CHAPTER XIV

SEYMOUR AND HOFFMAN

1868

The fall elections of 1867 made a profound impression in the Empire

State. Pennsylvania gave a small Democratic majority, Ohio defeated a

negro suffrage amendment by 50,000, besides electing a Democratic

legislature, and New York, leading the Democratic column, surprised

the nation with a majority of nearly 48,000. In every county the

Republican vote had fallen off. It was plain that reconstruction and

negro suffrage had seriously disgruntled the country. The policy of

the Republicans, therefore, which had hitherto been one of delay in

admitting Southern States to representation in Congress, now changed

to one of haste to get them in, the party believing that with negro

enfranchisement and white disfranchisement it could control the South.

This sudden change had alarmed conservatives of all parties, and the

Democratic strength shown at the preceding election encouraged the

belief that the radical work of Congress might be overthrown. "The

danger now is," wrote John Sherman, "that the mistakes of the

Republicans may drift the Democratic party into power."[1150]

[Footnote 1150: Sherman's Letters, p. 299.]

The action of Congress after the removal of Edwin M. Stanton, then

secretary of war, did not weaken this prediction. The Senate had

already refused its assent to the Secretary's suspension, and when the

President, exercising what he believed to be his constitutional power,

appointed Adjutant-General Thomas in his place, it brought the contest

to a crisis. Stanton, barricaded in the War Office, refused to leave,

while Thomas, bolder in talk than in deeds, threatened to kick him

out.[1151] In support of Stanton a company of one hundred men, mustered

by John A. Logan, a member of Congress, occupied the basement of the

War Department. Not since the assassination of Lincoln had the country

been in such a state of excitement. Meanwhile former propositions of

impeachment were revived, and although without evidence of guilty

intent, the House, on February 14, resolved that Andrew Johnson be

impeached of high crimes and misdemeanours. This trial, which

continued for nearly three months, kept the country flushed with

passion.

[Footnote 1151: _Impeachment Trial_, Vol. 1, p. 223.]

New York Democrats greatly enjoyed the situation. To them it meant a

division of the Republican party vastly more damaging than the one in

1866. Opposition to Grant's candidacy also threatened to widen the

breach. The Conservatives, led by Thurlow Weed, wishing to break the

intolerant control of the Radicals by securing a candidate free from

factional bias, had pronounced for the Soldier's nomination for

President as early as July, 1867,[1152] and although the current of

Republican journalism as well as the drift of party sentiment tended

to encourage the movement, the Radicals opposed it. Grant's report on

the condition of the South in 1865, and his attendance upon the

President in 1866 during the famous swing-around-the-circle, had

provoked much criticism. Besides, his acceptance of the War Office

after Stanton's suspension indicated marked confidence in the Chief

Executive. Indeed, so displeasing had been his record since the close

of the war that the _Tribune_ ridiculed his pretensions, predicting

that if any man of his type of politics was elected it would be by the

Democrats.[1153] Even after the loss of the elections the _Tribune_

continued its opposition. "We object to the Grant movement," it said.

"It is of the ostrich's simple strategy that deceives only himself.

There are times in which personal preference and personal popularity

go far; but they are not these times. Does any one imagine that

General Grant, supported by the Republicans, would carry Maryland or

Kentucky, under her present Constitution, against Seymour or

Pendleton?"[1154] Many agreed with Greeley. Indeed, a majority of the

Radicals, deeming Grant unsound on reconstruction and the negro,

preferred Chief Justice Chase.

[Footnote 1152: New York _World_, July 25, 1867.]

[Footnote 1153: New York _Tribune_, October 15, 1867.]

[Footnote 1154: New York _Tribune_, November 7, 1867.]

Very unexpectedly, however, conditions changed. Stanton's suspension

in August, 1867, led to Grant's appointment as secretary of war, but

when the Senate, early in the following January, refused to concur in

Johnson's action, Grant locked the door of the War Office and resumed

his post at army headquarters. The President expressed surprise that

he did not hold the office until the question of Stanton's

constitutional right to resume it could be judicially determined. This

criticism, delivered in Johnson's positive style, provoked a long and

heated controversy, involving the veracity of each and leaving them

enemies for life. The quarrel delighted the Radicals. It put Grant

into sympathy with Congress, and Republicans into sympathy with Grant.

Until then it was not clear to what party he belonged. Before the war

he acted with the Democrats, and very recently the successors of the

old Albany Regency had been quietly preparing for his nomination.[1155]

Now, however, he was in cordial relation with Republicans, whose

convention, held at Syracuse on February 5, 1868, to select delegates

to the National convention, indorsed his candidacy by acclamation. The

Conservatives welcomed this action as their victory. Moreover, it was

the first formal expression of a State convention. Republicans of

other Commonwealths had indicated their readiness to accept Grant as a

candidate, but New York, endorsing him before the termination of his

controversy with the President, anticipated their action and set the

party aflame. Indeed, it looked to Republicans as if this nomination

assured success at a moment when their chances had seemed hopeless.

[Footnote 1155: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 458.]

In like manner the convention recommended Reuben E. Fenton for

Vice-President. Fenton had made an acceptable governor. Under his

administration projects for lengthening the locks on the Erie Canal

and other plans for extending the facilities of transportation were

presented. Another memorable work was the establishment of Cornell

University, which has aptly been called "the youngest, the largest,

and the richest" of the nearly thirty colleges in the State. Even the

_Times_, the great organ of the Conservatives, admitted that the

Governor's "executive control, in the main, has been a success."[1156]

Opposition to his promotion, however, presented well-defined lines. To

Thurlow Weed he represented the mismanagement which defeated the

party,[1157] and to Conkling he appealed only as one on whom to employ

with effect, when occasion offered, his remarkable resources of

sarcasm and rhetoric. The Governor understood this feeling, and to

avoid its influence delegates were instructed to vote for him as a

unit, while three hundred devoted friends went to Chicago. Daniel E.

Sickles became chairman of the delegation.

[Footnote 1156: New York _Times_, February 4, 1868.]

[Footnote 1157: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 459.]

The Republican convention convened at Chicago on May 20, and amidst

throat-bursting cheers and salvos of artillery Ulysses S. Grant was

nominated for President by acclamation. For Vice-President a dozen

candidates were presented, including Henry Wilson of Massachusetts,

Reuben E. Fenton of New York, Benjamin Wade of Ohio, and Schuyler

Colfax of Indiana. Fenton's friends, finding the Northern States

pre-empted by other candidates, turned to the South, hoping to benefit

as Wade's strength receded. Here, however, it was manifest that Wilson

would become the Buckeye's residuary legatee. Fenton also suffered

from the over-zeal of friends. In seconding his nomination an Illinois

delegate encountered John A. Logan, who coolly remarked that Fenton

would get three votes and no more from his State. To recover prestige

after this blow Daniel E. Sickles, in a brief speech, deftly included

him with Morton of Indiana, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Andrew of

Massachusetts, and other great war governors. In this company Fenton,

who had served less than four months at the close of the war, seemed

out of place, and Sickles resumed his seat undisturbed by any

demonstration except by the faithful three hundred.[1158] Fenton's

vote, however, was more pronounced than the applause, although his

strength outside of New York came largely from the South, showing that

his popularity centred in a section whose representatives in National

Republican conventions have too often succumbed to influences other

than arguments.[1159]

[Footnote 1158: _Official Proceedings of the Convention_, p. 96.]

[Footnote 1159: BALLOTS

1 2 3 4 5 6

Wade 147 170 178 206 207 38

Colfax 115 145 165 186 226 541

Fenton 126 144 139 144 139 69

Wilson 119 114 101 87 56

Hamlin 28 30 25 25 20

Curtin 51 45 40

Outside of New York Fenton's vote was as follows:

Northern States 23 33 32 32 31 2

Southern States 44 45 42 48 61 1]

The echo of Fenton's defeat seriously disturbed the Syracuse State

convention (July 8). The Conservatives of New York City, many of whom

had now become the followers of Conkling, objected to the Fenton

method of selecting delegates, and after a bitter discussion between

Matthew Hale of Albany and Charles S. Spencer, the Governor's ardent

friend, the convention limited the number of delegates from a city

district to the Republican vote actually cast, and appointed a

committee to investigate the quarrel, with instructions to report at

the next State convention.

The selection of a candidate for governor also unsettled the

Republican mind. Friends of Lyman Tremaine, Charles H. Van Wyck,

Frederick A. Conkling (a brother of the Senator), Stewart L. Woodford,

and John A. Griswold had not neglected to put their favourites into

the field at an early day, but to all appearances Horace Greeley was

the popular man among the delegates. Although Conkling had snuffed out

his senatorial ambition, he had been the directing power of the

February convention, and was still the recognised guide-post of the

party. Besides, the withdrawal of Tremaine, Van Wyck, and Conkling

practically narrowed the rivalry to Greeley and Griswold. Indeed, it

seemed as if the ambition of the editor's life was at last to be

satisfied. Weed was in Europe, Raymond still rested "outside the

breastworks," and the Twenty-third Street organisation, as the

Conservatives were called, sat on back seats without votes and without

influence.

Greeley did not go to Syracuse. But his personal friends appeared in

force, led by Reuben E. Fenton, who controlled the State convention.

Greeley believed the Governor sincerely desired his nomination.

Perhaps he was also deceived in the strength of John A. Griswold. The

people, regarding Griswold's change from McClellan to Lincoln as a

political emancipation, had doubled his majority for Congress in 1864

and again in 1866. The poor loved him, the workmen admired him, and

business men backed him. Though but forty-six years old he had already

made his existence memorable. In their emphasis orators expressed no

fear that the fierce white light which beats upon an aspirant for high

office would disclose in him poor judgment, or any weakness of

character. To these optimistic speeches delegates evinced a

responsiveness that cheered his friends.

But the real noise of the day did not commence until Chauncey M. Depew

began his eulogy of the great editor. The applause then came in drifts

of cheers as appreciative expressions fell from the lips of his

champion. It was admitted that Depew's speech adorned the day's

work.[1160] He referred to Greeley as "the embodiment of the principles

of his party," "the one man towering above all others in intellect,"

who "has contributed more than any other man toward the

enfranchisement of the slaves," and "with his pen and his tongue has

done more for the advancement of the industrial classes." In

conclusion, said the speaker, "he belongs to no county, to no

locality; he belongs to the State and to the whole country, because of

the superiority of his intellect and the purity of his patriotism."[1161]

As the speaker finished, the applause, lasting "many minutes,"[1162]

finally broke into several rounds of cheers, while friends of Griswold

as well as those of Greeley, standing on chairs, swung hats and

umbrellas after the fashion of a modern convention. Surely, Horace

Greeley was the favourite.

[Footnote 1160: New York _Tribune_, July 9, 1868.]

[Footnote 1161: New York _Tribune_, July 9, 1868.]

[Footnote 1162: _Ibid._]

The roll-call, however, gave Griswold 247, Greeley 95, Woodford 36.

For the moment Greeley's friends seemed stunned. It was worse than a

defeat--it was utter rout and confusion. He had been led into an

ambuscade and slaughtered. The _Tribune_, in explaining the affair,

said "it was evident in the morning that Griswold would get the

nomination. His friends had been working so long and there were so

many outstanding pledges." Besides, it continued, "when the fact

developed that he had a majority, it added to his strength

afterward."[1163] Why, then, it was asked, did Greeley's friends put

him into a contest already settled? Did they wish to humiliate him?

"Had Greeley been here in person," said the _Times_, with apparent

sympathy, "the result might have been different."[1164] The _Nation_

thought otherwise. "In public," it said, "few members of conventions

have the courage to deny his fitness for any office, such are the

terrors inspired by his editorial cowskin; but the minute the voting

by ballots begins, the cowardly fellows repudiate him under the veil

of secrecy."[1165] The great disparity between the applause and the

vote for the editor became the subject of much suppressed amusement.

"The highly wrought eulogium pronounced by Depew was applauded to the

echo," wrote a correspondent of the _Times_, "but the enthusiasm

subsided wonderfully when it came to putting him at the head of the

ticket."[1166] Depew himself appreciated the humour of the situation.

"Everybody wondered," said the eulogist, speaking of it in later

years, "how there could be so much smoke and so little fire."[1167] To

those conversant with the situation, however, it was not a mystery.

Among conservative men Greeley suffered discredit because of his

ill-tempered criticisms, while his action in signing Jefferson Davis's

bail-bond was not the least powerful of the many influences that

combined to weaken his authority. It seemed to shatter confidence in

his strength of mind. After that episode the sale of his _American

Conflict_ which had reached the rate of five hundred copies a day,

fell off so rapidly that his publishers lost $50,000.[1168]

[Footnote 1163: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1164: New York _Times_, July 9.]

[Footnote 1165: The _Nation_, July 16.]

[Footnote 1166: New York _Times_, July 9, 1868.]

[Footnote 1167: Conversation with the author.

The ticket nominated was as follows: Governor, John A. Griswold,

Rensselaer; Lieutenant-Governor, Alonzo B. Cornell, Wyoming; Canal

Commissioner, Alexander Barkley, Washington; Prison Inspector, Henry

A. Barnum, Onondaga.]

[Footnote 1168: _The Nation_, November 11, 1869.]

The platform approved the nomination of Grant and Colfax, held

inviolate the payment of the public debt in the spirit as well as the

letter of the law, commended the administration of Fenton, and

demanded absolute honesty in the management and improvement of the

canals; but adopting "the simple tactics of the ostrich" it maintained

the most profound silence in regard to suffrage of any kind--manhood,

universal, impartial, or negro.[1169]

[Footnote 1169: New York _Tribune_, July 9, 1868.]

The day the Syracuse convention avoided Greeley, the National

Democratic convention which had assembled in Tammany's new building on

July 4, accepted a leader under whom victory was impossible. It was an

historic gathering. The West sent able leaders to support its

favourite greenback theory, the South's delegation of Confederate

officers recalled the picturesque scenes at Philadelphia in 1866, and

New England and the Middle States furnished a strong array of their

well-known men. Samuel J. Tilden headed the New York delegation,

Horatio Seymour became permanent president, and in one of the chairs

set apart for vice presidents, William M. Tweed, "fat, oily, and

dripping with the public wealth,"[1170] represented the Empire State.

[Footnote 1170: New York _Tribune_, March 5, 1868.]

The chairmanship of the committee on resolutions fell to Henry C.

Murphy of Brooklyn. Murphy was a brave fighter. In 1832, when barely

in his twenties, he had denounced the policy of chartering banks in

the interest of political favourites and monopolists, and the reform,

soon after established, made him bold to attack other obnoxious fiscal

systems. As mayor of Brooklyn he kept the city's expenditures within

its income, and in the constitutional convention of 1846 he stood with

Michael Hoffman in preserving the public credit and the public faith.

To him who understood the spirit of the Legal Tender Act of 1862, it

seemed rank dishonesty to pay bonds in a depreciated currency, and he

said so in language that did not die in the committee room. But

opposed to him were the extremists who controlled the convention.

These Greenbackers demanded "that all obligations of the government,

not payable by their express terms in coin, ought to be paid in lawful

money," and through them the Ohio heresy became the ruling thought of

the Democratic creed.

Although New York consented to the Pendleton platform, it determined

not to sacrifice everything to the one question of finance by

permitting the nomination of the Ohio statesman. There were other

candidates. Andrew Johnson was deluded into the belief that he had a

chance; Winfield S. Hancock, the hero of the famous Second Army Corps,

who had put himself in training while department commander at New

Orleans, believed in his star; Salmon P. Chase, chief justice of the

United States Supreme Court, having failed to capture the nomination

at Chicago, was willing to lead whenever and by whomsoever called;

while Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana, then a United States senator

and supporter of the "Ohio idea," hoped to succeed if Pendleton

failed. Of these candidates Seymour favoured Chase. If nominated, he

said, the Chief Justice would disintegrate the Republican party, carry

Congress, and by uniting conservative Republicans and Democrats secure

a majority of the Senate. It was known that the sentiments of Chase

harmonised with those of Eastern Democrats except as to negro

suffrage, and although on this issue the Chief Justice declined to

yield, Seymour did not regard it of sufficient importance to quarrel

about. Indeed, it was said that Seymour had approved a platform,

submitted to Chase by Democratic progressionists, which accepted negro

suffrage.[1171]

[Footnote 1171: New York _Times_, September 4, 1868.]

Samuel J. Tilden, appreciating the importance of defeating Pendleton,

at once directed all the resources of a cold, calculating nature to a

solution of the difficult problem. To mask his real purpose he pressed

the name of Sanford E. Church until the eighth ballot, when he

adroitly dropped it for Hendricks. It was a bold move. The Hoosier was

not less offensive than the Buckeye, but it served Tilden's purpose to

dissemble, and, as he apprehended, Hendricks immediately took the

votes of his own and other States from the Ohioan. This proved the end

of Pendleton, whose vote thenceforth steadily declined. On the

thirteenth ballot California cast half a vote for Chase, throwing the

convention into wild applause. For the moment it looked as if the

Chief Justice, still in intimate correspondence with influential

delegates, might capture the nomination. Vallandigham, who preferred

Chase to Hendricks, begged Tilden to cast New York's vote for him, but

the man of sheer intellect was not yet ready to show his hand.

Meanwhile Hancock divided with Hendricks the lost strength of

Pendleton. Amidst applause from Tammany, Nebraska, on the seventeenth

and eighteenth ballots, cast three votes for John T. Hoffman. This

closed the fourth day of the convention, the eighteenth ballot

registering 144-1/2 votes for Hancock, 87 for Hendricks, 56-1/2 for

Pendleton, and 28 scattering.

On the morning of the fifth and last day, the New York delegation,

before entering the convention, decided by a vote of 37 to 24 to

support Chase provided Hendricks could not be nominated. Seymour

favoured the Chief Justice in an elaborate speech, which he intended

delivering on the floor of the convention, and for this purpose had

arranged with a delegate from Missouri to occupy the chair. It was

known, too, that Chase's strength had increased in other delegations.

Eleven Ohio delegates favoured him as their second choice, while

Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Georgia, and Wisconsin could be

depended upon. Indeed, it was in the air that the Chief Justice would

be nominated. When the convention opened, however, a letter several

days old was read from Pendleton withdrawing from the contest. This

quickly pushed Hendricks to 107. On the twenty-first ballot he rose to

132 and Hancock fell off to 135-1/2, while four votes for Chase, given

by Massachusetts, called out hisses[1172] as well as applause,

indicating that the ambitious Justice was not entirely _persona grata_

to all of the Westerners. To the confused delegates, worn out with

loss of sleep and the intense heat, the situation did not excite hopes

of an early settlement. New York could not name Chase since

Pendleton's withdrawal had strengthened Hendricks, while the

nomination of a conservative Union soldier like Hancock, so soon after

the close of the war, would inevitably exasperate the more radical

element of the party. Thus it looked as if the motion to adjourn to

meet at St. Louis in September presented the only escape. Pending a

roll-call, however, this motion was declared out of order, and the

voting continued until the Ohio delegation, having returned from a

conference, boldly proposed the name of Horatio Seymour. The

delegates, hushed into silence by the dominating desire to verify

rumours of an impending change, now gave vent to long, excited

cheering. "The folks were frantic," said an eye-witness; "the delegates

daft. All other enthusiasms were as babbling brooks to the eternal

thunder of Niagara. The whole mass was given over to acclaims that

cannot even be suggested in print."[1173]

[Footnote 1172: New York _World_, July 10, 1868.]

[Footnote 1173: New York _World_, July 10, 1868.]

Seymour had positively declined a score of times. As early as

November, 1867, after the Democratic victories of that month, he had

addressed a letter to the _Union_, a Democratic paper of Oneida,

stating that for personal reasons which he need not give, he was not

and could not be a candidate. Other letters of similar purport had

frequently appeared in the press. To an intimate friend he spoke of

family griefs, domestic troubles, impaired health, and the

impossibility of an election. Besides, if chosen, he said, he would be

as powerless as Johnson, a situation that "would put him in his grave

in less than a year."[1174] In the whole convention there was not a man

who could truthfully say that the Governor, by look, or gesture, or

inflection of voice, had encouraged the hope of a change of mind.

Within forty-eight hours every Democrat of influence had sounded him

and gone away sorrowful. Now, when order was restored, he declined

again. His expressions of gratitude seemed only to make the

declaration stronger. "I do not stand here," he said, "as a man proud

of his opinion or obstinate in his purposes, but upon a question of

duty and of honour I must stand upon my own convictions against the

world. When I said here, at an early day, that honour forbade my

accepting a nomination, I meant it. When I said to my friends I could

not be a candidate, I meant it. And now, after all that has taken

place here, I could not receive the nomination without placing myself

in a false position. Gentlemen, I thank you for your kindness, but

your candidate I cannot be."[1175]

[Footnote 1174: New York _Times_, Sept. 4.]

[Footnote 1175: New York _World_, July 10.]

Vallandigham replied that in times of great public exigency personal

consideration should yield to the public good, and Francis Kernan,

disclaiming any lot or part in Ohio's motion, declared that others

than the New York delegation must overcome the sensitiveness of the

chairman. Still, he said, Horatio Seymour ought to abide the action of

the convention. These speeches over, the roll-call monotonously

continued, each State voting as before until Wisconsin changed from

Doolittle to Seymour. In an instant the chairman of each State

delegation, jumping to his feet, changed its vote to the New Yorker.

The pandemonium was greater than before, in the midst of which

Seymour, apparently overwhelmed by the outcome, retired to a committee

room, where Church, Joseph Warren of the Buffalo _Courier_, and other

friends urged him to yield to the demands of the Democracy of the

country. He was deeply affected. Tears filled his eyes, and he

piteously sought the sympathy of friends.[1176] Soon after he left the

building. Meanwhile Tilden rose to change the vote of the Empire State

from Hendricks to Seymour. "It is fit on this occasion," he said,

"that New York should wait for the voice of all her sister States.

Last evening I did not believe this event possible. There was one

obstacle--Horatio Seymour's earnest, sincere, deep-felt repugnance to

accept this nomination. I did not believe any circumstance would make

it possible except that Ohio, with whom we have been unfortunately

dividing our votes, demanded it. I was anxious that whenever we should

leave this convention there should be no heart-burnings, no jealousy,

no bitter disappointment; and I believe that in this result we have

lifted the convention far above every such consideration. And I

believe further that we have made the nomination most calculated to

give us success."[1177]

[Footnote 1176: New York _Times_, Sept. 4, 1868.]

[Footnote 1177: New York _World_, July 10.]

This did not then seem to be the opinion of many men outside the

convention. The nomination did not arouse even a simulated enthusiasm

upon the streets of the metropolis.[1178] In Washington Democratic

congressmen declared that but one weaker candidate was before the

convention,[1179] while dispatches from Philadelphia and Boston

represented "prominent Democrats disgusted at Seymour and the

artifices of his friends."[1180] Even Tammany, said the _Times_,

"quailed at the prospect of entering upon a canvass with a leader

covered with personal dishonour, as Seymour had said himself he would

be, if he should accept. Men everywhere admit that such a nomination,

conferred under such circumstances, was not only pregnant with

disaster, but if accepted stained the recipient with personal

infamy."[1181]

[Footnote 1178: New York _Times_, July 10.]

[Footnote 1179: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1180: New York _Times_, July 10, 1868.]

[Footnote 1181: _Ibid._]

Not since the Democratic party began holding national conventions had

the tactics practised at New York been equaled. The convention of 1844

must always be ranked as a masterpiece of manipulation, but its

diplomacy was played to defeat Van Buren rather than nominate a

candidate. In 1852 circumstances combined to prevent the nomination of

the convention's first or second choice, and in the end, as a

ball-player at the bat earns first base through the errors of a

pitcher, Franklin Pierce benefited. But in 1868 nothing was gained by

errors. Although there was a chief candidate to defeat, it was not

done with a bludgeon as in 1844. Nor were delegates allowed to

stampede to a "dark horse" as in 1852. On the contrary, while the

leading candidate suffered slow strangulation, the most conspicuous

man in the party was pushed to the front with a sagacity and firmness

that made men obey the dictates of a superior intelligence, and to

people who studied the ballots it plainly appeared that Samuel J.

Tilden had played the game.

Tilden had not sought prominence in the convention. He seldom spoke,

rarely figured in the meeting of delegates, and except to cast the

vote of the New York delegation did nothing to attract attention. But

the foresight exhibited in changing from Church to Hendricks on the

eighth ballot discovered a mind singularly skilled in controlling the

actions of men. The play appeared the more remarkable after the

revelation of its influence. New York did not want Hendricks. Besides,

up to that time, the Hoosier had received less than forty votes, his

own State refusing to unite in his support. Moreover, since adjoining

States save Michigan warmly advocated Pendleton, all sources of growth

seemed closed to him. Yet Tilden's guiding hand, with infallible

sagacity, placed New York's thirty-three votes on Indiana and

absolutely refused to move them. To dispose of Hendricks, Vallandigham

and other Ohio delegates offered to support Chase, and if the chairman

of the New York delegation had led the way, a formidable coalition

must have carried the convention for the Chief Justice. But the man

whose subtile, mysterious influence was already beginning to be

recognised as a controlling factor in the party desired Seymour, and

to force his nomination he met at Delmonico's, on the evening of the

fourth day, Allen G. Thurman, George E. Pugh, Washington McLean,

George W. McCook, and George W. Morgan, Ohio's most influential

delegates, and there arranged the _coup d'état_ that succeeded so

admirably. This scheme remained a profound secret until the Ohio

delegation retired for consultation after the twenty-first ballot, so

that when Seymour was addressing the New York delegation in behalf of

Chase, Tilden knew of the pending master-stroke. "The artful Tilden,"

said Alexander Long, a well-known politician of the day, "is a

candidate for the United States Senate, and he thinks that with

Seymour the Democrats can carry both branches of the New York

Legislature."[1182]

[Footnote 1182: New York _Times_, September 4, 1868.]

Tilden disclaimed all instrumentality in bringing about the

nomination. "I had no agency," he wrote, "in getting Governor Seymour

into his present scrape."[1183] He likewise professed ignorance as to

what the convention would do. "I did not believe the event possible,"

he said, "unless Ohio demanded it."[1184] This admission, frankly

conceding the necessity of Ohio's action which he had himself forced,

shattered the sincerity of Tilden's disclaimer.

[Footnote 1183: John Bigelow, _Life of Samuel J. Tilden_, Vol. 1, p.

211.]

[Footnote 1184: New York _World_, July 10, 1868.]

Seymour also had difficulty in preserving the appearance of sincerity.

The press claimed that when he saw the nomination coming to him with

the approval of Pendleton's supporters he quickly retired instead of

further insisting upon his declination. This insinuation allied his

dramatic performance with Tilden's tactics, and he hesitated to expose

himself to such a compromising taunt. In this emergency Tilden

endeavoured very adroitly to ease his mind. "My judgment is," he wrote

a mutual friend, "that acceptance under present circumstances would

not compromise his repute for sincerity or be really misunderstood by

the people; that the case is not analogous to the former instances

which have made criticism possible; that the true nature of the

sacrifice should be appreciated, while on the other hand the opposite

course would be more likely to incite animadversion; that, on the

whole, acceptance is the best thing. I think a decision is necessary,

for it is not possible to go through a canvass with a candidate

declining. I am sincerely willing to accept such action as will be

most for the honour of our friend; at the same time my personal wish

is acceptance. You may express for me so much on the subject as you

find necessary and think proper."[1185]

[Footnote 1185: John Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 1, p. 212.]

On August 4, when Seymour finally accepted, he neither apologised nor

explained. "The nomination," he wrote, "was unsought and unexpected. I

have been caught up by the overwhelming tide which is bearing us on to

a great political change, and I find myself unable to resist its

pressure."[1186] Those who recalled the Governor's alleged tortuous

course at Chicago and again at Albany in 1864 did not credit him with

the candour that excites admiration. "Such men did not believe in the

sincerity of Seymour's repeated declinations," said Henry J. Raymond,

"and therefore accepted the final result with the significant remark,

'I told you so.'"[1187] Horace Greeley was more severe. "The means by

which Horatio Seymour obtained his nomination," he wrote, "are

characteristic of that political cunning which has marked his career.

The whole affair was an adroit specimen of political hypocrisy, by

which the actual favourite of the majority was not only sold, but was

induced to nominate the trickster who had defeated him."[1188]

[Footnote 1186: _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, p. 343.]

[Footnote 1187: New York _Times_, August 10.]

[Footnote 1188: New York _Tribune_, November 5, 1868.]

After Seymour's nomination the first expression of the campaign

occurred in Vermont. Although largely Republican the Democrats made an

unusually animated contest, sending their best speakers and furnishing

the needed funds. Nevertheless, the Republicans added 7,000 to their

majority of the preceding year. This decisive victory, celebrated in

Albany on September 2, had a depressing influence upon the Democratic

State convention then in session, ending among other things the

candidacy of Henry C. Murphy for governor. The up-State opponents of

the Tweed ring, joined by the Kings County delegation, hoped to make a

winning combination against John T. Hoffman, and for several days

Murphy stood up against the attacks of Tammany, defying its threats

and refusing to withdraw. But he wilted under the news from Vermont.

If not beaten in convention, he argued, defeat is likely to come in

the election, and so, amidst the noise of booming cannon and parading

Republicans, he allowed Hoffman to be nominated by acclamation.[1189]

[Footnote 1189: "Then we have John T. Hoffman, who is kept by Tammany

Hall as a kind of respectable attaché. His humble work is to wear good

clothes and be always gloved, to be decorous and polite; to be as much

a model of deportment as Mr. Turvydrop; to repeat as often as need be,

in a loud voice, sentences about 'honesty' and 'public welfare,' but

to appoint to rich places such men as Mr. Sweeny. Hoffman is kept for

the edification of the country Democrats, but all he has or ever can

have comes from Tammany Hall."--_Ibid._, March 5, 1868.]

In the selection of a lieutenant-governor Tammany did not fare so

well. Boss Tweed, in return for Western support of Hoffman, had

declared for Albert P. Laning of Buffalo, and until District Attorney

Morris of Brooklyn seconded the nomination of another, Laning's

friends had boasted a large majority. Morris said he had no objection

to Laning personally. He simply opposed him as a conspirator who had

combined with Tammany to carry out the programme of a grasping clique.

He wished the country delegates who had unconsciously aided its

wire-pulling schemes to understand that it sought only its own

aggrandisement. It cared nothing for the Democratic party except as it

contributed to its selfish ends. This corrupt oligarchy, continued the

orator, his face flushed and his eyes flashing with anger, intends

through Hoffman to control the entire patronage of the State, and if

Seymour is elected it will grasp that of the whole country. Suppose

this offensive ring, with its unfinished courthouse and its thousand

other schemes of robbery and plunder, controls the political power of

the State and nation as it now dominates the metropolis, what honest

Democrat can charge corruption to the opposite party? Did men from the

interior of the State understand that Hoffman for governor means a

ring magnate for United Sates senator? That is the game, and if it

cannot be played by fair means, trickery and corruption will

accomplish it. Kings County, which understands the methods of this

clique, has not now and he hoped never would have anything in common

with it, and he warned the country members not to extend its wicked

sway.[1190]

[Footnote 1190: New York _Times_, _World_, and _Tribune_, September 3,

1868.]

Morris' speech anticipated the startling disclosures of 1871, and as

the orator raised his voice to a pitch that could easily be heard

throughout the hall, the up-State delegates became deeply interested

in his words. He did not deal in glittering generalities. He was a

prosecuting officer in a county adjoining Tammany, and when he

referred to the courthouse robbery he touched the spot that reeked

with corruption. The Ring winced, but remained speechless. Tweed and

his associate plunderers, who had spent three millions on the

courthouse and charged on their books an expenditure of eleven, had

no desire to stir up discussion on such a topic and be pilloried by a

cross-examination on the floor of the convention. A majority of the

delegates, however, convinced that Tammany must not control the

lieutenant-governor, nominated Allen C. Beach of Jefferson, giving him

77 votes to 47 for Laning.[1191]

[Footnote 1191: New York _World_, July 10, 1868.]

In the light of this result Murphy's friends seriously regretted his

hasty withdrawal from the contest. Morris intended arraigning Tammany

in his speech, nominating the Brooklyn Senator for governor, and the

latter's supporters believed that Hoffman, whom they recognised as the

personal representative of the Tweed ring, must have gone down under

the disclosures of the District Attorney quite as easily as did

Laning. This hasty opinion, however, did not have the support of

truth. Hoffman's campaign in 1866 strengthened him with the people of

the up-counties. To them he had a value of his own. In his speeches he

had denounced wrongs and rebuked corruption, and his record as mayor

displayed no disposition to enrich himself at the expense of his

reputation. He was careful at least to observe surface proprieties.

Besides, at this time, Tammany had not been convicted of crime.

Vitriolic attacks upon the Tweed Ring were frequent, but they came

from men whom it had hurt. Even Greeley's historic philippic, as

famous for its style as for its deadly venom, came in revenge for

Tweed's supposed part in defeating him for Congress in 1866.[1192]

[Footnote 1192: New York _Tribune_, March 5.

The ticket nominated was as follows: Governor, John T. Hoffman, New

York; Lieutenant-Governor, Allen C. Beach, Jefferson; Canal

Commissioner, Oliver Bascom, Washington; Inspector of Prisons, David

B. McNeil, Cayuga; Clerk of Court of Appeals, Edward O. Perrin,

Queens.]

A Political History of the State of New York, Volumes 1-3 · 第 14 / 38 章