Capture of Ciudad Rodrigo--and of Badajos--Battle of
Salamanca--State of Napoleon's Foreign Relations--His Military
Resources--Napoleon at Dresden--Rupture with Russia--Napoleon's
conduct to the Poles--Distribution of the Armies--Passage of the
Niemen--Napoleon at Wilna.
Lord Wellington had now complete possession of Portugal; and lay on the
frontiers of that kingdom, ready to act on the offensive within Spain,
whenever the distribution of the French armies should seem to offer a
fit opportunity. Learning that Marmont had sent considerable
reinforcements to Suchet, in Valencia, he resolved to advance and once
more besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. He re-appeared before that strong fortress
on the 8th of January 1812, and carried it by storm on the 19th, four
days before Marmont could collect a force adequate for its relief. He
instantly repaired the fortifications, entrusted the place to a Spanish
garrison, and repaired in person to the southern part of the Portuguese
frontier, which required his attention in consequence of that miserable
misconduct of the Spaniards which had enabled the French to make
themselves masters of Badajos in the preceding year. He appeared before
that city on the 16th March, and in twenty days took it also. The loss
of life on both sides, in these rapid sieges, was very great; but they
were gained by a general at the head of at most 50,000 men, in despite
of an enemy mustering full 80,000; and the results were of the first
importance to the English cause. Marmont, on hearing of the fall of the
second fortress, immediately retreated from the neighbourhood of Ciudad
Rodrigo, which he had made a vain attempt to regain; and Soult, who had
arrived from before Cadiz just in time to see the British flag mounted
on the towers of Badajos, retired in like manner. The English general
hastened to make the best use of his advantage, by breaking up the only
bridge by which Marmont and Soult could now communicate; and, having
effected this object early in May, marched in June to Salamanca, took
the forts there, and 800 prisoners, and--Marmont retiring as he
advanced--hung on his rear until he reached the Douro.
Marmont was now joined by Bonnet's army from Asturias, and thus once
more recovered a decided superiority in numbers. Wellington accordingly
retired in his turn; and for some days the two hostile armies moved in
parallel lines, often within half cannon shot, each waiting for some
mistake of which advantage might be taken. The weather was all the while
intensely hot; numbers fainted on the march; and when any rivulet was in
view, it was difficult to keep the men in their ranks. On the evening of
the 21st of July, Wellington and Marmont lay in full view of each other,
on two opposite rising grounds near Salamanca; a great storm of thunder
and rain came on, and during the whole night the sky was bright with
lightning. Wellington was at table when he received intelligence that
his adversary was extending his left,--with the purpose of coming
between him and Ciudad Rodrigo. He rose in haste, exclaiming, "Marmont's
good genius has forsaken him," and was instantly on horseback. The great
battle of Salamanca was fought on the 22nd of July. The French were
attacked on the point which Marmont's movement leftwards had weakened,
and sustained a signal defeat. The commander-in-chief himself lost an
arm: 7000 prisoners, eleven guns, and two eagles were taken; and it was
only the coming on of night that saved the army from utter destruction.
Wellington pursued the flying enemy as far as Valladolid, and then,
re-crossing the Douro, marched upon Madrid. King Joseph fled once more
at his approach, and the English were received with enthusiasm in the
capital of Spain.
Lord Wellington had thus ventured to place himself in the heart of
Spain, with, at most, 60,000 men, well-knowing that the French armies in
the Peninsula still mustered at the least 150,000 in the expectation
that so spirited a movement, coming after the glorious successes of
Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and Salamanca, would effectually stimulate the
Spanish generals. Ballasteros in particular, he doubted not, would at
least take care to occupy all the attention of Soult, and prevent that
able leader from advancing out of the south. But the Spaniard's
egregious pride took fire at the notion of being directed by an
Englishman, and he suffered Soult to break up the siege of Cadiz, and
retire with all his army undisturbed towards the Sierra Morena. Lord
Wellington, incensed at this folly, was constrained to divide his army.
Leaving half at Madrid under Sir R. Hill, to check Soult, he himself
marched with the other for Burgos, by taking which great city he judged
he should have it in his power to overawe effectually the remains of the
army of Marmont. He invested Burgos accordingly on the 19th of
September, and continued the siege during five weeks, until Soult, with
a superior force, began to threaten Hill, and (Marmont's successor)
Clausel, having also received great reinforcements, appeared ready to
resume the offensive. Lord Wellington then abandoned the siege of Burgos
and commenced his retreat. He was joined in the course of it by Hill,
and Soult and Clausel then effected their junction also, in his
rear--their troops being nearly double his numbers. He retired leisurely
and deliberately as far as Ciudad Rodrigo--and thus closed the
Peninsular campaign of 1812. But in sketching its progress we have lost
sight for a moment of the still mightier movements in which Napoleon was
personally engaged upon another scene of action.
It has already been mentioned, that before the year 1811 reached its
close, the approach of a rupture with Russia was sufficiently indicated
in an edict of the Emperor of Austria, granting a free passage through
his territories to the armies of his son-in-law. However, during several
months following, the negotiations between the Czar and Napoleon
continued; and more than once there appeared considerable likelihood of
their finding an amicable termination. The tidings of Lord Wellington's
successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos were calculated to temper the
ardour of Buonaparte's presumption; and for a moment he seems to have
felt the necessity of bringing the affairs of the Peninsula to a point,
ere he should venture to involve himself in another warfare. He, in
effect, opened a communication with the English government, when the
fall of Badajos was announced to him; but before the negotiation had
proceeded many steps, his pride returned on him in its original
obstinacy, and the renewed demand, that Joseph should be recognised as
King of Spain, abruptly closed the intercourse of the diplomatists.
Such being the state of the Peninsula, and all hope of an accommodation
with England at an end, it might have been expected that Napoleon would
have spared no effort to accommodate his differences with Russia, or, if
a struggle must come, to prepare for it, by placing his relations with
the other powers, capable of interfering on one side or the other, on a
footing favourable to himself. But here also the haughty temper, which
adversity itself could never bend, formed an insurmountable and fatal
obstacle. To gain the cordial friendship of Sweden was obviously, from
the geographical position of that country, and the high military talents
of Bernadotte, an object of the most urgent importance; yet the Crown
Prince, instead of being treated with as the head of an independent
state, was personally insulted by the French resident at Stockholm, who,
in Bernadotte's own language, "demeaned himself on every occasion as if
he had been a Roman proconsul, dictating absolutely in a province." In
his anxiety to avoid a rupture, Bernadotte at length agreed to enforce
the "continental system," and to proclaim war against England. But these
concessions, instead of producing hearty goodwill, had a directly
contrary effect. England, considering Sweden as an involuntary enemy,
disdained to make any attempt against her; and the adoption of the
anti-commercial edicts of Napoleon was followed by a multiplicity of
collisions between the Swedish coasters and the Imperial _douaniers_,
out of which arose legal questions without number. These, in most cases,
were terminated at Paris, with summary injustice, and the provocations
and reclamations of Bernadotte multiplied daily. Amazed that one who had
served under his banners should dare to dispute his will, Napoleon
suffered himself to speak openly of causing Bernadotte to finish his
Swedish studies in Vincennes. Nay, he condescended to organise a
conspiracy for the purpose of putting this threat into execution. The
Crown Prince escaped, through the zeal of a private friend at Paris, the
imminent danger of being carried off after the fashion of the D'Enghiens
and the Rumbolds: and thenceforth his part was fixed.
On the other flank of the Czar's dominion--his hereditary enemy, the
Grand Seignior, was at this time actually at war with him. Napoleon had
neglected his relations with Constantinople for some years past; but he
now perceived the importance of keeping this quarrel alive, and
employed his agents to stimulate the Grand Seignior to take the field
in person at the head of 100,000 men, for the purpose of co-operating
with himself in a general invasion of the Russian empire. But here he
encountered a new and an unforeseen difficulty. Lord Castlereagh, the
English minister for foreign affairs, succeeded in convincing the Porte,
that, if Russia were once subdued, there would remain no power in Europe
capable of shielding her against the universal ambition of Napoleon. And
wisely considering this prospective danger as immeasurably more
important than any immediate advantage which she could possibly reap
from the humiliation of her old rival, the Porte commenced a
negotiation, which, exactly at the most critical moment (as we shall see
hereafter) ended in a peace with Russia.
The whole forces of Italy--Switzerland, Bavaria, and the princes of the
Rhenish League,--including the Elector of Saxony,--were at Napoleon's
disposal. Denmark hated England too much to have leisure for fear of
him. Prussia, surrounded and studded with French garrisons, was more
than ever hostile to France; and the king was willing, in spite of all
that he had suffered, to throw himself at once into the arms of Russia.
But this must have inferred his immediate and total ruin, unless the
Czar chose to march at once into Germany. Such a movement was wholly
inconsistent with the plan of operations contemplated, in case of a war
with Buonaparte, by the military advisers of Alexander; and Frederick
William saw himself compelled to place 20,000 troops, the poor relics of
his army, at the disposal of the common oppressor.
Austria was bound by treaty to assist Napoleon with 30,000 men, whenever
he chose to demand them; but this same treaty included Buonaparte's
guarantee of Austria's Polish provinces. Could he have got rid of this
pledge, he distinctly perceived the advantages which he might derive
from the enthusiasm of the Poles; to proclaim their independence would
have been, he well knew, to array a whole gallant nation under his
banners; and of such objections to their independence as might be
started by his own creature, the Grand Duke of Warsaw, he made little
account. But Austria would not consent to give up his guarantee of
Galicia, unless he consented to yield back the Illyrian territory which
she had lost at Schoenbrunn; and this was a condition to which Napoleon
would not for a moment listen. He would take whatever he could gain by
force or by art; but he would sacrifice nothing. The evil consequences
of this piece of obstinacy were twofold. Austria remained an ally
indeed, but at best a cold one; and the opportunity of placing the whole
of Poland in insurrection, between him and the Czar, was for ever lost.
But if Napoleon, in the fulness of his presumption, thus neglected or
scorned the timely conciliation of foreign powers-some of whom he might
have arrayed heartily on his side, and others at least retained
neutral-he certainly omitted nothing as to the preparation of the
military forces of his own empire. Before yet all hopes of an
accommodation with St. Petersburg where at an end, he demanded and
obtained two new conscriptions in France; and moreover established a law
by which he was enabled to call out 100,000 men at a time, of those whom
the conscriptions had spared, for service _at home_. This limitation of
their service he soon disregarded; and in effect the new system-that of
_the Ban_, as he affected to call it-became a mere extension of the old
scheme. The amount of the _French_ army at the period in question
(exclusive of _the Ban_) is calculated at 850,000 men; the army of the
kingdom of Italy mustered 50,000; that of Naples, 30,000; that of the
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 60,000; the Bavarian, 40,000; the Westphalian,
30,000; the Saxon, 30,000; Wirtemberg, 15,000; Baden, 9,000; and the
minor powers of the Rhenish League, 23,000. Of these armies Napoleon had
the entire control. In addition, Austria was bound to furnish him with
30,000, and Prussia with 20,000 auxiliaries. The sum-total is 1,187,000.
Deducting 387,000--a large allowance for hospitals, furloughs, and
incomplete regiments-there remained 800,000 effective men at his
immediate command. The Spanish peninsula might perhaps occupy, even now,
150,000; but still Napoleon could bring into the field against Russia,
in case all negotiation failed, an army of 650,000 men; numbers such as
Alexander could have no chance of equalling; numbers such as had never
before followed an European banner.
Notwithstanding all this display of military strength, the French
statesmen who had in former days possessed the highest place in the
Emperor's confidence, and who had been shaken in his favour by their
bold prophecies of the result of his attempts on Spain and Portugal,
did not hesitate to come forward on this new occasion, and offer
warnings, for which the course of events in the Peninsula might have
been expected to procure a patient hearing. Talleyrand, still in office,
exhausted all his efforts in vain. Fouche, who on pretence of ill health
had thrown up his Roman government, and was now resident at his country
seat near Paris, drew up a memorial, in which the probable consequences
of a march into Russia were detailed with masterly skill and eloquence;
and demanded an audience of the Emperor, that he might present it in
person. Napoleon, whose police now watched no one so closely as their
former chief, was prepared for this. He received Fouche with an air of
cool indifference. "I am no stranger to your errand," said he. "The war
with Russia pleases you as little as that of Spain." Fouche answered,
that he hoped to be pardoned for having drawn up some reflections on so
important a crisis. "It is no crisis at all," resumed Buonaparte, "but a
mere war of politics. Spain falls whenever I have destroyed the English
influence at St. Petersburg. I have 800,000 soldiers in readiness: with
such an army I consider Europe as an old prostitute, who must obey my
pleasure. Did not you yourself once tell me that the word _impossible_
is not French? You grandees are now too rich, and though you pretend to
be anxious about my interests, you are only thinking of what might
happen to yourselves in case of my death, and the dismemberment of my
empire. I regulate my conduct much more by the sentiments of my army
than by yours. Is it my fault that the height of power which I have
attained compels me to ascend to the dictatorship of the world? My
destiny is not yet accomplished-the picture exists as yet only in
outline. There must be one code, one court of appeal, and one coinage
for all Europe. The states of Europe must be melted into one nation, and
Paris be its capital." It deserves to be mentioned that neither the
statesman thus contemptously dismissed, nor any of his brethren, ever
even alluded to the injustice of making war on Russia for the mere
gratification of ambition. Their arguments were all drawn from the
extent of Alexander's resources-his 400,000 regulars, and 50,000
Cossacks, already known to be in arms-and the enormous population on
which he had the means of drawing for recruits; the enthusiastic
national feelings of the Muscovites; the distance of their country; the
severity of their climate; the opportunity which such a war would afford
to England of urging her successes in Spain; and the chance of Germany
rising in insurrection in case of any reverses.
There was, however, one person who appealed to the Emperor on other
grounds. His uncle, the Cardinal Fesch, had been greatly afflicted by
the treatment of the Pope, and he contemplated this new war with dread,
as likely to bring down the vengeance of Heaven on the head of one who
had dared to trample on its vicegerent. He besought Napoleon not to
provoke at once the wrath of man and the fury of the elements; and
expressed his belief that he must one day sink under the weight of that
universal hatred with which his actions were surrounding his throne.
Buonaparte led the churchman to the window, opened it, and pointing
upwards, said, "Do you see yonder star?" "No, sire," replied the
Cardinal. "But I see it," answered Napoleon; and abruptly dismissed him.
Trusting to this star, on which one spot of fatal dimness had already
gathered, Napoleon, without waiting for any formal rupture with the
Russian diplomatists at Paris, now directed the march of very great
bodies of troops into Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander's
minister was ordered, in the beginning of April, to demand the
withdrawal of these troops, together with the evacuation of the
fortresses in Pomerania, in case the French government still entertained
a wish to negotiate. Buonaparte instantly replied that he was not
accustomed to regulate the distribution of his forces by the suggestions
of a foreign power. The ambassador demanded his passports, and quitted
Paris.
On the 9th of May, Napoleon left Paris with his Empress, and arrived on
the 16th at Dresden, where the Emperor of Austria, the Kings of Prussia,
Naples, Wirtemberg, and Westphalia, and almost every German sovereign of
inferior rank, had been invited, or commanded, to met him. He had sent
to request the Czar also to appear in this brilliant assemblage, as
affording a last chance of an amicable arrangement; but the messenger
could not obtain admission to Alexander's presence.
Buonaparte continued for some days to play the part of undisputed master
amidst this congregation of royalties. He at once assumed for himself
and his wife precedence over the Emperor and Empress of Austria; and, in
the blaze of successive festivals, the King of Saxony appeared but as
some chamberlain, or master of the ceremonies, to his imperious guest.
Having sufficiently indicated to his allies and vassals the conduct
which they were respectively to adopt, in case the war should break out,
Napoleon, already weary of his splendid idleness, sent on the Abbe de
Pradt to Warsaw, to prepare for his reception among the Poles, dismissed
Maria Louisa on her return to Paris, and broke up the Court in which he
had, for the last time, figured as "the King of Kings." Marshal Ney,
with one great division of the army, had already passed the Vistula;
Junot, with another, occupied both sides of the Oder. The Czar was known
to be at Wilna, his Lithuanian capital, there collecting the forces of
his immense empire, and entrusting the general arrangements of the
approaching campaign to Marshal Barclay de Tolly.[61] The season was
advancing; and it was time that the question of peace or war should be
forced to a decision.
Napoleon arrived at Dantzick on the 7th of June; and during the
fortnight which ensued, it was known that the final communications
between him and Alexander were taking place. The attention of mankind
was never more entirely fixed on one spot than it was, during these
fourteen days, upon Dantzick. On the 22nd, Buonaparte broke silence in a
bulletin. "Soldiers," said he, "Russia is dragged on by her fate: her
destiny must be accomplished. Let us march! let us cross the Niemen: let
us carry war into her territories. Our second campaign of Poland will be
as glorious as our first: but our second peace shall carry with it its
own guarantee: it shall put an end for ever to that haughty influence
which Russia has exercised for fifty years on the affairs of Europe."
The address, in which the Czar announced the termination of his
negotiations, was in a far different tone. After stating the innumerable
efforts he had made to preserve peace, without losing for Russia the
character of an independent state, he invoked the aid of Almighty
Providence as "the witness and the defender of the true cause;" and
concluded in these words--"Soldiers, you fight for your religion, your
liberty, and your native land. Your Emperor is amongst you; and God is
the enemy of the aggressor."
Buonaparte reviewed the greater part of his troops on the field of
Friedland; and having assured them of still more splendid victories over
the same enemy, issued his final orders to the chief officers of his
vast army. Hitherto the Poles had had no certain intelligence of the
object which Napoleon proposed to himself. As soon as no doubt remained
on that score, the Diet at Warsaw sent both to him and to the King of
Saxony, to announce their resolution to seize this opportunity of
re-establishing the ancient national independence of their dismembered
country. We have already mentioned the circumstance which compelled the
Emperor to receive this message with coldness. He was forced to
acknowledge that he had guaranteed to Austria the whole of her Polish
provinces. It was therefore impossible for him to take part in the
re-establishment of Old Poland:--"Nevertheless," added he, with
audacious craft, "I admire your efforts; I even authorise them. Persist;
and it is to be hoped your wishes will be crowned with success."
This answer effectually damped the ardour of the Poles; and thenceforth,
with a few exceptions, the eminent and influential men of the nation
were mere observers of the war. If any doubt as to Napoleon's treachery
could have remained after his answer to the Diet, it must have been
wholly removed when the plan of his campaign transpired, and the
Austrian auxiliaries were known to be stationed on the right of his
whole line. On them, as it seemed, the march through Volhynia was thus
devolved, and no clearer proof could have been afforded that it was
Napoleon's desire to repress every symptom of a national insurrection in
Lithuania. The inhabitants, had French soldiers come amongst them, might
have been expected to rise in enthusiasm; the white uniform of Austria
was known to be hateful in their eyes, in the same degree, and for
precisely the same reason, as the Russian green.
The disposition of the French army when the campaign commenced was as
follows:--The left wing, commanded by Macdonald, and amounting to 30,000
men, had orders to march through Courland, with the view of, if
possible, outflanking the Russian right, and gaining possession of the
sea coast, in the direction of Riga. The right wing, composed almost
wholly of the Austrians, 30,000 in number, and commanded by
Schwartzenberg, were stationed, as has been already mentioned, on the
Volhynian frontier. Between these moved the various corps forming the
grand central army, under the general superintendence of Napoleon
himself, viz. those of Davoust, Ney, the King of Westphalia, the Viceroy
of Italy, Poniatowski, Junot and Victor; and in numbers not falling
below 250,000. The communication of the centre and left was maintained
by the corps of Oudinot, and that of the centre and the extreme right by
the corps of Regnier, who had with him the Saxon auxiliaries and the
Polish legion of Dombrowski. The chief command of the whole cavalry of
the host was assigned to Murat, King of Naples; but he was in person at
the headquarters of the Emperor, having immediately under his order
three divisions of horse, those of Grouchy, Montbrun, and Nansouty.
Augereau with his division was to remain in the north of Germany, to
overawe Berlin and protect the communications with France.
A glance at the map will show that Napoleon's base of operations
extended over full one hundred leagues; and that the heads of his
various columns were so distributed, that the Russians could not guess
whether St. Petersburg or Moscow formed the main object of his march.
The Russian main army, under Barclay de Tolly himself, had its
headquarters at Wilna; and consisted, at the opening of the campaign, of
120,000. Considerably to the left lay "the second army," as it was
called, of 80,000, under Bagrathion; with whom were Platoff and 12,000
of his Cossacks; while, at the extreme of that wing, "the army of
Volhynia," 20,000 strong, commanded by Tormazoff, watched
Schwartzenberg. On the right of Barclay de Tolly was Witgenstein with
30,000, and between these again and the sea, the corps of Essen, not
more than 10,000 strong. Behind the whole line two armies of reserve
were rapidly forming at Novgorod and Smolensko; each, probably, of about
20,000 men. The Russians actually on the field at the opening of the
campaign were, then, as nearly as can be computed, in number 260,000;
while Napoleon was prepared to cross the Niemen at the head of at least
470,000 men.
On the Russian side the plan of the campaign had been settled ere now;
it was entirely defensive. Taught by the events of the former war in
Poland, and of that which had already fixed the reputation of Wellington
in the Peninsula, the Czar was resolved, from the beginning, to draw
Buonaparte if possible into the heart of his own country ere he gave him
battle. The various divisions of the Russian force had orders to fall
back leisurely as the enemy advanced, destroying whatever they could not
remove along with them, and halting only at certain points, where
intrenched camps had already been formed for their reception. The
difficulty of feeding half a million of men in a country deliberately
wasted beforehand, and separated by so great a space from Germany, to
say nothing of France, was sure to increase with every hour and every
step; and Alexander's great object was to husband his own strength until
the Polar winter should set in around the strangers, and bring the
miseries which he thus foresaw to a crisis. Napoleon, on the other hand,
had calculated on being met by the Russians at, or even in advance of,
their frontier (as he had been by the Austrians in the campaigns of
Austerlitz and Wagram, and by the Prussians in that of Jena); of gaining
a great battle; marching immediately either to St. Petersburg or to
Moscow--and dictating a peace, after the fashion of Presburg or
Schoenbrunn, within the walls of one of the Czar's own palaces.
On the 24th of June, the grand imperial army, consolidated into three
masses, began their passage of the Niemen; the King of Westphalia at
Grodno; the Viceroy Eugene at Pilony, and Napoleon himself near Kowno.
The emperor rode on in front of his army to reconnoitre the banks; his
horse stumbled, and he fell to the ground. "A bad omen--a Roman would
return," exclaimed some one; it is not certain whether Buonaparte
himself or one of his attendants. The first party that crossed were
challenged by a single Cossack. "For what purpose," said he, "do you
enter the Russian country?" "To beat you and take Wilna," answered the
advanced guard. The sentinel struck spurs to his horse, and disappeared
in the forest. There came on at the same moment a tremendous
thunder-storm. Thus began the fatal invasion.
No opposition awaited these enormous hosts as they traversed the plains
of Lithuania. Alexander withdrew his armies deliberately as they
advanced. The capital itself, Wilna, was evacuated two days before they
came in sight of it; and Napoleon took up his quarters there on the 28th
of June. But it was found that all the magazines, which Buonaparte had
counted on seizing, had been burnt before the Russians withdrew, and the
imperial bulletins began already to denounce the "barbarous method" in
which the enemy seemed resolved to conduct his defence.
It was noticed in an early part of this narrative that Napoleon's plan
of warfare could hardly have been carried into execution on a great
scale, unless by permitting the troops to subsist on plunder; and we
have seen through how many campaigns the marauding system was adopted
without producing any serious inconvenience to the French. Buonaparte,
however, had learned from Spain and Portugal how difficult it is for
soldiers to find food in these ways, provided the population around them
be really united in hostility against them. He had further considered
the vast distance at which a war with Russia must needs be carried on,
and the natural poverty of most of the Czar's provinces, and came to the
resolution of departing on this occasion from his old system. In a word,
months before he left Paris, he had given orders for preparing immense
quantities of provisions of all kinds, to be conveyed along with his
gigantic host, and render him independent of the countries which might
form the theatre of his operations. The destruction of the magazines at
Wilna was sufficient indication that the Emperor had judged well in
ordering his commissariat to be placed on an efficient footing; and his
attention was naturally directed to ascertaining, ere he advanced
further, in how much his directions as to this matter had been
fulfilled. He remained twenty days at Wilna--a pause altogether
extraordinary in a Buonapartean campaign, and which can only be
accounted for by his anxiety on this head. The result of his inquiries
was most unsatisfactory. The prodigious extent of the contracts into
which his war-minister had entered was adequate to the occasion; but the
movement of such enormous trains of cattle and waggons as these
contracts provided for must, under any circumstances, have been tedious,
and in some degree uncertain. In this case they were entered into either
by French traders, who, in consequence of Buonaparte's own practice in
preceding campaigns, could have slender experience of the method of
supplying a great army in the field; by Germans, who regarded the French
Emperor as the enemy of the world, and served him accordingly with
reluctance; or finally, by Polish Jews--a race of inveterate smugglers,
and consequently of inveterate swindlers.
The result was, that after spending three weeks at Wilna, the Emperor
found himself under the necessity, either of laying aside his invasion
for another year, or of urging it in the face of every difficulty which
he had foreseen, and, moreover, of that presented by a commissariat less
effective by two-thirds than he had calculated on.
[Footnote 61: This officer had been born and educated in Germany. He was
descended from an ancient Scottish family, exiled for adherence to the
Stuarts, in 1715.]