hostile forces than we have of our own. In the first volume of Hakluyt's
_Voyages_, dedicated to Lord Effingham, who commanded against the
armada, there is given--from the contemporary foreign writer Meteran--a
more complete and detailed catalogue than has perhaps ever appeared of a
similar armament:
"A very large and particular description of this navie was put in print
and published by the Spaniards, wherein were set downe the number,
names, and burthens of the shippes, the number of mariners and soldiers
throughout the whole fleete; likewise the quantitie of their ordinance,
of their armor, of bullets, of match, of gun-poulder, of victuals, and
of all their navall furniture was in the saide description
particularized.
"Unto all these were added the names of the governours, captaines,
noblemen, and gentlemen voluntaries, of whom there was so great a
multitude that scarce was there any family of accompt, or any one
principall man throughout all Spaine that had not a brother, sonne, or
kinsman in that fleete; who all of them were in good hope to purchase
unto themselves in that navie--as they termed it--invincible, endless
glory and renown, and to possess themselves of great seigniories and
riches in England and in the Low Countreys. But because the said
description was translated and published out of Spanish into divers
other languages, we will here only make an abridgement or brief
rehearsal thereof.
"Portugall furnished and set foorth under the conduct of the Duke of
Medina Sidonia, generall of the fleete, 10 galeons, 2 zabraes, 1300
mariners, 3300 souldiers, 300 great pieces, with all requisite
furniture.
"Biscay, under the conduct of John Martines de Ricalde, admiral of the
whole fleete, set forth 10 galeons, 4 pataches, 700 mariners, 2000
souldiers, 250 great pieces, etc.
"Guipusco, under the conduct of Michael de Oquendo, 10 galeons, 4
pataches, 700 mariners, 2000 souldiers, 310 great pieces.
"Italy, with the Levant islands, under Maitine de Vertendona, 10
galeons, 800 mariners, 2000 souldiers, 310 great pieces, etc.
"Castile, under Diego Flores de Valdez, 14 galeons, 2 pataches, 1700
mariners, 2400 souldiers, and 380 great pieces, etc.
"Andaluzia, under the conduct of Petro de Valdez, 10 galeons, 1 patache,
800 mariners, 2400 souldiers, 280 great pieces, etc.
"Item, under the conduct of John Lopez de Medina, 23 great Flemish
hulkes, with 700 mariners, 3200 souldiers, and 400 great pieces.
"Item, under Hugo de Moncada, 4 galliasses, containing 1200
gally-slaves, 460 mariners, 870 souldiers, 200 great pieces, etc.
"Item, under Diego de Mandrana, 4 gallies of Portugall, with 888
gally-slaves, 360 mariners, 20 great pieces, and other requisite
furniture.
"Item, under Anthonie de Mendoza, 22 pataches and zabraes, with 574
mariners, 488 souldiers, and 193 great pieces.
"Besides the ships aforementioned, there were 20 caravels rowed with
oares, being appointed to performe necessary services under the greater
ships, insomuch that all the ships appertayning to this navie amounted
unto the summe of 150, eche one being sufficiently provided of furniture
and victuals.
"The number of mariners in the saide fleete were above 8000, of slaves
2088, of souldiers 20,000--besides noblemen and gentlemen voluntaries;
of great cast pieces, 2600. The aforesaid ships were of an huge and
incredible capacitie and receipt, for the whole fleete was large enough
to containe the burthen of 60,000 tunnes.
"The galeons were 64 in number, being of an huge bignesse, and very
flately built, being of marveilous force also, and so high that they
resembled great castles, most fit to defend themselves and to withstand
any assault, but in giving any other ships the encounter fair inferiour
unto the English and Dutch ships, which can with great dexteritie wield
and turne themselves at all assayes. The upper worke of the said galeons
was of thicknesse and strength sufficient to beare off musket-shot. The
lower worke and the timbers thereof were out of measure strong, being
framed of plankes and ribs foure or five foote in thicknesse, insomuch
that no bullets could pierce them but such as were discharged hard at
hand, which afterward prooved true, for a great number of bullets were
founde to sticke fast within the massie substance of those thicke
plankes. Great and well-pitched cables were twined about the masts of
their shippes, to strengthen them against the battery of shot.
"The galliasses were of such bignesse that they contained within them
chambers, chapels, turrets, pulpits, and other commodities of great
houses. The galliasses were rowed with great oares, there being in eche
one of them 300 slaves for the same purpose, and were able to do great
service with the force of their ordinance. All these, together with the
residue aforenamed, were furnished and beautified with trumpets,
streamers, banners, warlike ensignes, and other such like ornaments.
"Their pieces of brazen ordinance were 1600, and of yron a 1000.
"The bullets thereto belonging were 120,000.
"Item of gun-poulder, 5600 quintals; of matche, 1200 quintals; of
muskets and kaleivers, 7000; of haleberts and partisans, 10,000.
"Moreover, they had great stores of canons, double-canons, culverings
and field-pieces for land services.
"Likewise they were provided of all instruments necessary on land to
conveigh and transport their furniture from place to place, as namely of
carts, wheeles, wagons, etc. Also they had spades, mattocks, and baskets
to set pioners on worke. They had in like sort great store of mules and
horses, and whatsoever else was requisite for a land armie. They were so
well stored of biscuit, that for the space of halfe a yeere they might
allow eche person in the whole fleete halfe a quintall every moneth,
whereof the whole summe amounteth unto an hundreth thousand quintals.
"Likewise of wine they had 147,000 pipes, sufficient also for halfe a
yeere's expedition. Of bacon, 6500 quintals. Of cheese, 3000 quintals.
Besides fish, rise, beanes, pease, oile, vinegar, etc.
"Moreover, they had 12,000 pipes of fresh water, and all other necessary
provision, as namely candles, lanternes, lampes, sailes, hempe, oxe-hides,
and lead to stop holes that should be made with the battery of gunshot.
To be short, they brought all things expedient, either for a fleete by
sea, or for an armie by land.
"This navie--as Diego Pimentelli afterward confessed--was esteemed by
the King himselfe to containe 32,000 persons, and to cost him every day
30,000 ducates.
"There were in the said navie five terzaes of Spaniards--which terzaes
the Frenchmen call regiments--under the command of five governours,
termed by the Spaniards masters of the field, and among the rest there
were many olde and expert souldiers chosen out of the garisons of
Sicilie, Naples, and Terçera. Their captaines or colonels were Diego
Pimentelli, Don Francisco de Toledo, Don Alonço de Luçon, Don Nicolas de
Isla, Don Augustin de Mexia, who had eche of them thirty-two companies
under their conduct. Besides the which companies, there were many bands
also of Castilians and Portugals, every one of which had their peculiar
governours, captaines, officers, colors, and weapons."
While this huge armament was making ready in the southern ports of the
Spanish dominions, the Duke of Parma, with almost incredible toil and
skill, collected a squadron of war-ships at Dunkirk, and a large
flotilla of other ships and of flat-bottomed boats for the transport to
England of the picked troops which were designed to be the main
instruments in subduing England. The design of the Spaniards was that
the armada should give them, at least for a time, the command of the
sea, and that it should join the squadron that Parma had collected off
Calais. Then, escorted by an overpowering naval force, Parma and his
army were to embark in their flotilla, and cross the sea to England,
where they were to be landed, together with the troops which the armada
brought from the ports of Spain.
The scheme was not dissimilar to one formed against England a little
more than two centuries afterward. As Napoleon, in 1805, waited with his
army and flotilla at Boulogne, looking for Villeneuve to drive away the
English cruisers and secure him a passage across the Channel, so Parma,
in 1588, waited for Medina Sidonia to drive away the Dutch and English
squadrons that watched his flotilla, and to enable his veterans to cross
the sea to the land that they were to conquer. Thanks to Providence, in
each case England's enemy waited in vain!
Although the numbers of sail which the Queen's government and the
patriotic zeal of volunteers had collected for the defence of England
exceeded the number of sail in the Spanish fleet, the English ships
were, collectively, far inferior in size to their adversaries', their
aggregate tonnage being less by half than that of the enemy. In the
number of guns and weight of metal the disproportion was still greater.
The English admiral was also obliged to subdivide his force; and Lord
Henry Seymour, with forty of the best Dutch and English ships, was
employed in blockading the hostile ports in Flanders, and in preventing
the Duke of Parma from coming out of Dunkirk.
The Invincible Armada, as the Spaniards in the pride of their hearts
named it, set sail from the Tagus on May 29th, but near Corunna met with
a tempest that drove it into port with severe loss. It was the report of
the damage done to the enemy by this storm which had caused the English
Court to suppose that there would be no invasion that year. But, as
already mentioned, the English admiral had sailed to Corunna, and
learned the real state of the case, whence he had returned with his
ships to Plymouth.
The armada sailed again from Corunna on July 12th. The orders of King
Philip to the Duke of Medina Sidonia were that he should, on entering
the Channel, keep near the French coast, and, if attacked by the English
ships, avoid an action and steer on to Calais roads, where the Prince of
Parma's squadron was to join him. The hope of surprising and destroying
the English fleet in Plymouth led the Spanish admiral to deviate from
these orders and to stand across to the English shore; but, on finding
that Lord Howard was coming out to meet him, he resumed the original
plan, and determined to bend his way steadily toward Calais and Dunkirk,
and to keep merely on the defensive against such squadrons of the
English as might come up with him.
It was on Saturday, July 20th, that Lord Effingham came in sight of his
formidable adversaries. The armada was drawn up in form of a crescent,
which from horn to horn measured some seven miles. There was a southwest
wind, and before it the vast vessels sailed slowly on. The English let
them pass by, and then, following in the rear, commenced an attack on
them. A running fight now took place, in which some of the best ships of
the Spaniards were captured; many more received heavy damage, while the
English vessels, which took care not to close with their huge antagonists,
but availed themselves of their superior celerity in tacking and
manoeuvring, suffered little comparative loss.
Each day added not only to the spirit, but to the number, of Effingham's
force. Raleigh, Oxford, Cumberland, and Sheffield joined him; and "the
gentlemen of England hired ships from all parts at their own charge, and
with one accord came flocking thither as to a set field where glory was
to be attained and faithful service performed unto their Prince and
their country."
Raleigh justly praises the English admiral for his skilful tactics:
"Certainly he that will happily perform a fight at sea must be skilful
in making choice of vessels to fight in: he must believe that there is
more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters than great daring,
and must know that there is a great deal of difference between fighting
loose or at large and grappling. The guns of a slow ship pierce as well
and make as great holes as those in a swift. To clap ships together,
without consideration, belongs rather to a madman than to a man of war;
for by such an ignorant bravery was Peter Strossie lost at the Azores
when he fought against the Marquis of Santa Cruza.
"In like sort had the Lord Charles Howard, admiral of England, been lost
in the year 1588, if he had not been better advised than a great many
malignant fools were that found fault with his demeanor. The Spaniards
had an army aboard them, and he had none; they had more ships than he
had, and of higher building and charging; so that, had he entangled
himself with those great and powerful vessels, he had greatly endangered
this kingdom of England; for twenty men upon the defences are equal to a
hundred that board and enter; whereas, then, contrariwise, the Spaniards
had a hundred for twenty of ours, to defend themselves withal. But our
admiral knew his advantage, and held it; which had he not done, he had
not been worthy to have held his head up."
The Spanish admiral also showed great judgment and firmness in following
the line of conduct that had been traced out for him; and on July 27th
he brought his fleet unbroken, though sorely distressed, to anchor in
Calais roads. But the King of Spain had calculated ill the number and
the activity of the English and Dutch fleets. As the old historian
expresses it: "It seemeth that the Duke of Parma and the Spaniards
grounded upon a vain and presumptuous expectation that all the ships of
England and of the Low Countreys would at the first sight of the Spanish
and Dunkerk navie have betaken themselves to flight, yeelding them
sea-room, and endeavoring only to defend themselues, their havens, and
sea-coasts from invasion.
"Wherefore their intent and purpose was, that the Duke of Parma, in his
small and flat-bottomed ships, should, as it were under the shadow and
wings of the Spanish fleet, convey ouer all his troupes, armor, and
war-like provisions, and with their forces so united, should invade
England; or while the English fleet were busied in fight against the
Spanish, should enter upon any part of the coast, which he thought to
be most convenient. Which invasion--as the captives afterward
confessed--the Duke of Parma thought first to have attempted by the
river of Thames; upon the bankes whereof having at the first arrivall
landed twenty or thirty thousand of his principall souldiers, he
supposed that he might easily have wonne the citie of London; both
because his small shippes should have followed and assisted his land
forces and also for that the citie it-selfe was but meanely fortified
and easie to ouercome, by reason of the citizens' delicacie and
discontinuance from the warres, who, with continuall and constant labor,
might be vanquished, if they yielded not at the first assault."[4]
[4] Hakluyt: _Voyages_.
But the English and Dutch found ships and mariners enough to keep the
armada itself in check, and at the same time to block up Parma's
flotilla. The greater part of Seymour's squadron left its cruising-ground
off Dunkirk to join the English admiral off Calais; but the Dutch manned
about five-and-thirty sail of good ships, with a strong force of soldiers
on board, all well seasoned to the sea-service, and with these they
blockaded the Flemish ports that were in Parma's power. Still it was
resolved by the Spanish admiral and the Prince to endeavor to effect a
junction, which the English seamen were equally resolute to prevent; and
bolder measures on our side now became necessary.
The armada lay off Calais, with its largest ships ranged outside, "like
strong castles fearing no assault, the lesser placed in the middle ward."
The English admiral could not attack them in their position without
great disadvantage, but on the night of the 29th he sent eight fire-ships
among them, with almost equal effect to that of the fire-ships which the
Greeks so often employed against the Turkish fleets in their war of
independence.
The Spaniards cut their cables and put to sea in confusion. One of the
largest galeases ran foul of another vessel and was stranded. The rest
of the fleet was scattered about on the Flemish coast, and when the
morning broke it was with difficulty and delay that they obeyed their
admiral's signal to range themselves round him near Gravelines. Now was
the golden opportunity for the English to assail them, and prevent them
from ever letting loose Palma's flotilla against England, and nobly was
that opportunity used.
Drake and Fenner were the first English captains who attacked the
unwieldy leviathans; then came Fenton, Southwell, Burton, Cross, Raynor,
and then the lord admiral, with Lord Thomas Howard and Lord Sheffield.
The Spaniards only thought of forming and keeping close together, and
were driven by the English past Dunkirk, and far away from the Prince of
Parma, who, in watching their defeat from the coast, must, as Drake
expressed it, have chafed like a bear robbed of her whelps. This was
indeed the last and the decisive battle between the two fleets. It is,
perhaps, best described in the very words of the contemporary writer, as
we may read them in Hakluyt:
"Upon the 29 of July in the morning, the Spanish fleet after the forsayd
tumult, having arranged themselues againe into order, were, within sight
of Greveling, most bravely and furiously encountered by the English,
where they once again got the wind of the Spaniards, who suffered
themselues to be deprived of the commodity of the place in Caleis road,
and of the advantage of the wind neer unto Dunkerk, rather than they
would change their array or separate their forces now conjoyned and
united together, standing only upon their defence.
"And albeit there were many excellent and warlike ships in the English
fleet, yet scarce were there 22 or 23 among them all, which matched 90
of the Spanish ships in the bigness, or could conveniently assault them.
Wherefore the English shippes using their prerogative of nimble
steerage, whereby they could turn and wield themselues with the wind
which way they listed, came often times very near upon the Spaniards,
and charged them so sore that now and then they were but a pike's length
asunder; and so continually giving them one broad side after another,
they discharged all their shot, both great and small, upon them,
spending one whole day, from morning till night, in that violent kind of
conflict, untill such time as powder and bullets failed them.
"In regard of which want they thought it convenient not to pursue the
Spaniards any longer, because they had many great advantages of the
English, namely, for the extraordinary bigness of their shippes, and
also for that they were so neerely conjoyned, and kept together in so
good array, that they could by no meanes be fought withall one to one.
The English thought, therefore, that they had right well acquitted
themselues in chasing the Spaniards first from Caleis, and then from
Dunkerk, and by that means to have hindered them from joyning with the
Duke of Parma his forces, and getting the wind of them, to have driven
them from their own coasts.
"The Spaniards that day sustained great loss and damage, having many of
their shippes shot thorow and thorow, and they discharged likewise great
store of ordinance against the English, who, indeed, sustained some
hinderance, but not comparable to the Spaniards' loss; for they lost not
any one ship or person of account; for very diligent inquisition being
made, the Englishmen all the time wherein the Spanish navy sayled upon
their seas, are not found to haue wanted aboue one hundred of their
people; albeit Sir Francis Drake's ship was pierced with shot aboue
forty times, and his very cabben was twice shot thorow, and about the
conclusion of the fight, the bed of a certaine gentleman lying weary
thereupon, was taken quite from under him with the force of a bullet.
"Likewise, as the Earle of Northumberland and Sir Charles Blunt were at
dinner upon a time, the bullet of a demy-culvering brake thorow the
middest of their cabben, touched their feet, and strooke downe two of
the standers-by. With many such accidents befalling the English shippes,
which it were tedious to rehearse."
It reflects little credit on the English government that the English
fleet was so deficiently supplied with ammunition as to be unable to
complete the destruction of the invaders. But enough was done to insure
it. Many of the largest Spanish ships were sunk or captured in the
action of this day. And at length the Spanish admiral, despairing of
success, fled northward with a southerly wind, in the hope of rounding
Scotland, and so returning to Spain without a further encounter with the
English fleet.
Lord Effingham left a squadron to continue the blockade of the Prince of
Parma's armament; but that wise general soon withdrew his troops to more
promising fields of action. Meanwhile the lord admiral himself, and
Drake, chased the "vincible" armada, as it was now termed, for some
distance northward; and then, when they seemed to bend away from the
Scotch coast toward Norway, it was thought best, in the words of Drake,
"to leave them to those boisterous and uncouth northern seas."
The sufferings and losses which the unhappy Spaniards sustained in their
flight round Scotland and Ireland are well known. Of their whole armada
only fifty-three shattered vessels brought back their beaten and wasted
crews to the Spanish coast, which they had quitted in such pageantry and
pride.
Some passages from the writings of those who took part in the struggle
have been already quoted, and the most spirited description of the
defeat of the armada which ever was penned may perhaps be taken from the
letter which our brave vice-admiral Drake wrote in answer to some
mendacious stories by which the Spaniards strove to hide their shame.
Thus does he describe the scenes in which he played so important a
part:[5]
"They were not ashamed to publish, in sundry languages in print, great
victories in words, which they pretended to have obtained against this
realm, and spread the same in a most false sort over all parts of
France, Italy, and elsewhere; when, shortly afterward, it was happily
manifested in very deed to all nations, how their navy, which they
termed invincible, consisting of one hundred forty sail of ships, not
only of their own kingdom, but strengthened with the greatest argosies,
Portugal carracks, Florentines, and large hulks of other countries, were
by thirty of her majesty's own ships of war, and a few of our own
merchants, by the wise, valiant, and advantageous conduct of the Lord
Charles Howard, high admiral of England, beaten and shuffled together
even from the Lizard in Cornwall, first to Portland, when they
shamefully left Don Pedro de Valdez with his mighty ship; from Portland
to Calais, where they lost Hugh de Moncado, with the galleys of which he
was captain; and from Calais, driven with squibs from their anchors,
were chased out of the sight of England, round about Scotland and
Ireland; where, for the sympathy of their religion, hoping to find
succor and assistance, a great part of them were crushed against the
rocks, and those others that landed, being very many in number, were,
notwithstanding, broken, slain, and taken, and so sent from village to
village, coupled in halters to be shipped into England, where her
majesty, of her princely and invincible disposition, disdaining to put
them to death, and scorning either to retain or to entertain them, they
were all sent back again to their countries, to witness and recount the
worthy achievements of their invincible and dreadful navy. Of which the
number of soldiers, the fearful burden of their ships, the commanders'
names of every squadron, with all others, their magazines of provision,
were put in print, as an army and navy irresistible and disdaining
prevention; with all which their great and terrible ostentation, they
did not in all their sailing round about England so much as sink or take
one ship, barque, pinnace, or cock-boat of ours, or even burn so much as
one sheep-cote on this land."