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A History of Greek Economic Thought
The University of Chicago
A HISTORY OF GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
ALBERT AUGUSTUS TREVER
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1916
COPYRIGHT 1916 BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
All Rights Reserved
Published August 1916
Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
PREFACE
The need of a reinterpretation of Greek economic theory in the light of
our modern humanitarian economy is presented in the introduction to this
work. If this volume may, in some degree, meet such a need, by awakening
the classicist to the existence of important phases of Greek thought
with which he is too unfamiliar, and by reminding the economist of the
many vital points of contact between Greek and modern economy, our labor
will have been amply repaid. There are doubtless errors both in
citations and in judgment which will not escape the critic’s eye. We
trust, however, that the work is, on the whole, a fair representation of
the thought of the Greeks in this important field. In the course of our
study, we have naturally been obliged to make constant reference to the
actual economic environment of the Greeks, as a proper background for
their theories. It is therefore our purpose to publish, at some future
date, a general history of economic conditions in Greece, which may
serve as a companion to this volume.
We gladly take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor
Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago, for his suggestion of the
subject of this work, as also for his many helpful criticisms and
suggestions during the course of its preparation.
LAWRENCE COLLEGE, APPLETON, WIS.
November 1, 1915
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 7
1. Previous works on Greek economic thought.
2. Scope, purpose, method.
3. General characteristics of Greek economic thought.
II. ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDEVELOPED
CHARACTER OF GREEK ECONOMICS 14
III. PLATO 22
1. General standpoint.
2. Theory of value.
3. Wealth: theory; moral attitude.
4. Production.
_a_) Agriculture.
_b_) Capital.
_c_) Labor and industry:
(1) Plato’s attitude toward.
(2) Division of labor.
(3) Slavery.
5. Money: theory; moral attitude; interest.
6. Exchange: theory; criticism of Plato’s negative attitude.
7. Population.
8. Distribution: theory; attitude toward laboring classes.
9. Communistic and socialistic ideas.
_a_) Reasons for such tendencies in Greek thought.
_b_) _Republics_ before Plato: Hippodamas; Phaleas.
_c_) Plato’s _Republic_.
_d_) Plato’s _Laws_.
IV. XENOPHON 63
1. Double standpoint.
2. Theory of value.
3. Wealth: practical interest in.
4. Production.
_a_) Theory; positive interest.
_b_) Agriculture.
_c_) Capital.
_d_) Labor and industry.
(1) Positive interest in its development.
(2) Division of labor.
(3) Slavery.
5. Money: theory; in favor of unlimited increase.
6. Exchange: proposed means for its free development.
7. Population.
8. Distribution: attitude toward masses.
9. Socialistic tendencies in the _Revenues_.
V. THE ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES, ISOCRATES 77
VI. ARISTOTLE 81
1. Attitude toward matters economic; domestic and public economy.
2. Theory of value.
3. Wealth: theory; negative attitude toward.
4. Production: theory; negative standpoint.
_a_) Agriculture.
_b_) Capital: theory; negative interest.
_c_) Labor and industry.
(1) Negative attitude.
(2) Division of labor.
(3) Slavery.
5. Money: origin; theory; interest; reasons for the negative
attitude of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers.
6. Exchange: theory; tariff; criticism of “chrematistik.”
7. Population.
8. Distribution: theory; attitude toward masses.
9. Communism and socialism.
_a_) Negative criticism of Plato’s _Republic_ and other systems.
_b_) Positive theory.
VII. MINOR PHILOSOPHERS, CONTEMPORARIES OR SUCCESSORS OR PLATO AND
ARISTOTLE 125
1. The Academy, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor.
2. Theophrastus.
3. _Economica_; the pseudo-Aristotelian _Economica_.
4. Cyrenaics: Aristippus; Bion.
5. Epicureans.
6. Cynics: Antisthenes; Diogenes; Crates.
7. Pseudo-Platonic _Eryxias_.
8. Teles.
9. Stoics: Zeno; Aristo; Cleanthes; Chrysippus; Plutarch.
10. Communistic tendencies after Aristotle.
VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OR GREEK
ECONOMICS 146
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
INDEX 157
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For a complete list of scholars who have devoted more or less attention
to the economic ideas of Greek thinkers, the reader is referred to the
bibliography at the conclusion of this work. On the surface, the list
appears to be reasonably extensive. It will be observed, however, that
the majority of the works are not of recent date; that many of them deal
largely with the practical phase of economics; that most of the larger
works on economic history treat Greek economic and social theory in a
merely incidental manner, and that nearly all are written from the
general standpoint of the economist rather than with the more detailed
analysis of the classicist. The work of Souchon, the most extensive,
careful, and satisfactory discussion of the subject, is no exception to
this latter rule, and since his standpoint is too exclusively that of
the older English economists, his criticism of the Greek theories is not
always sufficiently sympathetic. The monumental volumes of Poehlmann
have treated Greek social theories thoroughly, but the chief interest of
the author is rather in the actual social conditions, and his work is
marred by a constant overemphasis of the analogy between ancient and
modern capitalism and socialistic agitation. Moreover, there is no book
in the English language, on Greek economic thought, that treats the
subject in anything more than the cursory manner of Haney and Ingram.[1]
There is, thus, still a place for a work of this type in the English
language, written from the standpoint of the classicist, but with a view
also to the needs of twentieth-century students of economics.
The present work aims to fulfil such a need. Its scope differs quite
essentially from all other accounts of Greek theory previously
published, in that our purpose is not merely to consider the extent to
which the Greek thinkers grasped the principles of the orthodox economy
of Ricardo and Mill. We shall also endeavor to ascertain how far they,
by the humanitarian and ethical tone of their thinking, anticipated the
modern, post-Ruskin economy, which makes man, not property, the supreme
goal, and recognizes the multiplicity of human interests and strivings
that belie the old theory of the “economic man.” Our verdict as to the
importance of the Greek contribution to economic thought is thus likely
to be somewhat more favorable than that which is usually rendered.
We purpose also to emphasize more than is often done the important fact
that Greek theory is essentially a reflection of Greek economic
conditions, and that a true interpretation of the thought depends upon a
clear understanding of the economic history of Greece. However, as we
shall see, this by no means implies that the anti-capitalistic theories
of the Socratics are evidence of an undeveloped state of commerce and
industry in fifth- and fourth-century Athens.
The method of presentation is primarily chronological. Thus the ideas of
each thinker can be discussed in a more thorough and unitary manner, and
more in relation to the contemporary economic conditions that gave rise
to them. Moreover, despite some practical advantages of the topical
method, it savors too much of an artificial attempt to force the Greek
thinkers on the procrustean rack of the concepts of modern economy.
The general characteristics of Greek economic thought have often been
enumerated. They may be restated with advantage, at this point, together
with some additions and needed criticisms.
1. _Simplicity._—The theory of economics as a separate science never
developed in Greece. The consideration of economic problems was
incidental to the pursuit of politics and ethics. In so far as Greek
thinkers treated such subjects, their theories reflect the comparative
simplicity of their economic environment. Without prejudging the issue
as to the actual extent of capitalism in ancient Athens, we need only to
think away the vast international scope of our modern commercial
problems, our giant manufacturing plants with their steam and electric
power, our enormous wealth and its extreme concentration, the untold
complexity of modern business and finance, the vast territorial expanse
of modern nations, almost all our luxuries and commonplace comforts, to
begin to appreciate something of this ancient simplicity.[2] However, as
a direct result of this limitation, the Greeks were led to deal with
their problems more in terms of men than in terms of things, and thus
their economic vision was sometimes clearer and truer than our own.
Aristotle struck the keynote in Greek economic thought in stating that
the primary interest of economy is human beings rather than inanimate
property.[3]
2. _Confusion of private and public economy._—As a result of this
simplicity, the terms οἰκονομία and οἰκονομική were, both in derivation
and largely in usage, referred to household management rather than to
public economy.[4] Domestic and public economy were regularly defined as
differing merely in extent.[5] Aristotle, however, distinctly criticizes
the confusion of the two.[6] Moreover, there is no warrant for the
frequent assertion that Greek thinkers never rose above the conception
of domestic economy. Xenophon’s treatise on the _Revenues of Athens_,
and Aristotle’s entire philosophy of the state are a sufficient answer
to such generalizations. The statement of Professor Barker that
“political economy,” to Aristotle, would be a “contradiction in terms,”
is extreme.[7] There is also a certain important truth in the Greek
confusion, which has been too generally missed by modern critics and
statesmen—that the public is a great property-holder, and that politics
should be a business which requires the application of the same economic
and ethical laws as are admitted to govern in private affairs.
3. _Confusion of economics with ethics and politics._—The assertion that
Greek economic theory was confounded with ethics and politics has become
a commonplace. The economic ideas of Greek thinkers were not arrived at
as a result of a purposeful study of the problems of material wealth.
All economic relations were considered primarily from the standpoint of
ethics and state welfare. “The citizen was not regarded as a producer,
but only as a possessor of wealth.”[8] Such statements are too commonly
accepted as a final criticism of Greek thinkers. Though the confusion
was a source of error, and caused Greek economic thought to be one-sided
and incomplete, yet some important considerations should be noted.
_a_) The Socratic philosophers are our chief source for the economic
ideas of the Greeks. Too sweeping conclusions should not, therefore, be
drawn from them as to the general attitude of the Greeks. Xenophon is
much freer from the ethical emphasis than the other Socratics.
Thucydides is entirely free from it, and very probably his standpoint
came much nearer being that of the average Athenian citizen.
_b_) The confusion was not merely with individual ethics, for Greek
moral philosophy always had the welfare of the state for its goal.
Indeed, the basal reason for this close union of economics, ethics, and
politics is the true idea that the state should rise above internal
strife, and unite all in a care for the common interest.[9]
_c_) The standpoint of the Greek philosophers is certainly no more to be
criticized than is that of the so-called orthodox political economy.[10]
They represent two extremes. If the Greek theory did not give to wealth
its full right, and was open to the charge of sentimentalism, the
Ricardian doctrine, with its “economic man,” which eliminated all other
ideals and impulses, was an unreal and pernicious abstraction. Of the
two errors, the Greek is the less objectionable, and is more in accord
with the trend of economic thought today. The best economists are now
insisting more and more on the Greek idea that economic problems must be
considered from the standpoint of the whole man as a citizen in society.
Modern political economy “has placed man as man and not wealth in the
foreground, and subordinated everything to his true welfare.” “Love,
generosity, nobility of character, self-sacrifice, and all that is best
and truest in our nature have their place in economic life.”[11] “The
science which deals with wealth, so far from being a ‘gospel of Mammon,’
necessarily begins and ends in the study of man.”[12] “Es soll kein
Widerspruch zwischen Ethik und Volkswirtschaft bestehen, es soll das
Sittengesetz für die Wirtschaft gelten und in ihr ausgeführt
werden.”[13] Such strong statements taken at random from modern
economists should serve to temper our criticism of the Greek confusion.
Plato’s definition of economics, as suggested by one of the most recent
historians of economic thought,[14] could easily be accepted by many a
modern scholar: “Economics is the science which deals with the
satisfaction of human wants through exchange, seeking so to regulate the
industries of the state as to make its citizens good and happy, and so
to promote the highest well-being of the whole.” The contention of the
Socratics, that all economic operations must finally root in the moral,
that all economic problems are moral problems, and that the province of
economics is human welfare, is thus a dominant twentieth-century idea.
And just as the ethical interest of the Greek philosophers caused them
to emphasize the problems of distribution and consumption, so these are
the phases of economics that receive chief consideration today. To be
sure, modern thought appreciates more fully the complementary truth that
all our social and moral problems root essentially in economic
conditions, though this too was by no means overlooked by Plato and
Aristotle.
4. _Ascetic tendency._—It cannot be denied, however, that, as a result
of the overemphasis on the ethical, Greek economic thought was hampered
by a certain asceticism. But this was also an outgrowth of pessimistic
tendencies in Greek philosophy itself. Moreover, the ascetic ideas of
the philosophers cannot be accepted as the common attitude of Athenian
citizens, any more than Thoreau can be recognized as a criterion of the
economic thought of his day in New England.[15] Asceticism was certainly
foreign to the mind of Pericles and Thucydides. In the course of our
discussion, also, we shall find that it represents, after all, only one
phase of the thought of the philosophers themselves.
5. _Socialistic tendency._—Since Greek economy was chiefly interested in
the problems of distribution, it tended toward socialism, both in theory
and in practice. This was also a natural outgrowth of the fact that
individual interests were subordinated to public welfare. Though the
latter half of the fifth century witnessed a great individualistic
movement in Greece, and though individualism and independence are often
named as prominent Greek characteristics, yet these terms did not
constitute a basal political principle, even in the free Athenian
democracy, in the same sense as they do with us today. The life of the
Greek citizen was lived far more for the state, and was more absolutely
at the disposal of the state, than is true in any modern democracy. In
Greece, politics was thus the social science of first importance, and
the supreme purpose of all human activity was to make good citizens.
State interference or regulation was thus accepted as a matter of
course, and the setting of prices, rigid regulation of grain commerce,
exploitation of the rich in the interest of the poor, and public
ownership of great material interests such as mines were not
revolutionary ideas, but common facts in Greek life.[16] The tendency of
the theorists was therefore naturally toward centralization of power in
the hands of the state, and an exaggerated idea of the omnipotence of
law.[17] Yet despite the error inherent in it, this socialistic tendency
of Greek economic thought had its basal truth, which is becoming an
axiom of modern economics and statesmanship—the belief that private
property is not a natural right, but a gift of society, and hence that
its activities should be controlled by society, and made to minister to
public welfare. Indeed, we have by no means escaped the error of the
Greek thinkers, for one of the most common mistakes of statesmen and
political theorists today is an overestimate of the effectiveness of
law.
Footnote 1:
F. Wilhelm (_Rhein. Mus._, XVII, No. 2 [1915], 163, n. 2) says: “Eine
Geschichte der theoretischen Behandlung der Oekonomik bei den Griechen
ist noch zu schreiben.” The present work was undertaken in the year
1911.
Footnote 2:
Cf. Zimmern, _Greek Commonwealth_, pp. 211 ff.; but the statement on
p. 222 is extreme: “where competition and unemployment are unknown
terms, where hardly anyone is working precariously for money wages or
salary.”
Footnote 3:
Cf. Roscher, _Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft_ (1878), I, chap. i, p. 7;
Ar. _Pol._ 1259_b_18-21.
Footnote 4:
Cf. Plato _Rep._ 498A; Xen. _Econ._, a treatise on household
management; Ar. _Pol._ i. p. 3, on the divisions of οἰκονομία; chap.
8, on whether finance (χρηματιστική) is a part of οἰκονομική;
pseudo-Ar. _Economica_; cf. _infra_, p. 63, nn. 5 and 6; p. 82, n. 1;
p. 128, for fuller discussion.
Footnote 5:
Xen. _Mem._ iii. 4. 6 ff., especially 12; _Econ._ xx; Plato _Pol._ 259
B-C; cf., on this passage, Espinas, _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
(1914), 105; cf. Ruskin: “Economy no more means saving money than it
means spending money. It means the administration of a house” (_A Joy
Forever_, I, 8, Allen ed., London, 1912, Vol. XVI, 19). We shall
frequently quote from this monumental edition of Ruskin.
Footnote 6:
_Pol._ i. 1. 2: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἵονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ
οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν.
Footnote 7:
_Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_, p. 357; cf. Zmavc,
_Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswissenschaft_, 1902, pp. 59 f., and
his references to Boeckh, Meyer, and Beloch; Kautz, _Die Gesch. d.
Entwickelung der National Ökonomik_, p. 133, n. 5; for note on the
authorship of the _Revenues_, cf. _infra_, p. 63, n. 2.
Footnote 8:
Ingram, _History of Political Economy_, p. 12; cf. Souchon, _Les
Théories économiques dans la Grèce antique_, p. 34.
Footnote 9:
Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 31 ff.
Footnote 10:
Cf. V. Brants, _Xenophon Economiste_, reprint from _Revue Catholique
de Louvain_, 1881, pp. 4 ff.
Footnote 11:
Ely, _Studies in Historical and Political Science_, 2d series, pp. 48
ff., especially p. 64, where he states that it is a return to the
Greek view.
Footnote 12:
Ely, _Outlines of Economics_, 1908, pp. 4 ff.; cf. Seligman,
_Principles of Economy_, (1905), pp. 4 ff., especially p. 14, where he
even quotes the sentences of Ruskin with approval: “There is no wealth
but life”; “Nor can anything be wealth except to a noble person”
(_Unto This Last_, IV, 77 [Vol. XVII, 105]). All citations will be
from the Allen library edition unless otherwise stated.
Footnote 13:
Schoenberg, _Handbuch der polit. Econ._ (1890), I, 56.
Footnote 14:
Haney, _History of Economic Thought_, p. 52; cf. Ely, _op. cit._, p.
48, n. 1, cited in n. 1, above, for a similar definition based on
Plato.
Footnote 15:
Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 57) goes to the extreme of saying that antiquity
represents “die Negation der ökonomischen Interessen und der
wirtschaftlichen Arbeit.”
Footnote 16:
Even abolition of debts and redivision of lands were not unknown in
Greek history. Grote (_History of Greece_, III, 105 f. and notes)
denies this, but the heliastic oath, which he cites (Dem. _Adv.
Timoc._ 746, and Dio Chrysost. Or. xxxi. 332), proves that such
measures were agitated, or there would be no reason for protective
measures. Cf. _infra_, Plato (_Laws_, 736E), who takes this for
granted. Cf. Solon’s Fragments; Isoc. (_Panath._ 259) says that it
would be hard to find a Greek state, except Sparta, that has not
fallen into “the accustomed accidents,” viz., στάσιν, σφαγάς, φυγὰς
ἀνόμους, ἁρπαγὰς χρημάτων, χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, γῆς ἀναδασμόν, etc.
Footnote 17:
Cf. _infra._ for citations and qualifications.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDEVELOPED CHARACTER
OF GREEK ECONOMICS
As stated above, the economic ideas of the Greeks were unsystematized
and inextensive.[18] The extant literature previous to Plato presents
only incidental hints on matters economic. Hesiod, in interesting
antithesis to classical thinkers, emphasizes the dignity and importance
of manual labor.[19] The contrast, however, is not so great as it
appears, for the labor which he dignifies is agricultural. He constantly
urges its importance as the chief source of wealth.[20] On the other
hand, he opposes the commercial spirit that was beginning to be rife in
his age, and decries the evil of unjust gains.[21] His mention of the
fact of competition between artisans of the same trade is of interest
for the development of industry in Greece.[22] His _Erga_ was, in a
sense, the forerunner of the later _Economica_ in Greek literature.
Solon proved by his reforms that he had some sane economic ideas as to
the importance of labor, industry, commerce, and money in the
development of the state. He also showed some insight into the solution
of the problem of poverty. His ideas, however, are not definitely
formulated in his extant fragments, and belong rather to economic
history.[23] The _Elegies_ of Theognis are full of moral utterances on
wealth, emphasizing its temporary nature as compared with virtue.[24]
Pythagoras and his followers have often been given a prominent place in
the history of communism, but this is probably due to a false
interpretation.[25] It is likely, however, that he opposed the evils of
luxury, and moralized on the relation between wealth and virtue.[26]
Democritus wrote a work on agriculture.[27] Like the other philosophers,
he taught that happiness was to be sought in the gold of character,
rather than in material wealth.[28] To his mind, poverty and wealth
alike were but names for need and satiety (κόρου).[29] Wealth without
understanding was not a safe possession, depending for its value on
right use.[30] The amassing of wealth by just means, however, was
good,[31] though unjust gains were always a source of evil.[32]
Excessive desire for wealth was worse than the most extreme poverty.[33]
It is possible also that Democritus held to a mild form of the social
contract theory of the origin of society.[34] Heraclitus complained
bitterly of the unwisdom of the masses and their merely material view of
life.[35] He made the common antithesis between material and spiritual
wealth,[36] and observed the fact that gold is a universal medium of
exchange.[37] Hippodamas of Miletus and Phaleas of Chalcedon proposed
new plans for the distribution of wealth, but we have the barest outline
of their theories from Aristotle.[38] Their systems will be discussed in
a following chapter.
The Sophists, true to their character as philosophers of extreme
individualism, developed a new theory of the origin of society. The
already current term φύσις, “nature,” which had been accepted as a
sufficient reason for the state’s existence, was now opposed to “law,”
νόμος, as natural to artificial. The Sophists argued that, in a
primitive state of nature, perfect individualism was the rule. Men did
injustice without restraint. The weaker, however, being in the majority,
and finding it to their disadvantage to compete with the strong, agreed
neither to do nor to suffer injustice, and constrained the stronger
minority to co-operate in their decision. Thus arose the social contract
whereby nature gave up its real instinct for an artificial convention
(συνθήκη), and thus society came into being.[39] The theory, at first,
though untrue, was not intended to be destructive of moral foundations,
but was opposed rather to the traditional idea of the laws of a state as
the “decrees of a divinely inspired lawgiver.”[40] In the hands of men
like Thrasymachus[41] and Callicles,[42] however, it became a means of
denying that the life according to nature was bound by any laws which
the strong need observe, and that might was the only final law.
In line with their radical individualism, the Sophists were also
pioneers in the more cosmopolitan spirit that characterized the Cynics
and Stoics. They taught the doctrine of the fundamental worth and
relationship of men,[43] and thus, with the Cynics, started the attack
upon the theory that upheld slavery as a natural institution.[44] Little
further is known of their other social or economic ideas. Protagoras
wrote a work on “wages,” but it was probably an argument relative to the
acceptance of pay by Sophists.[45] In any event, this fact that the
Sophists were so ready to be enriched through their lectures is clear
evidence that their teaching on wealth was not the negative doctrine of
the other Greek philosophers.[46] Prodicus seems to have scorned menial
labor as morally degrading, though he agreed with Hesiod in his doctrine
of the dignity of all work that is noble.[47] He emphasized the
necessity of labor in the production of material good,[48] and, like
Democritus, was the forerunner of the Socratics in his insistence upon
right use as a criterion of wealth.[49] Hippias prided himself on his
accomplishment in many arts,[50] and thus probably did not share the
prejudice of the philosophers against manual labor.
Euripides, though markedly individualistic, like the Sophists, shows
traces of the older use of nature to explain the necessity of the state.
He draws a parallel between the social order and the order of nature, by
which law and government are justified, and the right of the middle
class of farmers to rule is upheld.[51] He emphasizes the importance of
agriculture, and the dignity of the peasant farmer (αὐτουργός), who
works his own land, as the stay of the country.[52] This latter accords
well with his cosmopolitan spirit, which he shares with the Sophists. He
opposes the artificial distinctions of birth,[53] slavery,[54] and the
traditional Greek idea of the inferiority of woman.[55] His attitude
toward wealth is that of the moral philosopher rather than that of the
Sophist.[56]
Thucydides reveals considerable insight into economic problems, though
he does not deal with them directly. Roscher declares that the Greek
historian contributed as much as any other writer to give him the
elements of his science, since he alone, of all Greek writers, did not
confuse his economic ideas with ethics.[57] He recognizes the place of
labor in production, and the importance of material wealth as the basis
for all higher development.[58] He also has some appreciation of the
true nature of capital. In his description of the undeveloped condition
of early Greece, which lived from hand to mouth, he writes like a modern
economist describing primitive conditions in Europe in contrast to the
capitalism of his own day.[59] Cornford’s attempt[60] to discredit
Thucydides as a historian, and to show that he missed the true cause,
economic, of the Peloponnesian War, is not convincing. Cornford both
exaggerates the influence of commercial interests in fifth-century
Athens and belittles the economic insight of Thucydides. The Greek
writer is, however, like Herodotus, a historical source for the actual
economic conditions in Greece, rather than an economic theorist.
Aside from the fragmentary hints presented above, Greek economic thought
begins with the Socratics, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, and is
continued, in a very incidental way, in the orators, and in the Stoics
and their contemporaries. As we shall see, however, even in the
Socratics, no real science of wealth is developed, in the modern sense.
The reason for this lack, which is most commonly emphasized since it is
closest at hand, is that the phenomena of actual production were but
slightly developed. This explanation is well summarized by Haney[61] as
follows: (_a_) that economic relations between individuals and states
were far simpler than now; (_b_) that international commerce was not
encouraged by ancient states, whose ideal was rather national exclusion;
(_c_) that public finance was then very limited and unimportant; (_d_)
that division of labor was not extensive; (_e_) that the relative lack
of security of life and property discouraged exchange and saving; (_f_)
that in all these respects, the situation is analogous to that of
mediaeval Europe.
There is certainly much force in this general reason. The development of
economic thought must, of course, depend upon the actual conditions
under which the thinkers live. We have already admitted also the vast
difference between the present economic complexity and the simplicity in
ancient Greece. The foregoing summary of Haney, however, is misleading.
Though the ideal of Sparta was national exclusion, it was surely not
that of Athens and some other Greek states. All extant records agree
that Athens, at least, the home of the economic theorists, encouraged
international commerce by every means in her power. The division of
labor, while insignificant compared with the minute division of modern
mechanical industry, was by no means inextensive, as is evidenced by the
fact that this is a point on which Greek thinkers show especial insight.
The notion that Greek industry was chiefly limited to household economy,
and that the era of capitalism had not yet dawned, has long ago been
refuted by Meyer and others. The alleged insecurity of life and
property, while relatively true, is exaggerated for Athens, at least.
Above all, the common attempt to draw an analogy between classical
Greece and mediaeval Europe economically is due to an utter
misconception. The period of Greek economic history, which corresponds
to that of the Middle Ages, is rather the era of economic awakening,
between the middle of the ninth and the end of the sixth century
B.C.[62]
Other reasons for the limited development of Greek economic thought are:
_a_) The dominance of the state over the individual citizen, which fact
caused political rather than economic speculation to absorb the
attention of Greek thinkers. It is stated that the importance of the
individual must be recognized before a science of economics can
develop.[63] This reason is also usually overemphasized.
_b_) The general prejudice in Greece against industry, labor for
another, and finance for its own sake. That such a prejudice existed to
some degree, arising from the old aristocratic feeling, moral
objections, the reflex influence of slavery, the spirit of independence,
and the belief that leisure was necessary for the proper performance of
the duties of citizenship, is generally admitted. The commonly assumed
universality of this feeling is, however, open to grave question. The
prejudice against skilled labor was probably limited to the moral
philosophers, and perhaps to the more aristocratic portion of the
citizens, and we shall see in another chapter that the hostile attitude
of the philosophers themselves has been considerably exaggerated. The
evil effects of slavery also could not have been so marked in Greece,
before the age of machinery. Moreover, as Meyer has pointed out, a
prejudice against manual labor is evident among the more favored classes
in most European countries today, yet it does not appear to retard the
advance of industry in the least.[64]
_c_) The approval of conquest as a legitimate source of wealth. This is
somewhat true as applied to the state, but it certainly is irrelevant
for the individual citizen of fifth-century Athens. To appeal to
Aristotle’s list of legitimate employments as evidence of this is to
misinterpret his meaning, for he is thinking of a primitive life, not of
contemporary Greece.[65]
_d_) Economic facts are a commonplace of daily life, and familiarity
breeds contempt.[66] This statement contradicts the first reason given
by Haney. Moreover, it is somewhat unfortunate as applied to Greece,
since the very opposite reason is given for the prominence of political
speculation—the commonness of practical politics.
_e_) Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative unimportance of
Greek economic thought is usually not emphasized. It is the patent fact
that almost our only extant sources are the Socratic philosophers, who
represent avowedly a direct moral reaction against the commercial spirit
and money-greed of their age.[67] Thus the limited development of Greek
economics, so far from being an evidence of primitive economic
conditions in Greece, is a direct argument for the opposite. To be sure,
a man with the scientific mind of Aristotle would scarcely have failed
to gain a clearer apprehension of certain fundamentals of economics than
he did, had his economic environment been more complex. Yet the fact
remains that he and Plato are moral prophets, protesting against that
very capitalism whose existence many modern historians have sought to
deny to their age.
Footnote 18:
Cf. _infra_ for qualifications. Zimmern (_op. cit._, p. 227) rightly
insists: “In spite of what is often said, Greece did produce
economists.”
Footnote 19:
_Erga_ 308, 314, 397 f., 311 (ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽
ὄνειδος), 310, 303-6, 413. Any material in Homer applies rather to a
history of economic conditions. Cf., however, _Il._ xiii. 730-32; iii.
65; xxiii. 667 on specialization of gifts.
Footnote 20:
Cf. _Erga_ and _Theogony_ 969-75; cf. n. 2.
Footnote 21:
Cf. n. 2 above; a common theme of seventh- and eighth-century poets;
cf. e.g., Sappho (Bergk-Hiller, _Lyr. G. Vet._ [1897], I, 204, fr. 79
[45]); ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος. Cf. also III,
168, fr. 49 (50), Alcaeus.
Footnote 22:
_Erga_ 25 f.
Footnote 23:
Cf. his poems, especially fr. xiii. 43 ff.; Ar. _Ath. Pol._ x. 1;
Plut. _Solon_ 15, 22-24; Kautz, _op. cit._, pp. 114 f. and note, on
Solon and the other lawgivers; Gilliard, _Quelque Réformes de Solon_.
Cornford (_Thucydides Mythhistoricus_, p. 66) thinks he was “on the
verge” of discovering the law that exports must balance imports.
Footnote 24:
_Elegies_ 1117 f., 227 ff., 1157 f., 181 f., 267 ff., 173 ff., 351
ff., 393 ff., 523 ff., 621 f., 199 ff., 753, 145 f., 559 f., etc.
Footnote 25:
On this error, cf. _infra_, on communism before Plato.
Footnote 26:
Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 114; Jamblichus, _De Pyth. vit._, chap. xii,
p. 58; chap. xvi, p. 69.
Footnote 27:
Diels, _Frag. d. Vorsokratiker_ (1912), II, 20, 69.
Footnote 28:
_Ibid._, p. 95, fr. 171; p. 73, fr. 40.
Footnote 29:
_Ibid._, p. 119, fr. 283.
Footnote 30:
_Ibid._, p. 77, fr. 77; cf. Stob. _Flor._ 94. 24; χρημάτων χρῆσις ξὺν
νόῳ μὲν χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καί δημοφελέα· ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ
χορηγίῃ ξυνή. Cf. Xenophon and Plato, _infra_, on value and wealth.
Footnote 31:
_Ibid._, p. 78, fr. 78.
Footnote 32:
_Ibid._, p. 105, frs. 200, 218, 221.
Footnote 33:
_Ibid._, fr. 219; p. 106, fr. 224. The ethical fragments of
Democritus, cited above, may be spurious. Cf. Mullach, _Frag. Phil.
Gr._, I, 138; Zeller (_Gesch. d. Gr. Phil._ I, 2, 925, n. 1) leaves
the question open. Diels (_op. cit._, II, 1912) cites the above
passages under the “echte fragmente,” though some are starred.
Footnote 34:
Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 37.
Footnote 35:
Diels, _op. cit._, I, 83, fr. 29; οἱ δὲ πολλὸι κεκόρηται ὁκώσπερ
κτήνεα.
Footnote 36:
_Ibid._, p. 82, fr. 22; cf. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ iv. 2. p. 565, and
his comment.
Footnote 37:
Diels, _op. cit._, I, 95, fr. 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ
ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσὸς.
Footnote 38:
_Pol._ ii; cf. _infra_ for details.
Footnote 39:
Cf. Glaucon’s tentative argument presenting the Sophist theory, _Rep._
358E ff., very similar to that of Hobbes. Cf. Barker’s (_op. cit._,
pp. 27 ff.) excellent presentation of the rise of this theory and its
causes.
Footnote 40:
Cf. A. Dobbs, _Philosophy and Popular Morals in Ancient Greece_
(1907), p. 48. For examples, cf. Hippias, cited below, n. 6, or
Lycophron, opposed by Aristotle, cited below in Aristotle’s criticism
of socialism (_Pol._ 1280_b_10-12).
Footnote 41:
_Rep._ i, and the story of Gyges, _Rep._ ii.
Footnote 42:
_Gorg._ 482E ff., though Callicles was hardly a Sophist.
Footnote 43:
E.g., Hippias in _Protag._ 337C, where he says that men are related
(συγγενεῖς, οἰκείους) by nature, not by law, and that the law is a
tyrant of men that does much violence contrary to nature (παρὰ τὴν
φύσιν).
Footnote 44:
Cf. Alcidamas frag., cited _infra_ on Aristotle’s theory of slavery,
and Ar. _Pol._ i. 3. 1253_b_20-23; Lycophron (pseudo-Plut. _Pro. Nob._
18. 2) denies the reality of the distinction between noble and
ill-born. Cf. also on Euripides, _infra_. On the development of the
opposition to slavery in Greece, cf. Newman, _Pol. of Arist._, I, 139
ff.
Footnote 45:
Diog. L. ix. 55: δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Cf. Diels, _op. cit._, II, 220,
231; Croiset, _Hist. de la Litt. Gr._, IV, 54. Souchon (_op. cit._, p.
23, n. 1) thinks that it may have taught the dignity of all labor. Cf.
also Plato (_Sophist_ 232 D): τὰ πρωταγόρεια ... περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Gomperz (_Die Apologie der Heilkunst_, p. 33) infers
that Protagoras had published a _Gesammtapologie der Künste_. Cf.
_Pol._ 299C, and Diog. L. ix. 8. 55.
Footnote 46:
Cf. Plato _Protag._ 328B, where Protagoras states his rule as to
charges for his lectures. Cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, I, 2, 1080 ff., on
the earnings of the Sophists. Cf. Plato _Euthyd._ 304C: ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ
χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν.
Footnote 47:
Plato _Charm._ 163 B-D on Hesiod.
Footnote 48:
Xen. _Mem._ ii. 1. 21-34, the story of Heracles (28).
Footnote 49:
Pseudo-Platon. _Eryxias_ 397 D-E, discussed _infra_.
Footnote 50:
_Hippias Minor_ 368 D, where he is presented as the jack of all
trades. Cf. _infra_ for the antithetic attitude of Plato.
Footnote 51:
_Orestes_ 917-22; _Supplices_ 399-456, 238-45; _Phoenissae_ 535-51
(Dindorf), cited by Dümmler, _Proleg. zu Platons Staat_ (1891), to
show that there are traces of a political treatise of the school of
Antiphon in Euripides. Cf. Barker, _op. cit._, p. 25 and note.
Footnote 52:
_Orestes_ 917 ff.; cf. also the noble character of the peasant
(αὐτουργός) in the _Electra_, who is a noble soul (252 f.), and who
speaks the prologue, though he is only a secondary person in the play.
Cf. also 367-82.
Footnote 53:
Fr. 345 (Nauck), the unjust man is ignoble (δυσγενής), though better
born than Zeus; frs. 54 (Alex.), 514 (Melanippe), 8 (Electra); cf. n.
1 above, and _infra_. He puts worthy sentiments into the mouths of
slaves and dresses his nobles in rags.
Footnote 54:
_Ion_ 854; ἐν γάρ τι τοῦς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει || τὀύνομα; frs.
828 (Phrixus), 515 (Melanippe) (Nauck); _Helena_ 730; cf. Decharme,
Euripide et l’esprit de son théâtre, pp. 162 ff.
Footnote 55:
His finest portrayals are noble women. He was no woman-hater, but
freely presented both sides of female character. Cf. _Medea_ 230 ff.
and other such passages complaining of woman’s lot; fr. 655
(_Protes._), advocating community of wives. Cf., however, Decharme,
_op. cit._, 133 ff.
Footnote 56:
Cf. Nauck, frs. 642 (Polyidus), 55, 56 (Alex.), 95 (Alcmene), 143
(Andromeda), 326 and 328 (Danae); cf. Decharme, _op. cit._, pp. 163
ff. and notes; Dobbs, _op. cit._, p. 78, n. 5.
Footnote 57:
_Op. cit._, p. 7: “Ich auch in volkswirtschaftlicher Beziehung von
keinen Neuern mehr als von ihm gelernt habe.” Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._,
pp. 123 ff.
Footnote 58:
Thuc. ii. 40. 1; i. 70. 8; ii. 40. 2; etc.
Footnote 59:
Thuc. i. 2.
Footnote 60:
_Thucydides Mythhistoricus_ (1907); cf. Shorey’s critical review,
_Dial_, July-December, 1907, pp. 202 ff.; also W. Lamb, _Clio
Enthroned_ (1914), especially pp. 34-67. Lamb’s citations of
Thucydides (pp. 35 f.), present sufficient evidence of the Greek
historian’s economic insight.
Footnote 61:
_Op. cit._, pp. 18 f.
Footnote 62:
“Die wirtschaftliche Entwickelung des Alterthums,” _Kleine Schriften_,
1910; cf. also Beloch, _Zeitschr. f. Socialwiss_., II, 21 ff.;
“Griechische Geschichte,” _ibid._; Poehlmann, _Geschichte des antiken
Socialismus und Kommunismus_, I (2d ed., 1912, _Geschichte der
sozialen Frage und des Socialismus in der antiken Welt_). Citations
from Poehlmann throughout the book are to this work unless otherwise
specified. He exaggerates the development of capitalism. Meyer and
Beloch are also somewhat misleading in their use of the modern terms
for Greek conditions. Francotte (_L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne_
[1900]) is more conservative. For the older extreme conservative view,
cf. the works of Rodbertus and Bücher. Cf. _infra_ for further notice
of the subject.
Footnote 63:
Haney, _op. cit._, p. 17.
Footnote 64:
For a full discussion of the Greek attitude toward labor, with
citations from ancient and modern authors, cf. _infra_, p. 29, n. 4;
pp. 32 ff., and notes; pp. 47 ff. and notes; pp. 69 f. and notes; pp.
93 ff. and notes.
Footnote 65:
_Pol._ i. 8. 1256_b_2.
Footnote 66:
Haney, _op. cit._, p. 17.
Footnote 67:
Emphasized by Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 593 f. Our citations will
always be from the second edition, 1912.
CHAPTER III
PLATO
As seen above, Plato was the first great economic thinker of Greece.[68]
Plato, however, was primarily interested in neither economics nor
politics, but in moral idealism. He is pre-eminent, even among the
Socratics, for this. All his economic thought is a direct outgrowth of
it, and is shot through with its influence. Yet, despite this fact, he
exhibits considerable insight into some of the basal principles of
economics,[69] and his entire _Republic_ is founded upon an essentially
economic theory of society. He traces its origin to mutual need,[70] and
makes little of the innate social impulse, so prominent in Aristotle’s
analysis.[71] He is the predecessor of Aristotle, however, in opposing
the social contract doctrine of the Sophists with its interpretation of
law as mere convention, by a natural theory of social origins. To his
thought, the very foundations of society are established in eternal
justice. They are not the result of mere convention, nor altogether the
work of inspired lawgivers, but a complex product of natural and
artificial elements.[72]
VALUE
Strictly speaking, Plato’s contribution to a theory of economic value
and a definition of wealth is practically nil. In his discussion of just
price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange value. He implies that,
since goods exchange according to definite proportions, they should have
a common quality capable of measurement, and that just price corresponds
to this.[73] He offers no suggestion as to the nature of this quality,
except that, in stating that “the artisan knows what the value of his
product is,” he seems to be thinking of labor, or cost of production, as
the chief element in value.[74]
In other passages, he insists on the doctrine taught previously by
Democritus,[75] and later by Xenophon and other philosophers, that
so-called goods depend for their value upon the ability of the possessor
to use them rightly.[76] This idea is represented in modern thought
especially by Ruskin.[77] The theory is, of course, true of absolute
value, and, in a sense, even of economic value, in that “all
exchangeableness of a commodity depends upon the sum of capacity for its
use.”[78] It cannot be made a criterion of economic value, though the
allied idea, implied by Plato and urged by Ruskin, that the innate
quality of the thing, its capacity for good or harm, is a real element
in economic value, is being recognized today. This is evident in the
increasing hostility toward such so-called commodities as opium and
intoxicating liquors. Since we have begun to define political economy in
terms of human life rather than in terms of property, Ruskin’s
definition of wealth is more acceptable: “the things which the nature of
humanity has rendered in all ages, and must render in all ages to come
... the objects of legitimate desire.”[79]
WEALTH
Plato has much to say of wealth, though he deals with it strictly from
the standpoint of the moralist. We look in vain for a clear definition,
or for a consistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods. His
terms are πλοῦτος, used of both material and spiritual wealth; χρήματα,
often interpreted literally of “useful things,” as the basis of the
subjective doctrine of value discussed above; κτήματα, “possessions,”
and such words as χρυσός and ἀργύριον. His use of these terms,
especially the first, is ambiguous. At times he means material goods
only; again, like Ruskin, he includes every human good, intellectual and
moral as well;[80] again he means “excessive wealth.”[81] As a result of
his conception of value, he includes in material wealth all those
objects that depend for their worth upon wise use and character in the
possessor.[82] Material wealth is regularly placed last by Plato, as
inferior to all other goods of soul or body, a mere means, and not an
end in itself,[83] for virtue does not come from property, but property
and all other goods from virtue.[84] Material goods should be the last
thing in one’s thought,[85] and the fact that people universally put
them first is the cause of many ills to state and individual alike.[86]
Wealth is not blind, if only it follows wisdom.[87] The things usually
called goods are not rightly so named, unless the possessor be just and
worthy.[88] To the base, on the other hand, they are the greatest
evil.[89] In all of this, Plato is the forerunner of Ruskin, with his
characteristic assertions: “Only so much as one can use is wealth,
beyond that is illth”; and “Wealth depends also on vital power in the
possessor.”[90]
Plato especially inveighs against excessive wealth and luxury.[91] Men
are urged not to lay up riches for their children, since great wealth is
of no use to them or the state.[92] The prime object of good legislation
should not be, as is commonly supposed, to make the state as rich as
possible,[93] since excessive wealth and luxury decrease productive
efficiency,[94] are incompatible with the highest character or
happiness, being based on both unjust acquisition (κτῆσις) and unjust
expenditure (ἀναλώματα),[95] produce degeneration in individual and
nation,[96] and are the direct cause of war[97] and civic strife.[98]
Were it feasible, he would prefer to go back to the simpler life of
earlier times, before luxury and the inordinate desire for riches had so
dominated all society.[99] Of course he realizes that such a return is
impossible, but he has little hope of any other escape from the evils.
He is thus led to express the belief that the fewer wants the better, a
doctrine common also to Ruskin, Carlyle, and Thoreau.[100]
However, Plato has no prejudice against moderate wealth. His sermons are
directed against excessive commercialism, which puts money before the
human interest,[101] thereby causing injustice, degenerate luxury,
vicious extremes of wealth and poverty, political graft, individual
inefficiency, and wars both within and without the state. Though his
philosophy leads to asceticism, and his attitude toward wealth seems, on
the surface, to breathe this spirit, yet Plato is not an ascetic in his
doctrine of wealth, as is often wrongly asserted. He describes the true
attitude as that which partakes of both pleasures and pains, not
shunning, but mastering them.[102] He recognizes an assured competency
to be practically a prerequisite for the development of the good
life,[103] while, on the other hand, he considers poverty to be an evil
only second to excessive wealth.[104]
To be sure, Plato’s demand for a limitation of private and national
wealth, and his general negative attitude are, if interpreted rigidly,
unfruitful and economically impossible.[105] It is not business that
should be curbed, but bad business.[106] Individual or nation cannot
become too prosperous, provided there is a proper distribution and a
wise consumption of wealth, and Plato’s idea that great prosperity is
incompatible with this goal can hardly be accepted by modern economists.
Nevertheless, there is much of abiding truth in his doctrine of wealth.
Aside from the profound moral value of his main contention, we may state
summarily several points in which he remarkably anticipated the thought
of the more modern humanitarian economists: (1) in the fact that
excessive private wealth is practically impossible without corresponding
extremes of poverty, and that such a condition is a most fruitful cause
of dissension in any state; (2) in the fact that extremes of wealth or
poverty cause industrial inefficiency; (3) in the prevalent belief that
no man can gain great wealth by just acquisition, since, even though he
may have done no conscious injustice, his excessive accumulation has
been due to unjust social conditions; (4) in the growing belief that
expenditures of great private fortunes are not likely to be helpful
either to individual or to community, but are too liable to be marked by
foolish luxury and waste that saps the vitality of the nation; to Plato,
such are mere drone consumers of the store (τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής, ...
κηφήν);[107] in this, he was a forerunner of Ruskin, who opposed the old
popular fallacy that the expenditures of the wealthy, of whatever
nature, benefit the poor;[108] (5) in the dominant note in economic
thought today, so emphasized by Plato and Ruskin, that the prime goal of
the science is human life at its best—as Ruskin states it, “the
producing as many as possible full-breathed, bright-eyed, and
happy-hearted human creatures”;[109] (6) in the fact that the national
demand for unlimited wealth is now recognized, as Plato taught, always
to have been the most fruitful cause of international differences; (7)
in the fact, which is receiving ever-greater recognition by modern
economists and statesmen, that the innate quality of the object for good
or harm must be considered in a true definition of economic wealth.[110]
PRODUCTION
Plato seems to have had little positive interest in the problems of
production. He was too much engrossed with suggesting means for limiting
excessive acquisition. He was, however, quite apt in his use of
illustrations from industrial life.[111] He was also apparently the
first to give a real classification of trades,[112] as follows:
furnishers of raw materials (πρωτογενὲς εἶδος), makers of tools
(ὅργανα), makers of vessels for conserving products (ἀγγεῖα), makers of
vehicles (ὅχημα), manufacturers of clothing and means of defense
(προβλήματα), workers in fine arts (παίγνιον), producers of food
(θρέμμα)—a fairly inclusive catalogue for that age; if commerce and the
learned professions were included. But some of the classes overlap,
since they follow no necessary principle of division. He divided
productive arts into co-operative (συναιτίους), which provide tools for
manufacture, and principal (ἀιτίας), which produce the objects
themselves.[113] They were further divided into productive arts
(ποιητικαί), which bring something new into existence, and acquisitive
(κτητικαί), which merely gain what already exists. In the latter class,
he placed all commerce, science, and hunting.[114] Plato would thus
appear to exclude commerce and the learned professions from the true
sphere of production. This, however, is only apparent, in so far as
legitimate exchange is concerned. He clearly understood that the
merchant and retailer save the time of the other workers,[115] and that
they perform a real service to the community, in that they make
necessary exchange convenient and possible.[116] He thus recognized them
as producers of a time and place value, and he cannot be accused of the
physiocratic error, which denied productivity to all workers except
those who produce directly from natural resources.[117] His distinction
of productive and acquisitive arts can, furthermore, hardly be
interpreted as intending to limit production to the material merely,
though learning is relegated to the acquisitive class. Such an
interpretation would be out of harmony with the whole trend of his
thought.[118] His further classification of productive agencies as
creative (ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν τι) or preventive (τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν)[119]
substantiates this, for many of the preventive agencies are intellectual
and scientific.
The general attitude of Plato toward economic production may be inferred
from his insistence upon the thorough application of the division of
labor for the perfection of industry.[120] He evidently recognized it as
the necessary basis of all higher life. We have seen above, also that
one of his chief objections to excessive wealth or poverty was the fact
that they caused inefficiency in production.
_Agriculture._—Of the three factors that enter into production—land,
labor, and capital—the most important in the mind of the Greek thinkers
was land. The relative prominence of agriculture was partly the cause of
this, but in the case of the philosophers, their ethical passion, their
idea of the necessity of leisure for personal development, and their
conservative attitude toward industry and commerce were the chief
motives that impelled them to urge their contemporaries back to the
simple life of the farm.[121] The aristocratic feeling, still strong in
European countries, that landed property is the most respectable,
probably also had some influence, though land was not so distinctively
in the hands of the upper classes in Attica.
Though the praise of agriculture was a characteristic feature of Greek
literature in all periods, it was not at first a conscious economic
theory.[122] Later, toward the end of the fifth century, it became a
definite ethico-economic doctrine of the philosophers, as a criticism of
their times, and as an appeal to what was deemed to be the more
healthful life of the earlier days.
Plato does not devote so much attention to this theme as do Xenophon and
Aristotle. His standpoint, however, is practically the same, though his
tendency toward the physiocratic error is not so marked. In his second
state, he orders that agriculture shall be the only means of
money-making,[123] and he even strikes the modern note of conservation,
in his directions for the care of land, waters, springs, and
forests.[124] On this point, he and the other Greek thinkers accord well
with the economy of the past decade with its urgent preachment, “Back to
the land,” though the modern watchword has, of course, a more economic
emphasis.
_Capital._—Though the function of capital, aside from natural resources,
was a familiar fact in the Athenian life of the fifth and fourth
centuries B.C.,[125] there is scarcely any consideration of it by the
theorists before Aristotle. Plato has no definition of capital, nor
indeed scarcely any recognition of the fact of its existence.[126] His
emphasis on the virtue of economy, however, and his criticism of those
who spend the “stored wealth,” imply the idea that wealth should be used
not merely for enjoyment, but also for productive purposes.[127] His
strictures upon interest show that he has but slight appreciation of the
productive function of money-capital.[128]
_Labor and industry._—On the other hand, Plato has considerable insight
into the rôle of labor in production. To be sure, he shares with the
other philosophers a certain prejudice against manual labor as degrading
to freemen.[129] The mechanical arts call forth reproach.[130] Free
citizens should not be burdened with such ignoble occupations,[131] and
any person who disobeys this rule shall lose his civic rights until he
gives up his trade.[132] Agriculture alone shall be open to them, and
only so much of this as will not cause them to neglect their higher
welfare.[133] However, this prejudice has been read into some passages
in Plato by a forced interpretation. The assertion of Socrates,[134]
that craftsmen have not temperance (σωφροσύνη), since they do other
people’s business, is made merely to draw Critias into the argument. The
statement that all arts having for their function provision for the body
are slavish,[135] does not necessarily imply prejudice against physical
labor. Such arts are slavish, to Plato, because they have no definite
principle of service as gymnastics has. He is merely illustrating the
point that it is an inferior type of statesmanship that works without a
definite principle for the highest political welfare. The idea,
expressed in the _Politics_,[136] that the masses (πλῆθος) cannot
acquire political science is a criticism against unprepared
statesmanship rather than against labor. Indeed, Plato asserts the same
of the wealthy.[137]
Moreover, the following facts should be observed: that the prejudice of
Plato against the manual arts is chiefly limited to the _Laws_; that
even there his prejudice is primarily against retail trade rather than
against industry;[138] that in so far as a real hostility exists, its
true source is not in any opposition to labor or industry _per se_, but
rather in the political belief that only as citizens have leisure for
politics can prepared statesmen take the place of superficial
politicians,[139] and in the moral feeling that constant devotion merely
to the physical necessities of life causes men to neglect the primary
purpose of their existence.[140]
Modern scholars have usually been extreme in their interpretation of
Plato on this point.[141] Such unwarranted generalizations as the
following are common: “Il ne découvre dans les professions qui tendent
au lucre qu’égoisme, bassesse d’esprit, dégradation des sentiments.”
“Platon et Aristote voient dans le commerce et dans l’industrie deux
plaies de la société; ils voudraient les extirper à’fond, si cela était
possible.”[142] One of the worst misinterpretations has been perpetrated
by Roscher, in inferring from the _Republic_ (372 ff.) that Plato “das
Leben der Gewerbetreibenden als ein Leben thierischen Behaglichkeit
schildert, sie wohl mit Schweinen vergleicht.”[143] Such absurdities are
unfortunately not rare, though they might be avoided by a careful
reading, even in a translation.[144]
It should not be overlooked either that Plato’s utterances on labor are
by no means all negative. Skilled labor is recognized in several of the
minor dialogues as fulfilling an actual need in civilization. Laborers
are represented as having their part in knowledge and virtue,[145] and
are admitted to be the necessary foundation of all human
well-being.[146] A positive interest is also manifested by Plato in
labor and the proper development of the arts in both the _Republic_ and
the _Laws_. He constantly harps on the necessity of each doing his
fitting work, and doing it well, and in his opinion happiness consists
in this rather than in idleness.[147] Indeed, that each one perform well
the task for which nature has fitted him is the definition of justice
itself.[148] The indolent rich man is a parasite and a drone, a disease
of the state. This is Plato’s favorite figure in both the _Republic_ and
the _Laws_, a figure that is suggestive of Hesiod, the pioneer champion
of labor.[149] He is even ready to admit that it is, after all, not the
kind of labor but the character of the workman that ennobles or degrades
any work.[150] In fine, his attitude toward the mechanical arts is
similar to that of Ruskin, who also thinks that manual labor is
degrading.[151] But as with Plato, the chief secret of his prejudice
lies in the fact that laborers usually do their work mechanically,
without thought. He believes that “workmen ought often to be thinking,
and thinkers ought often to be working.” He is willing to classify all
work as liberal on this basis, the only distinction being the amount of
skill required.[152] However, in agreement with Plato’s idea, he would
set the roughest and least intellectual to the roughest work, and this
he thinks to be “the best of charities” to them.[153] With Plato, he is
also convinced that, under actual conditions of labor, the degradation
is very difficult to avoid, and therefore he would emphasize chiefly
agricultural labor, where education of head and hand are more fully
realized.[154]
It is, however, in Plato’s constant insistence upon the principle of the
division of labor, as a prerequisite for any success in the mechanical
arts or elsewhere, that he reveals insight into, and interest in,
productive labor. This is the basal idea in the _Republic_. It is also
one of the chief regulations in the _Laws_, where its direct application
to the artisan is a clear evidence that he appreciates the economic
significance of the principle.[155] To him, it is the foundation of all
human development. Society finds its source in mutual need (ἡ ἡμετέρα
χρεία). Man is not self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης). Reciprocity is necessary
even in the most primitive state.[156] Out of this necessary dependence
arises the division of labor, a beneficent law, “since the product is
larger, better, and more easily produced, whenever one man gives up all
other business, and does one thing fitting to his nature, and at the
opportune time.”[157]
The basis of this law Plato finds in the fact of the diversity of
natures, which fits men for different tasks.[158] In this he differs
from Adam Smith, who believes that the differences of natural talents in
men are much less than is generally supposed. Smith makes the propensity
to barter the source of specialization, which, in turn, is based on the
interdependence of men. He thus considers the diversities in human
nature to be the effect rather than the cause of the division of
labor.[159] Plato, however, is probably nearer the truth, since the very
reason for mutual interdependence is diversity of nature.[160]
The advantages of specialization, according to Plato,[161] are four, as
stated above. It enables one to accomplish more work with greater ease,
more skilfully, and at the proper season. The second and fourth of these
are not mentioned by Adam Smith, but he notes the resulting increase in
opulence for all the people, and the development of inventive genius. He
also observes that the division of labor causes the growth of capital,
and that this in turn increases specialization.[162] Of course Plato
could not appreciate the important fact of the influence of the division
of labor on the development of inventive genius, since he lived before
the age of machinery.
Plato is also a forerunner of Adam Smith in his recognition of the fact
that the division of labor depends for its advance upon a great increase
in the size and complexity of the state.[163] It means a multiplication
of trades, a development of industry,[164] the entrance of the retail
trader (κάπηλος),[165] and the invention of money as a means of
exchange.[166] The necessity of the division of labor between states is
also recognized. It is impossible to establish a city where it will not
be in need of imports (ἐπεισαγωγίμων). International trade therefore
arises, and with it are born the merchant (ἔμπορος) and the sailor
class, together with all those who are engaged in the labor of the
carrying trade.[167] Thus Plato, the idealist, and reputed enemy of
trade and industry, develops them directly out of the basal principle of
his _Republic_. He appreciates the necessity of a full-fledged industry
and commerce to the existence even of a primitive state, and his
hostility to them is actually directed only against what he terms their
unnatural use.[168] Moreover, in his opinion, one function of the
division of labor should be to limit them to the performance of their
proper tasks, and keep them from degenerating into mere money-making
devices. It should also result in limiting such vocations to the less
capable classes since the rulers should be artisans of freedom.[169]
It would take us too far afield to discuss the diverse ways in which
Plato uses his principle. We may observe in passing, however, that
he applies it to war, in his interesting criticism of the
citizen-soldier;[170] to the finer arts, even when they are quite
similar to each other;[171] to politics, as noted above; to justice
and the moral life in general;[172] and to the intellectual life, in
his unsparing criticism of the superficial versatility and
dilettantism of the contemporary Athenian democracy, which trusts
the government to any incompetent, professes to be able to imitate
everything, and makes the many-sided Sophist (πολλαπλοῦς) the man of
the hour.[173] Though he begins with the development of the
principle as an economic fact, his primary interest in it is as a
moral and intellectual maxim. The fact that the cobbler sticks to
his last is only a symbol (εἴδωλον) of justice.[174] Nevertheless
Plato does appreciate to a remarkable degree the economic bearings
of the law, and his discussion of it is notably scientific and
complete.[175] He sometimes pushes its application to an extreme,
though such instances are perhaps meant in a playful Socratic
vein.[176] At least, like Ruskin, he understands that extreme
specialization must produce narrow and one-sided men, and that
progress revolts against its too rigid application.[177] He is aware
too that the division of labor breaks down in the case of the poor
unemployed of the state, since they have no special work.[178]
SLAVERY
Plato is not blind to the ethical aspects of the problem of slavery. In
his first healthy state (ὑγιείνη), slavery and war are conspicuously
absent, and it is the natural inference that the author believed these
to be necessary evils of the more complex state.[179] He appreciates the
dangers of absolute power, even in private life, and believes that few
men can stand the strain.[180] He conceives human nature as a unity that
defies absolute division into separate classes.[181] Though he does not
renounce slavery in the _Republic_, he would limit, it to the barbarians
and to those who seem unfit for the higher life.[182] It plays a
remarkably small part in his first state, and it would seem that his
idealism is here struggling against what he feels to be an economic
necessity. In the _Laws_, he frankly accepts the necessity, and puts
even agriculture, as well as the other industries, into the hands of
slaves.[183] However, they are not to be treated as animals, but as
rational men, in whom a proper usage may develop a certain degree of
morality and ambition for good work.[184] To be sure, his purpose is
economic rather than ethical—to make the slaves satisfied with their
lot, and thus better producers.[185] He makes no mention of freedom as a
reward for good behavior, though he elsewhere provides for the existence
of freedmen in the state, and stipulates that they shall not become
richer than their former masters.[186]
MONEY
As Plato was the first of extant Greek thinkers to grasp the principle
of the division of labor, so he was the first to give any hint as to the
origin of money. He states that it came into use by reason of the growth
of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted from increased division of
labor.[187]
The function of money he defines somewhat indefinitely by the term
“token of exchange,”[188] an expression suggestive of Ruskin’s
definition “a ticket or token of right to goods.”[189] It seems to imply
that money is not itself a commodity to be trafficked in. In the Laws,
he specifies more clearly the functions of this symbol. It acts as a
medium of exchange and as a measure of value.[190] The latter office is
performed by reason of the fact that money is a common denominator of
value, changing products from incommensurable (ἀσύμμετρον) and uneven
(ἀνώμαλον) to commensurable and even.[191]
Since Plato did not consider money to be a commodity to be bought and
sold, and since he did not appreciate its productive function as
representative capital, his theory of interest was superficial. His
attitude toward it was somewhat similar to that of many people today
toward speculation in futures in the stock market, as a practice
contrary to public interest and policy. The application of the term
τόκος to interest by Plato[192] and Aristotle, as though interest were
the direct child of money, is probably only a punning etymology, and not
intended seriously. It can therefore hardly be used, as it often is, to
prove the superficiality of the theory of the Socratics. Plato, however,
would have no money-making by usury,[193] nor indeed any loaning or
credit at all, except as an act of friendship.[194] Such contracts
should be made at the loaner’s own risk,[195] and held legal only as a
punishment for breaking other contracts.[196] He calls the usurer a bee
that inserts his sting, money, into his victims, thereby beggaring them
and enriching himself.[197]
Such strictures against interest were common in mediaeval Europe,
reappeared in Ruskin,[198] and are implied in the present opposition, in
some quarters, to so-called “unearned income.”[199] The motive in
mediaeval times, however, was distinctively religious, and was also
partly due to the absence of a developed capitalism. With Ruskin and
modern theorists, on the other hand, the objection is, at bottom,
socialistic. The motive of the Socratics was essentially moral and
political.
Plato’s other error concerning money, as above observed, was that it
need possess no intrinsic value for domestic use. He looked upon gold
and silver as causes of degeneration in state and individual,[200] and
would therefore have put a ban on them for use within the state.[201] To
his mind, a mere state fiat was sufficient to give currency and
value.[202] This doctrine has also often recurred in the history of
economic thought, as in Ruskin and the Greenback party of a generation
ago.[203] The error, however, was not so grave in Plato’s case, for he,
at least, recognized the need of the precious metals for international
purposes.[204] Moreover, in his proposed state of such limited extent,
the problem would have been far simpler, and he would have distinguished
between actual conditions and possibilities in Greece and his admittedly
more or less utopian ideal.
EXCHANGE
Exchange in Greek economy held a very minor place, compared with its
dominant importance in modern theory. It was discussed chiefly in a
negative manner, as the object of the moral and aristocratic prejudice
of Greek thinkers. We find, however, some appreciation of its true place
in the economic life of a state. Plato divides trade, ἀλλαγή or
ἀγοραστική, into αὐτοπωλική, which sells its own products, αὐτουργῶν,
and μεταβλητική, which exchanges the products of others. He further
divides the latter into καπηλική, the exchange within the state, which
he calls one-half of all the exchange, and ἐμπορική, foreign
commerce.[205] He finds its origin in the division of labor, and in the
mutual interdependence of men and states.[206] He understands the
necessity of the reciprocal attitude in international, as well as in
private, exchange, and thus has a clearer insight than the mercantilists
and some modern statesmen. A state must raise a surplus of its own
products, so as to supply the other state from which it expects to have
its own needs satisfied.[207]
Since a tariff on imports played little part in Greek life, except in so
far as it was imposed for sumptuary or war purposes,[208] the perplexing
modern problem of the protective tariff scarcely came within the horizon
of Greek thinkers. Plato would prohibit the import of certain luxuries,
as a moral safeguard. He divides merchandise into primary and secondary
products, and would not permit the import of the latter.[209] Elsewhere,
however, he legislates against imposts upon either imports or exports,
though unconscious of the significance of his suggestion.[210]
He appreciated something of the function of exchange in society. It
performed a very important service, as a mediator between producer and
consumer.[211] Like money, it served to equalize values, and thus acted
as an aid to the satisfaction of needs.[212] When limited to this
primary function, it was of advantage to both parties to the
exchange,[213] and merchants and retailers had then a real part in the
production of values.[214]
The sweeping assertion is too often made that the Greek people were
hostile to trade, and therefore that their theorists were especially
opposed to it. We have already seen how false this idea is for the
Greeks themselves,[215] but it also needs a great deal of qualification
in the case of their writers. Their hostility is directed especially
against the more petty business of retail trade (καπηλική) rather than
against the extensive operations of the merchant (ἔμπορος). But their
opposition even to this is not entirely undiscriminating. We have seen
that Plato clearly understands the necessity of exchange to the life of
the state.[216] He admits that even retail trade is not necessarily
evil.[217] The chief reason why it appears so is because it gives free
opportunity for the vulgar greed of unlimited gain, which is innate in
man.[218] If the noblest citizens, who are governed by rational
interests, should become retailers and innkeepers, the business would
soon be held in honor.[219]
Plato, however, would limit exchange to its primary function as defined
above.[220] Like Ruskin, he believes that, whenever it is pursued merely
for private gain, it becomes a source of degeneration to individual and
state. It is then akin to the fraudulent or counterfeit pursuits
(κιβδήλοις).[221] The retailers in well-ordered states are generally the
weakest men, who are unable to undertake other work.[222] The rulers in
the _Republic_ must keep themselves entirely free from the trammels of
trade, lest they become wolves instead of shepherds,[223] though Plato
is grappling here with a very real problem that still faces us—how to
prevent graft among public servants.[224] In the _Laws_, retail trade is
entirely prohibited to citizens,[225] and permitted only to metics and
strangers,[226] and, indeed, only to those whose corruption will be of
least injury to the state.[227] These aliens are not to be permitted to
gain overmuch wealth,[228] and they must depart from the state, after
twenty years’ residence, with all their belongings.[229] Retail trade,
even in their hands, must be strictly limited to the demands of the
state,[230] and confined to the market-place for the sake of
publicity.[231] All exchange must be honest, dealing with unadulterated
products (ἀκίβδηλον).[232] There shall be no dickering over sales, but
only one price shall be set upon goods each day. If this is not
accepted, the goods must be removed from sale until the following
day.[233] If possible, the executors of the laws should try to fix a
just schedule of prices, to allow of moderate gain, and should see that
this is observed by the retailers.[234] As a climax to all these
precautions, Plato would have the rulers take pains to devise means
whereby the retailers shall not degenerate into unbridled shamelessness
and meanness of soul.[235] Under such limitations, he has faint hopes
that retail trade may be freed of its stigma, so as to do least harm to
those who pursue it, and to benefit the whole state.[236]
It need not be observed that this attitude of Plato toward trade and
commerce is alien to the spirit of economic progress, and that no
advanced civilization could be developed on such a basis. His profuse
legislation, too, as above outlined, strikes a modern as naïve and
visionary.[237] No man, however, is more aware of this than Plato
himself. He should be judged, not in a spirit of rigid literalism, but
with a sympathetic criticism which tries to understand the psychological
reasons for his attitude. His suggestions are not offered as a proposed
scheme for actual legislation,[238] but rather in the spirit of the
moralist, who, observing that almost inevitable evils accompany retail
trade and commercialism, with human nature as it is, and that commerce,
the servant of man, has become his master, sees almost the only hope of
escape in its limitation to what is barely necessary. The age-long
problem of a greedy commercialism, which is blind to the appeal of all
other goods when profits are at stake, Plato certainly saw clearly, and
outlined with the hand of a master. The problem faces us still, in a
form even more acute, but the protests of Plato, Ruskin, and Carlyle are
bearing positive fruit today, in a political economy that takes as its
supreme goal human life at its best.
But aside from these generalities, a sympathetic study of Plato’s
thought on exchange reveals an insight into certain specific points, of
interest to modern economics, which are commonly overlooked. His protest
against the former axiom of economics, that the prime purpose of trade
is profit, and that the mere fact that goods change hands, necessarily
increases the wealth of a country, is substantially correct.[239]
Commerce for commerce’ sake is a clear case of mistaking the means for
the end, and is contrary to sound economics as well as ethics. The
objections of Plato and Ruskin[240] against the principle too generally
accepted by business and economy of the past, at least tacitly, that “it
is the buyer’s function to cheapen and the seller’s to cheat,” are being
recognized today as worthy of consideration.
The anxiety of Plato over the effect of trades or professions upon
character is well worthy of modern imitation, and this is, to a
considerable extent, an economic as well as a moral question.
Zimmern[241] has well observed: “Our neglect to study the effect of
certain modern professions upon character, when we are always insisting,
and rightly, upon the importance of a character-forming education, is
one of the strangest lapses, due to the sway of nineteenth-century
economics.”
As we have seen, one of the chief purposes of Plato in his limitation of
commerce was to eliminate graft from the government. Though his remedy
was not acceptable, yet his remarkable appreciation of a very grave
problem that still faces us should be recognized. Furthermore, no better
solution for it has ever been offered than the separation of politics
from big business. This was the underlying principle of his suggestion,
and it is in accord with the trend of modern statesmanship.
Another impelling motive of Plato in his stringent legislation was to
render impossible the development of extremes of wealth or poverty in
the state. Again, we should credit him with having clearly appreciated
the problem, though we may criticize his attempted solution. The great
commercial prosperity of today has made the situation vastly more acute,
and still economics has no satisfactory solution to offer. After all, in
the light of modern tendencies toward the regulation of industry and
commerce, some of Plato’s ideas do not seem so “grandfatherly,” but
rather prophetic, and in accord with sound economy. His legislation
against the sale of adulterated products,[242] and in favor of publicity
in business,[243] and state supervision of prices[244] has a startlingly
modern ring.
POPULATION
The problem of population and food supply, which disturbed Malthus and
some of the other English economists, was also a cause of concern to
Greek thinkers. This might well be expected, since it is a recognized
fact that the source of the grain supply was always a matter of grave
concern to Athens and many other Greek cities.[245] Plato states the
problem clearly and hints at a solution, when he says that the natural
increase of population in his state shall not exceed the economic basis
for it.[246] In the _Laws_, he suggests specific means for preserving
the proper number by restraining over-productive people, and by
encouraging the opposite.[247] If such general provisions should not
prove sufficient, he would then resort to colonization.[248] On the
other hand, should population be greatly depleted by war or disease, he
would even open the doors of citizenship to the undesirable
classes.[249] His interest in the problem of population, however, is
primarily moral and social rather than economic. Moreover, in antithesis
to Malthus, he limits his consideration to a very small, artificially
constructed state. With the narrow political vision of a Greek, he
thinks that the production of a _multitude_ of “happy-hearted” men in a
state is impossible.[250]
DISTRIBUTION
As stated in the Introduction, the economic interest of Greek thinkers
was particularly alive in the fields of distribution and consumption. It
is here that they are especially interesting and suggestive.[251]
However, they dealt very little with the important principles of
distribution as laid down by modern economists. Theories of the several
elements that enter into distribution—wages, profits, and rent—are for
the most part conspicuously absent.[252]
The problem of distribution is also hardly considered from the modern
standpoint. We look in vain for a treatment of the modern dominant
question of the relation between capital and labor. Moreover, the Greek
theories of distribution are, on the whole, not the outgrowth of the
sentiment of human sympathy for the poor and the common laborer, which
is so prevalent today. The purpose seems to be to guard against
dishonesty rather than oppression from either contracting party.[253]
This lack in Greek theory is not strange, in an age when slaves took the
place of machinery, so that capital and labor were largely united in
them, while the majority of free laborers worked directly for the
public, or on the land.[254] The goal of the theorists, therefore, is
the conservation of the state rather than the relief of any class of the
citizenship.
Plato discusses the importance of a proper distribution of wealth in the
_Republic_, but the point that looms large to him is the fact that
excessive wealth or poverty is likely to endanger the stability of the
state.[255] As seen above, also, some of his regulations in the _Laws_
seem to strike a modern note. He would have a state commission fix
prices,[256] would permit the state to limit the freedom of
inheritance,[257] and perhaps even intervene in securing a just
wage.[258] Yet in all of this, the dominant motive is to avoid civic
discord.
Before proceeding to the larger subject in distribution, Plato’s theory
of private property, we will discuss briefly his attitude toward the
laboring classes.[259] It is commonly asserted that the Greek
philosophers had little or no regard for the masses. As usually
expressed, however, the statement is very unfair, and especially to
Plato. Such extreme assertions as the following are frequent: “They [the
masses] are of no account altogether.”[260] Plato in the _Republic_
“voue à l’ignominie, au mépris, à la misère, à la servitude éternelle la
classe des ouvriers.”[261] “Für die des Erwerb obliegenden Personen
bedarf es keiner Erziehung.”[262] “Plato, in treating of the ideal
state, deems it not worth while to concern himself with the trading and
artisan classes.”[263] “Und im übrigen will er sie [the masses], wie es
scheint, durchaus sich selbst überlassen.”[264]
To be sure, as above admitted, the interest of Greek thinkers was not
marked by the modern sentiment of sympathy for the laborer. Their
writings are characterized by a certain aristocratic feeling, and they
do not emphasize the worth or importance of the masses. Yet they are far
from being indifferent or hostile to them.
Aristotle himself was the first to make this false criticism of
Plato.[265] But the author of the _Republic_ foresaw that he might be
misinterpreted, and excused himself for his indefiniteness in the
details of the ideal state.[266] Moreover, Aristotle’s criticism is not
borne out by a study of the _Republic_. Plato implies with sufficient
clearness that his communistic regulations are limited to the two upper
classes.[267] It is not true either, as Aristotle asserts,[268] that
there is a rigid caste system in the _Republic_. The very opposite
principle is laid down.[269] The myth of the three metals presents an
aristocracy based strictly on intellectual and moral excellence. No
arbitrary obstacle hinders either the degradation or the rise of any
individual from his class. It depends entirely upon the possession of
the gold of character and mentality, for which all may strive. Moreover,
the life of the so-called first caste is literally dedicated to the best
service of the rest. If this be aristocracy, we cannot have too much of
it.[270]
Neither is Aristotle’s criticism warranted, that Plato makes the
happiness of the whole state something different from the sum of its
parts.[271] He merely states the principle, universally true, that no
class has a right to expect to be happy at the expense of the whole
state, and that, in the long run, the prosperity of each is bound up in
the prosperity of all. Indeed, he puts the very objections of Aristotle
and Grote into the mouth of Adeimantus, and answers them satisfactorily,
in his illustration of the painted statue.[272] There could hardly be a
better example of Plato’s lofty ideal, that each part is to contribute
its share toward the utility, beauty, and happiness of the whole, and
that through this cooperation each realizes the highest quantum of
happiness for himself. This doctrine of mutual interdependence is the
basal principle of Christianity, taught by Jesus and Paul in a
strikingly similar figure of the body and its members,[273] though
naturally Plato’s idea of brotherhood is narrower in scope.
The common assertion that Plato has no regard for the artisan class,
then, is unwarranted.[274] The entire _Republic_ is built upon the
opposite principle, to prevent exploitation of the lower by the upper
classes; and his comparison of good and evil rulers to shepherd dogs and
wolves[275] is a precursor of the famous passages of Milton and Ruskin
on the same theme. All classes of citizens in the state are
brothers.[276] The rulers are saviors (σωτῆρας), allies, shepherds
(ποίμενες), nurses (τροφέας), paymasters, and friends.[277] This happy
unity (ὁμόνοια), or harmony (ξυμφωνία), of all classes is to Plato the
highest goal toward which the true statesman should strive,[278] and the
point of next highest importance to the communism of the guards is the
proper regulation of wealth and poverty for the artisans.[279] The mere
fact that he does not believe the artisans to be capable of political
independence by no means indicates that he is indifferent to their
social or economic welfare. It is to conserve this that he would put the
government into the hands of the most capable,[280] and, in any event,
the artisans are not to be held in subjection so much by external force
as by their own free self-restraint.[281] This, in itself, is sufficient
evidence that Plato intended to include the third class in his lower
scheme of education, a fact borne out also by other passages.[282]
It must be admitted that a somewhat different spirit pervades the
_Laws_, where he seems to have despaired of the lofty ideal of the
_Republic_. He relegates the working classes to non-citizenship. But
here, also, he is still anxious that they shall have the sort of
education that befits their station,[283] and that justice be done
them.[284] He also provides against the existence of beggary in the
state.[285] Whatever may be said of his aristocratic spirit, therefore,
he cannot be justly accused of the gross indifference of the early
nineteenth-century economy and of modern capitalism toward either masses
or public, in their concern for material wealth.[286]
COMMUNISTIC AND SOCIALISTIC IDEAS
The Greek theory of distribution was employed chiefly in the criticism
of the institution of private property, and in the suggestion of more or
less communistic systems to succeed it. This tendency, however, was not
like the modern either in motive or in general type. Modern socialism
aims to be scientific, and professes to build a scientific system on a
basis of economic laws. Greek socialism had no such aim. It did not lay
claim to any relation to economic law, but frankly presented itself for
what it was, a politico-moral sentiment. Other points of distinction
will be observed as we proceed, but this primary one must not be
overlooked, if either the spirit or the meaning of the Greek social
theory is to be understood.
Two considerations made the communistic sentiment a normal one to the
Greek democrat. (_a_) The institution of private property had not become
so thoroughly imbedded in the very foundations of society as it has
today. The custom of family tenure was not entirely forgotten, and in
some backlying districts may well have been still in vogue.[287] In some
states, also, a part of the land was probably still held in common by
the citizenship. The frequent establishment of cleruchies in conquered
territories, in which the land was regularly assigned by lot, and the
ever-recurring revolutions, which usually resulted in confiscation of
the land in favor of the victorious party, must have assisted materially
in unsettling the confidence of the Greeks in private property as a
basal institution of society. The actual existence of a polity like that
of Sparta, where private ownership does not seem to have been so
absolute,[288] doubtless also exerted its influence on the imagination
of Greek thinkers. (_b_) As is generally recognized, the Greek, far more
than the modern, took for granted the subordination of the individual
citizen to the state. We have also seen that he tended to magnify the
power of legislation as sufficient to encompass any reform, even in the
face of economic laws. To him, therefore, the demand that the state be
made the dispenser of private property did not seem unnatural.[289] We
should be on our guard, however, against exaggerating the extent of this
sentiment among the Greek writers, or against reading into them the
modern socialistic doctrines.
A consideration of the predecessors of Plato in social speculation may
be conveniently introduced at this point, before we proceed to the
discussion of the _Republic_. Some have thought to find traces of
communism in Homer. The evidence of any real communism, however, is very
slight, and the frankly individualistic spirit of the poems is against
it. Moreover, this is a problem that concerns the economic conditions
rather than the theory.[290] Little is definitely known of Pythagoras
and his school, but it is improbable that he either taught or practiced
a real communism.[291]
As for Hippodamas of Miletus, it is difficult to gain a clear idea of
his ideal state from Aristotle’s meager description,[292] but it seems
not to have been markedly socialistic. He divides his body of ten
thousand citizens into artisans, farmers, and soldiers.[293] He makes a
corresponding triple division of the land—sacred, to provide for the
expense of worship; public, for the support of the soldiers; private, to
be owned and worked by the husbandmen.[294] Thus only the farmers are to
own land, and the question as to who shall work the land for the
military class is left in obscurity.[295] It seems likely that
Hippodamas intended that the farmers should work all the land, and own
one-third of it for their own support. His system contains some
communistic elements, as the fact that two-thirds of the land is public,
but it is certainly not socialistic in spirit and purpose. The prime
interest of Hippodamas was very probably not in a system to supplant
private property, but rather in a plan of assured support for the
priestly and military classes.[296]
Phaleas of Chalcedon, according to Aristotle’s description, approaches
much nearer to the modern socialistic idea.[297] Aristotle makes him a
type of those thinkers who lay chief stress on the right system of
property as the necessary basis of civic peace.[298] His central tenet
is equality of possessions and of education for all the citizens,[299]
but he seems to have specified only landed property.[300] This demand,
though only landed property is included, seems to strike a truly modern
socialistic note. But nowhere better than here may we see the gulf that
separates ancient and modern socialism. The avowed interest of Phaleas
is not in the masses. The artisans are all to be public slaves.[301] His
interest is rather in the classes, and not even in these primarily, but
rather in the state itself. His entire system has for its fundamental
motive the avoiding of civic discord in the state.[302]
The ideal state of Plato’s _Republic_ has often been presented by
socialists and other modern writers as the great prototype of all
socialistic doctrine. We must consider to what extent such a view is
justified. In his famous myth of the three metals, Plato divides his
citizens into three classes—rulers, auxiliaries, and farmers and
artisans.[303] His avowed purpose here, as indeed throughout his
_Republic_, is to secure the highest degree of happiness for all the
citizens.[304] In order to gain this end, he provides for a most
thoroughgoing system of communism, including all property, both for
production and for consumption, except such as is necessary for the
immediate need.[305] He extends it even to the common possession of
wives and children,[306] that all private interests may be reduced to a
minimum.[307] He provides further for a common work[308] and
education[309] for men and women.
Such, in brief, is the system proposed in the _Republic_.[310]
Superficially considered, it would seem to be the parent of modern
socialism and communism. There is, however, actually but slight
similarity between them. The so-called communism of Plato extends only
to the first two classes, which can include but a small minority of the
citizenship.[311] Thus the masses, with whom modern socialism is
especially concerned, are not directly touched by his system. Again, the
primary motive of Plato’s communism is not the modern motive at all. His
thought is not to secure a just share for all in the products of
industry. Though he recognizes the importance of providing against the
evils of extremes of wealth and poverty,[312] the motive is not the
material interest of any class. It is an intense desire for unity and
for escape from civic strife in the state,[313] for provision against
graft, corruption, and tyranny in the rulers,[314] and for insuring as
efficient work as possible.[315] Like Ruskin, Plato is no democrat.
Equality is not in his thought.[316] Unlike many a modern socialist, he
realizes that absolute arithmetical equality is impossible, and that if
gained it would be the greatest injustice. He knows that the true
equality must be proportional, demanding not that each receive exactly
the same, but that each receive his due.[317] His third class,
comprising a large majority of the citizens, is practically without
political activity, a fact in marked contrast to the modern
social-democratic spirit. His emphasis is not economic and material, as
is that of modern socialism, but political and moral.[318]
In fine, the _Republic_ contains some socialistic elements. Plato’s
restriction of the freedom of the individual so as to subserve the
interest of the whole,[319] his tendency to magnify the power of law in
the face of economic principles and of human nature,[320] his interest
in the welfare of the common people, his declaration against inequality
of fortune, his denial of the right of private property for the upper
classes, and his proposed community of wives and children, a measure too
radical for the better type of modern socialism,[321] all seem
socialistic in trend.
The tendency to magnify the power of law, and the submission of
individual to state interest, however, were characteristics of Greek
civilization, and not distinctly Platonic or socialistic. His interest
in the welfare of the masses, as we have seen, was not primarily
economic, but had for its ulterior motive the preservation of the peace
of the state. His denial of private property and family interests to the
guards, and his opposition to extreme wealth or poverty were, as seen
above, devoid of socialistic motive. Moreover, in his hostility to
retail trade, he was not moved by the modern socialistic demand for
immediate contact between producer and consumer. The conditions that
called forth such a demand were not then in existence,[322] as is also
true of the modern agitation for a proper distribution of the profits of
industry. Above all, Plato made no pretense to any economic basis for
his communism, but presented it as a moral and political ideal. The
_Republic_ cannot therefore be classified as truly socialistic either in
motive or in general plan.[323]
In any event, there is nothing in common between the high moral idealism
of Plato’s so-called communism and the crass materialistic communism
that is the subject of Aristophanes’ satire in the _Ecclesiazusae_.
Dietzel[324] has well pointed out that the latter is extremely
individualistic, atheistic, and immoral, demanding all from the state
with no return; that the _Republic_, on the other hand, demands the
loftiest morality and renunciation, and is a direct protest against such
tendencies in Athens as are attacked by the comic poet. As he shows, the
two are as far apart as are the watchwords, “All for self,” and “All for
all.”
Plato’s idea that society is the exact counterpart of the individual in
the large, however, is quite analogous to the modern comparison of
society to an organism.[325] Both are wrong in attempting to press the
analogy too far, yet they contain a truth of profound importance, which
is at the foundation of the marked change in the spirit of economics in
recent years. It is the notion of solidarity, which demands that the
individual shall no longer seek the content of his being in himself
alone, but also in the conditions that shall produce the highest life
for the commonwealth.
In the _Laws_, Plato reluctantly abandons some of the utopian
suggestions of the _Republic_ for a more practical legislation,[326]
though his ideal is really unchanged. Communism of property and of the
family are both discarded even for the rulers, as feasible only for a
supernatural order of beings.[327] As a noble ideal, however, it still
hovers before him.[328] Private property is permitted to the
citizens,[329] but under protest, and if practicable, Plato would like
to prohibit it, as the primary root of all social disturbance and
corruption.[330] He would advocate, therefore, a return to the old
régime of family tenure, somewhat on the model of the Spartan
system.[331] He would also hamper this by limitations so as to make it
no real ownership at all. The land is to be practically state property,
over which the citizens exercise merely the right of use.[332] It is to
be divided into lots of equal value, corresponding exactly to the number
of citizens.[333] Natural disadvantages shall be compensated for by an
increase in the size of the lot, and part of each allotment shall be
near, and part at a distance from the city, that all may be on an equal
footing, and alike ready to defend against invasion.[334] In order that
no citizen may lose his lot, and no man may possess more than one, very
stringent regulations are advised.[335] No lot may be purchased or
sold,[336] confiscated,[337] or divided by will to more than one
heir,[338] and no citizen, in any manner whatsoever, may become owner of
more than one lot.[339] The living of the other members of the family is
arranged for by a provision for a general distribution of the product of
the soil, in imitation of the Cretan law.[340] The annual product of
grain and cattle shall be divided into three equal parts, one for
citizens, one for their servants, and one for the artisans, metics, and
strangers. The first two parts shall not be subject to sale, but each
head of a family shall receive from them enough to nourish his family
and slaves.
It is evident from all these regulations that Plato’s citizens do not
actually own their lots, but merely enjoy the usufruct of them from the
state on certain conditions. He takes away with one hand what he gives
with the other. Under such a system all his precautionary measures could
not have prevented the growth of an even more oppressive poverty, unless
the growth of population could be checked.
The regulations limiting the acquisition or possession of personal
property are even more stringent, though here an absolute equality is
not attempted. He seeks, however, to prevent the rise of inequality of
fortunes, at the very threshold, by making undue acquisition difficult
or even impossible for the citizens. All money-making occupations are
practically closed to them[341]—trade,[342] the mechanical arts,[343]
and even agriculture, so far as their own personal work is concerned.
The latter is given over to slaves,[344] the arts and trade to aliens,
with strict limitations to be enforced by the officers of the
market.[345] As seen above, two-thirds of the farm products are not to
be subject to commercial dealings.[346] The loan of money at interest is
forbidden, and he who disobeys will risk the loss of both principal and
interest.[347] A bulky coinage of baser metal is provided for the daily
use of private citizens, such as will not pass current in another
country.[348] No dowries are to be given or received,[349] and there
shall be no hoarding, but the entire produce of the lots must be
annually distributed for consumption among the whole population of the
state.[350] To make assurance doubly sure, Plato prohibits his citizens
from owning personal property above four times the value of the
lot,[351] or four minas.[352] Any amount in excess of this must be
handed over to the state on pain of severe fine for disobedience.[353]
This is to be accomplished by the regulation that all property except
the lot must be publicly registered, and failure to fulfil this
obligation entails the loss of all but the original lot, and public
disgrace.[354]
In all this drastic limitation of property rights, Plato’s chief motive
is to render excessive wealth or poverty impossible,[355] and to
harmonize the citizenship by reducing all inequalities to a
minimum.[356] This he purposes to accomplish, not merely by the
foregoing restrictions, but also by means of a common education,[357]
and by the institution of the _sussitia_.[358] He makes the road to
comparative equality easier than in his first state by relegating all
the third class, the artisans, merchants, and farmers, outside the pale
of citizenship.[359] The actual difference, however, is not so great as
it might appear. In the _Republic_ there is equality in the upper class,
while in the _Laws_ there is comparative equality among the citizens who
comprise only the upper class. In neither case is there a real equality
in the whole state. Plato is well aware that only approximate equality
can be attained, and that differences not only in property, but also in
birth, virtue, strength, and beauty, are bound to exist.[360] He would
therefore have taxes and distributions unequal in the same ratio, so as
to avoid dissatisfaction and dispute.[361] The difficulties incident to
such a scheme of legislation he would obviate by starting a new state in
virgin soil.[362]
Souchon[363] recognizes the Plato of the _Laws_ as a true socialist, and
points to his attempt to prevent all inequality, and to his extreme
state intervention as characteristic elements of socialism. Plato
certainly does approach nearer to a real socialism in the _Laws_ than in
the _Republic_. In addition to the points noted by Souchon, there may be
observed the application of the system of equality to the whole
citizenship, though at the cost of shutting out all the workers; the
strong sense of the social function of property;[364] the practical
denial of real private ownership of land; the demand for publicity in
business, which is one of the chief suggestions for the regulation of
corporations today;[365] the active interest in the conservation of
natural resources, which, while not socialistic, lies in the direction
of greater social control;[366] and the fact that distribution of the
products of industry is made practically a function of the state.[367]
The demand for equality and unity is also somewhat analogous to the
modern socialistic hostility to competition, which Ruskin calls the “law
of death.”[368] It may be added further that Plato’s description of the
economic strife in his day is slightly suggestive of the criticism of
capitalism by modern socialism.[369] However, the basal motive of Plato
is, again, not that of modern socialism. His aim is still primarily
moral and political rather than material,[370] and he exhibits less
interest in the welfare of the laborers than he does in the
_Republic_.[371] Moreover, his demand for equality is prompted by
exactly the same motive as was active in the _Republic_, not to
ameliorate the condition of the laborer, whom he has relegated to
slavery, but to avoid the hated civic discord (διάστασις) and to
preserve the unity of the state.[372] The equality too, is in no sense
analogous to that sought by modern socialism, for, as seen above, it is
merely equality within a class, comprising the aristocratic minority of
the state, and does not touch the working masses at all.[373] In fine
then, though there are perhaps enough truly socialistic elements in the
_Laws_ to warrant the classification of Souchon, yet if Plato’s ideal
were realized, it would be mainly a restoration of the old economic
régime in Greece, based on agriculture and the family tenure of
property. Such an ideal, modern socialists would doubtless fail to
recognize as having much in common with their own.[374]
Footnote 68:
To judge by Xen. _Mem._, this might have been said of Socrates had he
been a writer.
Footnote 69:
Robin (_Platon et la science sociale_, p. 239) makes him the
forerunner of the triple division of economics—production, exchange,
distribution—but this is hardly warranted.
Footnote 70:
_Rep._ 369 B-C.
Footnote 71:
_Pol._ i. chap. 2. But in the _Laws_, Plato’s theory of origins is
more social, tracing society back to clan and family.
Footnote 72:
Cf. _Laws_ 889 D-E, 709 B-D, and Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 224 f.; also
the entire argument of the _Republic_ on justice.
Footnote 73:
_Laws_ 921B. The word is ἀξία.
Footnote 74:
_Ibid._: γιγνώσκει γὰρ ὅγε δημιουργὸς τὴν ἀξίαν.
Footnote 75:
Cf. p. 15, n. 7 above.
Footnote 76:
_Euthydemus_ 280B-E, 281B, D, 288E-289A; _Meno_ 88D-E.
Footnote 77:
_Unto This Last_, IV, 62: “Useful articles that we can use”; 64:
“Wealth is the possession of the valuable by the valiant” (Vol. XVII,
86 ff.); _Fors Clavigera_, Letter 70 (Vol. XXVIII, 712 ff.); _Munera
Pulveris_, I, 14 (Vol. XVII, 154); II, 35 (Vol. XVII, 166 f.). Plato’s
economic ideas greatly influenced Ruskin. Cf. _infra_, p. 149, n. 2.
Cf. also Vol. XXXVIII, 112; XXXIX, 411, of Ruskin. He says, in the
preface to _Unto This Last_ (Vols. XVII, XVIII), that his “real
purpose is to give ... a logical definition of wealth,” which has
“often been given incidentally in good Greek by Plato and Xenophon.”
Cf. _ibid._, n. 1, for other such references.
Footnote 78:
_Ibid._
Footnote 79:
Cf. above note and _Mun. Pul._, II, 30, notes; _Fors Clav._, Letter
70, 3 (Vol. XXVII, 713), the “good things.”
Footnote 80:
_Fors Clav._, Lett. 70, 8 f. (Vol. XXVIII, 718 ff.), where he refers
to Plato’s _Laws_ 727A.
Footnote 81:
Cf. _infra_ for citations.
Footnote 82:
Cf. p. 23 and notes.
Footnote 83:
_Laws_ 697B, 631C, 728A, 870B; _Apol._ 29D-E.
Footnote 84:
_Apol._ 30B; also _Laws_ 743E; _Gorg._ 451E; cf. Ruskin, _Fors Clav._,
Lett. 70, 6 and 11 (Vol. XXVIII, 717), where he cites _Laws_ 726-728A,
on the value of the soul. He also cites _Laws_ 742-743 and _Rep._ 416E
(cf. _Mun. Pul._ [Vol. XVII, 89, 148]).
Footnote 85:
_Laws_ 743E.
Footnote 86:
831C-D. Ruskin (_Crown of Wild Olive_, 83, Vol. XVIII, 456 f.) cites
_Critias_ 120E ff., in urging the same idea. He also cites Plato’s
myth of the metals, _Rep._ 416E, in similar vein (_Mun. Pul._, III,
89, Vol. XVII, 211).
Footnote 87:
631C cited by Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, III, 88 (Vol. XVII, 210).
Footnote 88:
661A, 661B; _Rep._ 331A-B.
Footnote 89:
_Laws_ 661B; _Hipp. Maj._ 290D; _Menex._ 246E.
Footnote 90:
_Mun. Pul._, II, 35 ff.; he refers to both Xenophon and Plato as being
right on this point. Cf. _Fors. Clav._, I, 8 (Vol. XXVII, 122); _Unto
This Last_, 64 (Vol. XVII, 89).
Footnote 91:
_Rep._ 550D, 373D: ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν
ἄπειρον ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον. On ἄπειρος cf. _infra_
under Aristotle. Cf. Dobbs, _op. cit._, pp. 202 f. and note, on the
evil results of excessive wealth and poverty in the Greece of that
age. Like Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, VI, 153 and note (Vol. XVII, 277), who
cites _Laws_ 736E; _Aratra Pentelici_, IV, 138 (Vol. XX, 295 f.) on
money as the root of all evil, citing _Laws_ 705B.
Footnote 92:
_Laws_ 729A.
Footnote 93:
742D.
Footnote 94:
_Rep._ 421D.
Footnote 95:
_Laws_ 742E, especially πλουσίους δ᾽ αὒ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον.
For the modern application of this doctrine, cf. _infra_; cf. also
743A, C; _Rep._ 550E, 551A.
Footnote 96:
_Rep._ 422; cf. 372E ff. on the φλεγμαίνουσα state.
Footnote 97:
373E; _Phaedo_ 66C. Compare the modern doctrine that lasting peace is
impossible under the present economic system.
Footnote 98:
_Laws_ 744D: διάστασις; also a basal idea of the _Republic_.
Footnote 99:
This is the spirit of the _Republic_ throughout, but cf. especially
369C-374D, and p. 25, n. 7.
Footnote 100:
_Laws_ 736E: καὶ πενίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὸ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω. Cf. _infra_ on Xenophon for
similar ideas. Carlyle, _Sartor Resartus_, chapter on “Everlasting
Yea”: “The fraction of life can be increased in value not so much by
increasing your numerator as by lessening your denominator.” Ruskin,
_Time and Tide_, II, 5 ff. (Vol. XVII, 319 ff.); cf. 320, n. 1, for
other references. Thoreau: “A man is wealthy in proportion to the
number of things he can let alone”—an overemphasized truth.
Footnote 101:
So Socrates (_Apol._ 41E, 29D-E) and Jesus (Matt. 6:33).
Footnote 102:
_Laws_ 634A.
Footnote 103:
_Rep._ 329E-330A, 330D-331B; cf. also the prayer of _Phaedrus_ 279C:
τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε ἅγειν δύναιτ᾽ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων;
_Laws_ 679B; _Gorg._ 477E: τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀππαλλάττει; οὐ
χρηματιστική; cf. also 452C.
Footnote 104:
Cf. preceding notes; also _Rep._ 421D-E; _Laws_ 744D.
Footnote 105:
Bonar (_Philosophy and Political Economy_, pp. 13 f.) criticizes
_Rep._ 400-402 for not seeing that unlimited wealth is necessary for
the realization of the highest art and beauty.
Footnote 106:
Plato also emphasizes this, _Laws_ 743E, 870B: οὐ χρὴ πλουτεῖν ζητεῖν
τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἐσόμενον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως πλουτεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως; 660E;
though he implies that unlimited wealth is necessarily evil.
Footnote 107:
_Rep._ 552B-D; cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 243, n. 1, on κηφήν.
Footnote 108:
In _Mun. Pul._, III, 91 (Vol. XVII, 213), he makes Circe’s swine a
type of false consumption; cf. _Fors Clav._, Letter 38 (Vol. XXVIII,
30 ff.); _Mun. Pul._, Pref., 16 (Vol. XVII, 139 f.); _Queen of the
Air_, III, 124 ff. (Vol. XIX, 404 ff.); _Pol. Econ. of Art_, I, 48 ff.
(Vol. XVI, 47 ff.); _Unto This Last_, IV, 76 (Vol. XVII, 102); Mill
also attacked this idea.
Footnote 109:
_Unto This Last_, II, 40 (Vol. XVII, 56); cf. also _Mun. Pul._, II, 54
(Vol. XVII, 178 f.).
Footnote 110:
Discussed above.
Footnote 111:
Cf. _Pol._ 281D-283A, for an excellent description of the weaving
industry; also _Crat._ 388C ff.; _Phileb._ 56B, on carpentry.
Footnote 112:
_Pol._ 287D-289B; cf. Espinas, _op. cit._, pp. 35 f.; “L’Art économie
dans Platon,” _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII (1914), 106 ff.
Footnote 113:
_Pol._ 281D-E; cf. also _Phaedo_ 99A-B; _Phileb._ 27A; _Timaeus_
46C-D.
Footnote 114:
_Sophist._ 219A-D. Bonar’s (_op. cit._, p. 20) criticism of this on
the ground that learning may produce something new, while the arts may
merely change the shape of things, takes Plato too seriously. We have
here only a characteristic Platonic generalization. Cf. Shorey, _Unity
of Plato’s Thought_ (1903), p. 64, n. 500, on the foregoing passages
from _Sophist._ and _Pol._; cf. Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 231 f.
Footnote 115:
_Rep._ 371C.
Footnote 116:
_Laws_ 918B-C, especially πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὃς ἂν οὐσίαν
χρημάτων ὡντινωνοῦν, ἀσύμμετρον οὔσαν καὶ ἀνώμαλον, ὁμαλήν τε καὶ
σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται.
Footnote 117:
Cf. DuBois, _Precis de l’histoire des doctrines économiques dans leurs
rapports avec les faits et avec les institutions_, pp. 45-47,
comparing Plato and Aristotle on this point. _Laws_ 743D and Plato’s
attitude on agriculture (cf. _infra_) might seem to point the other
way. Cf. _infra_, p. 41, nn. 7-10. Espinas (_Revue des études
Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 247, n. 1) is extreme in calling him a
physiocrat. The term would more nearly apply to Aristotle.
Footnote 118:
Ar. (_Pol._ vi [iv]. 1291_a_12-19) so interprets him, because he finds
the origin of the state in physical needs (_Rep._ 369C ff.), but this
is a carping criticism. Blanqui is hardly fair to Plato on this point
(_Histoire de l’économie politique en Europe_, p. 88). Cf. above, p.
22, n. 4, on Plato’s other theory of origins.
Footnote 119:
_Pol._ 279C.
Footnote 120:
Cf. _infra_ and Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 574.
Footnote 121:
As we shall see, the third reason has been exaggerated for the
philosophers. On the favorable attitude to labor at Athens, cf. V.
Brants, _Revue de l’instruction publique in Belg._, XXVI (1883), 108
f., 100 f.; he distinguishes between the _doctrine philosophique_ and
the _doctrine politique_. So also Guiraud, _La main-d’œuvre
industrielle dans l’ancienne Grèce_ (1900), pp. 36-50; Zimmern, _op.
cit._, pp. 382 ff., 256-72. For the older view of general prejudice
against free labor in Greece, cf. Drumann, _Arbeiter und Communisten
in Griechenland u. Rom_ (1860), pp. 24 ff. Francotte (_L’Industrie_)
takes the more conservative position. Cf. _infra_ for further notice
of this problem.
Footnote 122:
Hesiod _Erga_; _Theog._ 969-975, though even here it is opposed to
commerce.
Footnote 123:
_Laws_ 743D, but he would even limit this, so that it may not become a
sordid occupation.
Footnote 124:
_Laws_ 760E-761C, 763D. Ruskin cites this in _Fors Clav._; cf. Vol.
XXIX, 546.
Footnote 125:
Cf. pp. 19 f., and notes; cf. also p. 106, n. 1. The extensive
commerce of Athens necessitated the presence of a comparatively large
amount of money capital, and a large amount was also invested in
slaves. For further notice, cf. _infra_, p. 68, nn. 8 ff., on the
terms.
Footnote 126:
But cf. _Laws_ 742C (κεφάλαιον), and _infra_, under Xenophon, on the
terms for capital.
Footnote 127:
Cf. _Rep._ 552B, and p. 27. Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 119) overemphasizes
this; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 91, n. 2, who observes, however,
that Plato, by his insistence upon collectivism in landed property
implies that “la terre est toujours un capital, et que la fortune
mobilière ne l’est jamais.”
Footnote 128:
Cf. _infra_ on money.
Footnote 129:
On the general attitude toward labor in Athens, cf. p. 30, n. 4. On
Plato’s regard for the laborer, cf. _infra_, under distribution.
Footnote 130:
_Rep._ 590C, but only for him whose higher nature (τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου
εἴδος) is naturally weak, though the implication is that this is
characteristic of the artisans. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 49 f.
Footnote 131:
_Laws_ 842D, 806D-E, 741E, 846D, 919D.
Footnote 132:
847A.
Footnote 133:
743D.
Footnote 134:
_Charm._ 163A-C.
Footnote 135:
_Gorg._ 517D-518E.
Footnote 136:
292E, 289E-290A.
Footnote 137:
_Ibid._ 300E.
Footnote 138:
Cf. _Rep._ 371C for a contrast in his attitude toward the two; cf.
Bonar, _op. cit._, pp. 21 f.
Footnote 139:
_Laws_ 846D, 847A. Ruskin (_Fors Clav._, Letter 82, 34 [Vol. XXIX, 253
f.]) contrasts the fevered leisure that results from extreme
money-making with the true leisure, citing _Laws_ 831.
Footnote 140:
_Laws_ 743D. The aristocratic Greek feeling of independence against
selling one’s powers to another, and the fact of the frank acceptance
of slavery, by most contemporary thinkers, as the natural order, also
exerted some unconscious influence.
Footnote 141:
Cf. _infra_ for citations from Zeller, and Poehlmann’s able, but
somewhat extreme, defense of Plato (_op. cit._, II, 36 ff.). He cites
Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, V, I, Pt. 2, art. 2, in similar vein
to Plato, on the ill-effects of mechanical labor, despite his
undoubted interest in the industrial arts.
Footnote 142:
Francotte, _L’Industrie_, I, 246, in reference to the _Laws_.
Footnote 143:
_Op. cit._, p. 26, n. 2.
Footnote 144:
Eisenhart (_Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_, p. 5) also says that
Plato calls “Volkswirtschaft gerade zu den Staat der Schweine.”
Dietzel (“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Socialismus und des
Kommunismus,” _Zeitschrift für Literatur und Geschichte der
Staatswissenschaften_, p. 397, n. 1) criticizes both the foregoing.
Footnote 145:
_Sympos._ 209A; _Phileb._ 56C.
Footnote 146:
_Protag._ 321E.
Footnote 147:
_Rep._ 420E, 421C; _Laws_ 779A, 807A-E, 808C. The passages in the
_Laws_ apply particularly to the work of the soldier and the citizen.
Cf. Ruskin, _Unto This Last_, I, 22 (Vol. XVII, 40) for a similar idea
that the function of the laborer is not primarily to draw his pay, but
to do his work well.
Footnote 148:
_Rep._ 433A.
Footnote 149:
_Rep._ 552A, C, 564E; cf. _Laws_ 901A, where he refers to the passage
in Hesiod’s _Erga_ 304: κηφηνέσσι κοθούροις. Cf. p. 27, n. 1, above.
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 87 f.) points to Plato’s demand that woman
be freed, so that the total number of free workers may be increased,
but Plato is thinking only of the ruling class.
Footnote 150:
_Laws_ 918B-919C, referring to retail trade; but if he could admit it
for this, he surely could for the industries. Cf. Aristotle’s passage
on liberal and illiberal work (_Pol._ 1337_b_5-22).
Footnote 151:
_Mun. Pul._, V, 105 and note (Vol. XVII, 234 f.), where he refers to
Plato’s diminutive, ἄνθρωπίσκοι, as applied to laborers (_Rep._ 495C;
_Laws_ 741E); _Time and Tide_, 103 (Vol. XVII, 402), 127 (p. 423 and
note); _Crown of Wild Olive_, 2 (Vol. XVIII, 388), on the furnace;
_Lectures on Art_, IV, 123 (Vol. XX, 113); on the evil effects of arts
needing fire, as iron-working, where Xen. _Econ._ iv. 2, 3 is cited.
He makes frequent reference to the Greek attitude, e.g., Vol. XVIII,
241, 461, and above. But he was not absolutely opposed to machinery;
cf. _Cestus Aglaia_, 33 for what is called the finest eulogy of a
machine in English literature. He even anticipated the great future
mechanical development (_Mun. Pul._, 17).
Footnote 152:
_Stones of Venice_ (Vol. X, 201); cf. also IV, 6 (Vol. XI, 202 f.),
where he cites Plato _Alc._ I. 129.
Footnote 153:
_Fors. Clav._, VII, 9 (Vol. XIX, 230).
Footnote 154:
Cf. Vol. XXVII, Intro., p. lxv.
Footnote 155:
_Rep._ 370A-C and many other passages. Cf. _infra_; _Laws_ 846E-847A.
Cf. _infra_ on the unfair interpretation of _Rep._ 421A by Zeller and
others. Plato implies by the passage merely that specialization is
more important for the statesman than for the cobbler (421C).
Footnote 156:
_Rep._ 369C. Adam Smith makes this the basal fact of exchange (_Wealth
of Nations_, I, ii).
Footnote 157:
_Rep._ 370C: πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ρᾷον, ὅταν ἑἶς
ἓν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. He first
states the principle less plausibly as a literary device, _Rep._ 369C;
cf. 433A.
Footnote 158:
_Rep._ 370C, B.
Footnote 159:
_Op. cit._, I, chap. ii.
Footnote 160:
So Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_ (1900), III, 342-49. Cf.
also Ruskin, _Fors Clav._, IV, 15 (Vol. XXVIII, 160).
Footnote 161:
_Rep._ 370B-C, 374B-E.
Footnote 162:
_Op. cit._, I, chap. 1. Plato implies the increase in wealth. Haney
(_op. cit._, p. 41) observes that Plato thought especially of the
advantages of division of labor to the state, rather than to the
individual. Cf. further _Wealth of Nations_, II, Intro.
Footnote 163:
_Rep._ 370C-371B; cf. DuBois, _op. cit._, p. 37.
Footnote 164:
_Rep._ 370C-D.
Footnote 165:
371C.
Footnote 166:
371B; _Laws_ 918B.
Footnote 167:
_Rep._ 370E-371A. In the _Laws_, he does not extend the principle to
international trade. Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 17.
Footnote 168:
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 185 f.) notes a contradiction between
Plato’s insistence upon the division of labor and his desire for the
simple life. But the philosopher is aware of this, and knows that the
simpler ideal is impossible. Cf. V. Brants, _Revue de l’instr. pub. en
Belg._, XXVI (1883), 102-4, on the fact of the extensive division of
labor in Athenian industry.
Footnote 169:
δεμιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας; _Rep._ 395C, 434A-D; cf. also 420B-421B. In
the _Laws_, the artisans and traders are non-citizens (846D, 847A,
918B-C), not because of prejudice primarily, but for the sake of
better government.
Footnote 170:
_Rep._ 374B-E.
Footnote 171:
395A-B; cf. Adam’s note to 395A, explaining _Sympos._ 223D, where
Plato asserts the opposite. He thinks Plato is speaking ideally in the
_Republic_ passage, but here of the actual fact. But cf. Shorey,
_Unity_, etc., p. 78, n. 597.
Footnote 172:
_Rep._ 433A-B, D, 434A-D, 432A, 443-444A, 396D-E; _Charm._ 161E. In
his broad application of the law, he has advanced beyond Adam Smith.
Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 81 and n. 2.
Footnote 173:
_Rep._ 397E-398A.
Footnote 174:
443C-D; cf. Nettleship _Lectures on the Republic of Plato_, p. 71.
Footnote 175:
Oncken observes (_Geschichte der Nationalökonomie_, pp. 34-36) that
while Smith drew from the law the idea of freedom of trade and
industry, Plato inferred the strictest subordination of these to the
will of the state, and that he also based the caste system on the
principle. For the alleged caste system, cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p.
82, and infra, under distribution. Aristotle’s state implies even a
more rigid separation of the capable few. On Plato’s insight into
economic principles, cf. Robin, _op. cit._, pp. 229 ff. He criticizes
Guiraud for belittling the value of Plato’s social ideas, and urges
that he should be judged, not by the worth of his proposed remedies,
but by his scientific insight (p. 252).
Footnote 176:
_Rep._ 395A-B; 374E, 395B; εἰς σμικρότερα κατακερματίσθαι.
Footnote 177:
_Apol._ 21C-22E; cf. _Rep._ 495D-E, though it applies rather to the
evil effects of the banausic life. Cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 16.
Ruskin (_Stones of Venice_, VI, 16 [Vol. X, 196]), says: It is “not
the labor that is divided but the men—divided into segments of men.”
It stunts their faculties.
Footnote 178:
_Rep._ 552A.
Footnote 179:
396C-373E; cf. Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 27.
Footnote 180:
579D.
Footnote 181:
Cf. Zimmern, _op. cit._, p. 389, note; _Laws_ 777B: δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ
δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ
δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ δεσπότην οὐδαμῶς
εὕχρηστον ἐθέλει εἶναι τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι. On his alleged caste system,
cf. above, n. 2, and _infra_.
Footnote 182:
_Rep_. 469C; cf. _Pol._ 309A.
Footnote 183:
_Laws_ 806D. For Ruskin on slavery, cf. _infra_ on Aristotle.
Footnote 184:
_Laws_ 776D-777E. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914],
256) observes that Plato adopts the mean between the two extremes in
his attitude to slaves.
Footnote 185:
Cf. Xen. _Ath. Pol._ i. 10-12 on the easy life of slaves in Athens,
and Zimmern, _op. cit._, pp. 382 f., who points out that this resulted
from economic necessity. Cf. 777C-D; _cf._ _Rep._ 578D-579A on the
dangers and troubles arising from extensive slave-holding.
Footnote 186:
Laws 915A ff., another striking evidence of the actual status of
freedmen and slaves in Athens.
Footnote 187:
Rep. 371B. The word is νόμισμα, something established by usage, hence
“current coin,” not necessarily suggestive of intrinsic worth, as are
χρήματα and the metals. Cf. Ar. _Clouds_ 248 for a play on the word,
θεοὶ ἡμῖν νόμισμ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. Cf. the simile, _Frogs_ 720, and _Phaedo_
69A, for an analogy between it and wisdom.
Footnote 188:
Rep. 371B: ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.
Footnote 189:
_Fors Clav._, IV, 11, note (Vol. XXVIII, 134 f.); cf. also Vol. XVII,
50, 194 f.
Footnote 190:
742A-B: νόμισμα δ᾽ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς; 918B: ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς
οὐσίαις, referring directly to traders.
Footnote 191:
_Laws_ 918B.
Footnote 192:
_Rep._ 553E; for Aristotle, cf. _infra_.
Footnote 193:
_Laws_ 743D.
Footnote 194:
849E.
Footnote 195:
742C, 915D-E; _Rep._ 556A-B; _Laws_ 850A.
Footnote 196:
921C, an obol per month.
Footnote 197:
_Rep._ 555E.
Footnote 198:
_Fors. Clav._, notes to Letter 43, 14 (Vol. XXVIII, 121 f.), notes to
Letter 81, 16 (Vol. XXIX, 212), where he refers to Plato and
Aristotle; _Mun. Pul._, IV, 98, note (Vol. XVII, 220), where he
absolutely condemns it; On the Old Road, Vol. XXXIV, 425, on usury,
ends with a citation from the Laws 913C; ἃ μὴ κατέθου, μὴ ἀνέλη.
Footnote 199:
E.g. J. Scott Nearing’s recent book on _Income_.
Footnote 200:
_Laws_ 679B, 831C; _Rep._ 545B ff., 548B. Cf. Ruskin on the evils
arising from money, Vol. XX, 295 f.
Footnote 201:
_Laws_ 743D, 742A-B, 801B.
Footnote 202:
742A.
Footnote 203:
Ruskin, _Mun. Pul._, I, 25. He thinks it is a relic of a barbarism
that will disappear as civilization develops.
Footnote 204:
_Laws_ 742A-B.
Footnote 205:
_Sophist._ 223C-D; cf. _Pol._, 289E for the triple division of
commercials, κάπηλοι, ἔμποροι, and ἀργυραμοίβοι; cf. _Phaedo_, 69A for
a figurative use of ἀλλαγή.
Footnote 206:
_Rep._ 370A-E, home; 370E-371E, foreign; cf. Adam Smith’s idea above.
Footnote 207:
370E-371A; Cornford (_op. cit._, p. 66) wrongly asserts that Plato did
not know the law that exports must balance imports. Cf. _op. cit._, p.
37.
Footnote 208:
Boeckh, _Die Staataushaltung der Athener_, I, pp. 382 ff.; Zimmern,
_op. cit._, 1st ed., p. 317. But cf. Brants, _Xenophon Economiste_, p.
18, n. 2 and references, on the protectionist tendency of the
commercial policy of Athens.
Footnote 209:
_Laws_ 847C; Souchon (_op. cit._, p. 102) sees in this a mercantile
trend, but the purposes are entirely different.
Footnote 210:
847B.
Footnote 211:
_Rep._ 371C-D.
Footnote 212:
_Laws_ 918B-C.
Footnote 213:
_Rep._ 369C.
Footnote 214:
On the relation of exchange to production, cf. above, p. 28.
Footnote 215:
Pp. 19 ff.
Footnote 216:
P. 41 and notes.
Footnote 217:
_Laws_ 918B.
Footnote 218:
918D.
Footnote 219:
918E.
Footnote 220:
P. 41 and notes.
Footnote 221:
_Laws_ 918A, 920C. He seems to feel that trade as regularly pursued is
a form of cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses. Cf.
Ruskin, _Unto This Last_, I, 22 (Vol. XVII, 40 f.); IV, 66 ff. (Vol.
XVII, 90 ff.); _Mun. Pul._, IV 95 ff. (Vol. XVII, 217 ff.), where he
refers to _Rep._ 426E, on the difficulty of curing this disease of
traders; cf. Vol. XVII, _Intro._, p. xlvi, citing Xen. _Mem._, iii. 7.
5, 6, on those who are “always thinking how they may buy cheapest and
sell dearest.”
Footnote 222:
_Rep._ 371C.
Footnote 223:
416A-417A.
Footnote 224:
Cf. 415E, χρηματιστικάς in contrast to στρατιωτικάς.
Footnote 225:
741E, 743D, 919D.
Footnote 226:
920A.
Footnote 227:
919D.
Footnote 228:
915A-B, though it applies especially to freedmen.
Footnote 229:
850B-C, and n. 1, above.
Footnote 230:
919C.
Footnote 231:
849D-E, 850A, 915D; cf. _infra_ on this and the other regulations in
their application to modern economics.
Footnote 232:
916D-E; cf. 917.
Footnote 233:
917B-D.
Footnote 234:
920B-C. Plato’s market regulations would exclude all selfish
competition and all gain, beyond mere return for labor expended, from
exchange, and would base it upon a mutual spirit of reciprocity. Thus
here, as often, he is the model for Aristotle, who usually fails to
recognize his debt. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
[1914], 246) is hardly in accord with the modern spirit in declaring
that competition is the social bond, and that Plato misconceives the
nature of this bond.
Footnote 235:
920A-B, 919D.
Footnote 236:
_Laws_ 920C.
Footnote 237:
Zimmern (_op. cit._, p. 280, n. 1) calls it “grandfatherly.”
Footnote 238:
But cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 212, n. 1, who argues that many of his
suggestions are based on actual legislation in Athens or elsewhere in
Greece. Cf. also Hermann, _Ges. Abh._ (1849), pp. 141, 153, 159, whom
he cites; J. Schulte, _Quomodo Plato in legibus publica Atheniensium
instituta respexerit_ (1907, dissertation), and the bibliography cited
there. But he deals very little with Plato’s economic and social laws.
Footnote 239:
Plato saw that it might add a time and place value (p. 41, and notes).
Footnote 240:
Cf. above, p. 42, n. 7; also _Fors Clav._, Letters 45, 82; _Crown of
Wild Olive_, II, 75 f. (Vol. XVIII, 450 f.). He argues that there
should be no profit in exchange, beyond merely the payment for the
labor involved in it. He insists that “for every plus in exchange
there is a precisely equal minus.” Cf. _infra_ on Aristotle for a
similar idea, pp. 107 ff.
Footnote 241:
_Op. cit._, p. 278, n. 2; cf. above, pp. 42 f.
Footnote 242:
Cf. p. 43.
Footnote 243:
_Ibid._
Footnote 244:
_Ibid._ Cf. Ruskin’s more socialistic idea that all retailers be made
salaried officers (_Time and Tide_, XXI, 134 [Vol. XVII, 427]).
Footnote 245:
Cf. e.g., Dem. _De corona_ 87; _Cont. Lept._ xx. 31; _Cont. Andr._
xxii. 15; _Cont. Lacrit._ xxxv. 50; Lysias xxii; Hdt. vii. 102; Thuc.
iii. 86, and many other passages. For modern discussions, cf. Droysen,
_Athen und der Westen_ (1882), pp. 41 ff.; Grundy, _Thucydides and the
History of His Age_ (1911), pp. 58-95; Zimmern, _op. cit._, 1st ed.,
pp. 349 ff.; Gernet, “L’Approvisionment d’Athènes en blé,” _Mélanges
d’histoire, ancienne_, 1909; Beloch, _G. G._, I, 406 f.; _Bevölkerung
im Alterthum_ (1898), p. 30, etc.
Footnote 246:
_Rep._ 372C: οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας.
Footnote 247:
_Laws_ 740D; but his specific methods for carrying out his difficult
suggestion, if he had any to offer, were probably impracticable,
judging by his discussion of women and children in the _Republic_.
Ruskin’s suggestions for meeting the problem are colonization,
reclamation of waste lands, and discouragement of marriage (_Unto This
Last_, IV, 80 [Vol. XVII, 108]).
Footnote 248:
_Laws_ 740E; Ar. (_Pol._ 1265_b_6-12) unfairly criticizes him for
limiting the amount of property, and making it indivisible, while
failing to provide against a too high birth-rate.
Footnote 249:
741A.
Footnote 250:
Cf. Ruskin, cited above, p. 27.
Footnote 251:
For the Greek term, cf. _infra_ on Aristotle.
Footnote 252:
Cf., however, Xen. _Mem._ ii. 7. 12-14, discussed _infra_, which may
be a suggestion of a theory of profits.
Footnote 253:
_Laws_ 921A-D, discussed on p. 39, n. 8; cf. also 847B.
Footnote 254:
The passages above cited, n. 1 above, need not imply labor for
capitalists. It does not appear that there was ever a considerable
body of free citizen laborers at Athens, who worked for capitalists,
though the number of free workers, aside from labor on the farms, was
fairly large. Cf. _C.I.A._ for records of such labor on the buildings
of the acropolis; Boeckh, _op. cit._, I, 58: “Der geringere war durch
seine Umstände so gut als der arme Schutzverwandte oder Sklave zur
Handarbeit genöthigt.” On the favorable attitude toward free labor at
Athens, cf. above, p. 29, n. 4. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, _in loc._)
takes the opposite view as to the number of free laborers for
capitalists.
Footnote 255:
_Rep._ 552B-D, a characteristic passage; _Gorg._ 507E; _Laws_ 757B.
Footnote 256:
920C.
Footnote 257:
740B ff., 923; but his purpose is to keep the allotments intact.
Footnote 258:
847B: μισθῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς περὶ καὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσεων τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ἐάν τις
αὐτοὺς ἕτερος ἢ κεῖνοί τινα ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι, μέχρι δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα
ἀστυνόμοι διαδικαζόντων, etc.; perhaps a strained interpretation.
Footnote 259:
On his attitude to industry, cf. pp. 32 ff.
Footnote 260:
Bonar, _op. cit._, p. 29.
Footnote 261:
Bussy, _Histoire et Réfutation du Socialisme_ (1859), p. 119.
Footnote 262:
Oncken, _op. cit._, p. 34.
Footnote 263:
Haney, _op. cit._, p. 16.
Footnote 264:
Zeller, _Phil. Gr._, II, 1 (1889), 907; cf. also above, pp. 32 f.
Historians of economic thought generally state the case extremely;
e.g., Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 59; Blanqui, _op. cit._, p. 45; Souchon
also, to some extent. Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 36-108) errs in the
opposite way.
Footnote 265:
Pol. ii. 5. 1264_a_11-17, 36-38; 1264_b_11-13.
Footnote 266:
423D: ὡς δόξειεν ἄντις; also 425D, both cited by Poehlmann.
Footnote 267:
415E-417B, 420A-421C admit of no other interpretation. Cf. 421C, how
he turns to the next related point (τοῦ τούτου ἀδελφόν) the question
of the effect of wealth or poverty on the artisans (τοὺς ἄλλους
δημιουργούς). Cf. also _infra_ for other citations.
Footnote 268:
_Pol._ 1264_a_36-38, repeated by many moderns.
Footnote 269:
_Rep._ 415B-C.
Footnote 270:
Cf. the undiscriminating statement of Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 41: “Et
il n’y a guère eu, au cours de l’histoire de la science politique, de
conception plus aristocratique que le mythe fameux des trois races
d’or, d’argent et d’airain.”
Footnote 271:
_Pol._ 1264_b_15-25, repeated by Grote and others.
Footnote 272:
_Rep._ iv. beg.-421C.
Footnote 273:
I Cor. 12:14 ff.; for other evidence of Plato’s interest in all
classes, cf. 519E ff., and the entire argument against Thrasymachus,
Book I.
Footnote 274:
_Rep._ 421A, cited by Zeller, _op. cit._, II, 1, 907, as evidence of
this, states merely that it is more important that there be efficient
rulers than efficient cobblers. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 36-108,
a masterly defense of the _Republic_ on this point, criticizing both
Zeller and Gomperz. He errs on the other side, however, as e.g., p.
96, where he infers from _Rep._ 462C that Plato intended his communism
to apply to the whole people.
Footnote 275:
416A-B, 417B.
Footnote 276:
415A, introducing the alleged aristocratic myth.
Footnote 277:
463B, 417B, 416A, 547C.
Footnote 278:
431E-432A, 443E, 423D.
Footnote 279:
421C-E, cited on p. 48, n. 8. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 91.
Footnote 280:
590C.
Footnote 281:
431D-E, 434C.
Footnote 282:
378B, E, 377B, insisting upon proper stories for all children;
915E-520A, implying that the artisans shall share in all benefits of
the state up to their capacity.
Footnote 283:
643B-C.
Footnote 284:
847B, 921C-D.
Footnote 285:
936B-C.
Footnote 286:
Mill is an exception, but despite his thoroughgoing definitions of
economics.
Footnote 287:
Cf. Ar. _Pol._ ii. 1266_b_17-24.
Footnote 288:
On the Spartan system, cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, pp. 41 f.;
Poehlmann, _op. cit._, I, 75-98, both of whom oppose the more extreme
theory of communism in Sparta.
Footnote 289:
On this general subject, cf. Guiraud, _La Prop. fonc._, 573 f.; cf. S.
Cognetti de Martiis, _Socialismo Antico_ (1889), pp. 515-17, on
socialistic tendencies in Greek constitutions and politics.
Footnote 290:
E.g., Esmein, _Nouvelle Revue historique_, 1890, pp. 821 ff. For a
refutation, cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, 1st ed., pp. 20 ff.; Guiraud,
_op. cit._, p. 37; Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 135 f.
Footnote 291:
For a refutation of the common error, cf. Zeller, _op. cit._, I, 1,
317, n. 1, and 318, n. 2; Guiraud, _op. cit._, pp. 574 f. and 7-11;
Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 136-39 and notes. The earliest witnesses for
Pythagorean communism, Epicurus, in Diog. L. x. 2, and Timaeus of
Tauromenium, _ibid._, viii. 10 are remote from his time and
untrustworthy. The later writers (Diog. L. viii. 10; Aul. Gell. i. 9.
12; Hippolytus _Refut._ i. 2. 12; Porphyry _Vit. Pyth._ 20; Jamblichus
_De Pyth. vit._ 30, 72, 168, 257, etc.; Photius, under κοινά) quoted,
and made the tradition general. The older writers know nothing of the
tradition. Moreover, some passages give evidence of private property
among the Pythagoreans (Diog. L. viii. 1. 15, 39). The origin of the
tradition has been plausibly assigned to a misunderstanding of the
proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων and to the doctrine of moral helpfulness
among the Pythagoreans. S. Cognetti de Martiis (_op. cit._, pp.
459ff.) calls it _socialismo cenobito_.
Footnote 292:
_Pol._ ii. 8. Hippodamas the Pythagorean, cited by _Stob. Flor._ xliii
(xli). 92 f., should not be confused with him. The former wrote in the
Dorian dialect, and differs materially in his ideas. His three classes
are rulers, soldiers, and all laborers, including merchants and
farmers. He says nothing of the division of the land or who shall own
it, but provides that the third class furnish a living to the rest.
But cf. Robin, _op. cit._, p. 228, n. 1, who identifies them.
Footnote 293:
_Pol._ 1267_b_31-33. Cf. Cornford’s visionary article (_Class.
Quart._, VI [1912], 246 ff.), in which he seeks to prove that the
tripartite psychology of Plato’s _Republic_ is an inference from this
triple division of society. Cf. a similar idea of Pohlenz, _Aus Platos
Werdezeit_ (1913), pp. 229 ff.
Footnote 294:
ii. 8. 1267_b_33-36.
Footnote 295:
1268_a_34 ff.
Footnote 296:
So Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 141, who makes him an individualist.
Footnote 297:
_Pol._ ii. 7.
Footnote 298:
1266_a_37 f.
Footnote 299:
1266_a_40: φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν;
1266_b_31-33, to be realized in an old state, partly by allowing only
the rich to give dowries and only the poor to receive them;
1266_b_2-4.
Footnote 300:
Ar. (1267_b_10) criticizes him for this.
Footnote 301:
1267_b_15; cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 7 f.
Footnote 302:
1266_a_37 f.; 1267_a_1 f. Aristotle’s account of these writers, as of
Plato, is incomplete and unsatisfactory.
Footnote 303:
_Rep._ 415A; cf. above, pp. 48 ff. on this and the following note.
Footnote 304:
420B-C.
Footnote 305:
416D-E, 458C; cf. also _Critias_ 112B-C, where common houses, common
meals, and the prohibition of gold and silver are presented as an
ideal.
Footnote 306:
457D.
Footnote 307:
462B-C.
Footnote 308:
451D-455D. Poehlmann points to this doctrine of the _Ebenbürtigkeit_
of women as an advanced ground even for Christianity.
Footnote 309:
451E.
Footnote 310:
Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, p. 578) distinguishes these elements in
Plato’s system, _Republic_ and _Laws_: exclusive right of property
vested in the state; use of land granted to a part of the citizens;
distribution of the product among all the citizens; obligation to
work, tempered by equality of service; inequality of classes, and
equality of men in each class; heredity of profession, corrected by
selection of talents.
Footnote 311:
Cf. pp. 48 f. and notes. Even Aristotle admits (1264_a_33) that Plato
makes his husbandmen absolute owners of their lots, on condition of
paying rental. The rulers alone (μόνοις) are to keep themselves from
silver or gold (417A). Cf. Book IV, beg.: οἶον ἄλλοι ἄγρούς τε
κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι, etc.; 420A, 416D-E, 458C,
464B-D, where the community is applied to the guards only, and 464A-D,
where the same is true of family communism. Doubtless he would have
extended it farther, had he thought it feasible (462B-C), but
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 569 f.; II, 96 f.) overemphasizes this
demand of Plato. Adler (_Geschichte des Socialismus und Kommunismus
von Plato bis zur Gegenwart_, p. 44), DuBois (_op. cit._, p. 40),
Oncken (_op. cit._, p. 34), Souchon (_op. cit._, 148); Malon (_op.
cit._, pp. 90 f.), Shorey (_Class. Phil._, October, 1914, art. on
“Plato’s Laws”) all agree with the foregoing conclusion. Francotte
(_L’Industrie_, II, 258 ff.) leaves the question open, but (261 f.)
observes that the third class is at least restrained from extremes of
wealth and poverty.
Footnote 312:
421D, 421E-422E.
Footnote 313:
_Ibid._, the fundamental idea of the _Republic_. L. Stein (_Sociale
Frage_, p. 164) rightly says: “Denn der Kommunismus Platons ist seinem
Schoepfer nicht Zweck, sondern blosses paedagogisches Mittel.”
Footnote 314:
415E-416A, 417B, 420D, 421A, 421C. He would also avoid vulgarization
of the rulers through trade (416E-417A).
Footnote 315:
421D.
Footnote 316:
Ruskin thinks that inequality of possessions, in itself, does not
necessarily mean either evil or good for a nation (_Unto This Last_,
II, 31 [Vol. XVII, 46 f.]); he argues that each is born with an
absolutely limited capacity, and calls the idea of natural equality of
men “radical blockheadism” (_Fors Clav._, VIII, Letter 95, 6 [Vol.
XXIX, 496]); cf. _Unto This Last_, III, 54 (Vol. XVII, 74); _Modern
Painters_, III, Pt. IV, chap. x, 22 (Vol. III, 189); _Seven Lamps of
Architecture_, IV, 28 (Vol. VIII, 167); _Fors Clav._, II, Letter 14, 4
and note (Vol. XXVII, 248); _Stones of Venice_, III, 4 (Vol. XI, 260),
all of which emphasize its impossibility. He strongly opposes
socialism, cf. above, and _Mun. Pul._, 21 (Vol. XVII, 144), though his
economic ideas contained essentially the germ of modern socialistic
doctrine.
Footnote 317:
Cf. his ironical criticism of democratic equality in Athens, 558C:
ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα; _Laws_ 757B-D,
744B-C; cf. _infra_ for Aristotle’s idea. Cf. p. 61, n. 1 for further
notice of these passages.
Footnote 318:
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 553, n. 3) is extreme in asserting that
Plato’s account of the growth of the proletariat, and the rise of
class struggles (Book VIII) contains “alle wesentlichen Züge des
Bildes, welches die moderne Plutokratie gewährt,” and (560), “Das
vierte Jahrhundert v. Chr. hat uns den Kampf vorgekämpft in welchem
wir selbst mittenhineinstehen.”
Footnote 319:
Pohlenz (_op. cit._, p. 240) makes his socialism a reaction against
the individualism of Pericles, but makes the extreme assertion: “Die
Grundlage auf der Plato seinen Idealstaat aufbaut, ist der strengste
Socialismus.”
Footnote 320:
Cf. p. 43, n. 10. He evidently recognizes his ideas on the family and
on the philosopher-king as utopian; cf. also 425D-E; but Poehlmann
(_op. cit._, II, 144-52) opposes this view. Cf. Shorey, _Class.
Phil._, October, 1914, pp. 357 f., on the idea of law in the _Laws_
and _Politics_.
Footnote 321:
When advocated, it has not been with the lofty motive of Plato.
Footnote 322:
Poehlmann ((_op. cit._, I, 579, 598) admits this. Guiraud (_La Prop.
fonc._, p. 594) points out that the analogy with modern socialism is
difficult, owing to the modern abolition of slavery, great extent of
states, and large increase in personal property.
Footnote 323:
So Souchon, (_op. cit._, pp. 145 ff.); Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, p.
638) well says: “Si ces derniers [modern socialists] reussissaient à
appliquer leurs projects, les sociétés qui sortiraient de leurs mains
n’auraient pas la moindre ressemblance avec la société hellenique.”
Cf. also _ibid_., p. 594, where he distinguishes between Plato and
modern socialists. Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250, n. 1) makes the
_Republic_ essentially socialistic, though he admits that it has not
the modern aim (p. 255). Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 123-43) makes it a
“Koinzidenz der beiden Prinzipien” (p. 143). Wolf (_Gesch. d. Ant.
Kommun. u. Individ._, p. 96) distinguishes Plato’s two aims as a
strong community spirit, and a strong central authority, devoid of
selfish interest. Cf. S. Cognetti de Martiis, (_op. cit._, pp.
524-89), on the _Socialismo filosofico of the Republic_.
Footnote 324:
_Vierteljahrschrift f. Staats u. Volkswirtschaft_, I, 375 ff. Of
course Aristophanes may have caricatured Plato as he did Socrates in
the _Clouds_. However, since both were opposed to extreme
individualism, and since the comedy was written before the _Republic_,
it is improbable. But cf. Drumann, _Arbeiter u. Communisten in
Griechenland u. Rom_ (1860), pp. 133 f., who thinks the poet was
satirizing the oral discussions of Plato. Pohlenz (_op. cit._, pp.
223-28) argues for an earlier edition of the _Republic_, and states
that, though the comedy is not a direct satire on the _Republic_, yet
its numerous specific ideas and expressions that are similar to
Plato’s warrant the conclusion that the poet followed Plato. Cf. also
S. Cognetti de Martiis, (_op. cit._, pp. 541-61), on the relation of
the two.
Footnote 325:
434D-E, and the entire plan of the _Republic_. Cf. Poehlmann, (_op.
cit._, I, 527 ff.; also II, 210 f.), on Plato’s idea of a
pre-established harmony between individual and common good.
Footnote 326:
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, II, 205 ff.) suggests that this change resulted
from Plato’s experiences with Dionysius of Syracuse, but it may be
easily accounted for by the natural conservatism of age. Cf. Shorey,
_Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 353.
Footnote 327:
739D, 740A.
Footnote 328:
739C-E, 807B.
Footnote 329:
737E, 741C.
Footnote 330:
831C-D, though it refers to the love of wealth, 807B, 713E.
Footnote 331:
Cf. Guiraud (_La Prop. fonc._, pp. 582 f.); cf. _infra_ for details.
Footnote 332:
740-741A, 923A-B, a remarkable passage, which declares that they are
not full owners either of themselves or their property, but that they
belong to the whole race, past, present, and future (ξύμπαντος δέ τοῦ
γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν και τοῦ ἔπειτα ἐσομένου), and especially
to the state.
Footnote 333:
737E, 745C-E.
Footnote 334:
745C-E.
Footnote 335:
740B.
Footnote 336:
741B-C.
Footnote 337:
745A, 855A-B, 754E-755A, 744E.
Footnote 338:
740B, 923C. If the family is large, the women are to be married off,
and the men adopted by the childless (740C). Personal property may be
willed to the other children (923D); cf. also above, pp. 45 f. and
notes.
Footnote 339:
740C, 741B-D.
Footnote 340:
847E-848C.
Footnote 341:
741E.
Footnote 342:
847D, 919D.
Footnote 343:
846D, 847A, 919D.
Footnote 344:
806E.
Footnote 345:
920A; cf. above, on exchange.
Footnote 346:
849C.
Footnote 347:
Cf. p. 39 and notes.
Footnote 348:
Cf. p. 40 and notes.
Footnote 349:
742C.
Footnote 350:
Cf. p. 59 and notes.
Footnote 351:
744E. The entire wealth will thus vary from the bare lot to five times
its value. Cf. Jowett, _Dialogs of Plato_, 3d ed., V, 127, though the
division into four classes might mean that the highest was only four
times the lot value. Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
[1914], 237) accepts the former interpretation.
Footnote 352:
54D-E. The value of the lot was thus only a mina.
Footnote 353:
744E, 745A.
Footnote 354:
745A, 754D-E (which requires it only for the excess), 755A. Espinas
(_op. cit._, pp. 118 ff.) emphasizes the ascetic tendency of his
regulations.
Footnote 355:
729A ff., 919B, 936B-C, against beggars.
Footnote 356:
744B-E, and above notes.
Footnote 357:
Book VII.
Footnote 358:
780B; women and children separate, 806E; on its Cretan origin, 625E
ff.
Footnote 359:
846D, 847A, D, 919D, 806E.
Footnote 360:
744B; cf. pp. 55 f. on equality; cf. 757B-D, contrasting the mere
arithmetical equality (τὴν ἀριθμῷ ἴσην), which is easily realized, and
the true equality, which is very difficult. This latter apportions to
each in accord with his nature (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν). The two are
almost opposites (ἐναντιαῖν). Espinas (_op. cit._, p. 236) thinks that
the division into property classes in the _Laws_ is an attempt to
realize this principle.
Footnote 361:
744B.
Footnote 362:
736C-D, 704.
Footnote 363:
_Op. cit._, p. 143; cf. also pp. 163-65, where he compares it to
modern collectivism; cf. p. 162; also Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 295.
Footnote 364:
923A; cf. 877D, and much of the legislation on property, above.
Footnote 365:
Cf. pp. 59 f. and notes. The modern analogy is not close, yet in each
case the aim is to prevent undue gains whereby the public is
oppressed.
Footnote 366:
Cf. p. 30, n. 3.
Footnote 367:
Cf. p. 59 and notes. The socialistic tendency to overemphasize the
power of law is also strong here as in the _Republic_. But cf. p. 36,
n. 4, and _Laws_ 807B, 746A-B, 747B.
Footnote 368:
_Time and Tide_, IX, 5-9. Modern Painters, V, Pt. 8, chap. i, 6 (Vol.
VII, 207). Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 246)
calls this Platonic denial of “conflict of interest” in trade “le
thème éternel de la chimère socialiste.”
Footnote 369:
Laws 626E: τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν; cited by Poehlmann, _op.
cit._, I, 557; but he exaggerates the analogy.
Footnote 370:
Cf. 742D-E, 743D-E, 729A, and the remarks on retail trade, 918B-919E,
870B; cf. also, above, on wealth.
Footnote 371:
As seen above, they are all slaves or strangers. A direct comparison
is hardly possible, since in the _Republic_, the masses are the
majority of the citizens, while in the _Laws_, there are none.
Footnote 372:
744D; cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 363: “Plato’s object,
however, is not socialistic equalization of the ‘good things’ of life,
but the enforced disinterestedness of the rulers, and the complete
self-realization of every type of man, in limitation to his own proper
sphere and task.”
Footnote 373:
Cf. pp. 55 and 60, on equality; also note 4, above.
Footnote 374:
Francotte (_L’Industrie_, II, 250) suggests that _l’étatisme_,
“nationalism,” would be a more applicable term for the _Laws_. He
distinguishes this from socialism, as being not so thoroughgoing a
limitation of the individual as is the “socialism” of the _Republic_.
Cf. Shorey, _Class. Phil._, IX (1914), 358, on the famous
“communistic” passage in _Laws_ 739C: ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, etc.
He calls it a “rhetorical exaltation of that ideal unity of civic
feeling, which Demosthenes upbraids Aeschines for not sharing.” For
further communistic ideas of Plato, cf. his incomplete romantic story
of Atlantis in the _Critias_. The ideal is similar to that of the
larger works. Cf. Poehlmann, _op. cit._, II, 348 ff.
CHAPTER IV
XENOPHON
Xenophon was a man of affairs, whose interests touched the practical
life of the world on many sides, as is evidenced by the broad scope of
his extant works. He was also, however, a pupil of Socrates. In his
economic thought, therefore, he vacillates between the positive interest
of the practical economist and the negative criticism of the
Socratics.[375] On the whole, his practical bent dominates, and is
especially exhibited in his essay on the _Revenues of Athens_,[376] as
also in the fact that he was the first writer to produce a work devoted
entirely to economics.[377] The spirit of the moral philosopher, on the
other hand, is prominent wherever the influence of Socrates is felt, as
in the first chapters of the _Economicus_ and in the _Memorabilia_. When
the Socratic ideal dominates, he, in common with other Greek thinkers,
confuses economics with ethics, and private with public economy.[378] He
makes the science of economy deal with the management of private
estates,[379] and believes with Plato and Ruskin that the same qualities
are necessary for the successful handling of the affairs of either house
or state.[380]
VALUE
Xenophon insists strongly on utility or serviceableness as a necessary
quality of property (χρήματα, κτήματα). By this, however, he means
primarily, not potential utility in the object, but ability of the owner
to use rightly.[381] Even exchangeability does not insure value in
anything, unless the seller can use to advantage that which he receives
in return.[382] This idea of value is true enough from the ethical
standpoint, and should not be left out of account, as is being
recognized by modern economists. But to attempt to build a theory of
economic value on such a basis, as Ruskin does,[383] would result in
hopeless confusion. Value is not merely an individual and moral, but
also a social and economic, fact.
A hint of exchange value is given in the implied classification of goods
as usable or salable.[384] But there is no discrimination between useful
things in the economic and uneconomic sense. In the _Revenues_, on the
other hand, when free from Socratic influence, Xenophon makes a positive
contribution to the theory of value. He observes that the exchange value
of goods varies with supply and demand, and that this law is, in a
sense, self-regulative by the fact that workmen tend to enter other
fields of activity whenever any industry becomes unprofitable through an
oversupply of its products.[385]
WEALTH
The double standpoint of Xenophon is well illustrated in his doctrine of
wealth. On the one hand, he values it highly, and tries to deduce
practical rules for its increase and enjoyment.[386] On the other hand,
like Socrates and Plato, he makes derogatory comparisons between
economic and spiritual wealth.[387] As in the case of value, he offers
no clear definition of economic wealth (κτῆσις). It is defined
indiscriminately as “whatever is useful to life,” and “useful” is
“everything that anyone knows how to use.”[388] But, as seen above, this
is a purely subjective notion, and is only one element in economic
wealth.[389] He also defines it (χρήματα) as “the excess of goods over
needs,” making it a merely relative term:[390] but here again the
thought is ethical rather than economic, an attempt to teach the
somewhat ascetic principle that a man’s riches are measured by the
paucity of his wants.[391] The hostile or indifferent attitude to wealth
is also assumed in the comparison of it with so-called mental wealth and
wisdom[392] and in the implication that it involves many cares.[393] The
idea so prominent in Plato, however, that the acquisition or expenditure
of great wealth is not consistent with justice, is not emphasized by
Xenophon. He calls that man happiest who has best succeeded in just
acquisition, and who uses his wealth in the best manner.[394]
PRODUCTION
The Greeks had no specific word for production, as we have, since
industry, though well developed, was not a dominant feature of Greek
life, and economics had not become a separate science. The word ἐργασία,
meaning “labor” or “business,” served the purpose. The term was used of
productive labor,[395] of building or manufacturing,[396] of work in raw
materials,[397] most commonly of agriculture,[398] of industries in
general,[399] of the trades, commerce, or other business for
money-making,[400] and of a guild of laborers.[401] The term ἡ ποιητικὴ
τέχνη, “the productive art,” which approaches more nearly to a specific,
technical expression, was also used.[402] Thus, though there is no
clear-cut term for production, the statement of Zimmern[403] that the
Greeks had no better word for “business” than ἀσχολία, “lack of
leisure,” is hardly warranted.
Xenophon was far more interested than Plato or Aristotle in the problem
of practical production. His shrewd discussion of agriculture, and his
urgent appeal to Athens to increase her revenues by systematic
exploitation of the mines, and by the encouragement of industry and
commerce, reveal a mind awake to economic advantage. Though at times he
seems almost to make war and agriculture the only true means of
production, it is evident that he has a live interest in all means of
acquisition.[404] Toward the theory of production, however, his
contribution is not large. In the _Economics_, he recognizes the
importance of labor and natural resources in production, and in the
_Revenues_, he sees the necessity of capital.[405] But naturally, like
Aristotle and the southern planter, he confuses capital with labor, in
the person of the slave.[406] The fable of the dog and the sheep reveals
a knowledge of the machinery of production, and some insight into the
proper relation between the employer and the laborer.[407] Xenophon’s
distinct contribution to future economic thought, however, consists in
his appreciation of the fact that economic production has its definite
limits; that the same ratio of profits cannot be increased indefinitely
by the constant addition of more labor and capital, but that these must
be proportioned to the greatest possible return.[408] To be sure, he
does not appreciate the scientific significance of the principle. His
purpose is rather to emphasize the danger of overproduction, and he even
fails to grasp the necessary application of this danger to the silver
mines. However, as the enunciator of the principle, he may be called the
forerunner of the doctrine of diminishing returns.
As seen above, special emphasis was laid by Xenophon upon natural
resources as an element in production, both in land and in the mines.
His great interest in and eulogy of agriculture as the basal industry,
upon which all other sources of wealth depend,[409] have caused him to
be classed with the physiocrats of modern time but such an
interpretation is hardly warranted. Without doubt, agriculture is, in
his opinion, the supremely honorable occupation. It shares with war the
right to be placed above all other vocations.[410] It permits the
maximum of leisure and physical development, and is not unworthy of the
personal attention of a prince.[411] It is the most pleasant, most
productive,, most dignified, of callings; the best exercise for the
athlete, the finest school for education in patriotism and justice, and
it offers the greatest opportunity for the exercise of hospitality to
men and reverence to gods.[412] Indeed, it is the first of all
occupations for an honorable and high-minded man to choose.[413] Here we
have the highest eulogy of agriculture in Greek literature. It is in
essence a sound statement, and offers a needed message for today.
Though Xenophon recognized the practical importance of capital in
industrial enterprises,[414] he developed no theory of it in his
writings. He appreciated, however, the value of being able to keep a
surplus.[415] The term ἀφορμή, as used by him of the provision of raw
material for weaving, probably signified nothing more than it would have
done to any Athenian business man of his time.[416] The word originally
meant a “starting-point,” especially in war.[417] Later, it signified
the “means” or “resources” with which one begins a project,[418]
especially in business. It was an easy step from this general business
use to the meaning, “financial capital” of a banker.[419] Other terms
for capital were ἐνεργά, used of interest-bearing capital in antithesis
to ἀργά, of goods merely for use;[420] κάρπιμα, “goods that yield a
produce,” as opposed to ἀπολαυστικά, “goods to be enjoyed,”[421] which
is suggestive of Mill’s[422] definition, “that part of his possessions
... which he designs to employ in carrying on fresh production,” and of
his two kinds of capital, “circulating” and “fixed”; ποιητικά, “things
for further production,” as opposed to πρακτικά, “things merely for
use”;[423] κεφάλαιος, of capital as opposed to interest or income.[424]
The term ἔρανος, also, since it came to mean a “contribution of money,”
was often used of a loan, and therefore approached the signification of
“money capital.”[425]
Xenophon is considerably more favorable to labor and the industrial life
than are the other Socratics. He quotes Socrates with apparent approval,
that to do something well is well-being, while he who does nothing well
is neither good for anything nor beloved of God.[426] Work is far better
than idleness. It produces more happiness, makes the laborer more
temperate and just, and is the _sine qua non_ for the independent
life.[427] This is a strong plea for industry, and is especially
significant, since it refers primarily, to manufacture rather than to
agriculture. The reference, however, is to women workers, whose loss of
leisure would not be an injury to the state. Each person is encouraged
to provide for himself, and to do his work in the best possible
manner,[428] and the maxim of Epicharmus, “For labor, the gods sell all
goods to us,” is heartily approved.[429] All the foregoing passages are
Hesiodic in their insistence upon the value of industry.[430] But apart
from his evident acceptance of the doctrine of Socrates, as quoted
above, Xenophon exhibits a positive interest in labor. His attitude
toward the advancement of industry and commerce is thoroughly modern,
except that he does not contemplate the employment of free citizen
labor.[431] He emphasizes labor almost as strongly as natural resources
as an important factor in production. He believes also that industrial
thrift and prosperity are the best means of realizing a more quiet and
orderly state.[432]
Even the practical Xenophon, however, is not free from the
moral-aristocratic prejudice against mechanical arts (βαναυσικαί) for
the better class of citizens. He admits that they are justly spoken
against, and held in ill-repute, since they tend to weaken the laborer
both in body and in soul.[433] The artisans have no leisure to give
either to their friends or to the state, and in a warlike state the
citizens cannot be thus employed.[434] The artisan is also servile
because of his ignorance of the higher moral sentiments (τὰ καλὰ καὶ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια).[435] All this sounds like Plato, but Xenophon
differs, in that he is in no wise opposed to the unlimited development
of industry and commerce, provided the drudgery of it may be done by
non-citizens.
The principle of the division of labor is clearly stated by him, but
here again he differs from Plato in that his prime interest is practical
and economic rather than moral. He presents it as the reason why royal
dishes are superior in flavor to others, and makes the acute observation
that the division of labor is not so fully applied in the small city,
because there are not enough consumers to support a man in one trade. In
the large city, on the other hand, the consumers are so numerous that
even the trades themselves are divided and subdivided. Thus much greater
skill is developed, and better results realized, for he who spends his
time in work of the narrowest compass (βραχυτάτῳ) must accomplish this
in the best manner.[436] He does not specify the advantages of the
division of labor to industry, except that it results in greater skill,
but he reveals especial insight in stating so clearly the relation of
the market to the development of the principle.[437] In this, he is the
forerunner of Adam Smith, who observes that a minute division of trades
cannot exist except in the larger cities, especially in coast and river
towns.[438] The assertion of Haney,[439] that the Greeks referred only
to a “simple separation of employments,” is certainly unwarranted in the
light of this passage, for Xenophon expressly distinguishes here the
simple from the more complex subdivision. He says that some are employed
on men’s shoes, others on women’s; some do the sewing (νευρορραφῶν),
others do the cutting (σχίζων), and that the same also is true in the
manufacture of clothing.[440] This passage is also an evidence that the
development of industry in fourth-century Athens must have been
extensive. Xenophon also, like Plato, observed the fact that the
diversity in the natures of men is the basis for the division of
labor,[441] though he did not follow him in his doctrine that men and
women should have the same work.[442]
Unlike Plato, the idealist, Xenophon, the practical man of affairs,
takes the institution of slavery for granted, seemingly unconscious of
any ethical or economic problems involved.[443] However, as a matter of
common-sense, he advises that slaves be treated with consideration. He
would give them a proper degree of liberty,[444] and arouse them to do
their best[445] by a fair system of rewards and punishments. In the case
of those slaves who hold positions of trust, he advises that their
affections should be won by kindly treatment, and even by making them
sharers in the prosperity of the household.[446] Slavery is, of course,
a condition most irksome to the free-born. The unfortunate Eutheros
would almost prefer starvation.[447]
MONEY
In his treatise on the _Revenues of Athens_, Xenophon shows some
appreciation of the theory of money. He appears to take for granted that
money must have intrinsic value. At least, he understands that silver is
a commodity whose value is affected by its use as such, as well as by
its employment for currency.[448] He also apprehends the value of a
silver currency for international commerce.[449] His naïvely
enthusiastic argument for the indefinite increase of the stock of
silver, however, is suggestive of the mercantile fallacy, which
identified money with wealth.[450] But perhaps he is merely using for
practical purposes of argument the fact that the Athenians were
accustomed to look upon silver as the metal for fixed and constant
value.[451] In any event, he sees that the increase of silver must be
attended by a corresponding increase in business activity, if its value
is not to depreciate,[452] and he cannot be accused of the error of the
mercantilists, that a country is impoverished by the export of
money.[453] He must also have understood clearly the importance of
stability of value in a currency, since he deems it necessary to show
that the increased output of silver will not decrease its value, and
that silver is the least changeable of the monetary metals.[454] Despite
his enthusiasm for his thesis, which causes him to exaggerate the
stability of silver, he does not fail to grasp the direct effect of
supply and demand upon it,[455] just as upon gold[456] and other
commodities.[457] He shows also some understanding of the quantitative
theory of the relation between gold and silver.[458] It need hardly be
added that, in strong contrast to Plato, his attitude toward the
precious metals, especially silver, is very favorable.[459]
EXCHANGE
Xenophon presents no theory of exchange,[460] though he is frankly
interested in the advance of commerce and trade. In his opinion, the
greater their development, the better it is for the city of Athens.[461]
He is full of practical suggestions to stimulate commercial
activity.[462] So assured is he of the prime importance of extensive
commerce to a nation, that, in the spirit of modern commercialism, he
insists upon the necessity of peace for its sake.[463] To his mind,
increased trade means not only material advantage, but social and
political as well, in that greater prosperity, more labor, and a better
distribution will mean greater satisfaction, and hence less danger of
revolution in the state.[464] He entertains none of the prejudice of the
other Socratics against the money-makers’ art, a fact which may well be
a warning against the too ready acceptance of their attitude as the
usual verdict of the Athenian citizens.[465] In his practical
suggestions for the development of commerce there is a hint of the
protective principle. He advises that certain advantages be granted to
shipowners so as to induce them to increase their shipping.[466] But the
purpose is not to limit the advantage to Athenian merchantmen, nor to
restrict import trade. It is rather the opposite. He would enrich the
city by tribute on both imports and exports, imposed for sumptuary and
revenue purposes,[467] and would also develop a public merchant-marine
for rent to merchants, as a further source of income.[468]
POPULATION
In antithesis to Plato and Aristotle, the problem of population has no
difficulties for Xenophon. He does not deem it advisable to set a limit
on the population of the state. On the contrary, he conceives it as one
of the advantages of his plan in the _Revenues_, that thereby the city
would become very populous, and thus land about the mines would soon be
as valuable as that in the city itself.[469]
DISTRIBUTION
Xenophon is far less concerned about the problem of distribution than
Plato. He has no suggestions as to wages, profits, or prices, no ideal
state where an equitable distribution shall be realized, no yearnings
after equality, or complaints against the evils of extreme wealth or
poverty. Like Plato, he would avoid civic discord in the state,[470] but
by the increase of production and exchange rather than by their
limitation. In Socrates’ parable of the dog and the sheep, he presents a
suggestion of a theory of profits, but his plea is for the employer
instead of the laborer. The right of the former to share in the profits
of the business is based on his service as overseer of the work, and as
protector of the workmen.[471]
Our author does not definitely reveal his attitude toward the poorer
masses, but it seems probable that he had little interest in them,
except in so far as their condition might affect the fortunes of the
state. He was, of course, opposed to giving them full political
rights,[472] and would probably have preferred a system such as that in
Plato’s _Laws_, where all free citizens have sufficient income so that
they can give their time largely to the state, and where all laborers
are slaves. He did not think of suggesting that the poorer citizens work
in the mines, or even that aliens do so, but suggested rather that each
citizen have the income from three state slaves.[473]
While Xenophon is not usually considered among the socialists of Greece,
he approaches perhaps even nearer than Plato to one phase of modern
socialism. Like Plato, he opposes the extreme individualism of the
political and private life of his day.[474] He also reveals the Greek
feeling of the social obligation of private property.[475] Again, as do
Plato and modern socialists, he magnifies the power of law to transform
economic or social conditions.[476] But in advocating the modern
doctrine of the socialization of industry, with an economic, and not a
moral or political, motive, he has advanced beyond either Plato or
Aristotle, and approaches modern socialism.[477] As seen above, however,
his economic motive is not interest in the welfare of the masses, for by
his scheme they would all be slaves. He desires only to abolish poverty
among the citizens.[478] He would have the state become entrepreneur,
not merely in one, but in many branches of industry. State merchant
shipping,[479] public ownership of slaves,[480] public exploitation of
the mines,[481] public buildings near the mines, for rental to
strangers,[482] are all in his plan. The rich must finance the scheme,
but their profit will be 18, 36, or even 200 per cent.[483] Companies
are to be organized so as to obviate individual risk.[484] Thus will
poverty be no more, plenty for all will reign, and there will be an era
of prosperity and security for the state.[485]
His thesis is, in a word, that what private capital can accomplish for
the enrichment of itself alone, state capital can accomplish to better
advantage for the enrichment of the whole citizenship,[486] a doctrine
which strikes a truly modern socialistic note.
Footnote 375:
We shall not try to distinguish between the actual ideas of Xenophon
and those which he reports objectively as Socratic.
Footnote 376:
On the Xenophontine authorship of the _Revenues_, cf. Croiset, _op.
cit._, IV, 393 and notes; Christ, _Griechische Literatur-Geschichte_,
4th ed., pp. 367 f. and notes. Other authorities are cited there.
Footnote 377:
The οἰκονομικός, at least, the first extant, devoted to private
economy, and especially agriculture, but revealing practical interest
in the details of the production of wealth. Cf. _infra_ for further
discussion of _Economica_ in Greek literature.
Footnote 378:
For some qualifications, cf. above, Introduction.
Footnote 379:
_Econ._ i. 2: οἰκονόμου ἀγοθοῦ εἶναι οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον; cf. 3:
τὸν ἄλλου δὲ οἶκον. οἶκον is used of one’s entire property (5).
Footnote 380:
_Mem._ iii. 4. 6; cf. further above, p. 9, n. 4. Cf. Ruskin, _Pol.
Econ. of Art_, I, 12: “Precisely the same laws of economy, which apply
to the cultivation of a farm or an estate, apply to the cultivation of
a province or an island.” Cf. the story in Hdt. v. 29 on this idea.
Espinas (_Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII [1914], 111) contrasts
Xenophon, to whom the royal administration is a greatly expanded
private economy, with Plato’s absorption of all private economy by the
state.
Footnote 381:
_Econ._ i. 7-15; cf. 10: ταύτα ἄρα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμένῳ χρῆσθαι
αὐτῶν ἑκάστοισ χρήματα ἐστι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ οὐ χρήματα. Cf. p. 23
and notes on Plato and Ruskin. H. Sewall (“Theory of Value before Adam
Smith,” _Publications of the American Economic Association_, II, Part
III, p. 1) says that the conception of value (ἀξία) as a quality
inherent in the thing was not questioned, but Xenophon seems to
question it here. As she observes, n. 1, the term originally meant
“weight,” at first weight in money, as well as actual worth.
Footnote 382:
i. 11 f.
Footnote 383:
_Unto This Last_, beginning; cf. preceding n. 1; Ruskin took _Xen.
Econ._ as the foundation on which he built all his own economic
studies. Cf. _Unto This Last_, Pref., Vol. XVII, pp. xlix and 18; Vol.
XXXI, Introd.; pp. xv ff. It was the first in his _Bib. Pastorum_. Cf.
his Preface to his translation of the _Economicus_; _Arrows of the
Chace_, Vol. XXXIV, 547; _Letters_, II (Vol. XXXVII, 350). In _Mun.
Pul._, IV, 105 (Vol. XVII, 230); also on pp. 288 and 88, he refers to
Xenophon’s “faultless” definition of wealth, citing _Mem._ ii. 3. 7.
Cf. also Vol. XXXI, pp. xvii and 27. Fontpertuis (“Filiation des idées
économiques dans l’antiquité,” _Jour. des écon._, September, 1871, p.
361) thinks this is at bottom the true theory of value.
Footnote 384:
_Econ._ i. 2: ἀποδιδομένοις μὲν οἱ αὐλοὶ χρήματα, μὴ αποδιδομένοις δὲ
ἀλλὰ κεκτημένοις οὔ, τοῖς μὴ ἐπισταμένοις αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι. Brants
(_Xen. Econ._, p. 8) overemphasizes this.
Footnote 385:
_Rev._ iv. 6-10, a remarkable passage, though he fails to include
silver in the law. Cf. Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 129; Kaulla, _Die
geschichtliche Entwickelung der modernen Werttheorien_, p. 2.
Footnote 386:
Especially in the story of Isomachus (_Econ._), and the _Revenues_.
Footnote 387:
Cf. _infra_; also Espinas, _Histoire des doctrines economiques_, p.
20.
Footnote 388:
_Econ._ vi. 4; cf. i. 7 ff., cited above, p. 64, n. 1.
Footnote 389:
P. 64 and notes. Büchsenschütz (_Besitz und Erwerb_, p. 15) criticizes
it as too broad, including spiritual goods; too narrow, including only
what one can use.
Footnote 390:
In _Econ._ ii. 2-8, Socrates’ comparison of himself with the wealthy
Critoboulos; _Hiero_ iv. 6-10; _Mem._ iv. 2. 37 f.; i. 6. 1-10, where
Socrates defends his own simple life, especially 10: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐνόμιζον
τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι. If meant in the economic sense,
this would approach a definition of capital, as “excess of goods over
needs.”
Footnote 391:
Cf. p. 25, n. 11, on the similar modern doctrine.
Footnote 392:
_Symp._ iii. 8 and iv. 34-44, given as the doctrine of Antisthenes,
the Cynic, though with apparent approval; _Mem._ iv. 2. 9.
Footnote 393:
_Econ._ xi. 9.
Footnote 394:
_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 23.
Footnote 395:
_Mem._ ii. 7. 7; _Rev._ iv. 29.
Footnote 396:
Thuc. vii. 6. 2, of walls; _Gorg._ 449D, ἱματίων; _Theaet._ 146D,
ὑποδημάτων; Xen. _Econ._ vii. 21, ἐσθῆτος.
Footnote 397:
Hdt. i. 68; _Charm._ 173E; Thuc. iv. 105.
Footnote 398:
Ar. _Frogs_ 1034; Isoc. _Areop._ 30.
Footnote 399:
Isoc. _Areop._, 146_d_, cited _infra_ on the terms for capital; _Ad
Nicocl._ 18C.
Footnote 400:
_Mem._ iii. 10. 1; Dem. xxxiii. 4.
Footnote 401:
_C.I.A._ 3924: ἡ ἐργασία τῶν βαφέων.
Footnote 402:
Ar. _N. Eth._ vi. 4. 2 ff.
Footnote 403:
_Op. cit._, 1st ed., p. 55.
Footnote 404:
_Econ._, especially chaps. v-vii; iv. 4; _Mem._ ii. 1. 6; _Econ._ v.
17: εὒ μὲν γὰρ φερομένης τῆς γεωργίας ἔρρωνται καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι
ἄπασαι, ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ ἡ γῆ χερσεύειν, ἀποσβέννυνται καὶ αἱ
ἄλλαι τέχναι σχεδόν τι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, a very true
statement, which does not belittle other industries.
Footnote 405:
_Ibid._ v. 2; iii. 15. 11, 16; _Rev._ i. 2 ff., etc.
Footnote 406:
_Pol._ i. 8 and 9.
Footnote 407:
_Mem._ ii. 7. 13 f., from Socrates. Cf. _infra_ under distribution, on
this.
Footnote 408:
_Rev._ iv. 5-7; Cossa, _op. cit._, p. 148; Kautz, _Histoire des
doctrines économiques_, p. 127; Fontpertuis, _op. cit._, p. 367.
Footnote 409:
_Econ._ v. 17, cited on p. 66, n. 11, perhaps the strongest statement
of the economic importance of agriculture in Greek writers. Ruskin
follows Xenophon in his high appreciation of agriculture. He thinks it
should be largely done by the upper classes (_Mun. Pul._, 109 [Vol.
XVII, 235]); cf. also Vol. VII, 341, 429; Vol. X, 201.
Footnote 410:
_Econ._ iv. 4; cf. _Rev._ v. and _Cyrop._ iii. 2. 17, which favor
peace for the sake of economic advance.
Footnote 411:
_Econ._ iv. 8 to end of chapter, especially 21.
Footnote 412:
_Econ._, v. 1; 2-16; vi. 9-10; cf. Fontpertuis, _op. cit._, pp. 362 f.
Footnote 413:
_Econ._ vi. 8.
Footnote 414:
Cf. _Revenues_.
Footnote 415:
_Econ._ ii. 10, περιουσίαν. Brants thinks (_Xen. Econ._, p. 13) that
the theory is implied in his principle of sparing (_Mem._ ii. 7).
Blanqui (_op. cit._, I, 81) emphasizes _Econ._ i. 7-15 as defining
productive and unproductive wealth, but this merely distinguishes
wealth from non-wealth, from the standpoint of consumption.
Footnote 416:
_Mem._ ii. 7. 11 f.
Footnote 417:
Thuc. i. 90. 2.
Footnote 418:
Cf. n. 1, although Liddell and Scott cite the passage as having the
meaning of “capital”; _Mem._ iii. 12. 4, where it need mean no more
than wealth; _Econ._ i. 1. 16; Dem. xxxvi. 54: πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν
ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν. Here πίστις is almost called capital.
Cf. p. 106, n. 3.
Footnote 419:
Dem. xxxvi. 11: καίτοι εἰ ἢν ἰδία τις ἀφορμὴ τουτῳῖ πρὸς τῇ τραπέζῃ;
xiv. 36; Lysias fr. 2. 2, p. 343, ed. Thalheim; _Rev._ iii. 9 and 12
and iv. 34 are also used of large financial undertakings; cf.
Harpocration’s definition; ὅταν τις ἀργύριον δῷ ἐνθήκην, ἀφορμὴ
καλεῖται ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς; for the term in Ar. _Pol._ vi.
1320_a_35-1320_b_17 cf. _infra_. Cf. Isoc. _Areop._ 146_d_ for a
similar passage.
Footnote 420:
Dem. xxvii. 8 and 13.
Footnote 421:
Ar. _Rhet._ i. 5. 7.
Footnote 422:
Laughlin, ed., 1907, pp. 66 and 93.
Footnote 423:
Ar. _Pol._ 1254_a_1 ff.; cf. _infra_ on Aristotle (“Production”);
pseudo-Ar. _Econ._ ii. 1346_b_14.
Footnote 424:
Plato _Laws_ 742C; Dem. xxvii. 75.
Footnote 425:
Lycurg., p. 150, 22: τοὺς ἐράνους διενεγκεῖν; Dem. xxi. 184 f.; cf.
Dem. lix. 8 for the interesting figurative use, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον
ἀποδοῦναι, “to pay him in his own coin”; also Lycurg., p. 168, 143.
Footnote 426:
_Mem._ iii. 9. 14 f.; cf. Brants, _Xen. Econ._, p. 10, for passages on
Xenophon’s attitude to labor.
Footnote 427:
_Mem._ ii 7. 7 f. Guiraud (_La Main-d’œuvre indust._, p. 46) thinks
that this passage is a good commentary on Pericles’ oration (Thuc.
ii). Both see in labor, not an inevitable evil, but a good. Guiraud
holds that this was the general attitude in Athens. Cf. this chapter,
pp. 36-50, on “Opinions des Grecs sur le travail.”
Footnote 428:
_Mem._ ii. 8. 1-5.
Footnote 429:
ii. 1. 20.
Footnote 430:
Cf. Döring, _Die Lehre des Socrates als soziales Reform-System_, pp.
387 ff.
Footnote 431:
_Rev._, especially i. 2 ff. and iv; _Econ._ v. 2; iii. 15; ii. 16;
Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 126. But cf., on the other hand, Xen. _Laced.
Pol._ on the restrictions in Sparta against acquisition of wealth by
trade and arts; cf. also (Xen.). _Rep. Ath._ ii. 11 ff.
Footnote 432:
_Rev._ iv. 51.
Footnote 433:
_Econ._ iv. 2; vi. 5-7; agriculture and war are not included.
Footnote 434:
iv. 3.
Footnote 435:
_Mem._ iv. 2. 22.
Footnote 436:
_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 5 f.; cf. also ii. 1. 21, of military labor.
Footnote 437:
Cf. p. 70.
Footnote 438:
_Op. cit._, I, iii.
Footnote 439:
_Op. cit._, p. 40; cf. also Dühring, _Kritische Geschichte der
Nationalökonomie und des Socialismus_, p. 22.
Footnote 440:
_Cyrop._ viii. 2. 5 f., cited above.
Footnote 441:
_Mem._ iii. 9. 3.
Footnote 442:
_Econ._ viii.
Footnote 443:
_Econ._ iii. 4; v. 16; ix. 11; xiii; _Rev._ iv. 17 ff.
Footnote 444:
_Econ._ iii. 4.
Footnote 445:
v. 16; xiii.
Footnote 446:
_Econ._ ix. 11; cf. p. 38, n. 4, on the actual status of slaves at
Athens.
Footnote 447:
_Mem._ ii. 8. 4.
Footnote 448:
_Rev._ iii. 2: ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτὸ, πανταχοῦ πλεῖον τοῦ ἀρχαίου
λαμβάνουσιν.
Footnote 449:
_Ibid._; cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, p. 114.
Footnote 450:
_Rev._ iv, especially 7-12; Haney (_op. cit._, chap. iv) and Simey
(“Economic Theory among the Greeks and Romans,” _Economic Review_,
October, 1900, p. 472) point to _Rev._ iii. 2 as distinguishing
between money and wealth, but this hardly balances the above passage.
_Econ._ i. 12-14 means merely that silver is not wealth unless
properly used.
Footnote 451:
So Brants, _Xen. Econ._, p. 21; cf. Lenormant _é La Monnaie dans
l’antiquité_, I, 179; III, 3.
Footnote 452:
_Rev._ iv. 8.
Footnote 453:
_Rev._ iii. 4; v. 3; iii. 2; cf. Ingram, _History of Political
Economy_, p. 15; Kautz, _op. cit._, p. 129; Roscher, p. 12.
Footnote 454:
_Rev._ iv. 5-11.
Footnote 455:
iii. 2; and iv. The demand will increase with the supply.
Footnote 456:
iv. 10: χρυσίον ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῇ, αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ
δὲ ἀργύριον τιμιώτερον ποιεῖ.
Footnote 457:
iv. 5-7.
Footnote 458:
iv. 10.
Footnote 459:
iv, especially 7-9, 11; he has no word against them. _Lac. Pol._ vii
shows that he favors their free use.
Footnote 460:
Brants (_Xen. Econ._, pp. 17 f.) says that he grasped both bases of
exchange, division of labor, and natural diversity of products, but he
bases it on _Rep. Ath._ ii. 12. 3.
Footnote 461:
_Rev._ iii., especially 5; _Hiero_ ix. 9; ἐμπόρια ὠφέλει πόλιν.
Footnote 462:
iii. 3. 4. 12 f.
Footnote 463:
iii. 4; v-vi.
Footnote 464:
vi. 1.
Footnote 465:
_Econ._ ii. 18: χρηματιστής; cf. iii, where Socrates teaches the art.
Cf. above, p. 17, on the Sophists’ attitude.
Footnote 466:
_Rev._ iii. 4.
Footnote 467:
iii. 5.
Footnote 468:
iii. 14.
Footnote 469:
iv. 50.
Footnote 470:
_Rev._ vi. 1.
Footnote 471:
_Mem._ ii. 7. 12-14. Poehlmann’s attempt to turn the argument about,
so as to favor the laborer, is strained (_op. cit._, I, 288), though
the passage may be a sidelight on the economic conditions in early
fourth-century Athens. Cf. _Mem._ ii. 8. 4-5, where, as Poehlmann
(_op. cit._, I, 286 f.) points out, the free laborer was coming to
feel himself to be on the same status with the slave.
Footnote 472:
Cf. e.g., his opposition to the free democracy of Athens, for evidence
of which we do not need to depend upon the _Ath. Pol._
Footnote 473:
_Rev._ iv. 17; cf. p. 70; but p. 69 might point the other way.
Footnote 474:
_Mem._ iv. 4. 16; ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὐτ᾽ ἂν πόλις εῦ πολιτευθείν οὐτ᾽
οἶκος καλῶς, οἰκηθείν.
Footnote 475:
_Econ._ xi. 9, 13.
Footnote 476:
Cf. how naïvely he takes for granted the feasibility of his schemes in
the _Revenues_. Cf. the opening sentence of the work, “As are the
governors [προστάται], so are the governments [πολιτείας]” cited by
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 299) as the illusion of socialism; but it
might easily be expressed by a conservative. Plato (_Rep._ 544D)
expresses a similar idea.
Footnote 477:
_Rev._ iii and iv.
Footnote 478:
iv. 33. The mines were already publicly owned, for the most part, but
they were privately worked. Cf. Ardaillon, _Les Mines du Laurion dans
l’antiquité_ (Paris, 1897).
Footnote 479:
iii. 14.
Footnote 480:
iv. 17.
Footnote 481:
iv.
Footnote 482:
iv. 49.
Footnote 483:
iii. 9 f.
Footnote 484:
iv. 30-32.
Footnote 485:
iv. 33; 49-52; vi. 1. Cf. the excellent résumé of the whole plan by
Poehlmann (_op. cit._, I, 299 ff.), though he reads into it too much
of the modern socialistic spirit; e.g., 306-8, he makes it an example
of the so-called psychological necessity by which socialism develops
out of capitalism.
Footnote 486:
Cf. especially iv. 14: τῆς μέντοι πόλεως πάνυ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τὸ
αἰσθανομένην πολλοὺς πλουτιζομένους ἕξ αὐτῆς ἰδιώτας μὴ μιμεῖσθαι
τούτους.