M. Venizelos had unfurled the standard of rebellion in the true spirit
of his temperament and traditions. To him civil war had nothing
repulsive about it: it was a normal procedure--a ladder to power.
Naturally, he persuaded others, and perhaps himself, that he acted
purely with the patriotic intention of devoting to the public benefit
the power which, for that purpose only, it became his duty to usurp.
Moved by the ambition to aggrandize Greece, he felt at liberty to use
whatever means might conduce to so desirable an end. The sole question
that troubled him was, whether this old ladder would serve him as
faithfully as in the past. And once again the answer depended on the
attitude of the "Protecting Powers."
Those Powers had hitherto blundered in all their Balkan dealings with
depressing uniformity. First came the mistake about Bulgaria. The
hate of the Greeks for the Bulgars was a psychological force which,
properly estimated and utilized, could without any difficulty have been
made to do our work for us. But that force was never properly
estimated by our diplomacy. The Entente Governments, instead of
enlisting it on their side, ranged it against them; thereby sacrificing
Servia and estranging Greece. To that initial error was added a
second. Until the truth could no longer be ignored, the Allies
persisted in the egregrious [Transcriber's note: egregious?] fallacy
that the popularity of King Constantine was as nothing compared with
the popularity of M. Venizelos--to our detriment. "Two years before,"
observes Admiral Dartige du Fournet, "all the Greeks were the friends
of France; in October, 1916, two-thirds of them were her enemies."
That was the fact; and, according to the same witness--who described
himself, not without reason, as "a Venizelist by profession"--the cause
was this: "The mass of the people of continental {140} Greece was
hostile to the Chief of the Liberals. When that mass saw that M.
Venizelos started a sedition and that we supported him, it became
plainly hostile to us." [1]
The Admiral mentions also German pressure, but he rightly regards it as
a subsidiary cause. The Germans did little more than "blow on the fire
kindled by our own clumsiness and violences." Baron Schenck, the
director of the German propaganda at Athens, watched our coercion of
King Constantine with that apparent indignation and secret joy which
the faults of an enemy inspire, and when expelled by the Allies, said
that he did not mind going: the Allies could be trusted to carry on his
mission. They did.
What their plan was will appear from their actions. We cannot
penetrate into the minds of men, and we cannot always believe their
words; but their actions are open to observation and speak more truly
than their lips.
As soon as he settled at Salonica, M. Venizelos applied to the Entente
Powers for official recognition of his Provisional Government. They
refused him this recognition: but instructed their Consuls to treat
with the Provisional Government "on a _de facto_ footing";[2] and,
while pouring cold water upon him with one hand, with the other they
gave him money. This mode of action was the result of a compromise,
achieved at the Boulogne Conference, between France and her partners.
A feeble and inconsequent way of doing things, no doubt. But to be
consequent and powerful, a partnership must be bottomed on some common
interest or sentiment; and such in the Greek question, as already
explained, did not exist.
At Athens the action of the Allies was less open to the criticism of
tameness.
After a life of three weeks passed in fruitless efforts to enter into
relations with the Entente Powers, even by proposing to discard the
Ministers obnoxious to them, the Calogeropoulos Cabinet resigned (4
Oct.), and King Constantine, having exhausted his stock of politicians,
sought a candidate for the Premiership in circles which, remote from
party intrigue, might have been thought immune from suspicion.
Professor Lambros, who accepted the {141} mandate (8 Oct.), was known
as a grave savant, generally esteemed for his kindly nature as much as
for his intellectual eminence and administrative capacity. But
Professor Lambros laboured under the universal disability of not being
a Venizelist. Therefore, he was "believed to be Germanophile," and it
was "questionable whether his Cabinet will be recognized by the Entente
Powers." [3] However, in less than a week, he "established contact"
with their representatives. It was "contact" in a sense of the term
more familiar to soldiers than to statesmen.
On 10 October Admiral Dartige de Fournet resumed his activities by
launching on the Hellenic Government an Ultimatum. Greece was
summoned, within twenty-four hours, to disarm her big ships, to hand
over to him all her light ships intact, and to disarm all her coast
batteries, except three which were to be occupied by the Allies. In
addition, the port of the Piraeus, the railways, and the police were to
be placed under Allied control.
The demand for her Fleet, Greece was told, arose from uneasiness about
the safety of the Allied armada--a pretext that exposed itself: the
Greek Fleet consisted of only five battleships dating from 1891-2,
except one whose date was 1908; two cruisers, dating from 1911 and
1914; and a microscopic light flotilla. "To see there a serious
danger, it would be puerile," says Admiral Dartige himself; and far
from feeling elated at the success of the operation, he tells us that
he "suffered at being constrained by events to use force against a
neutral and weak nation." But he had to do it: though not a matter to
be proud of, it was a precaution not altogether unjustifiable. He
could, however, neither justify nor qualify the other measures. They
involved, he says, a high-handed encroachment on the internal affairs
of the country--an abuse of power pure and simple: "We admitted
officially the right of Greece to neutrality, and yet we laid hands
upon part of her national life, even upon the secrets of the private
life of every Greek. It was the execution of the plan which the
admirals assembled at Malta had repelled in March, 1916. Well might
the Germanophiles point out that Germany did not act thus in Denmark,
in Sweden, in Holland; that a victor would not have imposed {142}
harder terms of armistice." These measures were entirely the work of
the French Government: the French Admiral himself disapproved of them
as much as did the Ministers of England and Russia.[4]
The Hellenic Government could not be deceived by pretexts which their
very authors despised. But neither could it argue with persons
accustomed to
"Decide all controversies by
Infallible artillery,
And prove their doctrine orthodox
By apostolic blows and knocks."
It could only protest and submit.
The Hellenic people proved less discreet. What could be the motive of
such measures? they asked. Were they intended to prevent or to provoke
troubles? The answer lay under their very eyes. From the moment when
M. Venizelos left Athens, the Allies did everything they could to
assist his partisans in following the Leader to Salonica. Their
warships patrolled the coast picking up rebels, and giving them a free
passage: even entertaining the more important among them as the
personal guests of the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship. But now
they took the movement openly under their direction. With an excess of
zeal which the British Minister deplored and the French Admiral himself
condemned, the French Secret Service at Athens organized convoys of
insurgents which defiled through the streets of the capital escorted by
French marines under French officers in uniform.[5]
The resentment of the Greeks was intense; but the consciousness of
impotence served as a curb on their emotions. It is true that one day,
as Allied aeroplanes flew over Athens, they were greeted with derisive
shouts: "Not here; to Berlin!" another day, as a band of rebels were
convoyed through the principal streets by the French, the crowds gave
vent to lively protests; and every day the newspapers told the
champions of Liberty and Justice what they thought of them so frankly
that the French Chief of the Police Control had to warn their editors
to desist on pain of suspension. But of active hostility, such as any
western capital would have manifested in similar circumstances, there
was no sign at Athens. The only impressive manifestations were
manifestations of {143} loyalty to the King, who set his subjects the
example of self-restraint. At a review of the crews of the warships
taken by the French, he thanked them for their fidelity and expressed
the hope that they would soon be able to return to their vessels.
After this quiet ceremony, bodies of citizens paraded the streets
carrying portraits of their sovereign.[6]
Had there been no popular demonstrations at all, one can fancy M.
Venizelos and the Allies pointing to that fact as proof of their
contention that the great majority of the people remained Venizelist.
As it was, they derived what profit they could from the opposite fact.
The various incidents were attributed by the Anglo-French and
Venizelist journals to German intrigue. The consolation which the King
administered to his sailors--men who had so brilliantly disappointed
the rebels' expectations by not deserting--was twisted into a defiance
of the Entente. The bodies of peaceful demonstrators were exaggerated
into crowds of rioters. And so, "in the interests of public order,"
Admiral Dartige proceeded to land reinforcements for the police: 1,200
bluejackets. Some occupied the town hall at the Piraeus and the
railway stations; some went to the forts on the heights; others were
posted about the harbour, or were told off to patrol the streets (16
Oct.), while a detachment was quartered at Athens itself, in the
Zappeion--a large exhibition building within a few hundred yards of the
Royal Palace.[7]
Under such circumstances the diplomatic intercourse between the Entente
and the new Greek Government went on. M. Lambros declared that he
intended to continue his predecessor's policy of friendly relations
with all the belligerents and of benevolent neutrality towards the
Allies, dwelling on the fact that nearly everyone of his predecessors
had plainly stated Greece's willingness to co-operate with the Entente
on terms not contrary to her own interests, and recalling that the
Calogeropoulos Ministry had set forth the conditions of co-operation,
but the Entente Governments had given no reply. So the Premier spoke
to the Entente representatives and asked that the coercive measures
might be brought to an end, {144} expressing the fear lest, should
these measures go beyond a certain limit, their acceptance by Greece
might become very difficult, and emphasizing the sorrow which the Greek
people felt at seeing its independence fettered.[8]
England found this declaration satisfactory; but before answering it
definitely, she must take counsel with her allies.[9] France, by the
mouth of M. Briand, pronounced the allusion to friendly relations with
all the belligerents unfortunate: she was unable to understand how
Greece could maintain friendly relations with Germany and even with
Bulgaria after the occupation of Eastern Macedonia.[10] And so, having
taken counsel together, the Allies set forth their views in a tardy
reply to King Constantine's last offer. The gist of it was contained
in this phrase: "The Greek Government has several times since the
beginning of the War offered to come in on our side; but its offers,
and particularly the last one, were accompanied by conditions which
rendered them unacceptable." The Entente Powers added that they did
not want Greece, unless she declared, on her own initiative, war
against Bulgaria. It was the only way to gain their confidence.[11]
In other words, Greece should take the field without any agreement, so
that she should have no claims either to adequate support during the
war or to compensations at the conclusion of peace: nay, it was even
hoped in Paris and London that Bulgaria might yet be seduced from the
Central Powers, and in that case not only would Greece gain nothing in
Thrace, but might very likely lose a portion of Macedonia.[12] It was
the old story--to which King Constantine could never listen. He would
suffer anything rather than plunge his country into war without even an
assurance of its territorial integrity. When at this juncture a
well-intentioned adviser warned him that his policy might cost him his
throne, he answered promptly: "I do not care about my throne. I only
think of Greece." [13]
{145}
At the same time, there was little he would not do to remove those
fears and suspicions which were perpetually pleaded as reasons for
coercion. The surrender of the Fleet had allayed once for all the
Allies' uneasiness about their forces at sea. There remained their
uneasiness about their forces on land. In spite of his repeated
declarations that under no circumstances would Greece take up a hostile
attitude, the King was credited with a treacherous design--to mass in
Thessaly 80,000 men, lay up munitions and provisions, wait until the
Allied Army should march on Monastir, and then attack it from
behind.[14] After reading M. Venizelos's own avowal of his intention
to follow up the conversion of Macedonia with an attack on the rest of
Greece, particularly Thessaly,[15] one hardly needs to be told at whom
King Constantine's precautions were aimed.
Yet, wishing to prove his good faith in a practical manner, the King
called the British Minister and offered to reduce his army to less than
half by disbanding about 35,000 men and to withdraw certain units from
Thessaly. The British Minister, delighted by this spontaneous offer,
thanked the King, expressing the hope that his action would be greatly
appreciated, that all mistrust would vanish, and that the Powers would
moderate their coercions. With a remark from the King, that the one
thing he would not tolerate was a descent of rebels on Thessaly and the
rest of Old Greece, and that he would attack them if they appeared, Sir
Francis Elliot fully concurred.
Instead of the return which the King expected to this spontaneous proof
of his sincerity, he received (20 October) an intimation that the
Powers not only demanded what he had already granted, but in addition
things which he could not possibly grant--the internment of the small
remnant of his army in the Peloponnesus and a surrender of arms and war
material equivalent to a complete disarmament. These measures, while
exceeding all requirements for the security of the Allies, put the
security of Greece in danger by leaving her a prey to revolutionary
agitation. The King, therefore, begged the Powers not {146} to insist
on concessions which neither could he make nor would his people let him
make.[16]
Nothing, indeed, was better calculated to excite to the highest degree
the passions fermenting against the Allies than an insistence on total
disarmament at a moment when M. Venizelos at Salonica and his partisans
at Athens were arming. Fortunately a mediator appeared in the person
of M. Benazet, a French Deputy and Reporter of the War Budget, who was
passing through Athens on his way to Salonica to inspect the sanitary
condition of the Army. His connexions had brought him into touch with
the most influential leaders of both Greek parties; and with the
sanction of M. Briand, procured through M. Guillemin, who, himself no
longer received at Court, saw an advantage in reaching it by proxy, he
undertook to negotiate an amicable arrangement between King Constantine
and the Entente.
M. Benazet's idea was to obtain from the King not only tangible pledges
which would eliminate all possibility of danger from the Allies' path,
but also positive reinforcements for them in arms and men; and as a
price he was prepared to guarantee to Old Greece her neutrality, her
liberty in the management of her internal affairs, and her immunity
from aggression on the part of M. Venizelos. Young, eloquent, and
refined, the spokesman brought into an environment corrupted by
diplomatic chicanery a breath of candour. His manner inspired and
evoked confidence. The King readily agreed, besides the reduction
which he had already offered, to transfer the remainder of his army to
the Peloponnesus, to hand over to the Allies a considerable stock of
guns, rifles, and other war material, and to allow all men who were
released from their military obligations, and all officers who first
resigned their commissions, to volunteer for service in Macedonia. M.
Benazet, on his part, made himself guarantor for the French Government
as to the pledges which the King required in exchange.[17]
This agreement met, at least in appearance, with the approval of M.
Briand, who sent a telegram of congratulations {127} to M. Benazet,[18]
and with that of M. Guillemin, who was at last received by the King.
Both the French Premier and his representative at Athens expressed
themselves enchanted with the new turn of affairs, and even the
fire-breathing Head of the French Secret Service declared that the
result of the negotiation surpassed all hopes. As to Admiral Dartige,
he could not but rejoice at an arrangement so consonant with his own
ideas.[19] Thus all outstanding differences seemed happily settled,
and the removal of mutual misunderstandings was celebrated by inspired
pens in Paris and London.[20]
The only discordant note was struck by the Venizelist Press, which made
no attempt to conceal its disappointment. And suddenly, just as the
withdrawal of the royal troops from the north was about to begin, the
troops of the Provisional Government attacked Katerini on the southern
frontier of Macedonia. M. Venizelos had dropped the pose that his
movement was directed solely against the Bulgars: he marched on Old
Greece. Did he by this move try to force the hand of the Allies, as
formerly by bringing them to Salonica he had tried to force the hand of
the King? And was he encouraged in this move by those who were
secretly opposed to an accommodation with the King? Admiral Dartige
did not know. What he did know was that this _coup de force_ was
designed to compromise the arrangement with Athens; and as he could
neither play nor appear to play a double game, he immediately
telegraphed to Salonica demanding the retreat of the Venizelists. At
the same time the King informed the French and British Ministers that
he could not withdraw his troops from Thessaly until all danger was
removed, and asked them to do everything that depended on them to
remedy this state of things. Whereupon General Roques, the French
Minister of War then at Salonica, disavowed the Venizelist action, and
to prevent similar exploits in future decided to create a neutral zone
under French occupation and administration. The Athens Government was
not pleased to see part of its territory passing into French hands;
but, after some demur, bowed to the decision.[21]
{148}
Not so the Salonica Government. M. Venizelos keenly resented this
barrier to his impetuosity. The neutral zone, he complained, by
blocking off his access to Thessaly, forbade all extension of his
movement and prevented him from "carrying with him three-fifths of
Greece and levying important contingents such as would have made him
the absolute master of the country." [22] But the Allies were no
longer to be deluded. They had discovered that "the mass of the people
of continental Greece was hostile to the Chief of the Liberals." An
extension of his movement could only be effected by overwhelming force,
and as M. Venizelos had neither the men nor the arms required for the
enterprise, the Allies would have to provide both. In other words,
civil war in the rear of their armies would not only jeopardise their
security but entangle them in a campaign for the conquest of Greece: a
thing which they could not afford to do even to oblige M. Venizelos.
They preferred a subtler and safer, if slower, way to the success of
their common cause.
Baulked in his design on continental Greece, M. Venizelos demanded from
Admiral Dartige the light flotilla in order to promote his cause in the
islands. But here, also, he met with a check. The Admiral had a
different use for those vessels in view. Many months back he felt the
want of patrol and torpedo-boats to cope with the growing submarine
peril, and had suggested asking Greece for the cession of her light
flotilla. The matter was postponed in the expectation that the vessels
would go over to the Allies spontaneously as a result of the Venizelist
movement, and on this expectation being disappointed they were, as we
have seen, sequestered under the pretence of security for the Allied
armada. Another excuse was needed for their appropriation; and it came
in the nick of time: two Greek steamers at that moment struck mines,
presumably sown by an enemy submarine, in the Gulf of Athens. With the
promptitude that comes of practice, Admiral Dartige announced to the
Hellenic Government his decision to employ, at a valuation, its light
flotilla in the submarine {149} warfare, and to use the Salamis arsenal
for repairs (3 November.)[23]
M. Lambros replied that compliance with the Admiral's request involved
a breach of International Law, which forbade the sale of naval units by
a neutral State to a belligerent, as well as a breach of a Greek law
which forbade the alienation of ships possessing military value.
Besides, public opinion would never endure to see the country stripped
of its naval means of defence and exposed to possible aggression. He
was, therefore, regretfully obliged to refuse the Hellenic Government's
consent.[24]
The Admiral could not let a refusal stand in his way: "It would be
unpardonable," he wrote in answer, "to leave these vessels unutilized
whilst German submarines, heedless of the neutrality of Greece, came
and sank her merchant ships in her waters, thus stopping maritime
traffic and seriously prejudicing the life of the country." [25]
Having got over these little formalities, he hoisted the French flag on
the vessels and seized the arsenal (7 November). The Hellenic
Government's protest against this fresh outrage,[26] naturally, had no
effect. Only the British Minister made it clear that the act was
exclusively the work of France.[27]
Nothing done by one group of belligerents, needless to say, escaped the
attention of the other; and the representatives of the enemy Powers,
besides fulminating against a step which, "in flagrant contravention of
the principles of neutrality came to augment the armed forces of their
adversaries," improved the occasion by reciting all the proofs of "a
benevolent neutrality without parallel," which Greece had been giving
those adversaries since the beginning of the War: the free passage of
munitions and provisions for Servia; the facilities accorded to Entente
shipping; the toleration of recruiting bureaux and wireless stations in
Greek territory; the use of isles and ports as naval bases. Then the
landing of the Allies in Macedonia {150} had inaugurated a period of
continuous violations of neutrality and the establishment of a regime
of terror towards them: their Consuls were arrested, members of their
Legations were assaulted, great numbers of their nationals were led
into captivity or driven into exile, their merchant ships were seized,
and the Ministers themselves were deprived of all means of
communicating with their Governments. Last of all came the
installation of Allied troops in Athens itself and the sequestration of
the Greek navy, now transformed into a definite cession; and,
according to trustworthy intelligence, the Entente Powers meant to
exact shortly the disarmament of the Greek army also. They ended with
a hint that the indulgence of their Governments might reach its
limit.[28]
A more painful position for a free people and its rulers could not be
imagined. But King Constantine comforted himself with the thought that
the "pledges of friendship" exacted from him by the Allies would be
followed by corresponding pledges from them. His negotiation with M.
Benazet had received its finishing touches in the evening of 7
November: the Entente Powers would present to the Greek Government a
Note setting forth their demands in the form of a "Summons," the terms
of which were, word for word, agreed upon between the two parties. By
this document the Allies bound themselves "to repeal the coercive
measures taken up to now and never to tolerate that armed Greek bodies
which had declared to have as their sole aim a struggle for the
vindication of national ideas should turn aside from that aim in order
to engage in acts of sedition." [29]
This clause formed the corner-stone of the whole pact. "It is clear,"
telegraphs M. Benazet to Paris, "that some sort of compensation is
admitted in principle,"--for very good reasons: "The King's sole
fear--and a very intelligible one--is lest his own arms should be
handed over to Greeks who would use them to march on Athens and
overthrow his dynasty." Moreover, without such guarantees it will be
impossible for the King and his Premier "to make disarmament acceptable
by the Royalist Party, {151} which constitutes the great majority of
the nation." He added that neither the King nor his Premier was
unaware of the hostility with which these efforts for conciliation were
viewed by certain personalities: but both were resolved to show the
greatest patience until the agreement had produced all its effects.
The negotiator himself, equally aware of the hostile forces at work,
left Athens with a heart full of misgivings.[30]
[1] Du Fournet, pp. 132, 171.
[2] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _The Times_, 17 Oct., 1916.
[3] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 8 Oct., 1916.
[4] Du Fournet, pp. 138-9, 141-3.
[5] Du Fournet, pp. 133-5, 146.
[6] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 16 Oct., 1916.
[7] Du Fournet, pp. 146-8.
[8] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16
Oct., 1916.
[9] Gennadius, London, 6/19 Oct., 1916.
[10] Romanos, Paris, 7/20 Oct., 1916.
[11] Gennadius, London, 10/23 Oct., 1916.
[12] Romanos, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916; Cp. Deville, pp. 221.
foll.; Du Fournet, p. 171.
[13] P. E. Drakoulis, in _The Times_, 30 Nov., 1920.
[14] Du Fournet, p. 149.
[15] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917.
[16] Zalocostas to Greek Legations. Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd,
7/20 Oct., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 149-50.
[17] Du Fournet, pp. 152-4, and Appendix 5.
[18] Du Fournet, p. 316.
[19] Du Fournet, pp. 155-6.
[20] _The Times_, 28 Oct., 1 Nov., 1916.
[21] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 12 Oct./3 Nov.;
General Roques to Greek Premier, Athens, 2/15 Nov.; Zalocostas to Greek
Legation, Paris, 4/17 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 169-70, 182.
[22] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917.
[23] Du Fournet, pp. 135-6, 165, 167, 183.
[24] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916.
[25] Dartige du Fournet to Lambros, on board the _Provence_, 7 Nov.,
1916.
[26] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 25 Oct./7 Nov., 1916.
[27] Du Fournet, p. 168.
[28] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 26 Oct./8
Nov., 1916.
[29] Du Fournet, p. 177.
[30] Du Fournet, pp. 174-8.
{152}