle to labor; cf. vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff.,

especially ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον

οἰκεῖσθαι.

Footnote 587:

_Pol._ 1258_a_34-38, cited on p. 89, n. 2.

Footnote 588:

1258_b_9-21.

Footnote 589:

_Ibid._ 40 ff.; cf. Newman, _op. cit._, II, 204, on the statements of

Varro _De re rustica_ i. 1. 8 and _Columella_ i. 1. 7 that Aristotle

and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. Cf. also (Plato) _Axiochus_

368C.

Footnote 590:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 9. 1329_a_1 f.

Footnote 591:

1254_a_1 ff.; cf. pp. 68 and 88 for Greek terms.

Footnote 592:

1254_a_2-4.

Footnote 593:

_Op. cit._, ii, chap. i.

Footnote 594:

_Pol._ 1254_a_7; cf. p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 595:

_Pol._ 1254_a_8 ff. He thinks chiefly of the domestic slave.

Footnote 596:

_Unto This Last_, p. 61, an unjust criticism of Mill; _ibid._, IV, 78:

“Production is primarily for the mouth, not for the granary.”

Footnote 597:

_Op. cit._, IV, chap. viii: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose

of all production; ... and the interest of the producer ought to be

attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of

the consumer.”

Footnote 598:

For reference and Greek terms, cf. p. 68.

Footnote 599:

For his term ἀφορμή cf. p. 68, n. 8, and _infra_. It probably was a

mere business word to him. DuBois (_op. cit._, p. 38) thinks that he

had a very clear idea of its significance.

Footnote 600:

_Pol._ 1258_b_12-21; cf. 1258_a_37 f.

Footnote 601:

_Ibid._ 21-27, and entire chaps., 8-11. For terms, cf. _infra_.

Footnote 602:

iv. 1121_a_29; 1122_a_14 f.; cf. the stress on δόσις and χρῆσις rather

than on κτῆσις and λῆψις, 1120_a_8-13; _b_14-16, and Stewart’s notes,

I, 323.

Footnote 603:

_Rep._ 552B, discussed above.

Footnote 604:

Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 121) seems to think it was.

Footnote 605:

_Pol._ 1258_b_8, but cf. p. 39 and _infra_ on this word τόκος. Cf.

also Ar. _Clouds_ 20; 1285 ff.; A. Smith, _op. cit._, II, chap. iv.

Footnote 606:

Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 97) is hardly fair to Aristotle on this point,

but cf. also p. 96, n. 1; cf. Ruskin, _Time and Tide_, XV, 81 (Vol.

XVII, 388); _Mun. Pul._, Pref., 21 (Vol. XVII, 144); _ibid._, VI, 139

(p. 264); _ibid._, 153 and note (p. 277), which cites _Laws_ 743C, on

the doctrine that the just are neither rich nor poor.

Footnote 607:

_Pol._ v (viii). 2. 1337_b_8-11. The terms for mechanical labor are

τέχνη, of ability through practice; δημιουργός, of one who works for

the people, rather than for himself or one other; βάναυσος, originally

of work by the fire, but later the common term for mechanical labor,

usually with a derogatory sense in the philosophers; cf. βαναυσία,

“vulgarity,” _N. Eth._ iv. 4. 1122_a_31; βάναυσος, “vulgar man,”

_ibid._ 1123_a_19; _Etymol. mag_; Schol. to Plato _Rep._ 495E; Pollux

i. 64. 50; Hesychius, _s.v._ The Greeks did not clearly distinguish

the finer from the mechanical arts; cf. Büchsenschütz, _op. cit._, p.

266; _Pol._ vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_1 ff., where all are included under

βάναυσον. Cf. Cope-Sandys, _Ar. Rhet._, 2d ed., I, 9, 27, note. Cf.

above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s attitude.

Footnote 608:

_Pol._ 1337_b_12; 1258_b_37.

Footnote 609:

1337_b_13 f.

Footnote 610:

1258_b_38 f.

Footnote 611:

vii (vi). 4. 1319_a_26-28.

Footnote 612:

v (viii). 2. 1337_b_5-7.

Footnote 613:

iv (vii). 9. 1328_b_37-41; cf. iii. 5. 1277_b_33 ff.

Footnote 614:

1329_a_1; 1330_a_25-31.

Footnote 615:

1330_a_25-31; cf. also the pseudo-_Econ._ i. 2. 1343_a_26 ff.

Footnote 616:

i. 3. 1260_a_40 ff.; cf. _infra_ for discussion of this idea.

Footnote 617:

1258_b_25-27; _Rhet._ i. 9. 27, 1367_a_; ἐλευθέρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς

ἄλλον ζῆν. His entire argument for the slave as a mere “instrument”

(cf. _infra_) shows the same attitude. Stewart (_op. cit._, II, 316)

says that he failed to see that labor is “an essential function of the

social organism, something καλόν and not merely ἁναγκαῖον.”

Footnote 618:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 4. 1326_a_22-24.

Footnote 619:

1328_b_19-23; vi (iv). 1291_a_1-3.

Footnote 620:

1329_a_1; i. 11. 1258_b_38 f.

Footnote 621:

v (viii). 2. 1337_b_15-22, especially 17 f.: ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν

καὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἣ μανθάνει.

Footnote 622:

The difference in employments and studies is largely one of method and

aim. The most humanizing pursuit becomes ἀνελεύθερον and βάναυσον, if

followed to an extreme or with a sordid purpose, merely. Cf. Plato

_Laws_ 918B-919C, and the criticism of the superficial method and

merely vocational motive in mathematical study (_Rep._ 525C ff.). Cf.

above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s idea on this point.

Footnote 623:

Aristotle also has the aristocratic idea of labor as robbing a freeman

of his independence, _Pol._ v (viii). 1337_b_15-22; _Rhet._ 1367_a_,

cited on p. 94, n. 9.

Footnote 624:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 9. 1328_b_39 ff.; _N. Eth._ x. 7. 1177_b_4; cf.

Jowett, _Ar. Pol._, I, 144, cited by Stewart, _op. cit._, II, 446.

Footnote 625:

_Pol._ ii 3. 1261_b_33-38.

Footnote 626:

1325_a_31-33.

Footnote 627:

1258_b_12-20.

Footnote 628:

_Rhet._ ii. 4. 9. 1381_a_, where the word αὐτουργοί is used; cf. above

on Euripides.

Footnote 629:

Cf. above on value, and _N. Eth._ v. 8-9. 1133_a_5-18.

Footnote 630:

_Pol._ vii (vi). 6. 1320_a_38 ff.; cf. p. 92, n. 6.

Footnote 631:

i. 12. 1259_b_1 ff.

Footnote 632:

1252_b_1 ff.; cf. Adam’s note to _Rep._ 370B; Susemihl and Hicks’s

note to _Pol._ 1252_b_3, for an exception to the rule (_De part.

Anim._ iv. 6. 11. 683_a_22). ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ

ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα.

Footnote 633:

_Pol._ ii 1261_a_30 f.; _N. Eth._ v. 5.

Footnote 634:

_Pol._ 1261_a_37-39; 1328_b_ ff. Fontpertuis (_op. cit._, p. 359)

accounts for the comparative superficiality of the Greek theory of

labor by the fact that their political constitution diminished its

importance, but cf. our introduction. Capitalistic employment of free

labor was probably not extensive.

Footnote 635:

Cf. above, p. 16, n. 6; p. 17, n. 1.

Footnote 636:

On the theory of the Sophists, cf. above, pp. 16 f. On the Cynics, cf.

_infra_; also Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 2, 376; Ar. _Pol._ 1253_b_20-23.

Barker (_op. cit._, p. 359), who has a very clear and discriminating

criticism of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, also states that slavery

had been attacked by the “logic of events”—e.g., the enslavement of

Athenians in Sicily, and the freeing of Messenian Helots, during the

Theban supremacy, by which Greek freemen had become slaves and Greek

slaves had become free. Cf. _Pol._ 1255_a_ ff., especially 17 f. and

21-23, for the two theories.

Footnote 637:

The _locus classicus_ for his theory is _Pol._ i. 4-7. 1253_b_14 ff.;

13. 1259_b_21 ff. For good criticisms, cf. Wallon, _Histoire de

l’esclavage dans l’antiquité_, 2d ed., pp. 372 ff.; and Barker, _op.

cit._, 1. Cf. also Newman, _op. cit._, I, 143 ff.

Footnote 638:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_36; 1253_b_32.

Footnote 639:

_Ibid._ 33-39. Aristotle would have been satisfied with electricity.

Footnote 640:

1254_a_8, cited on p. 88, n. 10. This relieves the severity of the

doctrine, since it shows that he thinks chiefly of domestic slavery.

But in his proposed state, all industry is manned by slaves. Cf. iv

(vii). 1330_a_25-31.

Footnote 641:

_Pol._ 1254_a_9-13; cf. _Eud. Eth._ 1241_b_17-24.

Footnote 642:

1254_a_13-17.

Footnote 643:

_Op. cit._, p. 362.

Footnote 644:

1254_a_28-31; 1254_b_15. As Wallon (_op. cit._, p. 391) points out,

his radical error is a constant confusion of hypothesis with reality.

Footnote 645:

1254_a_23-24.

Footnote 646:

_Ibid._ 33 f.

Footnote 647:

_Ibid._ 30-40; 1254_b_10-13; 1253_b_7; 18 f., cf. _Eud. Eth._

1241_b_17 ff.

Footnote 648:

1254_b_16-19.

Footnote 649:

_Ibid._ 20-26.

Footnote 650:

_Ibid._ 26 ff.

Footnote 651:

1254_a_21 f.

Footnote 652:

1254_b_6-10; 11 f.; 16-20; 1255_b_6-15; a doctrine emphasized by

Plato, _Rep._ 590D; _Laws_ 645B, 714A, 818A, 684C, as also by Carlyle

and Ruskin; cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 355 ff. Though

Ruskin believed that natural slavery was the inevitable lot of many

men, he did not uphold negro slavery, _Mun. Pul._, v, 133 (Vol. XVII,

256 f.); Time and Tide, p. 149 (Vol. XVII, 438). But he pointed to the

white economic slavery as equally bad, _Stones of Venice_, II (Vol. X,

193); Time and Tide, p. 105 (Vol. XVII, 403); _Crown of Wild Olive_,

119; _Cestus Aglaia_, p. 55.

Footnote 653:

1254_b_32-34; 1255_b_5 ff.

Footnote 654:

1254_b_38 f.

Footnote 655:

1255_a_3-7.

Footnote 656:

_Ibid._ 19-21 and next note.

Footnote 657:

_Ibid._ 24 f.

Footnote 658:

_Ibid._ 25 f.: καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον

εἶναι.

Footnote 659:

_Ibid._ 26-28.

Footnote 660:

_Ibid._ 33 ff.

Footnote 661:

1255_b_20-22. Barker (_op. cit._, p. 369, n. 1) well observes that

this is a challenge of the right of slavery, not an argument for it,

and that it may have impressed his contemporaries so. Cf. Ruskin: “So

there is only one way to have good servants; that is to be worthy of

being well served.” (_Letters on Servants and Houses_, Vol. XVII,

5-18, App. V); cf. also pp. 520 ff.

Footnote 662:

1259_b_26-28.

Footnote 663:

_Ibid._ 36-38.

Footnote 664:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 665:

1260_a_2-4; 14-16; cf. 33 ff., which sets a limit on the slave’s

virtue.

Footnote 666:

1260_a_39-42; 1260_b_2 f. Cf. Ruskin, _Fors Clav._, III, Letter 28,

14, on the virtue of the “menial” condition.

Footnote 667:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 370.

Footnote 668:

_N. Eth._ 1161_b_1-10, especially 5: ᾗ μὲν οῦν δοῦλος, οὔκ ἐστι φιλία

πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος.

Footnote 669:

Cf. his reference to Cleisthenes’ gift of Athenian citizenship to many

slaves; also his own emancipation, by will, of five of his own slaves

(Diog. L. V. 1. 9).

Footnote 670:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 370.

Footnote 671:

_Sesame and Lilies_, end of lecture on “Kings’ Treasuries”; cf. _Fors

Clav._, VII, 9 (Vol. XXIX, 230); _Mun. Pul._, 130, note; cf. _Fors

Clav._, III (Vol. XXVII, 515 f.). Lett. 28, 13 ff., on the workman as

a serf.

Footnote 672:

Barker, _op. cit._, 368.

Footnote 673:

On the servile condition of the modern laborer, cf. Ruskin as above; a

common idea also of Carlyle and of many modern economic writings.

Footnote 674:

_Pol._ 1257_a_31 ff., praised for its exactness and insight. Cf.

Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 585; Dühring (_op. cit._, p. 23) belittles

it. Newman (_op. cit._, II, 184) points to ξενικωτέρας as implying

that the increased distance between buyers and sellers also caused the

origin of money.

Footnote 675:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_26-28.

Footnote 676:

_Pol._ 1257_a_31-36; ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ

εἰσάγεσθαι ὦν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὦν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάνκης ἡ τοῦ

νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις, etc.

Footnote 677:

_Ibid._ 36-38; εὐμεταχείριστον could mean “malleability,” but probably

not, since he considers coinage to be an afterthought.

Footnote 678:

_Ibid._ 38 f.

Footnote 679:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 680:

1257_b_1-5.

Footnote 681:

As a symbol of exchange (ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς) it is a medium of

exchange and a measure of value (_Rep._ 371B; _Laws_ 742A-B, 918B).

Footnote 682:

v. 8. 1133_a_18-1133_b_28.

Footnote 683:

1133_a_29.

Footnote 684:

_Ibid._ 5-19; 25; 27 f.; 1133_b_10, etc.

Footnote 685:

1133_a_19-22, 25 f.; 1133_b_16; 22; ix. 1164_a_1 f.; _Pol._

1258_b_1-5, μεταβολῆς χάριν; 1257_a_30 ff. Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 416

ff.) thinks that the author meant to apply the corrective

(διορθωτικόν) function of justice also to money, in that it makes

exchange more fair and uniform. As evidence, he points to _N. Eth._

1131_a_18 ff. and 1133_a_19-22, where the functions of justice and

money are defined in similar terms. Cf. also his interesting remarks

on the dianemetic function, which prompts exchange and distribution.

Footnote 686:

1133_b_10-13.

Footnote 687:

_Ibid._ 15-18: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης αλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, etc.

Footnote 688:

_Pol._ 1257_b_8 f.

Footnote 689:

1257_b_10-18; for the theory of the Cynics, cf. _infra_, especially on

_Eryxias_. Cf. Newman, _op. cit._, II, 188, note, and his reference to

Macaulay’s note on the margin of his edition of the _Politics_.

Footnote 690:

1257_b_19 ff.; cf. the transitional sentence, 18, a slight hint that

he accepts the theory.

Footnote 691:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_a_29-31; cf. 1133_b_20 f., ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, cf.

_infra_, where the pseudo-_Economica_ takes it for granted.

Footnote 692:

_Pol._ 1257_a_36 f., cited on p. 102.

Footnote 693:

_N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_13 f.: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ

βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

Footnote 694:

Cf. p. 86, n. 1, for passages.

Footnote 695:

Blanqui (_op. cit._, pp. 36, 88), Ingram (_op. cit._, p. 18), DuBois

(_op. cit._, p. 51 and n. 1), Zmavc (_Zeitschr. f. d. ges.

Staatswiss._ [1902], pp. 76 f.), Palgrave’s _Dictionary_ (art.

“Aristotle,” p. 54), all admit this conclusion. Barker (_op. cit._, p.

380) says that the idea is hinted at. Souchon (_op. cit._, pp. 110 f.)

accepts the other view, stating that this was his purpose, to show the

folly of making merely imaginary goods the goal of all life.

Footnote 696:

Cf. _N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_13 f.

Footnote 697:

_Pol._ 1257_b_5-8, and the whole of 1257_b_; 1258_b_1-5.

Footnote 698:

1258_b_25.

Footnote 699:

_N. Eth._ 1121_b_34: καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Cf. Zell’s

translation.

Footnote 700:

_Pol._ 1258_b_1-8; but cf. p. 39 on this point. The etymology should

not be taken seriously. Ruskin cites Aristotle on this point. Cf.

above, p. 39, n. 10.

Footnote 701:

Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 385 and n. 2, where he criticizes Poehlmann

for his idea that Aristotle “is attacking a great credit system,” and

“is enunciating a gospel of socialism.” But cf. _infra._

Footnote 702:

_Pol._ 1257_b_5 ff.

Footnote 703:

_Ibid._ 33 ff.; for further discussion of chrematistik, cf. _infra._

Footnote 704:

Cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 49: “In Athens, the circulation of capital

was inconsiderable, and money was not lent for productive purposes as

often as for the purpose of relieving distress”; Souchon, _op. cit._,

p. 93, though (pp. 106 f.) he recognizes the other side.

Footnote 705:

Cf. Paley and Sandys ed., especially _Or._ xxxvi; Isoc.

_Trapeziticus_; Boeckh, _op. cit._, I, 160 ff.; V. Brants, “Les

operations de banque dans la Grèce antique,” _Le Muséon_, I, 2,

196-203; Koutorga, _Le trapézites_, (Paris, 1859); cf. also E. Meyer,

_Kleine Schriften_.

Footnote 706:

_Or._ xx. 25.

Footnote 707:

_Or._ xxxvi. 44: εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ τῶν πασῶν ἐστὶ

μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν, πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας.

Footnote 708:

_Ibid._ 57 ff.

Footnote 709:

Cf. p. 105, n. 7, on Souchon; E. Boehm von Bawerk (_Capital und

Capitalzins_, [1900] I, 17 f.) says: “Die Geschäftsleute und Praktiker

standen sicher auf der zinsfreundlichen Seite.” He accounts for the

fact that almost the only passages against interest are in the

philosophers by the inference that to uphold interest was superfluous,

and to oppose it was useless. Poehlmann exaggerates both the degree of

credit operations, and the prejudice of Aristotle.

Footnote 710:

For the Greek terms, cf. p. 40.

Footnote 711:

_Pol._ 1257_a_15-17.

Footnote 712:

_Ibid._ 22-28; _N. Eth._ v. 5. 1133_b_26-28.

Footnote 713:

_Pol._ 1257_a_30 ff. These two periods of οἰκονομική and χρηματιστική

correspond well to the German terms _Naturalwirtschaft_ and

_Geldwirtschaft_. Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 137, n. 4) says that this

antithesis was about as dear to Aristotle as it is to moderns. For the

terms, cf. _infra._

Footnote 714:

_N. Eth._ v. 4. 1132_b_11-1133_b_28; cf. also under value and money,

above; cf. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_19 ff.

Footnote 715:

1132_b_11-20; cf. _Rep._ 369B-C; 370B, for a similar idea of Plato.

Footnote 716:

1132_b_33.

Footnote 717:

_Ibid._ 32-34, especially τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πίλις; 17

f.; Stewart, _op. cit._, I, 449.

Footnote 718:

1133_a_5-10, cited on p. 83, nn. 2-7; cf. _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10.

1243_b_28-38.

Footnote 719:

1133_a_10 f.

Footnote 720:

Cf. p. 83, n. 7. The less valuable product must make up in quantity

what it lacks in quality. The proportion thus becomes, γεωργός :

σκυτοτόμος : : _x_ pairs of shoes : a quantity of grain of equal value

(1133_a_32 f.). Cf. other methods of statement, 1133_b_4 f., 22

Stewart, _op. cit._, I, 453 f.

Footnote 721:

1133_b_1-4.

Footnote 722:

1133_a_11 f.; 16-18: ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. Cf. _Rep._ 369C, 370B; Ar.

_Pol._ 1261_a_22 for a similar idea. Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 464 f.),

following Jackson, interprets, on the basis of 1132_a_33, the buyer’s

two advantages to be, if he buys too cheaply, the part of the article

still unpaid for, and the money he should have paid for it. Cf.

_ibid._ pp. 455-67 for other interpretations.

Footnote 723:

1133_a_15 f.: ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ

οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔπασχε τοῦτο και τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. I follow

Jackson, note, pp. 97 f.; Rassow, _Forsch._, p. 18 (Peters’ trans., p.

154, n. 2), in accepting this difficult passage as an integral part of

its context, and in interpreting it as above, though aside from the

context, it would hardly bear this meaning. Stewart (_op. cit._, I,

455 ff.) thinks it is an interpolation or note, referring merely to

the mechanical fact in the arts that material is receptive to the

impression.

Footnote 724:

1133_a_18 f.; 25-28; 1133_b_6-8; 19 f.; cf. _Rep._ 369C.

Footnote 725:

1133_a_19-29; cf. Stewart’s excellent comments, _op. cit._, I, 459 ff.

Footnote 726:

1133_b_14-16; 20-22: τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα; e.g., if a house

is equal to five minae and a bed is worth one, five beds equal one

house (23-26).

Footnote 727:

_Handwörterbuch der Staatswwissenschaft_, art. “Geld,” 2d ed., Bd. IV,

82 f.

Footnote 728:

_Op. cit._, p. 384.

Footnote 729:

Cf. citations above, p. 42, n. 7, and p. 44, n. 2. Cf. DuBois, _op.

cit._, p. 46.

Footnote 730:

Cf. Haney, _op. cit._, p. 48.

Footnote 731:

_Pol._ 1259_a_2 f.; 33-35.

Footnote 732:

iv (vii). 6. 1327_a_25-30.

Footnote 733:

_Rhet._ i. 4. 7: περὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, as among the

subjects for a statesman’s consideration; cf. also 11.

Footnote 734:

Pp. 89 and notes.

Footnote 735:

_Pol._ 1257_a_28-30; vi (iv). 4. 1291_a_4-6; 1291_b_19 f.; vii (vi).

7. 1321_a_6, all seem to take retail and wholesale trade in the state

for granted. But it is not named in the list of necessary callings in

the ideal state, 1328_b_24 ff.; 5 ff.; cf. also 1329_a_40 ff. Of

course the citizens are not to engage in it (1328_b_37 ff.).

Footnote 736:

_N. Eth._ v. 8. 1132_b_4 f.; 1133_a_27; all of chap. 8; cf. above, on

just exchange.

Footnote 737:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 6. 1327_a_25-28.

Footnote 738:

vii (vi). 5. 1320_a_39: ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας. Cf. p. 96.

Footnote 739:

Cf. discussion above of just exchange.

Footnote 740:

_Pol._ i. chaps. 8-11. Ruskin does not seem to have used the term

“chrematistik,” and he has no reference to this passage, though, as

seen above, he has much to say in the same general spirit.

Footnote 741:

_Pol._ 1256_a_11 f.; cf. p. 40 on Plato’s terms for trade. For the

word χρηματιστική, cf. _Rep._ 415E, contrasted to soldiers; _Gorg._

477E, the art that frees from poverty; 452C; _Euthyd._ 304C, of the

Sophists; Xen. _Econ._ ii. 18, where no prejudice is implied.

Footnote 742:

_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_a_10-12; but cf. _N. Eth._ i. 1. 1094_a_9: τέλος

οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος; and _Pol._ iii. 4. 1277_b_24 f.: ἐπεὶ καὶ

οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ

φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν. An American economist would hardly make the

latter distinction. Newman (_op. cit._, II, 166) thinks that in these

two passages he states the actual condition, but cf. _infra_, where

Aristotle admits a degree of acquisition in domestic economy.

Footnote 743:

1256_a_15 ff.

Footnote 744:

1256_b_26-39.

Footnote 745:

_Ibid._ 30-37; cf. above on the definition of wealth.

Footnote 746:

1258_a_19 ff. He would combat the common idea that the first business

of economics is to provide unlimited revenue (1259_a_35; 1254_a_1 f.)

Footnote 747:

1256_b_40-42; 1257_a_4 f.; 17 f.; cf. _Eud. Eth._ iii. 4. 1232_a_6-9.

Footnote 748:

1257_b_1 f.; 9 f.

Footnote 749:

1257_a_18 f., 28-30; 1257_b_19 f.; 31 ff.

Footnote 750:

1257_a_31 ff. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 599) cites Schaeffle, _Bau und

Leben des sozialen Körpers_, I, 256, that this analysis of the change

from natural to capitalistic economy holds “im Kern die ganze moderne

Kritik des Kapitals,” but the standpoint of the two is essentially

different.

Footnote 751:

1258_a_1-14. Extreme desire demands superfluity (ὑπερβολή).

Footnote 752:

1257_b_20 f.

Footnote 753:

_Ibid._ 23 ff.

Footnote 754:

_Ibid._ 35 f. The two uses overlap (ἐπαλλάττει).

Footnote 755:

_Ibid._ 36-39.

Footnote 756:

1258_a_16-18.

Footnote 757:

_Ibid._ 19 ff. The other function is secondary (ὑπερετική).

Footnote 758:

_Ibid._ 39 f.

Footnote 759:

_Ibid._ 37 f.

Footnote 760:

1258_b_12-21.

Footnote 761:

_Ibid._ 1 f.; cf. 1256_a_40 ff., where καπηλεία is opposed to

αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν.

Footnote 762:

1258_b_20-23.

Footnote 763:

_Ibid._ 25-27. This contrasted yet overlapping relation between the

two kinds of finance is well represented by Haney, _op. cit._, 46. Cf.

also Ashley, _op. cit._, p. 340, for a synopsis of the divisions of

κτητική.

Footnote 764:

1258_b_27-33.

Footnote 765:

_Op. cit._, pp. 333 ff., more satisfactory than Jowett’s idea that the

intermediateness consists either in exchange for money of the direct

products of the earth, or else that wood-cutting and mining are

themselves the intermediate form; or than Newman’s (_op. cit._, II,

202 f.) theory that it consists in the fact that in this type wealth

is sought, not from fruits or animals, but from things, just as

exchange seeks wealth from other men or from money, as Ashley shows.

However, two questions still remain unanswered: why Aristotle has

three forms in chap. 11 and only two elsewhere; and why the terms,

ἀκάρπων, wood-cutting, and mining are so prominent, if their relation

to the thought is only incidental.

Footnote 766:

_Pol._ iv (vii). 1328_b_39 ff.; 1327_a_29-31.

Footnote 767:

This was a common Greek feeling (Dem. xxv. 46).

Footnote 768:

But he seems to recognize it elsewhere (_N. Eth._ v. 8).

Footnote 769:

Cf. DuBois, _op. cit._, p. 48.

Footnote 770:

Cf. the entire criticism of chrematistik, and especially 1257_b_40-42,

the contrast between ζῆν and εὐ ζῆν. On this point, cf. above, pp. 109

f. and 87 ff. Zmavc (_Zeitschrift_, etc., p. 52), rightly states that

even Adam Smith made his economic theory a subordinate part of his

practical philosophy.

Footnote 771:

An unfair criticism, as seen above.

Footnote 772:

_Pol._ 1266_b_8-14; iv (vii). 1335_b_22 ff.

Footnote 773:

1265_b_6-12.

Footnote 774:

1270_a_40 ff.

Footnote 775:

Cf. iv (vii). 4. 1326_a_25-30, especially, τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν

πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. Cf.

entire chapter.

Footnote 776:

1130_b_ ff.; cf. under value, money, and exchange. The terms are

διανομή or ἡ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή.

Footnote 777:

1131_a_11.

Footnote 778:

_Ibid._ 21: καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἱσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἶς. Cf. above, pp. 55

f. and 60 f., on Plato’s idea of equality; cf. _infra_ for further

comments on Aristotle.

Footnote 779:

1132_b_32 f.; cf. pp. 107 ff. and notes for a more detailed

discussion, and for Greek expressions.

Footnote 780:

1131_b_27-32: ἡ διανομὴ ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. Cf. _Mag. mor._ i. 33. 1193_b_36 ff.

Stewart (_op. cit._, I, 432) says that the expression ἡ τῶν κοινῶν

διανομή must mean more than distribution by some central authority,

for the most important form of it is the distribution of wealth,

operating under economic laws that regulate wages and profits.

Footnote 781:

1131_a_24-26.

Footnote 782:

_Ibid._ 22-24. For Plato, cf. pp. 55 f.

Footnote 783:

_Ibid._ 26-29.

Footnote 784:

_Ibid._; _Pol._ iii. 1280_a_7 ff.; 1282_b_23 ff.

Footnote 785:

Cf. above, pp. 113, and 93 ff. on labor.

Footnote 786:

_Pol._ ii. 4. 1262_b_2 f.

Footnote 787:

1264_a_11-17; 36-38; 1264_b_11-13, all discussed above under Plato.

Footnote 788:

iv (vii). 1329_b_41 ff.

Footnote 789:

1271_a_29-37; 1272_a_12-21.

Footnote 790:

_N. Eth._ v. chaps. 4-5, discussed above.

Footnote 791:

_Pol._ vi (iv). 1295_b_35 ff.

Footnote 792:

v (vi). 1320_a_33 ff.; cf. pp. 95 f.; cf. especially 35: τεχναστέον

οὖν ὅπως, ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος, and 1267_b_3 ff. on the

insatiety of the masses. He believed that the state doles for mere

consumption aggravated the evil—a very sane doctrine which our city

charity organizations are prone to overlook.

Footnote 793:

Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 339 f., on this passage.

Footnote 794:

Cf. above, n. 4 above, and pp. 95 f.

Footnote 795:

1320_a_36: ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, and 34, τοῦτο γὰρ

αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; viz., undue poverty of the

masses.

Footnote 796:

_Op. cit._, p. 7; cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 600, on this point.

Footnote 797:

_Pol._ ii. 7. 1266_b_14-25, as advocated by Phaleas; cf. above. Cf.

_infra_ for Aristotle’s advocacy of equality in landed property.

Footnote 798:

1267_a_37-39.

Footnote 799:

_Ibid._ 39-41.

Footnote 800:

1267_b_1-4; vii (vi). 1320_a_31; cf. p. 117 on this idea. He does not

consider the rise in the cost of living.

Footnote 801:

1266_b_28-30.

Footnote 802:

Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 45.

Footnote 803:

Aristotle, like Plato, strongly emphasizes education as a great cure

for the ills of the state (1310_a_15 ff.). It should be common to all

citizens, and be publicly supervised (1336_a_22 ff.).

Footnote 804:

1267_a_13-17.

Footnote 805:

1266_b_38-1267_a_2.

Footnote 806:

_Ecclesiazusae._ Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 403) argues that such ideas

were widespread in Greece.

Footnote 807:

_Pol._ iii. 9. 1280_a_14-21: σχεδὸν δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ

τῶν οἰκείων. Cf. 7-31, his discriminating remarks on equality in

general.

Footnote 808:

vii (vi). 5; iii. 10; cf. Haney _op. cit._, p. 45.

Footnote 809:

Cf. above on fair exchange; also p. 116 and notes.

Footnote 810:

vi (iv). 4. 1292_a_4-38.

Footnote 811:

vii (vi). 3. 1318_b_1-5, especially οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν

φροντίζουσιν; cf. iii. 9. 1280_a_, especially 22-30, on the false idea

of equality on both sides.

Footnote 812:

i. 1: ζῷον πολιτικόν; 1280_a_31 ff.; 1252_b_30 f.; cf. all of chap. 9

to 1281_a_10.

Footnote 813:

1280_b_10-12, against Lycophron; cf., above, p. 16; καὶ ὁ νόμος

συνθήκη καὶ ... ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵος ποιεῖν

ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

Footnote 814:

_Op. cit._, II, 304.

Footnote 815:

_Pol._ v (viii). 1. 1337_a_27-30, a remarkable passage, suggestive of

Plato and of St. Paul’s analogy of the body. Aristotle paints vividly

the antithesis between political and economic equality, whereby there

grows up a state within a state (1295_b_13 ff.), for he believes with

the author of _Eud. Eth._ vii. 10. 1242_a_, that man is not only a

πολιτικόν, but also an οἰκονομικόν ζῷον. Cl. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I,

276 ff.

Footnote 816:

1266_b_8-14; 1265_a_38-42; unfair to Plato, as seen above.

Footnote 817:

1266_b_24-28; 1265_a_28-38.

Footnote 818:

1265_b_22 ff.

Footnote 819:

1267_b_9-13.

Footnote 820:

Cf. his criticism of the Spartan system, 1270_a_40 ff.

Footnote 821:

On its wisdom, cf. _infra_; on its feasibility, cf. 1263_b_29: πάμπαν

ἀδύνατος.

Footnote 822:

1261_a_16-1261_b_15.

Footnote 823:

1261_b_30-32; 24-28.

Footnote 824:

32-35.

Footnote 825:

1262_b_4-24.

Footnote 826:

22-24.

Footnote 827:

1262_a_40-1262_b_3.

Footnote 828:

1263_b_30 ff., and preceding note.

Footnote 829:

1263_a_11-16.

Footnote 830:

22-26; 39 f.

Footnote 831:

26-30, citing the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Cf. 1329_b_14 ff. _N. Eth._

viii; 8 f. on φιλία; _Pol._ 1252_b_29; 1280_a_25; cf. Xen. _Laced.

Pol._ vi. 3-4.

Footnote 832:

Cf. preceding note, and 1261_b_32 ff.

Footnote 833:

1261_a_30 f. _N. Eth._ v. 5.

Footnote 834:

1263_b_22 f.

Footnote 835:

37-42. But Plato used both methods.

Footnote 836:

1263_b_27-29; e.g., besides the personal satisfaction (1263_a_40 f.),

the opportunity for liberality (1263_b_11-13).

Footnote 837:

iv (vii). 10. 1330_a_5 ff. He would make part of the land public. In

the _Laws_, the expense is met by making the product public.

Footnote 838:

1271_a_29-37.

Footnote 839:

_Ibid._ 28 f.; 1272_a_12-21.

Footnote 840:

Cf. above on socialism in the _Laws_.

Footnote 841:

_Pol._ ii. 1270_a_21 f.; viii (v). 1309_a_23-25, though rather a

measure for an oligarchy; vii (vi). 1319_a_8-13, for a democracy, also

against mortgage on land; cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, p. 591. Like

Plato, he opposes free disposal of dowries (1270_a_23-25).

Footnote 842:

Cf. p. 122, n. 1.

Footnote 843:

1330_a_9-23.

Footnote 844:

1265_b_24-26.

Footnote 845:

iv (vii). 1329_a_18-21.

Footnote 846:

1330_a_25-31; 1328_b_40; 1329_a_2; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 169

f., on his system as compared with that of the _Laws_.

Footnote 847:

Cf. p. 120, n. 5; but cf. viii (v). 1308_b_16-19 for a recognition of

the desirability of such a regulation.

Footnote 848:

Cf. above, his criticism of chrematistik, _Pol._ i. chaps. 8-10.

Footnote 849:

So Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 167; cf. above for differences in detail.

Footnote 850:

Cf. pp. 119 f.; 1280_b_35 ff. He does not overlook the complement of

this principle, that the prosperity of the whole involves that of the

parts (iv [vii]. 1328_b_37 ff.; 1329_a_18-21), his unjust criticism of

Plato on this point. Zmavc (_Zeitschrift_, etc., p. 56, n. 3) rightly

observes that there is more truth in this Greek doctrine of the

relation of the individual to the state than moderns are prone to

recognize.

Footnote 851:

_Op. cit._, p. 391.

Footnote 852:

Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250) strongly emphasizes their extreme

limitation of the individual. Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 170) refers to

them as precursors of Marx, though he recognizes the difference in

their aim.