In their Note of 21 June the Allies assured the Greek people that they
acted for its sake as much as for their own. One half of the preamble
was taken up by their grievances against the Skouloudis Government--its
toleration of foreign propagandists and its connivance at the entry of
enemies, which formed a fresh menace for their armies. The other half
was devoted to the violation of the Constitution by the dissolution of
two Chambers within less than a year and the subjection of the country
to a regime of tyranny. Their aim, they said, was to safeguard the
Greek people in the enjoyment of its rights and liberties.[1]
These generous sentiments left the Greek people strangely cold.
Indeed, the absence of any manifestations of popular joy at the Allies'
success was as striking as had been the manifestations of resentment at
the means employed. The only persons who did applaud the action were
the persons whose party interests it served. The Venizelist Press
hailed the triumph of violence as a victory for legality. M. Venizelos
addressed to M. Briand his felicitations, and gave public utterance to
his gratitude as follows: "The Note solved a situation from which there
was no other issue. The just severity of its tone, the sincerity of
its motives, its expressly drawn distinction between the Greek people
and the ex-Government, give it more than anything else a paternal
character towards the people of this country. The Protecting Powers
have acted only like parents reclaiming a son's birthright." [2]
Pared down to realities, the aim of the Protecting Powers was to bring
their protégé to power and Greece into the War. The demobilization of
the army, which stood first on their list, was the first step to that
end. M. Venizelos {106} had been asserting that the people were still
with him, and, given a chance, would uphold his policy, but that chance
was denied them by the mobilization. With a pardonable ignorance of
the people's feelings, and also, it must be owned, with a too naïve
confidence in the accuracy of the People's Chosen, the Allies had
decided to act on this assumption: an assumption on which M. Venizelos
himself was most reluctant to act.
We have it on his own evidence that he looked for a solution of his
difficulties, not to an election, but to a revolution. Further, he has
told us that, eager as he might be for a revolutionary stroke, he could
not lose sight of the obstacles. To those who held up French
revolutions as a model, he pointed out that the analogy was fallacious:
in France "long years of tyranny had exasperated the people to its very
depths. In Greece the people had a king who, only two years earlier,
had headed his armies in two victorious campaigns." [3] So he scouted
the idea of intervention at Athens, convinced that any attack on the
Crown would spell destruction to himself.[4] His project was to steal
to Salonica and there, under General Sarrail's shield, to start a
separatist movement "directed against the Bulgars, but not against the
king," apparently hoping that the Greek troops in Macedonia, among whom
his apostles had been busy, fired by anti-Bulgar hate, would join him
and drag king and country after them. This project had been
communicated by the French Minister at Athens to General Sarrail on 31
May:[5] but, as the British Government was not yet sufficiently
advanced to countenance sedition,[6] M. Venizelos and his French
confederate saw reason to abandon it for the present.
Thus all concerned were committed to a test of the real desires of the
Greek people by a General Election, which they declared themselves
anxious to bring off without delay--early in August. This time there
would be no ambiguity about the issue: although the Allies in their
Note, as was proper and politic, had again disclaimed any {107} wish or
intention to make Greece depart from her neutrality, M. Venizelos
proclaimed that he still adhered to his bellicose programme, and that
he was more confident of victory than ever[7]: had not the Reservists
been set free to vote, and were not those ardent warriors his
enthusiastic supporters? With this cry--perhaps in this belief--he
entered the arena.
It was a lively contest--rhetoric and corruption on both sides
reinforced by terrorism, to which the Allies' military authorities in
Macedonia, and their Secret Service at Athens, whose efficiency had
been greatly increased by the dismissal of many policemen obnoxious to
them, and by other changes brought about through the Note of 21 June,
contributed of their best.
But even veteran politicians are liable to error. The Reservists left
their billets in Macedonia burning with anger and shame at the
indignities and hardships which they had endured. The Allies might
have had among those men as many friends as they pleased, and could
have no enemies unless they created them by treating them as such. And
this is just what they did: from first to last, the spirit displayed by
General Sarrail towards the Greek army was a spirit of insulting
distrust and utterly unscrupulous callousness.
Unable to revenge themselves on the foreign trespasser, the Reservists
vowed to wreak their vengeance on his native abettor. They travelled
back to their villages shouting: "A black vote for Venizelos!" and
immediately formed leagues in the constituencies with a view to
combating his candidates. The latter did all they could to exploit the
national hate for the Bulgars and the alarm caused by their invasion.
But fresh animosities had blunted the edge of old feelings: besides,
had not the Bulgarian invasion been provoked by the Allies' occupation,
and who was responsible for that occupation? For the rest, the
question, as it presented itself to the masses, was no longer simply
one of neutrality or war. Despite M. Venizelos's efforts, and thanks
to the efforts of his adversaries, his breach with the King had become
public, and {108} the division of the nation had now attained to the
dimensions of a schism--Royalists against Venizelists. Nor could there
be any doubt as to the relative strength of the rival camps.
Thus, by a sort of irony, the action which was designed to clothe
Venizelos with new power threatened to strip him of the last rags of
prestige that still clung to his name. Therefore, the elections
originally fixed for early in August were postponed by the Entente to
September.
Such was the internal situation, when external events brought the
struggle to a head.
With the accession of 120,000 Serbs, 23,000 Italians, and a Russian
brigade, the Allied army in Macedonia had reached a total of about
350,000 men, of whom, owing to the summer heats and the Vardar marshes,
some 210,000 were down with malaria.[8] Nevertheless, under pressure
from home and against his own better judgment,[9] General Sarrail began
an offensive (10 August). As might have been foreseen, this display of
energy afforded the Bulgars an excuse, and the demobilization of the
Greek forces an opportunity, for a fresh invasion. M. Zaimis, in view
of the contingency, imparted to General Sarrail his Government's
intention to disarm the forts in Eastern Macedonia, so that he might
forestall the Bulgars by occupying them. But again, as in May, the
Frenchman treated the friendly hint with scornful suspicion.[10] There
followed a formal notice from the German and Bulgarian Ministers at
Athens to the Premier, stating that their troops were compelled, by
military exigencies, to push further into Greek territory, and
repeating the assurances given to his predecessor on the occupation of
Fort Rupel.[11]
The operation was conducted in a manner which belied these assurances.
Colonel Hatzopoulos, acting Commandant of the Fourth Army Corps,
reported from his headquarters at Cavalla that the Bulgarian troops
were accompanied by irregular bands which indulged in murder {109} and
pillage; that the inhabitants of the Serres and Drama districts were
fleeing panic-stricken; and that the object of the invaders clearly
was, after isolating the various Greek divisions, to occupy the whole
of Eastern Macedonia. He begged for permission to call up the
disbanded reservists, and for the immediate dispatch of the Greek
Fleet. But the Athens Government vetoed all resistance, and the
invasion went on unopposed.[12] By 24 August the Bulgars were on the
outskirts of Cavalla.
Truth to tell, the real authors of the invasion were the Allies and M.
Venizelos, who, by forcing Greece to disarm before the assembled enemy,
practically invited him. But it was not to be expected that they
should see things in this light. They, as usual, saw in them a new
"felony"--yet another proof of King Constantine's desire to assist the
Kaiser and defeat M. Venizelos[13]--and acted accordingly.
M. Venizelos opened the proceedings with a meeting outside his house on
Sunday, 27 August, when he delivered from his balcony a direct
apostrophe to the King--an oration which may have lost some of its
dramatic effect by being read out of a carefully prepared manuscript,
but which on that account possesses greater documentary value:
"Thou, O King, hast become the victim of conscienceless counsellors who
have tried to destroy the work accomplished by the Revolution of 1909,
to bring back the previous maladministration, and to satisfy their
passionate hate for the People's Chosen Leader. Thou art the victim of
military advisers of limited perceptions and of oligarchic principles.
Thou hast become the victim of thy admiration for Germany, in whose
victory thou hast believed, hoping through that victory to elbow aside
our {110} free Constitution and to centre in thy hands the whole
authority of the State." After enumerating the disastrous results of
these errors--"instead of expansion in Asia Minor, Thrace, and Cyprus,
a Bulgarian invasion in Macedonia and the loss of valuable war
material"--the orator referred to the elections and warned the King
that persistence in his present attitude would involve danger to the
throne: "The use of the august name of Your Majesty in the contest
against the Liberal Party introduces the danger of an internal
revolution." The discourse ended with another scarcely veiled menace
to the King: "If we are not listened to, then we shall take counsel as
to what must be done to rescue all that can be rescued out of the
catastrophe which has overtaken us." [14]
It was not an empty threat. The Chief spoke on Sunday, and on
Wednesday his followers at Salonica rose up in revolt and, supported by
General Sarrail, took possession of the public offices, set up a
revolutionary committee under a Cretan, and launched a war proclamation
for Macedonia on the side of the Entente. The Royalist troops, after
some fighting, were besieged in their barracks, starved into surrender,
and finally shipped off to the Piraeus, while many civil and
ecclesiastical personages were thrown into prison. The French General
received notice that M. Venizelos himself would arrive on 9 September
to take command of the movement.[15]
Concurrently with this first product of the plot hatched between M.
Venizelos and M. Guillemin in May, was carried on the more orthodox
mode of action inaugurated by the Allied Governments in June. At the
news of the Bulgarian invasion, the French Minister at Athens felt or
feigned unbounded fear--_tout était à redoubter_: even a raid by Uhlans
to the very gates of the capital--and asked Paris for a squadron to be
placed at his disposal. Paris did what it could. On 26 August Admiral
Dartige du Fournet was ordered to form a special squadron and proceed
against Athens according to the plans drawn up {111} in June. He
immediately left Malta at the head of thirty-four ships, and on the
28th arrived at Milo, where he found a British contingent of
thirty-nine ships awaiting him. The joint armada thus formed was
believed to be strong enough to preclude all danger of resistance. For
all that, every precaution was taken to secure to it the advantage of a
surprise, though in vain: its size and the proximity of its objective
rendered secrecy impossible.
Four days were wasted in idleness--a delay due to England's scruples.
But at last all was ready; and on the morning of 1 September the Allied
Fleet stood out to sea: seventy-three units of every description, the
big ships in single file, flanked by torpedo-boats, steaming bravely at
the rate of fifteen knots, and leaving behind them a track of
white-crested waves that stretched to the very edge of the horizon: _le
coup d'oeil est impressionant_.
All arrangements for battle had been made, and each contingent had its
special role assigned to it: only the Intelligence Services, being
otherwise occupied, had failed to furnish any information about Greek
mines and submarines. It was therefore necessary to be more than ever
careful. But the six hours' voyage was accomplished safely, and not
until the armada cast anchor at the mouth of the Salamis Strait did it
meet with a tangible token of hostility. The Greek Admiral commanding
the Royal Fleet before the arsenal of Salamis--a force composed of two
ironclads, one armoured cruiser, eighteen torpedo-boats and two
submarines--failed to bid the Allies welcome: a breach of international
rules which was duly resented and remedied.
The expedition had for its objects: (1) To seize a dozen enemy
merchantmen which had taken refuge since the beginning of the War in
the harbours of Eleusis and the Piraeus; (2) to obtain the control of
Greek posts and telegraphs; (3) to procure the expulsion of enemy
propagandists, and the prosecution of such Greek subjects as had
rendered themselves guilty of complicity in corruption and espionage on
the wrong side.
Of the first operation, which was conducted to a successful issue that
same evening "with remarkable activity" by one of Admiral Dartige's
subordinates, no justification was attempted: we needed tonnage and
took it. The {112} pretext for the second was that the Allies had
heard "from a sure source" that their enemies were furnished by the
Hellenic Government with military information. So serious a charge, if
made in good faith, should have been supported by the clearest proofs.
Yet even Admiral Dartige, whose disagreeable duty it was to prefer it,
bitterly complained that "he never received from Paris a single proof
which could enlighten him." On the other hand, he did receive abundant
enlightenment about the "sure source": the Russian Minister needed to
send a cipher message to the American Embassy at Constantinople which
was entrusted with Russian interests, and, the Hellenic Government
readily agreeing to transmit it through its Legation at Pera, Prince
Demidoff, with the consent of his Entente colleagues, proceeded to make
use of the Athens wireless for that purpose. Within forty-eight hours
the Admiral received from Paris an excited telegram asking him what
measures he had taken to prevent the Hellenic Government from
"violating its engagements." The rebuke, explains the Admiral, was the
result of a sensational report from the head of the French Secret
Intelligence at Athens, denouncing the above transaction as an example
of "the bad faith of the Greeks." On this pretext all the means by
which the Hellenic Government could communicate with its
representatives abroad and reply to the attacks of its enemies passed
under the Allies' control.
Somewhat less neat were the methods adopted to secure the third object
of the expedition. The Secret Services had compiled a voluminous
register of undesirable persons out of which they drew up a select list
of candidates for expulsion and prosecution. Unfortunately, despite
their industry, it teemed with embarrassing errors: individuals put
down as Germans turned out to be Greeks; and the suspects of Greek
nationality included high personages, such as M. Streit, ex-Minister
for Foreign Affairs, General Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxas, ex-Chiefs
of the General Staff, and so on. At last an expurgated list was
approved and carried out summarily.[16] Some of the criminals escaped
punishment by transferring their services from the German to the French
and British propagandas; for, {113} while to intrigue with the former
was to commit a crime, to intrigue with the latter was to perform a
meritorious deed.
There the Allies and M. Venizelos stopped for the moment, hoping that
Rumania's entry into the War, which had just taken place, would induce
Greece to do likewise.
[1] _Journal Officiel_, p. 99.
[2] The _Daily Mail_, 24 June, 1916.
[3] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917.
[4] Du Fournet, p. 91.
[5] Sarrail, pp. 107, 354-5.
[6] "_L'Angleterre avait mis son veto._"--Sarrail, p. 153.
[7] See his statement to the Correspondent of the Paris _Journal_, in
the _Hesperia_, of London, 7 July, 1916.
[8] Du Fournet, p. 99.
[9] Caclamanos, Paris, 1/14 June, 1916.
[10] M. Zaimis's deposition on oath at the judicial investigation
instituted by the Venizelos Government in 1919. Cp. Sarrail, p. 152.
[11] _White Book_, Nos. 158-60.
[12] _White Book_, Nos. 161-5.
[13] "The King, having no illusions as to the result of an election,"
says M. Venizelos, in the _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, "organized, in
connivance with the Germans and Bulgarians, the invasion of Western and
Eastern Macedonia. As the Liberals thus lost about sixty seats, the
King might hope . . . to secure at least some semblance of success at
the coming elections." On the first opportunity that the people of
Macedonia, Eastern and Western alike, had of expressing their
opinion--at the elections of 14 Nov., 1920--they did not return a
single Venizelist.--See Reuter, Athens, 15 Nov., 1920.
[14] For the Greek original, see the _Hesperia_, 1 Sept., 1916. A much
longer text, apparently elaborated at leisure, with a colourless
English translation, was published by the Anglo-Hellenic League.
[15] Sarrail, pp. 152-4; Official statement by the Revolutionary
Committee, Reuter, Salonica, 31 Aug., 1916.
[16] Du Fournet, pp. 99-104, 122-4, 127, 129.
{114}