other nations of the peninsula had acquired during centuries of free
institutions and successful war against the Moors had not yet become
obliterated. Charles V had, indeed, destroyed the liberties of Spain;
but that had been done too recently for its full evil to be felt in
Philip's time. A people cannot be debased in a single generation; and
the Spaniards under Charles V and Philip II proved the truth of the
remark that no nation is ever so formidable to its neighbors, for a
time, as a nation which, after being trained up in self-government,
passes suddenly under a despotic ruler. The energy of democratic
institutions survives for a few generations, and to it are superadded
the decision and certainty which are the attributes of government when
all its powers are directed by a single mind. It is true that this
preter-natural vigor is short-lived: national corruption and debasement
gradually follow the loss of the national liberties; but there is an
interval before their workings are felt, and in that interval the most
ambitious schemes of foreign conquest are often successfully undertaken.
Philip had also the advantage of finding himself at the head of a large
standing army in a perfect state of discipline and equipment, in an age
when, except some few insignificant corps, standing armies were unknown
in Christendom. The renown of the Spanish troops was justly high, and
the infantry in particular was considered the best in the world. His
fleet, also, was far more numerous and better appointed than that of any
other European power; and both his soldiers and his sailors had the
confidence in themselves and their commanders which a long career of
successful warfare alone can create.
Besides the Spanish crown, Philip succeeded to the kingdom of Naples and
Sicily, the duchy of Milan, Franche-Comté, and the Netherlands. In
Africa he possessed Tunis, Oran, the Cape Verd and the Canary islands;
and in Asia, the Philippine and Sunda islands and a part of the
Moluccas. Beyond the Atlantic he was lord of the most splendid portions
of the New World, which Columbus found "for Castile and Leon." The
empires of Peru and Mexico, New Spain, and Chile, with their abundant
mines of the precious metals, Española and Cuba, and many other of the
American islands were provinces of the sovereign of Spain.
Whatever diminution the Spanish empire might have sustained in the
Netherlands seemed to be more than compensated by the acquisition of
Portugal, which Philip had completely conquered in 1580. Not only that
ancient kingdom itself, but all the fruits of the maritime enterprises
of the Portuguese, had fallen into Philip's hands. All the Portuguese
colonies in America, Africa, and the East Indies acknowledged the
sovereignty of the King of Spain, who thus not only united the whole
Iberian peninsula under his single sceptre, but had acquired a
transmarine empire little inferior in wealth and extent to that which he
had inherited at his accession. The splendid victory which his fleet, in
conjunction with the papal and Venetian galleys, had gained at Lepanto
over the Turks, had deservedly exalted the fame of the Spanish marine
throughout Christendom; and when Philip had reigned thirty-five years,
the vigor of his empire seemed unbroken, and the glory of the Spanish
arms had increased, and was increasing throughout the world.
One nation only had been his active, his persevering, and his successful
foe. England had encouraged his revolted subjects in Flanders against
him, and given them the aid, in men and money, without which they must
soon have been humbled in the dust. English ships had plundered his
colonies; had defied his supremacy in the New World as well as the Old;
they had inflicted ignominious defeats on his squadrons; they had
captured his cities and burned his arsenals on the very coasts of Spain.
The English had made Philip himself the object of personal insult. He
was held up to ridicule in their stage plays and masks, and these scoffs
at the man had--as is not unusual in such cases--excited the anger of
the absolute King even more vehemently than the injuries inflicted on
his power. Personal as well as political revenge urged him to attack
England. Were she once subdued, the Dutch must submit; France could not
cope with him; the empire would not oppose him; and universal dominion
seemed sure to be the result of the conquest of that malignant island.
There was yet another and a stronger feeling which armed King Philip
against England. He was one of the sincerest and one of the sternest
bigots of his age. He looked on himself, and was looked on by others, as
the appointed champion to extirpate heresy and reestablish the papal
power throughout Europe.
A powerful reaction against Protestantism had taken place since the
commencement of the second half of the sixteenth century, and he looked
on himself as destined to complete it. The Reformed doctrines had been
thoroughly rooted out from Italy and Spain. Belgium, which had
previously been half Protestant, had been reconquered both in allegiance
and creed by Philip, and had become one of the most Catholic countries
in the world. Half Germany had been won back to the old faith. In Savoy,
in Switzerland, and many other countries the progress of the
Counter-reformation had been rapid and decisive. The Catholic league
seemed victorious in France. The papal court itself had shaken off the
supineness of recent centuries, and, at the head of the Jesuits and the
other new ecclesiastical orders, was displaying a vigor and a boldness
worthy of the days of Hildebrand or Innocent III.
Throughout Continental Europe the Protestants, discomfited and dismayed,
looked to England as their protector and refuge. England was the
acknowledged central point of Protestant power and policy; and to
conquer England was to stab Protestantism to the very heart. Sixtus V,
the then reigning Pope, earnestly exhorted Philip to this enterprise.
And when the tidings reached Italy and Spain that the Protestant Queen
of England had put to death her Catholic prisoner, Mary, Queen of Scots,
the fury of the Vatican and Escurial knew no bounds. Elizabeth was
denounced as the murderous heretic whose destruction was an instant
duty.
A formal treaty was concluded in June, 1587, by which the Pope bound
himself to contribute a million of scudi to the expenses of the war, the
money to be paid as soon as the King had actual possession of an English
port. Philip, on his part, strained the resources of his vast empire to
the utmost. The French Catholic chiefs eagerly coöperated with him. In
the seaports of the Mediterranean and along almost the whole coast from
Gibraltar to Jutland the preparations for the great armament were urged
forward with all the earnestness of religious zeal as well as of angry
ambition.
"Thus," says the German historian of the Popes,[1] "thus did the united
powers of Italy and Spain, from which such mighty influences had gone
forth over the whole world, now rouse themselves for an attack upon
England! The King had already compiled, from the archives of Simancas, a
statement of the claims which he had to the throne of that country on
the extinction of the Stuart line; the most brilliant prospects,
especially that of a universal dominion of the seas, were associated in
his mind with this enterprise. Everything seemed to conspire to such an
end--the predominancy of Catholicism in Germany, the renewed attack upon
the Huguenots in France, the attempt upon Geneva, and the enterprise
against England. At the same moment a thoroughly Catholic prince,
Sigismund III, ascended the throne of Poland, with the prospect also of
future succession to the throne of Sweden. But whenever any principle or
power, be it what it may, aims at unlimited supremacy in Europe, some
vigorous resistance to it, having its origin in the deepest springs of
human nature, invariably arises. Philip II had to encounter newly
awakened powers, braced by the vigor of youth and elevated by a sense of
their future destiny.
[1] Ranke.
"The intrepid corsairs, who had rendered every sea insecure, now
clustered round the coasts of their native island. The Protestants in a
body--even the Puritans, although they had been subjected to as severe
oppression as the Catholics--rallied round their Queen, who now gave
admirable proof of her masculine courage and her princely talent of
winning the affections and leading the minds and preserving the
allegiance of men."
Ranke should have added that the English Catholics at this crisis proved
themselves as loyal to their Queen and true to their country as were the
most vehement anti-Catholic zealots in the island. Some few traitors
there were, but as a body, the Englishmen who held the ancient faith
stood the trial of their patriotism nobly. The lord admiral himself was
a Catholic, and--to adopt the words of Hallam--"then it was that the
Catholics in every country repaired to the standard of the lord
lieutenant, imploring that they might not be suspected of bartering the
national independence for their religion itself." The Spaniard found no
partisans in the country which he assailed, nor did England, self-wounded,
"Lie at the proud foot of her enemy."
For upward of a year the Spanish preparations had been actively and
unremittingly urged forward. Negotiations were, during this time,
carried on at Ostend, in which various pretexts were assigned by the
Spanish commissioners for the gathering together of such huge masses of
shipping, and such equipments of troops in all the seaports which their
master ruled; but Philip himself took little care to disguise his
intentions; nor could Elizabeth and her able ministers doubt but that
this island was the real object of the Spanish armament.
The peril that was wisely foreseen was resolutely provided for.
Circular-letters from the Queen were sent round to the lord lieutenants
of the several counties requiring them to "call together the best sort
of gentlemen under their lieutenancy, and to declare unto them these
great preparations and arrogant threatenings, now burst forth in action
upon the seas, wherein every man's particular state, in the highest
degree, could be touched in respect of country, liberty, wives,
children, lands, lives, and--which was specially to be regarded--the
profession of the true and sincere religion of Christ, and to lay before
them the infinite and unspeakable miseries that would fall out upon any
such change, which miseries were evidently seen by the fruits of that
hard and cruel government holden in countries not far distant.
"We do look," said the Queen, "that the most part of them should have,
upon this instant extraordinary occasion, a larger proportion of
furniture, both for horsemen and footmen, but especially horsemen, than
hath been certified thereby to be in their best strength against any
attempt, or to be employed about our own person or otherwise. Hereunto
as we doubt not but by your good endeavors they will be the rather
conformable, so also we assure ourselves that almighty God will so bless
these their loyal hearts borne toward us, their loving sovereign, and
their natural country, that all the attempts of any enemy whatsoever
shall be made void and frustrate, to their confusion, your comfort, and
to God's high glory."[2]
[2] Strype, cited in Southey: _Naval History_.
Letters of a similar kind were also sent by the council to each of the
nobility and to the great cities. The Primate called on the clergy for
their contributions; and by every class of the community the appeal was
responded to with liberal zeal, that offered more even than the Queen
required. The boasting threats of the Spaniards had roused the spirit of
the nation, and the whole people "were thoroughly irritated to stir up
their whole forces for their defence against such prognosticated
conquests; so that in a very short time all her whole realm, and every
corner, were furnished with armed men, on horseback and on foot; and
those continually trained, exercised, and put into bands in warlike
manner, as in no age ever was before in this realm.
"There was no sparing of money to provide horse, armor, weapons, powder,
and all necessaries; no, nor want of provision of pioneers, carriages,
and victuals, in every county of the realm, without exception, to attend
upon the armies. And to this general furniture every man voluntarily
offered, very many their services personally without wages, others money
for armor and weapons, and to wage soldiers--a matter strange, and never
the like heard of in this realm or elsewhere. And this general reason
moved all men to large contributions: that when a conquest was to be
withstood wherein all should be lost, it was no time to spare a
portion."[3]
[3] Copy of contemporary letter in the Harleian Collection, quoted
by Southey.
Our lion-hearted Queen showed herself worthy of such a people. A camp
was formed at Tilbury; and there Elizabeth rode through the ranks,
encouraging her captains and her soldiers by her presence and her words.
One of the speeches which she addressed to them during this crisis has
been preserved; and, though often quoted, it must not be omitted here.
"My loving people," she said, "we have been persuaded by some that are
careful of our safety to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed
multitudes, for fear of treachery; but I assure you I do not desire to
live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear! I have
always so behaved myself that, under God, I have placed my chiefest
strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and good-will of my subjects;
and therefore I am come among you, as you see, at this time, not for my
recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of the
battle, to live or die among you all, to lay down for my God, for my
kingdom, and for my people, my honor and my blood even in the dust.
"I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the
heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England, too, and think it
foul scorn that Parma, of Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to
invade the borders of my realm, to which, rather than any dishonor shall
grow by me, I myself will take up arms; I myself will be your general,
judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know
already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns: and
we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you.
In the mean time my lieutenant-general shall be in my stead, than whom
never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject, not doubting but
by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your
valor in the field we shall shortly have a famous victory over those
enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people."
Some of Elizabeth's advisers recommended that the whole care and
resources of the government should be devoted to the equipment of the
armies, and that the enemy, when he attempted to land, should be
welcomed with a battle on the shore. But the wiser counsels of Raleigh
and others prevailed, who urged the importance of fitting out a fleet
that should encounter the Spaniards at sea, and, if possible, prevent
them from approaching the land at all.
In Raleigh's great work, the _History of the World_, he takes occasion,
when discussing some of the events of the First Punic War, to give his
reasonings on the proper policy of England when menaced with invasion.
Without doubt we have there the substance of the advice which he gave to
Elizabeth's council; and the remarks of such a man on such a subject
have a general and enduring interest beyond the immediate crisis which
called them forth.
Raleigh says: "Surely I hold that the best way is to keep our enemies
from treading upon our ground; wherein if we fail, then must we seek to
make him wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it
should happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular circumstances
that belong not unto this discourse. But making the question general,
the positive, _Whether England, without the help of her fleet, be able
to debar an enemy from landing_, I hold that it is unable so to do, and
therefore I think it most dangerous to make the adventure; for the
encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of
being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a most perilous
consequence.
"Great difference I know there is, and a diverse consideration to be
had, between such a country as France is, strengthened with many
fortified places, and this of ours, where our ramparts are but the
bodies of men. But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to
be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice
of the invader, cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a
fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France or any other
country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in
each of them to make opposition.
"For let the supposition be granted that Kent is able to furnish twelve
thousand foot, and that those twelve thousand be layed in the three best
landing-places within that country, to wit, three thousand at Margat,
three thousand at the Nesse, and six thousand at Foulkstone, that is,
somewhat equally distant from them both, as also that two of these
troops--unless some other order be thought more fit--be directed to
strengthen the third, when they shall see the enemy's fleet to head
toward it: I say, that notwithstanding this provision, if the enemy,
setting sail from the Isle of Wight, in the first watch of the night,
and towing their long boats at their stems, shall arrive by dawn of day
at the Nesse, and thrust their army on shore there, it will be hard for
those three thousand that are at Margat--twenty-and-four long miles from
thence--to come time enough to reënforce their fellows at the Nesse.
Nay, how shall they at Foulkstone be able to do it, who are nearer by
more than half the way? seeing that the enemy, at his first arrival,
will either make his entrance by force, with three or four shot of great
artillery, and quickly put the first three thousand that are intrenched
at the Nesse to run, or else give them so much to do that they shall be
glad to send for help to Foulkstone, and perhaps to Margat, whereby
those places will be left bare.
"Now, let us suppose that all the twelve thousand Kentish soldiers
arrived at the Nesse ere the enemy can be ready to disembark his army,
so that he will find it unsafe to land in the face of so many prepared
to withstand him, yet must we believe that he will play the best of his
own game--having liberty to go which way he list--and, under covert of
the night, set sail toward the east, where what shall hinder him to take
ground either at Margat, the Downes, or elsewhere, before they at the
Nesse can be well aware of his departure?
"Certainly there is nothing more easy than to do it. Yea, the like may
be said of Weymouth, Purbeck, Poole, and of all landing-places on the
southwest; for there is no man ignorant that ships, without putting
themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that coast
them. '_Les armeés ne volent point en poste_' ('Armies neither flye
nor run post'), saith a marshal of France. And I know it to be true that
a fleet of ships may be seen at sunset, and after it at the Lizard, yet
by the next morning they may recover Portland, whereas an army of foot
shall not be able to march it in six days.
"Again, when those troops lodged on the sea-shores shall be forced to
run from place to place in vain, after a fleet of ships, they will at
length sit down in the midway and leave all at adventure. But say it
were otherwise, that the invading enemy will offer to land in some such
place where there shall be an army of ours ready to receive him; yet it
cannot be doubted but that when the choice of all our trained bands, and
the choice of our commanders and captains, shall be drawn together--as
they were at Tilbury in the year 1588--to attend the person of the
Prince, and for the defence of the city of London, they that remain to
guard the coast can be of no such force as to encounter an army like
unto that wherewith it was intended that the Prince of Parma should have
landed in England.
"For end of this digression, I hope that this question shall never come
to trial: his majesty's many movable forts will forbid the experience.
And although the English will no less disdain, than any nation under
heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own ground, or elsewhere, by a
foreign enemy, yet to entertain those that shall assail us, with their
own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons, I
take it to be the wisest way--to do which his majesty, after God, will
employ his good ships on the sea, and not trust in any intrenchment upon
the shore."
The introduction of steam as a propelling power at sea has added tenfold
weight to these arguments of Raleigh. On the other hand, a
well-constructed system of railways, especially of coast-lines, aided by
the operation of the electric telegraph, would give facilities for
concentrating a defensive army to oppose an enemy on landing, and for
moving troops from place to place in observation of the movements of the
hostile fleet, such as would have astonished Sir Walter, even more than
the sight of vessels passing rapidly to and fro without the aid of wind
or tide., The observation of the French marshal whom he quotes is now no
longer correct. Armies can be made to pass from place to place almost
with the speed of wings, and far more rapidly than any post-travelling
that was known in the Elizabethan or any other age. Still, the presence
of a sufficient armed force at the right spot, at the right time, can
never be made a matter of certainty and, even after the changes that
have taken place, no one can doubt but that the policy of Raleigh is
that which England should ever seek to follow in defensive war.
At the time of the armada, that policy certainly saved the country, if
not from conquest, at least from deplorable calamities. If, indeed, the
enemy had landed, we may be sure that he would have been heroically
opposed. But history shows us so many examples of the superiority of
veteran troops over new levies, however numerous and brave, that,
without disparaging our countrymen's soldierly merits, we may well be
thankful that no trial of them was then made on English land. Especially
must we feel this when we contrast the high military genius of the
Prince of Parma, who would have headed the Spaniards, with the
imbecility of the Earl of Leicester, to whom the deplorable spirit of
favoritism, which formed the great blemish on Elizabeth's character, had
then committed the chief command of the English armies.
The ships of the royal navy at this time amounted to no more than
thirty-six; but the most serviceable merchant vessels were collected
from all the ports of the country; and the citizens of London, Bristol,
and the other great seats of commerce showed as liberal a zeal in
equipping and manning vessels as the nobility and gentry displayed in
mustering forces by land. The seafaring population of the coast, of
every rank and station, was animated by the same ready spirit; and the
whole number of seamen who came forward to man the English fleet was
17,472; the number of the ships that were collected was 191; and the
total amount of their tonnage, 31,985. There was one ship in the
fleet--the Triumph--of 1100 tons, one of 1000, one of 900, two of 800
each, three of 600, five of 500, five of 400, six of 300, six of 250,
twenty of 200, and the residue of inferior burden.
Application was made to the Dutch for assistance; and, as Stowe
expresses it: "The Hollanders came roundly in with three-score sail,
brave ships of war, fierce and full of spleen, not so much for England's
aid as in just occasion for their own defence, these men foreseeing the
greatness of the danger that might ensue if the Spaniard should chance
to win the day and get the mastery over them; in due regard whereof,
their manly courage was inferior to none."