son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they
are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings
of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the
descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at
various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our
fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if
you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island
of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient
Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how
inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other
particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the
Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori,
who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as
far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the
difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that
the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is
the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is
needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of
the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept
as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and
I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly
knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is
tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the
royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with
the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may
be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in
great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put
upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out
hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal
schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to
be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the
wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth
the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster,
the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him
also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest,
teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate,
forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be
accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first,
and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless,
telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas
Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave
of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and
education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have
said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only
to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or
nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian,
unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on
the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the
anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other
bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own
inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease
and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil
and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these
respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them.
Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must
reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth
of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short
of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent
and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number
of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of
the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough
of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon
than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has
been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often
from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop
the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in
are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of
Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are
the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are
the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and
they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet
the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the
other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and
their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up
to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent
land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the
country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her
veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved
for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several
habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one
were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and
say to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not
worth fifty minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a
son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he
has a mind to go to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this
Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would
say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things
which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who
is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly
uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education
and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says
that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On
what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his
beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think
that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you
possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido,
the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis,
all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present
uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she
too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not
have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies'
wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their
assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian
inscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but these kings
are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And
if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming
renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more
than any other man ever desired anything.
ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which
are required, Socrates,--can you tell me?
SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the
manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling
you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you;
and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.
ALCIBIADES: What is that?
SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian,
Pericles.
ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?
SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to
converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially
designed to bring you to honour.
ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men
greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.
ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me.
SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself.
ALCIBIADES: But what can we do?
SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.
ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we
not wish to be as good as possible?
ALCIBIADES: We do.
SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?
ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men.
SOCRATES: Who are good in what?
ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.
SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them?
ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.
SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the
unwise?
ALCIBIADES: The wise.
SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making
of shoes?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he is good in that?
ALCIBIADES: He is.
SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and
also bad?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?
ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.
SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But over men?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: When they are sick?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Or on a voyage?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?
ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say.
SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.
ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using
one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.
SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the
services of other men?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the
rowers?
ALCIBIADES: No; they are not.
SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who
lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who
use other men?
ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of
citizenship, and dealings with one another.
SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you
again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their
fellow-sailors,--how would you answer?
ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot.
SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables
them to rule over their fellow-singers?
ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just
now mentioning.
SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?
ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: But good counsel?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the
aim is the preservation of the voyagers.
SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which
you speak?
ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.
SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves
and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is
that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order
of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of
disease. You would say the same?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I
should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of
blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved
and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was
present in them.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the
presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed
and ordered?
ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the
absence of hatred and division.
SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?
ALCIBIADES: Agreement.
SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?
ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic.
SOCRATES: And private individuals?
ALCIBIADES: The same.
SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?
ALCIBIADES: The same.
SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the
comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of
measure?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and
states, equally?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about
what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to
the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent
with himself and with another?
ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so.
SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint
not.
ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and
agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their
son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.
SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the
spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?
ALCIBIADES: No, truly.
SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms,
which she has never learned?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a
male accomplishment?
ALCIBIADES: It would.
SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of
knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and
men?
ALCIBIADES: There is not.
SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?
ALCIBIADES: Plainly not.
SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose not.
SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their
own work?
ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the
truth. (Compare Republic.)
SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered
when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying,
alone secures their good order?
ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for
this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.
SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean
now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How
can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of
which the other is in ignorance?
ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing
what is just or unjust?
ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly.
SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no
friendship among them?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about
which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?
I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the
same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.
ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I
have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.
SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your
deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of
yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the
discovery should be made.
ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the
discovery?
SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which,
by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very
improving to both of us.
ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.
SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived
by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves
when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself?
and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes
care of what belongs to him?
ALCIBIADES: I should think so.
SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care
of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?
ALCIBIADES: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring
belong to the finger, and to the finger only?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our
feet?
ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a
thing is a correct expression?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?
ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking.
SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some
other art which improves the feet?
ALCIBIADES: By some other art.
SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of
the body?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking
of that which belongs to our feet?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of
graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of
weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from
that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take
care of yourself?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to
be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care
of ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.
SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is
not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves
better?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if
we did not know a shoe?
ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not
know a ring?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not
know what we are ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be
lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is
self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?
ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself;
at other times the task appears to be very difficult.
SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is
no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of
ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be
discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own
existence, which otherwise we can never know.
ALCIBIADES: You say truly.
SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are
conversing?--with whom but with me?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: As I am, with you?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And I in talking use words?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?
ALCIBIADES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square
tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the
tool?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be
distinguished from the harper himself?
ALCIBIADES: It is.
SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the
user to be always different from that which he uses?
ALCIBIADES: I do.
SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his
tools only or with his hands?
ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well.
SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?
ALCIBIADES: He does.
SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things
which he uses?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from
the hands and feet which they use?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?
ALCIBIADES: That is the inference.
SOCRATES: What is he, then?
ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.
SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul.
SOCRATES: And the soul rules?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally
admitted.
ALCIBIADES: What is it?
SOCRATES: That man is one of three things.
ALCIBIADES: What are they?
SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the
body is man?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did.
SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
ALCIBIADES: It would seem not.
SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body,
and consequently that this is man?
ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is
subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man,
either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
ALCIBIADES: Just so.
SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.
SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we
shall be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have
discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry
would be too much protracted.
ALCIBIADES: What was that?
SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be
first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been
considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps,
be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more
properly ourselves than the soul?
ALCIBIADES: There is nothing.
SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with
one another, soul to soul?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates,
am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real
Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his
soul?
ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true.
SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things
of a man, and not the man himself?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the
trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
ALCIBIADES: He does not.
SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from
knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own
belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise
they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know
the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his
art none of them is temperate?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar,
and are not such as a good man would practise?
ALCIBIADES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but
what belongs to him?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor
his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his
own concerns?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of
Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference.
SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth
fades?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul
follows after virtue?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you,
when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you
will remain.
SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best.
ALCIBIADES: I will.
SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the
son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any
other; and he is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and
Phaenarete.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were
on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas
other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you,
is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will
never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian
people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover
of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has
been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is
of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe
the caution which I give you.
ALCIBIADES: What caution?
SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to
know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote
which will keep you out of harm's way.
ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to
me in what way I am to take care of myself.
SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably
well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as
we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of
something which is not ourselves.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look
to that?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to
others?
ALCIBIADES: Very good.