LEAGUE OF NATIONS--THE SCHEME
_If any peace after the War is to be permanent there must
be a settlement not only between territorial claims but
an arrangement with regard to the machinery by which
peace will be maintained in the future._
Perhaps the most convenient way to gain a more definite idea of what the
proposal for a League of Nations really means, to understand both its
advantages and the difficulties involved in it, may be to follow the
debate on the subject initiated by Lord Parmoor in the House of Lords in
March of 1918. It shows that the idea of a League of Nations to prevent
war is taking definite shape, and is not regarded by practical
men--statesmen with experience of the actual conduct of international
affairs, and lawyers who as members of the judicial committee of the
Privy Council have had to devote their attention to questions of
international law--as outside the range of practical politics. It shows
also that the idea will stand the test of discussion and calm criticism.
Lord Lansdowne--to whom, whatever may be thought of some recent
utterances, the country owes a debt of gratitude too little recognised,
especially for his conduct of foreign affairs at a most difficult period
during the Boer War--stated his opinion that "in a league pronouncing a
sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away
from its obligations you would have a material guarantee for the
maintenance of peace." He pointed out how "the existence of such a
league might perhaps have prevented the War in July of 1914, as it was
impossible in that time of clamour and confusion when one suggestion
after another made by those who, like Sir Edward Grey, were working for
peace was rejected, to put forward a definite proposal for dealing with
the dispute in a manner provided for by previous agreement." Lord
Parker, whose authority carries the greatest weight with jurists
everywhere, having the true lawyer's instinct for putting vague
proposals into definite shape, actually presented a draft of heads of
agreement for the establishment of a League.[1] These heads would, to
say the least, form the basis for discussion leading to practical
results. One or two of his proposed clauses may be quoted as expressing
in definite language the fundamental principles which must be the basis
of any such League. The first may appear perhaps only a "pious opinion."
It is really very much more. Assent to it means the complete repudiation
of the ideas which have guided German policy--the ideas which made world
war inevitable, and which will inevitably lead to war in the future
unless they are abandoned. Any nation which assents to the clause tells
the world that it expressly rejects those ideas and agrees that its
action shall be guided by principles diametrically opposed to them.
Assent to a declaration of the kind suggested would certainly affect the
spirit in which international questions are approached in future, and
probably the resulting action also. It runs:
"The League to recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our
common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled
on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms." The last
clause dealing with the admission of new members of the League is the
complement of this. There is to be power "to admit a nation as a member
of the League, if satisfied in each case that the nation bona fide
accepts the principle on which the League is founded, and bona fide
intends that international disputes shall thereafter be settled by
peaceful means." It is contemplated, and rightly contemplated, that
there should be a possibility for the Central Empires to join the League
sooner or later, but it can only be on terms of their rulers at the time
saying expressly, "We abjure in the sight of the world and of our own
people those principles of action which German rulers and leaders of
thought have been inculcating for two generations." The choice for
Germany would be either to stand excommunicated from the brotherhood of
nations for ever, or to say plainly, "I declare what my professors and
schoolmasters have for half a century had to teach to be false; the
doctrines of Treitschke and of his disciple von Bernhardi are anathema;
it is infamous to adopt the statement of the German writer that 'It is
of no importance to me whether an action is just or unjust,' or that 'If
I am powerful enough to perform any deed, then I am justified in doing
it.' I renounce such leaders and teachers and all their words and works,
so that I will not follow or be led by them." It may be urged that the
recantation might not be sincere, but it would discredit the authority
of those who attempt to revive the damnable doctrines.[2]
The great difficulty, of course, arises as to the means of enforcing the
agreement against war, of finding some proper and effective sanction to
secure its observance. It may be well to note that throughout this
discussion the word sanction is used in the strict legal sense, meaning
some definite penalty or punishment to be inflicted on a wrong-doer. It
is the existence of such a "sanction" which is the clearest way of
enforcing obedience, and gives a rule of conduct the force of law.
Two definite proposals are made in Lord Parker's scheme. (1) "If an act
of war be committed against any member of the League, the Council is to
notify it, and thereupon every member should (_a_) break off diplomatic
relations with the nation guilty of such act; (_b_) prohibit and take
effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the
guilty party; (_c_) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the
guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its
territories."
A very similar suggestion, though not quite so definite, was made by the
present writer in an article on "Sanction in International Law," which
appeared in the Italian Journal "Scientia" in 1916. "The nations might
agree that any belligerent which wilfully violates or invades neutral
territory shall be treated as a moral leper. Without actually going to
war they should cease to have dealings with the invader, forbid all
intercourse of their subjects with the country which violates the
neutral territory."
For the sake of brevity this may be called the "economic boycott," but
it is really very much more than simply economic pressure. It is a
common habit in political discussions to confuse very different things,
to which the same name is given, and the term "economic boycott" is
being used to cover three proposals of very different character. (_a_)
It may mean a permanent exclusion of Germany from the markets of the
world to punish its people for supporting the crimes of its rulers and
incidentally to secure for ourselves a valuable extension of trade by
reason of the exclusion of a rival. (_b_) It may mean a temporary
measure to insure that agreed terms of peace are observed by those who
disregard "mere scraps of paper," to act as a guarantee that restitution
shall be made for wrongs done, to check the revival and extension of the
enemy's armaments, to make the German people feel the disadvantages and
loss caused by their action, and the desirability of joining with
others in repudiating war as a means of settling disputes or asserting
national claims. (_c_) It may mean a sanction for breach of the
stipulations contained in the agreement on which the League of Nations
is founded, i.e., a punishment to be inflicted on anyone who infringes
the agreement he has made--a means of insuring performance of its terms.
It is in this last sense that it is used in the present discussion.
(2) The second sanction proposed in the scheme is of a still more
serious character. The clause to embody it runs as follows:
"Certain members of the League specified in a schedule and to consist of
the chief military and naval powers, should agree, if required to do so
by a resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty
nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty
nation shall have accepted terms which shall be approved by the League."
This proposal might more effectually prevent wrong-doing, but, even if
carefully guarded as Lord Parker proposes, appears open to serious
objections. There seems grave reason to fear that while intended to
prevent war, it might really be the cause of disputes, and possibly of
war of the most deadly kind. Such a stipulation might cast a terrible
burden on a strong naval power like Great Britain, and have most
disastrous consequences. We are bound to maintain a strong navy to keep
open communication between the different parts of the Empire and also to
protect our food supplies. Without sea power Britain could in a few
months be starved into submission to any terms in case of war, but to
maintain a large navy to be at the beck and call of a Council
representing all the nations who cared to join the proposed League would
be intolerable. Suppose, for example, the United States demanded
satisfaction for some outrage on American subjects, or suppose American
subjects were threatened with massacre in some unsettled country such as
Mexico, and in order to obtain satisfaction or to protect its subjects
sent some warships to a Mexican port and landed an armed force, not with
any object of aggression, but to prevent irreparable injuries. Suppose
Great Britain was of opinion that the American demand was amply
justified, but that a majority of representatives of the League, or
even, as Lord Parker's scheme suggests, a majority of the powers named
in the Schedule, took a contrary view and called on Great Britain to
fulfil the agreement to use her naval force and commence and prosecute
to the bitter end a war against the United States because its Government
had acted at once instead of waiting while the representatives of a
score of other nations were discussing whether any action was
permissible. Would not the alternative between breaking the engagement
and undertaking a bitter and ruinous war against a powerful and friendly
nation put us in an intolerable position? Half a dozen States in the
League might for one reason or another wish to resist the claim of the
United States for redress. Names of States which might possibly so
combine could be given, but it is better to refrain. It is not
inconceivable that German penetration and intrigue at some future time
might promote a combination of the kind. All sorts of influences might
be brought to bear on certain of the States and on their
representatives. Dynastic claims might even affect them.
Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government
and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some
limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or
military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its
forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from
employing them in making war. An engagement which might in
circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at
present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a
thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are
not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where
there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which
nations ally themselves to prevent some particular wrong, such, for
example, as guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Even for a single
specific agreement of this kind a very strong case is required, but that
is a totally different thing from agreeing to provide a kind of world
police to enforce and execute the orders of a Council of heterogeneous
States under conditions the nature of which no one can predict now. We
cannot tell beforehand with any certainty what will be the real
character of the proposed League Council, nor what motives may inspire
its members at some future time, nor whom the majority of them will in
fact represent. It does not necessarily follow that there can be no
sanction of any kind to enforce the rules of International Law or the
decisions of a League of Nations to prevent a breach of international
peace, no penalty attaching to those who disregard those rules or are
guilty of breaking that peace. As already stated, the economic boycott,
every member of the League agreeing to treat an aggressor as an outlaw,
and without actually going to war ceasing to have any dealings with him,
and forbidding all intercourse of its subjects with the peace-breaker,
is likely to be really effective. Lord Shaw, whose interest in the
subject is no new thing, and who has devoted long and careful
consideration to it, later in the debate gave the weight of his
authority as to the efficacy of such measures. "Let it," he said, "be
known once and for all that from the moment a nation becomes a traitor
to the League it becomes, _ipso facto_, an economic outlaw, then the
motive both for being included within and for remaining within the
League will be increased a hundredfold, and wholly for the benefit of
mankind."
Of course, logically many of the objections which can be urged against
an agreement to make war might also be urged against an agreement for a
boycott of this kind, but in practice the risks in the case of the
boycott would be far less serious. Members of a club might well agree to
expel and to cut a member who assaults another, but it would be a
different matter to agree that, they should be able to order the
strongest man in the club to go to his house and thrash the offender
until he makes such compensation as may seem satisfactory to them. A man
who objected to be put on a "schedule" of members liable to be deputed
for such a mission would not necessarily be a coward. He might possibly
think that the member assaulted did in fact deserve a horse-whipping,
though he might deprecate such a proceeding, and consider that the
affair, or the dispute between the parties, ought to have been dealt
with by the club committee as a case for expulsion. A hatred of
injustice, resentment against wrong, if it really exists in nations and
individuals, will make itself felt. Without it, formal agreements will
be found to be of little use. The objections to a League of Nations
having power practically to order certain of its members to make war do
not in any way prevent the establishment of international tribunals
being followed by useful results. Without any express sanctions to
enforce them as above suggested, their decisions will usually be obeyed
in practice. There is and will be plenty of scope for the action of such
tribunals. A nation may hate war, may recognise its perils and the
inevitable losses involved, but may feel that an unwarrantable claim is
being made against it which it is bound to resist. It may, however, be
perfectly willing to submit the point to any tribunal which even
purports to be impartial, and abide by its decision. In this way some
systems of law have grown up. They began by regulating procedure. Each
of two parties claimed something as his property, was ready to fight to
maintain his right; but such contests might result in injustice, and
were certainly injurious to the peace of the State. In early Roman Law
each party who claimed the object in dispute touched it with his spear,
showing his readiness to fight for it; then some respected citizen--_vir
pietate gravis_--stepped in, and each party, without fear that his
refraining from fighting would expose him to future encroachments on his
rights, could agree to abide by his decision. As time goes on, what was
merely the casual intervention of an arbitrator becomes an habitual
rule, and eventually the fixed law of the land. Custom develops by
general consent into law. Trial by combat may become obsolete in
practice even long before it becomes illegal. There are many cases in
which a man (or a nation) dare not give way, though he knows that it
will cost him more to fight the case. A rough Lancashire manufacturer
was once advised against fighting a difficult case on the ground that
the result was uncertain, and the costs would in any event be very
heavy, more than the value of the matter in dispute. He said afterwards
to his solicitor with some force, "If I give in in this, that ---- will
come into my kitchen, kick me, and ask what business I have there. No,
I'll fight him now." He brought his action and won, and found the
prediction as to costs was only too fully borne out, even though
judgment in the Court of Appeal was finally given in his favour. The man
who says he will not fight in any circumstances invites injuries, though
the man who fights when he could honourably avoid it is pretty sure to
rue his decision.
Where two high-spirited persons are engaged in a dispute, and each is
ready to maintain his cause with the sword, the intervention of a third
may save both from the disasters of a battle. The words of the Douglas
when intervening in a heated contest, "The first who strikes shall be my
foe," may sometimes be a model for the real peacemaker. But he would
certainly have resented the idea of agreeing to keep prepared, ready
armed to fight at the bidding of a number of other chiefs, anyone who
used force to prevent or punish some injury to himself.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The death of Lord Parker, which occurred soon after these
words were written, has deprived the country of the services of one of
the few great jurists at a time when they are most sorely needed. There
are many good lawyers, many judicial minds acute in seizing the really
relevant points in a complicated case, but very few, perhaps none, who
united to legal learning and judicial penetration so broad a grasp of
principle and appreciation of the larger issues involved in decisions
given.]
[Footnote 2: A passage in Mr. Brailsford's book on a "League of
Nations," published some months before the debate took place, but which
I had not seen when the above lines were written, puts the point most
forcibly:
"We set out to destroy Prussian militarism. It will be destroyed at the
moment when a German Government pledges itself to enter a league based
on arbitration and conciliation."]