SEYMOUR'S PRESIDENTIAL FEVER
1864
"I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation
Proclamation," said the President at the opening of Congress in
December, 1863; "nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free
by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress."
But in submitting a plan for the restoration of the Confederate States
he offered amnesty, with rights of property except as to slaves, to
all persons[968] who agreed to obey the Constitution, the laws, and
the Executive proclamations, and proposed that whenever such persons
numbered one-tenth of the qualified voters of a State they "shall be
recognized as the true government of such State."[969] A week later
the Thirteenth Amendment, forever abolishing slavery, was introduced
into Congress. Thus the purpose of the radical Republicans became
plain.
[Footnote 968: Except certain ones specifically exempted.]
[Footnote 969: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, Vol. 2, p. 443.]
In January, 1864, Governor Seymour, then the acknowledged head of his
party, made his message to the Legislature a manifesto to the
Democrats of the country. With measured rhetoric he traced the
usurpations of the President and the acknowledged policy that was in
future to guide the Administration. He courageously admitted that a
majority of the people and both branches of Congress sustained the
policy of the President, but such a policy, he declared, subordinating
the laws, the courts, and the people themselves to military power,
destroyed the rights of States and abrogated cherished principles of
government. The past, however, with its enormous debt, its
depreciated currency, its suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
and its abolition of free speech and a free press, did not mean such
irretrievable ruin as the national bankruptcy which now threatened to
overwhelm the nation. "The problem with which we have to grapple is,"
he said, "how can we bring this war to a conclusion before such
disasters overwhelm us." Two antagonistic theories, he continued, are
now before us--one, consecrating the energies of war and the policy of
government to the restoration of the Union as it was and the
Constitution as it is; the other, preventing by the creation of a new
political system the return of the revolted States, though willing to
lay down their arms. This alternative will enable an administration to
perpetuate its power. It is a doctrine of national bankruptcy and
national ruin; it is a measure for continued military despotism over
one-third of our country, which will be the basis for military
despotism over the whole land.
Every measure to convert the war against armed rebellion into one
against private property and personal rights at the South, he
continued, has been accompanied by claims to exercise military power
in the North. The proclamation of emancipation at the South, and the
suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_ at the North; the
confiscation of private property in the seceding States, and the
arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and banishment of the citizens of
loyal States; the claim to destroy political organization at the
South, and the armed interference by Government in local elections at
the North, have been contemporaneous events. We now find that as the
strength of rebellion is broken, new claims to arbitrary power are put
forth. More prerogatives are asserted in the hour of triumph than were
claimed in days of disaster. The war is not to be brought to an end by
the submission of States to the Constitution and their return to the
Union, but to be prolonged until the South is subjugated and accepts
such terms as may be dictated. This theory designs a sweeping
revolution and the creation of a new political system. There is but
one course, he concluded, which will now save us from such national
ruin--we must use every influence of wise statesmanship to bring back
the States which now reject their constitutional obligations. The
triumphs won by the soldiers in the field should be followed up by the
peacemaking policy of the statesmen in the Cabinet. In no other way
can we save our Union.[970]
[Footnote 970: _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, pp. 198-212.]
Seymour's claims and portents were in amazing contrast to his proposed
measures of safety. Nevertheless he did his work well. It was his
intention clearly to develop the ultimate tendencies of the war, and,
in a paper of great power and interest, without invective or acerbity,
he did not hesitate to alarm the people respecting the jeopardy of
their own liberties. Indeed, his message had the twofold purpose of
drawing the line distinctly between Administration and anti-Administration
forces, and of concentrating public attention upon himself as a
suitable candidate for President.[971] Seymour was never without
ambition, for he loved politics and public affairs, and the Presidency
captivated him. With deepest interest he watched the play at
Charleston and at Baltimore in 1860, and had the nomination come to
him, Lincoln's election, depending as it did upon New York, must have
given Republicans increased solicitude. Developments during the war
had stimulated this ambition. The cost of blood and treasure, blended
with arbitrary measures deemed necessary by the Government, pained and
finally exasperated him until he longed to possess the power of an
Executive to make peace. He believed that a compromise, presented in a
spirit of patriotic clemency, with slavery undisturbed, would quickly
terminate hostilities, and although he made the mistake of surrounding
himself with men whose influence sometimes betrayed him into weak and
extreme positions, his ability to present his views in a scholarly and
patriotic manner, backed by a graceful and gracious bearing, kept him
in close touch with a party that resented methods which made peace
dependent upon the abolition of slavery. He never provoked the
criticism of those whom he led, nor indulged in levity and flippancy.
But he was unsparing in his lectures to the Administration,
admonishing it to adopt the principles of government which prevailed
when happiness and peace characterised the country's condition, and
prophesying the ruin of the Union unless it took his advice. While,
therefore, his eulogy of the flag, the soldiers, the Union, and the
sacrifices of the people won him reputation for patriotic
conservatism, his condemnation of the Government brought him credit
for supporting and promoting all manner of disturbing factions and
revolutionary movements.
[Footnote 971: Horace Greeley, _History of the Rebellion_, Vol. 2, p.
667.]
The Regency understood the Governor's ambition, and the Democratic
State convention, assembling at Albany on February 24 to designate
delegates to Chicago, opened the way for him as widely as possible. It
promulgated no issues; it mentioned no candidate; it refused to accept
Fernando Wood and his brother as delegates because of their pronounced
advocacy of a dishonourable peace; and it placed Seymour at the head
of a strong delegation, backed by Dean Richmond and August Belmont,
and controlled by the unit rule. It was a remarkable coincidence, too,
that the New York _Herald_, which had pursued the Governor for more
than a year with bitter criticism, suddenly lapsed into silence.
Indeed, the only shadow falling upon his pathway in the Empire State
reflected the temporary anger of Tammany, which seceded from the
convention because the McKeon delegation, an insignificant coterie of
advocates of peace-on-any-conditions, had been admitted on terms of
equality.
As the summer advanced political conditions seemed to favour Seymour.
During the gloomy days of July and August the people prayed for a
cessation of hostilities. "The mercantile classes are longing for
peace," wrote James Russell Lowell,[972] and Horace Greeley, in a
letter of perfervid vehemence, pictured to the President the unhappy
condition. "Our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country," he said,
"longs for peace, shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, or
further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human
blood."[973] The President, also yearning for peace and willing to
accept almost any proposition if it included the abolition of slavery,
waited for a communication from some agent of the Confederacy
authorised to treat with him; but such an one had not appeared,
although several persons, safely sheltered in Canada, claimed
authority. One of these, calling himself William C. Jewett of
Colorado, finally convinced Horace Greeley that Clement C. Clay of
Alabama and Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, two ambassadors of
Jefferson Davis, were ready at Niagara Falls to meet the President
whenever protection was afforded them. Upon being informed by Greeley
of their presence, Lincoln replied (July 9): "If you can find any
person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson
Davis in writing for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and
abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may
come to me with you."[974]
[Footnote 972: Motley's _Letters_, Vol. 2, p. 168.]
[Footnote 973: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 186.]
[Footnote 974: _Ibid._, pp. 187-188.]
While Greeley, hesitating to undertake the mission himself, indulged
in further correspondence with the President, James P. Jaquess, a
Methodist clergyman and colonel of an Illinois regiment, with the
knowledge of Lincoln, but without official authority except to pass
the Union lines, obtained (July 17) an audience with Jefferson Davis,
to whom he made overtures of peace. In the interview Davis declared
that "we are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for
independence, and that or extermination we will have. We will be free.
We will govern ourselves. We will do it if we have to see every
Southern plantation sacked and every Southern city in flames.... Say
to Mr. Lincoln from me that I shall at any time be pleased to receive
proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be
useless to approach me with any other."[975] It is known now that
Jaquess' report was substantially correct, but at the time the peace
advocate defiantly challenged its truth and the conservative was
incredulous.
[Footnote 975: J.R. Gilmore (Kirke), _Down in Tennessee_, pp.
272-280.]
Meantime Greeley (July 16) proceeded to Niagara Falls. Thompson was
not there and Clay had no authority to act. When the famous editor
asked fresh instructions Lincoln sent John Hay, his private secretary,
with the historic paper of July 18, which stopped further
negotiations.[976] In this well-meant effort the President desired to
convince his own party of the hopelessness of any satisfactory peace
until the surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies; but to the people,
grieved by the death of loved ones, or oppressed by constant anxiety,
his brief ultimatum seemed maladroit, while the men who favoured peace
simply on condition of the restoration of the Union, without the
abolition of slavery, resented his course as arbitrary and needlessly
cruel.
[Footnote 976: "To whom it may concern: Any proposition which embraces
the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the
abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that
can control the armies now at war against the United States will be
received and considered by the executive government of the United
States and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and
collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe
conduct both ways. Abraham Lincoln."--Horace Greeley, _The American
Conflict_, Vol. 2, p. 665; Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1864, p. 780;
Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 192.]
Lincoln's unpopularity touched bottom at this moment. The
dissatisfaction found expression in a secret call for a second
national convention, to be held at Cincinnati on September 28, to
nominate, if necessary, a new candidate for President.[977] This
movement, vigorously promoted in Ohio by Salmon P. Chase, received
cordial support in New York City. George Opdyke directed it, Horace
Greeley heartily endorsed it, Daniel S. Dickinson favoured it, and
Lucius Robinson and David Dudley Field sympathised with it.[978] Parke
Godwin and William Curtis Noyes, if unwilling to go as far as Opdyke
and Greeley, would have welcomed Lincoln's withdrawal.[979] Roscoe
Conkling, being advised of the scheme, promptly rejected it. "I do not
approve of the call or of the movement," he wrote, "and cannot sign
it. For that reason it would not be proper or agreeable that I should
be present at the conference you speak of."[980]
[Footnote 977: "The undersigned, citizens of the State of New York and
unconditional supporters of the national government, convinced that a
union of all loyal citizens of the United States upon the basis of a
common patriotism is essential to the safety and honour of the country
in this crisis of its affairs; that the present distraction and apathy
which depress the friends of the Union threaten to throw the
Government into the hands of its enemies; and that a convention of the
people should be assembled to consider the state of the nation and to
concentrate the union strength on some one candidate, who commands the
confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary; do
therefore invite their fellow citizens ... to send delegates ... to a
convention at Cincinnati on Wednesday, September 28, for friendly
consultation, with the purpose above stated."--New York _Sun_, June
30, 1889.]
[Footnote 978: Under date of Aug. 18, 1864, Greeley wrote Opdyke: "I
must go out of town to-morrow and cannot attend the meeting at your
house. Allow me to say a word. Mr. Lincoln is already beaten. He
cannot be elected. We must have another ticket to save us from utter
overthrow. And such a ticket we ought to have anyhow, with or without
a convention."--_Ibid._
On August 26, Dickinson declared that "the cry for a change, whether
wise or ill founded, should be both heard and heeded."--_Ibid._
On August 29, Lucius Robinson regretted "that it will be impossible
for me to be present at the meeting at Mr. Field's to-morrow
evening.... McClellan will be the next President unless Lincoln is at
once withdrawn."--_Ibid._]
[Footnote 979: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 366.]
[Footnote 980: New York _Sun_, June 30, 1889.]
It is doubtful if Lincoln knew of this conspiracy, but his friends
informed him of the critical condition of affairs. "When, ten days
ago, I told Mr. Lincoln that his re-election was an impossibility,"
Weed wrote Seward on August 22, "I told him the information would
also come through other channels. It has doubtless reached him ere
this. At any rate nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from
other States who authorises the slightest hope of success. The people
are wild for peace. They are told the President will only listen to
terms of peace on condition that slavery be abandoned."[981] Weed's
"other channels" meant a report from the Republican National Executive
Committee, which Raymond, then its chairman, submitted to Lincoln on
August 22. "The tide is setting strongly against us," he wrote. "Hon.
E.B. Washburn writes that 'were an election to be held now in Illinois
we should be beaten.' Mr. Cameron says that Pennsylvania is against
us. Governor Morton writes that nothing but the most strenuous efforts
can carry Indiana. This State, according to the best information I can
get, would go 50,000 against us to-morrow. And so of the rest. Two
special causes are assigned for this great reaction in public
sentiment--the want of military successes, and the impression in some
minds, the fear and suspicion in others, that we are not to have peace
in any event under this Administration until slavery is abandoned. In
some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused that we can have
peace with Union if we would. It is idle to reason with this
belief--still more idle to denounce it. It can only be expelled by
some authoritative act at once bold enough to fix attention, and
distinct enough to defy incredulity and challenge respect."[982]
[Footnote 981: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 250.]
[Footnote 982: _Ibid._, p. 218.]
In December, 1860, in the presence of threatened war Lincoln refused
to yield to a compromise that would extend slavery into free
territory; now, in the presence of failure at the polls, he insisted
upon a peace that would abolish slavery. In 1860 he was flushed with
victory; in 1864 he was depressed by the absence of military
achievement. But he did not weaken. He telegraphed Grant to "hold on
with a bulldog grip, _and chew and choke as much as possible_,"[983]
and then, in the silence of early morning, with Raymond's starless
letter on the table before him, he showed how coolly and magnanimously
a determined patriot could face political overthrow. "This morning, as
for some days past," he wrote, "it seems exceedingly probable that
this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to
so coöperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the
election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on
such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."[984]
[Footnote 983: _Lincoln's Complete Works_, Vol. 2, p. 563.]
[Footnote 984: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 251.]
The influence of this popular discouragement exhibited itself in a
mass peace convention, called by Fernando Wood and held at Syracuse on
August 18. Its great attraction was Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio,
its platform favoured an armistice and a convention of States, and its
purpose was the selection of a delegation to Chicago, which should
adequately represent the peace faction of the State. The absence of
military achievement and the loud cries for peace, it was claimed, had
changed the conditions since the adjournment of the Democratic State
convention in February, and the necessity for a third party was
conceded should the existing peace sentiment be ignored in the
formulation of a platform and the selection of candidates at Chicago.
Although the assembly indicated no preference for President, its known
partiality for Seymour added to its strength. Through the manipulation
of Richmond and the Regency, Wood failed to secure the appointment of
delegates, but he claimed, with much show of truth, that the meeting
represented the sentiment of a great majority of the party. Wood had
become intolerable to Dean Richmond and the conservative Democracy,
whose withering opposition to his candidacy for the United States
Senate in the preceding February had made him ridiculous; but he could
not be muzzled, and although his influence rarely disturbed the party
in the up-State counties, he was destined to continue in Congress the
rest of his life, which ended in 1881.
The Democratic national convention had been called for July 4, but the
popular depression, promising greater advantage later in the summer,
led to its postponement until August 29. Thus it convened when gloom
and despondency filled the land, making Horatio Seymour's journey to
Chicago an ovation. At every stop, especially at Detroit, crowds,
cheers, speeches, and salvos of firearms greeted him. The convention
city recognised him as its most distinguished visitor, and the
opponents of a war policy, voicing the party's sentiment for peace,
publicly proclaimed him their favourite.
Before Seymour left Albany the _Argus_ announced that he would not be
a candidate;[985] but now, flattered by attention, and encouraged by
the peace-faction's strategic movement, he declined to indicate his
position. Political conditions had made a profound impression upon
him. Moreover, deep in his heart Seymour did not fancy McClellan. His
public life had been brief, and his accomplishment little either as a
soldier or civilian. Besides, his arrest of the Maryland Legislature,
and his indifference to the sacredness of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
classing him among those whom the Governor had bitterly denounced,
tended to destroy the latter's strongest argument against the Lincoln
administration.
[Footnote 985: "The announcement in the Albany _Argus_ that Governor
Seymour was not a candidate was written by Seymour himself, and taken
to the _Argus_ by his private secretary. It is now announced that it
was intended as a feeler. The whole force of the opposition to
McClellan is centred in this move for Seymour."--New York _Herald_
(Chicago despatch), August 28, 1864.]
Dean Richmond, now a vigorous supporter of McClellan, could not be
confused as to the General's strength or the Governor's weakness, and
he attempted at an early hour to silence the appeal for Seymour by
solidifying the New York delegation for McClellan; but in these
efforts he found it difficult to subdue the personal independence and
outspoken ways of the Governor, whose opposition to McClellan was more
than a passing cloud-shadow.[986] This delayed matters. So long as a
ray of hope existed for the favourite son, the New York delegation
declined to be forced into an attitude of opposition. Indeed, the day
before the convention opened, it refused, by a vote of 38 to 23, to
ascertain its choice for President. When, at last, it became
definitely known that McClellan had a majority of each State
delegation, practically assuring his nomination under the two-thirds
rule on the first ballot, Seymour put an end to the talk of his
candidacy. Nevertheless, his vote, dividing the New York delegation,
was cast for Samuel Nelson, the distinguished jurist who had succeeded
Smith Thompson as an associate justice of the United States Supreme
Court. Other anti-McClellan New York delegates preferred Charles
O'Conor and James Guthrie of Kentucky. Subsequently, in explaining his
action, Seymour disclaimed any doubt of the ability or patriotism of
the late commander of the Army of the Potomac.[987]
[Footnote 986: "Dean Richmond remains firm for McClellan, and has cut
loose from the Regency. He is at the present moment closeted with
Seymour, trying to convince him of the fallacy of the move."--New York
_Herald_ (Chicago despatch), August 28, 1864.]
[Footnote 987: _Ibid._, September 1, 1864.]
The New York delegation had as usual a strong if not a controlling
influence in the convention. Dean Richmond who led it at Charleston
and Baltimore again guided its counsels, while the presence of John
Ganson and Albert P. Laning of Buffalo, and Francis Kernan of Utica,
added to its forcefulness upon the floor. Next to Seymour, however,
its most potent member for intellectual combat was Samuel J. Tilden,
who served upon the committee on resolutions. Tilden, then fifty years
old, was without any special charm of person or grace of manner. He
looked like an invalid. His voice was feeble, his speech neither
fluent nor eloquent, and sometimes he gave the impression of
indecision. But his logic was irresistible, his statements
exhaustive, and his ability as a negotiator marvellous and unequalled.
He was the strong man of the committee, and his presence came very
near making New York the dominant factor in the convention.
Tilden's sympathies leaned toward the South. He resented the formation
of the Republican party,[988] maintained that a State could repel
coercion as a nation might repel invasion,[989] declared at the
Tweddle Hall meeting in January, 1861, that he "would resist the use
of force to coerce the South into the Union,"[990] and declined to
sign the call for the patriotic uprising of the people in Union Square
on April 20.[991] On the other hand, he addressed departing regiments,
gave money, and in 1862 wrote: "Within the Union we will give you [the
South] the Constitution you profess to revere, renewed with fresh
guarantees of equal rights and equal safety. We will give you
everything that local self-government demands; everything that a
common ancestory of glory--everything that national fraternity or
Christian fellowship requires; but to dissolve the federal bond
between these States, to dismember our country, whoever else consents,
we will not. No; never, never never!"[992] Yet in February, 1863, in
opposition to the Loyal Publication Society, he assisted in organising
a local society which published and distributed "Copperhead"
literature.[993] He had not, however, been active in politics since
his defeat for attorney-general in 1855. It was during these years
that he began the accumulation of his large fortune. He acquired
easily. He seemed to know intuitively when to buy and when to sell,
and he profited by the rare opportunities offered during the great
depreciation in government bonds. Later, he dealt in railroads, his
private gains being so enormous that men thought his ambition for
wealth unscrupulously selfish.
[Footnote 988: Statement to Preston King in 1854. _Harper's Weekly_,
September 16, 1876.]
[Footnote 989: Letter to William Kent in October, 1860.]
[Footnote 990: Horace Greeley, _The American Conflict_, Vol. 1, pp.
388-394. William H. Russell's _Diary_, entry March 17, 1861, p. 20.]
[Footnote 991: _Harper's Weekly_, September 9, 1876.]
[Footnote 992: John Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 1, pp. 173-174.]
[Footnote 993: _Harper's Weekly_, September 9 and 27, 1876.]
But whatever may have been his sentiments respecting the war, Tilden
had little liking for Vallandigham in 1864, and after a bitter contest
finally defeated him for chairman of the committee on resolutions by a
vote of thirteen to eleven in favour of James Guthrie of Kentucky. He
also defeated a measure introduced by Washington Hunt suggesting an
armistice and a convention of States, and supported a positive
declaration that he thought sufficient to hold the war vote. However,
the dread of a split, such as had occurred at Charleston and Baltimore
in 1860, possessed the committee, and in the confusion of the last
moment, by a slight majority, the pivotal declaration pronouncing the
war a failure was accepted.[994]
[Footnote 994: "Never did men work harder than Messrs. Guthrie of
Kentucky and Tilden of New York. All they asked finally was that the
platform should not be so strong for peace that it would drive the war
vote from them."--New York _Herald_, September 5, 1864.
"Vallandigham wrote the second, the material resolution, of the
Chicago platform, and carried it through the sub-committee and the
general committee, in spite of the most desperate and persistent
opposition on the part of Tilden and his friends, Mr. Cassidy himself
in an adjoining room labouring to defeat it."--New York _News_,
October 22, 1864.
"The platform which declared the war a failure was jointly concocted
by Seymour and Vallandigham."--New York _Tribune_, November 5, 1868.]
Seymour's election as permanent chairman of the convention gave him
abundant opportunity to proclaim his abhorrence of the Administration.
His speech, prepared with unusual care, showed the measured dignity
and restraint of a trained orator, who knew how to please a popular
audience with a glowing denunciation of principles it detested. Every
appeal was vivid and dramatic; every allusion told. Throughout the
whole ran the thread of one distinct proposition,--that the Republican
party had sinned away its day of grace, and that the patriotic work
of the Democratic party must begin at once if the Union was to be
saved. To Seymour it was not a new proposition. He had stated it in
the last campaign and reiterated it in his latest message; but never
before did he impress it by such striking sentences as now fell upon
the ears of a delighted convention. "Even now, when war has desolated
our land," he said, "has laid its heavy burdens upon labor, when
bankruptcy and ruin overhang us, this Administration will not have
Union except upon conditions unknown to our Constitution; it will not
allow the shedding of blood to cease, even for a little time, to see
if Christian charity or the wisdom of statesmanship may not work out a
method to save our country. Nay, more than this, it will not listen to
a proposal for peace which does not offer that which this government
has no right to ask. This Administration cannot now save this Union,
if it would. It has, by its proclamations, by vindictive legislation,
by displays of hate and passion, placed obstacles in its own pathway
which it cannot overcome, and has hampered its own freedom of action
by unconstitutional acts. The bigotry of fanatics and the intrigues of
placemen have made the bloody pages of the history of the past three
years."
It was impossible not to be impressed by such an impassioned lament.
There was also much in Seymour himself as well as in his words to
attract the attention of the convention.[995] Added years gave him a
more stately, almost a picturesque bearing, while a strikingly
intelligent face changed its expression with the ease and swiftness of
an actor's. This was never more apparent than now, when he turned,
abruptly, from the alleged sins of Republicans to the alleged virtues
of Democrats. Relaxing its severity, his countenance wore a
triumphant smile as he declared in a higher and more resonant key,
that "if this Administration cannot save the Union, _we can_! Mr.
Lincoln values many things above the Union; we put it first of all. He
thinks a proclamation worth more than peace; we think the blood of our
people more precious than the edicts of the President. There are no
hindrances in our pathway to Union and to peace. We demand no
conditions for the restoration of our Union; we are shackled with no
hates, no prejudices, no passions. We wish for fraternal relationships
with the people of the South. We demand for them what we demand for
ourselves--the full recognition of the rights of States. We mean that
every star on our Nation's banner shall shine with an equal
lustre."[996] As the speaker concluded, the audience, with deafening
applause, testified its approval of these sentiments. Yet one wonders
that he could end without saying a word, at least, in condemnation of
the Secessionists, whose appeal from the ballot to the bullet had
inaugurated "the bloody pages of the history of the past three years."
[Footnote 995: "Governor Seymour was an elegant and accomplished
gentleman with a high-bred manner which never unbent, and he was
always faultlessly dressed. He looked the ideal of an aristocrat, and
yet he was and continued to be until his death the idol of the
Democracy."--_Speeches of Chauncey M. Depew_, November, 1896, to
April, 1902, p. 105.]
[Footnote 996: Horatio Seymour's _Public Record_, pp. 230-232.]
The platform, adopted without debate, reaffirmed devotion to the
Union, expressed sympathy with soldiers and prisoners of war,
denounced interference in military elections, and stigmatised alleged
illegal and arbitrary acts of the government. The second resolution,
prepared by Vallandigham, declared that "this convention does
explicitly resolve as the sense of the American people, that after
four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war,
justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view
to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to
the end that the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on
the basis of the Federal Union of the States."[997]
[Footnote 997: Edward McPherson, _History of the Rebellion_, p. 419;
Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1864, p. 793.]
It is difficult to excuse Tilden's silence when this fatal resolution
was adopted. In the final haste to report the platform, the deep
significance of Vallandigham's words may not have been fully
appreciated by the Committee;[998] but Tilden understood their
meaning, and vigorous opposition might have avoided them.[999] He
seems, however, to have shared the fear of McClellan's friends that
the defeat of the resolution would endanger the integrity of the
convention, and to have indulged the hope that McClellan's letter of
acceptance would prove an antidote to the Ohioan's peace-poison. But
his inaction did little credit either to his discernment or judgment,
for the first ballot for President disclosed the groundlessness of his
timidity,[1000] and the first work of the campaign revealed the
inefficiency of the candidate's statements.[1001] Indeed, so grievous
was Tilden's mistake that his distinguished biographer (Bigelow)
avoided his responsibility for declaring the war a failure by
ignoring his presence at Chicago.
[Footnote 998: "McClellan's supporters are not scared by any paper
pellets of the brain, wise or otherwise, which ever came from the
midnight sessions of a resolution committee in the hurly-burly of a
national convention."--Speech of Robert C. Winthrop in New York City,
September 17, 1864.--_Addresses and Speeches_, Vol. 2, p. 598.]
[Footnote 999: "When the resolution, as reported, had been debated in
the committee, Mr. Tilden, far from protesting, stated in the
convention that there was no dissent among the members. His remarks
were confirmed by Mr. Brown of Delaware, who said there was not the
slightest dissension, and by Mr. Weller of California, who said that
all were in favour of peace."--_Harper's Weekly_, September 9, 1876.]
[Footnote 1000: The first ballot resulted as follows: Seymour of New
York, 12; Seymour of Connecticut, 38; McClellan, 181. In the
adjustment, after the conclusion of the roll-call, McClellan had
202-1/2 and Seymour of Connecticut, 28-1/2. Vallandigham moved to make
the nomination unanimous. George H. Pendleton of Ohio was named for
Vice-President.]
[Footnote 1001: "McClellan's name, associated with a noble struggle for
the national cause, has elicited and will elicit the wildest
enthusiasm; but leagued with propositions for national humiliation, it
is not a name the people will honor. McClellan is not large enough to
cover out of sight the bad points in the Chicago platform."--New York
_Herald_, September 6, 1864.]
Meanwhile the cheers for McClellan that greeted the returning
delegates were mingled with those of the country over Sherman's
capture of Atlanta and Farragut's destruction of the Mobile forts.