CHAPTER II

THE RENAISSANCE[1] (1453–1690)

=The General Character of the Renaissance.= The causes that led to the

decline of the society of the Middle Ages were of course the same that

ushered in the period of the Renaissance,――the first, the longest, and

the most hopeful period of modern times. The general characterization

of this period may be expressed in a single phrase,――_a New Man in a

New Universe_. This, however, needs explanation.

(a) The _New Man_ of the Renaissance was distinctly a man with a

country. The fusion of the German and Roman peoples in the Dark Ages

before Charlemagne (800) was now completed. The fusion did not result

in a ♦homogeneous whole, but in groups which formed the nations of

Europe. The time when this grouping was practically finished is a

difficult problem, into which we will not inquire. In a real sense it

never was nor will be ended. We know that the nations began to form

about the year 1000, and when we examine the history of the Renaissance

we find Italians, Germans, French, Dutch, and English with distinctive

national characteristics. We find the Renaissance first centralized

among the Italians and Germans, and then later among the English, the

people of the Low Countries, and the French. The Italian is a new Roman

and the German a new Teuton. The undefined nationalities of the Middle

Ages now become clear-cut. Philosophy also becomes now more or less of

a national concern.

(b) A _New Universe_ is now opened to the “New Man” of the Renaissance.

Not only in mental equipment, but in scope for his activity, does

the European of the Renaissance differ from the mediæval man. The

world is actually a new world――new in its geographical outlines and

its astronomical relations; new in its intellectual stores from the

past. The physical world that supported his body and the intellectual

world that refreshed his mind were newly discovered by the man of the

Renaissance. We must examine these two new worlds more in detail.

1. The physical universe had undergone a wonderful transformation

for man. Our nineteenth century has often been looked upon as a

period of extraordinary discoveries; but no discoveries have ever

so revolutionized the human mind as those enumerated above as “the

external causes of the fall of the society of the Middle Ages.” Think

how new that old world must have seemed to the common people who

had supposed it to be flat, as well as to the scientists who had

hypothetically supposed it to be solid――how new it must have seemed

when they found that it had been actually circumnavigated! How the

horizon of men’s minds must have widened when new continents were

discovered by sailors and new celestial worlds were found by the

telescope of the astronomers! Discovery led to experiment, and the

whole new physical world was transformed by the new physical science of

Galileo into a mechanical order. It was a wonderful new material world

that was discovered and scientifically reorganized at the beginning

of the Renaissance. Whereas the common man in mediæval time had found

little joy in living, the common man now looked upon the world as a

magnificent opportunity. Whereas the mediæval man had turned from the

disorders of this wicked world to contemplation of the blessedness of

heaven, the man of the Renaissance came forth from the cloister and

engaged in trade and adventure. The earth and the things therein had

suddenly become objects of emotional interest.

2. Not only was a new geographical and physical world discovered at

this time, but also the intellectual world of antiquity was restored.

For more than a thousand years in western Europe the literature of

the Greeks and Romans had been a thing of shreds and patches, and even

then read only in Latin translations. Now the European had come into

possession of a large part of it and was reading it in the original. He

was aroused to the wonderful intellectual life of the Age of Pericles.

The interest in ancient literature, which had been started by Dante,

Petrarch, and Boccaccio in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,

became an absorbing and controlling force at this time. The real

interest began with the stimulus received by the coming of the Greek

scholars to Italy from the East: first the ecclesiastical embassy

in 1438, and afterward in 1453 the large number of refugees from

Constantinople at the time of its capture by the Turks. Upon these

refugees the patronage of the great Italian nobles――chiefly perhaps

in Florence――was lavishly bestowed. The Platonic Academy was founded.

Learned expounders of the new learning arose,――Pletho, the two Picos,

Fincinus, Reuchlin. Of all the philosophies of antiquity Platonism

was favored, and it was interpreted in a mystical manner. Aristotle

and Christianity were looked upon as mere interpretations of Plato.

Nevertheless the Renaissance scholars were interested in all the new

literary material from the East. They studied the Jewish Cabala and

its mystic numbers. They revived Skepticism, Eclecticism, Stoicism, and

Epicureanism. Aristotle was represented by two antagonistic schools;

and Taurellus opposed both and appealed to the scholarly world to

return to Christianity.

=The Significance of the Renaissance in History.= We have above

characterized the Renaissance as a time in which a “new man” found

himself living in a “new universe.” But the old world of mediæval

science, culture, and conventional manners had by no means been

entirely outgrown and discarded. Periods of history do not “leave their

low-vaulted past” as easily as a man may throw away his coat. Mediæval

science and theology still remained, not only as a background but

also as an aggressive social factor everywhere. Mediæval scholasticism

was something with which the Renaissance had always to reckon.

Scholasticism modified, frequently restricted, and even directed

the thought of the Renaissance. Consequently when we form our final

estimate of the place of the Renaissance in the modern movement, we

must not overlook the conservative force of the mediæval institutions

existing during the period. The “new man” lived in a “new universe”;

and _his problem was how to explain the relation of that “new

universe” to himself so that his explanation would not antagonize

the time-honored traditions of the church_. This was the constructive

problem that gave the Renaissance its place in history.

The first impression, however, of the Renaissance upon the reader is

that it stands for no constructive problem whatever. The changes that

usher in the Renaissance seem to speak of an epoch that is entirely

negative, destructive, and revolutionary. The period seems from one

side to be a declaration against time-honored traditions. The “new man”

had risen superior to dogma and to Aristotle. Intellectual fermentation

had set in, and never had so many attempts at innovation been so

strenuously sought. The love for novelty filled the human mind, and the

imagination ran riot. The movement toward modern individualism appeared

in the decentralization that at this time was everywhere taking place.

Latin, for example, ceased to be the one language for educated men,

and the modern languages came into use. Rome ceased to be the only

religious centre, and Wittenberg, London, and Geneva became centres.

There was no longer one church, but many sects. Scientific centres

became numerous. Many of the universities had arisen independently,

and now Oxford, Vienna, Heidelberg, Prague, and numerous universities

in Italy and Germany afforded opportunities for study equal to those

of Paris. To the man who looks upon the Classic Period of Scholasticism

in the Middle Ages as the golden age of united faith,――to that man the

Renaissance will appear only as the beginning of the disintegration and

revolution that he sees in modern times.

Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE

IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

(Note that Rome, Wittenberg, London, and Geneva are the

religious centres; that Paris, Oxford, Heidelberg, and Prague

are the educational centres; and that Europe is divided into

many nations)

But a deeper insight into the Renaissance shows that its revolutionary,

negative, and spectacular aspect is not its whole significance. No

doubt a strong, universal, and well-centralized government and a unity

of faith are social ideals. The reverence in which the name of Rome

was held long after the empire had been destroyed, and the reluctance

with which the first Protestants separated themselves from the Catholic

church, show that the loss of such a unity is a real loss. But the

church of the Middle Ages was not the carrier of all the treasure

of the past, nor could the church with its own inherent limitations

stand as representative of modern times. The new problem which the

Renaissance faced might be destructive of much of the traditional

past, but it contained many new elements. The “new man” found himself

in a “new universe.” He was obliged to undertake the solution of a

far deeper problem than antiquity had ever attempted. He must orient

himself in a larger world than the past had ever imagined. He must do

this in the very presence of mediæval institutions, which had not lost

their spiritual nor their temporal power. The constructive problem

before the man of the Renaissance was therefore an exceedingly complex

one. How should he explain his relation to the “new universe” in a

way that would not antagonize tradition? It was a new problem, a real

problem in which the traditional factor was always persistently present.

There were two _motifs_ which give to the problem of the Renaissance

its constructive character. These were _naturalism_ and _subjectivism_.

_In the first place, the Renaissance is the period when the naturalism

of the Greeks was recovered._ By naturalism is meant the love for

earthly life. Of this the mediæval church and the mediæval time had

little or nothing. The church had been born out of the revulsion from

the earthly, and it rose on the aspiration for the supernatural. The

Renaissance was, on the contrary, born out of a passionate joy in

nature, which joy was intensified by the unexpected possession of the

literature of the past and by the discovery of new lands beyond the

seas. Man felt now the happiness and dignity of earthly living and

the worth of the body as well as the soul. _In the next place, the

Renaissance is marked by the rise of subjectivism._ At the beginning of

our book we have already given the meaning of subjectivism (see vol. i,

p. 2), and we have characterized modern civilization as subjective

in distinction from the ancient as objective and the Middle Ages as

traditional. We have also found, as we have gone on, the beginnings

of subjectivism in the Sophists, Stoics, and Christians. But in the

Renaissance for the first time does the individual as a rational self

gain the central position. This is subjectivism: the individual is

not only the interpreter of the universe, but also its mental creator.

Of the subjective _motif_ in modern times the Renaissance marks the

inauguration, and German Idealism the culmination. While the world of

the ancients was cosmo-centric and the mediæval world was theo-centric,

the world of the modern man is ego-centric. The love of life, and

the love of life because the individual feels his own capacity for

life――this is the situation presented to the man of the Renaissance.

Thus in the restoration of naturalism and in the construction of

subjectivism did the Renaissance stand for positive upbuilding, in

spite of the fact that in all this the period was constrained by the

powerful tradition of the church.

=The Two Periods of the Renaissance: The Humanistic= (1453–1600);

=The Natural Science= (1600–1690). The Renaissance is divided into two

periods at the year 1600. The reason for taking this date as a division

line will soon appear. The period before 1600 we call the Humanistic,

or the period of the Humanities; the period after this date the Natural

Science Period.

(a) The Similarities of the Two Periods. These two periods are alike

in having the same motives. Both feel the same urgent need (1) for

new knowledge, (2) for a new standard by which to measure their

new knowledge, (3) for a new method of gaining knowledge. From the

beginning to the end of the Renaissance the “new man” was feeling

his way about, was trying to orient and readjust himself in his “new

universe.” He was seeking new acquisitions to his rich stores of

knowledge, to systematize his knowledge by some correct method, and

to set up some standard by which his knowledge might be tested.

(b) The Differences of the Two Periods. There are, however, some marked

differences in the carrying out of these motives by each period, and to

these we must give our attention.

(1) _The Countries which participate in the Renaissance differ in the

Two Periods_. In the Humanistic Period Italy and Germany were chiefly

concerned. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, these

countries had been engaged in commerce with the Orient, had become

prosperous and more or less acquainted with the culture of the Orient.

In the second place, Italy had been the refuge of the Greek scholars;

when the colony of Greek refugees in Florence had died out in 1520,

northerners like Erasmus, Agricola, Reuchlin, the Stephani, and Budæus

had luckily already made themselves masters of the Greek language and

literature, and had carried their learning into Germany.

In the Natural Science Period the Renaissance had practically become

dead both in Germany and in Italy. The reason for this is not far to

seek. In Italy, in 1563, the Council of Trent had fixed the dogma of

the church and had made it impossible for the church to assimilate

anything more from antiquity. The so-called Counter-Reformation set

in, and Italy became dumb under the persecutions of the Inquisition.

Furthermore, the discovery of the sea-route to the East had turned

commerce away from Italy. When we look to Germany, we find a similar

situation. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) had devastated the land

and had made intellectual life wholly impossible.

On the other hand, England, France, and the Low Countries represent

the Natural Science Period in the Renaissance. By the War of Liberation

(1568–1648) Holland became the European country where the greatest

freedom of thought was granted, and it proved itself an asylum for

thinkers and scholars. France, through the influence of the University

of Paris, was the centre of mathematical research. In England the

brilliant Elizabethan era had already begun.

(2) _The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two Periods._ The

Humanistic Period has been well characterized as the time of “the

struggle of traditions.” Naturally enough, with the revival of Greek

learning the thinkers of the first period of the Renaissance would

try to solve the new problems by the standards which they found in

antiquity. What did Aristotle, Plato, the Epicureans say in matters of

science? What standards did they yield for solving the new problems of

the “new universe”? The traditions of antiquity were therefore revived;

and the contention was, Which should be taken as a standard? Among

all the ancient systems neo-Platonism became the most prominent. It

dominated the Humanistic Period because its æsthetic character and its

mystical explanations appealed to the susceptible mind of that time.

Nevertheless, the sway of neo-Platonism was not absolute. The “struggle

of traditions” continued throughout the period, as appears in the

schisms of the church and in the literary and philosophical contentions.

The Natural Science Period, in its hope of finding a standard to

explain the problems of the “new universe,” discovered a new standard

within the “new universe” itself. No tradition of antiquity had proved

itself adequate to the situation. Nothing could be found in Plato

and Aristotle to give a theoretic standard for the new discoveries

and inventions. Nature disclosed its own standard within itself. The

Natural Science Period said _nature facts must be explained by nature

facts_. But the question will naturally be asked, Why did the thinkers

of this period, when the theories of antiquity were found to be

inadequate, turn to nature rather than elsewhere for an explanation

of nature? The answer to this is found in the great successes of the

physical astronomers, who had started their investigations at the

beginning of the Humanistic Period, and had reached the zenith of their

glory at the beginning of the Natural Science Period. The discoveries

of Galileo were especially important.

(3) _The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were Different._ The

method usually employed in the Humanistic Period was magic. This first

period tried to explain nature facts of the “new universe” by referring

them to agencies in the spiritual world. In their neo-Platonic

nature-worship the scholars of this period imagined that the control

of nature was to be obtained by a fanciful linking of the parts of

nature to the spirits supposed to be in nature. The Bible is the

product of the spiritual world, so why is not the “new nature-world”

inspired from the same source? God is the first cause of all things;

He is in all things and each finite thing mirrors Him. All things have

souls. To gain control over nature, some all-controlling formula must

be found which will reveal the secret of the control of spirits over

nature; and to master the spirits that control nature is to control

nature herself. Hence arose, as the methods of this first period, magic,

trance-mediumship, necromancy, alchemy, conjurations, and astrology.

Antiquity could offer (and especially is this true of Platonism) only

spiritual causes for nature facts,――hence the search in this time for

the philosopher’s stone. There was never a blinder groping after a

method.

The scientific method used in the Natural Science Period was the

mathematical. The world of experience was found to coincide with the

number system, and therefore mathematics was used as the symbol to

determine the form of nature events. Induction and deduction were used

in different combinations. The period has been characterized as the

time of “the strife of methods.” Induction and deduction became in fact

the new methods of finding the truth about the “new world.” Whatever is

clear and distinct, like the axioms, must be taken as true. All other

knowledge must be deduced from these axiomatic certainties. In contrast

with the magical methods of the Humanistic Period, which point beyond

nature for an explanation of nature, here in the Natural Science Period

mathematics need not lead the explanation farther than nature herself.

(4) _The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs in the Two

Periods._ In the Humanistic Period the attitude of the church toward

the new learning was not yet defined. This was because the bearing

of the new learning upon dogma was not yet understood. On the one

hand, on matters upon which the church had clearly declared itself,

it was easily seen what could and what could not be believed. But,

on the other hand, the significance of much of the wealth of the

newly acquired learning could not at first be fully determined. The

enthusiasm for science was so widespread, and the new discoveries were

so many, that the church was unable to know what was consistent with

dogma and what was not. At the outset the church was inclined to treat

the new science with contemptuous toleration. Nevertheless, in spite of

the new intellectual intoxication there was no real freedom of thought.

The position of science was merely precarious, uncertain, and undefined.

In the Natural Science Period this uncertainty was dispelled because

dogma came into violent conflict with science. It was soon found

that questions in physics involved metaphysics, and that the new

science touched the church doctrines at every point. In 1563 the

church authorities at the Council of Trent settled dogma for all time.

Great conflicts arose between the church and the secularizing spirit.

The scientist became wary. He tried to avoid any intrusion upon the

field of theology, and he insisted that his own field existed quite

independent of theological dogma. But practically it was impossible

for science not to take heretical positions, and this was especially

true of the Rationalistic School, which tried to construct a new

scholasticism. Safe independence of thought was not gained until the

next period (the Enlightenment), and this was brought to pass by

political changes.

=A Brief Contrast of the Two Periods――A Summary of the Discussion

above.=

_The Humanistic Period._

(1) The Time――1453–1600.

(2) The Countries Concerned――Italy and Germany.

(3) The Intellectual Standards――Neo-Platonism and other theories

of antiquity.

(4) The Method――magic.

(5) The Relation of Science to the Church――precarious and

uncertain.

_The Natural Science Period._

(1) The Time――1600–1690.

(2) The Countries Concerned――England, France, and the Low

Countries.

(3) The Intellectual Standard――the mechanism of nature facts.

(4) The Method――induction and mathematical deduction in various

combinations.

(5) The Relation of Science to the Church――so definitely stated

as to be placed in conflict with dogma.

A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy · 第 2 / 13 章