CHAPTER VII

PAGAN CUSTOM AND BARBARIAN GENIUS INFUSED INTO CHRISTIANITY

[Sidenote: Need of paganising Christianity.]

The western intellect, in order to accept the gospel, had to sublimate

it into a neo-Platonic system of metaphysics. In like manner the western

heart had to render Christianity congenial and adequate by a rich

infusion of pagan custom and sentiment. This adaptation was more gentle

and facile than might be supposed. We are too much inclined to impute an

abstract and ideal Christianity to the polyglot souls of early

Christians, and to ignore that mysterious and miraculous side of later

paganism from which Christian cultus and ritual are chiefly derived. In

the third century Christianity and devout paganism were, in a religious

sense, closely akin; each differed much less from the other than from

that religion which at other epochs had borne or should bear its own

name. Had Julian the Apostate succeeded in his enterprise he would not

have rescued anything which the admirers of classic paganism could at

all rejoice in; a disciple of Iamblichus could not but plunge headlong

into the same sea of superstition and dialectic which had submerged

Christianity. In both parties ethics were irrational and morals corrupt.

The political and humane religion of antiquity had disappeared, and the

question between Christians and pagans amounted simply to a choice of

fanaticisms. Reason had suffered a general eclipse, but civilisation,

although decayed, still subsisted, and a certain scholastic discipline,

a certain speculative habit, and many an ancient religious usage

remained in the world. The people could change their gods, but not the

spirit in which they worshipped them. Christianity had insinuated itself

almost unobserved into a society full of rooted traditions. The first

disciples had been disinherited Jews, with religious habits which men of

other races and interests could never have adopted intelligently; the

Church was accordingly wise enough to perpetuate in its practice at

least an indispensable minimum of popular paganism. How considerable

this minimum was a glance at Catholic piety will suffice to convince us.

[Sidenote: Catholic piety more human than the liturgy.]

The Græco-Jewish system of theology constructed by the Fathers had its

liturgical counterpart in the sacraments and in a devout eloquence which

may be represented to us fairly enough by the Roman missal and breviary.

This liturgy, transfused as it is with pagan philosophy and removed

thereby from the Oriental directness and formlessness of the Bible,

keeps for the most part its theological and patristic tone. Psalms

abound, Virgin, and saints are barely mentioned, a certain universalism

and concentration of thought upon the Redemption and its speculative

meaning pervades the Latin ritual sung behind the altar-rails. But any

one who enters a Catholic church with an intelligent interpreter will at

once perceive the immense distance which separates that official and

impersonal ritual from the daily prayers and practices of Catholic

people. The latter refer to the real exigences of daily life and serve

to express or reorganise personal passions. While mass is being

celebrated the old woman will tell her beads, lost in a vague rumination

over her own troubles; while the priests chant something unintelligible

about Abraham or Nebuchadnezzar, the housewife will light her

wax-candles, duly blessed for the occasion, before Saint Barbara, to be

protected thereby from the lightning; and while the preacher is

repeating, by rote, dialectical subtleties about the union of the two

natures in Christ’s person, a listener’s fancy may float sadly over the

mystery of love and of life, and (being himself without resources in the

premises) he may order a mass to be said for the repose of some departed

soul.

In a Catholic country, every spot and every man has a particular patron.

These patrons are sometimes local worthies, canonised by tradition or by

the Roman see, but no less often they are simply local appellations of

Christ or the Virgin, appellations which are known theoretically to

refer all to the same _numen_, but which practically possess diverse

religious values; for the miracles and intercessions attributed to the

Virgin under one title are far from being miracles and intercessions

attributable to her under another. He who has been all his life devout

to Loreto will not place any special reliance on the Pillar at

Saragossa. A bereaved mother will not fly to the Immaculate Conception

for comfort, but of course to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. Each

religious order and all the laity more or less affiliated to it will

cultivate special saints and special mysteries. There are also

particular places and days on which graces are granted, as not on

others, and the quantity of such graces is measurable by canonic

standards. So many days of remitted penance correspond to a work of a

certain merit, for there is a celestial currency in which mulcts and

remissions may be accurately summed and subtracted by angelic recorders.

One man’s spiritual earnings may by gift be attributed and imputed to

another, a belief which may seem arbitrary and superstitious but which

is really a natural corollary to fundamental doctrines like the

atonement, the communion of saints, and intercession for the dead and

living.

[Sidenote: Natural pieties.]

Another phase of the same natural religion is seen in frequent

festivals, in the consecration of buildings, ships, fields, labours, and

seasons; in intercessions by the greater dead for the living and by the

living for the lesser dead—a perfect survival of heroes and penates on

the one hand and of pagan funeral rites and commemorations on the

other. Add Lent with its carnival, ember-days, all saints’ and all

souls’, Christmas with its magi or its Saint Nicholas, Saint Agnes’s and

Saint Valentine’s days with their profane associations, a saint for

finding lost objects and another for prospering amourettes, since all

great and tragic loves have their inevitable patrons in Christ and the

Virgin, in Mary Magdalene, and in the mystics innumerable. This, with

what more could easily be rehearsed, makes a complete paganism within

Christian tradition, a paganism for which little basis can be found in

the gospel, the mass, the breviary, or the theologians.

Yet these accretions were as well authenticated as the substructure, for

they rested on human nature. To feel, for instance, the special efficacy

of your village Virgin or of the miraculous Christ whose hermitage is

perched on the overhanging hill, is a genuine experience. The principle

of it is clear and simple. Those shrines, those images, the festivals

associated with them, have entered your mind together with your earliest

feelings. Your first glimpses of mortal vicissitudes have coincided with

the awe and glitter of sacramental moments in which those _numina_ were

invoked; and on that deeper level of experience, in those lower reaches

of irrationalism in which such impressions lie, they constitute a mystic

resource subsisting beneath all conventions and overt knowledge. When

the doctors blunder—as they commonly do—the saints may find a cure;

after all, the saints’ success in medicine seems to a crude empiricism

almost as probable as the physicians’. Special and local patrons are the

original gods, and whatever religious value speculative and cosmic

deities retain they retain surreptitiously, by virtue of those very

bonds with human interests and passionate desires which ancestral demons

once borrowed from the hearth they guarded, the mountain they haunted,

or the sacrifice they inhaled with pleasure, until their hearts softened

toward their worshippers. In itself, and as a minimised and retreating

theology represents it, a universal power has no specific energy, no

determinate interest at heart; there is nothing friendly about it nor

allied to your private necessities; no links of place and time fortify

and define its influence. Nor is it rational to appeal for a mitigation

of evils or for assistance against them to the very being that has

decreed and is inflicting them for some fixed purpose of its own.

[Sidenote: Refuge taken in the supernatural.]

Paganism or natural religion was at first, like so many crude religious

notions, optimistic and material; the worshipper expected his piety to

make his pot boil, to cure his disease, to prosper his battles, and to

render harmless his ignorance of the world in which he lived. But such

faith ran up immediately against the facts; it was discountenanced at

every turn by experience and reflection. The whole of nature and life,

when they are understood at all, have to be understood on an opposite

principle, on the principle that fate, having naturally furnished us

with a determinate will and a determinate endowment, gives us a free

field and no favour in a natural world. Hence the retreat of religion to

the supernatural, a region to which in its cruder forms it was far from

belonging. Now this retreat, in the case of classic paganism, took place

with the decay of military and political life and would have produced an

ascetic popular system, some compound of Oriental and Greek traditions,

even if Christianity had not intervened at that juncture and opportunely

pre-empted the ground.

[Sidenote: The episodes of life consecrated mystically.]

Christianity, as we have seen, had elements in it which gave it a

decisive advantage; its outlook was historical, not cosmic, and

consequently admitted a non-natural future for the individual and for

the Church; it was anti-political and looked for progress only in that

region in which progress was at that time possible, in the private soul;

it was democratic, feminine, and unworldly; its Oriental deity and

prophets had a primitive simplicity and pathos not found in pagan heroes

or polite metaphysical entities; its obscure Hebrew poetry opened, like

music, an infinite field for brooding fancy and presumption. The

consequence was a doubling of the world, so that every Christian led a

dual existence, one full of trouble and vanity on earth, which it was

piety in him to despise and neglect, another full of hope and

consolation in a region parallel to earth and directly above it, every

part of which corresponded to something in earthly life and could be

reached, so to speak, by a Jacob’s ladder upon which aspiration and

grace ascended and descended continually. Birth had its sacramental

consecration to the supernatural in baptism, growth in confirmation,

self-consciousness in confession, puberty in communion, effort in

prayer, defeat in sacrifice, sin in penance, speculation in revealed

wisdom, art in worship, natural kindness in charity, poverty in

humility, death in self-surrender and resurrection. When the mind grew

tired of contemplation the lips could still echo some pious petition,

keeping the body’s attitude and habit expressive of humility and

propitious to receiving grace; and when the knees and lips were

themselves weary, a candle might be left burning before the altar, to

witness that the desire momentarily forgotten was not extinguished in

the heart. Through prayer and religious works the absent could be

reached and the dead helped on their journey, and amid earthly

estrangements and injustices there always remained the church open to

all and the society of heaven.

[Sidenote: Paganism chastened, Hebraism liberalised.]

Nothing is accordingly more patent than that Christianity was paganised

by the early Church; indeed, the creation of the Church was itself what

to a Hebraising mind must seem a corruption, namely, a mixing of pagan

philosophy and ritual with the Gospel. But this sort of constitutive

corruption would more properly be called an adaptation, an absorption,

or even a civilisation of Hebraism; for by this marriage with paganism

Christianity fitted itself to live and work in the civilised world. By

this corruption it was completed and immensely improved, like

Anglo-Saxon by its corruption through French and Latin; for it is always

an improvement in religion, whose business is to express and inspire

spiritual sentiment, that it should learn to express and inspire that

sentiment more generously. Paganism was nearer than Hebraism to the Life

of Reason because its myths were more transparent and its temper less

fanatical; and so a paganised Christianity approached more closely that

ideality which constitutes religious truth than a bare and intense

Hebraism, in its hostility to human genius, could ever have done if

isolated and unqualified.

[Sidenote: The system post-rational and founded on despair.]

The Christianity which the pagans adopted, in becoming itself pagan,

remained a religion natural to their country and their heart. It

constituted a paganism expressive of their later and calamitous

experience, a paganism acquainted with sorrow, a religion that had

passed through both civilisation and despair, and had been reduced to

translating the eclipsed values of life into supernatural symbols. It

became a post-rational religion. Of course, to understand such a system

it is necessary to possess the faculties it exercises and the experience

it represents. Where life has not reached the level of reflection,

religion and philosophy must both be pre-rational; they must remain

crudely experimental, unconscious of the limits of excellence and life.

Under such circumstances it is obviously impossible that religion should

be reconstituted on a supernatural plane, or should learn to express

experience rather than impulse. Now the Christianity of the gospels was

itself post-rational; it had turned its back on the world. In this

respect the mixture with paganism altered nothing; it merely reinforced

the spiritualised and lyric despair of the Hebrews with the personal and

metaphysical despair of the Romans and Greeks. For all the later classic

philosophy—Stoic, Sceptic, or Epicurean—was founded on despair and was

post-rational. Pagan Christianity, or Catholicism, may accordingly be

said to consist of two elements: first, the genius of paganism, the

faculty of expressing spiritual experience in myth and external symbol,

and, second, the experience of disillusion, forcing that pagan

imagination to take wing from earth and to decorate no longer the

political and material circumstances of life, but rather to remove

beyond the clouds and constitute its realm of spirit beyond the veil of

time and nature, in a posthumous and metaphysical sphere. A mythical

economy abounding in points of attachment to human experience and in

genial interpretations of life, yet lifted beyond visible nature and

filling a reported world, a world believed in on hearsay or, as it is

called, on faith—that is Catholicism.

When this religion was established in the Roman Empire, that empire was

itself threatened by the barbarians who soon permeated and occupied it

and made a new and unhappy beginning to European history. They adopted

Christianity, not because it represented their religious needs or

inspiration, but because it formed part of a culture and a social

organisation the influence of which they had not, in their simplicity,

the means to withstand. During several ages they could only modify by

their misunderstandings and inertia arts wholly new to their lives.

[Sidenote: External conversion of the barbarians.]

What sort of religion these barbarians may previously have had is beyond

our accurate knowledge. They handed down a mythology not radically

different from the Græco-Roman, though more vaguely and grotesquely

conceived; and they recognised tribal duties and glories from which

religious sanctions could hardly have been absent. But a barbarian mind,

like a child’s, is easy to convert and to people with what stories you

will. The Northmen drank in with pleased astonishment what the monks

told them about hell and heaven, God the Father and God the Son, the

Virgin and the beautiful angels; they accepted the sacraments with vague

docility; they showed a qualified respect, often broken upon, it is

true, by instinctive rebellions, for a clergy which after all

represented whatever vestiges of learning, benevolence, or art still

lingered in the world. But this easy and boasted conversion was fanciful

only and skin-deep. A non-Christian ethics of valour and honour, a

non-Christian fund of superstition, legend, and sentiment, subsisted

always among mediæval peoples. Their soul, so largely inarticulate,

might be overlaid with churchly habits and imprisoned for the moment in

the panoply of patristic dogma; but pagan Christianity always remained a

religion foreign to them, accepted only while their minds continued in a

state of helpless tutelage. Such a foreign religion could never be

understood by them in its genuine motives and spirit. They were without

the experience and the plastic imagination which had given it birth. It

might catch them unawares and prevail over them for a time, but even

during that period it could not root out from barbarian souls anything

opposed to it which subsisted there. It was thus that the Roman Church

hatched the duck’s egg of Protestantism.

[Sidenote: Expression of the northern genius within Catholicism.]

In its native seats the Catholic system prompts among those who inwardly

reject it satire and indifference rather than heresy, because on the

whole it expresses well enough the religious instincts of the people.

Only those strenuously oppose it who hate religion itself. But among

converted barbarians the case was naturally different, and opposition to

the Church came most vehemently from certain religious natures whose

instincts it outraged or left unsatisfied. Even before heresy burst

forth this religious restlessness found vent in many directions. It

endowed Christianity with several beautiful but insidious gifts, several

incongruous though well-meant forms of expression. Among these we may

count Gothic art, chivalrous sentiment, and even scholastic philosophy.

These things came, as we know, ostensibly to serve Christianity, which

has learned to regard them as its own emanations. But in truth they

barbarised Christianity just as Greek philosophy and worship and Roman

habits of administration had paganised it in the beginning. And

barbarised Christianity, even before it became heretical, was something

new, something very different in temper and beauty from the pagan

Christianity of the South and East.

In the Catholicism of the Middle Ages, as it flourished in the North,

the barbarian soul, apprenticed to monkish masters, appeared in all its

childlike trust, originality, and humour. There was something touching

and grotesque about it. We seem to see a child playing with the toys of

age, his green hopes and fancies weaving themselves about an antique

metaphysical monument, the sanctuary of a decrepit world. The structure

of that monument was at first not affected, and even when it had been

undermined and partially ruined, its style could not be transformed,

but, clad in its northern ivy, it wore at once a new aspect. To races

without experience—that is, without cumulative traditions or a visible

past—Christianity could be nothing but a fairy story and a gratuitous

hope, as if they had been told about the Sultan of Timbuctoo and

promised that they should some day ride on his winged Arabian horses.

The tragic meaning of the Christian faith, its immense renunciation of

all things earthly and the merely metaphysical glory of its transfigured

life, commonly escaped their apprehension, as it still continues to do.

They listened open-mouthed to the missionary and accepted his

asseverations with unsuspecting emotion, like the Anglo-Saxon king who

likened the soul to a bird flying in and out of a tent at night, about

whose further fortunes any account would be interesting to hear. A seed

planted in such a virgin and uncultivated soil must needs bring forth

fruit of a new savour.

[Sidenote: Internal discrepancies between the two.]

In northern Christianity a fresh quality of brooding tenderness

prevailed over the tragic passion elsewhere characteristic of Catholic

devotion. Intricacy was substituted for dignity and poetry for rhetoric;

the basilica became an abbey and the hermitage a school. The feudal ages

were a wonderful seed-time in a world all gaunt with ruins. Horrors were

there mingled with delicacies and confusion with idyllic peace. It was

here a poet’s childhood passed amid the crash of war, there an

alchemist’s old age flickering away amid cobwebs and gibberish.

Something jocund and mischievous peeped out even in the cloister;

gargoyles leered from the belfry, while ivy and holly grew about the

cross. The Middle Ages were the true renaissance. Their Christianity was

the theme, the occasion, the excuse for their art and jollity, their

curiosity and tenderness; it was far from being the source of those

delightful inventions. The Crusades were not inspired by the Prince of

Peace, to whose honour they were fancifully and passionately dedicated;

so chivalry, Gothic architecture, and scholastic philosophy were profane

expressions of a self-discovering genius in a people incidentally

Christian. The barbarians had indeed been indoctrinated, they had been

introduced into an alien spiritual and historic medium, but they had not

been made over or inwardly tamed. It had perhaps been rendered easier

for them, by contact with an existing or remembered civilisation, to

mature their own genius, even in the act of confusing its expression

through foreign accretions. They had been thereby stimulated to civilise

themselves and encouraged also to believe themselves civilised somewhat

prematurely, when they had become heirs merely to the titles and

trappings of civilisation.

The process of finding their own art and polity, begun under foreign

guidance, was bound on the whole to diverge more and more from its Latin

model. It consisted now of imitation, now of revulsion and fanciful

originality; never was a race so much under the sway of fashions.

Fashion is something barbarous, for it produces innovation without

reason and imitation without benefit. It marks very clearly that margin

of irresponsible variation in manners and thoughts which among a people

artificially civilised may so easily be larger than the solid core. It

is characteristic of occidental society in mediæval and modern times,

because this society is led by people who, being educated in a foreign

culture, remain barbarians at heart. To this day we have not achieved a

really native civilisation. Our art, morals, and religion, though deeply

dyed in native feeling, are still only definable and, indeed,

conceivable by reference to classic and alien standards. Among the

northern races culture is even more artificial and superinduced than

among the southern; whence the strange phenomenon of snobbery in

society, affectation in art, and a violent contrast between the educated

and the uneducated, the rich and the poor, classes that live on

different intellectual planes and often have different religions. Some

educated persons, accordingly, are merely students and imbibers; they

sit at the feet of a past which, not being really theirs, can produce no

fruit in them but sentimentality. Others are merely _protestants_; they

are active in the moral sphere only by virtue of an inward rebellion

against something greater and overshadowing, yet repulsive and alien.

They are conscious truants from a foreign school of life.

[Sidenote: Tradition and instinct at odds in Protestantism.]

In the Protestant religion it is necessary to distinguish inner

inspiration from historical entanglements. Unfortunately, as the whole

doctrinal form of this religion is irrelevant to its spirit and imposed

from without, being due to the step-motherly nurture it received from

the Church, we can reach a conception of its inner spirit only by

studying its tendency and laws of change or its incidental expression in

literature and custom. Yet these indirect symptoms are so striking that

even an outsider, if at all observant, need not fear to misinterpret

them. Taken externally, Protestantism is, of course, a form of

Christianity; it retains the Bible and a more or less copious selection

of patristic doctrines. But in its spirit and inward inspiration it is

something quite as independent of Judea as of Rome. It is simply the

natural religion of the Teutons raising its head above the flood of

Roman and Judean influences. Its character may be indicated by saying

that it is a religion of pure spontaneity, of emotional freedom, deeply

respecting itself but scarcely deciphering its purposes. It is the

self-consciousness of a spirit in process of incubation, jealous of its

potentialities, averse to definitions and finalities of any kind because

it can itself discern nothing fixed or final. It is adventurous and

puzzled by the world, full of rudimentary virtues and clear fire,

energetic, faithful, rebellious to experience, inexpert in all matters

of art and mind. It boasts, not without cause, of its depth and purity;

but this depth and purity are those of any formless and primordial

substance. It keeps unsullied that antecedent integrity which is at the

bottom of every living thing and at its core; it is not acquainted with

that ulterior integrity, that sanctity, which might be attained at the

summit of experience through reason and speculative dominion. It

accordingly mistakes vitality, both in itself and in the universe, for

spiritual life.

[Sidenote: The Protestant spirit remote from that of the gospel.]

This underlying Teutonic religion, which we must call Protestantism for

lack of a better name, is anterior to Christianity and can survive it.

To identify it with the Gospel may have seemed possible so long as, in

opposition to pagan Christianity, the Teutonic spirit could appeal to

the Gospel for support. The Gospel has indeed nothing pagan about it,

but it has also nothing Teutonic; and the momentary alliance of two such

disparate forces must naturally cease with the removal of the common

enemy which alone united them. The Gospel is unworldly, disenchanted,

ascetic; it treats ecclesiastical establishments with tolerant contempt,

conforming to them with indifference; it regards prosperity as a danger,

earthly ties as a burden, Sabbaths as a superstition; it revels in

miracles; it is democratic and antinomian; it loves contemplation,

poverty, and solitude; it meets sinners with sympathy and heartfelt

forgiveness, but Pharisees and Puritans with biting scorn. In a word, it

is a product of the Orient, where all things are old and equal and a

profound indifference to the business of earth breeds a silent dignity

and high sadness in the spirit. Protestantism is the exact opposite of

all this. It is convinced of the importance of success and prosperity;

it abominates what is disreputable; contemplation seems to it idleness,

solitude selfishness, and poverty a sort of dishonourable punishment. It

is constrained and punctilious in righteousness; it regards a married

and industrious life as typically godly, and there is a sacredness to

it, as of a vacant Sabbath, in the unoccupied higher spaces which such

an existence leaves for the soul. It is sentimental, its ritual is

meagre and unctuous, it expects no miracles, it thinks optimism akin to

piety, and regards profitable enterprise and practical ambition as a

sort of moral vocation. Its Evangelicalism lacks the notes, so prominent

in the gospel, of disillusion, humility, and speculative detachment. Its

benevolence is optimistic and aims at raising men to a conventional

well-being; it thus misses the inner appeal of Christian charity which,

being merely remedial in physical matters, begins by renunciation and

looks to spiritual freedom and peace.

Protestantism was therefore attached from the first to the Old

Testament, in which Hebrew fervour appears in its worldly and

pre-rational form. It is not democratic in the same sense as

post-rational religions, which see in the soul an exile from some other

sphere wearing for the moment, perhaps, a beggar’s disguise: it is

democratic only in the sense of having a popular origin and bending

easily to popular forces. Swayed as it is by public opinion, it is

necessarily conventional in its conception of duty and earnestly

materialistic; for the meaning of the word vanity never crosses the

vulgar heart. In fine, it is the religion of a race young, wistful, and

adventurous, feeling its latent potentialities, vaguely assured of an

earthly vocation, and possessing, like the barbarian and the healthy

child, pure but unchastened energies. Thus in the Protestant religion

the faith natural to barbarism appears clothed, by force of historical

accident, in the language of an adapted Christianity.

[Sidenote: Obstacles to humanism.]

As the Middle Ages advanced the new-born human genius which constituted

their culture grew daily more playful, curious, and ornate. It was

naturally in the countries formerly pagan that this new paganism

principally flourished. Religion began in certain quarters to be taken

philosophically; its relation to life began to be understood, that it

was a poetic expression of need, hope, and ignorance. Here prodigious

vested interests and vested illusions of every sort made dangerous the

path of sincerity. Genuine moral and religious impulses could not be

easily dissociated from a system of thought and discipline with which

for a thousand years they had been intimately interwoven. Scepticism,

instead of seeming, what it naturally is, a moral force, a tendency to

sincerity, economy, and fine adjustment of life and mind to

experience—scepticism seemed a temptation and a danger. This situation,

which still prevails in a certain measure, strikingly shows into how

artificial a posture Christianity has thrown the mind. If scepticism,

under such circumstances, by chance penetrated among the clergy, it was

not favourable to consistency of life, and it was the more certain to

penetrate among them in that their ranks, in a fat and unscrupulous age,

would naturally be largely recruited by men without conscience or ideal

ambitions. It became accordingly necessary to reform something; either

the gay world to suit the Church’s primitive austerity and asceticism,

or the Church to suit the world’s profane and general interests. The

latter task was more or less consciously undertaken by the humanists who

would have abated the clergy’s wealth and irrational authority, advanced

polite learning, and, while of course retaining Christianity—for why

should an ancestral religion be changed?—would have retained it as a

form of paganism, as an ornament and poetic expression of human life.

This movement, had it not been overwhelmed by the fanatical Reformation

and the fanatical reaction against it, would doubtless have met with

many a check from the Church’s sincere zealots; but it could have

overcome them and, had it been allowed to fight reason’s battle with

reason’s weapons, would ultimately have led to general enlightenment

without dividing Christendom, kindling venomous religious and national

passions, or vitiating philosophy.

[Sidenote: The Reformation and counter-reformation.]

It was not humanism, however, that was destined to restrain and soften

the Church, completing by critical reflection that paganisation of

Christianity which had taken place at the beginning instinctively and of

necessity. There was now another force in the field, the virgin

conscience and wilfulness of the Teutonic races, sincerely attached to

what they had assimilated in Christianity and now awakening to the fact

that they inwardly abhorred and rejected the rest. This situation, in so

uncritical an age, could be interpreted as a return to primitive

Christianity, though this had been in truth, as we may now perceive,

utterly opposed to the Teutonic spirit. Accordingly, the humanistic

movement was crossed and obscured by another, specifically religious and

ostensibly more Christian than the Church. Controversies followed, as

puerile as they were bloody; for it was not to be expected that the

peoples once forming the Roman Empire were going to surrender their

ancestral religion without a struggle and without resisting this new

barbarian invasion into their imaginations and their souls. They might

have suffered their Christianised paganism to fade with time; worldly

prosperity and arts might have weaned them gradually from their

supernaturalism, and science from their myths; but how were they to

abandon at once all their traditions, when challenged to do so by a

foreign supernaturalism so much poorer and cruder than their own? What

happened was that they intrenched themselves in their system, cut

themselves off from the genial influences that might have rendered it

innocuous, and became sectaries, like their opponents. Enlightenment was

only to come after a recrudescence of madness and by the mutual

slaughter of a fresh crop of illusions, usurpations, and tyrannies.

[Sidenote: Protestantism an expression of character.]

It would be easy to write, in a satirical vein, the history of

Protestant dogma. Its history was foreseen from the beginning by

intelligent observers. It consisted in a gradual and inevitable descent

into a pious scepticism. The attempt to cling to various intermediate

positions on the inclined plane that slopes down from ancient revelation

to private experience can succeed only for a time and where local

influences limit speculative freedom. You must slide smilingly down to

the bottom or, in horror at that eventuality, creep up again and reach

out pathetically for a resting-place at the top. To insist on this

rather obvious situation, as exhibited for instance in the Anglican

Church, would be to thresh straw and to study in Protestantism only its

feeble and accidental side. Its true essence is not constituted by the

Christian dogmas that at a given moment it chances to retain, but by the

spirit in which it constantly challenges the others, by the expression

it gives to personal integrity, to faith in conscience, to human

instinct courageously meeting the world. It rebels, for instance,

against the Catholic system of measurable sins and merits, with rewards

and punishments legally adjusted and controlled by priestly as well as

by divine prerogative. Such a supernatural mechanism seems to an

independent and uncowed nature a profanation and an imposture. Away, it

says, with all intermediaries between the soul and God, with all

meddlesome priestcraft and all mechanical salvation. Salvation shall be

by faith alone, that is, by an attitude and sentiment private to the

spirit, by an inner co-operation of man with the world. The Church shall

be invisible, constituted by all those who possess this necessary faith

and by no others. It really follows from this, although the conclusion

may not be immediately drawn, that religion is not an adjustment to

other facts or powers, or to other possibilities, than those met with in

daily life and in surrounding nature, but is rather a spiritual

adjustment to natural life, an insight into its principles, by which a

man learns to identify himself with the cosmic power and to share its

multifarious business no less than its ulterior security and calm.

[Sidenote: It has the spirit of life.]

Protestantism, in this perfectly instinctive trustfulness and

self-assertion, is not only prior to Christianity but more primitive

than reason and even than man. The plants and animals, if they could

speak, would express their attitude to their destiny in the Protestant

fashion. “He that formed us,” they would say, “lives and energises

within us. He has sealed a covenant with us, to stand by us if we are

faithful and strenuous in following the suggestions he whispers in our

hearts. With fidelity to ourselves and, what is the same thing, to him,

we are bound to prosper and to have life more and more abundantly for

ever.” This attitude, where it concerns religion, involves two

corollaries: first, what in accordance with Hebrew precedent may be

called symbolically faith in God, that is, confidence in one’s own

impulse and destiny, a confidence which the world in the end is sure to

reward; and second, abomination of all contrary religious tenets and

practices—of asceticism, for instance, because it denies the will; of

idolatry and myth, because they render divinity concrete rather than

relative to inner cravings and essentially responsive; finally of

tradition and institutional authority, because these likewise jeopardise

the soul’s experimental development as, in profound isolation, she

wrestles with reality and with her own inspiration.

[Sidenote: and of courage.]

In thus meeting the world the soul without experience shows a fine

courage proportionate to its own vigour. We may well imagine that lions

and porpoises have a more masculine assurance that God is on their side

than ever visits the breast of antelope or jelly-fish. This assurance,

when put to the test in adventurous living, becomes in a strong and

high-bred creature a refusal to be defeated, a gallant determination to

hold the last ditch and hope for the best in spite of appearances. It is

a part of Protestantism to be austere, energetic, unwearied in some

laborious task. The end and profit are not so much regarded as the mere

habit of self-control and practical devotion and steadiness. The point

is to accomplish something, no matter particularly what; so that

Protestants show on this ground some respect even for an artist when he

has once achieved success. A certain experience of ill fortune is only a

stimulus to this fidelity. So great is the antecedent trust in the world

that the world, as it appears at first blush, may be confidently defied.

[Sidenote: but the voice of inexperience.]

Hence, in spite of a theoretic optimism, disapproval and proscription

play a large part in Protestant sentiment. The zeal for righteousness,

the practical expectation that all shall be well, cannot tolerate

recognised evils. Evils must be abolished or at least hidden; they must

not offend the face of day and give the lie to universal sanctimony.

This austerity and repression, though they involve occasional hypocrisy,

lead also to substantial moral reconstruction. Protestantism, springing

from a pure heart, purifies convention and is a tonic to any society in

which it prominently exists. It has the secret of that honest simplicity

which belongs to unspoiled youth, that keen integrity native to the

ungalled spirit as yet unconscious of any duplicity in itself or of any

inward reason why it should fail. The only evils it recognises seem so

many challenges to action, so many conditions for some glorious

unthought-of victory. Such a religion is indeed profoundly ignorant, it

is the religion of inexperience, yet it has, at its core, the very

spirit of life. Its error is only to consider the will omnipotent and

sacred and not to distinguish the field of inevitable failure from that

of possible success. Success, however, would never be possible without

that fund of energy and that latent resolve and determination which

bring also faith in success. Animal optimism is a great renovator and

disinfectant in the world.

[Sidenote: Its emancipation from Christianity.]

It was this youthful religion—profound, barbaric, poetical—that the

Teutonic races insinuated into Christianity and substituted for that

last sigh of two expiring worlds. In the end, with the complete

crumbling away of Christian dogma and tradition, Absolute Egotism

appeared openly on the surface in the shape of German speculative

philosophy. This form, which Protestantism assumed at a moment of high

tension and reckless self-sufficiency, it will doubtless shed in turn

and take on new expressions; but that declaration of independence on the

part of the Teutonic spirit marks emphatically its exit from

Christianity and the end of that series of transformations in which it

took the Bible and patristic dogma for its materials. It now bids fair

to apply itself instead to social life and natural science and to

attempt to feed its Protean hunger directly from these more homely

sources.

The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress · 第 7 / 21 章