CHAPTER VII

STRIFE OF RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE

1864

In his Auburn speech Seward had declared for Lincoln's

renomination.[928] Proof of the intimate personal relations existing

between the President and his Secretary came into national notice in

1862 when a committee of nine Radical senators, charging to Seward's

conservatism the failure of a vigorous and successful prosecution of

the war, formally demanded his dismissal from the Cabinet. On learning

of their action the Secretary had immediately resigned. "Do you still

think Seward ought to be excused?" asked Lincoln at the end of a long

and stormy interview. Four answered "Yes," three declined to vote, and

Harris of New York said "No."[929] The result of this conference led

Secretary Chase, the chief of the Radicals, to tender his resignation

also. But the President, "after most anxious consideration," requested

each to resume the duties of his department. Speaking of the matter

afterward to Senator Harris, Lincoln declared with his usual

mirth-provoking illustration: "If I had yielded to that storm and

dismissed Seward, the thing would all have slumped one way. Now I can

ride; I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag."[930]

[Footnote 928: Delivered November 3, 1863. New York _Herald_, November

6.]

[Footnote 929: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 6, p. 266.

Senators Sumner of Massachusetts, Trumbull of Illinois, Grimes of

Iowa, and Pomeroy of Kansas, voted Yes; Collamer of Vermont, Fessenden

of Maine, and Howard of Michigan declined to vote. Wade of Ohio was

absent.]

[Footnote 930: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 6, p. 268.]

Other causes than loyalty contributed to the President's regard for

Seward. In their daily companionship the latter took a genial,

philosophical view of the national struggle, not shared by all his

Cabinet associates, while Lincoln dissipated the gloom with quaint

illustrations of Western life.[931] At one of these familiar fireside

talks the President expressed the hope that Seward might be his

successor, adding that the friends so grievously disappointed at

Chicago would thus find all made right at last. To this Seward, in his

clear-headed and kind-hearted way, replied: "No, that is all past and

ended. The logic of events requires you to be your own successor. You

were elected in 1860, but the Southern States refused to submit. They

thought the decision made at the polls could be reversed in the field.

They are still in arms, and their hope now is that you and your party

will be voted down at the next election. When that election is held

and they find the people reaffirming their decision to have you

President, I think the rebellion will collapse."[932]

[Footnote 931: Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_, Vol. 3, p. 197.]

[Footnote 932: _Ibid._, p. 196.]

Unlike Seward, Thurlow Weed wabbled in his loyalty to the President.

Chafing under the retention of Hiram C. Barney as collector of

customs, Weed thought Lincoln too tolerant of Radicals whose

opposition was ill concealed. "They will all be against him in '64,"

he wrote David Davis, then an associate justice of the United States

Supreme Court. "Why does he persist in giving them weapons with which

they may defeat his renomination?"[933] Barney had become a burden to

Lincoln, who really desired to be rid of him. Many complaints of

irregularity disclosed corrupt practices which warranted a change for

the public good. Besides, said the President, "the establishment was

being run almost exclusively in the interest of the Radicals. I felt

great delicacy in doing anything that might be offensive to my friend.

And yet something had to be done. I told Seward he must find him a

diplomatic position. Just then Chase became aware of my little

conspiracy. He was very angry and told me the day Barney left the

custom house, with or without his own consent, he would withdraw from

the Treasury. So I backed down."[934]

[Footnote 933: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 434.]

[Footnote 934: Maunsell B. Field, _Memories of Many Men_, p. 304.]

Lincoln's tolerance did not please Weed, whose infrequent calls at the

White House had not escaped notice. "I have been brought to fear

recently," the President wrote with characteristic tenderness, "that

somehow, by commission or omission, I have caused you some degree of

pain. I have never entertained an unkind feeling or a disparaging

thought towards you; and if I have said or done anything which has

been construed into such unkindness or disparagement it has been

misconstrued. I am sure if we could meet we would not part with any

unpleasant impression on either side."[935] Such a letter from such a

man stirred the heart of the iron-willed boss, who hastened to

Washington. He had much to say. Among other things he unfolded a plan

for peace. It proposed full amnesty to all persons engaged in the war

and an armistice for ninety days, during which time such citizens of

the Confederate States as embrace the offered pardon "shall, as a

State or States, or as citizens thereof, be restored in all respects

to the rights, privileges, and prerogatives which they enjoyed before

their secession from the Union." If, however, such offer is rejected,

the authority of the United States denied, and the war against the

Union continued, the President should partition all territory, whether

farms, villages, or cities, among the officers and soldiers conquering

the same.[936]

[Footnote 935: Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 440.]

[Footnote 936: _Ibid._, p. 437.]

In presenting this plan Weed argued that if the offer was rejected it

would secure "a united North in favour of war to the knife." Besides,

the armistice, occurring when the season interrupts active army

movements, would cause little delay and give ample time for widespread

circulation of the proclamation. Respecting the division of lands

among soldiers, he said it would stop desertion, avoid the payment of

bounties, and quickly fill the army with enterprising yeomen who would

want homes after the termination of hostilities. It had long been

practised in maritime wars by all civilized nations, he said, and

being a part of international law it could not in reason be objected

to, especially as the sufferers would have rejected most liberal

offers of peace and prosperity. Weed frankly admitted that Seward did

not like the scheme, and that Senator Wilson of Massachusetts eyed it

askance; but Stanton approved it, he said, and Dean Richmond

authorised him to say that if fairly carried out the North would be a

unit in support of the war and the rebellion would be crushed within

six months after the expiration of the armistice.[937]

[Footnote 937: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, pp.

437-439.]

In conversation Weed was the most persuasive of men. To a quiet,

gentle, deferential manner, he added a giant's grasp of the subject,

presenting its strong points and marshalling with extraordinary skill

all the details. Nevertheless, the proposition now laid before the

President, leaving slavery as it was, could not be accepted. "The

emancipation proclamation could not be retracted," he had said in his

famous letter to the New York convention, "any more than the dead

could be brought to life." However, Lincoln did not let the famous

editor depart empty-handed. Barney should be removed, and Weed,

satisfied with such a scalp, returned home to enter the campaign for

the President's renomination.[938]

[Footnote 938: New York _Herald_, May 24, 1864.]

Something seemed to be wrong in New York. Other States through

conventions and legislatures had early favored the President's

renomination, while the Empire State moved slowly. Party machinery

worked well. The Union Central Committee, holding a special meeting on

January 4, 1864 at the residence of Edwin D. Morgan, recommended

Lincoln's nomination. "It is going to be difficult to restrain the

boys," said Morgan in a letter to the President, "and there is not

much use in trying to do so."[939] On February 23 the Republican State

Committee also endorsed him, and several Union League clubs spoke

earnestly of his "prudence, sagacity, comprehension, and

perseverance." But the absence of an early State convention, the tardy

selection of delegates to Baltimore, and the failure of the

Legislature to act, did not reveal the enthusiasm evinced in other

Commonwealths. Following the rule adopted elsewhere, resolutions

favourable to the President's renomination were duly presented to the

Assembly, where they remained unacted upon. Suddenly on January 25 a

circular, signed by Simeon Draper and issued by the Conference

Committee of the Union Lincoln Association of New York, proposed that

all citizens of every town and county who favoured Lincoln's

nomination meet in some appropriate place on February 22 and make

public expression to that fact. Among the twenty-five names attached

appeared those of Moses Taylor and Moses H. Grinnell. This was a new

system of tactics. But the legislative resolutions did not advance

because of it.

[Footnote 939: _Ibid._, February 7.]

A month later a letter addressed by several New Yorkers to the

National Republican Executive Committee requested the postponement of

the Baltimore convention.[940] "The country is not now in a position

to enter into a presidential contest," it said. "All parties friendly

to the Government should be united in support of a single candidate.

Such unanimity cannot at present be obtained. Upon the result of

measures adopted to finish the war during the present spring and

summer will depend the wish of the people to continue their present

leaders, or to exchange them for others. Besides, whatever will tend

to lessen the duration of an acrimonious Presidential campaign will be

an advantage to the country."[941] If the sentiment of this letter was

not new, the number and character of its signers produced a profound

sensation. William Cullen Bryant headed the list, and of the

twenty-three names, seventeen were leading State senators, among them

Charles J. Folger and James M. Cook. "This list," said the _Tribune_,

"contains the names of two-thirds of the Unionists chosen to our

present State Senate, the absence of others preventing their signing.

We understand that but two senators declined to affix their

name."[942] Greeley did not sign this letter, but in an earlier

communication to the _Independent_ he had urged a postponement of the

convention.[943] Moreover, he had indicated in the _Tribune_ that

Chase, Fremont, Butler, or Grant would make as good a President as

Lincoln, while the nomination of either would preserve "the salutary

one-term principle."[944]

[Footnote 940: It was called to meet on June 7.]

[Footnote 941: Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1864, p. 785.]

[Footnote 942: New York _Tribune_, April 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 943: New York _Independent_, February 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 944: New York _Tribune_, February 23, 1864.]

It is not easy to determine the cause or the full extent of the

dissatisfaction with Lincoln among New York Republicans. Seward's

influence and Weed's relations seriously weakened him. After the

election of 1862 Radicals openly charged them with Wadsworth's defeat.

For the same reason the feeling against Edwin D. Morgan had become

intensely bitter. Seeing a newspaper paragraph that these men had been

in consultation with the President about his message, Senator Chandler

of Michigan, the prince of Radicals, wrote a vehement letter to

Lincoln, telling him of a "patriotic organisation in all the free and

border States, containing to-day over one million of voters, every man

of whom is your friend upon radical measures of your administration;

but there is not a Seward or a Weed man among them all. These men are

a millstone about your neck. You drop them and they are politically

ended forever.... Conservatives and traitors are buried together. For

God's sake don't exhume their remains in your message. They will smell

worse than Lazarus did after he had been buried three days."[945]

[Footnote 945: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 7, p. 389.]

Although Weed had left the President with the promise of aiding him,

he could accomplish nothing. The Legislature refused to act, demands

for the postponement of the national convention continued to appear,

and men everywhere resented conservative leadership. This was

especially true of Greeley and the _Tribune_, Bryant and the _Evening

Post_, and Beecher and the _Independent_, not to mention other

Radicals and radical papers throughout the State, whose opposition

represented a formidable combination. Except for this discontent the

Cleveland convention would scarcely have been summoned into existence.

Of the three calls issued for its assembling two had their birth in

New York, one headed by George B. Cheever, the eminent divine, who had

recently toured England in behalf of the Union,--the other by Lucius

Robinson, State comptroller, and John Cochrane, attorney-general.

Cheever's call denounced "the imbecile and vacillating policy of the

present Administration in the conduct of the war,"[946] while Robinson

and Cochrane emphasised the need of a President who "can suppress

rebellion without infringing the rights of individual or State."[947]

[Footnote 946: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 20.]

[Footnote 947: Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1864, p. 786.]

That Weed no longer possessed the wand of a Warwick was clearly

demonstrated at the Republican State convention, held at Syracuse on

May 26, to select delegates to Baltimore. Each faction, led in person

by Greeley and Weed, professed to favour the President's renomination,

but the fierce and bitter contest over the admission of delegates from

New York City widened the breach. The Weed machine, following the

custom of previous years, selected an equal number of delegates from

each ward. The Radicals, who denounced this system as an arbitrary

expression of bossism, chose a delegation representing each ward in

proportion to the number of its Republican voters. The delegation

accepted would control the convention, and although the Radicals

consented to the admission of both on equal terms, the Weed forces,

confident of their strength, refused the compromise. This set the

Radicals to work, and at the morning session, amidst the wildest

confusion and disorder, they elected Lyman Tremaine temporary chairman

by a majority of six over Chauncey M. Depew, the young secretary of

state, whose popularity had given the Conservatives an abnormal

strength.

In his speech the Chairman commented upon the death of James S.

Wadsworth, killed in the battle of the Wilderness on May 6, from whose

obsequies, held at Geneseo on the 21st, many delegates had just

returned. Tremaine believed that the soldier's blood would "lie heavy

on the souls of those pretended supporters of the government in its

hour of trial, whose cowardice and treachery contributed to his defeat

for governor."[948] In such a spirit he eulogised Wadsworth's

character and patriotism, declaring that if justice had been done him

by the Conservatives, he would now, instead of sleeping in his grave,

be governor of New York. Although spoken gently and with emotions of

sadness, these intolerably aggressive sentences, loudly applauded by

the Radicals, stirred the Weed delegates into whispered threats.[949]

But Tremaine did not rely upon words alone. He packed the committee on

contested seats, whose report, admitting both city delegations on

equal terms, was accepted by the enormous majority of 192 to 98,

revealing the fact that the great body of up-State Republicans

distrusted Thurlow Weed, whose proposition for peace did not include

the abolition of slavery. Other reasons, however, accounted for the

large majority. Tremaine, no longer trusting to the leadership of

Greeley,[950] marshalled the Radical forces with a skill learned in

the school of Seymour and Dean Richmond, and when his drilled cohorts

went into action the tumultuous and belligerent character of the

scene resembled the uproar familiar to one who had trained with

Tammany and fought with Mozart Hall. In concluding its work the

convention endorsed the President and selected sixty-six delegates,

headed by Raymond, Dickinson, Tremaine, and Preston King as

delegates-at-large.

[Footnote 948: New York _Tribune_, May 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 949: New York _Herald_, May 29.]

[Footnote 950: "Greeley received an almost unanimous call to lead the

party in the State and the first convention which he attended (1862)

bowed absolutely to his will. He thought he was a great political

leader, and he might have been if he had ever been sure of himself;

but he was one of the poorest judges of men, and in that way was often

deceived, often misled, and often led to change his opinions.... In

less than two years his power was gone."--From speech of Chauncey M.

Depew, April 4, 1902. _Addresses of_, November, 1896, to April, 1902,

pp. 238-239.]

The echo of the Syracuse contest reached the Cleveland convention,

which assembled on May 31. Of all the distinguished New Yorkers whose

names had advertised and given character to this movement John

Cochrane alone attended. Indeed, the picturesque speech of Cochrane,

as chairman, and the vehement letter of Lucius Robinson, advocating

the nomination of Grant, constituted the only attractive feature of

the proceedings. Cochrane and Robinson wanted a party in which they

could feel at home. To Cochrane the Republican party was "a medley of

trading, scurvy politicians, which never represented War

Democrats,"[951] while Robinson thought the country "had survived,

through three years of war, many bad mistakes of a weak Executive and

Cabinet, simply because the popular mind had been intensely fixed upon

the single purpose of suppressing rebellion."[952] Both resented the

Administration's infringement of individual rights. "Whoever attacks

them," said Cochrane, "wounds the vital parts of the Republic. Not

even the plea of necessity allows any one to trample upon them."[953]

The Cleveland convention, however, did not help these statesmen any

more than the nomination of John C. Fremont and John Cochrane, "the

two Johns from New York" as they were called, injured the

President.[954] When Lincoln heard that instead of the many thousands

expected only three or four hundred attended, he opened his Bible and

read: "And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in

debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto

him; and he became a captain over them; and there were with him about

four hundred."[955]

[Footnote 951: Cochrane's speech at Cleveland. McPherson's _History of

the Rebellion_, p. 411.]

[Footnote 952: _Ibid._, p. 413.]

[Footnote 953: _Ibid._, p. 412.]

[Footnote 954: A singular mistake of the convention was its

nomination, contrary to the requirement of the Constitution, of both

candidates from the same State.]

[Footnote 955: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 40.]

Lucius Robinson's suggestion that Grant be nominated for President

represented the thought of many New Yorkers prominent in political

circles. "All eyes and hopes now centre on Grant," wrote Thurlow Weed

on April 17. "If he wins in Virginia it will brighten the horizon and

make him President."[956] The _Herald_ sounded the praises of the

Lieutenant-General in nearly every issue. The _Tribune_ and _Times_

were equally flattering. Even the _World_ admitted that a skilful

general handled the army.[957] Other papers throughout the State

expressed similar confidence in his victorious leadership, and with

the hope of changing the sentiment from Lincoln to Grant a great mass

meeting, called ostensibly to express the country's gratitude to the

latter, was held in New York City two days before the meeting of the

National Republican convention. Neither at this time, however, nor at

any other did the movement receive the slightest encouragement from

the hero of Vicksburg, or shake the loyalty of the delegates who

assembled at Baltimore on June 7.

[Footnote 956: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 443.]

[Footnote 957: See New York _Herald_, April 25, 27, May 7, 9, 14, 16,

18, 23, 26, 28, 29, 31, June 1, 4; New York _Tribune_, May 10, 12, 13,

14; New York _Times_, May 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19; New York _World_,

May 2, 11, 12, 13, 14.]

Henry J. Raymond, evidencing the same wise spirit of compromise

exhibited at Syracuse in 1863, reported the platform. It declared the

maintenance of the Union and the suppression of rebellion by force of

arms to be the highest duty of every citizen; it approved the

determination of the government to enter into no compromise with

rebels; favoured the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment;

applauded the wisdom, patriotism, and fidelity of the President;

thanked the soldiers, and claimed the full protection of the laws of

war for coloured troops; encouraged immigration and the early

construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast; pledged the national

faith to keep inviolate the redemption of the public debt; and opposed

the establishment, by foreign military forces, of monarchical

governments in the near vicinity of the United States.[958] On the

second day every State voted for Lincoln for President.[959]

[Footnote 958: Edward McPherson, _History of the Rebellion_, pp.

406-407.]

[Footnote 959: _Ibid._, p. 407.]

The contest for Vice-President renewed the fight of the New York

factions. An impression had early taken root in the country that a War

Democrat should be selected, and the Radicals of New York, under the

leadership of Lyman Tremaine, quickly designated Daniel S. Dickinson

as the man. Dickinson's acceptability in New England and New Jersey

strengthened his candidacy, while its approval by three or four border

and western States seriously weakened Hamlin. Nevertheless, the New

York Conservatives vigorously opposed him. Their antagonism did not at

first concentrate upon any one candidate. Weed talked of Hamlin and

later of Joseph Holt of Kentucky; Raymond thought Andrew Johnson of

Tennessee the stronger; and Preston King, to the great surprise of the

Radicals, agreed with him. This brought from George William Curtis the

sarcastic remark that a Vice-President from the Empire State would

prevent its having a Cabinet officer. Tremaine declared that a change

in the Cabinet would not be a serious calamity to the country, and

Preston King, who attributed his displacement from the United States

Senate to the Seward influence, did not object to the Secretary's

removal. Thus Raymond's influence gave the doughty War Governor 32 of

New York's 66 votes to 28 for Dickinson and 6 for Hamlin. This

materially aided Johnson's nomination on the first ballot.[960]

[Footnote 960: Johnson received 200 votes to 108 for Dickinson. After

recording all changes, the ballot stood: Johnson, 494; Dickinson, 17;

Hamlin, 9. McPherson, _Hist. of the Rebellion_, p. 407.]

Raymond's power and influence may be said to have climaxed in 1864 at

the Baltimore convention. He became chairman of the New York

delegation, chairman of the committee on resolutions, chairman of the

National Executive Committee, and the principal debater upon the

floor, manifesting a tact in the performance of his manifold duties

that surprised as much as it charmed. But the reason for his ardent

support of Johnson will probably never be certainly known. McClure

declared that he acted in accord with the wishes of Lincoln, who

discreetly favoured and earnestly desired Johnson's nomination. This

view was approved by George Jones, the proprietor of the _Times_ and

Raymond's most intimate friend.[961] On the other hand, Nicolay

declared that "it was with minds absolutely untrammelled by even any

knowledge of the President's wishes that the convention went about its

work of selecting his associate on the ticket."[962] In his long and

bitter controversy with Nicolay, however, McClure furnished testimony

indicating that Lincoln whispered his choice and that Raymond

understood it.[963]

[Footnote 961: Alex. K. McClure, _Lincoln and Men of War Times_, p.

444.]

[Footnote 962: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, pp. 72-73.]

[Footnote 963: Alex. K. McClure, _Lincoln and Men of War Times_, pp.

425-449.]

While Raymond antagonised the radical supporters of Dickinson,

patronage questions were again threatening trouble for the President.

Serious friction had followed the appointment of a General Appraiser

at New York, and when John J. Cisco, the assistant United States

treasurer, tendered his resignation to take effect June 30 (1864), the

President desired to appoint one unobjectionable to Senator Morgan;

but Secretary Chase, regardless of the preferences of others, insisted

upon Maunsell B. Field, then an assistant secretary of the treasury.

Morgan vigorously protested, regarding him incompetent to fill such a

place. Besides, the designation of Field, who had no political backing

in New York, would, he said, offend the conservative wing of the

party, which had been entirely ignored in the past. As a compromise

the Senator begged the President to select Richard M. Blatchford,

Dudley S. Gregory, or Thomas Hillhouse, whom he regarded as three of

the most eminent citizens of New York.

Lincoln, in a note to the Secretary, submitted these names. "It will

really oblige me," he wrote, "if you will make choice among these

three, or any other men that Senators Morgan and Harris will be

satisfied with."[964] This brief letter was followed on the same day

by one presenting the annoyance to which patronage subjects a

President. Happily civil service reform has removed much of this evil,

but enough remains to keep an Executive, if not members of Congress,

in hot water. "As the proverb goes," wrote Lincoln, "no man knows so

well where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. I do not think Mr.

Field a very proper man for the place, but I would trust your judgment

and forego this were the greater difficulty out of the way. Much as I

personally like Mr. Barney it has been a great burden to me to retain

him in his place when nearly all our friends in New York were directly

or indirectly urging his removal. Then the appointment of Judge

Hogeboom to be general appraiser brought me to the verge of open

revolt. Now the appointment of Mr. Field would precipitate me in it,

unless Senator Morgan and those feeling as he does could be brought to

concur in it. Strained as I already am at this point, I do not think I

can make this appointment in the direction of still greater

strain."[965]

[Footnote 964: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 93.]

[Footnote 965: _Ibid._, pp. 93-94.]

Chase had relieved the tension temporarily by inducing Cisco to

withdraw his resignation, but after getting the President's second

letter, cleverly intimating that Field's appointment might necessitate

the removal of Barney, the Secretary promptly tendered his

resignation. If the President was surprised, the Secretary, after

reading Lincoln's reply, was not less so. "Your resignation of the

office of secretary of the treasury, sent me yesterday, is accepted,"

said the brief note. "Of all I have said in commendation of your

ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you and I have

reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relation which

it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the

public service."[966] Secretary Blaine's hasty resignation in 1892,

and President Harrison's quick acceptance of it, were not more

dramatic, except that Blaine's was tendered on the eve of a national

nominating convention. It is more than doubtful if Chase intended to

resign. He meant it to be as in previous years the beginning of a

correspondence, expecting to receive from the President a soothing

letter with concessions. But Lincoln's stock of patience, if not of

sedatives, was exhausted.

[Footnote 966: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 95.]

A few weeks later, after William Pitt Fessenden's appointment to

succeed Chase, Simeon Draper became collector of customs. He was one

of Weed's oldest friends and in 1858 had been his first choice for

governor.[967] But just now Abraham Wakeman was his first choice for

collector. Possibly in selecting Draper instead of Wakeman, Lincoln

remembered Weed's failure to secure a legislative endorsement of his

renomination, a work specially assigned to him. At all events the

anti-Weed faction accepted Draper as a decided triumph.

[Footnote 967: "Simeon Draper was impulsive and demonstrative. With

the advantages of a fine person, good conversational powers, and ready

wit, his genial presence and cheerful voice imparted life and spirit

to the numerous social circles in which he was ever a welcome guest."

_Weed's Reminiscences_, T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2,

p. 483.]

A Political History of the State of New York, Volumes 1-3 · 第 7 / 38 章