A week had hardly elapsed since the conclusion of the agreement between
the King of Greece and the French Deputy, when (16 November) Admiral
Dartige du Fournet addressed to the Hellenic Premier a letter, claiming
18 batteries of field and 16 of mountain artillery with 1,000 shells for
each gun; 40,000 rifles with 220 cartridges for each rifle; 140
machine-guns with ammunition; and 50 motor-vans. The claim was presented
as "compensation" for the war material abandoned to the Germano-Bulgars
in Cavalla: about guarantees not a word.[1]
The King called the Admiral (19 November) and, with perfect courtesy, yet
with a visible change in his attitude, expressed his astonishment at so
unexpected a version of the "Summons" agreed upon. The Admiral had no
explanation to give to the King. But to us he explains everything. The
French Minister at Athens was hostile to M. Benazet's amicable
arrangement, and repudiated his pledges, notably the one concerning the
spread of sedition. "We are not made to defend kings against their
peoples," he said. The French Government likewise completely ignored the
agreement, and the French Minister of War had dictated the lines on which
the claim was drafted. Admiral Dartige's comments on this volte-face are
interesting: "Without wanting to give the Greek Government the two
guarantees which it demanded, they claimed from it the fulfilment of the
engagements of which those guarantees were the counter-part. It was a
truly draconian and unexpected pretension," he says, and to base that
pretension on the Cavalla affair was "to misconstrue in part the reality
of facts." [2]
Why, then, was M. Benazet encouraged to negotiate? Probably there were
in France moderate elements strong enough to make it necessary to throw a
sop to them. But the extremists were the stronger party; and when it
came {153} to a decision they carried the day. However, be the motive of
the mission what it may, its repudiation meant that the old policy still
held the field. It was an essential part of that policy not to allow
Greece any attitude other than that of a belligerent. So, while the
Entente Cabinets continued disclaiming all desire to drag an unwilling
country into war and declaring that the only thing they asked for was the
observance of a benevolent neutrality, the practical exponents of their
policy on the spot continued to take steps in which Greece could
acquiesce only if she contemplated a rupture with the Central Powers.
In the evening of the same day (19 November) Admiral Dartige, at the
instance of the Entente Ministers, ordered their German, Austrian,
Turkish, and Bulgarian colleagues to quit the country in three days.[3]
The Hellenic Government, to whom the Admiral communicated his decree,
protested against this blow at the representatives of Powers with whom
Greece, in virtue of her neutrality recognized by the Entente, was on
terms of friendship and peace; pointing out that the step was a breach
not only of the inviolability assured to diplomats by International Law,
but also of a formal promise given by the French and British Ministers to
Premier Zaimis when the Allied Fleet arrived at the Piraeus--viz. that
the missions of the Powers at war with the Entente had absolutely nothing
to fear. It asked that the decision might be revoked.[4]
Our representatives experienced no difficulty in disposing of this
protest. The promise given was merely "an act of spontaneous
courtesy"--it had not "any character of a definite, irrevocable
engagement"--"and could not, in any case, have for effect to guarantee
the Ministers of countries at war with the Entente against the
consequences of hostile acts foreign to their diplomatic functions and
contrary to the neutrality of Greece"--acts of espionage and intrigue
which, as a matter of fact, form an integral part of a diplomat's
functions. They did not, therefore, "deem it possible to ask Admiral
Dartige du Fournet to revoke the decision taken by him in virtue of the
powers with which he was invested." [5]
{154}
Thus the Ministers of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria were bundled
off (22 November), protesting vigorously "against the outrages committed
on four diplomatic representatives in neutral territory," characterising
the things which took place at Athens as "beyond all comment," and
wondering "whether a firmer attitude would not have spared the country
these affronts on its sovereignty." [6]
This unprecedented measure added still further to the irritation of the
Greeks, and the manner in which it was executed--without even a show of
the courtesies prescribed between diplomats by the tradition of
centuries--shocked the very man who acted as the executioner. Not for
the first time had Admiral Dartige been made to serve ends which he did
not understand, by means which he did not approve, in association with
persons whom he could not respect. But the worst was yet to come.
The Greek Premier delivered his answer to the Admiral's claim on 22
November. In that answer M. Lambros showed that the Allies had already
"compensated themselves" amply: the war material which they had
appropriated--not to mention the light flotilla--being superior both in
quantity and in quality to anything that had been abandoned to their
enemies. Then he went on to state that the surrender of any more
material would be equivalent to a departure from neutrality; and the
Central Powers, which had already protested against the light flotilla's
passing into the hands of the Entente, would so regard it. Lastly,
public opinion would never tolerate that Greece should so denude herself
of arms as to be unable to defend herself in case of need. For all these
reasons, the Hellenic Government categorically refused the Admiral's
claim.[7]
The Admiral felt keenly the iniquity of compelling a neutral country to
give up, without conditions, the arms which constituted its safeguard at
once against invasion and against insurrection. But what could he do?
He had his orders, and it was his duty to carry them out as soon as
possible.[8] So, making use of the plenary authority {155} thrust upon
him, he retorted (24 Nov.) with an Ultimatum: ten mountain batteries
should be handed over to him by 1 December at the latest, and the
remainder by 15 December. Failing obedience to his command, suitable
steps would be taken on 1 December to enforce it. He declined to believe
that "the public opinion of a country so enlightened as Greece could
regard as intolerable the idea of handing over to Powers towards whom it
professed a benevolent neutrality a stock of arms and munitions destined
for the liberation of territory saturated with the noblest Greek blood:
their place was, not at the bottom of magazines, but at the front." [9]
There is always a limit beyond which human intelligence cannot be
insulted with success, or human patience tried with impunity. France had
long since overstepped that limit. Across all the self-contradictory
subtleties of her statesmen, the Greeks, thanks to the self-revealing
acts of her soldiers, sailors, and agents, had discerned the real object
of her diplomacy: to force upon them M. Venizelos and to rule them
through him: she had already helped M. Venizelos to establish his sway
over New Greece, and was now attempting to extend it over Old Greece.
The creation of a "neutral zone" did not blind them: they had only too
much reason to know what neutrality meant in the vocabulary of the
Allies: they had taken the King's ships: all that remained was to take
his arms and to hand them over to their protégé. Such was the true
significance of the fresh "pledges of friendship" claimed from them; and
the claim aroused unanimous indignation: we will not submit to any
further robbery, they cried. What have we gained by submission so far?
Our conciliatory attitude towards the Allies and our efforts for a
friendly settlement of the questions daily raised by them are regarded as
signs of fear and rewarded accordingly: their arrogance increases with
our compliance. No more compliance. The indignation was, naturally,
most pronounced in military circles, and the officers of the Athens
garrison took a vow to lay down their lives in defence of the King's and
country's honour.
Before pushing matters to extremes, Admiral Dartige called on the King
(27 Nov.) and tried to intimidate him {156} by telling him that the
Allied armada had Greece at its mercy, and that by simply cutting off the
supplies of corn and coal it could break all resistance. The King agreed
that the Allies possessed all-powerful means of persuasion, but did not
seem as much impressed as was expected. He reminded the Admiral that he
had done everything possible to prove his goodwill by spontaneously
reducing his active army. He could do no more: the people and the army
were so excited over this last demand that to make them accept it was
beyond his power. The measure might be accepted, if the quantity claimed
was lessened: he would take steps in that sense with the French
Government through his brother, Prince George. It was clear that the
King's change of tone arose from the absence of the guarantees which he
had asked and hoped for: not having received those guarantees he
considered himself released from the promises he had given. The Admiral
understood the position perfectly, and in his heart did not blame the
King for rejecting the "draconian pretension" that he should disarm while
not secure that his arms would not be used against himself. But he had
his orders and could only say that he meant to carry them out: on Friday
morning, 1 December, he would impose the will of the Entente Governments.
He still thought that the King would not resist "energetic pressure." [10]
Proportionate to their loyalty was the Athenians' animosity against the
Venizelists in their midst, who had long been plotting and arming in
conjunction with the French, and preparing for one of those _coups_ for
which Paris had set the fashion during a hundred years. Admiral Dartige
had expressed his concern for these unhappy patriots to the King at his
last interview, and on going from the Palace to the French Legation he
found there the British Minister greatly alarmed because several
important Venizelists had prayed him to obtain for them the Admiral's
protection; but no sooner had the Admiral acted on their prayer, than the
panic-stricken patriots implored him not to protect them, lest the
measures taken for their safety should cause their destruction.[11]
However, next day, the King assured the Admiral through his Marshal of
the Court, that neither the persons nor the {157} property of the
Venizelists should suffer, on condition that neither the Entente Powers'
detectives nor the detachments he was going to land indulged in arrests,
deportations, or disappearances of Greek subjects, and that the
Venizelists themselves abstained from acts calculated to provoke
reprisals.[12]
Such was the state of things created by the Admiral's Ultimatum. What
would happen when the time-limit expired? The inhabitants of Athens
debated this question anxiously, and their anxiety was deepened by the
sight of many disquieting symptoms: day after day Allied aeroplanes and
automobiles carried out reconnaissances over the capital, paying special
attention to the Royal Palace, intensifying the irritation of civilians
and soldiers, and stiffening their resolution to resist, come what might.
The Hellenic Government endeavoured to ward off the storm by
remonstrating with the Governments of the Entente direct. As the
Admiral's claim was presented exclusively in the name of France, it began
with Paris. The answer was that King Constantine had promised to the
French Government the war material demanded, and the French Government
had promised in exchange to relax the coercive measures: since the Greek
Government declared that it could not fulfil this promise, it must suffer
the consequences. Paris, in Admiral Dartige's words, "wanted to reap the
fruit of the Benazet negotiation without paying the price agreed to."
[13] Whatever London may have thought of this manoeuvre, it said that
the British Government was in full knowledge of the French Admiral's
steps and supported them. Petrograd was equally cognizant of the affair,
and, as it was a question of military measures with which Russia could
not interfere, advised Greece to comply, assuring her that "what was done
was for her good." [14]
As a last resource, Greece appealed to neutral countries, describing the
condition in which she had long found herself, because she was not strong
enough to impose respect for her neutrality, and protesting against this
latest demand as most injurious to her honour and {158} subversive of all
her rights.[15] The solicitation remained fruitless. The great American
Republic was too intimately connected with France and England to
intervene on behalf of Greece. The small states knew too well from their
own experience how frail are the foundations upon which rest the honour
and the rights of weak neutrals in a world war.
Nevertheless, firm in the knowledge that he had the vast majority of the
nation behind him, M. Lambros, on 30 November, by a final letter,
declared to the French Admiral that his claim was utterly unacceptable.
"I do not wish to believe," he concluded, "that, after examining in a
spirit of goodwill and equity the reasons which render it impossible for
the Greek people and its Government to give you satisfaction, you will
proceed to measures which would be incompatible with the traditional
friendship between France and Greece, and which the people would justly
regard as hostile acts." [16]
In face of Greece's unequivocal determination not to yield, the Admiral
would have been well advised to insist with his Government on an amicable
accommodation. He had not the means of carrying out his threats. It is
true, his ships dominated the sea and their guns the capital; but, since
the Greeks were determined to stand another blockade and to risk the
bombardment of their capital rather than surrender their arms, how could
he take them without an army? The problem had not escaped the worthy
sailor. So grave a claim, he tells us, could not be enforced without
war; and the Entente Powers were not thinking of going to war with
Greece. Therefore, he had hit on the expedient of giving to his action
the name and, so far as the nature of the thing permitted, the character
of a "pacific demonstration." Not one shot would be fired except in
self-defence: the troops would not seek to seize the material by
violence: they would simply occupy certain points of vantage until they
received satisfaction. He admits that his confidence in the success of
these tactics, since his last interview with the King, had suffered some
diminution. But he still {159} nourished a hope--based on the fact "that
the Athens Government had always hitherto ended by bowing to our will."
[17] He overlooked the inflamed minds of the people.
Before break of day, on 1 December, a body of marines some 3,000 weak
landed at the Piraeus with machine-guns and marched on Athens in three
columns, driving back the Greek patrols, which retired at their approach,
and occupied some of the strategic positions aimed at without
encountering any resistance. So far the pacific demonstration lived up
to its name. Both sides conformed to their respective orders, which were
to avoid all provocation, and on no account to fire first. But for all
that the situation teemed with the elements of an explosion. Admiral
Dartige, on landing, had noted the faces of the people: sullen and
defiant, they faithfully reflected the anger which seethed in their
hearts. And, about 11 o'clock, at one point the smouldering embers burst
into flame. How, it is not known: as usually happens in such cases, each
side accused the other of beginning. Once begun, the fight spread along
the whole line to the French headquarters in the Zappeion.
At the sound of shots, King Constantine caused a telephone message to be
sent through the French Legation to the French flagship, asking for
Admiral Dartige, to beg him to stop the bloodshed. The officer at the
other end of the wire hesitated to disclose the Admiral's whereabouts,
fearing a trap; but at last he replied that his Chief had gone to the
Zappeion, where indeed he was found shut up. A parley between that
building and the Palace led to an armistice, during which negotiations
for a peace were initiated by the Entente Ministers. In the middle of
these, fighting broke out afresh; according to the Royalists, through the
action of the Venizelists who, desirous to profit by the foreign invasion
in order to promote a domestic revolution, opened rifle fire from the
windows, balconies, and roofs of certain houses upon the royal troops
patrolling the streets: a statement more than probable, seeing that arms
had long been stored in Venizelist houses with a view to such an
enterprise. At the same time, Admiral Dartige, who seems to have
completely lost his head, {160} considering the armistice at an end,
ordered the warships to start a bombardment.
While shells fell upon the outlying quarters of the town, and even into
the courtyard of the Royal Palace itself, forcing the Queen to put her
children in the cellar, the Entente Ministers arrived to conclude the
treaty:
"Are these your arguments, gentlemen?" asked the King, as he received
them. Amid the general consternation, he alone maintained his calmness.
The conference went on to the accompaniment of whistling and bursting
shells, and at 7 o'clock ended in an agreement, whereby Admiral Dartige
consented to stop hostilities and accept the King's offer of six mountain
batteries, in lieu of the ten he had demanded; the Entente Ministers
undertaking to recommend to their Governments the abandonment of his
other demands.
There ensued an exchange of prisoners, and the retreat of the Allies to
their ships during the night, followed next day by the detachment
quartered at the Zappeion, and all the controllers of police, posts,
telegraphs, telephones, and railways. Many of the ruffians in the pay of
the Franco-British Secret Services anticipated this evacuation by
slipping out of the capital which they had terrorized for nearly a year.
And so the pacific demonstration was over, having cost the Greeks 4
officers and 26 men killed, and 4 officers and 51 men wounded. The
Allied casualties were 60 killed, including 6 officers, and 167 wounded.
For the rest, no epithet was less applicable to the affair than that of
"Athenian Vespers," with which the Parisian press christened it. Admiral
Dartige protests indignantly against the grotesque exaggerations of his
imaginative compatriots. Apart from the tragic features natural to a
pacific demonstration, he declares that the whole drama passed off as
pleasantly as a drama could. Not a single Allied subject was
ill-treated. Not one shot was fired on the Legations of the Entente
Powers, whose Ministers and nationals, in the midst of it all, incurred
only such danger as came from their own shells--shells showered upon an
open town. Even the French bluejackets, who had long been a thorn in the
very heart of Athens, were conducted back to their proper place under a
Greek escort, ingloriously {161} but safely. A like spirit, to a still
higher degree, marked the treatment in Greek hospitals of the Allies'
wounded, whose rapid recovery, says the Admiral, testified to the care
which they received. "We assisted in a civil war: the Royalists struck
in our marines the protectors of their political enemies." [18]
It was upon those enemies that Royalist wrath satiated itself. On 2
December, veritable battles took place in many parts of Athens; suspect
houses, hotels, offices, and shops being assailed and defended with
murderous fury. The house of M. Venizelos, as was fitting, formed the
centre of the conflict. Twenty Cretan stalwarts had barricaded
themselves in it and held out until machine-guns persuaded them to
surrender. Within was discovered a small arsenal of rifles, revolvers,
hand-grenades, dynamite cartridges, fuses: among them a bundle of weapons
still wrapped in the French canvas in which it had arrived. Tell-tale
articles of a similar nature were discovered on the premises of other
conspirators, who were led off to prison, pursued by crowds hooting,
cursing, spitting at them, so that their escorts had the greatest
difficulty in saving them from being lynched. Although not comparable to
parallel scenes witnessed by many a Western city under analogous
circumstances, the event was an exhibition of human savagery sufficiently
ugly in itself: it did not require the legends of massacre and torture
with which it was embellished by pious journalists anxious to excite in
the Allied publics sympathy for persons whom the Allies' own advance had
instigated to violence and their precipitate retreat had exposed to a not
unmerited vengeance.[19]
[1] Du Fournet, pp. 188-9.
[2] Du Fournet, pp. 151, 179-80, 182-3, 190-1.
[3] Du Fournet, pp. 195-7.
[4] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 7/20 Nov, 1916.
[5] Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdani, Demidoff, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916.
[6] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916.
[7] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 9/22 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du
Fournet, pp. 192-4.
[8] Du Fournet, p. 187.
[9] Du Fournet, pp. 197-9.
[10] Du Fournet, pp. 201-4.
[11] Du Fournet, pp. 202-3.
[12] Du Fournet, pp. 208-9.
[13] Du Fournet, p. 205.
[14] Romanos, Paris, 15/28, 16/29 Nov.; Gennadius, London, 16/29 Nov.;
Panas, Petrograd, 17/30 Nov., 1916.
[15] Zalocostas to Ministers of the United States, etc., Athens, 14/27
Nov.
[16] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 17/30 Nov., 1916.
[17] Du Fournet, p. 204.
[18] Du Fournet, pp. 210-51; Paxton Hibben, pp. 440-80; _Resumé du
Rapport Official sur les Evenements du 18 novembre/1 decembre_, 1916.
[19] According to the Hellenic Government, the losses of the Royalists in
this civil strife amounted to 13 soldiers killed and 24 wounded, 6
civilians killed and 6 wounded, besides 5 killed (including 3 women) and
6 wounded (including 4 women) by the insurgents accidentally; the
Venizelist losses were limited to 3 killed and 2 wounded.--Zalocostas to
Greek Legations abroad, Athens, 27 Nov./10 Dec. 1916.
{162}