the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they
see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider
which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference
between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and
profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no
good.
SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so
much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient
for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?
ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again
from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.
SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be
refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different
refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no
longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and
new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over
again,--Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the
expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single
question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and
will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you
learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive
that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will
enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is
not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say
why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or
different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you,
or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.
ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to
discuss the matter with you.
SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the
ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men
individually.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual
singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The
grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about
letters.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and
persuade many?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?
ALCIBIADES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can
persuade many?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you
know?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are
doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one
seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same
things.
ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude
can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that
the just is not always expedient.
ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of
that which you will not prove to me.
ALCIBIADES: Proceed.
SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all.
ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.
SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do.
SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?
ALCIBIADES: I think not.
SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that
the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe
another man again.
ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come
to any harm.
SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether
you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was
dishonourable and yet just?
ALCIBIADES: Never.
SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not
good, or are they always good?
ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are
evil.
SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men
have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when
others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in
safety?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable,
in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this
is courage?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and
the death another?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of
view, but evil in another?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now
whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage
which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or
evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or
evil?
ALCIBIADES: Good.
SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and
would least like to be deprived of them?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be
willing to be deprived of courage?
ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward.
SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
ALCIBIADES: I do.
SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and
cowardice?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their
opposites you would least desire?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death
and cowardice the worst?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle
honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?
ALCIBIADES: I should.
SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You
may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result,
and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and
dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is
honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is
good and yet evil?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor
anything base, regarded as base, good.
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who
acts honourably acts well?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified.
ALCIBIADES: Manifestly.
SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we
shall also find to be good?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?
ALCIBIADES: Expedient.
SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted
justly must also act honourably.
SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
ALCIBIADES: I should infer so.
SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you
answer?
ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true.
SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the
expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who,
pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets
up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the
just may be the evil?
ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am
saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to
me I am of different minds in successive instants.
SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my
friend?
ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not.
SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you
have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort,
you would then be of different minds in successive instants?
ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that
I should.
SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you
would know?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is
clearly that you are ignorant?
ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust,
honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient,
the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in
perplexity. Is not that clear?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily
perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is.
SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
ALCIBIADES: Tell me.
SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but
you do not think that you know.
ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?
SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which
you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the
preparation of food.
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of
food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?
ALCIBIADES: The latter.
SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by
considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do
you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?
ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot.
SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you
know that you do not know it?
ALCIBIADES: I imagine not.
SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice
are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of
knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?
SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what
we are doing?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust
their business to others?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make
mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they
are ignorant?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of
course, be those who know?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they
do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and
think that they know.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those.
SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is
mischievous?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do
with the greatest matters?
ALCIBIADES: By far.
SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the
honourable, the good, and the expedient?
ALCIBIADES: There cannot be.
SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has
shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being
ignorant you fancy that you know them?
ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right.
SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly
like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good
friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of
this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by
your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are
educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say
the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of
your guardian, Pericles.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his
wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of
the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras,
and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.
SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who
was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught
you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he
liked wise.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he
thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by
making his sons wise?
ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons,
what has that to do with the matter?
SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?
ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.
SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were
simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you
be as you are?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.
SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner,
bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of
Pericles,--as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and
Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of
Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of
a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their
wisdom and fame.
ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one.
SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain
as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?
ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you
speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I
agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite
uneducated.
SOCRATES: What is the inference?
ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained
athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge
and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become
politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble
of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature
I shall get the better of them.
SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your
noble form and your high estate!
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?
SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.
ALCIBIADES: At what?
SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is
with people here.
ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?
SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?
ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?
SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action,
would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not,
while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence,
rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your
fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they
will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as
inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind
of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to
accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.
ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim.
SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are
better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior
and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the
generals of the enemy.
ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then
with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?
ALCIBIADES: True enough.
SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not
be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were
your true rivals?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right.
SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought
rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others
like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark,
you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds
as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to
flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and
then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in
such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what
has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when
thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.
ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not
suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really
different from anybody else.
SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.
ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?
SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of
yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you
are not?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.
SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take
care of yourself?
ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited.
SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of
yours is bad.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably
false.
ALCIBIADES: How so?
SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found
in noble races or not in noble races?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races.
SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to
be perfect in virtue?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the
Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?
Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the
latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of
Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?
ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!