LEAGUE OF NATIONS--THE CONDITIONS
After an adjourned debate on June 27th, 1918, in which Lord Curzon
pointed out several practical difficulties that would have to be faced,
the House of Lords, surely not a body to be carried away by any
ephemeral current of popular feeling[3] or captivated by a vague phrase,
passed with practical unanimity a resolution in these terms, "That this
House approves of the principle of a League of Nations, and commends to
His Majesty's Government a study of the conditions required for its
realisation." It in effect declared the "preamble proved," and proposed
that "the clauses" should be considered. At the suggestion of Lord
Bryce--a true friend of peace, if ever there was one--certain words
contained in the original resolution proposing that there should be a
tribunal constituted "whose orders shall be enforceable by adequate
sanction" were omitted. The question of sanction is, no doubt, a crucial
one, but it seemed better to substitute the more general words urging an
inquiry into the conditions necessary for the establishment of a League,
in fact to see generally--looking at the question as a whole--what
definite and practical steps should be taken to bring the League into
existence and define its constitution, aims and powers. In passing such
a resolution the House of Lords was expressing the feeling of the
nation. Its great importance was that by an assembly so critical,
containing men of such varied experience and-with special knowledge both
of law and of foreign affairs, a resolution supporting the idea of a
League was accepted with real unanimity.
It would be most unfortunate if the approval of the proposal to give the
League powers to direct the use of the naval and military forces of
certain of its members were to be made a condition precedent to approval
of the principle of a League and as necessarily implied in it. Earnest
advocates of that principle may dissent entirely from Viscount Grey's
statement in his pamphlet, published about the time when the debate took
place, that "those States that have power must be ready to use all the
force, economic, military or naval, that they possess." "_Anything less
than this is of no value._" They may hold, on the contrary, that a
League might be of great value without any agreement binding certain of
its members to employ--which implies an obligation to maintain--naval
and military forces and armaments at the bidding of the League Council
on a scale and in the manner which would either be settled from time to
time by representatives of other nations or be the subject of some
preliminary agreement. Settling the terms of such an agreement might
involve serious disputes and delay the establishment of the League
indefinitely. The moral influence due to the existence of a League
embracing all nations which regard war as an evil to be stopped if
possible, would be great. A Declaration of Faith, in which those who
hold a common belief give expression to it, has its effect. An agreement
between nations or individuals, even where there is no legal sanction,
would be regarded as something that they will try to carry out. The
breach of such an agreement would excite the "resentment which is the
life-blood of law." Still the risk of disregard of the obligations is
great unless there is a definite material sanction, an evil imposed by
force on a wrong-doer, and no doubt it will be urged that some
objections to employ military and naval power to enforce the obligations
imposed by the League may be raised against the less drastic proposal
for an economic boycott, but in actual working the two things, as
already pointed out, differ enormously. The suggested economic boycott
imposes a similar obligation on all members of the League; all alike can
immediately forbid all intercourse by their subjects with the aggressor,
instead of imposing on certain members the duty of going to war.
Secondly, it does not imply the maintenance of great armaments by any
State.
It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe
punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one,
provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months
sooner that Britain would assuredly go to war and put into such war her
whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that
outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that
the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German ship in
the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as
a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany,
that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and
that these restraints would be continued until complete restitution had
been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been
invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to
German trade and commerce, the bankers of Berlin and Frankfort would
have denounced war; the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen would have been
the strongest advocates of peace. A like test might be applied to other
cases of aggression. The effects of breaking off diplomatic--and, still
more, commercial--relationships, although no shot is fired and no
regiment mobilised, and of mere neutrality differ _toto coelo_. The very
people who are least influenced by moral restraints, who scorn justice,
will be most influenced by the financial losses and the destruction of
their trade.
It was, no doubt, right "to commend a study of the question" to His
Majesty's Government, but it is also well to commend to the Government
the desirability of consultation with those outside the Government
departments who have given study to it already. Like other problems, it
should be considered in advance during the War. As Lord Shaw forcibly
pointed out, "The project does not mean the slackening of our efforts or
a weakening of our forces or timidity in our policy in the present War.
If it did I would not be associated with it for one hour."
To quote Lord Grey's words, Germany has to be convinced that force does
not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict
intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her. The regeneration of
Germany, a real new birth, is necessary if the peace of the world is to
be secured; and surely by now we might have learned that such
regeneration will never come unless Germany is beaten in this War. As
Lord Grey says, "Recent military success and the ascendancy of Prussian
militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence"
in Germany. As these words are written comes the report of the sinking
of the hospital ship _Llandovery Castle_, followed by cold-blooded and
deliberate murder. The mass of German crime grows daily.
The "economic boycott" above referred to differs absolutely in its aim
and character from the proposal to impose a permanent and continuous
boycott on German commerce to maintain and extend British or other trade
at the expense of Germany. Phrases are sometimes used here which seem to
be almost a repetition of those so dear to the Pan-German party.
"Destroy British commerce that German may replace it," is echoed back as
"Destroy German commerce that British may replace it." The whole idea
that the progress and extension of the trade and industry of one country
is an injury to another is radically false. A spirit of jealousy,
regarding the prosperity of others as involving injury to ourselves, is
a curse to the individual, to the class, or to the nation which is
imbued with it.
To put these questions on the highest moral basis--on a true religious
basis, if you will--is not cant, but only a recognition of the real
facts. The world will without doubt everlastingly perish unless this
true faith is maintained and acted upon. Self-interest and
self-aggrandisement as dominant motives inevitably lead to destruction,
hastened by every advance in the knowledge and in the efficiency of
those who take them as their guides.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 3: These words were written before July 9th, and perhaps now
require some modification.]