It has probably occurred to the reflecting student of logic, that the
philosophers of the schools must have been sorely straitened in seeking
for a definition of man, before they would have had recourse to such a
derogation from his apparently higher attributes, as to define him by
"_animal risibile_," or "_animal bipes implumis_." An attentive
consideration will, however, show the enquirer, that to distinguish man
from the remainder of the animal kingdom by his structural
characteristics alone, is not so easy a task as would at first sight
appear; and he will be obliged at length to return to some such
humiliating designation of the _genus animal_, _species homo_, as those
above given. Physical differences, indeed, there are between man and the
other tribes of mammalia; but these differences are more matters of
anatomical detail, than such salient notable exponents as would at once
be recognised and admitted by the sceptical objector. The strength,
moreover, of these differences resides in the whole collectively, and
not in any one taken singly. If, however, the student take as his
grounds for induction the habits of the species, instead of its
structure, he will find a much broader line of demarcation. Wherever he
examines the existing relations or former records of his race, and
compares them with those of other animals, he will find that the
instincts of the one are variable and progressive, those of the other
are definite and stationary. As far as has ever been ascertained by the
most accurate observer, the nest of the grossbeak, the dam of the
beaver, the cone of the termites, were, ages ago, each similar in
character, and equal in perfection, to those of the present day; while,
whether we compare the rude wigwam of the uncivilized savage, or the
more finished architecture of ancient Thebes, with the buildings,
railroads, and shipping of the present day, we still find a continual
variation, and a progressive adaptation to new wants. The psychological
characteristics stand out then in fuller relief than the physiological;
but yet the former are by no means free from grounds for cavil. Domestic
animals acquire new habits, varying from their natural instincts.
Admitting these to result from the teaching of man, it still shows--as
does, indeed, the fact of domestication--a capability of progression;
and some feeble instances of the faculty of learning may be detected
even in the wild tribes of animals. Thus every thing becomes, if
hypercritically examined, a question of degree, "_demo unum, demo etiam
unum_," and the hundred years become an hour; nought is every thing, and
every thing is nought. Rational investigation, then, should lead us to
reject, or at least to set no undue value upon, extreme instances, or
the merging shadows of boundaries; the spectrum consists of separate
colours, though we may not tell where the red ends and the yellow
begins.
The fair questions in examining the physiology and psychology of man,
with a view to his place in the creation, are, 1st, Whether his
distinctive marks and attributes, taken collectively, are such as
broadly separate him from the rest of the animal kingdom; 2dly,
Supposing such distinctions to exist now, whether they have existed at
all periods of which we can acquire any evidence; and, 3dly, Whether
these distinctions are common to the whole of the race to which the term
_man_ is applied, or whether different tribes of men differ _inter se_
as much as the species viewed collectively differs from other species.
These, with other minor questions which arise out of them, are, as far
as we can gather, the propositions discussed in the work before us--a
work abounding in elaborate research and erudition, but somewhat
deficient in logical precision or lucid arrangement; a mass of details
is given, but the links whereby the generalizations from these are
sought to be established, are here and there wanting, and here and there
obscure. It is probably the fault of the subject, which is in its
character inexact; but we certainly expected that more had been done;
and from some passages in the early portions of the work, we were
induced to believe that the author had succeeded in proving races of
mankind to be more distinctly deducible from their sources, and that
their physical and moral relations were more definitely traced. The
following passage, in which the object of the work is enounced by the
author, is wanting in precision and perspicuity:--
"That great differences in external conditions, by the double
influence of their physical and moral agency, should have effected,
during a long series of ages, remarkable changes in the tribes of
human beings subjected to their operation--changes which have
rendered these several tribes fitted in a peculiar manner for their
respective abodes--is by no means an improbable conjecture; and it
becomes something more than a conjecture, when we extend our view
to the diversified breeds of those animals which men have
domesticated, and have transferred with themselves from one climate
to another. Considered in this point of view, it acquires, perhaps,
the character of a legitimate theory, supported by adequate
evidence, and by an extensive series of analogous facts.
"But we must not omit to observe, that to this opinion there is an
alternative, and one which many persons prefer to maintain; namely,
that the collective body of mankind is made up of different races,
which have differed from each other in their physical and moral
nature from the beginning of their existence. To determine which of
these two opinions is the best entitled to assent, or at least to
set before my readers a clear and distinct notion of the evidence
that can be brought to bear upon the question, will be my principal
object in the following work."
Now, as they are here stated, the two opinions are not necessarily
contradictory; differences in external condition may effect remarkable
changes in tribes of human beings, and yet the collective body may be
made up of different races: and to set before the reader a clear and
distinct notion, is to prove nothing, although indeed, as we shall see
in the sequel, the author has a very strong conviction, and believes
that he succeeds in proving, as far as a matter incapable of
mathematical demonstration can be proved, the negative of the latter
proposition. What the author seems to intend, or rather what the whole
tenor of his book imports, though his expressions at times go much
further, is, not that community of origin is proved inductively by the
researches which have been made into the existing and past state of man,
but that the natural history of man presents nothing inconsistent with
such a view.
The researches of Cuvier and others have negatived the theory of
Lamarcke as to the transmutation of species. The "_nisus formativus_" is
admitted, but admitted with limits, "_quos ultra citraque nequit
consistere rectum_".
The extreme rarity of hybrids, their inability of continuous
procreation, the absence of any well-authenticated cases of a permanent
species formed by the union of two distinct ones, the return to the
original type when the disturbing causes are removed, with various other
arguments tending the same way, have been considered, by the most
competent and impartial judges, as conclusive evidence of the real and
permanent existence in nature of distinct species. These arguments are
stated in detail in the second volume of Lyell's _Principles of
Geology_, to which we refer those of our readers who wish for further
information.
Having briefly stated these and similar arguments, Dr Prichard expresses
his conclusion as follows:--
"It seems to be the well-established result of enquiries into the
various tribes of organized beings, that the perpetuation of
hybrids, whether of plants or animals, so as to produce new and
intermediate tribes, is impossible.
"Now, unless all these observations are erroneous, or capable of
some explanation that has not yet been pointed out, they lead, with
the strongest force of analogical reasoning, to the conclusion,
that a number of different tribes, such as the various races of
men, must either be incapable of intermixing their stock, and thus
always fated to remain separate from each other; or, if the
contrary should be the fact, that all the races to whom the remark
applies, are proved by it to belong to the same species.
"I believe it may be asserted, without the least chance of
contradiction, that mankind, of all races and varieties, are
equally capable of propagating their offspring by intermarriages,
and that such connexions are equally prolific, whether contracted
between individuals of the same or of the most dissimilar
varieties. If there is any difference, it is probably in favour of
the latter."
This conclusion is repeated a little further on.
"It appears to be unquestionable that intermediate races of men
exist and are propagated, and that no impediment whatever exists to
the perpetuation of mankind when the most dissimilar varieties are
blended together. We hence derive a conclusive proof--unless there
be, in the instance of human races, an exception to the universally
prevalent law of organized nature--that all the tribes of men are
of one family.
"Perhaps the solution of the problem which we have undertaken to
discuss might be left on this issue, or considered as obtained by
this argument. But further light may be thrown on the subject, by a
careful analysis of the facts which can be collected relative to
the nature and origination of varieties; and it may be satisfactory
to my readers to survey this field of enquiry."
Granting, then, the truth of the limitation of species to be
established, and taking as the definition of species the power of
continual propagation, we have it proved at the commencement of the
work, that "all human races are of one species;" the only question which
remains is, whether, admitting them to be of one species, the deduction
that they have a common origin is necessary; or, if not necessary,
whether it is proved in the course of the author's work. It does not
appear to us a _necessary_ conclusion; for there appears no reason _a
priori_ why the Creator should not as well form separately an indefinite
number of creatures of the same species as a single pair. This point is
not adverted to in the work before us; and whenever identity of origin
is assumed, it is upon the same grounds from which identity of species
is deduced. In fact, they are generally coupled; thus, at page 487, we
have the expression--
"If now it should appear, on enquiry, that one common mind, or
psychical nature, belongs to the whole human family, a very strong
argument would thence arise, on the ground of analogy, for their
community of species and origin."