Rumania's policy had always been regarded by the Greeks as of capital
importance for their own; and as soon as she took the field, King
Constantine, though suffering from a recrudescence of the malady that had
nearly killed him in the previous year, set to work to consider whether
her adhesion did not make such a difference in the military situation as
to enable him to abandon neutrality. Two or three days before the
arrival of the Allied Fleet he had initiated conversations in that sense
with the Allied Ministers.[1]
Simultaneously the question of a war Government came up for discussion;
the actual Cabinet being, by order of the Allies, a mere business
Ministry charged only to carry on the administration until the election
of a new Parliament.
Two alternatives were suggested. The first, which found warm favour in
Entente circles, was that M. Zaimis should lay down the cares of office
and make place for M. Venizelos. Constantine was advised to "bend his
stubborn will to the inevitable and remain King of the Hellenes"--that
is, to become an ornamental captain--by abandoning the ship of State to
the management of the wise Cretan. "It is now possible," the homily ran,
"that the precipitation of events will prevent the return of M.
Venizelos by the voice of the electorate." But that did not signify: "M.
Venizelos can count on the backing of nine-tenths of the nation, given a
semblance of Royal support." [1] In less trenchant language, the British
Minister at Athens expounded the same thesis.
But Constantine showed little inclination to perform this noble act of
self-effacement. On no account would {115} he have a dictator imposed
upon him to shape the fortunes of Greece according to his caprice,
unfettered by "military advisers of limited perceptions." If Greece was
to have a dictator, the King had said long ago, he would rather be that
dictator; though he had no objection to a Cabinet with a Venizelist
admixture. In fact, he insisted on M. Venizelos accepting a share in the
responsibility of war, either by himself sitting in the Cabinet or by
permitting three of his friends to represent him in it. "It will not
do," he said frankly, "to have his crowd standing out, trying to break up
the army and making things difficult by criticizing the Government." [3]
The other alternative was that M. Zaimis should be invested with
political functions; but for this the consent of the Allies and of their
protégé was needed. The latter, in his oration of 27 August, had
magnanimously declared himself willing, provided his policy were adopted,
to leave the execution of it in the hands of M. Zaimis, whose honesty and
sincerity remained above all suspicion: "the Liberal Party," he had said,
"are prepared to back this Cabinet of Affairs with their political
authority." On being asked by M. Zaimis to explain precisely what he
meant, M. Venizelos broached the subject of elections. As already seen,
he and the Allies had reason to regret and to elude the test which they
had exacted. It was, therefore, not surprising that M. Venizelos should
stipulate, with the concurrence of the Entente Ministers, that the
elections now imminent be postponed to the Greek Kalends.[4] By
accepting this condition, M. Zaimis obtained a promise of support; and
straightway (2 Sept.) proceeded to sound London and Paris.
Before making any formal proposal, he wanted to know if the Western
Powers would at least afford Greece the money and equipment which she
required in order to prepare with a view to eventual action. England
welcomed these overtures, convinced that thus all misunderstandings
between Greece and the Allies would vanish; {116} but, before giving a
definite reply, she had to communicate with France. France manifested
the greatest satisfaction; but M. Briand urged that there was no time for
negotiations: the vital interests of Greece demanded immediate action:
she should hasten to make a formal declaration without delay; after which
he would do all that was necessary to provide her, as soon as possible,
with money and material. M. Zaimis in his very first dispatch had said:
"Unfortunately the state of our finances and of our military organization
does not permit us to think of immediate action: we need a certain delay
for preparation"; and all the exhortations of M. Briand to leap first and
look afterwards failed to move him. Besides the matter of equipment--a
matter in which the Entente Powers, owing to their own necessities, had
been the reverse of liberal to their small allies, as Belgium and Servia
had already found, and Rumania was about to find to her cost--there was
another point Greek statesmen and strategists had to weigh very carefully
before committing themselves: would Rumania co-ordinate her military
action with theirs? Unless she were inclined and able to divert enough
forces from the Austro-Hungarian to the Bulgarian frontier, her entry
into the War could not be of any help to them. So, after nine days'
correspondence, we find M. Zaimis still writing: "When the English answer
arrives, the Royal Government will take account of it in the examination
in which it will engage before taking a definite decision--a decision
which will be subordinated to its military preparations and to the course
of war operations in the East." [5]
Directly afterwards (11 Sept.) M. Zaimis resigned "for reasons of
health." These reasons convinced no one: everyone agreed in ascribing
his withdrawal to his discovery that he was the victim of duplicity; but
as to whose duplicity, opinions differed. According to M. Venizelos,
while the conversations about entering the War went on, King Constantine,
in consequence of a telegram from the {117} Kaiser assuring him that
within a month the Germans would have overrun Rumania and flung Sarrail's
army into the sea, and asking him to hold out, reverted to the policy of
neutrality; and M. Zaimis, realizing that he was being fooled, refused to
play the King's game and resigned.[6] For this statement we have M.
Venizelos's authority; and against it that of M. Zaimis, who, on hearing
from Paris that his resignation gave rise to the supposition that the old
policy had prevailed, replied: "My impression is that the Cabinet which
will succeed me will not quit the line of policy which I have pursued."
[7]
Another account connected the fall of the Cabinet with an incident which
occurred at that critical moment and strained the situation to the
utmost. In the evening of 9 September, as the Entente Ministers held a
conference in the French Legation, a score of scallywags rushed into the
courtyard, shouting "Long live the King! Down with France and England!"
fired a few revolver shots in the air, and bolted. Immediately M. Zaimis
hastened to the Legation and expressed his regrets. But that did not
suffice to placate the outraged honour of the French Republic. Despite
the objections of his colleagues, M. Guillemin had a detachment of
bluejackets landed to guard the Legation; and next day a Note was
presented to the Greek Premier demanding that the perpetrators of this
grave breach of International Law should be discovered and punished, and
that all Reservists' leagues should instantly be broken up. It was even
proposed that the King should be asked to issue a Proclamation disavowing
and condemning the demonstration. Inquiry proved that the demonstration
was the work of _agents provocateurs_ in the pay of the French Secret
Service which acted in the interest of M. Venizelos.
Whereupon, M. Zaimis, realizing that the negotiations he was trying to
conduct could not be sincere on the part of the French, begged to be
relieved of his mandate. The King was loth to let him go. The British
Minister was equally upset, and added his plea to that of the Sovereign.
M. Zaimis said that, if M. Guillemin disavowed {118} the intrigue and
displayed a willingness to continue the negotiations in a spirit of
candour, he would remain; but M. Guillemin could not bring himself to go
so far.[8]
Whatever may be the truth in this matter--for, owing to lack of
documentary evidence, it is impossible fully to ascertain the truth--the
whole position, for a man of M. Zaimis's character, was untenable: if
sense of duty had prompted him to take up the burden, common-sense
counselled him to lay it down. So he resigned; and the fat was once more
in the fire--and the blaze and the stench were greater than ever; for his
resignation synchronized with another untoward event.
Colonel Hatzopoulos with his own and the Serres Division had for some
time past been isolated at Cavalla--the Bulgars occupying the forts on
one side, while the British blockaded the harbour on the other.
Suddenly, upon a false report that King Constantine had fled to Larissa
and Venizelos was master at Athens, the demeanour of the Bulgars, which
had always been harsh, became thoroughly hostile. They strengthened
their outposts, cut off the food supplies that came from Drama and
Serres, and, on 6 September, demanded that the heights immediately above
the town still held by the Greeks should be abandoned to them, on the
plea that otherwise they would be unable to defend themselves in case of
an Entente landing: refusal would be considered an unfriendly act. As
his orders forbade resistance, Colonel Hatzopoulos had no choice but to
yield. Thus the Greeks were reduced to absolute helplessness; and their
isolation was completed on 9 September, when British sailors landed and
destroyed the wireless station.
The worst was yet to come. Next morning (10 Sept.) a German officer
peremptorily notified Colonel Hatzopoulos on the part of Marshal von
Hindenburg that, as the Greek troops scattered over Eastern Macedonia
obstructed the operations of the Bulgarian army, they should all be
concentrated at Drama. Colonel Hatzopoulos, perceiving that compliance
meant captivity in the hands of the Bulgars, asked that, as his
instructions were that all the troops should concentrate at Cavalla, and
as he could not act otherwise without orders from the King, he might be
{119} allowed to send a messenger to Athens via Monastir. This being
refused on the ground that the journey would take too long, he pleaded
his inability to decide about so grave a matter on his own initiative,
but must call a council of the principal officers. Meanwhile, in order
to avoid capture by the Bulgars, he asked if, should they decide to
surrender, Hindenburg would guarantee their transportation to Germany
with their arms. The German promised to communicate with headquarters
and to let him know the answer on the following morning.
Evidently the invaders, who would formerly have been more than content
with the withdrawal of the Greek forces, were now--in violation of the
pledges given to Athens by the German and Bulgarian Governments--resolved
on making such withdrawal impossible. It is not hard to account for this
change. The pledges were given in the belief that Greece would continue
neutral. This belief had been shaken not only by the Venizelist
movement, but more severely still by M. Zaimis's soundings of the Entente
Powders. The Greek Premier had from the first insisted on secrecy,
stating among the main reasons which rendered absolute discretion
imperative, "the presence in part of our territory of the eventual
adversary," and "the need to extricate two divisions and a large quantity
of material" from their grip.[9] Nevertheless, the Entente Press gloried
in the hope that the Allies would soon have the only non-belligerent
Balkan State fighting on their side, and the principal Entente news
agency trumpeted abroad M. Zaimis's confidential conversations.[10]
Hence the desire of the Germano-Bulgars to prevent the escape of men and
material that might at any moment be used against them.
On the other hand, the Greek officers' council decided {120} to try first
every means of escape, and only if that proved impossible to comply with
the German demand on condition that they should be taken to Germany and
not be left in the hands of the Bulgars. Accordingly, Colonel
Hatzopoulos addressed a most earnest appeal to the British for vessels to
get his men away to Volo or the Piraeus, and, having received a promise
to that effect, he secretly arranged for flight. In the night of 10
September all the men with their belongings gathered on the sea-front
ready to leave. But they reckoned without the partisans of M. Venizelos
in their midst. One of them, the Commandant of the Serres Division, a
month ago had informed General Sarrail that he would fight on the side of
the Allies,[11] and another on 5 September, in a nocturnal meeting on
board a British man-of-war, had proposed to kidnap Colonel Hatzopoulos,
arm volunteers, and attack the Bulgars with the aid of Allied detachments
landed at Cavalla. His proposal having been rejected, it was agreed that
all "patriotic" elements should be transported to Salonica. In pursuance
of this agreement, only those were allowed to embark who were willing to
rebel. Those who refused to break their oath of allegiance to their King
were turned adrift. Some tried to gain the island of Thasos, but their
boats were carried to the open sea and capsized, drowning many, the rest
got back to the shore in despair.
As a last hope of escape, Colonel Hatzopoulos begged the British naval
authorities, who controlled all means of communication between Cavalla
and Athens, to transmit to his Government a message asking if he might
surrender to the British and be interned in the isle of Thasos. The
message was duly transmitted through the British Legation on 11
September, and in reply the Greek Minister of War, after an understanding
with the British authorities, ordered him through the same channel to
embark at once with all his men and, if possible, material for Volo, on
Greek ships by preference, but if such were not available, on any other
ships. Whether these orders were never forwarded, or whether they
reached their destination too late, is not quite clear. It is certain,
however, that during the critical hours when the fate of the unhappy
soldiers hung in the balance, the British Fleet did not permit
embarkation {121} except to the few who joined the Rebellion.[12] For
the loyal majority there was nothing left but the way to Drama.
Nor was any time allowed for vacillation. When, in the morning of 11
September, Colonel Hatzopoulos met the German officer, the latter handed
to him a telegram from Hindenburg, guaranteeing the transport of the
Greeks to Germany with their arms, where they would be treated as guests.
He added that the departure from Cavalla would not be enforced for the
present. But in the afternoon he intimated that this was due to a
misunderstanding, and that they should leave the same night. Their
efforts to escape had obviously become known to the Germans, who, taking
no chances, imposed immediate departure under threat to cancel
Hindenburg's guarantee. Thus, the two Greek divisions were under
compulsion huddled off to Drama, whence, joined by the division stationed
there, they were taken to Germany and interned at Goerlitz.[13]
Nothing that had hitherto happened served so well to blacken the rulers
of Greece in the eyes of the Entente publics, and the mystery which
enveloped the affair facilitated the propagation of fiction. It was
asserted that the surrendered troops amounted to 25,000--even to 40,000:
figures which were presently reduced to "some 8,000: three divisions,
each composed of three regiments of 800 men each." The surrender was
represented as made by order of the Athens Government: King Constantine,
out of affection for Germany and Bulgaria, and hate of {122} France and
England, had given up, not only rich territories he himself had
conquered, but also the soldiers he had twice led to victory.
In point of fact, as soon as the Athens Government heard of the
catastrophe--and it did not hear of it until after the arrival of the
first detachment in Germany--it addressed to Berlin a remonstrance,
disavowing the step of Colonel Hatzopoulos as contrary to his orders, and
denying Germany's right to keep him as contrary to International Law:
"for Greece being in peaceful and friendly relations with Germany, the
Greek troops can neither be treated as prisoners of war nor be interned,
internment being only possible in a neutral country, and only with regard
to belligerent troops--not vice versa." The dispatch ended with a
request that "our troops with their arms and baggage be transported to
the Swiss frontier, whence they may go to some Mediterranean port and
return to Greece on ships which we shall send for the purpose." [14]
Berlin answered that she "was ready to meet the desire of the Greek
Government, but actual and effective guarantees would have to be given
that the troops under German protection would not be prevented by the
Entente Powers from returning to their fatherland, and would not be
punished for their loyal and neutral feeling and action." [15] This
because the Entente press was angrily denouncing the step as a
"disgraceful desertion" and asking "with what ignominious penalty their
War Lord has visited so signal and so heinous an act of mutiny, perjury,
and treason on the part of his soldiers" [16]--the soldiers who went to
Germany precisely in order to avoid committing an act of mutiny, perjury,
and treason. Truly, in time of war words change their meaning.
[1] See _Constantine I and the Greek People_. By Paxton Hibben, an
American journalist who took part in these diplomatic transactions, pp.
281-90.
[2] See Crawfurd Price, Athens, 1 Sept., in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, 15
Sept., 1916.
[3] Paxton Hibben, p. 289.
[4] "_La question de la dissolution de la Chambre fut écartée. . . . De
plus tout faisait supposer que de nouvelles élections ne seraient pas
favorables an parti venizéliste, dont la cause était si intimement liée à
la nôtre._"--Du Fournet, pp. 121-2; Paxton Hibben, pp. 278-9, 306-7.
[5] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; Rome,
Bucharest, Petrograd, 29 Aug./11 Sept. Romanos, Paris, 20 Aug./2 Sept.,
22 Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 26 Aug./8 Sept. Gennadius, London, 22
Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 1916.
[6] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917.
[7] Romanos, Paris, 31 Aug./13 Sept.; Zaimis, Athens, 1/14 Sept., 1916.
[8] Paxton Hibben, pp. 313-19; Du Fournet, pp. 119-21, 129.
[9] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept., 1916.
All his dispatches are marked "strictly confidential and to be deciphered
by the Minister himself." The replies are to be addressed to him
personally, and for greater security, must be prefaced by some
meaningless groups of figures.
[10] See messages from the Athens Correspondents of _The Times_ and the
_Daily Chronicle_, 3 Sept.; Reuter, Athens, 9 Sept., 1916. In view of
the strict censorship exercised during the war and in view of the
Franco-Venizelist anxiety to rush Greece into a rupture these
indiscretions can hardly be considered accidental.
[11] Sarrail, p. 152.
[12] King Constantine has publicly taxed the Allies with not forwarding
the orders (see _The Times_, 8 Nov., 1920). On the other hand, there is
on record a statement by Vice-Consul Knox that the orders were forwarded
from Athens and that he himself delivered them at Cavalla. Cp. Admiral
Dartige du Fournet: "_Au moment ou les Grecs virent les Bulgares en
marche sur Cavalla, Us voulurent embarquer lews troupes et leur matériel.
L'amiral anglais qui commandait en mer Egée leur refusa son concours,
espérant sans doute les déeterminer à se défendre. Quand, se rendant un
compte plus exact de la situation, il donna son assentiment à cette
évacuation, il étaii trop tard: les Bulgares entraient à Cavalla le jour
même._"--Du Fournet, p. 151.
[13] My chief sources of information concerning this event are a Report
by Col. Hatzopoulos to Marshal von Hindenburg, dated "Goerlitz, 13/26
Oct., 1916," and another report drawn up at Athens in July, 1921, from
the records of the judicial investigation instituted by the Venizelos
Government in 1919, including the evidence of the British Vice-Consul G.
G. Knox.
[14] _White Book_, No. 173.
[15] Telegram from Berlin reported by Renter's Amsterdam Correspondent,
23 Sept., 1916. I find this confirmed by a dispatch from the Greek
Minister at Berlin (Theotokis, Berlin, 18/31 Oct., 1916), in which he
gives an account of his efforts to obtain from the German Government the
return of the troops and restitution of the war material, as well as the
Greek officers' protests to Hindenburg and Ludendorff against the
pressure under which they had been hurried from Cavalla. It is to be
regretted that M. Venizelos did not find room for this document and for
Col. Hatzopoulos's illuminating Report in his _White Book_.
[16] Leading article in _The Times_, 19 Sept., 1916.
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